Aims and Scope

All Azimuth, journal of the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, is an English-language, international peer-reviewed journal, published biannually. It aims:

- to provide a forum for academic studies on foreign policy analysis, peace and development research,
- to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements in the dialogue between the “center” and the “periphery”;
- to encourage publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches.
- to transcend conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries,
- to highlight works of senior and promising young scholars,
- to uphold international standards and principles of academic publishing.

Published two issues per year. Articles are subject to review by anonymous referees. Submissions should be made in English by e-mail and should conform to the instructions on the inside back cover and the journal’s website.

This journal is indexed and abstracted by:

CIAO, EBSCO, Emerging Sources Citation Index, European Sources Online, Gale, JournalSeek, Left Index, Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies, One Belt One Road, Political Science Complete, ProQuest, Scopus, ULAKBİM, Ulrich’s, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

Published two issues per year. Articles are subject to review by anonymous referees. Submissions should be made in English by e-mail and should conform to the instructions on the inside back cover and the journal’s website.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Vol. 7 No. 2 July 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In This Issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARTICLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Challenge of the South China Sea: Congressional Engagement and the U.S. Policy Response</td>
<td>James M. Scott</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unpacking the Post-Soviet: Political Legacy of the Tartu Semiotic School</td>
<td>Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conceptual Cultivation and Homegrown Theorizing: The Case of/for the Concept of Influence</td>
<td>Eyüp Ersoy</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would 100 Global Workshops on Theory Building Make A Difference?</td>
<td>Knud Erik Jørgensen</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reshaping International Relations: Theoretical Innovations from Africa</td>
<td>Karen Smith</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMENTARY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is Terrorism Becoming an Effective Strategy to Achieve Political Aims?</td>
<td>Nihat Ali Özcan</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REVIEW ARTICLE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roundtable Discussion on Homegrown Theorizing</td>
<td></td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abstracts in Turkish</td>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In This Issue

This issue of *All Azimuth* opens with Scott’s analysis of the role of the United States (U.S.) Congress in maritime territorial disputes in Asia. He argues that these disputes have the potential to not only disrupt relations among the states of the region, but also to carry significant implications for the relations between the U.S. and the region (including China). He argues that the U.S. approach to the issue has been influenced by American Congress. His analysis reveals that members of Congress moved from indirect and non-legislative approaches to direct and legislative approaches in order to limit and shape the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The article concludes by addressing the implications of the U.S. approach and the relationships among the key parties.

In the second article, Makarychev and Yatsyk unpack the concept of ‘post-Soviet’ by focusing on the political legacy of the Tartu Semiotic School. The article offers a general approach in which cultural semiotics is used as a cognitive tool for analyzing international relations in general, and post-Soviet international relations in particular. Specifically looking for projections of cultural semiotic concepts in the vocabulary of foreign policy, they problematize the post-Soviet concept with its conflictual split between reproducing archaic policies and discourses, and playing by the rules of post-modern society with entertainment, hybridity and the spirit of deconstruction as its pivots.

In the third article, Ersoy engages in a concept-development endeavor by focusing on the concept of influence. He argues that most of the studies that engage in homegrown theorizing have an analytical proclivity to forge an exclusive and immutable semantic affiliation between concepts and what they signify. Pointing to the degenerative shortcomings of the insular practice of transmuting conceptual indigeneity into conceptual idiosyncrasy, he offers an alternative. He takes influence, a widely used, but under-theorized word in international relations, and by imparting indigenous properties, subjects it to a systematic conceptual cultivation, which arguably transcends the prohibitive semantic inflexibility and conceptual exclusivity that mires homegrown theorizing.

In the next article, Jørgensen looks at the problem of indigenous theorizing from an institutional perspective and asks whether 100 global workshops on theory building would make a difference. Relying on an analogy about Hollywood vs. Bollywood, he argues that theory building for a number of domestic or regional markets might impact ‘consumption’ patterns in domestic or regional markets, but not necessarily in the world market. He also questions the assumption that International Relations (IR) discipline is still under American hegemony, and argues that while American hegemony remains a fact in institutional terms, it is not so in terms of theoretical fads and debates in the rest of the world. Lastly, he suggests that the efforts to create a more theoretically diverse IR would benefit from a focus on contemporary and future issues, and that such efforts should contribute to redefine the (contested) core of the discipline.

In the final research article of this issue, Smith argues that theoretical contributions from the global South – and in this case, Africa – do not need to be radically different from existing theories in order to constitute an advancement in terms of engendering a better understanding of international relations. While adaptations and conceptual innovations by western scholars are recognized as legitimate and adopted into the canon of theory, she argues that this is not always the case with similar contributions emerging from outside of the West. She then
examines three contributions by African scholars on the concepts of ‘middle power’, ‘isolated state’ and Ubuntu. These contributions illustrate that theoretical innovations emerging from the Global South can assist us in better understanding international relations in general.

This issue’s commentary comes from Özcan, a veteran terrorism expert, who discusses whether terrorism is becoming an effective strategy to achieve political aims. After differentiating terrorism from other forms of violence, he suggests that terrorism uniquely relies on shock to instigate change. He then discusses the changes in the nature of terrorism since 9/11, and how it increasingly focuses on more calculable consequences such as territory gained, weapons accrued, financial damage inflicted and, most commonly, the number of dead and injured, rather than the action’s symbolic meaning. He also predicts that in the future we may see a shift towards more knowledge-intense strategies as both terrorists and states adapt to the current age of knowledge.

In lieu of our usual review article, we present you a review of the discipline by publishing the roundtable minutes of the “2nd All Azimuth Workshop: Widening the World of IR Theorizing” organized by the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research on September 23rd and 24th, 2016.
The Challenge of the South China Sea: Congressional Engagement and the U.S. Policy Response

James M. Scott
Texas Christian University

Abstract
Maritime territorial disputes in Asia are increasingly contentious, with competing claims and confrontations among numerous states of the region carrying significant implications for the relations among the countries of the region, between the U.S. and the region, and for the broader US-China relationship. This analysis examines the politics of the U.S. approach to the challenge, focusing on the role of Congress as a factor shaping the U.S. response. After establishing an analytical framework that directs attention to legislative-executive interactions and the domestic political/institutional context, it assesses the consequences of this context for U.S. policies and approaches to the problem. The analysis reveals the sequence and dynamics of congressional engagement, by which members moved from indirect and non-legislative approaches to direct and legislative approaches to narrow the boundaries and the shape the direction of US foreign policy. It concludes by addressing the implications for the U.S. approach and the relationships among the key parties.

Keywords: Congress, foreign policy, diplomacy, South China Sea, maritime territorial disputes

1. Introduction
The stakes are high in the South China Sea as territorial disputes and China’s increasingly assertive claims pose challenges for its neighbors in the region and for the United States. While China accuses the U.S. of meddling in what its leaders routinely characterize as China’s historic claims to the disputed area, U.S. policymakers seek to chart a course that firmly addresses China’s claims and accompanying threats and assertive actions, protects U.S. interests in the region, supports its friends and allies in the region, but avoids escalating the tension unnecessarily.

However, these efforts to respond to the South China Sea challenge are shaped by actors other than the executive branch. Making sense of U.S. diplomacy and its policy approach to this potentially volatile territorial issue requires attention not only to the presidency, but also to members of Congress. As Garrison describes it, “the struggle for the China agenda is usually one between members of Congress who represent competing interests (and corresponding lobbying groups) and the administration, which focuses on the general health of the bilateral relationship.”

From the original post-World War II China Lobby to the pro-Taiwan lobby

---

James M. Scott, Herman Brown Chair and Professor, Department of Political Science, Texas Christian University. Email: j.scott@tcu.edu.

to the current context of human rights, religious freedom, national security, and business interests, competing agendas and priorities in Congress have often played an important role in shaping U.S. policy toward China. Hence, incorporating the role of the U.S. Congress is essential to understanding U.S. foreign policy making.

This analysis presents an interpretive case study\(^2\) of the pattern of engagement of the U.S. Congress in shaping U.S. diplomacy and policy response to the challenge of the South China Sea in the 2014-2015 period. This social science case study approach applies an established, “conceptual framework that focuses attention on some theoretically specified aspects of reality” to a case – a set of events bounded by space and time – to provide better understanding of the events and explanations of their nature.\(^3\) This approach thus provides explanation of the processes and outcomes of a specific case, but also sheds light on the case as a member of a broader class of phenomena,\(^4\) and offers insights on the utility and, in some instances, limits, of the theoretical/analytical framework.

I argue that approaching this case through the lens of congressional engagement in foreign policy sheds light on both the processes and outcomes of foreign policymaking. Focusing on the central question about congressional engagement, I first establish an analytical/conceptual framework for understanding/explaining U.S. foreign policymaking that calls attention to the nature of the policymaking process and the avenues and activities of congressional influence. I then apply that framework to interpret U.S. foreign policymaking in one period of the South China Sea dispute, highlighting key phases and activities in the policymaking process from 2014-2015. Focusing on this set of events within these time boundaries has several purposes and advantages. First, China’s actions and the tensions in the region accelerated significantly in late 2013, presenting a “new” problem on the foreign policy agenda. Second, the 2014-2015 period presents two legislative/budgetary cycles to observe administration action and congressional engagement. Third, the consequences of congressional elections in November 2014, in which the House remained in the hands of the Republican majority, but the Senate flipped from Democrat to Republican control, offers a glimpse into the effects of changing political context. The analysis concludes with a brief summary of subsequent events and policymaking activities after January 2016, and consideration of the implications of the dynamics revealed in the analysis.

2. The Analytical Lens: Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy

Understanding the U.S. response to the South China Sea dispute demands more than assessing the problem, considering U.S. interests, and looking to the White House for its decisions and actions. U.S. foreign policy takes shape through a complicated institutional structure, and it can be both complex and messy. Members of Congress are often significant players but gauging their roles and impact requires attention of several key features of the institutional context and the nature of the legislative-executive relationship.

A framework to examine congressional behavior and decisions on whether and how to engage on foreign policy issues such as the South China Sea dispute — and contribute to a


\(^3\) Levy, “Case Studies,” 4-5.

\(^4\) A. George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 5.
better understanding of how and why the U.S. response to the South China Sea in particular has unfolded as it has — rests on three components. First, two clarifications must be made to provide the foundation to understanding the congressional role and influence in U.S. foreign policy in general: a) incorporating the range of actors comprising Congress, from the collective institution to its individual members; b) recognizing multiple avenues of congressional influence. Second, the cues and conditions that motivate congressional foreign policy behavior and help explain the patterns of legislative-executive interaction must be incorporated. Finally, based on these two foundations, one can understand general patterns of legislative-executive interactions and congressional engagement and influence on the U.S. response to the South China Sea dispute.

2.1. Setting the context

Understanding congressional activity and influence on the South China Sea dispute first requires clarifying what is meant by “Congress” as a foreign policy actor. Most generically, “Congress” may represent the institution as a whole, or one or the other of its two chambers, with a corresponding focus on formal legislative outputs. Within each chamber, there are numerous committees and subcommittees where policy is shaped. Policy can also be shaped in caucuses focusing on specific policy issues or regions. Party organizations and leadership also play an increasingly important role both as an access point and in developing foreign policy positions.5

However, “Congress is not truly an ‘it’ but a ‘they,’” and its 535 individual members each have their own political and policy agendas.6 It is individual members who highlight issues, help set the governmental agenda, frame debate, introduce bills, and lobby their colleagues and administration officials for their support.7 As others have noted, “Congress does not check presidential power, individuals within it do.”8 Some of these individual MCs are especially interested in foreign policy and often take the initiative. In general, those interested in forcing policy innovation in Congress have been called “congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs,” issue leaders, and other similar labels.9 Such entrepreneurs are not only generally more interested and attentive to foreign policy, but they are also generally more assertive, and more committed to initiating policy change or innovation.10 According to one scholar, such members regularly attempt to “seize the initiative to identify policy problems and offer substantive alternatives and solutions.”11 While such individual members

---


10 Carter and Scott, Choosing to Lead.

may seek to pass legislation, they frequently engage in many less formal actions and they usually take the lead in congressional efforts to shape foreign policy.

The second important contextual factor for assessing and understanding legislative-executive interaction between Congress and the president is an accurate accounting of the avenues of influence available to members of Congress. The Constitution assigns the president powerful but numerically limited foreign policy roles in Article 2, Section 2, including commander-in-chief. The application of these powers, combined with court decisions and the growth of executive institutions under the command of the president have established important opportunities and precedents for presidential leadership. However, in Article I, Section 8, the Constitution assigns Congress more numerous and more specific foreign policy powers to add to the general legislative power (Section 1) and the power to appropriate funds (Section 7): to collect duties; provide for the common defense; regulate foreign commerce; set uniform rules for naturalization of citizens; punish piracy and “other Offences against the Law of Nations”; declare war; raise and support armies and navies; regulate land and naval forces; organize, arm, discipline, and call forth the militia; and make all necessary laws to carry out such powers.

However, “members of Congress exert influence over foreign policy through many formal and informal inquiries, investigation, floor statements, and various procedural customs and techniques”12 As indicated in Table 1, four broad avenues of influence emerge from differentiating between legislative vs. nonlegislative actions and direct vs indirect actions:13 direct-legislative, indirect-legislative, direct-nonlegislative, and indirect-nonlegislative.14 Most scholars focus on the kinds of activities that fall in the direct-legislative category (such as substantive legislation aimed at particular policy outputs), but procedural efforts (including procedural legislation aimed at shaping the decision process), oversight, signaling, framing, and other indirect legislative and nonlegislative approaches are influential as well.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1- Avenues of Congressional Foreign Policy Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaties (Senate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters/Phone Calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations/Advising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight Activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from James M. Scott, “In the Loop: Congressional Influence in American Foreign Policy,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 25 (Summer 1997): 47-76.

As important, distinguishing between these avenues calls attention to a very important characteristic of congressional activity and influence: the role of anticipated reactions. As Lindsay noted, “Just as chess players consider their opponent’s possible moves and plan

---

12 Hersman, Friends and Foes, 20.
14 Legislative actions pertain to the passage of specific pieces of legislation. Nonlegislative actions do not involve a specific item of legislation. Direct actions are specific to both the issue involved and the case at hand. Indirect actions include those that seek to influence the broader political context or setting.
15 James Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
several steps ahead, Congress and the executive branch anticipate one another's behavior and modify their own behavior accordingly."16 In this context, members can use any of the avenues to prompt presidents to accommodate their preferences (or risk facing legislative resistance later). Essentially, this aspect of congressional influence refers to the use of signals (e.g., hearings, speeches, letter) the threat of congressional legislative action (e.g., non-binding resolutions, introducing legislation), and the use of that threat as leverage by members to bring administration proposals or actions into line with their preferences. Thus, while anticipated reactions are not an avenue of influence per se (and are thus not represented in Table 1), they constitute a signaling/leverage strategy through which such avenues can be employed. Such congressional signaling or conditioning can play an important role in foreign policy decisions, even if legislation itself never results.17

2.2. Cues and conditions18

With these clarifications as the foundation, understanding the role, actions and influence of Congress in the South China Sea dispute further requires addressing the cues and conditions that motivate congressional foreign policy behavior. Members of Congress are motivated by a wide variety of cues (factors members consider) and conditions (situational characteristics) of the policy context/structure. Among the most significant of these cues and conditions are public opinion, policy preferences, partisanship, the nature of the policy process, differences in policy type and issue, and policy instruments.19 Particular configurations of these factors help to explain the patterns of legislative-executive interaction: Congress may be compliant, competitive or confrontational, and no single form or sequence prevails.

Public Opinion. Congress is “the people’s branch” and its members are powerfully driven by political calculations related to public opinion and reelection concerns.20 With respect to foreign policy, these concerns have several dimensions. First, members are attentive to broad public opinion regarding the president, with popular presidents and popular policies more likely to receive support than unpopular ones. Moreover, policies regarded by the public as failures are likely targets for congressional activity and assertiveness. Second, members are attuned to constituency opinion and tend not to stray far from the broad preferences of their districts or states (or the preferences of those who fund their campaigns).

Partisanship. Foreign policy is an increasingly partisan process, and partisan calculations provide significant cues for member activity and assertiveness. While partisanship is not necessarily the driving force behind all congressional activism and assertiveness in U.S. foreign policy, its impact has expanded since the Vietnam War. Presidential party members have a partisan reason to support the president or to work with or through the administration where possible. Conversely, opposition party members are quicker to challenge presidents and to promote their own alternative foreign policy initiatives.21 As one study concluded, the

17 Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy; Howell and Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather; Carter and Scott, Choosing to Lead. See also Douglas Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2010).
18 This section builds on and draws on Scott and Carter, “The Not-So-Silent Partner,” 191-93.
19 Carter and Scott, Choosing to Lead; Scott and Carter, “The Not-so-Silent Partner”.
20 David Mayhew, America’s Congress: Actions in the Public Sphere, James Madison through Newt Gingrich (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Kingdon, “Models of Legislative Voting”.
21 Carter and Scott, Choosing to Lead; Howell and Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather.
impact of partisanship on foreign policy has increased in nearly every way imaginable over the past several decades.22

**Policy Preferences.** While members weigh public opinion, constituency views, and partisan calculations, they are also strongly motivated by their own preferences and ideology, which are in turn, shaped by their personal experiences and values.23 Member policy preferences, as typically measured by ideological predisposition and their personal interest in creating good public policy, are central to congressional behavior in foreign policy.24

**Policy Process and Timing.** The foreign policy process is cyclical, typically proceeding with initial formulation-decision-implementation phases linked to subsequent iterations of these phases. While the initial cycle of policy making is usually dominated by the executive branch, subsequent cycles afford members of Congress opportunities to play a significant role. Annual budget authorization/appropriation cycles and oversight responsibilities establish regular opportunities for policy evaluation and “hard-wire” members into the process, so members frequently rely on such cycles to engage on issues of concern and try to shape policies. Thus, it is not uncommon for congressional foreign policy activity to occur at predictable times in the legislative calendar, with early spring, mid-summer, and early fall as particularly common access points.

**Policy Context.** As others have argued, different foreign policy contexts tend to involve distinct legislative-executive orientations.25 By their nature, crises — or even high-stakes or high-threat issues — favor the executive and push Congress to the background, at least for a time. In a crisis, the need for a speedy response often leads presidents to keep the decision unit as small as possible; members of Congress are rarely invited to participate.26 Although some may complain about being left out, most members either rally in support of the president’s response to the crisis, arguing that the country needs to present a united front to the provocateur or defer for a time.27 Yet true crises are infrequent, and extended crisis decision making tends to invite congressional second-guessing.28 The sense of ‘crisis’ inevitably recedes and invites later involvement by members.

Non-crisis foreign policy can be divided in two types: structural and strategic. The conventional wisdom long held that the presidency dominates strategic decisions — those

---

involving the basic ends of foreign policy – while Congress was more comfortable in making structural foreign policy – as it dealt with the means to implement those ends. However, numerous studies suggest members are increasingly likely to address strategic issues since the early Cold War years. Indeed, many members seek out strategic foreign policy issues whenever they see a policy vacuum or a need for a policy correction (see below).

Policy structure. As just noted, differences between policy corrections and policy vacuums are also significant. In policy corrections, members need to overcome the inertia of existing policy, persuading the president to change course. Policy failures are especially inviting targets for correction, especially when public opinion is activated, and members are particularly active in efforts to shape policymaking in these situations. In contrast, vacuums – when problems are identified but policy actions have not been taken - present members with opportunities to act in contexts less dominated by other stakeholders, especially in the executive branch. Members identifying such vacuums relevant to problems that matter to them engage in activities to convince the administration to address the problem in ways that conform to member preferences, and/or to convince enough other members to act through legislative avenues to persuade or force the president to respond.

Policy Instrument. It is also helpful to distinguish between executive-dominated instruments and legislative-dominated instruments. Policies relying on the use of force, diplomacy, and intelligence activities are usually initiated by the executive branch, with Congress generally playing a more reactive role. Other policies, such as those relying on aid and tied more closely to the annual authorization/appropriation cycle, are more amenable to congressional initiative.

2.3. Constructing the analytical framework

The combination of the conceptual clarifications and the cues/conditions discussed above leads to some general expectations for the role/influence of Congress and patterns of legislative-executive interactions that provide a useful lens through which to examine and interpret the congressional role and activity on the South China Sea dispute. Together, they contribute to a better understanding of the nature of the U.S. response and the impact of members of Congress on it. Moreover, they call attention to the rhythms and patterns of congressional engagement on the issue.

Drawing on the clarifications and insights just introduced to interpret the role of Congress in U.S. foreign policymaking on the South China Sea dispute during the 2014-2015 period, a simple starting point is to differentiate between initial phases of the policymaking process and subsequent iterations of the policy process. Within this simple structure, a number of patterns and sequences can be introduced to develop the analytical lens for application to the South China Seas dispute.

Initial Cycle. The insights from the preceding section suggest that initial foreign policymaking phases begin with problem recognition and response. In this initial process cycle, the administration is most likely to take the initiative, especially in cases of higher

---

29 Carter and Scott, Choosing to Lead; Howell and Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather; Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy.


32 Scott and Carter, “The Not-so-Silent Partner”.

---
Members of Congress typically respond to initial phases with substantial deference to presidential leadership. Compliance with presidential initiatives is common at the outset, especially in crisis or potential crisis situations. Individual members often engage in basic framing activities that reflect problem recognition and signal their concerns, as well as “surveillance” of administration actions to monitor policy responses. However, beyond such indirect and non-legislative activities, most members take a “wait and see” approach, leaving more extensive attention to the handful of individual members with particular interests in the problem (entrepreneurs).

**Subsequent Cycles.** As the initial administration response unfolds, members of Congress react, and congressional engagement increases in later process cycles. The nature of that adjustment/engagement is contingent on several factors. In some circumstances, member engagement is essentially supportive. This is particularly likely with policy success, with relatively high public approval of the policy and/or president, and with co-partisans. In such success situations, members may engage in “band-wagoning” or bidding wars to out-do a president in responding to a situation, effectively proposing increased efforts in line with the general administration policy response. However, with unsuccessful policy, lack of policy response, and/or low public approval, congressional engagement is generally more competitive, especially among partisan opponents of the president. Furthermore, to the extent that a high-stakes crisis or potential crisis extends in time, members are more likely to engage competitively as well. Here, members are more likely to make “balancing” or “prodding” efforts to resist or redirect administration initiatives.

In any case, these variants can be expected to emerge in general accordance with a common dynamic reflecting several key characteristics. First, individual members with relatively high levels of attention, interest and engagement (entrepreneurs) typically take the lead. Second, individual and congressional activity and assertiveness is likely to begin in non-legislative and indirect avenues (oversight, framing, signaling) and then extend to more direct and legislative approaches (procedural and/or substantive legislation). Third, on any given foreign policy issue, congressional activity and assertiveness is likely to begin in legislative-dominated instruments (e.g., budgets) and then extend to executive-dominated instruments (e.g., strategy statements; use of military). Fourth, on a given issue, changes in the partisan balance in Congress are likely to lead to greater/lesser assertiveness (depending on the direction of the shift vis-à-vis the party of the president).

**Extended Cycles.** The role and activity of Congress in extended cycles is highly contingent on a variety of factors, but may escalate to legislative-executive confrontation. The first contingency is the problem development itself. In some situations, policy developments result in a defusing of the issue, which can lead to a reduction of engagement by Congress (e.g., a crisis is averted or resolved). A second contingency depends on presidential responsiveness. Administrations that respond to congressional activity by adjusting policy essentially purchase some combination of compliance and surveillance/monitoring until

---

subsequent policy developments take shape and trigger further engagement (or resolution). Non-responsiveness — rejection of congressional preferences/proposals (defiance) or failure to act (policy vacuums) invites greater assertiveness, engagement, and more independent policymaking efforts by members. In either case, both public opinion and partisanship continue to play a role, with unpopular presidents/policies inviting more confrontational efforts, and partisan divisions generating more policy challenges.

With these expectations in mind, this explanatory framework sheds light on U.S. policymaking on the South China Sea dispute in 2014-2015. Applying this lens calls attention to the role and impact of members of Congress in shaping the U.S. response, the patterns and sequences of their engagement, and the limits and conditional constraints on their influence.

3. Applying the Lens: Congress and the South China Sea, 2014-2015

Long-standing concerns over the numerous territorial disputes in the South China Sea escalated after 2013 — in particular those involving the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and the Scarborough Shoal. China claims approximately 90% of the South China Sea, relying on what has been characterized as the “nine-dash line” to demarcate its territorial assertions. Tension increased beginning late 2013 as China ramped up its actions through a series of incremental steps — often described as a “salami-slicing strategy” — to push the status quo in favor of its assertions and change the strategic context without taking any individual step so dramatic as to trigger a significant military confrontation. These incremental actions included small steps to gradually take control of smaller reefs and islands within the South China Sea, establishing settlements on many, operating and expanding naval patrols in the area, gradually leasing oil and fishing blocks inside areas claimed by neighboring countries, sending naval patrols to harass and impede other countries’ development efforts in the area, dredging and developing smaller reefs and islands for military and economic use, and other steps.

Additionally, China and the U.S. are locked in a dispute over China’s claims to rights to control the activities of foreign military forces (i.e., the U.S. Navy) in what it asserts is its Exclusive Economic Zone. Clashes over access and activity in this disputed zone led to a series of incidents between China and the U.S. from 2001 on. At the heart of these concerns are the U.S. assertion and defense of “Freedom of Navigation” rights in the regions (and generally). In 2014, China’s actions escalated to include a program of activity to build and expand a series of reefs and islands in the South China Seas to further establish and extend its claims, leading to heightened tension in the region. Fears that China is engaged in a strategy to extend its control over the “near-seas” area, which includes the South China Sea, led the U.S. and other states in the regions to take action in defense of their strategic, political, and economic interests.


40 To be sure, reclamation efforts in the South China seas are not new and China is not the only claimant to engage in this activity. As a recent Defense Department report stated, “All territorial claimants, except Brunei, maintain outposts in the South China Sea, which they use to establish presence in surrounding waters, assert their claims to sovereignty, and monitor the activities of rival claimants. All of these claimants have engaged in construction-related activities...Though other claimants have reclaimed land on disputed features in the South China Sea, China’s latest efforts are substantively different from previous efforts both in scope and effect. The infrastructure China appears to be building would enable it to establish a more robust power projection presence into the South China Sea.” See Department of Defense, “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy,” undated, released August 2015, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDA%20A-P_Maritime_Security_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF, 16-7.
3.1. Phase 1: “Managing differences” and the administration response

As the tension over the South China Sea escalated, during the period of this analysis (2014-2015), members of Congress engaged in framing and oversight/surveillance, expressing concerns over the issue and monitoring the administration response. These activities were concentrated in the most interested members on the foreign policy and armed services committees. Concerns with actions by the Obama Administration (Democratic Party) were more critically expressed in the House of Representatives (controlled by Republicans) than in the Senate (controlled by Democrats).

As the problem developed, the administration responded with actions and declarations building on the broad foundations of existing U.S. policy, including the administration’s “Asia pivot” initiative and bilateral relations with China. As Daniel Russel, assistant secretary of state for East Asia, explained it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the spring of 2014, cooperation on economic issues, expansion of military-to-military coordination and regional security initiatives, and collaboration on regional and global issues like nonproliferation (Korea, Iran) and climate change were critical elements of the broader bilateral relationship. In the context of these larger issues, Russel characterized the South China Sea matters as part of “managing differences” in the overall (and generally positive) relationship. As Russel put it in testimony before the U.S. Senate:

In the Asia-Pacific region, Beijing’s neighbors are understandably alarmed by China’s increasingly coercive efforts to assert and enforce its claims in the South China and East China Seas. A pattern of unilateral Chinese actions in sensitive and disputed areas is raising tensions and damaging China’s international standing. Moreover, some of China’s actions are directed at U.S. treaty allies. The United States has important interests at stake in these seas: freedom of navigation and overflight, unimpeded lawful commerce, respect for international law, and the peaceful management of disputes. We apply the same principles to the behavior of all claimants involved, not only to China.41

Emphasizing the broader U.S.-China relationship, a number of principles formed the foundation of the specific issue of the South China Sea. These included emphasis on:

• U.S. neutrality on the competing claims to sovereignty in the area;
• the U.S. commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes and consistency with the principles of international law by all parties;
• support for the principle of freedom of the seas;
• the precepts of customary international law respecting territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, especially the principles that states may regulate economic activities in such zones, but not foreign military activities (freedom of navigation) or surveillance flights above international waters;
• restraint by claimants and respect for the status quo until peaceful settlement is reached, especially regarding land reclamation efforts.42

As Secretary of State John Kerry put it later in 2014 (in the context of a speech on the administration’s efforts to rebalance or pivot to Asia):

---

The United States is not a claimant, and we do not take a position on the various territorial claims of others. But we take a strong position on how those claims are pursued and how those disputes are going to be resolved. So we are deeply concerned about mounting tension in the South China Sea and we consistently urge all the parties to pursue claims in accordance with international law, to exercise self-restraint, to peacefully resolve disputes, and to make rapid, meaningful progress to complete a code of conduct that will help reduce the potential for conflict in the years to come. And the United States will work, without getting involved in the merits of the claim, on helping that process to be effectuated, because doing so brings greater stability, brings more opportunity for cooperation in other areas.\textsuperscript{43}

In addition, the administration took steps to promote coordination and cooperation in the region. These steps included moves to bolster cooperative relationships with U.S. friends and allies in the region. For instance, the administration worked to expand naval and maritime engagement with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, among others. The administration also undertook a number of efforts to address potential clashes between U.S., Chinese, and other claimants’ commercial and military transit and activities. For example, in 2014, China participated for the first time in the Rim of the Pacific naval exercises, or RIMPAC. According to the U.S. Department of Defense this step provided “an opportunity for the United States, China, and countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region to exercise key operational practices and procedures that are essential to ensuring that tactical misunderstandings do not escalate into crises.”\textsuperscript{44} Additionally, in 2014 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel led efforts to establish codes of conduct to avoid clashes. In the spring, 21 Pacific rim countries, including the U.S. and China, agreed to a non-binding protocol called the “Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea” (CUES), which outlined “safety procedures, basic communications, and basic maneuvering instructions for naval ships and aircraft during unplanned encounters at sea, with the aim of reducing the risk of incidents arising from such encounters.” Later in 2014, Hagel and his Chinese counterpart signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters, including rules of behavior for safety during surface-to-surface encounters.\textsuperscript{45}

Assistant Secretary of State Russel summarized the administration approach to the issue under questioning from Sen. Bob Corker, the Republican ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing in June 2014:

we use public messaging, we use diplomacy. We also engage in building the capacity of the countries in Southeast Asia to ensure that they are able to adequately police their own territorial waters and that they can maintain the domain awareness that ensures that they know what is going on in their contiguous waters or in the open seas. Our strategy, Senator, includes the support for a unified and influential ASEAN [Association of SouthEast Asian Nations], and we believe that the call from the ASEAN countries to China to work with them, not to bully them, has a long-term salutary effect. Lastly, the fact of the matter is that the robust military presence, the strong security commitments, and the healthy alliances that the United States maintains with many countries in the region similarly serves to maintain stability and keep the peace, going forward, as it has for the last six decades.\textsuperscript{46}


\textsuperscript{46} U.S. Senate, \textit{The Future of U.S.-China Relations}. 
During most of 2014, the congressional reaction to the mounting tension — and the administration response — was cautious and involved indirect and/or non-legislative efforts at framing and “surveillance.” For example, as concerns over the South China Sea tension ramped up in late 2013, a number of U.S. senators signaled concern through a letter to China’s Ambassador to the United States. Foreign Relations Committee member Robert Menendez (D-NJ, and committee chair), Bob Corker (R-TN), Marco Rubio (R-FL), and Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) expressed concern over China’s unilateral actions which they argued “reinforces the perception that China prefers coercion over rule of law mechanisms to address territorial, sovereignty or jurisdictional issues in the Asia-Pacific. It also follows a disturbing trend of increasingly hostile Chinese maritime activities, including repeated incursions by Chinese vessels into the waters and airspace of Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and other in the East and South China Seas. These actions threaten freedom of air and maritime navigation, which are vital national interests of the United States.”

Members of Congress also used hearings to raise their concerns about the issue and engage in initial oversight over administration responses, which key members found too restrained. For example, on January 14, 2014, the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee and the House Foreign Affairs Asia and the Pacific subcommittee held a joint hearing on the maritime disputes. Led by their Republican majority members, the joint session featured testimony by regional specialists from the U.S. Naval War College, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the American Foreign Policy Council, and commentary and questions from the subcommittee members designed to call attention to the need to address the problem. As Steve Chabot (R-OH) stated, “There is no other issue right now in the Asia-Pacific region more worrisome than the rise in tensions we are seeing as a result of China’s efforts to coercively change and destabilize the regional status quo.” Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA) further signaled concerns and framed the potential significance of the issue, noting “My greatest fear is that China’s coercive methods of dealing with territorial disputes could manifest into increased tensions that could ultimately lead to miscalculation… I believe we must be 100 percent intolerant of China’s territorial claims and its continued resort to forms of military coercion to alter the status quo in the region.” Ranking Democratic Party members of the subcommittees also voiced concern, with Ami Bera (D-CA) noting “We have got to send, as a body, in a bipartisan manner, a strong message to China that these threatening and provocative moves to assert their maritime territorial claims are unacceptable. These steps clearly undermine the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific. If China is left unchallenged, China’s claims over the region will solidify, thus altering the status quo.” The session’s witnesses —none of whom were administration officials — collectively recommended firm responses and a concerted strategy to address the problem.

Later that same spring, in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s East Asia and Pacific Affairs subcommittee, the Democratic Party majority led by Ben Cardin (D-MD) used the topic of U.S.-Taiwan relations to signal concerns over the maritime disputes, hearing testimony from administration witnesses, along with regional specialists from the

47 Quoted/excerpted in O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes, 4.
48 House of Representatives, The Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the Committee on Armed Services Meeting Jointly with Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Maritime Sovereignty in the East and South China Seas, Hearing, January 14, 2014, (Serial No. 113-137), 2.
49 House of Representatives, Maritime Sovereignty in the East and South China Seas, 3-4.
50 House of Representatives, Maritime Sovereignty in the East and South China Seas, 6.
South China Sea...

National Bureau of Asian Research and the Project 2049 Institute. Along with other things, the session included calls for expanded cooperation and support for U.S. friends and allies in the face of China’s assertive actions.\textsuperscript{51} Just two months later, in late June the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held additional hearings on U.S.-China relations that also addressed growing concerns about aggressive Chinese actions.\textsuperscript{52} Led by Democrats Robert Menendez (NJ) and Ben Cardin (MD), the hearings were cast in the broad context of bilateral and regional relations and included testimony from the U.S. State Department’s head of the Asia bureau and policy analysts from Princeton University and the Kissinger Institute. Raising concerns about the provocative Chinese actions, members from both parties sought information about administration responses, as well as analysis from the outside specialists on the nature, stakes, and potential recourses.

Mounting congressional worries led Menendez to join with Senators Cardin, Rubio (R-FL), McCain (R-AZ), Risch (R-ID), Cornyn (R-TX), Leahy (D-VT), and Feinstein (D-CA) to sponsor a resolution (S.Res 412, first introduced in April) signaling their concerns to the administration. This resolution stressed the importance of “freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region, and for the peaceful diplomatic resolution of outstanding territorial and maritime claims and disputes,” condemned China’s actions, and laid out a 13-point statement of U.S. policy:

\begin{enumerate}
\item reaffirm its unwavering commitment and support for allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and that Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
\item oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea that belong to all nations;
\item urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed claims;
\item ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;
\item call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;
\item support efforts by ASEAN and the People's Republic of China to develop an effective Code of Conduct, including the “early harvest” of agreed-upon elements in the Code of Conduct that can be implemented immediately;
\item reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People's Republic of China;
\item support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law;
\item encourage the adoption of mechanisms such as hotlines or emergency procedures for preventing incidents in sensitive areas, managing them if they occur, and preventing disputes from escalating;
\end{enumerate}


\textsuperscript{52} U.S. Senate, The Future of U.S.-China Relations.
(10) fully support the rights of claimants to exercise rights they may have to avail themselves of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms;

(11) encourage claimants not to undertake new unilateral attempts to change the status quo since the signing of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct, including not asserting administrative measures or controls in disputed areas in the South China Sea;

(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a “common operating picture” in the South China Sea that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities; and

(13) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law.53


3.2. Phase 2: Heightened concerns and congressional reaction

In the latter half of 2014, tension continued to mount over the South China Sea disputes, China’s unilateral efforts continued unabated, and a number of events led members of Congress to begin efforts to exert pressure on the administration to take additional and more forceful action. Among the most salient developments, a clash between Chinese military forces and a U.S. P-8 surveillance plane in August, China’s accelerated reclamation efforts, which transitioned in late 2014 to expanded construction and re-purposing of a number of sites (including the development of airfields and other facilities designed to project Chinese control), and aggressive assertion of territorial sovereignty in the region combined to heighten concern that a more assertive U.S. response was needed.

Concerns mounted in the latter half of the 2014, even as diplomatic progress on confidence-building measures and other matters occurred. A tense incident in which a Chinese jet challenged a U.S. Navy P-8 patrol aircraft over the South China Seas — which the Department of Defense characterized as “very, very close, very dangerous”54 — raised concerns in August, which were only modestly allayed by the memorandum of understanding reached in November.55 However, in early 2015 when an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies posted an article that compared satellite photography from earlier years to those of late 2014-early 2015, revealing the pace and extent of Chinese activities, it generated significant alarm.56

This critical moment galvanized a number of members of Congress to advocate for more aggressive efforts to prepare for and counter the Chinese challenge. To do so in an arena in which the policy instruments (military, diplomacy) favored presidential initiative and leadership, members engaged in a variety of efforts short of direct-legislative actions. As one analyst described, “While the Obama Administration would likely rather continue its present strategy of trying to engage Beijing and work towards some sort of ‘new type of great power relations,’ it appears a group of lawmakers are working towards pushing the administration

54 Quoted in O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes, 12.
to consider a different approach. Such an approach would likely engage Beijing on a whole range of Indo-Pacific issues—with a specific focus on the challenges in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{57}

For example, a number of members began to communicate their concerns and call for action by what they regarded as a reluctant administration. In the spring (after Republicans gained control of the Senate in the 2014 midterm elections), Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Jack Reed (D-RI), the chair and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senators Bob Corker (R-TN) and Bob Menendez (D-NJ), the chair and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter urging greater attention to the dispute and advocating for “the development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy for the maritime commons of the Indo-Pacific region.”\textsuperscript{58}

In what respected former executive branch official, policy analyst and academic Jack Goldsmith characterized as “a strong signal to the administration and to China,”\textsuperscript{59} the letter also stated

\begin{quote}
China’s deliberate effort to employ non-military methods of coercion to alter the status quo, both in the South China Sea and East China Sea, demands a comprehensive response from the United States and our partners. While administration officials have highlighted various speeches and initiatives as evidence of a broader strategy, we believe that a formal policy and clearly articulated strategy to address these forms of Chinese coercion are essential. That is why the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 includes a requirement for a report on maritime security strategy with an emphasis on the South China Sea and East China Sea.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

In the House of Representatives, Randy Forbes (R-VA), founder of the Congressional China Caucus and chair of the Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee, took another approach, attempting to educate and persuade his colleagues by distributing news and information on China to them and their staffs in a daily publication called \textit{The Caucus Brief}.\textsuperscript{61}

Members also accelerated the use of hearings to press their policy preferences. In 2014, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 3 hearings that included significant attention to the South China Seas issue, while the House Foreign Affairs Committee held 6. In 2015, both panels increased their activities: the Senate committee held 7 hearings, while the House committee held 8.\textsuperscript{62} In the Senate, the Armed Services committee increased its hearings on the matter from 2 in 2014 to 7 in 2015.\textsuperscript{63} Notably, the 2014 midterm elections put the Republicans in the majority in Senate for 2015.

In these hearings, members pushed the administration to take action to meet the challenge. For example, in April, both the House and Senate Armed Services committees held hearings in the context of defense authorizations that addressed the threat to U.S. interests that Chinese reclamation/construction work in the South China Sea entailed. In May, the Senate Foreign

\begin{footnotes}
\item[58] Quoted in Kazianis, “Can Congress Stop China in the South China Sea”.
\item[60] Quoted in Kazianis, “Can Congress Stop China in the South China Sea”.
\item[61] See \textit{The Caucus Brief}, accessed July 1, 2016, https://forbes.house.gov/chinacaucus/. (The website is no longer active.)
\item[63] See the hearings schedules for 2014-2015 in the Senate Armed Services committees, https://wwwarmed-services.senate.gov/hearings.
\end{footnotes}
Relations Committee convened a session specifically on the South China Sea (and East China Sea) challenge. Two administration officials — Daniel Russel (assistant secretary of state for Asia) and David Shear (assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs) were challenged by members of both parties in an effort to push the administration into greater action. Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) the committee chair flatly stated “I am concerned that absent a course correction, specifically high-level and dedicated engagement from the United States Government to articulate a coherent China policy, our credibility will continue to suffer throughout the region, whether it is in regards to nonproliferation or preserving freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas.”

After lengthy questioning and prodding by members from both parties, Corker concluded by saying:

it just again builds on the narrative that there is a lot of talk coming out of the administration, with not much follow-through. And I do hope that somehow we will develop a coherent policy relative to China that somehow, while they violate international norms in multiple ways, we can figure out a way for a price to be paid…. But I think you should leave here today with a sense of disappointment from both sides of the aisle about not really having, still, a coherent policy. The reason this hearing is taking place today is, a year ago, we were concerned about the fact that the United States does not have a coherent policy relative to these issues and others with China….I leave here as disappointed as I was a year ago about the fact that we do not have a policy.

A series of other hearings occurred in both houses of Congress, as key members such as Menendez, Corker, Forbes, and others on the foreign affairs and armed services committee in both chambers continued to press the administration for both attention and action. The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia held highly critical hearings in July to highlight security interests and threats in the South China Sea (no administration officials testified), while the armed services committees in both houses and the Senate Foreign Relations followed up with additional hearings in September. Throughout the series of hearings, members also regularly pressed for more tangible support for allies and friends in the region, including Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and others.

Finally, members of Congress used the annual budget cycle to take the lead and introduce a variety of bills to direct funds and attention to the issue. For example, in early 2015 the Senate took the lead and, in a “bidding war” action doubling down on initial administration efforts, added language to the 2015 concurrent resolution on the budget that allowed funds to be allocated:

to supporting a comprehensive multi-year partner capacity building and security cooperation plan in the Indo-Pacific region, including for a regional maritime domain awareness architecture and for bilateral and multilateral exercises, port calls, and training activities of the United States Armed Forces and Coast Guard to further a comprehensive strategy to strengthen United States alliances and partnerships, freedom of navigation, and the unimpeded access to the maritime commons of the Asia-Pacific.

References:


65 The U.S. Senate, Safeguarding American Interests in the East and South China Seas, 40.


68 Quoted in O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes, 46.
Both the House and Senate included various sections to promote support and funding for a number of initiatives directed toward key states involved in the dispute, including Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In early May, key senators took it upon themselves to introduce a proposal in the defense authorization bill in the spring to move beyond the existing approach and support and assist friends and allies more extensively in the region. This new “South China Sea Initiative,” authorized over $400 million for assistance and training to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Brunei, Singapore, and Taiwan, “for the purpose of increasing maritime security and maritime domain awareness of foreign countries along the South China Sea.”

This new initiative was eventually approved by both houses (after the broader bill was first vetoed by the White House in October) in the National Defense Authorization Act in November 2015. The administration then directed the newly available funds to a broad range of support.

The Obama administration appeared to respond to the assertive signaling and prodding of members of Congress from both houses and from both parties. Under pressure both from developing events and members of Congress, the administration expanded U.S. efforts across several dimensions. First, the administration engaged more broadly with allies and friends in the region. This engagement included maritime collaboration with Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, and a growing list of joint training and exercises with members of ASEAN and others in the region, among other efforts. As Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter noted in a public speech on the matter, members of Congress were credited for their role: “DoD will be launching a new Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative. And thanks to the leadership of the Senators here today (emphasis added)... [ellipse as in original] and others, Congress has taken steps to authorize up to $425 million dollars for these maritime capacity-building efforts.”

When established, the new initiative involved a range of efforts to increase the maritime security capacity of our allies and partners, to respond to threats in waters off their coasts and to provide maritime security more broadly across the region. We are not only focused on boosting capabilities, but also helping our partners develop the necessary infrastructure and logistical support, strengthen institutions, and enhance practical skills to develop sustainable and capable maritime forces.

Another highly salient element of this increased support occurred in late 2015, when a $1.83 billion arms sale was approved for Taiwan.

Taking the cue from congressional prodding, the administration response also involved efforts to support ASEAN and encourage a united front in addressing China’s actions. For example, in the fall of 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry and other administration officials worked with allies from Japan, Australia and New Zealand to convince ASEAN to include a joint statement on the South China Sea disputes at a conference of ASEAN’s defense ministries, and supported and facilitated agreements among members such as Taiwan and the

---


72 Quoted in O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes, 35.

73 “FACT SHEET: U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia”.

Philippines to resolve their differences.\textsuperscript{75} Such efforts were resisted by China, which strongly preferred to address the competing claims on a bilateral basis.

The administration also increased its efforts to promote peaceful diplomatic solutions, including negotiations, arbitration, and other international legal mechanisms. In September 2015, for example, the Defense and State departments successfully completed an annex to the existing Memorandum of Understanding on commercial and military transit in the South China Sea to establish rules of behavior for safety of air-to-air encounters.\textsuperscript{76} Expanded efforts to collaborate with key allies on the issue also occurred as U.S. officials worked “closely with our friends in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere to coordinate and amplify our efforts toward promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia. In part, we are partnering trilaterally to achieve these goals.”\textsuperscript{77}

Another interesting element of the administration response was to increase the public visibility of U.S. efforts in a version of public diplomacy or signaling that was consistent with calls by Congress to increase U.S. involvement. In addition to speeches, attendance at meetings, and a variety of other efforts in the fall of 2015, one good example occurred in November when U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter took Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein to visit the USS Theodore Roosevelt, an aircraft carrier conducting operations in the South China Sea. During the publicized visit, Carter told the press

\begin{quote}
Being here on the Theodore Roosevelt in the South China Sea is a symbol and signifies the stabilizing presence that the United States has had in this part of the world for decades.... If it's being noted today in a special way, it's because of the tension in this part of the world, mostly arising from disputes over land features in the South China Sea, and most of the activity over the last year being perpetrated by China.\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

The administration responded further by embracing congressional calls for increased activity “to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters” (as stated in S.Res 412) and significantly expanded a program of “freedom of navigation operations” by the U.S. Navy in the region, designed to assert and demonstrate the U.S. commitment to maritime access to the disputed air and sea lanes claimed by China. Although such operations had been slowly increasing in general since 2013,\textsuperscript{79} Department of Defense testimony at a congressional hearing in September established that the United States had not conducted such operations in the South China Sea/Spratly Islands area after 2012.\textsuperscript{80} In response to congressional pressure, the administration decided in the early fall to initiate such operations as part of a more assertive and visible strategy. The first such operations occurred in October 2015, when the USS Lassen and P-8 patrol planes sailed in the disputed region. While China vigorously protested, the U.S. publicly confirmed the action as a measure to “rebuff” of Beijing’s territorial and maritime claims in the disputed waters.” According to reporting, the White House decision to transit the disputed areas was intended to “assert the U.S. position that they lie in international waters where ships from all countries are free to travel,” in the

\textsuperscript{76} O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes, 20.
\textsuperscript{80} O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes, 40.
word of an anonymous senior U.S. defense official. U.S. actions were quickly supported by officials from Australia and Japan, and U.S. defense officials confirmed that they expected to continue such operations at a rate of about twice per quarter going forward. In addition, this operation was followed by a number of overflights by U.S. B-52 bombers in November and December 2015 as well.

Finally, in the first weeks of 2016, the Philippines cleared the way for a defense cooperation agreement with the U.S. to allow U.S. forces use of eight bases in that country, including two in the South China Sea — the first such arrangement since the end of U.S. basing rights twenty-five years earlier. According to one analyst, officials from both countries intended the agreement and deployment to deter China and “help convince the Chinese that pressuring its neighbors into giving up their territorial claims is actually not in China’s interest.” Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), an advocate for more aggressive efforts in the region, noted “As Manila finds itself the target of Chinese coercion…and is looking to Washington for leadership, this agreement will give us new tools to deepen our alliance with the Philippines, expand engagement with the Philippine Armed Forces, and enhance our presence in Southeast Asia.”

3.3. Phase 3: Into the future

By the end of 2015, tension persisted and the U.S. response had generated mixed results. While more assertive actions and concerted efforts emerged in the wake of heightened concern, troubling developments, and congressional urging, the future of the dispute remained uncertain. For its part, China appeared ready to consolidate and extend its actions, moving forward in construction activities, initiating test flights and announcing plans for regular air traffic to newly established airfields. Tension between China, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines appeared greater in early 2016 because of these advancements.

For the U.S., the way forward remained unclear. Despite the more aggressive and concerted efforts, the territorial disputes in the area remained unresolved and fears of a Chinese fait accompli grew with each passing month as the reclamation and construction efforts continued. One Australian foreign policy specialist opined that “Ultimately…it may take a crisis for the U.S.-China relationship to reach a stable equilibrium.” Other observers cautioned that the most visible efforts — the freedom of navigation operations — were likely a case of “too little, too late” unless accompanied by further and more assertive efforts, including not only more (and regular) such operations, but also joint flotillas involving the U.S., Japan, Australia, Vietnam and the Philippines, and perhaps even an international conference to demilitarize the entire region.

For members of the U.S. Congress, 2015 ended with continued scrutiny and a readiness to press for further action. While the administration’s responsiveness to congressional prodding

82 O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes, 42.
83 “China Slams US”.
85 Dan De Luce, “China Fears Bring”.
87 Cloud and Makinen, “China, Angered over Warship”.
in 2015 assuaged members to some degree, the uncertainty led many to remain concerned. For example, in December 2015, a bipartisan group of House members publicly offered support for Taiwan and its efforts to counter Chinese actions and resolve disputes with the other claimants in the region.89 Similarly, Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA) continued to circulate information about events in the region and to urge attention and action in response.90 As 2016 began, members appeared to be in a “strategic pause,” wary and monitoring the situation to gauge the significant of China’s actions, the results and progress of administration responses, and the need for further pressure and action.

As time passed, congressional frustration grew, however, and congressional signaling and pressure increased. Many members of Congress preferred a more confrontational approach to China’s continued expansion of activities in the South China Seas, while the Obama administration took a more restrained approach that reflected concerns over cooperation with China on climate change and other issues.91 As a consequence, citing the administration’s “weak and lackluster” response, Sen. Corker joined with his colleagues Menendez, Cardin, and Cory Gardner (R-CO) to write President Obama urging action, and to introduce the “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Act” (S. 2865), legislation requiring expanded naval operations in the South China Seas and deeper military/security cooperation with other states of the region, including the Philippines. A similar bill (H.R. 5890) was introduced in the House in July, but both stalled in their respective committees.92

Congressional concerns persisted as 2016 passed, heightened by China’s defiance of the July 2016 decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague (Netherlands) rejecting China’s expansive claims in the region.93 The slow pace and eventual freezing of US Freedom of Navigation operations in the South China Seas in October 2016 raised further concerns. After the 2016 elections and the change in administration, members of Congress initially waited to see what the new administration’s approach would be, encouraged by firm and assertive statements by Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson at his confirmation hearings calling for confrontation.94 However, assertiveness receded as the new administration sought cooperation with China to address North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

As a consequence, members of Congress took action to prod the reluctant administration forward, combining signals, hearings, and the introduction of legislation to press their preferences for a different, more assertive approach. For example, seven senators wrote to the White House urging more aggressive actions, including the resumption of naval patrols in the South China Seas. According to one congressional aide, “We thought it was important to weigh in and also to try to help shake things loose in the administration on this.”95 Corker, still chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, joined with Sens. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), Cory Gardner (R-Colo.), Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Edward Markey

---

90 See, for example, his China Caucus Blog, https://forbes.house.gov/chinacaucus/blog/.
(D-Mass.), and Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii) on the letter. In addition, Rubio introduced the “South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2017” (S.659) in March, legislation that would escalate U.S. responses to include entry and property sanctions (currently pending in committee at this writing).\(^{96}\) In response, the administration ended its freeze of naval operations in the region (it had denied several requests from the Department of Defense for such operations) and, in May, authorized the first such action of its tenure in office.\(^{97}\) Administration officials including Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis also delivered more assertive warnings to China public statements during travel in the region in June, and the administration increasingly embraced an approach similar to its predecessor, with somewhat more emphasis on shows of force.\(^{98}\)

4. Conclusion: Congress, the South China Sea, and Congressional Engagement in Foreign Policy

Examining U.S. policymaking on the South China Sea dispute through the analytical framework employed in this chapter sheds light on how and why the U.S. response to the challenge unfolded as it did. As the preceding discussion indicates, members of Congress were significant players in the 2014-2015 period, and beyond, and their role and influence is better understood when seen through the analytical lens employed here.

First, congressional engagement generally took shape according to the sequence and dynamics of the analytical framework. On this strategic policy issue, members first deferred to and monitored administration responses. The complex array of interests in the U.S.-China relationships and the significant stakes involved in both the South China Sea dispute and the broader relationship contributed to broader, more bipartisan concerns. As the problem developed and concerns over the nature of the administration response grew, members engaged in indirect and non-legislative efforts to signal their concerns and push the administration toward further action and policy development. Framing, oversight, and reliance on the annual budgetary cycle were central to these efforts. While the executive-dominated instruments involved in the matter (military force, diplomacy) constrained congressional opportunities to some degree, the legislative-dominated instruments of the power of the purse offered opportunities to shape policy. Members moved to more assertive efforts after the first phase of policymaking in 2014, and exerted significance influence — through both anticipated reactions and through direct-legislative measures — in 2015, after “surveilling” the administration response and finding it lacking. As concerns with administration responses to their prodding ensued, such actions became increasingly direct, with clearer and more binding actions specified in proposed legislation in 2015-2017.

Second, the preceding analysis shows the significance of key individual members in driving congressional engagement and influence. Attentive members in key committees were central to the use of indirect and non-legislative activities that prodded the administration. These members led Congress with their activity and engagement, and their use of key access points in committee and subcommittees empowered them in efforts such as framing, signaling,

---


oversight, and the introduction of legislation. They acted as foreign policy entrepreneurs and were able to communicate preferences and signal the need for administration responses, and — as the Forbes example most clearly illustrates — they were able to inform, persuade and mobilize activity from other members of Congress, with the passage of legislation in 2015 as a key example. Thus, the multiple avenues cued by the analytical framework revealed a broader range of activity and influence by Congress, and a more important role for the institution in shaping the U.S. response.

In this context, this analysis sheds some light on the role and influence of the more indirect and non-legislative efforts, especially regarding signaling and anticipated reactions. As members signaled their concerns, administration reception and responsiveness was heightened by their nature. Signals by a president’s own party members are generally more powerful, while signals from members of Congress from the opposite party are less so. In this case, the bipartisan signals were particularly important and consequential. Moreover, the administration reaction — responsiveness to members of Congress and their preferences and signals — shaped the nature of the ensuing legislative-executive interactions as well. To be sure, U.S. policy responses were not solely attributable to congressional action, but the sequences and action-reaction processes strongly suggest anticipated reactions and additional, more direct effects (e.g., 2015 legislation).

Third, partisanship played a significant, but limited role in this issue. The nature of the challenge and its broader stakes, along with the array of economic interests and global concerns that connect the U.S. and China, as well as the interests of various factions of the U.S. political system, worked to establish competing interests and priorities that muted partisanship and generated more cooperative efforts. Such conditions frequently reduce the impact of partisan foreign policy behavior, as many studies of post-World War II conclude. However, at least two indications of the partisan aspect emerged. First, the more partisan House of Representatives, with its Republican majority, took a more critical approach. It is noteworthy that, while the Senate regularly invited administration witnesses to its hearings, the House regularly did not, relying on critical policy analysts from foreign policy institutes and the like. Second, when Republicans gained control of the Senate in 2015, more critical and assertive efforts ensued. To be sure, the arc of the challenge accounts for some of this, but it is also apparent from hearings transcripts that Republican members were consistently more critical and more demanding of forceful responses than their Democratic colleagues. Moreover, as noted, hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Armed Services committees increased substantially in 2015, driven in part by developments in the regions, but also by the changed partisan control of the chamber.


Overall, the nature and patterns of the U.S. foreign policymaking and the response to the South China Sea challenge are better understood and explained when inspected through the lens of this analytical framework. Looking forward, as the challenge continues, members of Congress are likely to continue their strategic approach, monitoring both the problem and the administration’s response to it, gauging progress and the need for policy correction, and relying on key individuals to take the lead in congressional engagement and activity. With progress, members are likely to defer; without it, they are likely to engage more aggressively, prodding the administration to take further action, or charting new courses should the administration prove unwilling to do so. In any event, members of Congress will be meaningful players in shaping the nature of the U.S. response to the South China Sea challenge in the future.

Bibliography


Unpacking the Post-Soviet: Political Legacy of the Tartu Semiotic School

Andrey Makarychev
University of Tartu

Alexandra Yatsyk
Uppsala University

Abstract

This article sketches out general approach to using cultural semiotics as a cognitive tool for analyzing international relations in general and in post-Soviet area in particular. The authors discuss how the homegrown school of cultural semiotics associated with the University of Tartu can be helpful for IR studies. In this respect we place cultural semiotic knowledge in a multidisciplinary perspective and look for projections of its concepts into the vocabulary of foreign policy. Then we intend to discuss the Tartu school from a political perspective, thus claiming that its premium put on cultural issues renders strong politicizing effects. Ultimately, we use cultural semiotic notions and approaches for problematizing the concept of the post-Soviet with its conflictual split between reproducing archaic policies and discourses, on the one hand, and playing by the rules of the post-modern society, with entertainment, hybridity and the spirit of deconstruction as its pivots.

Keywords: Post-Soviet transition, cultural semiotics

1. Introduction

The discipline of cultural semiotics is peripheral for International Relations (IR) theorizing. Yet it is this peripherality that might bring up new insights in analysis of foreign policies of individual countries and world politics in general, since many political categories (power, borders, security, and even politics itself) can be immensely enriched by meanings derived from a plethora of disciplines that were not in the limelight for IR and its major schools. This is particularly true for the Tartu school of cultural semiotics that was born in the Soviet Estonia, a borderland country that even under the Soviet occupation became a home to world-class research in this field of social sciences. Semiosphere as a space of multiple meaning-makings is a central concept to this school. Importantly, the cultural semiotic scholarship has grown up at the crossroads of Russia and Europe, which explains its sensitivity to issues of boundaries, communication, identity, inclusion / exclusion, and inside / outside dynamics. This vocabulary remains topical for today’s Estonia that in many respects might be regarded as a frontline country – not only according to Huntingtonian lines of civilizational distinction, but also in the framework of a new Cold War between Russia and the West.

Andrey Makarychev, Visiting Professor, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu. Email: andrey.makarychev@ut.ee. Alexandra Yatsyk, Visiting fellow at the Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden. Email: ayatsyk@gmail.com.

Received: 29.08.2016 Accepted: 10.10.2016
The Tartu school might be treated as a source of semiotic knowledge and simultaneously a semiotic object itself. It was conceived and matured since the 1950s in Estonia, the most liberal of all Soviet republics. The concepts and ideas developed by the Tartu school are Europe-compatible and even Europe-centric, to which attests a remarkable absence of conceptualizations of the Orient by Yurii Lotman, the founding father of the school, along with other seminal thinkers. In fact, Lotman saw Europe as Russia’s key identity maker, thus offering a reverse version of Iver Neumann’s vision of Russia – along with Turkey – playing a constitutive role for Europe’s identity building in a long historical run.

However, cultural gravitation to – and suture in - Europe is paralleled in Lotman’s works with well-pronounced critical attitudes to – and cultural distance from – Europe. This might be explained by the fact that the Tartu school promoters and protagonists stayed in a relative – and sometimes voluntary - isolation from European schools of semiotic analysis, including its French tradition that has significantly enriched IR theorizing through approaching texts as domains of resistance to power, rather than accommodation with it.

In this article we dwell upon a number of core points. We start with a general discussion on how the homegrown school of cultural semiotics associated with the University of Tartu can be used as a tool offering certain optics for IR studies. In this respect we place cultural semiotic knowledge in a multidisciplinary perspective and look for projections of its concepts into the vocabulary of foreign policy. Then we intend to discuss the Tartu school from a political perspective, thus claiming that its premium put on cultural issues renders strong politicizing effects. Ultimately, we use cultural semiotic notions and approaches for problematizing the concept of the post-Soviet with its conflictual split between reproducing archaic policies and discourses, on the one hand, and playing by the rules of the post-modern society, with entertainment, hybridity and the spirit of deconstruction as its pivots.

2. The Tartu School: A Brief Guide for Political Analysis

The Tartu tradition of cultural semiotics belongs to what two Estonian scholars dub “Estonian theory as a local episteme - a territorialized web of epistemological associations and rules for making sense of the world” based on academic resources of the University of Tartu. The Tartu school theorizing is grounded in the idea of semiosphere that is understood as a cultural space where essential meanings are produced, formulated, articulated and communicated. Semiotic studies are interested to find out who and how defines relations of inclusion in and exclusion from the semiosphere, how its boundaries are socially constructed and shaped, and what exactly they delineate? Can cultural borderlands generate their own identities?

For Lotman, centers are self-regulated and relatively well organized entities, and tend to impose their semiotic cores (systems of meanings and norms) to the periphery that often treats these impositions as alien and inappropriate. Boundaries as symbolic and communicative constructs translate foreign cultural narratives into local ones, and thus can be viewed as “membranes” that transform / reprocess the outside into the inside, filter out external cultural impacts and domesticate them. It is due to the existence of cultural boundaries that external spaces get semiotically structured through constructing the outside and ascribing to outsiders certain characteristics that can often be mythical, since what lies on the opposite side of the boundary can easily be culturally marked as “chaotic”, “unfriendly”, or even “infernal”.

---

Cultural othering (the articulation of self-other distinctions) is thus a central element of cultural semiotics. It is through cultural boundaries that we construct the outer spaces and ascribe to outsiders certain characteristics. Borderlands therefore define the discursively constructed distinctions between “the secure” and “the insecure,” “the ordered” and “the disordered,” “the allowed,” and “the disallowed,” which leads to the self-reproduction of a binary type of thinking. Ultimately, the binary structure of discourse leads to “explosion” – a dramatic “collision of misunderstandings” grounded in a conflictual encounter of mutually incompatible and irreconcilable logics.

Many of these semiotic arguments are highly relevant for IR studies. In particular, it would be fully consistent with Lotman's theorizing to argue that Russia and Europe, two political communities-in-the-making, discursively construct each other's role identities, and are in the process of a painful of bargaining over their boundaries and adjusting to policies of each other. The binary logic often prevails in this process: in spite of all attempts to get rid of the Cold War legacy, the structure of EU–Russia communication reproduces and reinforces the logic of binary oppositions. Besides, this process of mutual / reciprocal construction leaves both Russia and Europe undetermined as to properly defining their (common) neighborhood(s), of which Ukraine seems to be the most dramatic example.

3. Cultural Semiotic School as a Homegrown Theory

There might be different approaches to tackle homegrown theories and engage with them in theorizing international relations. In this section we discuss how the Tartu School is relevant to improving the extant IR theoretical platforms such as constructivism and post-structuralism. The cultural semiotic reading of international relations inspired by the Tartu school raises a couple of particular issues that we would like to touch upon in this section, namely related to the multidisciplinary potential of the school and a problem of translating its key terms into other conceptual languages.

3.1. From the Tartu school to social constructivism and post-structuralism

*Multidisciplinarity:* The indispensability of interdisciplinary analysis for IR can be well illustrated by tracing intellectual trajectories of basic political concepts, such as power, security, borders, etc. At certain point of maturation all of them have became open to various readings that infused into these concepts cultural, sociological, anthropological and other interpretations and vistas. Due to this interdisciplinary cross-fertilization many traditional concepts were deployed in denser cultural and discursive contexts. Thus, the idea of security became problematized from the viewpoint of discursive practices of securitization and desecuritization, politics is discussed in terms of the interconnected processes of politicization and depoliticization, boundaries and frontiers are viewed through the prism of bordering and debordering as social and cultural phenomena, etc. Today’s academic discourse in many IR domains is replete with interdisciplinary language - security cultures, biopower, identity, otherness, and so forth.

We may start integrating the cultural semiotics into various IR theories and schools with finding some similarities between them. There are indeed many overlapping approaches and interpretations that form a vast area for cross-theoretical discussions.

Semiotics in many respects is close to *social constructivism* with its self-other dynamics and emphasis on collective identity making. The constructivist social ontology claims that
ideational structures trump material ones. Therefore, analysis of actors’ policies should start not with the allegedly pre-existing interests (as realists would do), but with social roles chosen by actors within a certain cultural milieu. “It is through communication – usually discursive, but also ritual and symbolic – that ideational structures condition actors’ identities and interests,” both constructivists and semioticians would consent. They would also agree that norms are a structural phenomenon, or “a means to maintain social order”\(^3\). In other words, norms are not simply instruments that states utilize at their liking; they foster changes in behavior, identities, and then interests of international actors. Thus, in constructivist reasoning, structures have prior causal power over agents.\(^4\) Semioticians would definitely second this claim, explaining that it is deep mechanisms of culture that in each society are foundational for its semiosphere and thus play a systemic role in its maturing.

The structural approach espoused by constructivism implies that social reality represents a network of invisible connections that compose a variety of social fields. Alexander Wendt has cogently captured this point by arguing that structures not only constrain but, more importantly, construct agents. What should be added to this point is the characterization of structures as “containers” of hegemonic relations. As Jonathan Joseph rightly presumed, “hegemony acts as a crucial mediating moment in the relation between structure and agency...[Hegemony thus] reaches down to the structural issue of the reproduction of the social formation and the various structural ensembles...Hegemony comes to represent the political moment in the structure-agency relation”\(^5\).

In the meantime, some elements of cultural semiotics might be compatible with the post-structuralist theorizing. Cultural semioticians might find a particularly rich common language with the school of critical discourse analysis when it comes to language games, imitation, mimicking and other discursive strategies widely applied by international actors in communicating with each other.

By the same token, cultural semiotic input might be quite substantial for studies of regionalism and, in particular, for the conception of boundaries as generators of important social, cultural and political dynamics. Yuri Lotman is known for his keen interest in semiotic analysis of boundaries in many cultural contexts. Post-positivists regionalist scholars would argue that “borders are moving apart – as exemplified by the history of Europe over the centuries”\(^6\). Therefore, political and legal borders of nation states less and less coincide with the complex patterns of social life, they believe. More specifically, a meeting point of semioticians and regional scholars could be a discussion on typology of boundaries that might include:

- “Borders” as geographical lines/zones that separate two territorial entities;
- “Frontiers” requiring a certain policy towards something what lies beyond them;\(^7\)
- “Edges” and “peripheries,” synonymous with underdevelopment, instability and


Unpacking the Post-Soviet...

exposure to external dangers. Political and cultural geographers describe peripheries as remote outskirts, or outlying – and usually fragmented – territories with obliterated features, and areas heavily dependent upon policies of pivotal powers;

• “Margins” that are not only products of core powers, but exist in two-way relations with these powers. Margins usually have room to maneuver and a meaningful degree of freedom in exploiting the advantages of their location. Politically, margins might be reluctant to accept that the core speaks for them; moreover, they may define the nature of the core itself. Culturally, regional identities are believed to be dependent upon interrelations between central and marginal entities.

According to post-structuralist regional scholars, state boundaries cannot bind or limit these new types of activities (in political, ecological, economic, religious, cultural, ethnic, or professional domains). The world thus is undergoing a transition from territorial communities (including nation-states) to “networks” that are independent of specifically defined territorial foundations and national identities. Networks blur distinctions between “insiders” and “outsiders”, as described by the concept of “open geography” (as opposed to the idea of “inescapable geography”). Open geography posits that “geographical cardinal points are relative”, and that there are no strict dividing lines between regions which are understood as mobile social and cultural constructs that might “encounter,” “clash,” “inject their own stories,” etc. This seems to be very much in line with Yuriii Lotman’s and Vladimir Toropov’s approaches to St. Petersburg as a particular type of text that is constitutive for Russian historical and cultural narratives. The “Petersburg text” is structurally close to what is currently known as “popular geopolitics” – a type of vernacular knowledge about geographical interpretations of political issues based on people’s narratives, myth, performances, spectacles, rumors, and even anecdotes. The “Petersburg text,” as seen from the cultural semiotic perspective, is composed of a multitude of literary representations of this city that belongs to the cultural spaces of Russia and Europe simultaneously, is included in and excluded from Europe, and within Russia balances between two reputations – as representing Russian identity and as being culturally exceptional, if not alien to Russian cultural mainstream.

This is an important point that can be extended further on by arguing that there can be no single mode of spatial representation or articulation of spaces, and all spatial arrangements can be opposed by alternatives. Geography cannot lock up regions in a “steel cage,” and geographical affiliations are subject to re-writing and re-interpretation. Therefore, both cultural semiotics and post-structuralism offer a decentralized, network-oriented model of the world, which leaves space open for creativity, inspiration, and the force of imagination, which is harmonious with approaches developed by cultural semiotics.

---

8 Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, “Contending Discourses on Marginality: the Case of Kaliningrad” (working paper, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2003).
11 Pertti Joenniemi and Marko Lehti, “On the Encounter Between the Nordic and the Northern: Torn Apart but Meeting Again?” (working paper 36, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2001), 32-3.
13 Mathias Albert, “From Territorial to Functional Space: Germany and the Baltic Sea Area” (working paper 39, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2000), 10-3.
There might also be a strong semiotic contribution to security studies, especially when it comes to the concept of securitization. Neither Lotman nor his disciples directly touched upon issues of risks, threats and dangers, yet the contemporary debates on ontological (in)security, as related to the vulnerabilities of collective identities, appear open to semiotic inputs. It is semiotic approach that can be helpful for elucidating a number of important aspects of the debate in this academic domain.

First, the debate on the discursive nature of security construction initiated by the Copenhagen school has been extended to the sphere of imageries and visuals. This trajectory fully corresponds to the evolution of the Tartu school that initially was exclusively text- and language-centric, yet ultimately matured into a more comprehensive field of studies to incorporate films, fashion, music and performative arts.

Secondly, a semiotic gaze might be productive for identifying voices of (in)security beyond the group of power holders. Opening up the sphere of politics to a variety of cultural phenomena, semioticians can be instrumental in explaining the roles of cultural actors (managers, producers, performers, authors, artists, etc.) in shaping the public agenda that defines perceptions of security.

Thirdly, the centrality of communication for semiotic relations might lead the contemporary followers of the Tartu school to a conceptually important rejection of taking the audience of security discourses as a pre-established and well-structured social group. In its stead, Lotman’s legacy might be interpreted in the sense that it is through the process of verbal interaction between “producers” and “consumers” of security narratives that both groups discursively construct their identities and subjectivities. However, given the linguistic (speech act-based) nature of the process of securitization, security-making can presumably be a self-referential practice, as opposed to an inter-subjective one. In other words, when it comes to existential security and survival, the space for dialogic communication tends to shrink, and the dominant discourse is usually bent on self-assertion and, as semioticians would say, autocommunication, rather than on dialogue.

Fourthly, there are some meaningful parallels between conceptualizing boundaries of the security sphere and boundaries of the semiosphere. Some security experts raised an important question of whether “security can mean everything,” and tend to answer it affirmatively, implying that each element of social and physical reality can be securitized, from water supply to language. A similar discussion takes place within the community of cultural semioticians as well: many of them claim that the semiosphere can embrace everything; yet in the meantime certain elements of material and ideational reality can be deprived of semiotic characteristics and thus relegated to the a-semiotic domain. The question is thus what exists beyond the semiosphere, and what segments of reality can be discursively excluded, discarded, ignored, rejected, denied or bracketed out as allegedly semiotically irrelevant and even non-existent, only because they disturb the seeming cohesiveness of the dominant discourse? Is there something for which we don’t have a language of conceptualization, and which therefore stays beyond representation? In particular, cultural semiotics and security studies can find

---

a common language in exploring perceptions and remembrances of traumatic experiences (wars, ethnic cleansings, cases of genocide, etc.) as an important element of the discursive making of security.

Translation: We may continue incorporating cultural semiotics into the terrain of international studies with an operation known from Lotman’s works as translation, or projecting the established semiotic concepts into the languages pertinent to other disciplines, such as IR.

One example would be the projection of the concepts of the sign and the image onto the domain of soft power, which opens interesting research perspectives. In fact, soft power is a deeply semiotic concept, since it can’t be operational beyond the semiosphere as the space where meanings are produced and communicated. The focus on the semiotic core of soft power allows seeing that “words alone often cannot carry the power that they often have – the force of affect is needed to explain how words resonate with audiences and have political effects beyond their mere verbal utterance…” There is no ‘natural’ link between words and the objects, identities, and so on that they purport to express…The attachment of signifiers to signified…is dependent upon an affective push prompting the construction of this linkage”.

This approach is of particular importance for soft power studies since it allows treating attraction as a largely performative and cultural construct that exists only under the condition of symbolic and emotional investment in it.

Another example is the reconceptualization of a rather traditional notion of cultural interdependence (for example, between Russia and Europe) into the post-structuralist idea of the suture that denotes the phenomenon of impossibility to break away from someone/something that you might wish to distance from. The suture is an intricate metaphor that describes the complexities of the inside - outside interrelations and dynamics. To quote Slavoj Zizek, the suture means that “self-enclosure is a priory impossible, that the excluded externality always leaves its traces within”. The suture denotes “a mode in which the exterior is inscribed in the interior” to the point of erasing substantial differences and forming “a consistent, naturalised, organic whole.” However, the suturing of external reality is always incomplete, and “external difference is always an internal one,” which demonstrates an inherent impossibility for the sutured political subject “to fully become itself”. This is exactly what can be used for comprehending a key controversy of the various region-making projects aimed at creating a coherent and prosperous regional society, distinct from the insecure outside; yet it is the irreducible and inassimilable otherness that leaves "the decentred traces" inside the regional societies-in-the-making. In particular, Lotman’s analysis of the precarious status of Russia as a European actor and its Other that needs to be domesticated nicely reflects the duality of the suturing process.

3.2. Political dimensions of cultural semiotics

Our next step would be to discover the wider political utility of approaching international relations from a cultural semiotic perspective. The question to be discussed is how the Tartu Schools can offer more novel approaches to IR studies.

20 Zizek, The Fright for Real Tears, 57.
21 Zizek, The Fright for Real Tears, 58.
Hereby the concept of the sign – as consisted of the signifier and the signified - seem to be crucial. It is the arbitrary linkage between the two elements that creates the space for political interventions, impositions and manipulations. In other words, without investments in producing and interpreting signs, that is to say relating signifiers with signifieds, politics can’t properly function.

In the meantime, the discipline of cultural semiotics offers good academic lens for exploring the process of re-signification, or redeployment of terms in previously unexplored or even “unauthorized” contexts. Re-signification is mostly used by agents located at the margins of political structures who wish to change previous meanings by either expanding the scope of concepts or by including other meanings into them.22 Re-signification is closely related to language games. Following the logic of Wittgenstein, language has neither ontological stability nor unity; consequently, there is no authoritative, determinate collective “we” that would appeal to a mental or metaphysical source of identity or authority, or unveil “literal, uninterpreted truth”.23 The language games approach claims that each concept under a closer scrutiny decomposes into a series of “pictures” of reality with their “playful and fluid”24 contexts. We shall come back to this while discussing the post-modernist reading of the post-Soviet Russia.

One should also pay attention to cultural semiotics as a helpful tool in discovering different languages of (international) politics. For example, instead of binary distinction between democracy and autocracy the discipline of cultural semiotics prefers to speak about different types of discourses, with a key distinction between dialogue (inter-subjective communication) and auto-communication (or self-referential communication), requiring no external other for legitimizing its speaking positions. In this sense the semiotic approach can be instrumental in avoiding absolutization and universalization of inter-subjectivity as one of pillars of constructivist theorizing; from a semiotic perspective inter-subjective construction of each other’s identities might be challenged or reversed by more unilateral and even unidimensional discourses grounded in the radiation of meanings from one center to multiple peripheries.

Very close to that we may find the semiotic concept of autopoiesis. “If the human mind is an autopoietic system, i.e. one that permanently constructs its own world, then representation can only be self-referential in nature. Self-reference has, furthermore, been declared to be a characteristic feature of postmodern culture. If postmodernity is confronted with a loss of the referent of the signs… the remains of these signs thus deprived of their function of representation can only become self-referential”.25

The most important political conclusion from the semiotic approach to culture is that value-based discourses increase the chances for auto-communication, both in democracies and non-democracies. Semiospheres can be playgrounds for totalizing practices, which explains the dangers of self-description and self-referentiality: the semiosphere can become “a self-identical homogenous structural whole” with a consequent effacement of internal

---

23 Christopher Robinson, Wittgenstein and Political Theory: The View from Somewhere (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 12-3.
24 Robinson, Wittgenstein, 49.
differences and multiplicity” through discursive practices of totalization, internalization, centring and structural unity that are manifested in a universalized language with a “single finite truth” that “occupies the core of the semiotic space” and “functions as the basis of what Lotman defines as the transcendental unity of self-consciousness”. It is exactly at this point that “a central codifying mechanism appears as a kind of generator of transcendental signifiers which are imposed as universal expression forms into the different contents circulating within the semiotic space, and which transforms the latter into an ordered and hierarchical totality”.

From a policy perspective, it is exactly this semiotic frame that might be used for understanding the unexpected for most analysts upsurge of far-right, conservative, nationalist, nostalgic and global-sceptical discourses all across the West, especially against the backdrop of the refugee crisis. These discourses that struggle for hegemony not only within specific countries (France, Germany, Austria, Poland, etc.), but also within the West, can be qualified as self-referential, autocommunicative and autopoietic in the sense that its bearers do not seek recognition or legitimation through constructively and interactively engaging with alternative or opposing discourses; rather they stabilize themselves through grounding in the idea of self-sufficiency of national forms of identification and reinterpretation of traditional Western concepts of democracy and freedom.

4. A Cultural Semiotic Perspective on the Post-Soviet Space

The theoretical observations given above might be used for purposes of political analysis in the sphere of post-Soviet studies, with Russia as the key player in this respect. In this section we focus on a range of possible interpretations of the post-Soviet space from a cultural semiotic perspective, which might be enriching for understanding the logic of turbulent transition in this part of the world.

In the extant literature much has been said about archaic and retrospective - if not retrograde - nature of many of post-Soviet regimes. This is particularly the case of Russia whose post-Soviet identity is largely rooted in practices vectored to the bygone past – great power management (otherwise known as a concert of great powers), spheres of influence, balance of power, etc. There are many voices in Russian academic community describing Russia as an archaic type of society that challenged rationality in decision-making and accumulates potential for coercion and violence. The rehabilitation of the Soviet model plays a particularly salient role in the archaic shift. What has started as basically a commodification and commercialization of nostalgia in a matter of years became a powerful source of politicization. According to Sergey Naryshkin, the head of the External Intelligence Service, Russia should not apologize for its history whatsoever. Elements of the Soviet semiotics came gradually back, including, for instance, the restoration of Leonid

---

27 Monticelli, Wholeness and Its Remainders, 195.
28 Monticelli, Wholeness and Its Remainders, 194.
Brezhnev’s commemorative plaque in Moscow. The Minister of Culture claimed that the society should praise the Soviet heroes as the Church venerates its saints, in its turn the head of the Russian Orthodox Church declared that one should not belittle achievements of Stalin.

This nostalgic trend definitely stretches far beyond Russia. The case in point is not only Russia’s increasingly obvious penchant for recycling Soviet practices; what is more, intellectual departures and recipes from the Cold War times (from the Kennan “long telegram” to Henry Kissinger’s advices to today’s Russian leaders) still keep their vitality and validity as explanatory tools applicable to a new reality of Russia’s confrontation with the West that obviously challenges ideas of globalization, trans-nationalization and de-territorialization constituted at the core of the post-Cold War international normative order.

It is not only that the Cold War mentality is easily revivable under this semiotic frame, but also the legacy of the Second World War can be recycled, as illustrated by the projection of the anti-fascist discourse of the time of the Great Patriotic War onto the situation in today’s Ukraine. These domestic trends have their foreign policy implications, since they can explain why Russian political establishment seriously considers “to play the same game as before [with the West], but to play it smarter”.

The semiotic dimension is crucial for duly comprehending this dominant tendency of building today’s Russian foreign policy on the highly symbolized and glorified triumphalist models excavated from the collective memory. It would be fair to assume that with the generation of wartime veterans almost completely passed away, the pro-Stalinist sentiments of certain social groups are based on the desire to identify themselves with a demonstration of force as such. The repetitive emotional rereading of the Great Patriotic War and the emotional projection of its meanings to contemporaneity are key elements of Russian security discourses under Putin’s presidency, especially in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea. The fight against fascism during the Second World War became a major reference point not only in the Russian mainstream discourse justifying the land grab by protecting ethnically Russian people from the so called “Kyiv’s junta,” but also in Russian performative propaganda that is an interesting object of semiotic research. One of the most illustrative examples is a bike show staged by the explicitly pro-Kremlin group “Night Wolves” near Sevastopol after the annexation: its plot visually represent the Maidan revolution as a neo-Nazi coup masterminded by the West and aimed against both Ukraine and Russia, which justifies Russia’s interference paralleled with the Soviet mission in the 1941-1945 war with fascism.
From a semiotic viewpoint, the recycling of Soviet experiences might be seen as a major boost for a binary type of thinking, particularly salient in times of security crises, which leaves at the limelight of discourse “only overt contrasts, only direct meanings, no metaphors”. This semiotic reading leaves much space for drawing some – perhaps unexpected - parallels between Lotman and Carl Schmitt. Lotman’s interpretation of the deep structures of Russian culture as grounded in polarizing binaries is coterminous with Schmitt’s understanding of the structure of the political as firmly engrained in the friend–foe dichotomy. Andreas Schonle and Jeremy Shine rightly claim that binary oppositions can be helpful for solidifying the hegemonic discourses and preventing them from fragmentation and dissipation, and it is exactly this political function that seems to be dominant in the case of Russian foreign policy’s resemblance – if not continuity - with Soviet practices and experiences.

Yet there is a different – and much less studied - dimension of the Putin regime, namely its ability to engage with more complex foreign policy models. To a large extent, Putin’s hegemonic discourse displayed a great deal of agility in deeply engaging with the manipulative potential of discourses and imageries grounded in the cultural industry producing signs and symbols, as exemplified by speech acts and images used for both consolidating the regime from inside and conveying a set of essential messages for external audiences. It might thus be argued that one of explanations of Putin’s regime is its appropriation of meaningful semiotic resources that it deploys in discursive contexts that delegitimize the kernel of the Western normative order. It is in this sense that this strategy can be considered as part of post-modernist paradigm that celebrates “the liberation of signs from dependency on well-defined signifieds… [and] from the strict confines of normative, foundationalist doctrines,” and it is this semiotic reality that Putin’s hegemonic discourse uses for the sake of stabilizing itself. This reality also includes the exhaustion and fading away of grand narratives. The strategy of the Kremlin foreign propaganda is exactly grounded in taking advantage of the “end of ideology” that is instrumentalized and pragmatically, if not cynically, turned against the core normative commitments of the West. Russia’s foreign policy messages are packed not as a consistent discourse, but as clusters of “catchphrases”, “codes without referents” that simulate “a reality where even the original turns out to be a mere copy”.

The blurred boundaries between the fact and the fiction, and the de-facto substitution of politics with performative acts of “post-truth” indicate a much greater problem stretching beyond Russia, since they might be seen as symptoms of a new worldview that excludes predictability, negates rationality, and downplays the attempts to judge the present from the standpoint of historical experience accumulated since the collapse of communism. Putin's project, therefore, can be seen as a part of post-modern deconstructions: unlike the Soviet project, it does not need to emanate the ultimate truth, in its discursive milieu everything is potentially constructed and deconstructed, with blurred lines between the fake and the real. At this juncture, cultural semiotics might offer a particularly interesting research outlook

---

from a post-structuralist perspective of “society of the spectacle” (authored by Guy Debord) and simulacrum (developed by Jean Baudrillard), concepts with strong semiotic backgrounds. Today governments and corporate actors invest huge budgets in creating systems of signifiers (nation branding, place promotion, high-profile performances and shows, cultural and sportive mega-events, etc.) that not only embellish undemocratic rule, but often distort and misrepresent the situation on the ground. This is especially the case of authoritarian governments looking for legitimizing their policies through investing in symbolic capital and using propagandistic imageries and visuals aimed for domestic and external consumption. Non-Western regimes are quite successful in promoting their semantically loaded messages and signs, however detached from reality they might be. Their discourses and imageries can be quite adaptable to the post-industrial information society of the 21st century. Some of these regimes in the post-Soviet area, Russia included, use the whole global infrastructure of media entertainment and advertisement for legitimizing their rule through cultural association with Europe that otherwise is lambasted as a source of morally unacceptable and socially detrimental practices. As many authoritarian regimes, Russia invests in promoting and legitimizing itself through what might be called a political economy of performances, images and regimes of signification. As many other countries, it is eager to spend lots of resources for the sake of advertising itself and embellishing its image for global audiences. Sportive mega events are a particular form of cultural production of entertainment, a series of exorbitantly expensive mega signifiers for nation branding and advertisement. The Sochi Olympics was an important element of politically legitimizing the Putin regime through self-assertive discourses of national pride, respect and admiration.

5. Conclusions

One of major conclusions to be drawn from this analysis is a huge – and still unexplored – emancipatory potential of semiotic expertise as a contributor to IR (re)theorizing. We have seen that many of well established IR concepts can be treated as semiotic constructs (such as soft power), and in the meantime many semiotic terms (representations, signs and meanings, etc.) can be read from the vantage point of IR scholarship. This intellectual cross-fertilization might open up the discipline of cultural semiotics to wider inter- and multi-disciplinary exposures, and by the same token discover cultural underpinnings in the professional lexicon of IR specialists.

An important element of our analysis concerns the culture–politics debate. Pace Lotman’s initial insistence on the autonomy of culture as inherently apolitical (or extra-political) sphere, many of the post-Lotman scholars specifically focus on political dimensions of cultural practices. As we have argued in this article, the fundamental political aspect of semiotic (and thus sign-based) representations, both textual and visual, boils down to the arbitrary and changeable nature of relations between the signifier and the signified; in other words, in the possibility to always reconsider and remold the meanings we attach to concepts as cornerstones of our language. (Re)signification therefore is pivotal for the everlasting process of (re)producing the political momentum, which from a practical perspective is a powerful tool for any politically meaningful action – socialization, mobilization, manipulation, and so forth.

One more facet of semiotic analysis relates to its contribution to elucidating the structure of political discourses. Of particular relevance is Lotman’s acceptance of deep dependence
of our thinking on dichotomies, followed by his anticipation of the transformation of the dominant binary logic into a more complex ternary one. Indeed, many of primordial political and academic conceptualizations are formulated in the language of binary distinctions – such as friends versus enemies, “false Europe” and “true Europe” (Iver Neumann’s conception of two dominant paradigms of Russia’s western policies), bordering and debordering, securitization and desecuritization, etc. A good example at this point would be a binary soft–hard security distinction that reflected primarily the dominant Western attitudes and anticipations in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, when other dichotomies were in a wide use as well (democracy versus autocracy, or freedom versus non-freedom).

One of the problems at this point is that many of these binaries have lost their cognitive potential and political appeal, since the structure of international relations has gradually become more complex and less susceptible to simplistic divisions and partitions. In a post-modern type of discourse binaries can be viewed as largely irrelevant and lacking in explanatory force; however many of them appear quite resilient and still keep playing their structuring roles in many political discourses, especially those positively retrospective (including the neo-Soviet nostalgia in the post-Soviet Russia addressed above, or the European right-wing sympathies with “old good times” of the nation state).

The debate on the power of binaries and their endurance can be extended to the analysis of the internal nature of the polarized structures. In particular, a distinction can be drawn between intersubjective dialogue between the two opposing poles (for example, proponents of hard versus soft security), and the autocommunicative and self-referential mode of articulation within each of the poles. The latter is conducive to the appearance and proliferation of concepts that position themselves as relatively self-sufficient and disinterested in legitimizing their discursive power through constant referring to and engaging with alternative or competing sources of conceptualization. In the sphere of IR – as in other social sciences – this leads to the dominance of rather closed schools of thought with their specific language of communication and circle of devoted adherents. This is why breaking invisible barriers between schools and theories and reaching out to other disciplinary fields is one of the most topical issues for interdisciplinary academic research.

From a semiotic perspective it would be also expedient to pay attention not only at the divisive momentum inherent in binary concepts, but also in their roles as building blocs in constructing relations of equivalence, with potential political consequences. For example, discourses that equate – or, at least, place at the same grounding – Communism and fascism as two forms of totalitarian dictatorships trigger ardent protest from the official Moscow that insists on treating them as historical mortal enemies fighting against each other. A similar political mechanism of equalization is manifested in a vision of Russian propaganda representing a challenge as strong to the EU as that of ISIS. Obviously, from the Russian perspective, Islamic terrorist groups are a common enemy of both Russia and the West, which is meant at creating a completely different relation of equivalence and difference.

These examples attest to an intricate nature of self-other (or “us” -versus- “them”) distinctions indispensable for any identity making. The cultural and semiotic production of relations of otherness and alterity necessarily implies both polarization (along with

---

distinction and partition) and construction of equivalence (or relations of solidarity and positive association). This symbiotic intermingling exposes one of the pivotal elements of politicization as a series of speech acts grounded in cultural and semiotic identification and dissociation, alignment and disengagement.

Semiotic analysis can be immensely helpful in scrutinizing cultural underpinnings of political momenta and their interpretations in categories stretching far beyond approaches traditional to political science and IR. The cultural semiotic toolkit, leaving aside simplistic binaries, looks at cultural contexts of political actions and practices through focusing on their performative, aesthetic and artistic dimensions not as peripheral, but rather as central elements of the political. It is in this capacity that the discipline of cultural semiotics might find its niche in bringing new creative insights in analysis of foreign policy and international relations.

Bibliography


Conceptual Cultivation and Homegrown Theorizing: The Case of/for the Concept of Influence

Eyüp Ersoy

Abstract

The absence of theoretical perspectives in International Relations originating in the worldviews and experiences of human geographies outside the West has elicited persistent calls in the discipline for homegrown theoretical frameworks based on indigenous practices and intellectual sensibilities. Responding to the veritable marginalization of non-Western viewpoints in the discipline belying the plurality of global experiences, a diverse range of studies on homegrown theorizing has ensued. Inasmuch as the initial step in any social theorizing is pertinent to concepts, studies of homegrown theorizing have necessarily engaged conceptual cultivation by drawing on local conceptual resources. Most of these studies, nonetheless, have evinced an analytical proclivity to forge an exclusive and immutable semantic affiliation between concepts and what they signify. Transmuting conceptual indigeneity into conceptional idiosyncrasy, this insular practice of homegrown theorizing can incur manifold degenerative shortcomings. On the other hand, in the lexicon of international relations, influence is a ubiquitous word which is yet to be rigorously conceptualized. By virtue of imparting indigenous properties, a systematic conceptual cultivation of influence is propounded in this study, which arguably transcends the prohibitive semantic inflexibility and associated shortcomings of conceptual exclusivity in homegrown theorizing.

Keywords: Conceptual cultivation, homegrown theorizing, influence, power, conceptual exclusivity

1. Introduction

Homegrown theorizing in international relations has recently gained more salience in disciplinary debates thanks to persistent calls for theoretical pluralism in international relations. The fundamental rationale underlying such disciplinary appeals is the consequential absence of theoretical perspectives originating in the worldviews and experiences of human geographies outside the West. Peoples of rich diversity in their historical and contemporary practices in international relations are generally relegated to secondary, and even subordinate, analytical categories, such as ‘the periphery,’ in relation to ‘the West,’ despite the unmistakable fact that their dispositions, preferences, and actions have been equally significant in the ultimate outcomes of global processes. The majority of the world, called ‘the non-West,’

Eyüp Ersoy, PhD, Independent Researcher, International Relations. Email: eyupersoy@hotmail.com.

1 There are indeed several analytical categories employed in the discipline to identify and differentiate human geographies in international relations with distinct and usually incongruent empirical scopes and normative connotations. One overarching classificatory template is the binary division of the world into two, one category being assigned to what is called ‘the West,’ and the other category being assigned to ‘what-is-not-the-West.’ The second category has been called the third world, the global south, the rest, and the developing world, among others. Abiding by the denomination that seems to have achieved widespread recognition in studies of and on homegrown theorizing, in this study ‘the non-West’ is preferred.
who are constitutive of the reality that is called international relations are not interpretative of that reality, and are only deemed illustrative for Western theory.

Although a corpus of non-Western theoretical approaches equivalent to that of Western theoretical approaches in composition, sophistication, and progression has yet to emerge in the discipline, a formative recognition of the necessity and feasibility of constructing indigenous perspectives to understand, explain, and predict international phenomena based on local intellectual sensibilities has incrementally suffused disciplinary discussions. Since the initial step in any social theorizing is pertinent to concepts, studies on homegrown theorizing have necessarily encountered the exigency of engaging conceptual inquiries. In this paper, first, the essential role of concepts in homegrown theorizing is discussed, and the varieties of native conceptual resources on which homegrown attempts of conceptual cultivation draw are introduced. In addition, the ways through which conceptual cultivation in homegrown theorizing can be performed are presented. Second, a novel definition of the concept of influence is propounded since a rigorous and systematic conceptual cultivation of influence is still lacking in international relations literature despite its perfunctory extensive usage. Besides, a special analytical emphasis is given to the relationship between influence and power. In the final section, conceptual exclusivity in homegrown theorizing and the analytical shortcomings it creates are critically discussed, and the explanatory potential of the concept of influence in homegrown theorizing is assessed, and affirmed.

2. Conceptual Cultivation and Homegrown Theorizing

The indispensability of concepts in theorizing in social sciences arises from the simple methodological necessity that concepts “are some of the main building blocks for constructing theoretical propositions.” Concept formation is ontologically crucial in identifying the phenomena and defining their attributes to be theorized. Accordingly, concepts determine the ontological contours of theory construction and the ensuing theoretical analysis by signifying certain phenomena with preconceived properties in social reality by simultaneously excluding some other phenomena or by excluding some other properties of the same phenomena from the process of theory construction. The construction of concepts, on the other hand, is a dynamic process that is subject to innovations, revisions, disputations, and contestations, more often than not susceptible to analytical confusion. In this study, I prefer ‘conceptual cultivation’ instead of the more mechanical term of ‘concept construction’ inasmuch as concepts are like living things embedded in the systems of meaning they are ‘planted,’ to which they acclimate in constantly transmuting varieties with outcomes ranging from sprouting to flourishing and sometimes to withering, semantically speaking.

As a case of conceptual cultivation in international studies, a passionate theoretical debate on the nature and extent of security persists. Security is an “essentially contested concept,” argues Barry Buzan, whereas for David A. Baldwin, “security is more appropriately

---


3 See, for example, Leonidas Tsilipakos, Clarity and Confusion in Social Theory: Taking Concepts Seriously (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2015). For example, in different theoretical fields of international relations, the concept of structure is attributed distinct meanings. Even in the sub-fields of the same theory, structure would have come to assume very different meanings. Accordingly, in the absence of sedulous assessment, analytical confusion is bound to ensue.

described as a confused or inadequately explicated concept than as an essentially contested one.\footnote{David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” \textit{Review of International Studies} 23, no. 1 (1997): 12. Also see, Benjamin Miller, “The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?” \textit{Journal of Strategic Studies} 24, no. 2 (2001): 13-42.} Essentially complicated or not, security is a cultivated concept in international relations. Depending on the referent object of security, or the unit of analysis, the scope of security research has been explored from ‘rice security’ to ‘space security.’ It has also been ‘cultivated’ at different levels of analysis: encompassing human/individual security, societal security, state/national security, regional security, international security, and global/world security.\footnote{For some examples, see, Amy Freedman, “Rice Security in Southeast Asia: Beggar Thy Neighbor or Cooperation,” \textit{The Pacific Review} 26, no. 5 (2013): 433-54; Kai-Uwe Schrelog et al., eds., \textit{Handbook of Space Security: Policies, Applications and Programs} (New York: Springer, 2015); Shahranou Tadjbaksh and Anuradha Chenoy, \textit{Human Security: Concepts and Implications} (Oxon: Routledge, 2007); Paul Roe, \textit{Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma} (Oxon: Routledge, 2005); Norrin M. Ripsman and T. V. Paul, \textit{Globalization and the National Security State} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Thomas G. Mahlknecht and Dan Blumenthal, eds., \textit{Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); Karin M. Fierke, \textit{Critical Approaches to International Security} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015); Ken Booth, \textit{Theory of World Security} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).} Among the conceptual derivations of security eliciting extensive analytical interest is ontological security, which refers “to the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time-as being rather than constantly changing-in order to realize a sense of agency.”\footnote{Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 12, no. 3 (2006): 342. It is asserted, for example, that “while physical security is (obviously) important to states, ontological security is more important because its fulfillment affirms a state’s self-identity (i.e. it affirms not only its physical existence but primarily how a state sees itself and secondarily how it wants to be seen by others),” and furthermore, “nation-states seek ontological security because they want to maintain consistent self-concepts, and the ‘Self’ of states is constituted and maintained through a narrative which gives life to routinized foreign policy actions.” Brent J. Steele, \textit{Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State} (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 2-3. Another derivative concept constituting the basis of an influential school in security studies, i.e. the Copenhagen School, is securitization.\footnote{For a recent application of securitization in a non-Western context see, Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya, eds., \textit{Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation} (Oxon: Routledge, 2016).} In brief, conceptual cultivation of security has proved to constitute a fertile research agenda in international relations.

Conceptual cultivation in theoretical studies in pursuit of devising indigenous analytical frames of reference is preceded, as it seems, by a self-reflexive process of exploring and exploiting native conceptual resources.\footnote{For example, Aydınlı and Mathews suggest that homegrown theorizing “address an existing body of literature, but [find] a gap or inconsistency in that literature and then [add] to that existing literature with concepts derived out of the local context and case,” Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Mathews, “Periphery Theorising for a Truly Internationalised Discipline: Spinning IR Theory out of a gap or inconsistency in that literature and then [add] to that existing literature with concepts derived out of the local context and case,” \textit{Review of International Studies} 34 (2008): 702.} Among conceptual resources, first, the notions and convictions of classical thinkers in non-Western contexts are revisited, reinterpreted, and reconfigured to develop indigenous approaches to international relations. This reflects a similar formative trajectory in the emergence of Western IR theory, which claims to represent an intellectual pedigree originating in the works of historical figures from Thucydides onwards. In the Chinese context, for example, the ideas of Sun Tzu and Confucius are recurrent themes of studies on homegrown approaches, while in the Indian context, the views of Kautilya, also called Chanaky, are habitually drawn upon.\footnote{For some examples, see, Yan Xuetong, “Xun Zi’s [Sun Tzu] Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications,” \textit{Chinese Journal of International Politics} 2, no. 1 (2008): 135-65; Yan Xuetong, \textit{Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power} (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011); P. K. Gautam, “Relevance of Kautilya’s \textit{Arhasastra},” \textit{Strategic Analysis} 37, no. 1 (2013): 21-8.} Second, historical traditions of thought, beliefs, and conventions are invoked instead of particular sages or scholars. Accordingly, for instance, Confucianism instead of Confucius, and Islamic thought instead of Ibn Khaldun are appropriated as conceptual resources.\footnote{See, among others, Cho-yun Yuan-Kang Wang, \textit{Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics} (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008).} Historical experiences of non-Western peoples and
polities are reflected upon to reveal authentic modes of thought and action in international relations. There can be other conceptual resources of equal analytical import in homegrown theorizing, such as foundational civilizational/cultural texts, foreign policy doctrines of political leaders, and contemporary state of affairs in international relations.

In conceptual cultivation, what is of consequence is not the morphology of a concept but its semantics. For instance, referring to the concept of influence as *nufūḏ / nofooz* (transliterations of the same word نفوذ in Arabic and Persian respectively) in an Arabic, Iranian, or in general, Islamic context does not spontaneously impart indigeneity to the concept. The semantic criteria for the indigeneity of influence in these contexts is its peculiar meanings with authentic connotations. Drawing on local conceptual resources, conceptual cultivation for homegrown theorizing can be performed in five distinct ways. First, a researcher can engage in novel conceptualization by appropriating a common linguistic unit, be it a word or a phrase, and attributing idiosyncratic properties to it, effectively rendering the word or phrase into a concept. Security is a common word employed in everyday language, and yet with the ascription of unique qualities, it is translated into a concept in international studies through a myriad of conceptualizations. These qualities, nonetheless, may not be necessarily derived from already existing indigenous conceptual resources inasmuch as these qualities constitute indigenous qualities in and of themselves as parts of the novel conceptualization.

Second, a researcher can redefine a concept already in use in Western theorizing by virtue of imparting indigenous properties to it. For example, one can reconceptualize human security by reconfiguring its referents as belief/religion, life, wealth/property, procreation/offspring, and mind/intellect from an Islamic perspective, the protection and preservation of which is considered the ultimate purpose of Islamic jurisprudence. Third, a researcher can take a non-conceptual derivative of a concept, which is again already in use in Western theorizing, usually in its adjectival form or phrasal alteration, and attribute indigenous characteristics to it. In Western theorizing, securitization and human security are two foremost examples, and the same approach is equally valid, at least in theory, for non-Western theorizing. Fourth, a researcher can opt for an indigenous concept, and apply it to theoretical undertaking in its authentic sense or senses (a concept in a sophisticated tradition of thought can acquire multiple meanings in the process of intellectual speculation). Harmony is a cultivated concept in Chinese political philosophy, and its referral in its original sense(s) in studies of China’s international relations is, for the most part, a preference to establish a coherent conceptual framework for indigenous theoretical approaches. Fifth, on the other hand, revising its

---


14 The following discussion draws, in part, on Gonca Biltekin, “Özgün teori inşası ve batı-dışı uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri [Homegrown theorizing and non-western international relations theories],” in *Uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri* [International relations theories], ed. Ramazan Güven (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2014), 217-64.
authentic sense(s), a researcher can redefine an indigenous concept for analytical purposes, such as its application in a different level of analysis or its application to a different unit of analysis.

3. Conceptual Cultivation of Influence
In the lexicon of the discipline of international relations, influence is a ubiquitous word which is yet to be rigorously conceptualized, and it is a phenomenon in international politics which is yet to be extensively theorized. This is a curious disciplinary case for some reasons. First, ‘sphere of influence’ as a phrase has been in use in the academic literature since it was first coined at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which divided the African continent into the ‘spheres of influences’ of European colonial powers. In other words, it is not a novel conceptual innovation nor is it recently incorporated into the discipline of international relations from other disciplines. Second, concepts similarly in use in the international relations literature like power and security have been excessively studied in the discipline both theoretically and empirically to the extent that these studies have constituted separate literatures of their own. Third, influence as an uncultivated concept has been extensively employed in academic as well as non-academic studies becoming an inseparable part of the international relations literature. In most of these studies, however, there appears to be no attempt to formulate and clarify the concept of influence, that is, no attempt for conceptualization, and the meaning of influence is just assumed as self-evident, or the author’s understanding of the concept of influence is implicit within the text and can only be inferred indirectly from the text.

Therefore, with regard to influence, there seems to be a conceptual and theoretical underdevelopment in international relations literature, which requires, above all, a systematic and yet lucid conceptual cultivation of influence. On the other hand, influence, as a phenomenon, is inherently related to power in international relations, and is frequently confused with it. Accordingly, introducing a distinct definition of influence necessitates differentiating the two concepts. Hence, power needs to be clarified first.

“Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure,” Joseph S. Nye, Jr. poetically acknowledges. Nonetheless, the enticing challenge of defining or measuring power, like love, has been embraced by scholars of international relations with ardor. Scholars of international relations have depended on divergent conceptions of power in their analyses, and there has yet to be a consensus on a common definition. These diverse conceptions of power have frequently challenged, contradicted, complemented, and overlapped each other. It is no surprise that the simple linguistic characteristics that two ontologically distinct entities can be signified by the same concept is lost in the exhaustive conceptual debates on power. Power is a polysemous word essentially signifying two ontologically discrete phenomena, and thus having two distinct meanings. There have been attempts to define these two discrete phenomena with two different concepts. One early attempt came from Raymond Aron, who

---

pointed out that “French, English and German all distinguish between two notions, power and force (strength), puissance et force, Macht und Kraft,” analogous to the Turkish notions of kudret and kuvvet. To Aron, it did not seem “contrary to the spirit of these languages to reserve the first term for the human relationship, the action itself, and the second for the means, the individual’s muscles or the state’s weapons.” A similar dichotomy has recently emerged distinguishing between the action itself and the means with the concepts of ‘power-over’ and ‘power-to,’ though the precise and unanimous definitions of ‘power-over’ and ‘power-to’ have yet to be agreed upon among scholars. Even so, two conceptions of power, one pertinent to the means of interaction, and the other pertinent to the outcome of interaction, are discernable.

The first conception of power, which can be called ‘power as capacity’ (Power I), refers to the material and non-material, tangible and intangible, resources possessed, and employed if need be, by an actor to have an effect on the outcome of a process of interaction. This conception of power is espoused, for instance, by John J. Mearsheimer. According to Mearsheimer, while others “define power in terms of the outcomes of the interactions between states,” by asserting that power “is all about control or influence over other states,” for him power “represents nothing more than specific assets or material resources that are available to a state.” The second conception of power, on the other hand, which can be called ‘power as capability’ (Power II), refers to the ability of an actor to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction. Accordingly, while power as capacity can be ascertained at any point, in and before a process of interaction, power as capability can only be ascertained at the end of a process of interaction. Although most conceptions of power appraise power as a capability, they differ on the causal mechanism through which certain resources possessed by a state are translated into the ability of state to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of an interaction. I argue that the nexus translating ‘power as capacity’ (Power I) into ‘power as capability’ (Power II) is influence.

In the scholarly literature of international relations, influence is in widespread circulation, employed to denote various international phenomena ranging from the international ‘influence of potato’ to ‘influence warfare’ between terrorists and governments. It may refer to policy behaviors of various actors ranging from single personalities to international organizations. In most of the research, influence is employed in the basic senses of effect or control, in a similar fashion Kenneth N. Waltz observes regarding the concept of ‘reification’. He argues that such “loose use of language or the employment of metaphor” serves limited

---

19 Aron, Peace and War, 48.
purpose other than “to make one’s prose more pleasing”. In some other research, however the author’s understanding of influence is implicit within the text, and can only be inferred indirectly from the text.

The word ‘influence,’ coming from Latin means ‘flowing into,’ akin to its Turkish translation nüfüz, which, coming from Arabic, means ‘penetration.’ There are tentative definitions, or at least definitional attempts, for influence in international relations literature. An ambiguous definition, for example, was introduced by Frederick H. Hartmann according to whom influence was simply “unconscious power.” To Hartmann, “in a more formal sense, power is the strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-state can use to achieve its national interests,” and “the very existence of power has an effect,” meaning that “no state can ignore the possibility that the power of another state will be used.” Accordingly, he clarifies, “the power of that other state is in effect used, and plays some part both in the initial formulation of policies and in the subsequent relations of the states concerned, even where it is not intentionally put to use.” In short, influence, as unconscious power, ensues. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, on the other hand, provide a circular definition of influence. They argue that “a state’s influence (or capacity to influence or coerce) is not only determined by its capabilities (or relative capabilities) but also by (1) its willingness (and perceptions by other states of its willingness) to use these capabilities and (2) its control or influence over other states.” This oblique definition of influence, it seems, confuses more than it clarifies.

A study on regional security strategies in Southeast Asia introduces a novel concept, ‘balance of influence,’ based on a conception of influence as encapsulating “a range of other modes and means [than military and economic resources] by which states with relatively less preponderance of power may still wield the resources and capacity to shape their strategic circumstances by virtue of status, membership, normative standing, or other persuasive abilities.” According to Evelyn Goh, the conception of ‘balance of influence’ permits researchers “to expand the number of key reference points from which they may compare resources, and highlights that a state’s influence and power may come as much from ideational sources as from material sources.” Goh’s conceptualization treats influence as a derivative of non-material instruments and sources of interstate diplomacy. Another study defines influence in a footnote as “power as control over actors,” and then refers to Jeffrey Hart’s definition of control over actors, i.e. “the ability of A to get B to do something which he would otherwise not do.” This definition of power was originally Dahl’s definition of power.

24 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010), 120.
26 Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, 41.
27 Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, 41.
28 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond (Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon, 1999), 64. Italics added.
29 The confusion here is the authors’ circular assertion that a state’s influence is determined by its influence!
30 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (2007-08): 147. This is an example of the third way of conceptual cultivation, that is, taking a non-conceptual derivative of a concept in use in Western theorizing, and attribute indigenous characteristics to it in phrasal alteration.
31 Goh, “Great Powers”.
evident in the works of David A. Baldwin\textsuperscript{35} and Nye, Jr.\textsuperscript{36} Although these scholars regard it as a definition of power, not influence or control, he argues that “this [definition] lumps together two related but distinct elements.”\textsuperscript{37} Ironically, in his attempt to define influence as a distinct element, he concludes by subsuming influence with power under the same definition.

As a final example, in his entry of \textit{Influence} to the \textit{Encyclopedia of Power}, Keith Dowding indicates two different definitions of influence. In the first definition, influence “is usually considered a form of verbal persuasion,” in the sense that “information given by A to B will change B’s decision. That information influences B’s decision.”\textsuperscript{38} Here, influence is considered a subset of power. In the second, influence is defined as “the socially induced modification of behavior” and thus, distinct from power, i.e. “structurally determined abilities to change behavior.”\textsuperscript{39} According to Dowding, “such a demarcation between power and influence is only definitional,” and “whether influence is a subset of power or a different category altogether is only of any interest if the difference has any effect on the manner in which we examine and explain society.”\textsuperscript{40} This rather equivocal and evasive evaluation of the distinction between two concepts is unfortunate since it fails to deliver any conceptual clarity between influence and power.

Despite its extensive usage in scholarly studies in international relations, a systematic conceptualization of influence presenting a perspicuous definition of influence and a coherent exposition of its relationship with power is arguably still underdeveloped in the literature.\textsuperscript{41} In this paper, I am proposing that influence can be defined as the \textit{effect} of actor A (henceforth A) over the \textit{decision} of actor B (henceforth B) through A’s involvement in the \textit{decisionmaking} process of B. Therefore, influence is not a cause; it is an effect. In addition, it is not a potentiality; it is an actuality. A has influence over B insofar as the decision of B reflects the preference of A that would otherwise not been reflected. This definition of influence depends on a basic assumption that a state’s foreign policy behavior is not a necessary outcome of a state’s automatic response to external stimuli. More importantly, a state’s foreign policy is assumed to be invariably a contingent outcome of a decision-making process which is susceptible to involvement of other states and actors in different degrees, ways, and forms.

The pervasive confusion in understanding and explaining power, influence, and the relationship between the two originates in the conflation of their points of reference. While power can be about both decision and behavior depending on its type (Power I or Power II), influence is exclusively about decision. This conceptual ambiguity can be noticed, for example, in Thomas C. Schelling’s discussion of forcible action. According to Schelling, “the only purpose [of inflicting suffering], unless sport or revenge, must be to influence somebody’s behavior, to coerce his decision or choice.”\textsuperscript{42} For Schelling, as it seems, altering the behavior of somebody and altering the decision of somebody are identical. However,

\textsuperscript{37} Jeremy Pressman, “Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East,” 150. The quotation is from the footnote.
\textsuperscript{38} Dowding, \textit{Encyclopedia of Power}, 342.
\textsuperscript{39} Dowding, \textit{Encyclopedia of Power}, 342.
\textsuperscript{40} Dowding, \textit{Encyclopedia of Power}, 342.
\textsuperscript{41} As a matter of fact, some noteworthy attempts to that end have been made from the perspective of sociology and political science. For a detailed presentation of these studies, see Ruth Zimmerling, \textit{Influence and Power: Variations on a Messy Theme} (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).
\textsuperscript{42} Thomas C. Schelling, \textit{Arms and Influence} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 2.
the act of taking a decision and the act of taking an action, even when it is based on that
decision, are two ontologically distinct acts despite being temporally sequential. Taking a
decision, let’s say, to drink water and taking an action of drinking water are two separate
personal acts. By the same token, taking a decision to invade a country and taking an action
of invading a country are two separate international acts.\textsuperscript{43} Simply, deciding to do something
is one thing while doing that thing is another. Since there is always a processual mechanism
through which a decision is or is not translated into an action, the underlying assumption of
most conceptions of power that there is a spontaneous translation of decision into behavior
is empirically erroneous. Needless to say, enacting a decision, and thereby translating it into
behavior is contingent upon a multitude of factors.\textsuperscript{44}

Nevertheless, the concurrent use of the concepts of influence and power in a great many
studies evinces the general understanding of the inherent association between them. Most of
the studies use power and influence conjointly,\textsuperscript{45} some talk of ‘power without influence,’\textsuperscript{46}
some talk of ‘influence without power,’\textsuperscript{47} and some talk of ‘influence of power.’\textsuperscript{48} This inherent
association in the form of a process connecting power as capacity (Power I), influence, and
power as capability (Power II) can be formulated in a simple fashion.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig1.png}
\caption{The Nexus between Power I, Influence, and Power II}
\end{figure}

Power I, as mentioned before, refers to the material and non-material, tangible and
intangible, resources possessed and employed by A to have an effect on the behavioral
outcome of a process of interaction with B by means of having \textit{an effect on the decision} of
B. While the ultimate objective of A exercising Power I is to have an effect on the behavior

\textsuperscript{43} See, for example, Michael J. Sullivan III, \textit{American Adventurism Abroad: 30 Invasions, Interventions, and Regime Changes
since World War II} (Westport: Praeger, 2004); Bradley F. Podliska, \textit{Acting Alone: A Scientific Study of American Hegemony and
Unilateral Use-of-Force Decision Making} (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010); Ahmed Ijaz Malik, \textit{US Foreign Policy and the Gulf Wars:

\textsuperscript{44} In terms of underbalancing, see, for example, Randall L. Schweller, \textit{Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power} (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008).

\textsuperscript{45} See, for example, Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, \textit{Power and Influence: An Introduction to International Relations} (Monterey:
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Juliet Kaarbo, “Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior
Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy,” \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 40, no. 4 (1996): 501-30; Ann L. Phillips,
\textit{Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East Central Europe} (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Robert E.
Hunter, \textit{Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices} (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008); Deborah E.
de Lange, \textit{Power and Influence: The Embeddedness of Nations} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Tore T. Petersen,
2015); Lorenzo Kamel, \textit{Imperial Perceptions of Palestine: British Influence and Power in Late Ottoman Times} (New York: I. B.
Tauris, 2015).

\textsuperscript{46} See, for example, Tuomas Forsberg and Antti Seppo, “Power without Influence? The EU and Trade Disputed with Russia,”

\textsuperscript{47} See, for example, Donald M. McKale, “Influence without Power: The Last Khedive of Egypt and the Great Powers, 1914-

\textsuperscript{48} See, for example, Alfred Thayer Mahan, \textit{Influence of Sea Power upon History}, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1918); Rick Fawn, “Alliance Behavior, the Absentee Liberator and the Influence of Soft Power: Post-communist State Positions over
of B, the proximate objective of A exercising Power I is to have an effect on the decision of B. The mere act of exercising Power I does not necessarily culminate in producing an effect on the decision of B due to intervening factors that condition the translation of Power I into an effect on the decision of B.

![Figure 2: Transition Mechanism from Power I to Influence to Power II](image)

Influence, as mentioned before, is the effect of A over the decision of B through A's involvement in the decisionmaking process of B by virtue of exercising Power I. Accordingly, in verbal form, to influence means to have an effect on the decision of B by virtue of exercising Power I. In adjectival form, being influential means having an effect on the decision of B by virtue of exercising Power I. It is imperative to distinguish between influence act and influential act here. Influence act is a volitional act with whose exercise an effect on the decision of B is intended. On the other hand, influential act is a volitional act with whose exercise an effect on the decision of B is achieved. Another significant point to stress here is that both A and B are willful agents in possession of the essential attribute of agency, that is, the capacity of making a decision. Accordingly, in this sense, non-willful, that is, non-self-conscious, entities cannot be a party to an influence relationship, neither as a subject nor as an object. Both A and B are necessarily willful agents.

Power II, as mentioned before, refers to the ability of A to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction with B by means of having an effect on the decision of B. There are two highly significant points that need articulation. The first is the relationship between influence and Power II. Influence as the effect of A on the decision of B is not the cause of Power II as the ability of A to have an effect on the behavior of B. There is not a causal relationship between the two as Figure 1 would suggest. Influence and Power II are ontologically distinct and yet require each other to exist; they are like the two sides of the coin. Only with influence can Power II come into existence, and Power II exists as long as influence exists. The second is that influence is a necessary condition for Power II, but not a sufficient condition. For Power II to exist, influence must exist in advance; still, the prior existence of influence does not necessarily lead to Power II. In other words, the effect on the decision of B (influence) does not necessarily lead to an effect on the behavior of B (Power II) due to intervening factors that condition the translation of decisional effect (influence) into behavioral effect (Power II). The respective points of reference for Power I, influence, and Power II are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power I</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power II</td>
<td>Behavior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List 1: Points of Reference for Power I, Influence, and Power II
4. Influence and Homegrown Theorizing

An empowered disciplinary unanimity has emerged in international relations on the West-centric, and specifically Eurocentric, disposition of prevailing theorizing. It is argued, for example, that “the bald fact of Western dominance” is beyond controversy in the established IR theory which manifests itself in “two obvious, and partly reciprocal, ways.” Implicitly relating to the questions of epistemology and ontology in theorizing, the first, the scholars continue, “is the origin of most mainstream IRT in Western philosophy, political theory and/or history. The second is the Eurocentric framing of world history, which weaves through and around much of this theory.”

Epistemological privileging of Western modes of knowledge production entrenches cognitive patterns postulating Western superiority in both the theory and practice of international relations. This privilege treatment is trenchantly criticized from several viewpoints. Mohammed Ayoob, for instance, contends that in the discipline “power translates into domination in the sphere of the manufacturing and reproduction of knowledge. Domination in the arena of knowledge further legitimatizes inequality in the international system.” In terms of the ontological foundations of West-centrism/Eurocentrism of IR theory, the defiant conviction is that “theories about the structures, processes, and events that define and recur within the international realm are based to a large extent on the history of the European states system and its role in world affairs since the sixteenth century.” As a result of this exclusive entitlement of Western epistemology and ontology for ‘conceivable’ theorizing in international relations, the discipline is now considered predominantly hegemonic.

In order to challenge, transform, and transcend the hegemony of the West in IR theorizing, persistent calls with numerous propositions are put forward. It is suggested, for example, that greater attention be paid “to the genealogy of international systems, the diversity of regionalisms and regional worlds, the integration of area studies with IR, people-centric approaches to IR, security and development, and the agency role of non-Western ideas and actors in building global order.” In a similar vein, arguing that the discipline of international relations is “dominated by Western modernity that is premised upon a self-other binary in which the other’s identity must be negated and agency be denied,” another scholar calls for the decolonization of IR theory for a “democratic ontology.” Another strand of research

---

49 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” in Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 6. Nonetheless, there are some studies contending that the discipline of international relations is not wholly dominated by the US, if not by the West. See, for example, Helen Louise Turton, International Relations and American Dominance: A Diverse Discipline (Oxon: Routledge, 2016).

50 Acharya and Buzan, “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?,” 6.


55 Ching-Chang Chen, “The Absence of Non-Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered,” International Relations of the Asia-
with an avowed interest in promoting homegrown theorizing has concomitantly focused on the state of the discipline periodically reviewing theoretical developments in non-Western contexts, as well as in the West for purposes of comparison. Indeed, a diverse array of studies advancing homegrown theoretical perspectives that are predicated on conceptual cultivations appropriating indigenous conceptual resources have been proffered.

Most of these studies, nonetheless, have evinced an analytical proclivity to expound a particular set of international phenomena observable in non-Western contexts with a particular native concept or a set of native concepts, forging an exclusive and immutable semantic affiliation between the concept and what it signifies. For example, in the Chinese context, two indigenous concepts, tianxia and harmony, have been cultivated by Chinese scholars in a quite elaborate manner to exclusively explain China’s understanding and associated practice of international relations. Transmuting conceptual indigeneity into conceptual idiosyncrasy, this insular practice of homegrown theorizing, called conceptual exclusivity here, can incur manifold degenerative shortcomings. First, it can readily reproduce the intellectual tendency of formulating analytical propositions only to constitute seemingly neutral and objective theoretical foundations for the promotion of parochial and subjective interests, both ideational and material, of the agents of theorizing, effectively retrogressing to problem-solving theorizing. It is argued, for example, that demonstrating “how non-Western alternatives [to the Westphalian system] can be even more state-centric,” the reconceptualization of tianxia by Chinese scholars “presents a popular example of a new hegemony where imperial China’s hierarchical governance is up-dated for the twenty-first century”.

Second, in the pursuit of theoretical pluralism, conceptual exclusivity would culminate in theoretical particularism, which, in turn, would stimulate theoretical exceptionalism, treating each non-Western context singularly. As an example, one of the three components of contemporary Chinese exceptionalism, according to Feng Zhang, is harmonious inclusionism, which “can be most effectively examined by tracing three recent discourses in China’s intellectual circles: the application of the ancient idea of ‘harmony with difference’ (he er butong), the ongoing official discourse on the ‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie), and the popular ‘neo-Tianxiaism’ (xin tianxia zhuyi).” The irony here is that the indigenous concepts of harmony

---


Conceptual Cultivation and...

and *tianxia* are cultivated by Chinese scholars only to postulate the exceptional character of China’s vision, and thus practice, of international relations. Theoretical particularism predicated on the exclusive semantic association of certain indigenous concepts with certain indigenous practices is liable to theoretical, and practical, exceptionalism. Furthermore, exceptionalism predicated on conceptual exclusivity is bound to constrain the receptivity of homegrown theoretical perspectives in other non-Western contexts in both theoretical premises and practical implications.

Third, in the quest to transcend West-centrism of IR theorizing, indigenous conceptual exclusivity becomes susceptible to duplicating the elemental dichotomous reasoning arguably underlying Western theorizing, albeit in native forms of dichotomies. As an example, again from the Chinese context, it is asserted that “if modern Western cosmopolitanism is an important ideological source of Western IR, traditional Chinese cosmopolitanism embodied in the *tianxia* system is a vital force shaping the way Chinese people think about IR.”

As opposed to Western cosmopolitanism whose “simple and abstract assumptions” conceal “selfish national interests under the slogan of ‘universal good’,” the advocates of Chinese cosmopolitanism argue that Chinese cosmopolitanism “takes ‘*tianxia*’ (the whole world) as an indivisible public domain and considers the world’s problems in the context of the whole world, enabling Chinese thinking to go past national interests for the interest, value and responsibilities of this world as a whole in the long-term.” Accordingly, they claim that Chinese cosmopolitanism “is inclusive, and favors culture over force, and free-choice over coercion.”

The irony here is that one of the most universal concepts of IR theorizing, that is, cosmopolitanism, is redefined with indigenous attributes only to advance a dichotomy comprised of two cosmopolitanisms with ethnocentric connotations.

To avoid the above shortcomings, indigenous theoretical approaches in international relations can be propounded in congruence with different ways of conceptual cultivation. In this research, the second way of conceptual cultivation is adopted, which refers to redefining a concept already in use in Western theorizing by virtue of imparting indigenous properties to it. On the other hand, temporal and spatial embeddedness of theorizing in international relations is in fact compellingly argued. The proverbial articulation of this position is perhaps Robert W. Cox’s assertion that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”

Nonetheless, such embeddedness is not antithetical to the temporal and spatial omnipresence of the phenomena that is being theorized. Even though concepts and their attributes are fashioned indigenously, and display temporal and spatial subjectivity, the phenomena they signify can be in objective existence in a broad temporal and spatial spectrum, such as conflict and cooperation. The seeming discrepancy between objective phenomena and subjective concept delivers an analytical space, which is imperative to surmount the prohibitive semantic inflexibility of conceptual exclusivity in homegrown theorizing. For example, influence acts are not confined to certain temporal and spatial domains. Insofar as there are actors trying to affect the decisions of others, there are influence acts, and if they succeed, influence.

---


59
Furthermore, influence acts can still reveal temporal and spatial variations with reference to different criteria, such as the actors involved, and the means employed, which enables the indigenous theorizing of influence with authentic attributes in discrete non-Western contexts.

5. Conclusion

The analytical departure point for homegrown theorizing is conceptual inquiries. Drawing on different indigenous conceptual resources, conceptual cultivation for homegrown theorizing can be performed in a number of ways. Indeed, incipient studies advancing homegrown theoretical perspectives predicated on authentic conceptual cultivations have been put forth for various non-Western contexts. Notwithstanding, in most of these studies, an analytical proclivity to expound a particular set of international phenomena observable in non-Western contexts with a particular native concept, forging an exclusive and immutable semantic affiliation between the concept and what it signifies, is noticeable. Conceptual exclusivity, as it is called here, can culminate in prohibitive semantic inflexibility potentially frustrating the progress in homegrown theorizing. A conceptual cultivation of influence is articulated here to provide further homegrown theoretical approaches with a framework which is potentially less prone to such exclusivity. Conceptual cultivation of influence transcends conceptual exclusivity by way of establishing an analytical framework which can be local in conceptual view and, at the same time, universal in theoretical purview.

By virtue of a variety of parameters transforming global governance structures in contemporary international relations, peoples and states of the non-West are no longer just quiescent objects of influence acts, and are incrementally evolving into assertive subjects of influence acts. Most IR theorists, it was once argued, “believe that studying the Western experience alone is empirically sufficient to establish general laws of individual, group, or state behavior irrespective of the point in time or the geographical location,” and “few look to the Third World to seek evidence for their arguments.”64 The conviction seems to persist. However, challenging this conviction on theoretical grounds has implications beyond theory inasmuch as influence is existentially consequential for non-Western societies and states. Conceptual cultivation of influence in non-Western contexts with authentic qualities is of critical analytical utility to inquire into the varying dynamics, forms, and outcomes of influence acts for specific non-Western contexts. It has equal analytical value to investigate asymmetrical influence structures in international relations repeatedly proved to be eviscerating for non-Western societies and states. Besides, influence acts are equally operational in interactions among non-Western contexts, which expands the scope of the relational variations of influence acts, simultaneously requiring and enabling indigenous conceptual cultivations of influence.

Bibliography


———. “Transforming Hegemonic International Relations Theorization: Nothingness, Worlding, and Balance of...


Would 100 Global Workshops on Theory Building Make A Difference?

Knud Erik Jørgensen  
Aarhus University and Yasar University

Abstract

The paper rests on the assumption that theoretical knowledge is valuable. However, such an assumption cannot be taken for granted. Indeed the first objective is to examine the comparative advantages of theoretical knowledge. Second, if 100 theory building workshops would make a difference, what exactly would the difference be? After all, movie production is said to be dominated by Hollywood but Bollywood produces more movies than Hollywood. Nonetheless, the world market is dominated by Hollywood. Hence, if a distinction between academic domestic and global markets is applied, theory building for a number of domestic or regional markets might impact ‘consumption’ patterns in domestic or regional markets but not necessarily the world market. Moreover, the apparent need for 100 workshops rests on the assumption that the IR discipline is under American hegemony but this assumption is severely challenged by empirical research showing that American hegemony remains a fact in institutional terms but not in terms of theoretical fads and debates being followed in the rest of the world. In short, intellectual global hegemony is largely a chimera. Finally, the paper argues that 100 workshops might be necessary but could turn out to be a waste of time and for two reasons. While theorizing a bygone world is fine, the workshops should address contemporary issues and be future-oriented. Furthermore, the workshops should contribute to redefine the (contented) core of the discipline.

Keywords: Theory, theory building, hegemony, markets, discipline, orthodoxy

1. Would 100 Global Workshops on Theory Building Make a Difference?

This article is essentially a concrete proposal to convene 100 workshops/panels during the next few years so that the 2019 commemorations of the highly symbolical 1919-2019 centenary can produce not only retrospective but also future-oriented studies. In order to have a lasting impact the workshops should exclusively be for scholars who have an interest in building theory. The guiding idea for the paper is that policies – for instance a policy on globalizing the discipline’s theory production – without organizational and public philosophical underpinnings have less potential impact than policies that enjoy such underpinnings. In this sense, Marx’ 11th Feuerbach thesis – philosophers have so far only interpreted the world, the point is to change it – remains valid and relevant also for academic practices. While the suggested workshops count as organizational footings, the public philosophical dimension is constituted by the idea that the IR discipline would become more consolidated and globally more relevant if global theorizing were to happen in a fashion that reflect more
diverse origins. Four observations make me think that the conditions for such an enterprise do exist. We are – cf. the 2013 special issue of the EJIR - in an ‘end of IR theory’ situation; Theorizing in one of the main centres of the discipline, the United States, does experience significant decline;¹ Theorizing in Europe is more dispersed than concerted and hegemonic; New centres of knowledge production are being established with potentials for consolidating both the discipline and its theories. In short, the timing for such an 100 workshops enterprise seems perfect.

The paper is structured in five parts. While the paper rests on the assumption that theoretical knowledge is valuable such an assumption cannot be taken for granted. The first section therefore examines the assumption and outlines the comparative advantages of theoretical knowledge. The second section provides a brief market analysis. If 100 workshops would make a difference, what exactly would the difference be? After all, movie production is said to be dominated by Hollywood but Bollywood produces more movies than Hollywood. Nonetheless, the world market is dominated by Hollywood. Hence, if Jean Leca’s distinction between academic domestic and global markets is applied,² theory building for a number of domestic or regional markets might impact ‘consumption’ patterns in domestic or regional markets but not necessarily the world market. The third section raises some serious doubts about the widespread belief that the discipline is characterized by American hegemony. The apparent need for 100 workshops could be legitimized by the argument that the IR discipline is under American hegemony but this assumption is severely challenged by empirical research showing that American hegemony is a fact in institutional terms but not in terms of theoretical fads and debates being followed in the rest of the world. In short, intellectual global hegemony is a chimera, a largely imagined state of affairs for which reason the rationale of the workshops cannot be anti-hegemonic. In the fourth section, the paper argues that 100 workshops might be necessary but would essentially be waste of time if focused on theorizing a bygone world. In the fifth and final section the paper makes the argument that the 100 workshops should contribute to redefine what is perceived to be the core of the discipline, i.e. what Ted Hopf calls ‘a particular well-known consensually foundational literature’.³ It is only if analysts begin by ignoring non-American, non-European or non-Western conceptions of foundational literature that they subsequently can construct a hegemonic global state of affairs and, in turn criticize what they have constructed.

³ Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). The paper draws on, synthesizes, summarizes and adds to my previous publications. In “Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret” (Knud Erik Jorgensen, “Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret,” European Journal of International Relations, 6, no. 1 (2000): 9-42) I intended to provoke Anglo-Saxon minds to the idea that the (European) Continental IR community produces IR theory of some significance. In “Towards a Six Continents Social Science: International Relations” (Knud Erik Jorgensen, “Towards a Six Continents Social Science: International Relations,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 6, no. 4 (2004): 330-43) the aim was to contribute to the endeavour of further globalizing the discipline. In International Relations Theory: A New Introduction (Knud Erik Jorgensen, International Relations Theory: A New Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)), I included a chapter on DIY theorizing, hoping it would give students (and perhaps their professors) the tools, building blocks and courage to engage in building their own theories. Finally, “After Hegemony in International Relations” (Knud Erik Jorgensen, “After Hegemony in International Relations,” European Review of International Studies, 1, no. 1 (2014): 57-64) while celebrating the arrival of the European Review of International Studies included an attempt to induce an ethics of responsibility for developing the disciplinary features that can be said to be weakly developed in major parts of the global IR community.
2. The Value of Theoretical Knowledge

The beach at the small Cornish town Porthcurno appears as just a beach but it is not. The beach is where the sea communication cables from many corners of the British empire entered Great Britain before continuing to London, the metropole and epicentre of the empire. The beach at Porthcurno – triggering powerful connotations of empire, hierarchy, hegemony as well as centre and periphery – is a suitable image of how various critics present past and contemporary acts of theorizing within the IR discipline. They claim that theorists within the dominant power(s) theorize global affairs by means of a local language, typically English. They also claim that the knowledge that in abstract or synthesized form constitute their theories is universal and that their theories are universally applicable. In the rest of the world there are no theorists and no IR theory is being produced, indeed knowledge in the form of theory is not appreciated or cherished. Calls to globalize the discipline and its theories are meant to change this state of affairs and different approaches are employed. Some point to parochialism masquerading as universalism. Others suggest that the discipline should be dismantled. Still others point to the fact that the world is bigger than the main centres of theorizing. I tend to follow the latter avenue arguing that the Porthcurno image is misleading, and for two reasons. The dichotomies of the British Empire/the rest or ‘the West/the rest' make more harm than good and obscures the distribution of agency in the field of theory building. Moreover, theorizing is cherished throughout the world. In other words, thinking theoretically is not exclusively a feature of ‘the West’ and anti-theoretical sentiments are not exclusively a feature of the non-West.

The following triptych of questions is crucially important for understanding both the universal yet contested value of theory and the potential value of the 100 workshops:

- What is theory?
- What is the theorizing process?
- What is the value of theoretical knowledge?

Given that defining theory is a task in itself, I have to be pragmatic so the following definition therefore works for me. According to Kenneth Waltz, “Theory is artifice. A theory is an intellectual construction by which we select facts and interpret them. The challenge is to bring theory to bear on facts in ways that permit explanation and prediction. That can only be accomplished by distinguishing between theory and fact. Only if this distinction is made can theory be used to examine and interpret facts”. It is the feature of artifice and the distinction between theory and fact that I in the present context find useful for understanding the nature of theory. I would add, though, that there are different kinds of theory: explanatory, interpretive and normative and, each kind has its own distinct features.

The theorizing process is a strangely under-described activity. It is as if theorists, like magicians, do not want to reveal theory secrets and others do not dare to explore. Donald Puchala is an exception, suggesting that theorists do the following when they theorize,

---

6 Scholars who are not used to think theoretically often spend considerable time either on approximating theory to facts (1:1 being the most extreme case and the most useless) or, concerned about the prevalence of contending theoretical perspectives, on erasing contention in an attempt to build a monistic theory construction.
7 I call it ‘strangely under-described’ because on the one hand theories are cherished as the backbone of the discipline but, on the other hand, most theorists do not describe what they do when they build theories. By contrast, the procedures for application of theory are described in an abundance of textbooks on methodology.
“[t]he theorists are first and foremost conceptualizers, symbolizers, synthesizers, and abstract organizers … what they have been doing as theorists is painting for us in their writings bold-stroked, broad-brushed pictures of social reality and telling us that the real world is their pictures.”

We now have an idea about what the theorists at the workshops are supposed to produce and the key characteristics of the production process. But why is what they do valuable? What’s the value of theoretical knowledge? The short version of the story about the value of theory is, in the words of Stanley Hoffmann and Robert Keohane, that ‘attempts to avoid theory not only miss interesting questions but rely implicitly on a framework for analysis that remains unexamined precisely because it is implicit’. I share Keohane and Hoffmann’s take on the role of theory and believe it has profound ramifications for our global discipline that the production of theoretical knowledge is uneven and that frameworks for analysis are left unexamined. It is high time to critically examine the unexamined frameworks no matter whether they originate in the North, South, East or West. I should like to add that theory has a number of different roles: guiding empirical research, inspiring research agendas, providing a scientific alternative to ideology and conspiracy theory. It is telling that geopolitics thrives as a framework for understanding world politics especially in areas where the IR discipline is less established.

Hence, on the pro side we will not miss interesting questions and we will get a chance to examine implicit assumptions. Such values are cherished in certain segments of the scholarly community but importantly, they are not shared throughout the community. Empiricists just want the descriptive or analytical job done without much theoretical fanfare and methodologists consider theories to be, at best a reservoir of hypotheses. It seems to me that Mearsheimer and Walt are spot on with their criticism of an approach that is trending especially within international studies as cultivated in the United States. Some naively consider paradigmatic theories, the so-called ‘isms’, to be downright ‘evil’. Others consider metatheory to be even worse, a position that unfortunately suggest an unwarranted abandonment of an entire scholarly field of enquiry. The above examples are all ‘Western’ deliberately selected to show that it is not the case that theoretical knowledge is cherished in the ‘West’ but not in the ‘South’ or ‘East’. It seems that the balance of power between explicit and implicit theoretical knowledge varies around the world. What matters might be the degree to which universities are autonomous vis-à-vis political-ideological or religious institutions. At the individual level those in the policy or media worlds who make careers on the basis of ‘knowing about international affairs’ do typically not see the value of making

---

11 Mearsheimer and Walt, “Leaving Theory Behind”.
implicit assumptions explicit and, even worse, to have their implicit assumptions examined. The advancement of IR theory would then potentially alter the balance of power between IR scholars who believe in science and those who rely on alternative frameworks or political or religious authorities. Theorists at the workshops should be fully aware of such institutional or individual power relations.

3. Market Analysis

The second section provides a brief market analysis and thus focuses on supply and demand or producers, the retail sector and consumers. If 100 workshops were to make a difference, what exactly would the difference be? Let us assume that the 100 workshops actually take place and that many of the participants succeed in building both paradigmatic and mid-range theories as well as both first and second order theory. The 100 workshops would in terms of output be a great success but what about outcome. Would they change anything? The supply of theories would be significantly increased but what about the demand? My hunch is that not that much would be different and three reasons explain why.

First, the newly built theories would not necessarily be part of the ‘consensual foundational’ literature but instead face an existence at the fringe of the discipline. In other words, their reception might not be as the authors intended or as the theories would deserve. The dialectics of author intent and reception is often unpredictable and some of the new theories might be capable of creating their own demand.

Second, following the Hollywood/Bollywood analogy we can critically ask if the new theories would be Bollywood productions. Bollywood movies entertain millions of people so perhaps the world market should not be the only indicator of success. In turn, we can therefore ask if such an outcome necessarily would be so bad. Do the new theories necessarily need to conquer the world market? The twins of modernization theory and dependencia theory can serve as illustrative examples of limited reach yet nonetheless some impact. By contrast, if the theorists do aim at the world market, then what would it take to enter and become established in the world market? A third option is Pinewood, a film studio that is especially known for its signature James Bond movies, and thus representing a distinct tradition of its own. The various theoretical schools around the world – for instance Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Toronto, Stanford – could perhaps be seen as Pinewood productions. No laws of nature suggest that theoretical schools cannot emerge in Shanghai, Izmir or Cape Town.

Third, authors do not always control the reception of their theories. To do so takes extraordinary efforts, some luck and persistence. The first hurdle is the mandatory peer assessment of quality and relevance. While the quality of theories is essentially contested, a genuine take-off requires recognition by a considerable segment of the market. Somehow theories produced in the traditional centre of knowledge production tend to be cherished more than theories built elsewhere, so an uphill battle is predictable. It is presumably the celebrity factor at play (celebrities are people who are known to be known). The second hurdle is socialization within the discipline of new generations of scholars. Hence the new theories need to be included in textbooks and be part of PhD training programmes. It will take some

---

16 cf. section five below.
17 Hans Morgenthau submitted the manuscript published as *Politics among Nations* to 13 different publishers before New York-based Simon and Schuster finally accepted it.
effort to persuade authors of textbooks and PhD programme planners to include the new theories. The cases of the English School and world systems theory illustrate the challenge as they struggle to become part of what is taught. The third hurdle is time. Theoretical dynamics tend to be characterized more by a certain slowness and inertia than rupture and quick adaptation. It took a decade, the 1990s, to cut the realist theoretical tradition to size and a similar amount of time to consolidate constructivist advances. Moreover, if textbooks were compared across time, it is clearly the case that their profile changes. Textbooks of the 1970s are very different from textbooks in 2017. Finally, while it takes considerable time to criticize existing textbooks for all their flaws, it will take considerably longer time for the critics to write the perfect textbooks they demand.

In summary, Leca’s distinction between academic domestic and global markets makes sense and can serve as a useful starting point for theorists when considering their ambitions. Is the aim of theory building to serve a number of domestic or regional markets or is the aim to be of consequence at the world market. In order to secure the desired outcome the three factors mentioned above need to be handled.

4. Global Pluralism is a Fact (Get Used to It!)

The aim of home-grown theorizing outside the traditional centres is sometimes to change what is described as theoretical hegemony within the discipline. However, if at some point European or American hegemony characterized the discipline, it no longer does. A degree of European hegemony characterized the main institution for the advancement of the discipline before WW2, i.e. the International Studies Conference (ISC) but the ISC was ‘killed’ in 1950. Subsequently the discipline became more institutionalized in the United States than elsewhere and the 1959 ISA secession from APSA is in this context a not insignificant factor. This paper takes the position that contemporary hegemony is very limited for which reason the often limited state of home grown theorizing outside traditional centres should not be explained primarily by means of external factors. The proposed 100 workshops represent simply one way of taking responsibility for changing the current state of affairs and in turn engage in upgrading the level of theorizing outside the current sites of production. In short, we are now in an after hegemony situation and this enables a range of opportunities but also presents several challenges.

The first opportunity to change the theoretical set-up of the discipline is based on the fact that most major cities around the world enjoy a critical mass of IR scholars with an interest in theoretical issues. They can organize workshops or symposia that focus on the different ways of engaging in theory building. The organization of such workshops is not dependent on a green light from a faraway hegemon. In contrast to workshops on big n dataset research, theory workshops do not require investments in expensive research infrastructure. The workshops merely require time and space to ‘think theory thoroughly’ plus perhaps some personal predispositions, to paraphrase Rosenau and Durfee.

---

18 Leca, “La science politique”.
20 James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 1995). In Thinking Theory Thoroughly, Mary Durfee and James Rosenau present a comprehensive account of what it takes to think theoretically, at least concerning causal empirical theory. In terms of thoroughly examining the nature of the theorizing process the book is simply unique.
The second opportunity is caused by the fact that theorizing does not necessarily need to begin from scratch, for instance by means of developing an entirely new vocabulary. The behavioralists of the 1960s opted for this kind of approach yet the results did not exactly live up to expectations. The process of theory building can begin with more modest objectives, for instance conceptualization, reconceptualization, theory synthesis or projects of reconstruction. If our collective objective is to understand global politics and economics then we need to translate our demand for knowledge into a number of research questions or research agendas. Such questions or agendas are not necessarily global or universal but can hardly avoid being influenced by our distinct centric perspectives. We engage in theoretical thinking because we believe it can help us achieve our general objective and help us transcend our centrism of various kinds. Both theory building and theory application have instrumental functions and are not ends as such. When we engage in conceptualization we do it because we have distinct research questions and agendas in our mind. When we engage in re-conceptualization we do so because we think existing concepts are inadequate vis-à-vis our questions and agendas. Likewise we engage in theory synthesis and theoretical reconstruction because the outcome provides a better match to our questions or a better guide to our analysis, i.e. the process through which we aim at finding answers to our questions.

Third, theory builders could perhaps find inspiration in the approach adopted by a group of Danish film directors, Dogme 95, consisting of a number of self-imposed limits, the purpose being enhanced creativity in areas that are unlimited. In the case of movie directors, they decided to only use natural lighting. In the case of theory builders I will for purely illustrative purposes mention two options: perhaps 50 workshops could focus entirely on building structural theories and 50 workshops could focus on agent-oriented theory building. Yet it would be for the workshop organizers to decide the constraints that would be imposed on the theorists. In any case, whereas homegrown theorizing is bound to begin at home it can end with a theory of home or a universal theory. Realist balance of power theory is the outcome of theorizing 19th century power politics in Europe (home) yet it might nonetheless have universal characteristics and thus be applicable elsewhere, for instance in studies of the Middle East, Africa or eastern Asia. Likewise, some theoretical traditions within Japanese IR contain homegrown theories, thus originating in Japan but the theories might be applicable elsewhere. Dependencia theory mainly took off in Latin America yet also found an audience on other continents.

Fourth, the production of many new first order theories carries the opportunity to strengthen the discipline of IR. After decades of endeavours to destabilize the discipline, for which reason the discipline remains contested, it would be most helpful for both the theories and the discipline if the new theories were built within the framework of the discipline and thus contribute to develop the discipline rather than dismantle it.

Fifth, while the 100 workshops can be and should be seen as an example of the ‘let 100 flowers blossom’ doctrine, the workshops/panels would unquestionable have more impact if connected to or organized within major existing associations, including WISC, the ISA, and EISA. It does not take too much effort to organize workshops, symposia, sections or panels. In addition to the venues of the major associations, financial constraints suggest that smaller events would be necessary, not least because the workshops should be global and despite aspirations, the major association events do not have complete global reach.
All these opportunities are to some extent available and are indeed in the process of being exploited, i.e. contemporary workshops do generate new theories. The existence of a dozen theory building projects indicates that the interest in theorizing is on the rise. Actually, one of the biggest challenges is to remain up to date on the many projects and thus realize the high degree to which the contemporary discipline is characterized by pluralism.

5. Theorizing the Local and the Bygone?

Globalizing the discipline implies changing the discipline and change depends on criticism. The 100 workshops should therefore be characterized by profound criticism, aimed at changing the profile of the discipline. However, in order to build theories, criticism should not be limited to critique. It should be an instrumental starting point, i.e. function as a platform for building theories. One example is E.H. Carr’s *Twenty Years Crisis* which is partly a critique of currents within the liberal tradition but also an example of early 20th century realist thought. Moreover, criticism should have a genuinely global perspective and theorizing should be relevant for the 21st century. Genuinely global perspectives do obviously not equal Global South perspectives but should be inclusive of all perspectives. In this context Kimberly Hutchings seems to believe that her best contribution to a globalized IR is to be increasingly quiet thereby leaving space to non-Western perspective. It seems to me that engagement is a better option.

Unfortunately, current critique is far from being global and, moreover, tends to focus on a bygone world. Criticism of the discipline and its theories is frequently characterized by conventions and a certain degree of orthodoxy. Thus, critique of Eurocentrism is conventionally a critique of Western, i.e. European or American instances of adopting centrist perspectives. However, Eurocentrism is only one distinct centric perspective and globally, centric perspective are widespread if not ubiquitous. Likewise, studies of empire are conventionally characterized by a more or less relevant critique of European or American imperial practices, yet strangely overlook the role of empire in contemporary Russian, Chinese or Iranian (foreign policy) discourses. Studies and critique of racism in the discipline conventionally focus on Western racism yet racism seems to be a global phenomenon and should in the context of globalizing IR be analysed as such. Finally, studies and critique of

---


25 In his APSA Presidential address, Peter Katzenstein addressed the issue of racism in political science. See, Peter J. Katzenstein, “‘Walls’ Between ‘Those People’? Contrasting Perspectives on World Politics,” *Perspectives on Politics* 8, no. 1 (2010):
orientalism conventionally focus on European or American instances of orientalist practices. But orientalism is merely a concept within the wider category of mis-representations (taking images for true representations of the other), an exercise in which Europe hardly can claim monopoly. It would be a pity if the theorists at the 100 workshops continue the present current of critical approaches turned orthodox.

The frequently employed dichotomy of ‘the West’ and ‘the non-West’ appears to be foremost an important obstacle to globalizing the discipline, yet is often presented as part of a solution to a claimed problem. The distinction clearly exaggerates similarities within and differences between the categories and thus obscures the fact that major parts of Europe can be characterized in ways that are strikingly similar to how ‘the non-West’ tends to be characterized. Jacek Czapatowicz and Anna Woyciuk identify features of Polish IR that Siddharth Mallavarapu claims characterize Indian IR. Furthermore, what exactly is ‘the West’? While it might include traditions within Japanese IR that were imported (from Germany) what about the home-grown IR traditions in Japan? Finally, what to do about theorists on the move, for instance the Australians Coral Bell, John Burton and Hedley Bull who all contributed to International Relations in Europe. Does South African Charles Manning’s theory of international society count as ‘Western’ or ‘non-Western IR’? Do we, when applying the theory of orientalism, apply a Western (Columbia University, NYC) or non-Western theory (built by a Palestinian, and therefore south, east, north or west)?

Theorists face not only a certain degree of orthodoxy in current critical approaches but also the inclusion of non-Western theoretical perspectives, an inclusion which is not without its problems. The employment of distinctly non-western concepts is obviously a notable challenge to lazy Western minds and a highly disquieting factor in the (de-)construction of our worldviews and globalizing discipline. Increased employment of notions like ubuntu or tianxia (and many more) would obviously extend the discipline’s vocabulary and might thus contribute to de-centralize the discipline. Yet it is an even bigger cognitive challenge to acknowledge that non-Western theoretical reflections frequently are primed by features that critical IR aims at problematizing. The following three challenges for a sound six continents IR discipline therefore amount to a mission nearly impossible.

First, exceptionalism is not particularly exceptional but characterizes ways of thinking around the world. While the American and European versions are exceptionally well-known and occasionally assumed to be exceptional in the world, scholarship on Russia, India and China suggest otherwise indeed demonstrates the significance of exceptionalism with Russian, Indian or Chinese characteristics. Actually, exceptionalist thinking is so widespread that it is not particularly exceptional but characterizes ways of thinking around the world. While the American and European versions are exceptionally well-known and occasionally assumed to be exceptional in the world, scholarship on Russia, India and China suggest otherwise indeed demonstrates the significance of exceptionalism with Russian, Indian or Chinese characteristics.
somewhat hard to find exceptions to this very special local yet seemingly universal way of thinking. Moreover, ethnocentrism is as widespread as exceptionalism and both documented and in some cases represented by scholarship. Finally, theorists in the West do not enjoy a monopoly in the market of universal ideas. Similar to western liberalism, Confucianism is universalistic, cf. notions like *tianxia* and expectations about a global order with Chinese characteristics, beginning with China’s (peaceful?) rise.

In a truly global six continents IR discipline it will be difficult but not impossible to acknowledge that Europe (or the West) does not enjoy a monopoly of exceptionalism, ethnocentrism and universalism, for which reason criticism of European or Western versions remain relevant but should be extended to generic ways of thinking and subsequently extended to local versions.

### 6. Towards a Consensually Foundational Literature

Theorists in the 100 workshops should aim at contributing to what Ted Hopf calls, “a particular well-known consensually foundational literature”. In other words, the target should be the core of the discipline. Otherwise the theories might experience a life at the fringes of the discipline, an existence that some might deem satisfactory but, again, if the general aim is to globalize the discipline then it is necessary to aim higher.

However, aiming at a consensually foundational literature is highly controversial, not least because it implies disciplinary features such as boundaries, foundations, trajectories, traditions, inclusions and exclusions as well as processes of deliberation that are capable of producing a new consensual foundational literature. In other words, if it really is ‘the discipline’ (and its theories) we aim at globalizing then conceptualizing disciplinary identity is a (pre-)condition for achieving the objective. Unfortunately pleas to globalize the discipline are frequently made without much reflection about the nature of the discipline or its uneven development and different trajectories in different parts of the world.

Tracing the trajectories takes some effort and is complicated by the fact that the nature of the discipline seems foremost to be a synthesizing or fusion discipline, this in contrast to most other disciplines that are the result of fission or splintering, e.g. molecular biology splintering off from biology yet preserves affiliations with biology. The suggestion that new theories should contribute to a consensual foundational literature is meant to counter loose non-committing references to ‘the discipline’ or, even more vague, ‘IR’.

The good news is that the consensual foundational literature is not etched in stone but somewhat dynamic as figure 1 illustrates.

---


---

Figure 1: Variations of ‘Consensually Foundational Literature’ (CFL) over time

The issue of a consensual foundational literature can be approached at both macro and micro levels. At the micro level we have the individual theorist who almost necessarily will build a given theory in the context of the macro level, i.e. the institutional, disciplinary settings. It would thus probably be insufficient to just assemble the building blocks of theory in new creative fashions, even if such theorizing would be for someone or for some purpose.

At the macro (institutional) level discipline requires a foundational literature, e.g. a canon of 50, 100 or 225 foundational publications. However, what exactly does ‘consensual’ mean? Unless globalizing equals a process through which the existing foundational literature is taken on as is, the globalizing process implies redefining the foundational literature. It is a body of literature that is not etched in stone but changes over time. Thus, the foundational literature of the 1950s is different from how it looks nowadays. Moreover, it is an essentially contested body of literature left in the hands of individual scholars or departments who design courses and syllabi as in their judgement it would be the best way to teach students. Fortunately, such designs are in many places not in the hands of government or association regulatory committees but left to individual scholars or university departments. The general aim for the workshops is to reshape the core canon of the discipline, yet such a thorough reshaping would be a gradual and long lasting process, a continuation of an already ongoing process. It is predictable that the outcome of the 100 workshops would be a significant body of new concepts and theories, some of which would be sufficiently compelling to be adopted in syllabi and enter into the list of standard references. The process can be illustrated by the concept ‘securitization’. It started as a one-man idea a 25 years ago yet has generated a sizeable literature and entered numerous syllabi around the world and thus become part of a redefined foundational literature.

How do scholars think the social reality of foundational literature should be changed? I will briefly examine five scholarly approaches.

First, according to Meera Sabaratnam, the preferred approach is to ‘throw away’ conceptions or ‘putting down’ unwarranted literature,

“Such openings are made eminently possible – indeed necessary – by Hobson’s comprehensive critique of Eurocentrism in world politics. I would also like to say that this should also mark the opportunity also to start putting down many of the Eurocentric texts that have populated reading lists for so long, and in doing so re-make the discipline more fit for purpose – a truly inclusive account of global interactions and politics, told from many sides, alert to multiple layers of connectivity, relationality and resonance as well as violence, dispossession and conflict. Hobson’s excellent book highlights again just how short-sighted and parochial Eurocentric conceptions of world politics have made us. The question is, now we have recognised this, do we have the courage, imagination and ability to throw them away?”

Sabaratnam’s approach might be innocent and fully in line with how disciplinary practices have been for decades. For all sorts of reasons individuals or departments decide frequently to drop a text from a syllabus and replace it with a different text. This is one of the ways in which the English School has experienced a renaissance, simply by means of being increasingly recognized as a part of the foundational literature. Sabaratnam declares she wants to avoid

being ‘short-sighted and parochial’ yet it is unclear if she considers Eurocentrism to be the only obstacle to achieve the objective. Moreover, it seems to me that the characteristics of a ‘discipline more fit for purpose’ are accurate descriptions of the discipline that already exists.

Second, in “Permeability of Disciplinary Boundaries in the Age of Globalization: Interdisciplinary Scholarship in International Relations,” Ehsanul Haque finds interdisciplinarity a promising approach.34

“In a globalized world, we witness an entirely new, unprecedented form of knowledge production where the creation and utilization of knowledge is no longer seen as a linear process. In fact, the forces of globalization demand multiple disciplines to unravel and scientists transgress/cross disciplinary boundaries in their search for new knowledge creation and dissemination. Against this backdrop, this paper particularly reflects on the interdisciplinary character of International Relations (IR) – a successful and fascinating interdisciplinary subject having infinite boundaries. While IR is a full-blown, autonomous, and accomplished academic discipline, its hybrid curricula bring complementary strengths and enlarged perspectives from a diverse array of disciplines including Political Science, History, Economics, Sociology, Philosophy, and the like in order to address the ever-increasing complexities and broader issues as well as to impart unified knowledge and produce cognitive advancement”... “students develop a ‘meta-knowledge’ of multiple disciplines, methods and epistemologies, and learn how to reflectively integrate and synthesize different perspectives. Finally, the paper concludes that such interdisciplinarity promotes quality research and contributes to solving new problems which cannot be addressed within the individual disciplines alone.”

It is the idea of IR having hybrid features that ensures that it can be understood as both a discipline and an interdisciplinary field. However, it seems to me that hybridity can be taken too far. In other words, if IR at the same time is both subject and discipline, both discipline and interdisciplinary field then it might accurately describe the diverse ways in which IR is perceived but conceptual overstretch also kicks in and the diagnosis becomes unhelpful for guidance for the way forward for ‘IR’.

Third, whereas I suggest new theories should be built within the framework of the discipline and thus contribute to develop the discipline rather than dismantle it, Chris Brown opts for a genuinely radical approach,

“If we truly wish to promote diversity in international thought, it may be that a crucial first step will be to contribute to the work of dismantling “International Relations” as an academic discipline”.35

This suggestion is in line with Brown’s general dismissive stance concerning the disciplinary character of International Relations.36 In principle, Brown’s approach could be compatible with my approach, especially if Brown by “International Relations” has an orthodox, set in stone perception of the discipline in mind. However, his criticism of Charles Manning’s tireless work to consolidate the discipline can be seen as an indication that Brown is dismissive of any attempt to cultivate the discipline.

35 Brown, Practical Judgement, 218.
36 See e.g., Brown, Practical Judgement.
Fourth, Pierre Lizee suggest that the way forward is to reinvent the discipline,

“Engaging all these questions, though, means a step forward for the discipline, one that entails a re-examination of its basic language about what is universal and what is particular in international affairs. This is the last element in the reinvention of international studies proposed in this book”...“the key authors and texts which have shaped the nature and evolution of international studies as a discipline must be brought in when we consider these issues. To do otherwise would leave unresolved the one issue which must be addressed by international studies at the moment: the core canon of the discipline would remain unchanged, the “rise of the rest” would proceed apace, and the gap between the discipline and the world it now has to explain would grow, without ever being bridged. This is where, in the end, the most crucial challenge for international studies could lie at this time”.

Lizee’s approach has greatly inspired my own approach and his plea to reconsider the canon of the discipline might also be compatible with Sabaratnam and Haque. The approaches partly overlap, do include contending perspectives but are not mutually exclusive. The fifth approach adds to the fabric of reflections on the way forward.

Fifth, Audrey Alejandro et al.’s Reappraising European IR Theoretical Traditions is based on the idea that wherever we are situated in the world, we should examine the trajectories of theoretical traditions. They are considered the backbone of the discipline for which reason it is highly worthwhile to know about their origins as well as how they have developed over time. The guiding idea for the project is that it is preferable, when setting sound future directions, that we know how we got to where we are. The authors of the book are all based in one geographical setting, Europe. When we reflect on world politics and economics, Europe provides our local coordinates. Our approach and findings, we claim, are valid for Europe but might/might not be applicable to or relevant elsewhere.

7. Conclusions

The 100 workshops on theory building could potentially make a significant difference and could have a most welcome impact on the process of globalizing the discipline of International Relations. In order to maximize the impact of home-grown theorizing, the value of theoretical knowledge needs to be spelled out in the rationale of the workshops and demonstrated in each of the theories built. Moreover, the paper takes the notion ‘discipline’ in ‘globalizing the discipline’ sufficiently serious to reject ideas of IR being a subset of any other discipline or merely an inter-disciplinary field. Instead it makes a plea to actually strengthen the discipline not least because it is only with a strong disciplinary core and an open mind that genuinely inter-disciplinary work can hope to be characterized by more analytical benefits than costs. Furthermore, theorizing should transcend orthodox critical approaches and while having a historical dimension it should not focus too much on bygone worlds. Instead theorizing should focus mainly on trends in the contemporary global order and its actors, structures and processes. Theories should aim at contributing to the so-called consensually foundational literature and thus potentially become part of the core of the discipline. It is highly likely that dispersed theorizing will have less impact but as theorizing is a creative and often

---


individual enterprise it might be naïve or unwarranted to aim at über-concerted action. While philosophies and theoretical frameworks external to the discipline have proven to be immensely helpful for the production of insights about global affairs, it seems to me that the workshops primarily should focus on new first order substantial theories about international relations.

Bibliography


Reshaping International Relations: Theoretical Innovations from Africa*

Karen Smith
University of Cape Town, South Africa and Leiden University, the Netherlands

Abstract
This article is based on the assumption that theoretical contributions from the global South – and in this case, from Africa, do not need to be radically different from existing theories to constitute an advancement in terms of engendering a better understanding of international relations. Reinterpretations or modifications of existing frameworks and the introduction of new concepts for understanding are equally important. This is an accepted practice in mainstream IR, where existing theories are constantly amended and revisited. One need only consider the various incarnations of realist thought. While adaptations and conceptual innovations by western scholars are recognised as legitimate and adopted into the canon of theory, this is not always the case with similar contributions emerging from outside of the West. This article will examine three examples of such contributions by African scholars. The first group of scholars reinterpreted the concept of “middle power,” arguing that there are specific characteristics that set emerging middle powers like South Africa apart from traditional middle powers. The second, Deon Geldenhuys, developed the concept “isolated states” and generated a novel analytical framework to categorise states based on indicators of isolation. Finally, Thomas Tieku draws on the African worldview of ubuntu in calling for the state to be reconceptualised in a collectivist, societal way. It is hoped that these examples will illustrate that there are theoretical innovations emerging from the Global South that can assist us in not only better understanding international relations in a particular part of the world, but can in fact provide greater insights into the field as a whole.

Keywords: South Africa, middle power, emerging states, ubuntu, homegrown theorizing, non-Western IR

1. Introduction
Much has been written in recent years about the Western-centric nature of existing International Relations (IR) theory, the inapplicability of ‘commonsense’ concepts to the Global South, and the need for the field of IR to engage with voices from outside the West. What started off as calls coming from the periphery of the field have now penetrated the

Karen Smith, PhD, Lecturer, Institute for History, Leiden University, the Netherlands. E-mail: Karen.smith@uct.ac.za.

*Upon the request of the author, certain changes were made in this version.

1 Deon Geldenhuys and the first group of scholars (van der Westhuizen, Nel, Schoeman and Jordaan) are South African, or in the case of Taylor, were based in South Africa, while Thomas Tieku is Ghanaian. The choice of scholars is not deliberately skewed towards South African scholars, but is based on the work of African scholars with whom I am most familiar. I intend to build on this initial attempt at identifying African theoretical contributions by identifying similar work from other parts of Africa.
US-based International Studies Association (ISA), reflected in the 2015 annual convention theme: “Global IR and Regional Worlds”. This increased interest, no doubt, stems partly from a growing sense of anxiety in the West about changes occurring in the international system, linked to the rise of new actors whose behaviour and motivations existing theories are not able to make sense of.

These criticisms have also been accompanied by calls for greater inclusion of contributions from outside of the West. Unfortunately, these calls have not been met with great success. While some journal and book editors and conference organisers are making a concerted effort to include the work of scholars from outside of the USA and Europe, many have been disillusioned by the lack of response they have received. Relatedly, scholars like Tickner and Waever and Tickner and Blaney who set out a decade ago on a project to discover how IR is taught, researched and practised in the different parts of the world found, to their disappointment, that IR in disperse parts of the world does not seem to be all that different.2

Is Vale’s comment about the South African IR community – namely that scholars seemed to be engaged in “an enterprise which, generally speaking, displays little imagination and almost no conceptual adventure”3— still applicable, also to other parts of the Global South?

Nkiwane asked whether the situation can be explained on the basis that “Africa has little to contribute to IR, or because the power dynamics of the discipline are such that African voices are not heard?”4 I have previously argued, in line with other scholars, that the answer to this question lies in both. While external factors prevent the expansion of IR knowledge to include contributions from the developing world, internal or domestic factors inhibit the creation and dissemination of this knowledge. As these have been discussed at length elsewhere they will not be revisited here.5

But is this disappointment really warranted? What is it that we are expecting to emerge from the Global South? A new theory to challenge realism? A groundbreaking new way of understanding IR that will change the way scholars and policymakers think?

In making the claim that not much innovative theoretical work has come out of the Global South, and Africa in particular, one has to be clear about what exactly is meant by a theoretical contribution or innovation. This means starting with a definition of theory as it applies to IR. In his 1967 article titled “What is a Theory of International Relations?” Raymond Aron contended that theory can have two meanings: first, it can be “contemplative knowledge… the equivalent of philosophy”.6 Secondly, a theory can be “a hypothetical, deductive system consisting of a group of hypotheses whose terms are strictly defined and whose relationships between terms (or variables) are most often given a mathematical form”.7 Mallavarapu defines theories on the basis of their expectations. According to him, theories involve a degree of abstraction, a degree of generalisation, and seek to explain.8

2 Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever, eds., International Relations Scholarship around the World (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Arlene Tickner and David Blaney, eds., Thinking International Relations Differently (London: Routledge, 2012).
With regards to advancing IR theory through contributions from outside of the West, the debate continues about whether universalist IR theories are at all possible, or whether the way forward is to develop regional-specific approaches (for example, the development of an IR theory with Chinese characteristics). Cunningham-Cross notes how in calls by Chinese scholars for greater innovation in Chinese approaches to IR theory, the emphasis has been on newness, with innovation meaning “coming up with something that is not only new but also distinctive”. She continues that newness is measured against certain ostensibly Western markers and originality can only exist where there is evidence of a clear distinction from the so-called Western theory that preceded it”.

2. Theoretical Innovation or Not?

Our excitement about the possibilities that exist outside of the West should also be tempered by the realisation that ground-breaking theoretical innovations are simply not that common. If we allow ourselves to think more generally about theoretical innovation it can, in the words of Mittelman mean “creative imagination in the production of new knowledge”. There must be a recognition that there are different levels of theoretical innovation, not necessarily to the extent of developing new theory but also through theory and concept adaptation. Gill writes, “An innovation introduces something new – a new method, a new theory, a new perspective – in ways that have some practical effect on the way that we may think about and potentially act in the world”. Importantly, he emphasises that “Often this simply involves the act of writing, synthesising, codifying or clarifying ideas current for over half a century…or else rearticulating existing Republican arguments in different political contexts”. Bilgin, drawing on the work of post-colonial scholars like Homi Babha, remains tremendously insightful with regard to reminding us that we should not expect to find only difference in the non-West. Identifying similarities and instances of mimicry with some adaptation – in other words, doing world politics in a ‘seemingly “similar” yet unexpectedly “different” way’ can be equally valuable. For example, adapting theory to the local context through reinterpretations or modifications of existing frameworks - what I have referred to as “reinterpreting old stories” in an earlier paper and the introduction of new concepts for understanding are equally important. This is an accepted practice in mainstream IR, where existing theories are constantly amended and revisited. One need only consider the various incarnations of realist thought. While adaptations by western scholars are recognised as legitimate and adopted into the canon of theory, this is not always the case with adaptations emerging from outside of the West. For example, Mohammed Ayoob’s notion of what he calls “subaltern realism” has remained on the fringes of the field and has not been recognised as constituting a significant elaboration of realist thinking. Disregarding such contributions as not important or radical enough denies agency to scholars who are contributing in ways that can enrich our understanding of international relations. South African scholars’ revisiting of the notion of “middle power” serves as a case in point.

---

10 Cunningham-Cross, “The Innovation Imperative,” 3.
3. South African Contributions to the Adaptation of the Middle Power Concept

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of South African scholars published articles in which they interrogated the “middle power” concept that had become increasingly popular as a way to understand South Africa’s foreign policy. They based their work on the existing literature on middle powers in IR that had been developed and popularised predominantly by scholars like Andrew Cooper and Robert Cox, from another recognised middle power, Canada. As the concept – initially reserved for “traditional middle powers” like Canada, Australia, Norway and Sweden – was increasingly being applied to states like South Africa, Brazil and Turkey, it appeared to be losing some of its analytical value. Scholars like Janis van der Westhuizen, Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, Schoeman and particularly Jordaan subsequently made an important contribution to the literature on middle powers by developing the concept through providing greater analytical clarity, and specifically making the distinction between traditional and new, emergent or emerging middle powers.16

While South Africa had been referred to in the literature as both an “emerging power”17 and a “middle power,”18 van der Westhuizen first writes about “South Africa’s emergence as a middle power” and Schoeman was the first to explicitly examine the meaning of the concept “emerging middle power” in relation to South Africa.19 Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, in exploring South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism, highlight what they refer to as a “deficiency in the literature to distinguish between traditional or established middle powers in the industrialized Western world and emerging middle powers in the South”.20 They set out five preliminary suggestions for distinguishing between traditional and emerging middle powers.

Building directly on Cooper and Nel et al., Jordaan sets out to further refine the conceptual distinction and to develop a schematic to distinguish between emerging and traditional middle powers on the basis of their constitutive and behavioural differences.21 According to Jordaan his motivation was to propose an analytical solution to the problems Schoeman and Nel et al had come up against in their attempts to distinguish between traditional and emerging middle powers.22 While recognising the similarities between middle powers, namely that they “conform to the middle power role by their legitimising and stabilising actions that enable a smoother functioning of the global order”,23 he emphasises that more differences exist than is recognised by the existing literature. Under constitutive differences he includes democratic tradition, time of emergence as middle powers, position in the world economy, domestic distribution of wealth, regional influence, and origins of perceived neutrality. Under behavioural differences, regional orientation, attitude to regional integration and cooperation, nature of actions to effect deep global change, and purpose of international identity construction are listed. For example, with regard to their position in the global

---

19 van der Westhuizen, “South Africa's Emergence”; Schoeman, “South Africa”.
20 Nel, Taylor, and van der Westhuizen, “Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” 46. (emphasis in original).
21 Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power,” 168.
23 Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power,” 178.
economy (a constitutive difference), he contends that while traditional middle powers are located in the core, emerging middle powers are in the semi-periphery. This has important implications for their consequent behaviour and overall foreign policy orientation, with the former engaging in legitimising behaviour, while the latter tend towards the reform of global economic rules and structures. This reformist tendency, rather than a more fundamental transformist approach exhibited by emerging middle powers can be explained by the fact that, as semi-peripheral economies, these states still have a competitive advantage over states in the periphery, an advantage they do not wish to lose through a large-scale overhaul of the system.24 Another significant difference between traditional and emerging middle powers has to do with the regional dimension. While the former have little interest in their immediate region and regional integration initiatives, the latter have a much stronger regional orientation and are often also considered as regional powers. These are important differences in foreign policy behaviour that are obscured by reliance on the original concept of “middle power” but usefully highlighted by Jordaan’s innovation of distinguishing between “traditional” and “emerging” middle powers.

The work of these scholars, and Jordaan’s in particular, is a useful illustration of how an existing concept can be adapted in order to make it more applicable to a particular context – in this case, understanding the role that South Africa was playing in the world. Significantly, however, the modification applies to a much wider group of states that all fit the criteria of “emerging middle powers”. Its conceptual value is evidenced by the fact that, despite being published in the internationally unknown journal Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, Jordaan’s article has been cited 187 times, and remains the second most viewed and second most cited article published in the journal (Politikon, 2016). This is a clear indication of the broader significance of his theoretical innovation.

4. Geldenhuys’ Conceptual Refinement

In a similar vein, South African scholar Deon Geldenhuys’ work on what he calls “isolated states” addresses a gap in the existing IR literature by providing us with analytical tools to study states that have been ostracised by the international community. As he notes, the notion of isolated states is a peculiar phenomenon in an increasingly interconnected international system. In his 1990 book, Geldenhuys emphasises why his work on isolated states is not just of importance to an isolated state like South Africa when he argues “While South Africa may indeed be the world’s foremost ostracised state today, it is not alone in this league. Notwithstanding the many unique features of South Africa’s isolation, it is part of a wide international problem”.25

He distinguishes between pariah or ostracised states, and those that voluntarily withdraw from international relations, in other words externally enforced versus self-imposed isolation. He defines isolation as “either a deliberate policy, voluntarily and unilaterally pursued by a state over a period of time, of restricting its international interactions and thereby withdrawing to a greater or lesser degree from ‘normal’ international relations (self-isolation or isolationism) or a deliberate policy pursued by two or more states against another, over a period of time, aimed at severing or curtailing the latter’s international interactions against its will (enforced isolation)”.

24 Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power,” 176.
26 Geldenhuys, Isolated States, 6 (emphasis in original).
He goes on to develop an analytical framework to measure the extent of a state’s isolation, involving a set of thirty indicators that he groups into four areas of isolation, namely: political-diplomatic, economic, military and socio-cultural. He also cautions that not all 30 indicators are of equal importance, and that they should be employed together with various other structural and functional considerations. These include the specific target, means, origins, objectives, time and results of isolation. He then applies his framework in a comparative study focusing on four main case studies, namely China, Israel, Chile and South Africa.

The notion of ostracism or isolation of states remains a highly topical issue. Some states who, historically, were the target of ostracism by the Western international society but were subsequently integrated to a certain extent, find themselves in a familiar situation today. Geldenhuys notes the examples of Russia and Turkey as historical examples of ostracism which, at the time of publication in 1990, “either no longer exists or their current level of isolation is generally well below that of Israel, Taiwan, Chile and South Africa”. Twenty-seven years later, it seems Russia and Turkey would again make for interesting case studies of isolated states. Geldenhuys notes how Russia has long been the target of ostracist thinking by Europeans, citing the 17th century internationalist theories of the duc de Sully and William Penn, which expressed reservations about including Russia in an international organisation. Similarly, he notes how throughout history, the Ottoman Empire was regarded as a threat to Europe and various plans were continuously developed to exclude it from European integration efforts.

Although his work is largely descriptive, Geldenhuys makes an important contribution with regard to refining the conceptual differentiation between terms like isolation, alienation, obscurity, seclusion and isolationism. More significantly, however, he provides students of IR with an analytical framework by which to measure the international isolation of states.

Although Geldenhuys did not comment on this directly, it is clear that the phenomenon of isolation, exclusion, and ostracism he studies has direct bearing on recent debates about the marginalisation of the non-West in the field of International Relations. In almost all cases, states are isolated as a result of not meeting particular criteria – decided by Western states - that allow for inclusion, acceptance and participation in international society.

In 2004, Geldenhuys published another book on states that are regarded as outcasts by the international community. This time, his focus was on “deviant states”. In a similar vein to his book on isolated states, his starting point is that the existing terms used in the mainstream literature to refer to those states who “behave[d] badly” – such as pariah, outcast or rogue – were analytically weak as they did not have “a fixed meaning nor any standing in international law” and therefore failed to offer “a structure for studying the full spectrum of offensive behaviour by states and non-state actors”. He then goes on to develop an analytical framework of deviance, drawing on sociological theories of deviance to outline three basic elements of deviant behaviour, namely social codes, rule breakers and rule defenders. As was the case with his isolated states book, he subjects his framework to rigorous empirical testing. While Geldenhuys’ theoretical work on isolated states and deviant conduct has been cited 148 and 33 times respectively (according to Google Scholar) his seminal book on South African foreign policy, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (1984) has been cited 240 times. There are numerous possible explanations – one being that...
the latter was published 6 and 20 years before his other work. It could also be explained by
the point made by scholars like Bajpai that in the global distribution of academic labour, scholars in the Global South are often relegated to regional experts whose value lies in their
capacity to provide empirical data for the application of existing (Western) frameworks. It
is also interesting to note that, when one disaggregates the citations for Isolated States, the
book is cited mainly by South African scholars or international scholars working on South
Africa. Perhaps, had Geldenhuys been an American scholar based at a prestigious American
institution, his work would have had a much greater impact.

5. The Collectivist Worldview: An Ubuntu Alternative to International Relations

Another scholar who makes a significant theoretical contribution in shedding light on the
foreign policy of African states, Thomas Tieku, not only refines existing frameworks or
refines concepts, but also incorporates indigenous worldviews into this analysis. In an
try to develop an alternative explanation for the behaviour of African states, Tieku draws
on the idea of African societies as collectivist to develop understandings of, amongst others,
the African solidarity norm. The notion of an African solidarity norm, which discourages
African leaders from disagreeing with each other in public and from defying continental
consensus on issues was referred to by scholars such as Mazrui and Clapham.

In an effort to explain the motivations for this behaviour, Tieku, a Ghanaian scholar,
bases his argument on the notion that the predominantly individualist ontology employed by
scholars of international relations fails to incorporate practices based on a more collectivist
understanding, such as consensual decision-making. He highlights some of the problems
with an individualist approach, one of which is that it neglects group identity. This is in
contrast to collectivist societies, where group membership and obligations are paramount.
When these assumptions are transferred to the state, we can only understand the state as
an independent, egotistical actor that, he argues, results in a limited understanding of state
behaviour. Specifically, he argues that the individualist ontology prevalent in Western IR “has
undermined our understanding of the international politics of collectivist social entities such
as those in Africa.”

A collectivist understanding of Africa’s international relations is manifested in the
perspective of ubuntu. It can be regarded as an indigenous worldview, common to southern
African societies, and found in different forms across the rest of the African continent.
While the term ubuntu comes from the Nguni language family, variants of it exist in many
sub-Saharan African languages. It is difficult to translate into English, with “collective
personhood” being the most direct translation. It refers to the idea that

[The individual] owes his existence to other people…He is simply part of the whole…
Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to
the whole group happens to the individual [...].

Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (London: Wakefield & Nicolson, 1967); Christopher Clapham,
While much has been written about *ubuntu*, particularly with reference to conflict resolution, peacebuilding and human rights, it remains on the fringes of scholarly analysis in IR. Scholars of South Africa’s foreign policy have had to take note of it after the term appeared in the title of the country’s 2011 foreign policy white paper: “Building a better world: the diplomacy of ubuntu”. As discussed in previous work, the concept of *ubuntu* may help us to understand how both states and non-state actors in Southern African relate to one another.

It is important to point out an important caveat in employing this term as representative of African communities: in light of the apparent disconnect between this concept and much of what is currently occurring on the African continent, it is often dismissed as utopian and not reflective of reality. However, while the principles underlying *ubuntu* are undoubtedly under tremendous pressure throughout Africa, as a result of urbanisation, conflict, and so forth, this does not invalidate its potential to contribute to our understanding of IR.

In applying a collectivist understanding to Africa’s international relations, Tieku argues that this has important implications for thinking about concepts like national interest. If the state does not primarily see itself as an independent actor pursuing its own narrow interests, seemingly irrational behaviour by African states can more easily be understood. He describes three features arising from a more collectivist approach, namely consensual decision-making, group-think and the Pan-African solidarity norm. Consensus-based decision-making is encapsulated in former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere’s statement, “We talk until we agree.” In practice, this means that decisions by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council about whether or not to intervene in a conflict on the continent has to be reached through consensus.

Tieku regards the Pan-African solidarity norm as “a widespread belief among African ruling elites that the proper and ethically acceptable behaviour of Africa’s political elites is to demonstrate a feeling of oneness and support towards other African leaders, at least in public”. He highlights the practical implications of continued adherence to this norm, which include that decisions to intervene are made on the basis of consensus, there is a strong preference for soft tools, and that African Union (AU) members are not allowed to criticise offending states in public. This sheds light on African states’ show of solidarity with Sudanese President al-Bashir – which involves their refusal to arrest him despite calls by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Attempts by the AU to engage Muammar Gaddafi in a negotiated solution before the United Nations (UN) decision to authorise North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) airstrikes is another illustration. Former South African president Thabo Mbeki’s handling of the crisis in Zimbabwe also remains a relevant case in point. He consistently deployed so-called “quiet diplomacy”, and – despite significant...
international pressure to the contrary – remained unwilling to publicly criticize the Mugabe regime’s human rights abuses. Whilst, from a western, individualist understanding, these public displays of solidarity by African states seem somewhat irrational, if approached from a collectivist worldview, they make much more sense. The preference for negotiated solutions to conflict and refusal to condemn human rights abuses by other African states is very much in line with notions of African collectivism. Tieku contends that understanding this can assist the rest of the international community in responding appropriately to African states. Importantly, however, he also emphasises that the collectivist ideas and practices he outlines are not only found in Africa. \(^\text{46}\) This is significant, in that what he calls “[t]heir omission from the analytical tools of IR” has not only impoverished our understanding of the behaviour of African states, but of IR in general. \(^\text{47}\) Drawing on indigenous concepts like *ubuntu* can help to explain not only the behaviour of African states, but in shifting our focus from an individualist to a collectivist ontology, can illuminate the dynamics at play in global governance more broadly. After all, an important motivation for exploring African and other non-Western readings of existing IR concepts is to gain new insights that can enrich our understanding of international relations in general.

While Tieku’s work on the African Union is frequently cited, his chapter on a collectivist worldview (published in 2012) has only been cited six times. This could partly be due to the fact that it was published as a book chapter, but may also tell us something about the interest in such alternative understandings of international relations.

**6. Conclusion**

This paper has tried to move beyond the now widely accepted criticism that existing IR theories are inadequate in understanding the full diversity of international relations, and fail in particular when trying to explain dynamics in the Global South. In exploring potential theoretical contributions from Africa, it has also tried to avoid being hamstrung by grand ambitions of innovative theorising and a perpetual search for difference. Instead, the contention is that even seemingly minor adaptations of existing concepts or frameworks constitute significant contributions to the development of the field of IR. Despite the obvious value of these contributions, the issue of recognition remains a challenge. Ironically, it is not just gatekeepers in the core that do not recognise adaptations as making significant contributions. Commentators in the Global South, too, disregard adaptation as an inferior practice as it still uses existing knowledge as its foundation, thus legitimising what is regarded by many as illegitimate forms of knowledge imposed on the developing world through colonialism.

Having considered some of the advantages of non-western theorising, it is only appropriate to also point out the potential pitfalls. Perhaps the most dangerous is the tendency towards nativism, the assumption that what is, for example, African or Asian or from the Global South, is necessarily superior, different, closer to the truth, or more radical than Western knowledge.

Recent calls for decolonising knowledge – while founded on legitimate concerns about what are perceived as continuing reliance on Western or colonial authors and ways of thinking about the world – have in some cases also been accompanied by a call for the rejection of all existing Western knowledge.

\(^\text{46}\) Tieku, “Collectivist Worldview,” 49.

\(^\text{47}\) Tieku, “Collectivist Worldview,” 49.
This approach is also reflected in renewed calls by some South African students to ‘decolonise’ or ‘Africanise’ the knowledge that they are exposed to at universities. The insistence on Africanist approaches is itself founded on dangerous notions of nativism and exclusivity that assume that African knowledge is necessarily superior, different, or more radical than western knowledge. These calls for a radical purging of colonial/Western influence are arguably impossible to achieve in practice, given the interconnected nature of knowledge in a globalised world. Bilgin and others have highlighted the ways in which knowledge sharing has always been an interactive process, and the difficulties in determining what is Western, colonial, imported knowledge versus what is truly autochtonous. Acknowledging the influence that colonial practices have had in imposing certain forms of knowledge does not mean that we should not also acknowledge the fact that knowledge has never travelled exclusively in a uni-directional manner. Knowledge creation and dissemination has occurred through imposition, but also through mutual exchange – whether deliberate or not, in parallel, in contestation, and in mimicry. Such demands are in stark contrast with the argument made in this paper, namely that knowledge creation can and should not be an isolated endeavour but that building on existing knowledge is essential to the broader project. By rejecting these calls, the claim is not that the Western canon does not suffer from severe shortcomings. It also does not imply that much of Western scholarship is not biased, shortsighted and simply illegitimate in its assumptions of universality. We cannot claim this, however, if we do not engage with it, in all its plurality, and draw our own conclusions.

One of the leading figures of African postcolonialist thinking, Frantz Fanon, was heavily influenced by a diversity of thinkers – most of them western. This, of course, does not mean that Fanon uncritically internalised these ideas and made them his own. Instead, he used them to develop his own thoughts, adopting, adapting, criticizing and discarding them as he saw fit.

While entirely novel theoretical innovations from the Global South should of course be encouraged, that should not be the sole focus of those looking beyond the West for new ways to understand international relations. Such a narrow focus would run the risk of overlooking much of the important work that is being, and has already been, done. The work of scholars such as those introduced in this article clearly constitute and should be recognised as valuable theoretical contributions, and serve to disprove the claim that little innovative theoretical work is being done outside of Europe and North America.

Bibliography


48 Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?”.


Is Terrorism Becoming an Effective Strategy to Achieve Political Aims?

Nihat Ali Özcan

TOBB University of Economics and Technology

Abstract

Terrorism is the method of changing policies of decision-makers and behaviors of the wider society by instigating fear through violent acts. Terrorism can be categorized based on several criteria, such as political aim, timing, context and the target of the violent acts, as well as tools and tactics. Although terrorism might sometimes show aspects similar to other types of conflict, such as guerilla warfare, urban warfare, irregular warfare, civil war, and insurgency, it is different from them by its reliance on shock in instigating change. Nevertheless, since 9/11 the nature of terrorism has itself changed to some extent. Rather than focusing on symbolic power, the emphasis for terrorist organizations has shifted from the action’s symbolic meaning to more calculable consequences, like the territory gained, weapons accrued, the financial damage inflicted and most commonly the number of the dead and the injured. In the future, we may also see shift towards more knowledge-intense strategies as both terrorists and states adapt to current age of knowledge.

Keywords: Terrorism, ISIL, jihadism, separatism, drone warfare

1. Introduction

Terrorism is a method, intended to change the policies of decision-makers and behaviors of the wider society by instigating fear through violent acts. The most common violent acts used by terrorists are bombing, assassinations, kidnapping, bank robbery, and shootings. Terrorist organizations can use a combination of these acts with certain aims in their mind, such as attrition, intimidation and provocation of the target. ¹

Terrorism can be categorized according to several criteria. The first of these is the political aim. Terrorist organizations have various political aims. Some of them want to carve out a territory, some of them want to establish an independent state, others look for reckoning or revenge and finally some want to compel the decision-makers to change their decisions or policies. A second parameter to consider is timing. When terrorism is used whenever and as much as it is needed, it can be pretty effective. Therefore, terrorism’s effectiveness depends on who commits the terrorist act, when and how the act is performed and how strong the arguments are behind the legitimization of the act. More importantly, terrorism’s effectiveness ultimately depends on the response of the target. By adding a factor of violence and fear into existing system, terrorism causes a ripple effect in institutions and in the society.

If governments, societies or even individuals do not generate an appropriate response to it, then it becomes an effective tool.

2. Effectiveness of Terrorism

Terrorism is an effective method in some countries and only under certain conditions. There is an ongoing debate about why kind of countries are more vulnerable to terrorism’s affects. For example, it has been argued that democratic countries are more vulnerable to terrorist blackmail, whereas authoritarian countries are less so. In authoritarian countries, terrorism’s effect might be diminished due to several reasons. For example, the news about the terrorist act does not find its way to the wider society because the media is restricted. Under such conditions, the terrorist group would not be able to make use of the theatrical and symbolic impact of the terrorist act. Under democratic regimes however, the abundance of media outlets, especially coupled with advanced technologies, would make the government more vulnerable because of the public opinion’s inherent impact on the decision making processes in such countries.

Terrorism’s effectiveness is also related to power of the government institutions. If institutions are established and fully functioning, if decision making process is swift and efficient then terrorism’s effectiveness diminishes.

Another important factor is of course the societal response. If the society as a whole understands the nature of the threat, maintains a healthy, self-protective instinct and is sensible about the precautions and measures taken, it is hard for terrorism to be effective. There is a strong tendency in governments to respond to the terrorist act as forceful as possible to portray its capability and willingness to protect the society. But at the end of the day, government’s capability to counteract terrorism is largely influenced by its effectiveness to pursue a winning public relations campaign. Both parties, the government and the terrorist organization, want to give a convincing message to the public. The terrorist organization’s message is “the state is weak and is unable to protect you. If you do not give me what I want, I will keep instigating violence and fear, and eventually will achieve control over your behavior.” Whereas the state claims it is strong enough to get rid of these organizations and stop their activities and that there is no room for extreme fear. Therefore, to make these messages credible, both parties tend to engage in an excessive show of power. But if the regime is democratic, and rationality prevails, the state response turns to a more proportionate level. In authoritarian regimes however, there is no such reason to convince the society in either way because the public lacks any power to shape policies. Even so, the public can be effectively shielded from the terrorism’s wider effect since in terrorists’ the most common strategic tools for propaganda and dissemination, communication and media technologies, does not work freely and independently. When the public is not informed, it is not disturbed. For example, it is unlikely for terrorism to be effective in North Korea. In comparison, it can be more effective in France and United Kingdom as it generates an immense societal response and reaction.

Culture and habits also limit terrorism’s effectiveness to some extent. When terrorism is naturalized as an ordinary part of everyday life, it becomes less effective in instigating change.

There are also differences in effectiveness, based on the tools and tactics. The attacks which have an element of surprise or shock seem to be the most effective. The surprise
element is usually dependent on organization’s capacity to learn and adapt. Terrorist organizations are learning organizations. They learn from their own experiences or from the experiences of other organizations and movements. ISIL, for example, when you look into their manuals and journals, learns from not only its own past, but from other organizations’ past mistakes. Its evolution does not only spring from the wars and conflicts in Iraq and Syria. It also incorporates lessons from Vietnam War, from Soviet-Afghan War of 1979-1989, Algerian War of Independence against the French or from Latin American Revolutionary movements. Wherever there is terrorism, guerilla warfare or any form of irregular warfare, they draw lessons. They do not care whether or not the organization or movement in question is Marxist, capitalist or anything.

Their learning process also incorporates adaptations of techniques developed for other spheres of life. For example, terrorists might include an engineer’s hard-work and resourcefulness to build a passenger plane into their terrorist strategy by using that plane not as a vessel but as a flyable bomb. Another example may be artificial fertilizers. A country may invest in buying millions of tons of nitrogen based fertilizers for its agricultural sector. The terrorists may acquire such material, go online and read the scientific article about the use of artificial fertilizers in detonation of open coal mines, and use both technologies to inflict harm.

Of course, terrorist’s learning depends on availability of such technologies at the first place. Advancement of technology, especially in transportation and communication enables weak individuals to exert enormous power. In the nineteenth century, dynamites and revolvers were the terrorists’ weapons of choice. Today, there is a great range of weapons, which extends from the simplest to nuclear ones, which enhances terrorists’ capacity to inflict harm to unprecedented levels. Today we talk about nuclear terrorism, bioterrorism or chemical terrorism. Most of these materials can be acquired by terrorists. This possibility alone greatly enhances terrorists’ capacity to instigate fear and terror, hence increasing their effectiveness.

3. Terrorism and Other Forms of Political Violence

There is also a difference between terrorism and other forms of political violence with respect to effectiveness. Obviously, guerilla warfare, urban warfare, irregular warfare, civil war, terrorism, insurgency are all different. Nevertheless, terrorism might sometimes show aspects similar to these other types in the course of their campaigns. Terrorism primarily relies on shock to change the minds of decision-makers and to control society. Organizations may choose to rely on terrorism as the main building block of their wider military-political strategy, but they can also incorporate a combination of all these other forms to supplement terrorism and make the whole strategy it more effective. For example, terrorism can start as a tool to kick-start and promote a long-term and wider insurgency as a result of a carefully thought-out plan. Terrorism can be used initially, and can later be discarded, or relocated depending upon the aims of the movement. Therefore, terrorism can increase the effectiveness of the wider strategy by instigating shock and fear.

On the other hand, terrorism is mainly a small-group act and its effects are in accordance. When it is supplemented by guerilla warfare, i.e. some military-like force, the whole campaign turns into a military movement which aims for popular legitimacy. Terrorism, on its own, does not aim for such support because it operates under the assumption that the system can be taken out by single/sudden acts of violence intended for change in certain
policies and behaviors. This distinction is very important, as it informs counteraction strategies and mechanisms. Terrorism is mainly a criminal act and should be dealt with police force. Terrorists are criminals who must be brought to justice by putting them on trial. In long-term political strategies such as insurgencies, however, the ultimate judge becomes the public itself. Therefore, the main battlefield in insurgencies is the hearts and minds of the people, and the trouble becomes a governance problem, i.e. who will govern?

Let’s look at some examples from Turkey. ASALA’s (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) actions, which ranged from assassinations to a few public attacks, such as the one in Ankara Esenboga Airport in 1982, were mainly criminal acts. The counterstrategy was to gather intelligence on the organization and individuals, apprehend these individuals and bring them to trial. Consider PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) on the other hand. PKK has used and currently uses all forms of terrorism. It has been designated as a terrorist organization by many states and institutions. Nevertheless, it also claims to be a guerilla movement and a revolutionary organization with transnational ties. More importantly, it has claims for representation of a particular ethnic group within Turkey’s borders, which translates into self-ascription of authority to govern them. Hence, there is a competition between the state and the PKK to govern.

It is also possible to assess terrorism’s effectiveness by looking into how much they can achieve their strategic goals. In attrition, the terrorists try erode the state’s resolve to fight by showing that they can go on inflicting pain for an indeterminate time. If they seek intimidation, they try to persuade the people that they have to behave as the terrorists wish, whereas in provocation they try to induce emotions leading to indiscriminate violence by the state. Some of the terrorists acts may be more suitable to achieve the above aims. For example, suicide bombing has become an increasingly dreaded terrorist act, due to its frequency.

Due to their political aims, ethnicity-based, or class-based terrorist organizations strive for political legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Therefore, terrorist organizations try to evolve into something different over time, even incorporating some of the modern humanitarian values, a liberal perspective even. For any cause to be legitimate in the public’s eye or even for them to begin listening to the message, the organization’s general system of values has to be in line with the values of the society. In the course of such evolution to an entity with wider audience, these organizations’ range of activities begun to be restricted due to moral hazard. Some limits were established about harming women and children and/or civilians. In that case, targets of terrorist acts become state or government employees, and usually combatant personnel, a change which terrorists would suppose is more tolerable by the public. In other times, for example, the terrorists would call the authorities and tell them about the bombs they planted. The important thing, they would realize, is not how many people they would kill, but how much panic they would cause and hence instigate a public debate about their demands.

4. Changing Nature of Terrorism

Pre-9/11 literature defined terrorism as method of symbolic action. Rather than achieving some material/military victory, the terrorist usually aims for a symbolic one. This can only be won if the number of audience is very high, the message is loud and impressive. The emphasis is on the message the act would convey. After the 9/11, the reference point for terrorist acts has increasingly become religious, and interestingly—and perhaps ironically—the emphasis
has shifted from the action’s symbolic meaning to more calculable consequences, like the territory gained, weapons accrued, the financial damage inflicted and most commonly the number of the dead and the injured. While previously, the acts were committed in the name of the wider group that the terrorists claimed to represent, in the new era, the terrorists undertake such acts either in the name of God, and/or for the terrorist himself/herself, because he will go to heaven by doing so. That is perhaps why terrorism has become even more brutal and shocking, devoid of any moral imperative whatsoever. There is no more a concern about the number of civilian casualties or the level harm to women and children, because if the ones who got killed are on the other side, it is supposedly God’s wrath on the enemy. If they are accidental deaths, then they would be martyrs, too and go to heaven as well.

The above form of legitimization does not change terrorism into something else, but it shapes its character. The new terrorists are not bound by the type of rationality or value systems that would guide the ethnicity-based terrorism with respect to public sensibilities. Values such as human rights, equality or liberty are considered alien, even evil, because they are perceived to be originating from the ‘enemy’ or the ‘infidel’. The claims and raison d’être of ethnicity-based terrorism on the other hand, is usually based on principles such as self-determination and freedom, all of which originate from the Western system of values. Especially those organizations operating in Western, or Westernized countries, feel the need to justify and modify their actions based on such values, which a makes them susceptible to other values of this system. In the end, if ethnic separatist organizations achieve their aims, the final result would be yet another Western form of political entity. For example even if Irish Republican Army (IRA) manages to obtain full independence in Northern Ireland, the system of values for the new political entity will not be so much different from that of the United Kingdom or from those of the Western civilization for that matter. The newer and more religiously inspired terrorists, however, rely on an entirely different system of values, and their rejection of the Western values is not only total but also accompanied by brutal hostility.

One may assume that such total rejection of values would jeopardize recruitment campaigns of terrorists, shrink their audience, and hence reduce their effectiveness. But actually, it does not. The organizations like ISIL have their own system of meaning, and focus on the opportunity to brutally punish the enemy as their main recruitment message: “I am punishing the infidels, whose way of life you detest. Join me if you want to do the same.” Think about a young man living in France, Germany or Italy, unemployed, feeling downtrodden and excluded, and full of anger and hate. These organizations offer this man tools and methods to express his anger and hate. The organization calls him to action, whether by leaving or staying in the same place, tells him to punish the others and most importantly to instigate fear. Going to heaven comes as a bonus. From their perspective, the logic is simple, understandable and ultimately rational.

5. Is ISIL successful?
What is success? If we define success as establishing sovereignty over a piece of land, ISIL has for some time been successful. But we must keep in mind that the “state” they have in mind is very far from the Westphalian state. On another note, ISIL’s antagonists are pretty powerful states and if they had wanted to stop it, they would. But is success is defined as going to heaven, then they are ultimately successful, there is no way to defeat them. Whenever they lose worldly battles, they are winning the heavenly struggle to go to heaven.
Apart from these two definitions of success, I believe, ISIL has been more successful in shaking up the contemporary status quo and in regard to the debate it sparked in the global community. The level of fear and brutality and the atmosphere it has set up, has been far more important than its actual/material impact. The messages they spread, even those that are seemingly mythical and unrealistic are carefully carved out to paint a convincing and deeply relevant picture of a battle between ultimate evil and ultimate good.

ISIL’s partial success was also dependent upon its timing. ISIL has not come to the fore until the timing was right and this was a calculated move. Prior to ISIL’s dominance, all other organizations in the Syrian War scene had a very severe shortcoming: they had begun to fight before they could come up with a thought-out political agenda. There are three criteria which give out the degree of maturity of the organization. The first one is whether the organization has a clear ideological framework and a clear political agenda which manages its military capacity and shapes it actions. The second is whether the organization has managed to isolate and sometimes take over other similarly organizations competing for the same resources. The initial strategic goal of a terrorist organization is never establishment of a state; it is to eliminate rivals. At this initial stage, elimination happens through absorption and assimilation of other organizations. Highly professional organizations do not engage in direct confrontation until it has become mature enough. ISIL is not unique in waiting until all competition has subsided -this aspect is common to Mao’s, Ho Chi Minh’s, or Võ Nguyên Giáp’s strategy- but it is unique in coming up with a religiously-inspired discourse, combining it with techniques mostly developed by Marxist organizations and doing it at a place where there are two failed states at a time when there is a regional and global power vacuum. Global rivalry and division among regional actors provided the necessary ecosystem for ISIL prominence. There is currently a proxy war going on, but for some time the major powers were oblivious to the region’s problems. The US has tried to stay clear of the most pressing tribulations Syrian Civil war posed, whereas Russia was preoccupied with the Ukrainian crisis. That’s why ISIL’s capture of Mosul in June 2014 was a surprise to regional and global actors: they were not particularly looking. But capturing of Mosul, ISIL has altered the tolerable balance of power, and hence get their attention. Accordingly, ISIL’s presence as such will continue as long as the global powers do not come to an agreement. The moment they do, ISIL would have to transform itself, either by retreating underground or splintering over the region and beyond.

There were reasons for such disinterest on the part of Western states, obviously. First of all, the task is extremely difficult. Elimination of an organization like ISIL may not amount to much, because of the high level of mobility and transfer of terrorists from one group to another during civil wars. Even if one is able to reduce their total numbers significantly, their capability to inflict harm remains high due to their abuse of technology. Secondly, the past experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq were particularly discouraging. Thirdly, the material cost of stopping a civil war is huge, almost unbearable. It would probably require 300,000 ground troops stationed over the course of 3-5 years to stop the conflict in Syria and Iraq and re-build both states. The cost would be higher when intervention is done by militaries of advanced, democratic nations, as these armies rely on hi-tech and very costly weapons, surveillance and defense systems. The Western electorate would not tolerate such a huge material cost, let alone human casualties. Finally, there are many concerns regarding the repercussions due to voluntary or involuntary violation of legal and ethical rules in the battlefield. In Western
Is Terrorism Becoming...

democratic states, the free media picks up on these transgressions and the public opinion is already very sensitive. Since the electorate holds decision-makers responsible for such acts, politicians are seldom willing to take such risks.

5. Counter-terrorism in the New Era

The turning point for Western interests was the phenomenon of the so-called foreign fighters. When Western citizens who fought alongside ISIL begun to return, the gravity of the issue became clear. The Western countries are still reluctant, though. Obama could only go far as to support the local actors, rather than using conventional military power. The reasons for such choice are manifold.

When the sides of a war are asymmetric, sides do not want to play by the same rules. In mathematical terms, the US is obviously superior with personnel, technology, etc. On the other hand, as usually happens in this type of warfare, weaker player subverts the game, trying to play by different rules. Rather than fighting openly, waiting seems to be optimum strategy for ISIL because they think that the public’s resilience in the face of violence in Western democracies is not particularly high. ISIL can wait and fight intermittently, the armies sent from abroad, however, cannot hold for so long because the public would demand results after some time. Secondly, ISIL strikes in extremely unexpected ways. In July 2016 in France, one of them killed several people by driving a truck over them.

To overcome these problems, the states may revert to cooperating with local forces. If anything bad happens, it becomes these local actors’ responsibility. If they are victorious, you can be proud. Moreover, training local actors cost very little compared to sending troops. It does not require a big manpower, a few special operations personnel can train many in a short time. A second way other than supporting local actors is to air strikes and unmanned aerial vehicles, PR drones. Real-time intelligence and strike capabilities of these vehicles are probably more effective in failed states and civil wars. The public also demands use of these weapons instead of using actual manpower because they are less risky or presumed to be more effective. One must be cautious though; the terrorists also develop some strategies to counter these capabilities. They live among the civilians and in cities for example. Cities provide enormous resources and opportunities for them. Tunnels, roads, privacy of homes all make the terrain into a maze full of obstacles for security personnel. Furthermore, they can make their own drones, using commercial drones for their purposes.

The terrorism has far reaching repercussions and fighting it has never been easy. But taking into account the democratic pressures and technological advancements, it is reasonable to expect more knowledge-intense strategies to replace traditional counter-terrorism measures. On the technological side, there is a huge research and development ongoing with respect to drones, for example. Many countries invest in developing surveillance and weapons systems, lowering the risk for human lives. The knowledge-intense strategies are not confined to combat or intelligence technologies, either. In response to increasing prominence of terrorism along ethnic and religious lines, states have already begun to train soldiers like cultural anthropologists or sociologists, who can understand and communicate effectively with local people. Combined, these developments signal not only a new age of terrorism, but also a new age for counter-terrorism, as well.
Bibliography

Roundtable Discussion on Homegrown Theorizing

2nd All Azimuth Workshop: Widening the World of IR Theorizing
23-24 September 2016, Ankara

Ersel Aydınlı (Bilkent University): Many people may not find the focus of this particular workshop to be relevant to what we study or how we see IR, but we believe that the accumulation of these different efforts might produce something at the end of the day. Our Center is a small one and our journal is primarily dedicated to being a platform for these types of discussions.

I want to raise some preliminary questions to open this roundtable discussion, and I hope we will have an extensive and very engaging discussion.

First of all, "Is there a need for post-Western theory?" It is somewhat off-putting that we still have to ask such existential questions. Moving on from there, “Can there be a post-Western theory?”; "Can IR theory be widened to include global alternative voices?"; "How can local IR communities engage with IR theory?"

Then there are more technical questions, such as, what are we going to do with ‘homegrown theorizing’? What are the ways of doing it? Are we going to redefine the concepts? Ask new questions? Or present brand new ontologies? What are the best ways of making homegrown theorizing more appealing to core IR theory? A lot of us pointed out that recognition is an issue. Many of the traditional gatekeepers are finally dying. So what is really stopping homegrown theories from moving into and becoming a respectable part of the core IR theory? And maybe more importantly, before that, what are the best ways of making homegrown theory relevant? Is it the predictive capacity? Or evidence based knowledge? What are the pitfalls for homegrown theorizing? Throughout our panels some of these became very clear, for example, misrepresenting some concepts became an issue in the cases of Islam and Guanxi. In the name of homegrown theorizing are we neglecting what already exists? Are we being thrown into simply an anti-Western approach? This would be extremely problematic, as most useful products would go to waste. In the name of homegrown theorizing, are we making ourselves vulnerable to local governmental use and abuse? Some of us might think this is the case. For example, in Turkey somebody came up with a theory regarded as homegrown and for a while it became the basis for Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP). Many of us now think that it was one of the biggest TFP disasters ever. So is there that risk too? Could homegrown theorizing be divisive? In Turkey when we push for homegrown theory, some of our colleagues say that it is divisive. They argue that we should integrate our forces, we should study what has been studied in the core and contribute that way. Finally there are questions about originality. "What does homegrown theory originality mean really?" And one of the last questions, “How do we overcome negligence by the core IR community?"

Are we really exaggerating? Are we seeking something that does not exist? The core followed a route, now we are following it, why?

Before going around the table to ask your thoughts on these questions, I’d like to give you some time to reflect by first asking one of our colleagues to comment in general on what has
been happening with Turkish IR in recent decades. He has been a pioneer in institutionalizing the IR community in Turkey and publishes an IR journal in Turkish.

Mustafa Aydın (Kadir Has University): The IR community in Turkey is fairly young: it started in the 1980s. We established the first association, Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi (International Relations Council) in 2004, and begun to publish the flagship journal of the Council, Uluslararası İlişkiler, in Turkish. The journal’s specific mission was to encourage and promote theoretical studies and conceptual works of international relations in Turkey. We actively encouraged our authors to write papers with a theoretical framework, which was the most difficult part of our job because most of the articles submitted were usually topical and descriptive, and were not really engaging in conceptualization. There are still fewer articles with a theoretical framework, but they are usually much better both in quality and style than topical articles.

We also encourage authors to publish in Turkish to fill in the gap in Turkish IR literature. That has also become a challenge because most Turkish scholars, even most of our own authors, do not cite articles written in Turkish while writing in English. This is a huge problem because a journal’s reputation depends on its citations. Uluslararası İlişkiler has been included in Thomson Reuters Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) since 2008 and it is the only such International Relations journal published in Turkey. Getting a considerable number of citations is very important to be able to continue being indexed in SSCI. Since Turkish authors do not cite Turkish sources when writing in English, and since there are not any other journals in Turkish in SSCI, increasing citation counts of Uluslararası İlişkiler has been a true challenge.

Apart from the above challenges, there are a couple of reasons for the lack of homegrown theorization in Turkey. The first is the lack of foundation at the pre-university education level. A lack of conceptual thinking is not endemic to IR or to undergraduate studies, but is pervasive in the general education system in Turkey. Turkish high school education does not encourage conceptual thinking, which is a huge problem. When students come to the university level, they are unable to think conceptually and they do not like those professors who conceptualize things. Moreover, the high school curricula do not include classical philosophy. It is very hard to teach theory to university students who have never even heard of the classics. IR theory is based on those classics. I believe that a successful theorist must have already mastered the classics in high school, and opportunities for doing so are lacking in Turkey.

The second problem is related to the maturity of the field. Even though International Relations has been taught in Turkey since the 1950s, the current generation of graduates is almost the first generation to have studied IR theory in Turkey. My own generation, now senior professors, is the first generation in Turkey to study IR as an undergraduate field. This was in the 1980s. Our professors had studied history, political science, or international law, even though they eventually became IR professors. Moreover, our generation did not study IR theory while we were studying IR as undergrads. Someone who did her IR PhD in the US was saying that in the US they were talking about four theories and nothing else. But when we were studying in Turkey, there was only one theory! I was taught that IR theory means Morgenthau’s realism of course. Realism did not exist before Morgenthau and it did not exist after him. Our generation is the first generation who started teaching IR theory as an undergrad course in Turkey. This was in the 1990s. I think the field is not mature yet in that sense.
There is also a problem with the center-periphery global discussion in terms of theorization. On one side, Turkey is a part of the periphery, because if you send an article from Turkey with a Turkish sounding name to an American journal, it will most likely get refused or not pass the editorial cut. If you have a Turkish sounding name and send an article claiming that you are addressing IR theory, you will get an editorial cut. What we are expected to do is to use these theories developed in the US or the West in general, and try to employ them in analyzing Turkish foreign policy or Turkey's neighborhood. This is being part of the periphery. But at the same time, when we look at the TRIP surveys, they show that Turkish academia is too much integrated with the Western or global IR community. When I say too much, I mean that we are more than anybody else. When we are talking about various issues or various countries, compared with academics from Chile or Hong Kong for example, it seems that Turkish IR academics identify themselves with much more Western academia than anybody else. This identification is not just ideational identification, it is also about the matters we like to study or talk and about the methods we claim to use in research. To have a homegrown theory, you have to have a healthy distance and a healthy dislike of what is happening in the Center, so that you can create an alternative. But if you identify yourself with that theorization and you think yourself as a part of that theorization, you don’t have the urge to develop an alternative. That is the two sides of a kind of contradiction in being part of both the center and periphery.

There is also another reason: weak institutionalization. As I said, the association and journal all started in 2004. The problem is not only evident in the association or the journal but in the universities too. How many universities or IR departments can you think of that they are dealing with more than one theory and discussing them in their lectures? Very few. Very few, even in Istanbul and Ankara.

And yet another problem, even if you are a theoretically grounded person, you face the situation that you are not able to discuss your ideas with anybody. IR professors, like in many other disciplines, are very dispersed. We don’t congregate enough. Every two years we have an IR congress. But that is not enough.

Ersel Aydınlı: But there is also some type of a theory fetishism. People like the label. The theoretician is also an identity that many young academics would love to present themselves. So there are a lot of theoreticians, self-claimed theoreticians, but we don’t see the outcome.

Mustafa Aydın: When I was in Ankara University I started to teach theory. The department used to advertise me as a theoretician, but I was not. I was teaching the theory course, that is what happens. Now, I’ll give you a few points from our TRIP research. First of all, the Turkish IR community is a relatively young community if you compare it to the global IR community. Hong Kong is the youngest in the world. But we are by average much younger than other IR communities. When we asked in the survey, “What is your main research area?”, we found that research methods in Turkey is zero percent. Nobody has made their main research area as research methods. Political theory and political philosophy get 1%. But if you don’t have strong foundations in political theory or philosophy, you cannot build IR theory on it. Regional studies were 25%. When we ask them about their theoretical approaches in their writings, realism is number one (33%) and constructivism is 28%. This is globally 19% realism and 23% constructivism. This is the first time we found out that constructivism has passed realism in the world but not in Turkey yet. I am saying ‘yet’ because we also asked another question: What was your original theoretical approach when you started studying
IR and it changed on the way, and 49% said it was realism. This is down to 33%. So it is dropping, but not at the same speed with the global trends. It is interesting that in Turkey 10% of scholars say they are not using any theoretical approach in their studies. In the world it is actually 26%. We are going totally different ways. There are people who are refusing to use a theoretical approach. This is something that is not understood in Turkey.

Ersel Aydınlı: Thank you for these thoughts. With all that in mind, I’d like to now go around the table and hear everyone’s comments and ideas on the questions raised at the outset.

Emre Baran (Middle East Technical University): I’ll start with the 5th question, i.e. what should be the purpose of homegrown theory. I think theory building seems to have a psychological dimension. Looking into the purpose of theory building -whether we need homegrown theory or not- can give insights about this psychological dimension. Some of the key concepts that are mentioned in the workshop, for example self-confidence, respect, humiliation, need for recognition, acquiring another identity, punishment and exposure are embedded within the psychological and emotional condition of the society that the researcher is a part of. As Prof. Mallavarapu said, theory building is to become a subject of one’s own thinking, which I understand encompasses mindfulness and reflexivity. Prof. Joergensen also touched upon this relationship by highlighting the critical potential for theorizing. I think we can have further insight about the need for a homegrown theory by reflecting on this psychological dimension. For example, does the researcher want to uphold his or her own culture against a colonial background? Or does the researcher want to contribute to ongoing debates by adding new authentic ideas and concepts? I think exploring these questions may prove insightful to understand the purpose of homegrown theorizing, because the politics behind these motives are very much different.

Andrey Makarychev (University of Tartu): First of all, there are theories that to some extent are homegrown. Take the English school, for example. They are based on certain local traditions and certain scholars that happened to work together for some time. All theories are based on certain kinds of homegrown premises to some extent, therefore it depends on what we mean by discussing homegrown theory. Within the Western academy, we also have traditions beyond the West. I would like to emphasize three challenges that homegrown theories in the non-Western world might face and are already facing. First is the danger of fragmentation. Do we need a kind of theory for each identity, for each nation state? Do we need Estonian IR, Georgian IR etc.? The recent danger of fragmentation in this field, if we go ahead with these, is that we can face a very fragmented professional field. The second challenge is the distinction between what I call academic theories and political doctrines, and sometimes they are very mixed with each other. I think that we need to struggle for purity of academic theories as distinct from political doctrines, because, as we discussed a couple of times, how political elites can hijack or capture academic knowledge or theories and the kind of transformation these academic ideas might face at the end of the day. I would say that in this sense homegrown theorization should be vigilant about the danger of transforming into political statements rather than academic theorizing. Sometimes when I analyze different literatures, some post-colonial theories, I see more political statements than academic theories. That is my personal experience, in non-Western academia. The third danger is the challenge of being repetitive. There are a lot of margins, borderlands, all kind of identities in between which can be well studied based on the Western tradition of critical...
thought. Sometimes, these traditions are even more effective for understanding these non-central actors. In many respects, more or less well established theories might be used exactly for the same purpose as post-colonial approaches. This is to some extent a challenge of repeating critical voices within the Western theoretical academia.

**Karen Smith** (University of Cape Town): I wanted to pick up on some points made by both speakers in the previous panel, which was the link between teaching and homegrown theories. It is very important because the question which I often wonder about is "to what extent are we allowing US IR to remain hegemonic in our teaching practices?" even though we sit here and talk about how we encourage homegrown theorizing, I think, including myself, a lot of us, especially in undergrad level, still teach IR in a very specific way which I don’t think is conducive to and encouraging theorizing. Here I differ from perhaps one of the points made by Mustafa Aydn that his generation of IR scholars in Turkey was disadvantaged by not having IR at the undergraduate level. I think in fact when we teach IR generally in a very traditional way at the undergraduate level it in fact impedes theory building. Perhaps, I think you should see it as a very positive thing. I try to encourage all of us to not forget about the teaching aspect when we think about how to take this forward. Another point may be just to add to the list of questions "how to take this practically forward?" Some of the things discussed here helped me realize that there are lots of groups now all over the world working together on this issue. I think it would be useful for all those to be somehow combined. For example, Siddarth and I are part of another group, not necessarily part of this group. So I would love to see one big conference of people, all of us working on non-Western or peripheral IR theories. I think we really should make use of the opportunities there. I can think of three books series that are out there urgently looking for books that present non-Western approaches to IR. Perhaps that would be one way or another way which we can disseminate some of the very interesting ideas that came up in this workshop.

**Ramazan Gözen** (Marmara University): I will focus on why we won’t have homegrown, actually non-Western IR theories in IR out of my experience from the Turkish case. May be I will make a big exaggeration, too much of a generalization, but I think this is mostly related to our developing underdeveloped categorization. In the Cold War years, we taught in IR about Western developed countries, southern underdeveloped countries. I think in this kind of categorization there is a truth about homegrown theories. Why would we have homegrown theories or non-Western theories? Why Western theories are hegemonic in IR theories is partly related with this kind of Western-developed and non-Western-underdeveloped issue. Here one of the important points is the freedom of thought, especially in our country. One of the reasons why we don’t have, for example, so many different ideas and theories related with social issues concerning IR is mostly related with the ideological hegemony and ideological propagation. And this is partly related with the education system in this country. This is a problem in most of the third world countries: lack of freedom of thought, problems with the education system, the type of state ideology, etc. I think in this kind of environment you don’t have philosophical debates. Most of the students do not know how to ask. They are afraid of asking questions. Maybe this is partly related with our country, our family traditions. We don’t ask questions. If you are oppressed not to ask different questions, how can you produce theories, different ideas? This is mostly related with the characteristics of this non-Western world. Another point I want to raise is that by trying to make up homegrown theories, we should not isolate ourselves from the mainstream theories, or debates and agendas. For
example in the Cold War, some Third World formations, initiatives tried to create a different world, cut off from the West, from the Colonial countries, in order to create a new, completely different world. That was difficult, almost impossible to achieve. At the end, I think we should not fall into this trap of making original, completely new non-Western theories, but instead aim for better integrating with the main traditional theories. Asking new questions to the existing theoretical debates would be the best contribution to the existing IR literature, I think.

**Mustafa Aydın:** Starting with this originality in homegrown theory, especially in countries like Turkey where there is no tradition of contributing to mainstream theorization, it is too ambitious to start talking about originality. Looking at the examples of non-Western theory contributions globally, most of them are using some sort of a local idea turning into a global conceptual explanation. There is a problem for Turkish academia too. We are too cut off from older or ancient ideas of Turkish past to be able to use them. Political Scientists in Turkey have used Ibn Khaldun to modernize it and to talk about it for state theory. Nothing comparable happened in the Turkish IR community. Maybe it could have happened, I have no idea. On the question of homegrown theory, what do we mean by homegrown theory? As Ramazan also pointed out, are we attaching ourselves to traditional or non-traditional theories and enlarging on them or we have so much ambition to develop a theory everybody would just jump in and follow? That is not going to happen. The big question is, there are more Turkish academics living abroad, studying IR then doing the same thing in Turkey. When we attend the ISA conventions, "Turkish" communities are one of the biggest ones. So why those Turkish origin people who are living in the US and studying theory are not contributing to the mainstream theory is also an important question.

**Pınar İpek (Bilkent University):** Thank you for all the participants and people behind this organization. I have been listening to the entire workshop except for yesterday's afternoon session. I must say that I am annoyed by this dichotomy between post-Western versus Western theorization. I find it quite dangerous, as some of us already mentioned. I personally reject the first two questions, i.e. whether we can build or need a post-Western theory. Then the third and fifth questions...

**Ersel Aydınlı:** What do you reject? Do you disagree that there is a need or do you reject the label?

**Pınar İpek:** The division between post-Western and Western. Where is “the West”? **Deniz Kuru (Turkish German University):** So you do not think there is a need either.

**Pınar İpek:** No, I mean there is no need. Maybe it is about again the philosophy or understanding behind the label that comes in front of the word “theory”. I find homegrown more useful because, as my colleagues already mentioned, all theories--traditional or emerging--are to an extent local. My understanding of homegrown is local. As a modest contribution to this workshop, my main focus will be on questions number four and five. Like Emre, I feel like there is more to the motivation for recognition. I have not heard a lot about this in most discussions, except the first session yesterday, where Ersel mentioned that. It seems like everywhere around the world there is a universal search for some theorizing or more and more talking about the limitations of, let's say, orthodox or traditional theories. My point is why the need? What are the conditions behind it? My modest answer is probably, the transformations--however you see it--and the change in the historical patterns. That gives us answers to all where the West is, post-West is, what is ancient, what is philosophical. Rather
than focusing on more recognition, my suggestion is to focus on the need. Why in certain times, like my colleague also mentioned, the English school emerged. It is not just a market, right? There are historical breakthroughs and some emerging problems that academics try to understand and/or explain. That is my last point. Very quickly, as a self criticism to the periphery—I prefer to use core-periphery—Indeed, our Iranian colleague, Homeira finished her presentation with ‘confidence’. To ask the question number eight, the confidence in periphery. Given the self-criticism I brought, and I agree with all the points about the cultural issue Dr. Gözen mentioned and about the general education system, we need trust among scholars in the periphery. Trust among scholars in the periphery, in terms of the quality of the journals, the citation problem and of course professional pressure like we have to produce something.

**Ersel Aydınlı:** Pınar mentioned that we have to focus on the need, the recognition. You are so right actually. Maybe it has been underemphasized but I have to say it. The reason we organized this workshop is because some of us believe that core IR theory is in crisis. It cannot explain global affairs. It is misleading and it is confusing. In fact, theories are piling up but, as that famous title reminds us, so are the bodies piling up in the Middle East, and here and there we have civil wars and terrorism. But core IR theory is doing the littlest on these issues. That is the reason for our engaging with this. The primary reason to make IR theory richer. So that maybe there would be new explanations for all these problems that core IR theory has been failing to explain adequately. This is why we would like to engage in homegrown theorizing. The name is problematic. I think we should call it *more* theorizing, or more plurality in theorizing, but it has to include fair access to publication and overall recognition. Just like the labor unions say, we would like to be represented. All the ideas, fair representation. I mentioned earlier the dying off of many gatekeepers, but I don't believe that all gate keepers are disappearing. The gate keeping is institutionalized. Every journal is institutional at the end of the day. To repeat, and this is critical I believe, IR theory is not working, it is not explaining things. What is it explaining in Syria? Did you know, there are no IR theories of informal violence? More people are dying in non-state violence than as a result of state violence. But there are no real theories of it. We need theories to explain what is happening to us, and that is why we are doing this.

**Haluk Özdemir** (Kırıkkale University): Yesterday I talked about my problem with concepts. And today we are talking about similar issues: homegrown, Western, non-Western. Whatever the label is, we need to focus on what we need to do, what should we do. Are we going to reject all Western methodology concepts, theories, paradigms everything? Sometimes we sound like we want to reject everything Western. If we *mean* by Western, everything, all the information all the knowledge about IR produced up to now that is called Western, I think we give too much credit to the term West. I think what we call Western already employs some of the non-Western knowledge. I think we call it Core IR, because this Western/non-Western creates some kind of competition. It is like we are coming to get you. We want to have recognition. We want to have original ideas; we want to make a contribution but we are also kind of threatening the Core to destroy the Core. Ersel talked about the shortcomings of Core IR. Our main focus should be contributing to the Core and overcoming those shortcomings. Yesterday I talked about what should we do? Should we try to contribute? Or should we try to be original? Something completely new. If we try to be original, this really raises the expectations. The great expectations lead to great disappointments. Not to be disappointed,
we should narrow it down and limit our goal to contribution to the Core, because that is the only thing that would give us recognition. We don't want to destroy something that we want to get recognition from.

**Deniz Kuru:** Generally we have discussed about the word local, but I think yesterday Dr. Mallavarapu pointed out that there is this new school or new approach of local history under the conditions of globalization at the close of the 19th Century. In the 21st Century we are no longer able to pinpoint certain things and say "OK, it is our local things and they are native and original." There are not many ideas or philosophies which are not of a more global character. It is getting more and more difficult to find those things. One major problem which I see is in the future with regard to homegrown theorizing is the threat of falling into the trap of creating some caricatured versions of different thinkers. That happened with mainstream IR. Everyday there is a new clever and revisionist scholar who writes about all the problems with that kind of explanation about all these past thinkers. If we are doing non-Western theorizing or if we are going to engage ourselves with all these thinkers from the past, from the non-Western world, we should be very careful to make sure that we are not going to create those kinds of caricatures because you can in the future fall into that trap. One last point is about the issue of emerging schools. I don't think that schools emerged. They are created or established. They are not necessarily started by themselves. For example, the English school was started by an American grant that brought together British scholars, and they wanted them to create a joint theory. Then we speak about the need. The need is what we are taught with it. That is also a market question I think. If we are successful, if we are eager to pursue our different agendas then we can succeed. One really final point, I think the differences around the views in this workshop are that, there are people who are from this logic, point of view or positivist and who are post-positivists. At some points we kind of talk past each other. Not in a negative way, but there are different thoughts.

**Chih-yu Shih** (National Taiwan University): I think there is a difference between post-Western and non-Western IR. They serve different functions. Post-Western IR tries to transcend the dichotomy between the Western and the non-Western. So it is impossible for anyone to be Western or non-Western. Everybody is post-Western. Non-Western IR just looks for the origin of intellectual sources that can provide lessons and perhaps even rules that governed international relations before the West has arrived in the non-Western world. Both post-Western IR and non Western IR are useful. On the other hand, both post-Western and non-Western IR have the danger of recentralizing the West, because in most post-Western IR agendas they study how the local, i.e. ‘the site’ has been influenced or constituted by the Western IR and revise them in certain ways. The assumption is that everybody seems to know what the West already said. I think that is the problem of post-Western IR, there is no conscious attempt to treat the West as a combination of post-Western sites. And every Western site is in itself also a post-Western site. In other words, not just the non-Western world be constituted by the Western values and institutional theories, but political sites in the West are also constituted by non-Western resources. There has been a historical continuity in which the west learns from the non-Western world. So making post-Western inspiring an agenda, to understand that post-West and non-West become hybrid, become mutually constitutive. And I think post-Western IR must also study the history of re-Worlding in the West. How the West become Worlding? If we don’t do that then we risk centralizing the West. So, we need to modify the West and then study how each different Western site is also at the same time a post-Western site.
On that note, I would like to make a metaphor for efforts to create homegrown IR theories. I would like to use Chinese chopsticks as a metaphor. We can argue that chopsticks are no longer useful for this world because we can eat any food without chopsticks. We can argue that chopsticks are useful for eating Chinese food, and everyone should use chopsticks to eat Chinese food in order to appreciate or enjoy Chinese food. But they don’t need chopsticks for other food. That’s the specific function. The third possibility; chopsticks are good for Chinese people to eat any food in the World, but no one else needs to use chopsticks. So chopsticks become useful for a particular population, not for anyone else. Fourthly, chopsticks can be used for anyone who wants to use it to eat any food. So people who don’t use or are not used to Chinese food can use chopsticks to eat. Chopsticks can be useful universally but differently for different people. Consider chopsticks as homegrown IR theory, then think about how this particular theory will be accepted outside its home. We can use these four possible metaphors to categorize its use: One, it's not useful for anyone. Two, it is useful for a particular function. Three, it is useful for a particular people. Or four, it is useful for people who are outside the particular whole. They learn something differently from the people of homegrown theory. That is how I see the function of homegrown theory and also the function of post-Western and non-Western IR. It really depends on what we want to do. If we want to transcend the dichotomy of West vs. non-West, then we do post-Western IR. We will not tell our people that you must do Western IR because we want to transcend the dichotomy. Some people believe that there are original intellectual resources in their intellectual history, that have never been included by the Western thought and that can be useful for the contemporary World. That does not mean that they could tell everyone else to do non-Western IR. That is a little different from the way you categorize homegrown theory, because you categorize it from the whole point of view. I define these four categories to categorize homegrown theories in the eyes of those people also.

Siddharth Mallavarapu (South Asian University): At the outset, I would like to congratulate the hosts of the conference for making available this creative space to think about theorizing more generically from the global south and specifically about the Turkish experience. These spaces are indeed few and it is particularly appreciable from that point of view.

To begin with we must acknowledge that the West/North or East/South is not a monolith. Disciplinary histories of IR reveal the strong connections with the fortunes of the major powers (e.g. 19th century Britain, 20th century United States). There is something called the core which often takes on the mantle of producing theory. We must not reject theory merely because of this. We should assume a moderate position which does not require us to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Instead we must demonstrate that theoretical work also takes place in the global south. Theory is far too fundamental a domain of knowledge.

I agree with Prof. Ersel Aydınlı’s proposition that it is true that core or mainstream IR theory is unable to answer many of the questions that concern us in our parts of the world. The world must therefore be viewed from distinctive locations. We should acknowledge that theory is produced from different locales. Theoretical work does take place in the global south. The challenge is to identify these strands and bring them into a serious conversation with other existing strands. A special anxiety is attached to theory given its standing within knowledge systems. A fundamental domain of knowledge must encourage diversity. Revisionist historiography reveals clearly that IR is not a neutral discipline. Particular modes
of socialization, the effacement of colonialism, Eurocentrism (treating European experiences as the universal), the silences of race, gender and class need to be accounted for. Robert Vitalis in his book *White World Order, Black Power Politics* argues that in 1910, the *Journal of Race Development* was the first journal of IR. There is something to be said about the partisan nature of knowledge. As Cox suggests, IR is an ideological formation. Like all ideological formations it has its own inclusions and exclusions.

Prof. Mustafa Aydn’s point about the distance from the mainstream is an important observation. We need to be patient and do our own thing without being too beholden to mainstream paradigms. We must also be willing to contest mainstream claims. Years ago Albert Hirschman penned a piece titled ‘paradigms as a hindrance to understanding’. That has a special ring today in the global south. Paradigms can imprison us.

The challenges of weak institutionalization, the absence of peer review of IR in many parts of the world still remains.

Prof. Karen Smith’s emphasis on bringing together various attempts of theorizing from around the world to contribute to IR merits further thought and deliberation. Our intent is not to score national points or to suggest that we must not engage the West merely because of its location. However, we need to be critical and recognize power relations that underpin knowledge claims. We must participate in a global conversation and enrich it from our own locales of experience and engagement with the world. As Terry Nardin has suggested earlier in one of his writings that ‘different traditions pose different questions’, the real challenge is to embrace these possibilities.

**Ching-Chang Chen** (Ryukoku University): Some of the issues I have in mind have been covered so far, I would add a quick footnote to Prof. Shih's comment about academic decisions to practice post-Western IR theorizing or not. Two years ago I co-authored a book chapter with Prof. Shih, and in our chapter we mention that Taiwanese IR academics, most of them, graduated from American Universities. It is interesting that it is quite hard to see anyone who is trying to do homegrown IR theorizing in Taiwan. Most people are not concerned about that. They are not interested. Why? In our chapter, we believe that it has to do with identity function of IR theory. If you are able to practice Western IR, if you can teach Western theory and you apply Western IR theory in your research, then somehow you acquire sort of the image of Americans. And for a post-colonial society like Taiwan, whose national identity is increasingly becoming or trying to make a distinction between Chinese and Taiwanese. This country imagines Americans as a useful reference point to demonstrate that Taiwan is not Chinese. So I think, probably this could be an interesting direction for thinking about how people chose to do or not to do post-Western IR theory. The second issue, is about teaching. Several years ago, I did teaching in Japan for some years. My first institution was more like an international university. I had to teach in English there. After one course, an exchange student from Canada told me that my IR course was the one he felt was closest to his courses back in Canada. I took that as a complement at first but I actually started studying a kind of homegrown IR theorizing and I questioned myself; how come my student picked me on that kind of observation? Again between what I was teaching and what I was researching, because I was teaching Western IR to my students, but I was researching sort of homegrown IR. I think probably I am not the only one, many of us face similar situations that we are using textbooks, which are mostly US centric and it is quite frustrating to teach this to our students and then teach them how to construct those theories. So one future direction for us is to think
about publishing textbooks that we can use for our own teaching. We don't need to repeat this
tiring process of teaching Western IR theory first, then deconstructing them.

**Seçkin Köstem** (Bilkent University): I think the biggest danger and at the same time the
obstacle for homegrown theorizing is to treat IR theory as the top and the best overall. We
start from the top, the abstract theoretical level without teaching the students prior steps;
"How do you ask questions? What is a research question? How do you make arguments and
hypothesis?" In that sense I find Turkish comparativists much more successful. That has got
to do with the nature of comparative politics, because in comparative politics you don't have
grand theories, realism, liberalism and whatever. People ask research questions and develop
theoretical answers to them. When you talk about theorizing in comparative politics, you talk
about hypotheses and testing them. Whereas in IR theorizing, you talk about explaining the
whole world, which I think is a big obstacle. As far as Turkey is concerned, I think this is a
very big obstacle as a faculty member who recently completed his PhD abroad. And also we
should not look down on ourselves. I did my PhD in Canada, and Canadian students faced the
same criticism all the time from their professors: “hey it's not original”. It is not only people
from the developing or non-Western world who are criticized for not being able to theorize,
Americans, Canadians face it all the time and I have met many students who had to quit their
programs because they were not original enough. Probably, they were better intellectuals
than many other students but they could not develop original hypotheses.

I see that Turkish scholars are widely read, their articles are widely downloaded and
cited. I have seen many articles written by Turkish scholars that were downloaded more
than 3000 times and cited more than 50 times, which is unimaginable for a standard Western
academic. I am myself involved in managing a Western academic journal and I know that
even professors who teach at top Western universities are downloaded only 300-400 times.
Maybe we should shift the focus from grand theorizing to a global level so that we can
develop in a healthier manner towards grand theorizing if that is the purpose. To get back
to Karen’s point, we might also consider ISA as a good platform to get together with people
who focus on homegrown theorizing. Again, it is an institution at the core but I can’t see any
other potential for doing that, if the goal is to bring in everyone from most parts of the world.

**Eyüp Ersoy** (Independent Researcher): There are four points I’d like to talk about. The first
and second questions are my favorite questions. Last night we were talking about how come
we can eat the best fish in Ankara. Ankara does not have any shores to any sea, but still
we eat the best fish in Ankara. The world of IR theory is something like that.

There are several countries dealing with civil wars for example, but the best theory for civil wars and its
regional implications are written in or produced or developed and consumed in, for example,
Boston. How come this has become a pattern is a legitimate thing to ask.

The second point is that there are some troubling patterns of citing in homegrown
theorizing. For example, my understanding of manifested ontology is actually inspired by the
12th century Muslim philosopher Suhrawardi, who developed a school of philosophy called
Illuminationism. For him, truth manifests itself as reality at different ontological levels. His
system of ontological levels, called the Levels of Ontology, was actually the main assumption
of Islamic philosophy for centuries. There was also Molla Sadra, a very important philosopher
on the relationship between ontology and epistemology. He categorized four relations: there
is being by knowledge, being by being, knowledge by being, and knowledge by knowledge.
This is his understanding of the relationship between ontology and epistemology. I think
Moshirzadeh cited him once. My question to the participants here is, should I cite him to be homegrown or not cite him? Or what is it that makes me cite him or not cite him? That is my question.

The third point, the idea that homegrown theory is theorizing in the periphery about the periphery is a self-imposed limitation in my view. Scholars in the periphery should be and must be theorizing about the core as well. For example, the most famous peripheral theory is dependency theory, because they also said something about the core and the relationship between the periphery and the core. So we should not limit ourselves to the issues of the periphery; we should be able to tell something about the core and the relationship between the core and periphery.

And my fourth point is related to Dr. Köstem's point. I definitely agree we don't need to theorize paradigms, we don't need to be concerned with grand theories. For example, in the global South or the periphery, there are lots of civil wars. There was a civil war between 1997-2003 in Congo and it is called by some scholars as the world war of Africa, around five million people died. There are of course books and articles about it, but I don't know any theoretical approach from African scholars or from the periphery. We have these experiences that are sometimes very detrimental. We should be able to theorize about them instead of meta-theorizing about homegrown theory.

Knud Erik Jörgensen (Yaşar University): I have five comments. The first is in response to your first question. The thing is that if you look at the development of the discipline, various people asked the very same question some forty or fifty years ago. But theory did not exist as an explicit body of knowledge when it was ‘only’ a vision of creating a discipline. Before the Second World War people were discussing the issue, namely if there a need for a study of international relations. But after the Second World War a new theme emerged. It was what was discussed in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States and Europe: is there a need for theory? In other words, the aim changed and it became a mission to create a theory of international politics. Given that it was only forty/fifty years ago, people outside the traditional centres of theory production could perhaps learn from how it was dealt with previously, not necessarily copying what was done but at least take some inspiration by looking into how the Europeans and the Americans at the time discussed and created theories. And of course, people also say that there is an advantage of being a latecomer so why not exploit this opportunity.

The second comment concerns the issue of authority and I take the first proper IR journal in German, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, as an example. By launching that journal younger German IR scholars managed to revolutionize the discipline in Germany. Because what they did by introducing the double-blind peer review was to undermine the authorities and hierarchies in the field – the gatekeepers. Young professors wanted to do things in new ways. And by introducing peer review – it is a revolution, right? – they took away that authority, that power. And scared of being rejected by unknown people, several old professors didn't dare to submit manuscripts. So it was a two lane street of revolution. The launch of the ZIB is also interesting concerning a second aspect. That is, it was launched by an exchange between Gunther Hellmann and Michael Zürn. Hellmann had a recipe for the future – a way forward – specifically that Germans should adopt US standards. Zürn responded with a telling title, “Sure we can do better – aber muss es auf Amerikanish sein?” Now, the funny thing is that Zürn subsequently adopted ‘American’ standards whereas Hellmann, as WISC president, promotes Global South perspectives.
The third comment is about the ‘homegrown’ issue. Most of us are – I guess – not nomads. So we all come from somewhere, at least most of the time. In my own case, that somewhere has been Denmark, London, Italy, Toronto, Barcelona and currently İzmir. It is my experience that I, from these observation posts, look at International Relations somewhat differently. In short, going somewhere might trigger exciting insights and outlooks that would not emerge being somewhere. On the other hand, you do not necessarily need to move yourself, because it is said that Kant never left Königsberg and was still capable of theorizing cosmopolitanism. That's quite an accomplishment, being in a very local Königsberg.

The fourth comment is about the speaker we had previously today from the Buddhist-oriented university. When our colleague was not quite sure if there was some Buddhism in the Kyoto School or not, and whether it matters, his comments took me along the avenue of associations. I will therefore remind you of the British diplomat, turned scholar, Michael Nicolson. In a book about him it is highlighted that he looked at the world and international politics through the lenses of the classics. So he had a kind of epistemic reference to the (European) classics. His concepts and dilemmas were developed through the lenses of the classics. Moreover, he pointed out that other people have other epistemic underpinnings, among which some were religious. Take the example of Martin Wight or Morgenthau. People say that you don't know Morgenthau's theory if you do not take into consideration that he was a deeply religious man. Other people have enlightenment philosophers as their prime reference point, and this suggests to me that at least there is a wide range of options to underpin IR theorizing.

The final comment I want to make is that you can have all sorts of ideas about how to theorize and from where, how abstract it should be, how local it should be, how homegrown it should be, etc. However, all such ideas have a limited chance of materializing into something close to a collective enterprise if we do not have three things: organization, organization and organization. Without organization, ideas floating around do not necessarily have the intended impact.

Berk Esen (Bilkent University): I think we are almost done. I’ll keep my comments short. Now, Seçkin also mentioned a couple of points I wanted to raise. First of all we don’t need to be critical and pessimistic about the quality of IR teaching and IR scholarship considering that IR is the field that is almost exclusively composed by scholars born, raised and taught in Western countries using arguments from the system drawing theories from the Western history. Also taking the fact the structural inequalities exist between, for instance, in education between Western and non-Western countries. Also considering that in order to get published and read widely, we need to speak and write English very fluently in a non-Western context is a lot more difficult to do than for those in the Western context.

Also considering how young the discipline is in some of the countries where the speakers are coming from, I think the situation is more positive than negative. What is interesting is that when I look at the countries and universities where the speakers are coming from it is hard to sort of miss this contrast between Western theory being associated with developed countries. Now there are more non-Western thinkers and scholars being associated with some of the rising developing countries or emerging markets, which have now more resources to allocate to their education systems, and which want to pull their weight in the global arena, so there is both an advantage and a disadvantage in that. I completely agree with my neighbor that there is a danger of fragmentation and nationalism with some non-Western
scholars. I think using this notion of pluralism in their IR theory to sort of promote their own nationalistic perspectives and viewpoints. I guess in answering the first two questions I would say it depends, but probably, yes. The reason why I say it depends is that like Pinar İpek I don’t like the post-Western label, but I think we need something that is somewhat different from the Western theory. What we need only so far as certain puzzles are better explained by these theories than what we already have. If they don’t necessarily have the same kind of explanatory power, then I am not necessarily that interested in coming up with a non-Western theory. I also don’t want the non-Western theories to be sort of turning to an ISA sort of academic model; let’s raise the barriers, let’s basically keep Western theories out of our universities in the non-Western world and try to come up with our own because we can't compete with the theories coming from the West. I think it is important for us, if we consider ourselves non-Western scholars, to be able contribute to the global debate and engage Western scholars and hopefully do a better job in explaining what is going on in our respected parts of the world. And also, for the second question, we can only do that, come up with theories that explain for instance, with regards to terrorism, if we come up with such a theory and it also explains some terrorist actions happening in other parts of the World, then we can only begin to develop a successful non-Western theory, that would have a wider appeal.

And the other part where I think the periphery can revolutionize IR theory, that goes to the 7th question, is now looking at the mainstream Western theories and paradigms that are been used for close to a century. Now much of it has been built upon Western history completely and modernized, ignoring what happens in the West before Westphalia and certainly what happened in non-Western contexts until the 20th Century/ So the non-Western scholars can easily, over time, revolutionize the IR field by coming up with instances from global history outside of the Western context, using something from Indian history, Chinese history, something from Ottoman, from Latin American history before the arrival of the Spanish or from African history. So I think there are channels and ways of doing that but we need to be vigilant about not falling into this trap of import substitution or completely being closed to the outside world. I guess the other important thing is that in order for this post-Western or homegrown theory to be manufactured we need to have democratic structures within these countries. Unless we have free and open academia in our respected countries it would be difficult to go beyond these kinds of nationalistic notions and really compete with Western academics in explaining what is happening.

**Ersel Aydınlı:** I would like to thank all of you for the whole workshop and this roundtable, which turned out to be what it was meant to be: we wanted to discuss, discuss, and discuss. Throughout the workshop there have been really valuable not only scholarly products as well as practical suggestions. We are going to write these down and try to categorize them to put in our journal for a larger audience. I would like to thank everybody who came here and but also the people who organized this, our Center's people. I would like to remind everyone that the founders of our Center and journal never tell us what we should do. We have complete academic freedom inside the journal and the Center, and this is how we see fit that we should use our resources and energy. As for *All Azimuth*, we remain committed to it being a platform for all voices. Thank you.
Abstracts in Turkish

Güney Çin Denizi Sorunu: Kongresel Katılım ve A.B.D. Siyasi Tepkisi

James M. Scott
Texas Christian Üniversitesi

Öz

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD Kongresi, diplomasi, dış politika, bölgesel deniz anlaşmazlıkları, Güney Çin Denizi

“Sovyet-sonrası”nın Ayrıntılı Bir İncelenmesi: Tartu Semiyotik Ekolün Siyasi Mirası

Andrey Makarychev
Tartu Üniversitesi

Alexandra Yatsyk
Uppsala Üniversitesi

Öz

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kültürel semiyotik, Sovyet sonrası geçiş
Kavram Geliştirme ve Yerli Kuramlaştırma: Nüfuz Kavramı Örneği

Eyüp Ersoy

Öz


Anahtar Kelimeler: Kavramsal geliştirme, kavramsal münhasırlık, yerli kuramlaştırma, etki, güç

Kuram İnşa Etmek Üzerine Yapılacak 100 Küresel Çalıştay Bir Farklılık Yaratar mı?

Knud Erik Jørgensen

Aarhus Üniversitesi ve Yaşar Üniversitesi

Öz


Anahtar Kelimeler: Disiplin, hegemonya, marketler, Ortodoksçuluk, kuram, kuram inşa etmek

Uluslararası İlişkileri Yeniden Şekillendirmek: Afrika’dan Kuramsal Yenilikler

Karen Smith

Cape Town Üniversitesi ve Leiden Üniversitesi

Öz


Anahtar Kelimeler: Gelişen ülkeler, yerli kuramlaştırma, orta güç, Batı dışı Uluslararası İlişkiler, Güney Afrika, ubuntu
Terörizm Siyasi Amaçlara Ulaşmak İçin Etkin Bir Strateji mi Oluyor?

Nihat Ali Özcan
TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi

Öz


Anahtar Kelimeler: Drone savaşları, IŞİD, cihadçılık, bölücülük, terörizm
Manuscript Submission:

Manuscripts submitted for consideration must follow the style on the journal’s web page (http://www.allazimuth.com/authors-guideline/). The manuscripts should not be submitted simultaneously to any other publication, nor may they have been previously published elsewhere in English. However, articles that are published previously in another language but updated or improved can be submitted. For such articles, the author(s) will be responsible in seeking the required permission for copyright.

Manuscripts must be submitted by e-mail to: allazimuth@bilkent.edu.tr

Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, İhsan Doğramacı Peace Foundation

The Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research was created under the auspices of the İhsan Doğramacı Peace Foundation.

The main purpose of the Center is to help develop agendas and promote policies that contribute to the peaceful resolution of international and inter-communal conflicts taking place particularly in the regions surrounding Turkey. It also aims to analyze and interpret contemporary policies from a critical, comparative but, at the same time, constructive and peace-oriented perspective.

The Center, in order to achieve its purpose, prepares research projects and programs, works to provide a suitable dialogical environment for social scientists, publishes research outcomes, holds conferences, round-tables, and workshops on national and international levels, offers fellowships, appoints candidates for the İhsan Doğramacı Peace Award, and publishes All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace.

The Center, in its activities, observes the highest academic standards, norms, and freedoms. In doing so it attaches significance to the theoretical and methodological aspects of foreign policy analysis and works to construct bridges between policy and theory. Together with All Azimuth, the Center also aims to provide a platform for homegrown conceptualizations of international relations and foreign policy research.