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Aims and Scope

All Azimuth, journal of the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, is an English-language, international peer-reviewed journal, published biannually. It aims:

- to provide a forum for academic studies on foreign policy analysis, peace and development research,
- to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements in the dialogue between the "center" and the "periphery",
- to encourage publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches.
- to transcend conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries,
- to highlight works of senior and promising young scholars,
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In This Issue

This issue of All Azimuth opens with Yasemin Akbaba and Jonathan Fox's examination of shifts in governmental religion policy and societal discrimination against the religious minorities in Muslim-majority states after the Arab Uprisings. They ask whether the level of governmental and/or societal discrimination against religious minorities changed since the Arab Uprisings and whether governmental religious policy patterns are different in states which experienced uprisings compared to other Muslim-majority states. The existing literature predicts a rise in all forms of discrimination in Arab Uprising states, and an even more significant rise in societal religious discrimination because transition periods present an opportunity to update formal and informal of policies of the states. However, updating the legal framework takes longer period compared to the changes in the society's attitudes, thus societal behavior can change more quickly than the governmental policies. By using the Religion and State round 3 (RAS3) dataset for the years 2009-2014 and focusing on 49 Muslim-majority countries and territories, Akbaba and Fox's test these predictions and partially confirm them: in Arab Uprising states, the government policy did not change significantly as opposed to societal discrimination which increased substantially.

In the second article, Burak Bilgehan Özpek and Yavuz Yağış explores the relationship between de facto statehood and jihadism to identify the rationale behind establishing a jihadist de facto state through the unique case of ISIS. Özpek and Yağış put forward the concept of 'competitive jihadism' and argue that ISIS is a de factor state that uses jihadism as a survival strategy. Through the use of Jihadism, ISIS competes with its metropole states, Syria and Iraq, to attract Muslims, who are inclined to radicalization and to recruit foreign fighters through showing the jihadist deficiency of the metropole states. They conclude that ISIS successfully employed this strategy and has become the magnet for foreign fighters, thus able to increase its military capabilities.

In the third article, Tuğba Bayar investigates the primary factors that shapes Iran's foreign policy through the lens of neoclassical realism. Bayar adopts a historical and multi-level approach to identify primary independent and intervening variables, which would provide a better understanding of Iran's foreign policy behavior. Bayar argues that Iran's foreign policy is the function of three systemic factors, geopolitics, threat perceptions and balance of power politics, that are filtered through three domestic factors, nationalism, theological and revolutionary ideology and policy making mechanisms.

In the fourth article, Ramazan Erdağ contends that there is still a need for organizational reform in the Turkish Armed Forces, which would solidify the structural changes that the Justice and Development Party had done. The failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016 has showed, he argues, the necessity of reforms at the operational level, which should be done by the civilian government in order to cope with challenges. Erdağ points out that organizational military reform in Turkey is needed to curb the military's tendency for coup actions and to improve the military's effectiveness. While the Justice and Development Party were able to make significant reforms in the military, they remained at the strategic level.

The final and fifth article tackles one of the most debated issues in the Turkish defense policy; the road that lead to the S-400 procurement decision. Sıtkı Egeli provides an in-depth and empirically rich account of Turkey's long journey of acquiring long range air and missile defense system. Egeli critically evaluates the rationale behind the decision since 2013 and guides the reader through the process and political problems that each decisions has caused.

He argues that 2017 decision to procure off-the-shelf standalone S-400 systems from Russia is an anomaly and had all the characteristics of a top-down decision cycle running afoul of technical, operational, and industrial criteria. Egeli also argues that although the government official justified the S-400 decision by pointing out the benefits of in-country production, access to technologies, and West's refusal to sell comparable systems, these justifications are either refuted by the Russian side and/or in discordant statements by Turkish institutions, authorities, and political figures themselves.

This issue closes with a review article on the foreign policy of Iran. Vali Golmohammadi critically evaluates Mahmood Sarioghalam's book "The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Theoretical Revision and the Coalition Paradigm", and Shahram Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit's edited volume "Iran in the World: President Rouhani's Foreign Policy".

Societal Rather than Governmental Change: Religious Discrimination in Muslim-Majority Countries after the Arab Uprisings

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Gettysburg College

Jonathan Fox
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Abstract

This study examines shifts in governmental religion policy and societal discrimination against religious minorities in Muslim-majority states after the Arab Uprisings by using the Religion and State round 3 (RAS3) dataset for the years 2009-2014 and by focusing on 49 Muslim-majority countries and territories. We build on threads of literature on religious pluralism in transitional societies to explain the changes in governmental religion policy and societal discrimination against religious minorities after the Arab Uprisings. This literature predicts a rise in all forms of discrimination in Arab Uprising states as compared to other Muslim-majority states, and an even more significant rise in societal religious discrimination since societal behavior can change more quickly than government policy, especially at times of transition. The results partially conform to these predictions. There was no significant difference in the shifts in governmental religion policy between Arab Uprising and other Muslim-majority states, but societal religious discrimination increased substantially in Arab Uprising states as compared to non-Arab Uprising states. Understanding the nature of religion policies and religious discrimination provides further opportunities to unveil the dynamics of regional politics as well as conflict prevention in the region.

Keywords: Arab Uprisings, religious policy, transitional regimes, societal discrimination

1. Introduction

The Arab Uprising, by demanding social justice and freedom, inspired hopes of change in a region where democratic prospects have been in short supply.[1] [2] While demonstrations led to a stable political transformation in Tunisia, uprisings escalated from acts of violence into civil war in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. With the notable exception of Tunisia, a short-lived era

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[1] This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation Grant 23/14. Any opinions expressed in this study represent those of the authors and not necessarily the Israel Science Foundations.

[2] For earlier work on authoritarianism in the Middle East see Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-57; and Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For a discussion on 'democratic deficit' of the region before and after the uprisings see, Eric Chaney, George A. Akerlof and Lisa Blaydes, "Democratic Change in the Arab World, Past and Present," *Brooking Papers on Economic Activity* 42, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 363-414; and Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 127-49. For a political and historical context of Arab uprisings see Mehran Kamrava, ed., *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

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of optimism in each region gave way to a state of chaos, confusion, and eventually what has come to be termed the "Arab Winter".[3] To a large extent, the goals of the Arab Uprisings were lost before they were realized. In the following months of protests, restrictions on freedom such as continuing or escalating discrimination against religious minorities surfaced.[4]

In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, tensions remain high in the region as religious tolerance deteriorates in societies with already deep sectarian divides. However, scholarship on religious liberty has yet to capture the changing landscape of governmental religion policies (such as religious discrimination) since the Arab Uprisings. Although various studies suggest the deteriorating treatment of religious minorities in Arab Uprising states, Fox in his analysis of the treatment of religious minorities from 1990 to 2008 demonstrates that "religious discrimination is present and increasing" in both Christian and Muslim majority states, "including Western democracies which are supposed to be among the most tolerant in the world." [5] With the exception of the Pew report, none of the relevant work compares religious discrimination trends in the pre- and post-Arab Uprising Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region with a cross-sectional, quantitative methodology.[6] The Pew report covers only one Arab Uprising year (2011) and it does not provide detailed information on discrimination trends in different sub-categories, such as core Arab Uprising countries as compared to others. In addition, the Pew data does not differentiate between the religious freedom of religious minorities and the religious freedom of members of a country's majority religion.[7]

This study asks the following questions: Has governmental and/or societal religious discrimination against religious minorities changed since the Arab Uprisings? Are governmental religious policy patterns different in Arab Uprising countries compared to non-Arab Uprising countries in the MENA or non-MENA Muslim-majority states? We build on the threads of literature on religious pluralism in transitional societies to provide a viable theoretical framework that explains the changes in religion policies and discriminations against religious minorities after the Arab Uprisings.

Transition periods present an opportunity for governments to update formal and informal policies of the state. One prominent example of this is governmental religious discrimination. Previous scholarship on regime transition suggests that restrictions targeting religious minorities tend to increase at times of political transition. This literature predicts that all forms of religious discrimination against religious minorities will increase (alongside other governmental religious policies) in transitional regimes such as the Arab Uprising states as compared to non-Arab Uprising states in the region, as well as in other Muslim-majority

[3] "Politics in the Middle East: The Arab Winter," *The Economist,* accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21685503-five-years-after-wave-uprisings-arab-world-worse-ever.

[4] Monica D. Toft, "The Politics of Religious Outbidding," *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* 11, no. 3 (2013): 10-9. "Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion," Pew Research Center, 2013, accessed December 20, 2016, http://www.pewforum.org/2013/06/20/arab-spring-restrictions-on-religion-findings/; James Michael Nossett, "Free Exercise after the Arab Spring: Protecting Egypt's Religious Minorities under the Country's New Constitution," *Indiana Law Journal* 89, no. 4, Article 8 (2014); Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, "Statism, Tolerance and Religious Freedom in Egypt," *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights* 13, no. 1 (2016): 1-24, accessed on 4 Jan. 2017, doi:10.1515/mwjhr-2015-0013; Fatima el-Issawi, "The Arab Spring and the Challenge of Minority Rights: Will the Arab Revolutions Overcome the Legacy of the Past?" *European View* 10 (2011): 249-58. For instance, in 2011 government's restriction on religion in Egypt was higher than any other country reported in the Pew (2013) report. In this study we found this to be true for societal discrimination, but not governmental discrimination. Moreover, Egypt's scores for both were static, i.e. not changing from pre-Arab Uprising levels.

[5] Jonathan Fox, *The Unfree Exercise of Religion: A World Survey of Religious Discrimination against Religious Minorities* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 8.

[6] "Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion".

[7] "Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion".

states outside of MENA. Societal behavior can change more quickly than governmental policy at times of transition since it takes longer to update the legal framework of a state than the attitudes of a society.[8] Therefore, we predict that societal religious discrimination will escalate more than governmental religious discrimination in Arab Uprising states.

We utilize round three of the Religion and State (RAS) dataset, which includes data on governmental religion policy and societal discrimination between 2009 and 2014. In this study we focus on 49 Muslim-majority countries and territories. The analysis shows that there is no evidence that government policy in Arab Uprising states changed significantly in a manner different from other Muslim-majority states. This applies to government-based discrimination against religious minorities, regulation of the majority religion and all religions in the country, and support for religion. The results indicate that societal discrimination increased substantially in Arab Uprising states as compared to other Muslim-majority states. Taking into consideration identity-based divides that shape regional politics, these results present implications for conflict prevention in the region.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section two reviews the existing literature on religious freedom in transitional regimes in the context of the Arab Uprisings. The research design section, presents the data and operationalization of the variables. We will then report our findings, and finally, present our conclusions.

2. Religious Pluralism in Transitional Societies

Regime transitions are known to be complex experiences that yield a diverse set of political outcomes. Scholarship on transitional regimes finds democratization attempts to produce intolerant governmental and social attitudes that welcome nationalist and religious outbidding tendencies.[9] Transitional regimes tend to restrict religious freedom as religion revives and religious regulations increase.[10] In addition, in a transitional regime, the desire for legitimacy leads to the creation of religion policies that aim to strengthen the government's authority and power. Interestingly, a government's yearning for legitimacy does not yield a single form of religious policy. As Fox suggests, states may "seek religious legitimacy" or simply "fear its use against the state."[11] Egypt's political adventures since the Arab uprisings present an example of this complexity. Right after the uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a significant political force, highlighted its legitimacy through religious policies that expanded the role of religion in politics. Since the toppling of Morsi and political marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood, legitimacy of the government is centered on control of religion. Simply put, aspects of government religion policy may emerge as governmental religious discrimination, religious support or restrictions placed on all religions.

This paper situates post-Arab Uprising governmental religion policies under the transitional regime scholarship to understand how religious liberty has changed in a region where the "robustness of authoritarianism"[12] and "democratic deficit"[13] had been defining attributes for many years.

[8] It is important to acknowledge that the reverse, i.e. government policy changing more quickly than societal behavior, could be true as well.

[9] Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W.W Norton, 2000); Toft, "The Politics of Religious Outbidding".

[10] John Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies: The Politics of Religion* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[11] Fox, *The Unfree Exercise of Religion,* 77.

[12] Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism".

[13] Chaney, Akerlof and Blaydes, "Democratic Change in the Arab World".

There are several bodies of literature that examine transitional regimes and democratization.[14] Part of this scholarship identifies the likely conditions and characteristics of transitional systems, such as the "politicization of ethnicity and the rise of nationalist movements,"[15] as well as the increasing tendencies toward violence and war.[16] Mansfield and Snyder[17] suggest "institutional capacity", "severe ethnic divisions", "democratic character of the surrounding international neighborhood", and "availability of an effective power sharing system" to be important factors that shape the outcome of a transition.

Transitional regime scholarship also explores how the transition process impacts ethnic and religious minorities. Embracing ethnic and religious pluralism has proven to be a common challenge to most transitional societies. It is frequently observed that minorities get "the short end of the stick" at times of transition due to the collective mindset of the majority. This mindset tends to focus on preserving the national unity of the state, which is perceived to be weak, fragile and unstable, at the expense of pluralism. Anderson,[18] referring to survey data from "post-Soviet societies", reveals peoples' perception of democratic rights:

> …for many people strong leadership and the restoration of 'order' were more important than democratic niceties, and that society and elites had yet to imbibe the values of tolerance and acceptance of diversity that tend to underpin mature democratic states.

Although it does not focus on transitional regimes, securitization scholarship suggests a similar dynamic. Securitization theory suggests a state representative can securitize an issue by invoking security.[19] *Securitized issues* are prioritized since they pose a threat to national security. The urgency of eliminating a threat opens the possibility of using unusual strategies.[20] In some cases, these strategies are not guided by democratic norms and principles even in democratic states. A religion or a religious group could be securitized. For instance, Cesari examines the securitization of Islam.[21] This theory is also used to explain restrictions on religious freedom. Fox and Akbaba use securitization theory to study religious discrimination against Muslims in comparison to other religious minorities in Western Democracies.[22]

Patriotic sentiments tend to strengthen exclusionary policies as competition among political actors facilitates the marginalizing political rhetoric that targets ethnic and/or religious minorities.[23] In addition, harsh responses to the demands of minority groups are

[14] For pioneering works on this see Guillermo A. O'Donnell et. al. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore;London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

[15] Timothy Frye, "Ethnicity, Sovereignty and Transitions from Non-Democratic Rule," *Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2 (1992): 623.

[16] Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Prone to Violence: The Paradox of the Democratic Peace," *The National Interest* 82 (2005/06): 39-45.

[17] Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Arab Spring," *International Interactions* 38, no. 5 (2012): 723.

[18] Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies*, 2.

[19] Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46-87; Ole Wæver, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery" (paper presented at annual meeting for ISA Conference, Montreal, March 2004); J. Huysmans, "Security: What do you mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier," European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (1998): 226-55.

[20] Carsten Bagge Lausten and Ole Wæver, "In Defense of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization," in *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile,* ed. Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2003), 147-80.

[21] Jocelyne Cesari, "The Securitization of Islam in Europe," (CEPS Challenge, Research Paper No. 15, April 2009).

[22] Jonathan Fox and Yasemin Akbaba, "Securitization of Islam and Religious Discrimination: Religious Minorities in Western Democracies, 1990 to 2008," *Comparative European Politics* 13 (2015): 175-97.

[23] For a description of the process for religious minorities see, John Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies: The*

normalized as ethnic and religious outbidding tendencies increase.[24]

Outbidding scholarship advances our understanding of societies in transition and what this means for pluralism. According to Snyder's[25] work on nationalist outbidding, political elites utilize outbidding tendencies to improve their nationalistic qualifications[26]. Mansfield and Snyder[27] suggest transitions to democratic regimes with "weak domestic institutions" can be violent, and that tensions across ethnic groups can be high at these times.[28] Since countries with "weak domestic institutions" are not equipped to accommodate the increasing political demands of previously marginalized groups, these countries often end up with "belligerent ethnic nationalism or sectarianism" that then inspires either civil strife or outside intervention.[29]

Much like in the nationalist outbidding process, in religious outbidding, political elites use religious outbidding to better qualify for their position. Toft[30] outlines the dynamics and conditions of religious outbidding and explains why it is common in transitional regimes. In the process of religious outbidding, political elites try to outbid the opposition by reframing "secular domestic threats to their tenure … as religious threats."[31] She suggests that religious outbidding frequently takes place in transitional regimes as it presents an opportunity for political actors to boost their credentials domestically and internationally.[32]

Posen[33] highlights a similar mechanism as he applies the security dilemma concept of international relations theory to ethnic conflict scholarship. Posen[34] suggests that "the collapse of imperial regimes can be profitably viewed as a problem of 'emerging anarchy.'" As groups try to address security concerns due to the disintegration of a central government, they could create security concerns for others that then lead to a security dilemma. In other words, much like international actors, ethnic groups could challenge the security of other groups as they try to advance their own security. Posen's application is expanded to understand the role of discrimination in the context of the ethnic security dilemma. [35]

Political transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and South Africa (among others), ushered in a research agenda on democratic consolidation and religious pluralism in transitional regimes.[36] Although commitment to religious freedom and high

Politics of Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[24] Toft, "The Politics of Religious Outbidding". For more on outbidding see Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, "More Combatant Groups, More Terror?: Empirical Tests of an Outbidding Logic," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 5 (2012): 706-21.

[25] Snyder, *From Voting to Violence.*

[26] For more on ethnic outbidding and ethnic political parties see Kanchan Chandra, "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 2 (2005): 235-52.

[27] Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Arab Spring," 722.

[28] For more on ethnic conflict in the Middle East and the spread of ethnic conflict across borders see Jonathan Fox, "Are Middle East Conflicts More Religious?" *Middle East Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (2001): 31-40; Jonathan Fox, "Is Ethnoreligious Conflict a Contagious Disease?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27, no. 2 (2004): 89-106.

[29] Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Arab Spring," 722.

[30] Toft, "The Politics of Religious Outbidding".

[31] Toft, "The Politics of Religious Outbidding," 10.

[32] Toft, "The Politics of Religious Outbidding".

[33] Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, no. 1 (1993): 27-47.

[34] Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,"27.

[35] For example,Yasemin Akbaba, Patrick James and Zeynep Taydas, "The Chicken or the Egg? External Support and Rebellion in Ethnopolitics," in *Intra-State Conflict, Government and Security: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Assurance*, eds. Stephen M. Saideman and Marie-Joelle Zahar (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 161-81.] examines security dilemma, discrimination against ethnic groups and internationalization of ethnic conflicts.

[36] See Aleš Črnič, "Religious Freedom and Control in Independent Slovenia," *Sociology of Religion* 64, no. 3 (2003): 349-66; Ani Sarkissian, "Religious Reestablishment in Post-Communist Polities," *Journal of Church and State* 51, no. 3 (2009): 472-501; Hubert Seiwert, "Freedom and Control in the Unified Germany: Governmental Approaches to Alternative Religions since 1989," *Sociology of Religion* 64, no. 3 (2003): 367-75; Lourens M. du Plessis, "The Protection of Religious Rights in South Africa's

democratic performance appear to be a challenge, transitional societies do not treat religious communities in a uniform manner. Numerous attributes of states, such as dominant religious affiliation, overlap of national and dominant religious identity, fears of instability, and competition among religious actors within a state, are discussed as explanatory factors for this variation. However, despite this variation, previous research suggests a common pattern running across transitional societies regarding the treatment of religious minorities. Anderson[37] examines the nature of religious freedom at times of change and how attitudes towards religious pluralism are shaped and guided by the need for national unity during unstable times by focusing on five transitional societies: Spain, Greece, Poland, Bulgaria, and the former USSR.[38] Although there is variation in religious freedom in these cases, the author discusses the presence of "broad types or families of arguments" across the five transitional regimes.[39] One of these arguments focuses on "a general need in transitional societies for order and stability in the face of uncertainty" which opens the way to "regulation of inappropriate or divisive religious activity."[40] Anderson[41] successfully demonstrates the challenge of creating a *democratic mentality* in transitional societies and the implications of this process for religious minorities.

Anderson reports that in most of the cases he examined, religion's significance in politics increased due to "its role in discourses about national identity and models of future developments."[42] He claims that

> the politics of religious liberty in transitional societies has a significance that transcends the narrowly religious. It suggests that religion will periodically erupt into the public domain, that the 'privatization' of religion is far from complete, and that historical legacies and contexts will continue to shape the ways in which politicians and political systems handle the public role of religion.[43]

Religious legitimacy scholarship echoes this argument. Religion is known to be a double-edged sword when used as a tool for political legitimacy. Faith and religious actors could boost or weaken the legitimacy of a government.[44] Therefore, in transitional regimes we might observe a broad spectrum of religious policies, including governmental religious discrimination, religious support, or restrictions placed on all religions. Among different forms of religious policies, discrimination emerges as a prominent one. Anderson suggests that "the countries where intolerance is more prominent are also countries where identity questions remain to the fore."[45] Moreover, he observes "a correlation between the broader level of societal tolerance and the degree of restriction or freedom available to minority religious groups."[46] Similarly, Sarkissian[47] finds tendencies of religious discrimination in

Transitional Constitution," *Koers* 59, no. 2 (1994): 151-68. Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies.*

[37] Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies.*

[38] For other works of Anderson on religious pluralism see John Anderson, "Social, Political, and Institutional Constraints on Religious Pluralism in Central Asia," *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 17, no. 2 (2002a): 181-96; John Anderson, "The Treatment of Religious Minorities in South-Eastern Europe: Greece and Bulgaria Compared," *Religion, State & Society* 30, no. 1 (2002b): 9-31.

[39] Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies,* 166.

[40] Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies,* 166.

[41] Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies,* 3, 22.

[42] Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies,* 184.

[43] Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies,* 206.

[44] Jonathan Fox, *An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory and Practice* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

[45] Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies,* 185.

[46] Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies,* 205.

[47] Sarkissian, "Religious Reestablishment in Post-Communist Polities," 472.

transitional societies as she explores the "stalled progress in the realm of religious freedom" in post-communist states. More specifically, she suggests that "the benefits allotted to formally and informally established churches are often accompanied by legislation that attempts to curb minority religious rights. Moreover, minority religious groups often suffer from campaigns intended to instill fear in local populations, and are perceived as a threat to 'traditional' religions and national culture."[48]

However, there is no study that situates the ebb and flow of post-Arab Uprising religion policies under the broader transitional regime literature. Prior to the uprisings, discrimination against religious minorities was considered to be "the rule rather than the exception" in the region.[49] For instance, the Pew Research Center reported that governmental restrictions on religion and social hostilities involving religion scores have been higher in the Middle East and North Africa than in any other region over the 2007-2011 time frame.[50] The same report also noted an increasing trend of social hostilities involving religion in the Middle East and North Africa for 2011.[51] Moreover, various studies suggested worsening treatment of religious minorities in Arab Uprising states.[52] Studies on the causes of discrimination identify various factors in order to explain variations in restrictions such as regime type, past discrimination of the state, and population dynamics.[53]

Findings on regime type suggest that democracies discriminate less than non-democracies.[54] Economic development is known to influence the dynamics of discrimination, but the direction of its impact is not clearly established.[55] It is also commonly argued that regimes with a history of discrimination are likely to repeat similar policies.[56] In addition, recent research on religious restrictions highlights the rise of religious discrimination over time. Fox[57] shows that there is a worldwide rise in different forms of governmental religion policy including support for majority religions and regulation of religion in general. Thus, any post-Arab Uprisings rise in religious discrimination or other forms of religion policy in Arab Uprising states may be part of a larger worldwide trend rather than due to the events of the Arab Uprisings.

These works provide useful guideposts for highlighting scope of change in the region for religious groups. However, scholarship on religious minorities is yet to capture the changing landscape of religious discrimination since the Arab Uprisings. More specifically, shifts in governmental and/or societal religious discrimination against religious minorities as well as other types of government religion policy need to be examined.

The transitional-society literature we outline above predicts an increase in both societal and governmental religious discrimination against religious minorities as well as an increase

[48] Sarkissian, "Religious Reestablishment in Post-Communist Polities," 473.

[49] Felix Neugart, "Uncertain Prospects of Transformation: The Middle East and North Africa," *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 12 (2005): 2, accessed December 21, 2016, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11342/Uncertain%20Prospects%20of%20TransformationThe%20Middle%20East%20and%20North%20Africa.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

[50] "Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion".

[51] "Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion".

[52] Nossett, "Free Exercise after the Arab Spring"; Rieffer-Flanagan, "Statism, Tolerance and Religious Freedom in Egypt".

[53] See Fox, *The Unfree Exercise of Religion*, 33-57, for a detailed discussion on previous research on causes of religious discrimination.

[54] Jonathan Fox, *Political Secularism, Religion, and the State: A Time Series Analysis of Worldwide Data* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Ted R. Gurr, *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).

[55] Fox, *The Unfree Exercise of Religion.*

[56] Gurr, *Peoples versus States.*

[57] Fox, *Political Secularism, Religion, and the State.*

in other types of government religion policy in Arab Uprising states as compared to other Muslim-majority states both inside and outside of the MENA. Furthermore, we anticipate societal religious discrimination to escalate more than governmental religious discrimination in Arab Uprising states. In their study on societal discrimination, Grim and Finke[58] expand the conventional focus of religious discrimination literature, i.e. simply examining a state's restriction of religious freedom, to include "social restrictions that inhibit the practice, profession, or selection of religion." Their central argument is that societal restrictions are often a precursor to government-based restrictions on religious minorities. Implicit in this argument is that societal attitudes toward religious minorities change quickly based on current events and that these changes in societal attitudes, if they remain stable, eventually result in government policies which reflect them. However, policy change is slow and often lags behind societal change by a considerable margin. Finke and Martin suggest that this lag-time exists because changing government policy through social pressure requires some organization:

> Working through social and political movements, as well as more formal political and religious institutions and leaders, the majority groups can reduce religious freedoms by advocating formal legislation or by applying informal pressures to local institutions.[59]

We suggest that the political environment that emerged during the instability and regime change caused by the Arab Uprisings created opportunities for changes to develop in societal attitudes toward religious minorities, as well as the emergence of latent negative attitudes toward religious minorities. This then resulted in an increase in societal religious discrimination against religious minorities in the Arab Uprising states. However, the organization necessary for this to translate into government policy, assuming such a transition occurs, is likely to take more time.

For instance, after drawing parallels between a long history of state-level intolerance and societal-level intolerance in the case of Egypt, Rieffer-Flanagan suggests that "the societal discrimination, harassment and violence that prevents freedom of religion and belief from being realized in Egypt arises from intolerant messages in civil society, in the media and in educational settings".[60] The tendencies to perceive religious diversity as a threat to national unity increase with the marginalizing rhetoric that divides these societies along religious lines.

As outlined in the previous paragraphs, the fragile condition of transitioning states, combined with religious outbidding tendencies and the impact of political openings for actors that were previously oppressed, facilitate and justify the tendencies of social religious discrimination against religious minorities. Times of transition involve social tension and polarization. Moreover, new institutional infrastructures tend to be weak at times of transition.

In the same vein, we expect social hostilities to be more prominent than governmental discrimination. In other words, we expect social discrimination to be more visible than governmental discrimination since the political context can be more forgiving of social hostilities at times of transition and political upheaval. Therefore, various groups and actors might display discrimination through societal discrimination rather than with governmental

[58] Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, *The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the 21st Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 9.

[59] Roger Finke and Robert R. Martin, "Ensuring Liberties: Understanding State Restrictions on Religious Freedoms," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 53, no. 4 (2014): 690.

[60] Rieffer-Flanagan, "Statism, Tolerance and Religious Freedom in Egypt," 11.

discriminatory policies. In addition, long-lasting discriminatory policies at the state level make societal discrimination more acceptable at times of transition. Societal discrimination has a lower cost since often, during times of transition, the state fails to protect or ignores the security concerns of religious minorities.[61] What is more, societal behavior changes more quickly than government policy at times of transition since it takes longer to update the legal framework of a state. The "rules of the game" are defined more rapidly by social norms than by government in transitional societies, and shape social interactions more dominantly. Therefore, in the aftermath of the uprisings, we expect an increase in social religious discrimination against religious minorities in Arab Uprising countries.

3. Research Design

3.1. Which countries are Arab Uprising countries?

While the *Arab Uprisings* is an often-discussed term, there are different perceptions of which countries are considered to have experienced the Arab Uprisings. Moreover, there are variations in the nature of the Arab Uprising movements and their outcomes.[62] In addition, various terms such as *unrest*, *uprising*, *protest*, and *demonstration* are used to explain the diverse set of social mobilizations that have changed the political landscape of Middle East and North Africa. We draw from eight sources to determine which countries should be included in the study as *Arab Uprising countries*.[63] We designated countries identified by at least seven of these sources as *core Arab Uprising states* (Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen). Syria codings are available only through 2012 because after that year there was no effective government. Countries that are included in at least three of these sources are designated as *other Arab Uprising states* (Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia). All other Muslim-majority MENA states and territories are considered separately as a basis for comparison, as are all Muslim-majority countries outside the MENA.

3.2. The religion and state (RAS) round 3 dataset

This study uses data from 49 Muslim-majority countries in the RAS3 dataset and covers the years 2009-2014. This time period uses 2009 and 2010 as baselines for the years previous to the Arab Uprisings. As the first Arab Uprising began in late December 2010, most of its influence should begin in 2011. 2014 is the most recent year available in the RAS3 dataset.

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[61] Rieffer-Flanagan, "Statism, Tolerance and Religious Freedom in Egypt".

[62] Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard, "What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades? ICTs and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring," *International Studies Review* 15 (2013): 58-9.

[63] The following eight sources are used to identify core Arab Uprising states and other Arab Uprising states: 1- "Arab Uprising: Country by Country," *BBC News,* accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482291; 2- In "Politics in the Middle East: The Arab Winter," *The Economist,* accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21685503-five-years-after-wave-uprisings-arab-world-worse-ever, *The Economist* identifies "six Arab countries in which massive peaceful protests called for hated rulers to go in the Uprising of 2011"; 3- "The Arab Uprising's Aftermath, in 7 Minutes," *The Atlantic*, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/arab-Uprising-anniversary/416301/; 4- Greg Botelho, "Arab Uprising Aftermath: Revolutions Give Way to Violence, More Unrest," *CNN*, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/middleeast/arab-Uprising-aftermath/. We would like to note that language of this piece on Arab Uprising cases was not precise. Referring to the cases included in the text it states: "Here's a look at some countries that were part of the Arab Uprising, and what's happened since."; 5- "Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion"; 6- "Arab Uprising: an interactive timeline of Middle East protests," *The Guardian,* accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline; 7- Hussein and Howard, "What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades?"; 8- Andreas Boogaerts, "Beyond Norms: A Configurational Analysis of the EU's Arab Spring Sanctions," *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2016): 1-21, doi: 10.1093/fpa/orw052.

RAS3 was collected using the same methodologies as previous rounds of the RAS dataset. Each country was examined using multiple sources, including government reports, NGO reports, media reports (primarily from the Lexis-Nexis database), primary sources such as constitutions and laws, and academic sources. These reports were the basis for coding the variables.[64]

We use four variables from the RAS3 dataset, three which measure aspects of governmental religion policy, and one which measures societal discrimination against minority religions. In this section we briefly discuss the variables.[65]

The first three focus on policies by governments that include laws, formal and informal government policies, and actions taken by government representatives and officials. First we measure governmental religious discrimination. This is defined as restrictions placed by the government or its representatives on the religious institutions or practices of religious minorities that are not placed on the majority religion. [66] Fox argues that the distinction between restrictions placed on minorities and those placed on the majority religion "is critical because actions that can be quite similar have considerably different implications depending on the object of these policies". [67] For example, if restrictions on places of worship are applied to all religions, this implies a regime that is generally anti-religious; if this restriction is applied only to minority religions it implies a regime that is not necessarily opposed to all religion, just to minority religions. This measure looks at 36 types of restrictions placed on religious minorities, each coded individually, including 12 types of restrictions on religious practices, eight types of restrictions on religious institutions and clergy, seven types of restrictions on conversion and proselytizing, and nine other types of restrictions. Each individual type is coded on a scale of zero to three based on severity, resulting in a measure that ranges from zero to 108.

We then measure restrictions that are placed on all religions, including the majority religion. This measure includes 29 such restrictions, each coded individually, including five types of restrictions on religion's role in politics, ten types of restriction on religious institutions, seven types of restriction on religious practices, and eight other types of restrictions. Each type is coded on a scale of zero to three based on severity, resulting in a measure that ranges from zero to 87.

Third, we measure religious support—the extent to which a government actively supports religion. This measure includes 52 types of support, each individually coded on a scale of zero to one, with 'one' meaning the type of support is present. The types of support in the measure include 21 types of religious law or precepts that are enforced by the government, five types of institution or government activity intended to enforce religion (e.g. religious courts), 11 ways the government can fund religion, six ways in which religious and government institutions can become entangled, and nine additional types of support. This measure ranges from zero to 52.

The fourth variable measures acts of discrimination, harassment, prejudice, or violence against members of minority religions by members of society who are not representatives of the government. This measure is intended to measure societal attitudes toward religious

[64] For a more detailed discussion of sources, data collection procedures, a reliability analysis and a discussion of why RAS composite measures are additive rather than weighted see Fox, *Political Secularism, Religion, and the State.*

[65] Jonathan Fox, "The RAS codebook," The Religion and the State Project, www.religionandstate.org.

[66] Fox, "The RAS codebook".

[67] Fox, *Political Secularism, Religion, and the State,* 106.

minorities. While many, such as Grim and Finke,[68] focus on attitudes, we posit that attitudes are difficult to measure in a comparable manner across countries and societies, but measuring concrete actions is far more feasible. This measure includes 27 types of actions, each coded individually on a scale of zero to three and based on severity, and including multiple types of public speech acts, vandalism, harassment, and violence (both against people and property). The resulting variable ranges from zero to 81.

We examine each of these four variables on a yearly basis, dividing all countries into four categories (described in more detail above): core Arab Uprising states, other Arab Uprising states, other MENA Muslim-majority states, and non-MENA-Muslim majority states.

4. Analysis

Tables one and two show governmental religion policy between 2009 and 2014 in 49 Muslim-majority countries. Governmental religious discrimination is rising overall in all four categories of the states examined. Among the core Arab Uprising states it increased in Bahrain, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, and remained stable in Egypt and Syria. In Bahrain this was largely due to increased limitations of public expressions of religion by Shi'a Muslims and the destruction of Shi'a Mosques in 2011 during the Arab Uprising protests. In Libya and Tunisia it was due to the government's inability or unwillingness to protect religious minorities from societal violence. In Yemen it was due to increased restrictions on the operating hours of Shi'a mosques.

Table 1- Governmental Religion Policy in Arab Uprising Countries and the Middle East

	Governmental Religious Discrimination						Religious Regulation						Religious Support					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Core Arab Uprising																		
Bahrain	15	16	20	20	22	22	16	16	16	16	17	17	23	23	23	23	23	23
Egypt	46	46	46	46	46	46	25	25	24	18	24	29	27	27	27	27	27	27
Libya	20	19	19	22	22	22	32	32	24	11	11	11	20	20	21	24	23	23
Syria	22	23	23	--	--	--	38	40	40	--	--	--	21	21	21	--	--	--
Tunisia	25	25	27	27	27	27	31	31	27	30	31	32	11	11	12	13	13	13
Yemen	33	33	34	33	34	34	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
Average	27.8	27.8	29.2	29.6	30.2	30.2	25.6	25.6	23.0	19.8	21.4	22.6	21.0	21.0	21.4	22.2	22.0	22.0
Other Arab Uprising																		
Jordan	34	34	34	34	34	34	21	21	21	21	21	26	30	30	30	30	30	30
Kuwait	34	34	35	35	35	35	18	18	18	18	18	18	28	28	28	29	29	29
Lebanon	13	13	13	13	13	14	4	4	4	4	4	4	21	21	21	21	21	21
Morocco	31	32	32	34	34	34	19	19	18	18	18	20	21	21	21	21	21	21
Oman	22	22	22	22	22	22	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	24
Saudi Arabia	78	78	78	80	80	80	41	41	41	41	41	41	46	46	46	46	46	46
Average	35.3	35.5	35.7	36.3	36.3	36.5	21.3	21.3	21.2	21.2	21.2	22.3	28.5	28.5	28.5	28.7	28.7	28.5
Avg. all Arab Spr.	31.9	32.0	32.7	33.3a	33.6a	33.6a	23.3	23.3	22.0	20.6	21.3	22.5	25.1	25.1	25.3	25.7	25.6	25.6
Other Middle East																		
Algeria	29	29	31	33	35	35	23	23	23	26	26	26	21	21	21	21	21	21
Gaza	19	19	19	20	19	19	18	18	18	18	19	18	28	28	28	28	28	30
Iran	71	71	71	71	71	71	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Iraq	16	16	16	18	24	24	4	4	4	4	4	4	24	24	24	24	26	26
Iraqi Kurdistan	10	10	10	10	9	9	15	15	15	15	13	13	15	15	15	15	14	14

[68] Grim and Finke, *The Price of Freedom Denied.*

	Governmental Religious Discrimination						Religious Regulation						Religious Support					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Palestinian Auth.	20	20	20	20	20	20	15	15	15	15	15	15	21	21	21	21	22	22
Qatar	39	39	39	39	39	39	22	22	22	22	22	25	26	26	26	26	26	27
Turkey	23	23	23	23	23	23	40	40	39	39	38	38	9	10	10	10	10	11
UAE	27	27	27	27	28	28	19	19	19	20	20	20	26	26	26	26	26	26
Western Sahara	31	32	32	34	34	34	19	19	18	18	18	20	21	21	21	21	21	21
Average	28.5	28.6	28.8	29.5	30.2	30.2	20.9	20.9	20.7	21.1	20.9	21.3	22.5	22.6	22.6	22.6	22.8	23.2

a = Significance of difference between marked year and 2009 < .05

Table 2- Governmental Religion Policy in Muslim-Majority Countries outside the Middle East

	Governmental Religious Discrimination						Religious Regulation						Religious Support					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Albania	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5
Azerbaijan	24	24	24	24	24	24	42	43	46	46	46	46	5	5	5	5	5	5
Bangladesh	6	6	6	6	6	6	17	18	18	18	18	18	14	14	14	14	14	14
Brunei	41	41	41	44	45	48	32	32	32	32	32	32	33	32	32	33	33	34
Burkina Faso	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	5
Chad	8	8	8	8	8	8	13	13	13	13	13	13	6	6	6	6	6	6
Comoros	27	26	26	26	31	31	5	5	5	5	5	5	10	10	10	10	11	11
Cyprus, Turkish	14	14	15	14	14	14	4	4	4	6	8	8	4	4	5	5	7	6
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	12	12	16	15	22	11	11	11	11	11	12
Gambia	3	1	1	1	1	1	5	6	6	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	8	8
Guinea	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	7	7	7	7	7	8
Indonesia	40	40	40	40	40	41	22	22	22	22	23	23	33	33	33	33	33	34
Kosovo	6	6	6	6	7	6	4	5	5	6	6	7	6	6	6	7	7	7
Kyrgyzstan	25	26	25	27	26	26	37	37	37	39	39	39	3	3	3	3	3	3
Malaysia	39	40	41	42	42	42	29	29	29	29	29	29	36	36	36	36	36	36
Maldives	65	66	66	66	66	66	31	33	33	33	33	33	25	27	27	27	27	27
Mali	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5
Mauritania	23	22	22	24	24	25	14	14	14	14	14	15	15	15	16	16	16	16
Niger	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	17	16	16	16	16	3	4	4	4	4	4
Nigeria	20	20	20	20	20	21	12	12	12	12	12	12	20	20	20	20	20	20
Pakistan	43	43	43	43	44	44	20	20	20	20	20	20	32	32	32	32	32	32
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	10	10	10	10	10	10
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	6	6	6
Somalia	12	12	12	12	15	12	7	7	7	7	7	7	19	19	19	19	19	19
Tajikistan	10	10	12	12	12	12	45	45	47	47	47	47	5	5	5	5	5	5
Turkmenistan	36	32	32	32	32	32	45	45	45	45	45	45	10	10	10	10	10	10
Uzbekistan	45	44	44	44	46	47	56	56	56	56	56	57	8	7	7	7	7	8

	Governmental Religious Discrimination						Religious Regulation						Religious Support					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Average	18.2	18.0	18.1	18.4a	18.9a	19.0a	18.0	18.3	18.4	18.8a	18.9a	19.4b	12.5	12.6	12.7	12.7	13.0a	13.2c

a = Significance of difference between marked year and 2009 < .05
b = Significance of difference between marked year and 2009 < .01
c = Significance of difference between marked year and 2009 < .001

Similarly, in four of the other six states experiencing Arab Uprising, religious discrimination increased. In 2011, Kuwait began arresting non-Muslims for eating and smoking during Ramadan. In Lebanon in 2015, the mayor of Tripoli began requiring that non-Muslim restaurants and cafés close during the fasting hours of Ramadan. In 2012, Morocco's local authorities began closing unofficial house-churches where foreigners met to pray. In the same year, two Ahmadi brothers in Saudi Arabia were arrested and sent to a prison after refusing to recant their beliefs. This is the first recorded incidence of a governmental attempt at forced conversion in Saudi Arabia. In Jordan and Oman, levels of religious discrimination remained stable.

However, as noted above, these increases were not unique to Arab Uprising Muslim-majority states. Average levels of governmental discrimination increased in other MENA states as well as in Muslim-majority states outside the MENA. Of these 49 states it decreased only in Iraqi Kurdistan, and only slightly at that; Iraqi Kurdistan, while having an independent government, is not an officially recognized country. The results were statistically significant for all Arab Uprising states combined, and for all non-MENA Muslim–majority states combined.

Religious support also does not distinguish the Arab Uprising states. Overall, religious support increased slightly in core Arab Uprising states but this was mostly due to Libya, where Islamic extremists set up religious courts and began applying Sharia criminal law and enforcing religion-specific laws such as dress codes for women. Increased support for religion was also evident in several MENA non-Arab Uprising states as well as in several Muslim-majority countries outside the MENA.

Superficially it appears that the regulation majority religions decreased in core Arab Uprising states as opposed to remaining stable or increasing in all three other categories of state. This is primarily due to a severe decrease in the regulation of Islam after the fall of Kaddafi's regime in Libya. Also, by 2014, regulation of majority religions had increased overall in more states than it had decreased; the measurement of government regulation of majority religions is at best inconclusive.

Thus, overall, there is no evidence in this descriptive analysis that government policy in Arab Uprising states changed significantly in a manner differently from any other Muslim-majority states.

The results for the occurrence of societal religious discrimination presented in table three, however, are different. Overall, core Arab Uprising countries have experienced an increase in societal discrimination, despite a lack of statistical significance in the average score. Societal discrimination increased in three of the core Arab Uprising states, with a dramatic increase in Libya. This includes an increase in non-violent activities, such as desecrations of Christian and Jewish cemeteries, anti-Christian and Jewish demonstrations, and the occurrence of property damage (such as an arson attack on the Coptic Church in Benghazi). It also includes

violent actions by civilian gangs and Islamic militia. Many of these attacks have been lethal, including the shooting of seven Coptic Christians in 2013, and beheadings in areas controlled by ISIS. In Tunisia the increase was dramatic, but less violent. It consisted of anti-Shi'a, anti-Sufi, anti-Christian, and anti-Semitic sermons by clergy, vandalism of Jewish and Christian religious sites, and the harassment of some members of these groups. Between 2011 and 2013 there was also a series of arson attacks against Sufi and Jewish religious sites. In Bahrain, the increase was modest and consisted of an increase of vandalism on Jewish and Shi'a property.

While these results are not statistically significant, they also do not include Syria because the RAS3 dataset does not code countries with no effective government. Had Syria been included, the violent actions taken against Christians in the country would likely have resulted in a large increase in the score for societal discriminations. In addition, the societal discrimination scores for Egypt are the highest in the world for each year between 1999 and 2014, making an increase less likely. Thus, it is arguable that the results for Syria and Egypt are skewing the average into a false negative.

The levels in the rest of the Muslim world remain relatively stable though societal discriminations increased as well as decreased by small amounts in several countries. The only non-Arab Uprising countries in which the score for societal discrimination increased by more than one point were Malaysia and the Maldives.

Table 3- Societal Religious Discrimination in Muslim-Majority Countries

Middle East							Non-Middle East						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Core Arab Uprising							Albania	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bahrain	9	7	10	15	13	13	Azerbaijan	4	4	4	4	4	5
Egypt	62	61	61	61	61	61	Bangladesh	11	11	11	11	12	12
Libya	7	7	13	27	27	27	Brunei	3	3	3	3	4	4
Syria	6	6	6	--	--	--	Burkina Faso	0	0	0	1	0	0
Tunisia	3	3	17	19	17	18	Chad	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yemen	23	22	22	23	22	22	Comoros	6	6	6	6	6	6
Average	20.8	20.0	24.6	29.0	28.0	28.2	Cyprus, Turkish	4	4	4	4	4	4
							Djibouti	5	5	5	5	5	6
Other Arab Uprising							Gambia	1	1	1	1	1	2
Jordan	8	8	8	8	8	9	Guinea	1	1	1	1	2	3
Kuwait	7	7	9	7	8	7	Indonesia	43	43	44	45	43	43
Lebanon	11	19	19	20	19	19	Kosovo	20	23	20	21	22	20
Morocco	5	7	8	5	5	7	Kyrgyzstan	1	7	1	6	1	1
Oman	1	1	1	1	1	1	Malaysia	9	9	9	7	8	13
Saudi Arabia	10	10	10	10	10	11	Maldives	1	1	3	2	1	3
Average	7.0	8.7	9.2	8.5	8.5	9.0	Mali	0	0	0	4	0	0
Avg. all Arab Spr.	13.3	13.8	16.2	17.8	17.4	17.7	Mauritania	1	0	0	0	0	0
							Niger	0	0	1	2	0	0
Other Middle East							Nigeria	27	27	27	27	27	27
Algeria	2	5	2	4	3	5	Pakistan	49	49	49	49	49	49
Gaza	4	4	4	4	4	6	Senegal	2	2	4	2	2	2
Iran	19	19	20	21	21	20	Sierra Leone	3	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq	35	35	35	35	35	35	Somalia	10	10	10	10	10	10
Iraqi Kurdistan	1	1	3	2	1	1	Tajikistan	1	2	1	1	1	1
Palestinian Auth.	17	17	17	17	17	17	Turkmenistan	1	1	1	1	3	2

Middle East							Non-Middle East						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Qatar	2	2	2	2	2	2	Uzbekistan	1	1	1	2	2	1
Turkey	22	21	21	21	20	20	Average	7.6	7.8	7.7	8.0	7.7	8.0
UAE	4	4	4	4	4	4							
Western Sahara	5	7	8	5	5	7							
Average	11.1	11.5	11.6	11.5	11.2	11.7							

No significant increases

5. Conclusion

The Arab Uprising was extraordinary series of events that destabilized regimes across the MENA. Outcomes of the uprisings are still unfolding and the transition process taking place in Arab Uprising states is far from complete. Based on the literature on religious pluralism in transitional societies, such a transitional period should lead to increases of societal and governmental religious discrimination as well as in other types of governmental religion policy. However, our findings show that governmental discrimination, as well as governmental support for and regulation of religion, did not change significantly in comparison to other Muslim-majority states, either inside or outside of the MENA. However, societal discriminations did increase substantially in the Arab Uprising states in comparison to other Muslim-majority states.

One of the potential explanations for the findings on governmental religious discrimination is related to the fact that religious discrimination is on the rise globally.[69] Another potential explanation involves the political traditions of Arab Uprising countries in comparison to those in post-Communist Europe, the latter having shaped transitional regime scholarship. As Romdhani[70] puts it,

> Picking their way through the wreckage of Communism, the leaders of the 1989 European revolutions were able to tap into their own deep-rooted democratic traditions. The post-Arab Spring political classes had no such foundation, and were faced instead with a dreary and forbidding legacy of autocratic rule.

A quick look at tables one and two reveals high governmental religious discrimination trends in Muslim-majority states. Our results show that governmental discrimination increased in Arab Uprising states, but not in a manner different from other Muslim-majority states. However, the average scores of all the MENA states were already high before the Arab Uprising and although slightly lower, it was still high in Muslim majority states outside of the MENA. Similarly, Fox suggests that although there are notable exceptions, "[t]he Muslim world differs from the Christian world in that religious discrimination is considerably more common and severe, on average".[71] In other words, in the short term, the societal dynamics of Muslim-majority states could more accurately measure the impact of the Arab Uprisings than government religion policies.

Alternatively, increasing religious discrimination in other Muslim-majority states may be due to the reactionary policies of non-Arab Uprising States that are concerned with a diffusion of the Arab Uprisings movement into their countries. It may also be related to the

[69] Fox, *Political Secularism, Religion, and the State;* Fox, *The Unfree Exercise of Religion.*

[70] Oussama Romdhani, "The Next Revolution: A Call for Reconciliation in the Arab World," *World Affairs* 176, no. 4 (2013): 89.

[71] Fox, *The Unfree Exercise of Religion, 121.*

refugee crisis caused by a high number of citizens fleeing their homes in Syria. For instance, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon receive many Syrian refugees. [72] In other words, although labeled as non-Arab Uprising Muslim-majority states, other states in the region may be indirectly impacted by the uprisings.

Although consistent with previous scholarship on transitional regimes, our findings on societal discrimination may be the canary in the coal mine. Anderson[73] suggests that

> the cultural context in the countries undergoing transition may be important to determining outcomes in the religious sphere. Most studies of societies undergoing transition in a liberal or democratic direction suggest that in the long term the evolution of a democratic mind-set or democratic political culture is important. In the first instance this may simply require that elites agree to play by the new 'rules of the game' and that they accept the legitimacy of the emerging system, but in the longer term it is argued that stability requires some form of mass acceptance of the political system and, if the democracy is to be truly 'liberal', the emergence of mass values accepting of difference and tolerant of alternative viewpoints.

Similarly, Grim and Finke find that societal discrimination is often a precursor to governmental discrimination.[74] Therefore, further research is not only helpful in understanding regional politics, but in preventing conflict in the region as well.

This study adds to the literature on transitional regime and religious pluralism by incorporating the governmental religion policy trends in the Arab Uprising states. This is particularly true of our findings on societal discrimination in the Arab Uprising states. Our findings on governmental religious policies also advance our understanding of global religious policy. Although the long-term consequences of the uprisings are still unfolding, this study shows that the Arab Uprisings did not usher in an era of religious pluralism and social acceptance of religious minorities.

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[72] Rawan Arar, Lisel Hintz, and Kelsey P. Norman, "The real refugee crisis is in the Middle East, not Europe," *Washington Post,* May 14, 2016, accessed April 24, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/14/the-real-refugee-crisis-is-in-the-middle-east-not-europe/?utm_term=.7eb198775d41.

[73] John Anderson, *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies*, 13.

[74] Grim and Finke, *The Price of Freedom Denied.*

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Competitive Jihadism: Understanding the Survival Strategies of Jihadist De Facto States

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Abstract

The debates dealing with ISIS address the questions of how ISIS is conceptualized, what its aim is, and how it has successfully retained a core sovereignty zone. This study attempts to answer these questions by proposing that ISIS is a de facto state and uses jihadism as a survival strategy. The term 'competitive jihadism' is used to argue that ISIS competes with its metropole states, Syria and Iraq, on the basis of jihadism. This is a deliberate strategy, which aims to attract Muslims inclined to radicalization as well as to recruit foreign fighters by showing the jihadist deficits of the metropole states. As the research shows, ISIS is successful at this game and has become a magnet for foreign fighters. Thus, it is able to increase its military capabilities and continue to survive.

Keywords: De facto states, competitive jihadism, ISIS, foreign fighters

1. Introduction

The rise of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) has most likely dominated international security agendas since 2014 for two reasons. The first is that ISIS has been able to control territory meant to be under the sovereignty of the Syrian and Iraqi governments. It has expansionist inclinations and the capabilities to realize them. Secondly, ISIS has plotted terrorist attacks on a global scale. Scholars of international relations who aim to define ISIS in order to establish how it can be stopped must examine the following two phenomena.

The first is the *de facto state*, which refers to a political authority functioning within a territory without international legal recognition. A central government might lose its monopoly of violence over a territory, rendering itself unable to prevent an alternative political institution to be established in the territory over which it claims sovereignty. This could reflect the state-building efforts of ISIS in the provinces it has captured from Syria and Iraq. The second phenomenon is transnational terrorism, which has posed a serious threat to peace and stability at both regional and global levels. It would not be wrong to argue that Islamic fundamentalism and jihadism have played a leading role in escalating this phenomenon.

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Nevertheless, the terms *de facto state* and *global jihadism* have rarely been used in the same literature. The establishment of a de facto state is generally locally motivated and stems from the ethnic, religious, or ideological dividedness of a certain society, while jihadism is pursued on a global agenda. In other words, jihadism and de facto statehood had never existed together until the proclamation of ISIS in June 2014, giving birth to a novel phenomenon, the *jihadist de facto state*.[1]

Until the birth of ISIS, jihadist organizations had been labeled as violent non-state actors. The phenomenon of de facto statehood had not been viewed as a condition that shaped the competition among these violent non-state actors. Governments who had jihadist groups operating under their sovereignty had been excluded from this competition. The emergence of ISIS, as a jihadist de facto state, has not only changed the rules of the competition among violent non-state actors but has also included governments in the game. In this sense, one could ask why ISIS has opted to build a de facto state (unlike its predecessors) and how ISIS has utilized the outcomes of this strategy.

This study aims to explore the relationship between de facto statehood and jihadism so as to identify the rationale behind establishing a jihadist de facto state. ISIS, as a unique case, will be examined. There will be a review of the literature on the motivations of de facto states and jihadi terrorism. Once the term *competitive jihadism* is coined a theoretical framework will be proposed to explain how ISIS has taken the advantage of having a de facto state. In order to test the variables presented in the hypothesis, the research includes empirical data obtained from primary sources as released by ISIS and its metropole states. In line with its findings, this study concludes with a discussion of whether regarding the organization as a violent non-state actor and ignoring its de facto statehood could stop ISIS.

2. Survival Strategies of De Facto States

The erosion of Westphalian sovereignty and the emergence of de facto states raise the questions of what defines a state, how de facto states are conceptualized, and why they have been a subject of international politics. According to Krasner, states possess four elements of sovereignty. *International legal sovereignty* refers to juridical independence and international recognition of a state by other states. All rulers seek international legal sovereignty because it provides juridical equality and access to international law. *Westphalian sovereignty* means that the domestic decisions made by internal authority structures are free from interference of external actors. *Domestic sovereignty* is the ability of the domestic political authority to exercise effective control within its borders. Finally, in *interdependence sovereignty* public

[1] One can argue that the Palestine state represents another example of a jihadist *de facto state*. However, this argument seems to make an over-generalization regarding the role of the jihadist groups over the Palestinian state's regime type. According to Rane, the conflict between Israel and Palestinians has gradually gained an Islamic dimension as an immense disparity among them has become more visible in terms of power and potential. Palestinian groups have adopted jihadism as a strategy to abrogate the power asymmetry that solidifies Israel's existence. That is to say, jihadism has been reformulated and the jihadist groups, which have aimed to counterbalance the Israel's material power and restore the rights of Palestinians, have narrowed down its definition. (Halim Rane, "Reformulating Jihad in the Context of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: A Theoretical Framework," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 19, no. 2 (2007): 127-47.) The story of HAMAS, following its landslide parliamentary election victory in January 2006, has demonstrated that Gaza has not turned into a jihadist de facto state. Although HAMAS, as the Gaza wing of Muslim Brotherhood, has not denied its Islamist identity it has managed to isolate the governance from resistance. For example, HAMAS has formed a cabinet composed of technocrats educated in Western institutions on secular fields and kept governance issues away from theological concerns. In addition to that Hamas has also defined its jihadist strategy in a limited manner and has not carried out any deliberate attacks beyond Israel/Palestine zone. This strengthens the idea that HAMAS has characteristics of both political Islam and national resistance and Gaza resembles to a typical de facto state rather than a jihadist de facto state. (Tristan Dunning, *Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy* (London: Routledge, 2016), 1-3.)

authorities are able to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, and capital across the borders of their state.[2] These four elements of sovereignty do not necessarily coexist in all states, and even less so now than during the Cold War. A state can have international legal sovereignty but lack domestic sovereignty or vice versa. For example, failed states such as Afghanistan have international recognition but do not have sufficient ability to exercise full control within their own territory. On the other hand, a political authority that is able to exercise full domestic sovereignty can be deprived of international legal sovereignty.

An example that includes the perfect congruence of different types of sovereignty is speculated by Charles Tilly. Accordingly, forming nation-states in the West is a gradual process of war-making, in which the war makers penetrate the society and in return become more and more efficient at performing the functions expected from rulers.[3] Kingston argues that the process Tilly has identified for the West has worked differently in the developing world. The states of the third world have not been able to develop a working-state mechanism. Instead, their rivals have initiated their own movements, which have led to *states-within-states*. In some cases, one sees political entities emerge that are in sharp contrast to the juridical states that rule them—especially in their capacity to control territory, collect taxes, and conduct business with international and transnational actors.[4] Thus, non-state actors such as de facto states have become a major challenge to the legitimacy of sovereign states.

It is then reasonable to argue that de facto states have the characteristics of sovereign states, other than that of being recognized by other sovereign states. As Pegg concludes,

> a de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership, which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability, receives popular support, and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time.[5]

Building on this definition, Pegg pinpoints the goals of de facto states. A de facto state aims to have full constitutional independence and seeks widespread international recognition as a sovereign state. In order to achieve this end, a de facto state enters into relations with other states. De facto states conduct foreign policy in order to protect their independence and pursue their bid for survival.

International politics play a determining role in the recognition of de facto states, although it is international law that defines the conditions that lead an entity to be accepted as a *de jure state*. For a de facto state to be recommended as a member of the United Nations it should receive nine affirmative votes of the 15 members of the Security Council, provided that none of the permanent members have voted against the proposal. A two-thirds majority is then required in the Assembly for the admission of the candidate de facto state. This implies that the diverging strategic interests of the great powers, which can shape the policies of other states as well, might prevent a de facto state from gaining membership status in the UN. In other words, decisions of the UN members are driven by their political calculations, which rarely converge on the same venue to grant membership status to a de facto state. De facto states are typically deprived of the guarantees provided by international law.

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[2] Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocricy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3-7.

[3] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and the European States: AD 990-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

[4] Paul Kingston, "States within States: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives," in *States within States: Incipent Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era,* ed. Paul Kingston and Ian Spears (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1-13.

[5] Scott Pegg, *International Society and the De Facto State* (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998), 26.

Therefore, de facto states are involved in the game of international politics in order to maintain their survival and achieve recognition. There are two leading approaches explaining the strategies that de facto states develop for recognition and survival. The first approach focuses on how third-party states are involved in the sovereignty crisis between a de facto state and metropole state. A de facto state, which struggles against its metropole state, might be supported by a patron state. According to Özpek, "sovereignty problems between parent states and de facto states might present an opportunity for potential patron states to explore such situations for the sake of their national interest".[6] Similarly, Kolstø argues that the patron state of a de facto state regards it's backing as a tool to achieve national interests and/or extend its regional goals.[7] This argument stems from the essential premises of the Realist School of International Relations discipline. Thus, de facto states are viewed as an instrument of the inter-governmental power game.

Another approach to the same phenomenon is the argument of *competitive democratization*. Unlike the state-centric and power-driven character of the realist perspective, Caspersen suggests that the survival and recognition of a de facto state is much more related to internal dynamics such as democratization, institutionalization, and state building capacity. According to her, democracy has become the legitimate norm since the end of the Cold War, and de facto states use the democratization process in order to justify their struggle in the eyes of the international society. In doing so, de facto states compete with their metropole states by claiming that they are more inclined to adopt *hegemonic international values* such as democracy and human rights. This strategy is called *competitive democratization* and de facto states aim to be identified as 'islands of freedom and stability' so as to gain international recognition. Caspersen argues that Kosovo's independence and partial recognition as a sovereign state (2008) serve as a model of how democracy and state building can lead to being recognized by international democratic actors. [8]

3. The Uniqueness of ISIS

Although these arguments can be applied to any de facto state seeking international recognition, the Islamic State is a unique case. A realist perspective acknowledges that the Islamic State is a proxy of a third-party state. However, it fundamentally challenges the established dynamics of international law and community; ISIS still displays the characteristics of a transnational terrorist organization. It claims responsibility for terrorist attacks targeting civilians in France, Egypt, Turkey, Belgium, Yemen, Tunisia, and the United States. Thus, the sovereign states of the international system are not able to recognize and attempt to build diplomatic relations with the Islamic State. Although politicians and journalists have accused some states of aiding the Islamic State, there is no evidence clear enough to isolate alleged states. This phenomenon undermines the realist perspective's explanatory power, which is based on state-centric assumptions, in explaining the foreign policy behaviors of ISIS.

On the other hand, there is an ontological incongruence between the founding principles of the Islamic State and those of democracy. The leaders of ISIS have utterly rejected democratic values in the state-building process. It should be noted that ISIS subscribes to

[6] Burak Bilgehan Özpek, "The Role of Democracy in the Recognition of De Facto States," *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 20, no. 4 (2014): 585-99.

[7] Pål Kolstø, "The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 6 (2006): 723-40.

[8] Nina Caspersen, *Unrecognized States* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 53.

Salafism, a theological movement concerned with purifying the faith by eliminating idolatry and emphasizing the God's Oneness.[9] That is to say, Salafism views that democracy claims partnership to God, the divine legislator, in legislation. Clearly then, ISIS does not adopt the strategy of *competitive democratization* in order to attract the support of the international community.

One still needs to explore the question of the survival strategy of ISIS. What makes the Islamic State a survivor in the Middle East even though it does not play the sovereign states' power games and is not instrumental in democratization?

The Islamic State claims to be a Caliphate, an umbrella state for all Muslims, while other jihadi non-state actors have different types of names—be it emirate or organizational—and hierarchies. Moghadam suggests that the Islamic State automatically aims to annihilate all other jihadi groups and to appear as the only legitimate political entity representing the entire Islamic nation. This exceptional stance causes the Islamic State to follow a more ambitious state-building process. Compared with the other jihadi organizations, ISIS is more focused on building institutions for efficient governance and providing order over a certain territory. It's attempts to create a motherland for Muslims enable ISIS to have a de facto state and dissociate itself from other jihadist organizations.[10]

This phenomenon acquires meaning when one considers the methodological discrepancy between Osama Bin-Laden and Abu Musab Al-Zerqawi. Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, Zerqawi left Herat city in 2001 and moved between Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Iraqi Kurdistan over the next 14 months. This helped him expand his network and recruit new fighters. After the fall of the Saddam regime, Zerqawi initiated an insurgency in the 'Sunni Triangle' in coordination with the Al-Qaeda core. Nevertheless, Zerqawi's methodology diverged from Al-Qaeda's strategic paradigm, which was based on maintaining popular support and mobilizing Muslims regardless of their sectarian identity in the global scale. According to the Al-Qaeda leadership, the attacks of the AQI (Al-Qaeda in Iraq) were divisive because they were targeting Shiites and killing innocent Muslims. Under Zarqawi's leadership the AQI was viewed as being more interested in exploiting the local complexities of Iraq than serving the global agenda of Al-Qaeda.[11]

The AQI evolved into ISIS and has managed to build a de facto state using this strategy. The localization of jihadism has made the AQI vulnerable to local level developments. This has produced obstacles as well as opportunities for the AQI. For example, the US counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq between 2006 and 2010 considerably diminished the capacity of the AQI (the Islamic State of Iraq as of 15 October 2006). Conversely, changing regional dynamics such as the Arab Spring, which created a power vacuum in Syria and frustrated Sunni Arab tribes due to the rising authoritarianism of the Baghdad government under the Nouri Al-Maliki rule, opened a window of opportunity for ISI to evolve into ISIS and establish its de facto state. In other words, Zarqawi's strategy of exploiting the local fault lines has worked and allowed ISIS control over a certain territory and government.

[9] Cole Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State" (Analysis Paper No. 19, The Brooking Project on U.S. Relations With the Islamic World, Washington DC, 2015).

[10] Assaf Moghadam, "Strategy, not Ideology, Differentiates ISIS from al-Qaida," *The Jerusalem Post,* February 12, 2016, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Strategy-not-Ideology-Differentiates-ISIS-from-Al-Qaida-444710.

[11] M. J. Kirdar, "Al Qaeda in Iraq"(Case Study Number 1, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, June 2011).

Examining the literature on competition amongst terrorist organizations makes it easier to understand ISIS's survival strategy. There is a scholarly consensus that a terrorist organization's ability to resort to violence helps it recruit more fighters and maintain group cohesion.[12] Therefore, terrorist groups engage in more violence if a more radical competitor challenges them. For example, the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) adopted terrorism as a response to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) engaging in terrorist activities. Similarly, secular Palestinian groups began to adopt suicide bombing after fundamentalist organizations used this tactic. According to the research conducted by Young and Dugan, the survival of a terrorist organization in a competitive environment depends on it's capabilities to use different kinds of attacks, kill masses of people, and organize costly attacks.[13] Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that outbidding is a rational strategy for a terrorist organization that aims to maintain its survival.

However, according to Nemeth, there are additional factors to consider when suggesting that competition amongst terrorist organizations can lead to more violence. First of all, groups that share similar ideologies should be compared to one another. For example, a jihadist organization should only be compared with another jihadist group, not an ethic or sectarian one. Secondly, following empirical testing, Nemeth finds that competition itself is not enough to escalate outbidding. Supportive government policy and a social acceptability of violence are also necessary if the competition is to produce more violence. In other words, the occurrence of outbidding is dependent on the political environment and the tolerance of the society that the terrorist organizations claim to represent.[14]

This explains how ISIS has taken advantage of having a de facto state and become the dominant player of the terrorism market in Syrian and Iraq. Using government apparatus in order to gain social acceptability has inspired the terrorist activities of ISIS without stressing the reaction of the society that it claims to represent. According to Fedorov, aided by its monopoly of violence ISIS has initiated an ambitious 'nation building' process and has demonstrated little tolerance for pluralism. In constructing the national identity, ISIS has used coercion to create self and promote antagonism against the other. Using this strategy, it has produced societal approval for its internal activities.[15] Unlike other fundamentalist organizations, ISIS has exploited the benefits of its modern nation state and instruments. As Margvelashvili and Elitsoy suggest, having a de facto state has allowed ISIS to control and command its affiliates whereas Al-Qaeda, without any state-like territory, has experienced difficulties in controlling its members.[16] Therefore, competition amongst terrorist groups is coupled with the comparative advantage of ISIS against other radical Islamist organizations to pave the way for ISIS to impose more violence. ISIS, as the champion of violence, has turned into a magnet and managed to attract foreign fighters and sympathizers.

[12] See, Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (2006): 7-48; Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (2006): 49-80.

[13] Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 2 (2014).

[14] Stephen Nemeth, "The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 2 (2014): 338-40.

[15] Egor Fedorov, "The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham: the Group's Nation-Building Project through the Instrumental Use of Violence," *McGill Journal of Political Studies* 7 (2016): 34-5.

[16] Kristine Margvelashvili and Aslı Elitsoy, "Regional Implications of the Al-Qaeda-ISIL Struggle," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (2015): 84.

It is also evident that the political environment has presented a unique opportunity for ISIS to build a de facto state. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the central authority in Syria has lost control of the territories over which it claims sovereignty. The Iraqi central government has also failed to establish an inclusive central government since the US invasion in 2003. The political environments in Syria and Iraq have allowed ISIS to capture new territories and go on to rule the local people of the land (with the exception of those who have been killed or deported).

Running ISIS as a political institution might help to eliminate other jihadist organizations and monopolize the jihadism market, but it does not suffice to make ISIS a political survivor. In other words, the Islamic State must also be involved in state-level competition to maintain its autonomy. ISIS should compete with its metropole states and their allies in addition to competing with rival jihadist organizations. Jihadism is used as a strategy to claim legitimacy against its metropole state. By using more aggressive jihadi discourse than its metropole states the Islamic State aspires to attract more jihadists to its motherland and to gain recognition in the Muslim nation. Unlike de facto states that seek recognition from the international community, undergo democratization, and swiftly adopt internationally accepted norms, the Islamic State, as a jihadist de facto state, pursues a foreign policy that aims to gain recognition from the Muslim community and adopt an aggressive jihadist policy to attract Muslims. In doing so, the Islamic State competes with its parent states by revealing their jihadist incompetency to Muslims all around the world. ISIS takes advantage of having a state in its fight against other jihadist organizations, and exploits jihadism in order to protect its de facto state from its metropole states.

This policy connotes the term *competitive democratization* as coined by Caspersen. Competitive democratization refers to the strategy of de facto states to gain support of or recognition by third-party states. In doing so, democracy is viewed as a hegemonic norm. De facto states illustrate their ability to develop democracy while highlighting the democratic deficits of their metropole states. ISIS adopts a similar methodology based on competition but replaces democracy with jihadism. The competitive democratization strategy aims to build bridges between de facto states and the democratic members of the international system, while ISIS prefers Muslims, non-state actors, as the target audience. Therefore, its strategy could be called *competitive jihadism*.

However, that ISIS strategically relies on attracting the support of Muslims is not confined to an ideological sympathy. ISIS also summons Muslims to join the jihadist battle. Its aim is to strengthen its military capacity by recruiting foreign fighters. It would not be wrong to argue that military power is the main asset of ISIS as it expands its territory inside Iraq and Syria and captures resources to provide income. According to Humud et al., ISIS takes advantage of its military capabilities to generate revenue mainly through trade of gas and oil. For example, ISIS controls the Deir Ez-zohr region, where locals estimate oil production to be 34,000–40,000 barrels a day. In Iraq and Syria, invasions of ISIS have enabled it to earn revenues from tax and extortion. According to media coverage, the amount of tax collected by ISIS might be as much as $600–900 million annually.[17] ISIS functions as a nation state and imposes fines and fees for utilities such as water and electricity and for services or infractions such as car registrations, college textbooks, and traffic violations. Extortion is

[17] Pamela Engel, "ISIS Has Found A Huge Moneymaking Method That's Impervious to Sanctions and Air Raids," *Business Insider*, December 2, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-taxation-extortion-system-2015-12.

another channel of revenue for ISIS. Although the exact number is not known due to lack of transparency, it is estimated that ISIS stole $500 million from the banks of the occupied cities of Iraq in 2014.[18]

The asset seizure strategy has played a key role in the entrenchment of ISIS's military power. It has captured tanks, vehicles, weapons, and other kind of ammunitions belonging to occupied districts. For instance, during the Ramadi offensive in May 2014, ISIS seized large amounts of military equipment including tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy guns from the arsenals abandoned by the Iraqi Army. Seizing sophisticated weapons and vehicles has beefed up the military capacity of ISIS, and it has become leverage for the jihadist war in Iraq and Syria.

ISIS has also been involved in various business dealings such as the antiquity trade, kidnapping and human trafficking, organ harvesting, illegal drug trade, and donations in order to raise funds. ISIS aims to sustain governance of the territories over which it claims sovereignty. Unlike other jihadist organizations, ISIS runs government agencies, pays regular salaries to government officials, implements welfare programs for the disadvantaged people, and sustains a regular army.

The expansion of ISIS since 2014 demonstrates how it has benefited from using its military strength to exploit resources. This military strength, which stems from jihadist ideology and de facto statehood, has served its survival. The transformation of a terrorist group into a de facto state has created a snowball effect. According to Cronin, ISIS is hardly identified as a terrorist organization even though it uses terrorism as a tactic. Unlike Al-Qaeda-like networks, which have dozens or hundreds of members, ISIS holds an army of about 30,000 fighters. Jihadist networks do not hold territory and are not capable of being involved in a direct military confrontation, while ISIS has a pseudo state led by a conventional army engaging in sophisticated military operations.[19] Foreign jihadist fighters have contributed to the military capabilities of ISIS and its jihadist ideology and de facto statehood have attracted foreign fighters. These factors have helped ISIS take over resources which has been conducive in sustaining itself as a de facto state.

This regenerative cycle might serve as a model to explain the survival strategies of jihadist de facto states. From the perspective of a jihadist de facto state, once sovereignty is proclaimed over a certain territory, competitive jihadism follows. A jihadist de facto state aims to attract a target audience by claiming that it is more jihadist than its metropole state. Foreign jihadist fighters join the holy army of the jihadist de facto state and enhance its military capability. As a result, the jihadi de facto state becomes capable of expanding its territory against the metropole state and capturing sources of revenues to sustain and improve its governance capacity. A jihadist de facto state, which is not recognized by the sovereign states of the international system due to its ideological stance, gains the support of its target audience by being successful at the game of competitive jihadism.

[18] Nadan Feldman, "How ISIS Became the World's Richest Terror Group," *Haaretz*, November 10, 2015, http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/isis/1.686287.

[19] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won't Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat," *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 2 (2015): 87-90.

4. Competitive Jihadism in Syria and Iraq

This conceptual framework explains the capacity of ISIS to survive in a hostile environment, but this argument should be tested. In doing so, we compare the jihadist discourses of ISIS and its metropole states, Syria and Iraq. The table below shows the content of press releases made by the official media outlets of these regimes. We scrutinized press releases on the official web site of the Iraqi government[20] and reports from SANA (Syrian Arab News Agency)[21] and *Dabiq* (an online magazine used by ISIS for propaganda)[22] under eight categories. It should be noted that the ongoing war brands its stamp on all of the news, reports, and articles.[23] We classified their contents in accordance with their main themes as follows:

1. Functions of Government: Contents related to government activities such as infra-structure, transportation, or economy has been coded as '1'. For example, in the fourth issue of *Dabiq*, articles dealing with the social services of ISIS have been coded under this category.
2. Diplomatic Relations with Other States and International Organizations: Contents related to foreign relations including diplomatic visits, bilateral agreements, and joint statements. For example, the meeting held between the Syrian Health Minister and a representative of UNICEF in Syria on 14 September 2015 has been coded under this category.
3. Foreign Connections of the Jihadist Groups: Contents related to the allegations of the Iraqi and Syrian governments about the connections of ISIS with foreign states. For example, articles in which the Syrian government accuses Gulf countries of supporting ISIS have been coded under this category.
4. Cultural and Natural Assets: Contents related to cultural, historical, and natural assets. For example, articles including performances of musicians, exhibitions, and theater plays have been coded under this category.
5. Sports, Art and Tourism: Contents related to sporting, artistic, and touristic activities. For example, the Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Abadi's statement about the Iraqi Olympic team has been coded under this category.
6. Anti-western and Anti-Imperialism: Contents related to the criticism of western countries' policies towards the Middle East. For example, *Dabiq's* articles condemning the Sykes-Picot Agreement have been coded under this category.
7. Fighting Against Jihadism: Contents related to the armed struggle against jihadist groups. For example, the Iraqi and the Syrian armies' operations against ISIS and other jihadist groups have been coded under this category.
8. Jihadism: Contents related to the armed struggle against infidels. For example, *Dabiq's* articles that call Muslims for holy war against infidels have been coded under this category.

[20] See, Iraq Prime Ministry Official Website, http://pmo.iq/pme/ipresse.htm.
[21] See, SANA (Syrian Arab News Agency), http://sana.sy/en/.
[22] See, *Dabiq Magazine*, www.clarionproject.org .
[23] In this study, we examined the aforementioned publications between the ISIS captured Mosul and declared its de facto state in June 2014 and May 2016, prior to the Mosul and Raqqa operations.

Table 1 - Content of the News, Reports, and Articles Published by the Official Media Bodies of Iraq, Syria, and ISIS[24]

	Iraqi Government (754 releases)	Syrian Government (131 releases)	ISIS(149 releases)
Functions of Government (Health, Technology, Military, Economy, Social Services, Education, Military)	173 (%22.9)	18 (%13.7)	11 (%7.3)
Diplomatic Relations with Other States and International Organizations	255 (%33.8)	8 (%6.1)	0
Foreign Relations of the Jihadist Groups	0	15 (%11.4)	15 (%10)
Cultural and Natural Assets	0	20 (%15.2)	0
Sports, Art and Tourism	1 (%0.13)	26 (%20.6)	0
Anti-western and Anti-imperialist	11 (%1.4)	22 (%16.7)	35 (%23.4)
Fighting Against Jihadism	210 (%27.8)	37 (%28.2)	0
Jihadism	25 (%3.3)	0	72 (%48.3)

As Table 1 shows, ISIS underlines its capacity to govern as effectively as Syria and Iraq. Of the articles published in *Dabiq*, 7.3% are related to the state-building efforts of ISIS while this number is 22.9% for Iraq and 13.7% for Syria. It is relevant to note that these actors behave as if there is no civil war and aim to demonstrate their ability to provide order as well as governmental services. Nevertheless, regarding diplomatic relations with other states and international organizations, ISIS radically deviates from Syria and Iraq. It does not have any diplomatic contact with recognized states and organizations in the international system. Conversely, Syria underlines its close relations with Russia and UNESCO, and the Iraqi government's website covers diplomatic relations extensively in order to demonstrate the international solidarity against ISIS. ISIS uses this opportunity to exploit and reflect these diplomatic relations as a collaboration of the Damascus and Baghdad governments with the Christian states against Muslims.

Nonetheless, 11.4% of the SANA reports argue that ISIS is not a 'solitary man' and that it has secret ties with the US, Israel, Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The Syrian regime propagandizes that ISIS is an artificial project of third-party states. The Iraqi government does not accuse any international states of backing ISIS, probably because of the need for diplomatic support. Contrary to the claims of the Syrian regime, *Dabiq* does not include any articles on the foreign relations of ISIS. Instead, it underlines the solitary character of ISIS. ISIS does not only present serious challenges to the sovereign states but also criticizes non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda, PKK, and the Shiite groups. As evident in the table, under the category 'foreign relations of the jihadist groups,' ten percent of the articles published in *Dabiq* accuse these groups either of being deviant or collaborating with imperialism. Thus, it is safe to argue that ISIS aims to present itself as a heroic figure fighting a solitary battle against an entirely corrupt system.

In regards to the non-political categories such as culture, nature, sports, art, and archeology, the Syrian regime deliberately highlights the assets of the country and aims to use these assets as a soft power strategy. This is a message to the international society: Do not allow such a rich culture and civilization to be captured and destroyed by ISIS and other

[24] a) News, reports and articles on social events and ceremonies are not included in the table. b) A report, news or article might include more than one direct theme.

Islamist groups. On the other hand, the Iraqi regime shows almost no interest in such issues. This negligence might be because it is easy for the Iraqi government obtain support of other states. Unsurprisingly, *Dabiq* magazine does not include any articles in these categories.

An examination of the anti-western and anti-imperialist articles of *Dabiq* magazine indicates ISIS's strategy to appeal to Muslims. Accordingly, 23.4% of the articles harshly criticize western values, the United States, and the existing world order. In doing so, the ISIS regime defines the Western world as crusaders and the source of the problems that the Middle East has been experiencing since the Sykes-Picot Agreement. To a lesser extent, the Syrian government also criticizes the imperialistic moves of other states and, as mentioned previously, argues that there are secret ties between ISIS and the western states. In addition, the Syrian regime also uses anti-Zionist, anti-Western, and patriotic rhetoric in 16.7% of it's reports to promote nationalism. It should be noted that the Iraqi government adopts a patriotic stance without using radical language to blame the western states and Israel. However, 1.4% of the news of the Iraqi government expresses specific discontent over Turkey's cross-border penetrations.

Fighting jihadism is the most popular subject addressed by the Syrian and Iraqi media outlets. Accordingly, the share of the news about struggles against ISIS is 27.8% for Iraq and 28.2% for Syria. It should be noted that the Syrian government uses the terms *jihadist* and *terrorist* interchangeably and defines the armed opposition as either holistically jihadist or terrorist, while the Iraqi government directly addresses ISIS. Needless to say, ISIS, as the pioneer of the jihadism in Iraq and Syria, has no reservations about jihadism.

On the other hand, there is no jihadist discourse in the reports of SANA. It is the product of the secular character of the Ba'athist ideology in Syria. The Iraqi government behaves pragmatically and prefers to use jihadism as a strategy to mobilize people against ISIS. According to news releases, the Iraqi government seeks the assistance of Shiite clerics in obtaining a *jihad fatwa* (opinion or interpretation of a qualified religious scholar) against ISIS. That is why the Iraqi government website released 25 news reports condemning ISIS using Islamic references. However, this strategy seems to attract and mobilize Shiite groups rather than undermine the popular support of ISIS. It can then be argued that the jihadist policy of the Baghdad government might deepen the sectarian tensions further and trigger the occurrence of *alternative jihadisms*. Evidently, as seen in Table 1, jihadism is the dominant subject matter of *Dabiq* magazine.

This shows that ISIS disseminates four messages to its target audience. The first is that ISIS has governance capacity and acts as a sovereign state. Second, it competes with other non-state armed groups and identifies them as tools of imperialism. Third, ISIS uses anti-western and anti-imperialist discourse and morally condemns the states with Muslim populations due to their diplomatic relations with western states. Finally, ISIS aims to establish a monopoly over jihadism. On the other hand, the Syrian and the Iraqi regimes seem to have failed to meet the challenges posed by ISIS. For example, the Iraqi government's enthusiasm to get diplomatic support from international society is identified as 'collaborating with imperialism' by ISIS. Similarly, ISIS criticizes the Syrian government's secular, nationalist, and modernist stance within the framework of jihadism.[25] ISIS, as an unrecognized entity, has no systemic

[25] Ahmed S. Hashim, "The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate: The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and

responsibility toward the other states of the international society and it believes that the Islamic worldview is categorically superior to other kinds of secular ideologies. It then has a free hand to judge its metropole states' policies based on pragmatism and rationalism in moral terms. In a final analysis, the jihadist and anti-imperialist market, which potentially includes foreign fighters, is overwhelmed by the radical and self-righteous ideology of ISIS.

Competitive jihadism is a game played by ISIS, which allows it to strengthen its military capabilities by recruiting foreign fighters. Building on this research, one could assume that ISIS, through its success in the competitive jihadism game, has attracted a considerable number of foreign fighters. Although it is not possible to obtain exact numbers, it is still possible to follow the influx of foreign fighters to ISIS.

According to Combatting Terrorism Center's report, *Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail*, the overall number of foreign fighters that arrived in Syria until mid-2013 was not more than 5,000.[26] In May 2014, the Soufan Group's report indicated that by governments' estimations there were 12,000 foreign fighters from 81 countries in Syria and Iraq. This number increases to 18,000 at the end of 2014[27] and to 22,000 by January 2015. According to the Soufan Group's calculations, this number increases to 31,000 people from 86 countries by December 2015.[28] These estimates are corroborated by the statements of intelligence officers. For example, in February 2016, US National Intelligence Director James Clapper estimated that more than 36,000 foreign fighters from 120 countries have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq since 2012.[29]

However, the influx of foreign fighters started to decrease in 2016. According to senior US army officers, the inpouring of foreign fighters to the Islamic State has dropped from 1500–2000 to 200 fighters per month.[30] Nevertheless, such a sharp decrease does not mean that jihadism has suddenly lost its attraction. This can instead be attributed to a show of force by the metropole states and their external allies (such as the US and Russia) to intimidate ISIS in Iraq and Syria. For example, when US-backed offensives escalated in Northern Syria the Iraqi army launched an operation to liberate Fallujah in early 2016. It would also not be wrong to argue that Turkey has considerably tightened control over the Syrian border since late 2015. In order to see the progress, one can compare the numbers of foreign fighters caught in 2015 and 2016. Turkey prevented 1136 foreign fighters from infiltrating into Syria between 1 January 2016 and 17 April 2016,[31] whereas only 280 fighters were prevented in the initial four months of 2015.[32]

Syria (ISIS)," *Middle East Policy Journal* 11, no. 4 (2014): 69-83.

[26] Brian Dodwell et. al., "Caliphate's Global Workforce : An inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail"(CTS Reports, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Zurich, April 2016).

[27] "ISIL Foreign Fighters : From Zero to Hero," *Global Security,* June 2016*,* http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/isil-2-4.htm.

[28] Richard Barrett, *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq* (New York: The Soufan Group, 2015).

[29] Barrett, *Foreign Fighters*.

[30] "Fewer Foreign Fighters Joining Islamic State," *Reuters,* April 26, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-recruiting-idUSKCN0XN2FO.

[31] "Sınırda yakalanan IŞİD'li sayısı açıklandı" [Number of the ISIS members captured at the Turkey-Syria border], *Sputnik News*, January 30, 2016, accessed September 20, 2016, http://sptnkne.ws/a7nY.

[32] "Sınırda yakalanan IŞİD'li sayısı açıklandı" [Number of the ISIS members captured at the Turkey-Syria border], *Doğan Haber Ajansı (DHA)*, January 30, 2016, accessed September 21, 2016, http://www.dha.com.tr/sinirda-yakalanan-isidli-sayisi-aciklandi_1125556.html.

5. Conclusion

The debates dealing with ISIS address how ISIS is conceptualized, what its aim is, and how it has successfully retained a core sovereignty zone. This study attempts to answer these questions by proposing that ISIS is a de facto state and uses jihadism as a survival strategy. In doing so, the term competitive jihadism is used to argue that ISIS competes with its metropole states, Syria and Iraq, on the basis of jihadism. This is a deliberate strategy, which aims to attract Muslims inclined to radicalization and to recruit foreign fighters by showing the jihadist deficits of the metropole states. As the research shows, ISIS is successful at this game and has managed to become a magnet for foreign fighters. Thus, it has managed to increase its military capabilities and has continued to survive.

The findings of this study also help us to analyze how ISIS will evolve if it is swept out of Mosul and Raqqa in the future. In this scenario, the status of ISIS is expected to reduce from a de facto state to a violent non-state political actor and it will be involved in competition with other jihadist organizations. Moghadam argues that ISIS competes with other jihadist organizations and takes advantage of having a state. Considering the number of articles that underline the governing capacity of ISIS and the declining influence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq, Moghadam's argument gains ground. Losing sovereignty will inevitably de-potentiate ISIS and its local agenda. This might pave the way for ISIS to pursue a global and unpredictable agenda. Furthermore, the disappearance of ISIS, as a magnet for foreign fighters, might give rise to homegrown radicalization. On the other hand, in the absence of ISIS, other terrorist organizations might adopt similar strategies and build jihadist de facto states in order to attract jihadists and sustain their own survival. Once Pandora's Box has been opened, it may be hard to get it closed again.

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Multiple Dualities: Seeking the Patterns in Iran's Foreign Policy

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Abstract

As one of the most significant actors of the region, Iran's interactions with great powers (as well as regional powers and non-state actors) have come under scrutiny. This article adopts an historical account and suggests a framework to study Iran's foreign policy. The framework is contextually built with a multi-level approach to specify the independent and intervening variables of Iran's foreign policy through the light of neoclassical realist theory. In this context, it is argued that the independent variables of Iran's foreign policy are geopolitics, threat perceptions and balance of power politics. These systemic variables are filtered through nationalism, theological and revolutionary ideology and policy making mechanisms.

Keywords: Iran, foreign policy, neoclassical realism, foreign policy analysis

1. Introduction

Regionally and globally, Iran has been one of the most remarkable international actors. Due to its geopolitical location, it attracted the attentions of the great powers during the Cold War. By the Islamic Revolution, it had opened a new chapter in its international relations. The foreign policy (FP) perspective of Iran came under scrutiny once again by the nuclear revelations. The Arab Spring wave intensified the role Iran plays in the region, which reached its climax with the Syria crisis. Iran is "a fiercely independent and defiant player"[1] that wants to be an engaged actor in regional and global politics. Due to the multiplicity of dualities in many levels, Iran is a challenging case for FP analysis.

The existing literature analyzing Iran's FP piles upon three episodes of the Islamic Republic. The recent literature is built upon Iran's regional role, its power balancing vis-à-vis regional actors like Saudi Arabia or vis-à-vis global powers. Former studies focus on Iran's nuclear aspirations, and the third study group is concerned with the revolutionary FP. As expressed by Zaccara, Iran's FP is widely seen as "irrational and unpredictable" and explained by "the radicalism of its principles and objectives, and the opaqueness of the internal decision-making mechanisms".[2] To determine which structural dynamics shape Iran's FP, and to sort out how to explain Iran's behavior on the international platform, this article applies the conceptual framework presented by neoclassical realism, which takes both

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[1] Anoushirevan Ehteshami, "The Foreign Policy of Iran," in *The Foreign Policies of Middle East,* ed. R. Hinnebusch and A. Ehteshami (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

[2] Luciano Zaccara, "Iran's Permanent Quest for Regional Power Status" in *Diplomatic Strategies of Nations in the Global South*, ed. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 184.

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systemic and domestic factors into account.[3] This study assumes that the main drivers of Iran's FP are found at the systemic level, and that they are geopolitical location, security concerns and power balancing. While translating the systemic elements into FP, the internal elements intervene. In concordance with this, the uniqueness of Iran's FP lurks in its exceptional political system that is based on duality as well as idiosyncratic values.

The literature assumes that 'there are patterns in the FP and not just single acts'.[4] The sources of the FP can be determined within a theoretical framework. This study does not aim to analyze the FP behavior of Iran on a case basis. Instead, this article seeks to find the variables that mold the general pattern of Iran's behavior, among them dualities like pragmatism vs. idealism, decision making through the institutions of the Revolution vs. parliamentary democracy and Iran's desire for recognition as a *regional power* vs. unrelenting intransigence.

The existing literature on Iranian FP focuses mainly on two facets: Iran's permanent search for regional leadership, and Iran's state identity as shaped by revolutionary ideology, theology and institutions. The first facet stretches from the era of the Shah until today, and the second dimension is a result of the Islamic Revolution. Byman, Chubin and Ehteshami discuss that the motivation for regional leadership is a result of revolutionary Islam and Persian nationalism. On the contrary, Barzegar states that regionalism is an outcome of systemic impulse and has been reinforced by global factors like 9/11 and its aftermath.[5] For Byman, Chubin and Ehteshami, economics, geopolitics and ethnicity and communalism are the elements that hold Iran back from obtaining the leadership it desires.[6] The most dedicated scholar of this field, Ramazani, discusses that it is an "internal power struggle" between two major governing bodies that prevents Iran from materializing its regional power status. He holds that two major FP events of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), the hostage crisis and the settlement of the Iraq-Iran conflict, are both marked by this duality.[7] Prezeczek seeks the FP determinants in the revolutionary character of the regime, for which anti-imperialism, self-sufficiency, independence and anti-Zionism are the foremost values.[8] Farideh Fardi agrees that revolutionary Islamic ideology is the foundation of Iran's FP priorities as shown in its regime security, territorial integrity and regional aspirations.[9] Ramazani formulates an argument that pragmatism and ideology are two competing dynamics of Iranian FP, in which the balance of influence is shifting from ideology to pragmatism.[10] Some scholars, like Lubna Arshad, have assessed that culture and religion are the foremost sources of the FP, since they directly influence the decision makers. There is a need to notice their worldviews and societal conditions.[11] Maleki also agrees with the agent-centered analysis by arguing that FP brings

[3] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 146.

[4] Kjell Goldman, *Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Détente* (Baltimore, Md.: Project MUSE, 2015), 7.

[5] Kayhan Barzegar, "Regionalism in Iran's Foreign Policy," *Iran Review*, February 7, 2010, http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Regionalism_in_Iran_s_Foreign_Policy.htm.

[6] Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold D. Green, *Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1320.html.

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[9] Farideh Farhi and Saideh Lotfia, "Iran's Post-Revolution Foreign Policy Puzzle," *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia* (2012): 118.

[10] R.K. Ramazani, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's Foreign Policy," *The Middle East Journal* 58, no. 4 (2004).

[11] Lubna Arshad, "Internal Dynamics of Iran's Foreign Policy," *Pakistan Horizon* 57, no. 1 (2004): 47-53.

religious hierarchy and parliamentary democracy together for decision making that constitutes a unique administrative impact on Iranian FP.[12] Constructivist scholars like Karimifard underline the significance of the national identity by discussing that Iran's perception of other states influences their FP and orientation.[13] Akbarzadeh and Barry similarly argue that Iran's FP choices rest upon Iranism, Islam and Shi'ism.[14] There is yet another group of work that attempts to interpret Iranian FP through its relations and conflicts with the U.S. and/or Israel by adopting a strategic perspective. The literature partially fails to reflect the complexity of Iran's FP that is a combination of the aforementioned determinants that partially contradict each other. Yet each FP determinant kicks in either at different levels or under particular conditions. This study is an attempt to draw a framework that encloses Iran's strategic concerns, regional and global influences and normative factors. The framework holds that both systemic and domestic factors shape Iranian FP; however, in diverse contexts.

2. Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism (NCR) provides the most appropriate conjectural infrastructure to analyze Iranian FP since it is deliberately designed as a theory of FP, rather than as a theory of *international politics*. Theories of international politics intend to explain states' behavior at the international level.[15] This article seeks to explore the general configuration of Iranian FP rather than the outcomes of Iran's interactions with other states. As stated by Waltz, theories of FP explain "why states similarly placed in a system behave in different ways. Differences in behavior arise from differences of internal composition".[16] NCR provides scholars flexibility through unit level variables (domestic political constraints, decisions makers' perceptions, etc.) to determine the FP identity of one state.[17]

Concordantly, this study analyses domestic determinants, as well as international setting.

Being a member of the realist school, NCR is built upon classical realism and neorealism. Both assume that the global system is anarchical; therefore, states adopt the self-help doctrine for security and defense reasons. The security dilemma locks states into a search for power. At this point, neoclassical realists differ from classical realists; the latter assume that power is the ultimate aim, but in NCR, power is a tool. The ultimate aim is consolidation of security and fulfillment of interests in the international arena. NCR argues that domestic ideas and politics contribute to the degree of power. The emphasis on internal factors can be traced back to classical realism, for which i*nternal* structures of states are reflected on to the FP. NCR integrates the core concept of constructivism by arguing that power is also rooted in national identity.[18] Liberalism's ideational variables and state and society relations are not excluded. The integration of constructivist and liberal elements do not isolate NCR from the realist school.

[12] Abbas Maleki, "Decision Making in Iran's Foreign Policy: A Heuristic Approach," *Journal of Social Affairs* 73 (2002).

[13] Hossein Karimifard, "Constructivism, National Identity and Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Asian Social Science* 8, no. 2 (2012): 239.

[14] Shahram Akbarzadeh and James Barry, "State Identity in Iranian Foreign Policy," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 4 (2016).

[15] Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics is Not Foreign Policy," *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (1996): 54.

[16] Waltz, "International Politics".

[17] Nuri Yeşilyurt, "Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East during the Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective," *All Azimuth* 6, no. 2 (2017): 65.

[18] Brian Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical realism as the logical and necessary extension of structural realism," *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 296.

NCR allows FP examination with a multi-level approach by uniting the micro-level and macro-level units and applying them with a systematic method.[19] The realist tradition disagrees that FP has roots in domestic politics.[20] In contrast with realism, *Innenpolitik* theories include domestic factors like ideology, national identity, party politics, social or economic structure into FP analysis.[21] In a similar way, *democratic peace theory* proposes that the distribution of political power among the inland democratic institutions prevents democratic systems waging wars against each other.[22]

For NCR, privileging one of the internal or external dynamics results in oversimplified explanations that are inaccurate.[23] Instead, the most important factor in determining FP behavior is *relative power*.[24] The systemic pressures must be filtered through the perceptions of the decision makers to formulate a FP.[25] The ability of a government 'to extract and direct the resources of their societies'[26] is another significant intervening variable for NCR. This capability is referred to as state power and interpreted as a significant portion of national power. The interests, resources, identity construction and understanding of prestige of a state are all factors that influence threat perception of a government. The assessment shall not ignore the civil-military relations, public/elite belief systems or organizational politics that influence the threat-assessment capacity of a state.[27]

The methodological perspective is built upon determining the independent intervening and dependent variables that reside at diverse levels of analysis. Historical case analysis is the most significant methodological component to determine the aforementioned variables. Various cases, processes and periods are examined. The aim is to ascertain the independent and intervening parameters and examine whether they have influenced the dependent variable (the FP) for change or continuity.[28]

[19] While addressing the *micro-level* examination, it is necessary to clarify three core concepts specific to Iran: the state, the regime and the government. In this article, the term *state* refers to the international legal definition that is about the territorial band with the population living on it; the term *regime* refers to the political system established by the Islamic Revolution. This is a complex system based on councils led by *mullahs* (religious clerics) that compose representatives, who are not popularly elected by the people. The Supreme Leader (*rahbar*) is elected by the Assembly of Experts, as stated by the §107 of Iran's constitution. The regime is led by the *Rahbar.* The §110 of the constitution holds that the main function of the *Rahbar* is to delineate the general policies with the values of the Islamic Republic and with religion. As for the *government*, it is popularly elected and composed of the president (who is elected for a term of four years and forms a cabinet) and the legislature, which is the parliament (*majlis*) composed of the popularly elected members; and also the Guardian Council of the Constitution, whose six members are directly appointed by the *rahbar* and other six members are nominated by the head of justice and approved through voting by the *majlis*. The national interests are represented by the state; the interests of the regime are represented by the Supreme Leader. The interests that are represented by the government may differ from one to another depending upon their orientation.

[20] Joseph S. Nye Jr., Gideon Rachman, Walter Russell Mead, John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Peter D. Feaver, Christopher Gelpi et al., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and evidence* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 6.

[21] Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 147-48.

[22] John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 87-125.

[23] Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 150.

[24] The key independent variable, the relative power, necessitates a definition. The definition coined Dahl "A's ability to get B to do something it would not otherwise do" (Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Systems Research and Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (1957): 202-3.) is the one that is most commonly referred to, which is however also still abstract to measure and to operationalize. Dahl's definition is a reference mostly for soft power. On the other hand, the power definition of Wohlforth "the capabilities of resources, mainly military, with which states can influence each other" (William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 4.) is a reference to hard power that is more functional to operate by *balance of power* and *balance of threat* theories. For power balancing two elements are counted in: the physical capacities of the states, and the individual perceptions of threat. The foreign behavior of a state is a result of decisions made by real human beings. The decisions are determined by subjective insights or the values, norms, rules, and principles of that state. The relative power is a concept that is mainly related with survival, which indicates hard power capabilities. Still, it does not exclude soft power elements.

[25] Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 157-61.

[26] Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 162.

[27] Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism,* 63.

[28] Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism*, chap. 5.

3. Systemic Factors

The adherents of NCR argue that the FP of a country is directly affected by its relative power. Therefore, systemic influences are the foremost independent variables of FP. When threats appear, states look for balancing that threat, yet balancing is not an immediate reaction. Security seeking is necessary, but not a tense activity. States are willing to increase their influence to be effective in controlling the architecture of their environment.

Iran has been living in a security complex since the Operation Ajax of 1953. Iran's FP is coded to answer the power balance vis-à-vis global and regional rivals. Its geopolitical location creates both security threats and strategic opportunities. Scholars discuss that Iran's drive to become a regional power is one of the most important developments of the 21st century.[29] However, they argue that Iran's behavior is not compatible with systemic and regional restrictions, and so, hinders it from becoming a regional leader. In order to adjust its interactions, a state has to realize and assess the actual environment it encounters. It has to weigh its geopolitical environment to resolve which power to deploy where, and to what extent. Hinnebusch and Ehteshami reflect that Iran is a "middle regional power" which is "playing the realist game" vis-à-vis great powers that are highly penetrant to the policies of the region, and have a better deterrence capacity as compared to lesser powers.[30]

3.1. Geopolitics

The *Shia Crescent* ideal is at the heart of Iran's geopolitics. This ideal is based upon the Shia-Sunni power sharing competition in the region. It is Iran's attempt to balance the great power existence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); Iran's arc of influence enables it in realizing ideological and pragmatic goals at a time. Religious and cultural ties ensure Iran's active presence in the region. Hosni Mobarak states that Shias "across the Middle East are more loyal to Iran than to their own countries".[31] For Barzegar, this speech also signifies "how much Arab elite are concerned by the Iranian Shiite influence upon the average people in their countries".[32] Iran's balancing against Saddam precluded potential tensions with the states of the Persian Gulf for a long time. Today, Iran's extensive influence in Iraq marks new geopolitical confrontations: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Iran today remain face to face, and Lebanon is within easy reach of Iran through Syria. If the crescent strategy functions properly, Iran will have a power advantage at multiple levels. It will have the tools to dictate policies on regional issues be it energy politics, economy, containing Israel or the Sunni rival, Saudi Arabia. Iran fails to balance against American military power; however, it narrows the gap through its enhanced political influence in the region. Iran will ensure regional hegemony when it can consolidate its power in Syria, and bridge through Hezbollah its influence in Lebanon. As a result, Iran will be able to intervene in the Arab-Israeli conflict through geographical proximity to Hamas. This connection also constitutes the basis of Iran's confrontation with Israel, and indirectly with the U.S. The operational capability of Iran is enabled via the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Additionally, Iran provides support for the Badr Brigades in Iraq, and

[29] Barry Rubin, "Iran: The Rise of A Regional Power," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no. 3 (2006): 142.

[30] Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran: Middle powers in a penetrated regional system* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 7.

[31] "Mubarak's Shia remarks stir anger," *Aljazeera,* April 10, 2006, accessed March 11, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/04/200849132414562804.html.

[32] Kayhan Barzegar, "Iran and the Shiite Crescent: Myths and Realities," *Journal of World Affairs* 87 (2008): 89.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine. As for the remote edges of the region like the Red Sea and Yemen, Iran opts for sponsoring Shia communities for operational capabilities. Iran's one other significant neighbor is Turkey. Both countries are striving for regional hegemony, although Turkey is not within the Shia crescent and Iran is not trying to extend its influence to Turkey. Ankara and Tehran encounter each other in Syria though the parties are not hostile; they keep up their diplomatic dialogue and even cooperate to solve the Syrian crisis.[33]

Iran's geopolitics rest upon maintaining security and stretching power through manipulating sectarian fissures and balancing against Israel, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. A fragile economy, insufficient military capacity, regional and international mistrust as well as a complicated FP (due to a mixture of idealism and pragmatism) are the basic impediments before Iranian geopolitics.

3.2. Security and balance of power

Historical adverse experiences have left a 'permanent scar on the Iranian psyche.'[34] Living in an unstable neighborhood, having non-NPT nuclear states in the close geography (Pakistan and India), having hostile regimes who have faced military invasion as neighbors (Taliban and Saddam), living close to near-failed neighbors (Pakistan and Afghanistan) and having politically dependent neighbors in the Persian Gulf, all combined with a general dissatisfaction with authoritarian regimes in the region, create stress on Iran's FP calculations. Regional rivalries, aspirations for hegemony and the aforementioned security threats are the basis of Iran's balance of power policy.[35] As Ramazani reminds, balancing revolutionary ideology with the pragmatism of power balancing "has been one of the most persistent, intricate, and difficult issues in all Iranian history".[36]

In regards to recent conduct, the initial security problem was created as a result of the U.S. invasions sparked by the War on Terror initiative and the preemption doctrine of the Bush government. Although Khatami has opted for cooperation, the *axis of evil* label (created by the U.S.) has raised perceptions of coercion, isolation and alienation as well as concerns over regime change. In order to balance against the U.S., Iran started to pursue an opaqueness policy in its nuclear development. While rejecting claims about its nuclear intentions, Iran kept the nature of its nuclear activities ambiguous by not ratifying the additional protocol of the NPT, and in providing partial access to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. This was a way of challenging the U.S. in non-military ways and indicating the possibility of prospective military action.[37]

Kamrava stresses that ideology is the basis of Iranian politics, though the FP and national security issues are a direct product of the pragmatic balance of power considerations.[38] The material capabilities of Iran are limited to sustain Iran's regional power aspirations or to maintain Iran's security in the stormy region.[39] After the cooperation failure in the

[33] "Turkish, Russian, Iranian presidents to meet in Turkey in April," *Hürriyet Daily News*, February 20, 2018, accessed March 15, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-russian-iranian-presidents-to-meet-in-turkey-in-april-127599.

[34] Ehteshami, "The Foreign Policy of Iran," 285.

[35] Ehteshami, "The Foreign Policy of Iran," 304.

[36] Ramazani, "Ideology and Pragmatism," 549.

[37] Hong-Cheol Kim, "The Paradox of Power Asymmetry: When and Why Do Weaker States Challenge US Hegemony?," *All Azimuth* 5, no. 2 (2016): 7.

[38] Mehran Kamrava, "Iran and Its Persian Gulf Neighbors," in *Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001: Alone in the World*, ed. Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi (London: Routledge, 2013), 104.

[39] Randall Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): 166.

Afghanistan case, Iran had to go back to maintaining a balance of power. Due to regional isolation, lack of sufficient allies and confrontations with great powers, Iran felt compelled to start an *alliance policy* by turning attentions to common regional conflicts like the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's nuclear ambiguity.[40] With respect to alliances, sectarianism has provided the most functional basis. Through the Shi'a connection, Iran has managed to establish close ties with Iraq's Haidar al-Abadi government. By this alliance, Iran managed to oust U.S. control and became the champion of influence in Iraq. As for Syria, the existence of the al-Assad government is a strong element of Iran's balance of power framework. The alliance with Syria provides Iran with a strong fortress against the Saudi-led block, which supports the opposition forces in Syria. A similar balancing is also observable in Yemen, where the Saudi/Emirati military campaign is set against the Huthis supported by Tehran. The sectarian balance of power is easy to trace, particularly in Lebanese politics, where Iran remains influential through Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia has opened a front in Lebanon to eliminate Iranian influence by supporting and sponsoring the March 14 Alliance, which is known as an anti-Syrian coalition of political parties in Lebanon.[41]

As for balancing the great powers, Iran has diplomatic relations with China and Russia; Iran shares similar strategic visions with both countries. However, the degree of engagement with China is not sufficient to create an anti-U.S. block. In Syria, Iran and Russia effectively cooperate to support the al-Assad regime. Still, it is unlikely that the cooperation extends to other conflicts, such as Yemen or Afghanistan. In Yemen, Russian-Iranian ties are strained over Iran's support for Houthis. In Afghanistan, the parties have divergent approaches to the inclusion of Taliban in the newly emerging political settlement.

Iran's FP options are narrowed by the regime's reliance on the strict principles of the Revolution. The innovative foreign policy approaches, like Khatami's Dialogue of Civilizations approach, had to bounce back to the rigidity of Mullahs as soon as they hit the counter reactions of especially great powers.

4. Intervening Variables: Translators of Stimuli into Foreign Policy

The confrontational FP of Iran is a product of various intervening variables. As would be expected, the clerical elite, the duality of the political system, the religious and revolutionary ideologies, the isolationist nationalism, the national resources and the economic conditions are factors that translate the international power distribution into foreign policy. In this context, the most prominent internal dynamics for Iran can be assessed under the titles of nationalism and ideology and as well as its complex decision making mechanism.

4.1. Nationalism

The link between nationalism and FP is a complex one, since it is not mono-directional. This study assumes that nationalism can shape FP in numerous causal ways, by affecting a state's perception of its environment, by interpreting the history or historical incidents, by motivating the state for certain aims or by creating subjective interpretations of power.

The Iranian leadership has reflected nationalism as an integral part of Iranian independence. Therefore, from Khomeini to Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinejad and Rouhani, all political

[40] Kayhan Barzegar, "Iran's foreign policy strategy after Saddam," *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (2010): 173.

[41] "Lebanon: At the Crossroads," *Aljazeera,* 2015, accessed March 14, 2018, https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2015/lebanoncrossroads/ .

figures have opted for incorporating nationalism into their FP.[42] The concept *Iranism* is the most all-encompassing approach and includes all elements from language to religion, ethnicity to history, culture and even geography.[43] This kind of a comprehensive concept helps when referring to different styles of Iranian leaders, who emphasize diverse aspects of Iranian corporate identity while addressing FP issues.

The history of informal imperialist domination and foreign interventionism that led to the 1953 Operation TP-Ajax has taught Iranian leadership a lesson: the governance has to preserve the regime from any kind of foreign involvement, especially Western influence. Nationalism functions in Iranian politics as a strict bearer of Iranian independence, a tool for non-submission. Pragmatism and nationalism are two elements of Iranian FP that are used alternately. Threats trigger nationalism; pragmatism is employed under stability and peace. Nationalism, in general, creates a confrontational approach against certain states. Concordantly, Iranian leaders keep labeling the U.S. as 'the great Satan' and Israel, 'the little Satan'. The existence of American troops in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and in Iraq has been causing distress. Additionally, during the nuclear talks with P5+1 group, the U.S. officials threatened Iran by often repeating that "all options are on the table" to solve the nuclear crisis. The more Iran feels their independence jeopardized, the bolder the nationalist discourse. In other words, Iranian nationalism is based on prudence; it is seen as the assurance of sovereignty and territorial integrity that are basic pillars of statehood. Iranian nationalism recognizes Iran's multiethnic character. Hence, Iranism is the widely employed nationalistic approach to ensure the loyalty of other ethnic groups. For instance, the rising Turkish nationalist tendency in Azerbaijan, under the governance of Elbulfez Elchibey, was perceived as a threat against Iran's territorial integrity. Iranism helped to shield the Turkish (*Azari*) population in Iran from Azerbaijani influence.

During the nuclear crisis, ambiguity over the true nature of Iran's nuclear program was harshly criticized all over the world. Ahmadinejad's take on these criticisms was that the West prevents Iran from bearing advanced technologies by overlooking it. He said, "the nuclear technology is ... the sort of technology that has been monopolized by a few countries and they want to maintain such a monopoly, and they want to use it as an instrument of domination over the whole world".[44] In other words, Ahmadinejad protected Iranian independence from Western domination of technology and economy.

Nationalism is treated as a flexible tool of Iran's FP; it is used in various cases like protecting Iran from manipulation by foreign forces, preserving Iran's territorial integrity or ensuring independence. Thus, nationalism is not referred in a singular manner like ethno-nationalism or lingo-nationalism, secular nationalism or religious nationalism. Instead, it is employed pragmatically to address necessity. When it is utilized to facilitate relations with Central Asian states such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan, language is emphasized; when shielding the country against the Arab states, the Shiite feature is held up. Iranism enables the flexibility of foreign behavior to adjust against any possible case in order to defend the Islamic Republic.

[42] Though, they disunite regarding the true nature of Iranian nationalism as a constituent of their foreign policy. The descriptions revolve mainly around references to the ancient past of Iran or Shiite Islam, and anti-imperialism/anti-U.S. sentiment/anti-Zionism. Some studies also embrace alternative concepts like race, language or geography.

[43] Shahram Akbarzadeh and James Barry, "State Identity in Iranian Foreign Policy," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 4 (2016): 617.

[44] "Ahmadinejad: Nations jealous of nuclear progress," CNN, accessed February 2, 2018, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/02/23/iran.jealous/ .

4.2. Theological and ideological influences

A revolution is, roughly described, a forcible overthrow of a government to establish a new one. Commonly, revolutions happen through a class struggle like a labor/peasant upheaval against an unjust governance of elites. However, the Islamic Revolution has a distinct character. It symbolizes a victory over imperialism. Ideological anti-Americanism lay at the heart of the revolution.[45] The Revolution treats America 'as an idea rather than a state.'[46] Ayatollah Khamenei defined the nature of the Revolution by saying "the Revolution uprooted the enemies' political position in the country … Well, the U.S. is now (…) angry with the Revolution of Iran because it was defeated by this massive, retaliatory movement".[47] *Iran* suffered from *British Imperialism for a long time*. Anti-Americanism is perceived as a general term to define *the West* as a monolithic *Other*. For a thorough break from dependent and west-inflicted exploitative politics, the Revolution popularized new terms such as 'westoxication' (*gharbzadegi,*), which is being infected by the West, its culture, economy and politics. The western influence is assessed as a disease, which spoils the cultural authenticity and sovereignty of Iran. The cure is 'westeradication' (*gharbzeda'i.*)[48] It is resistance to forceful western stimulus by nativism. It is the key to independence from the tyranny of oppressive neocolonialism.

Disassociation from the West did not bring a rapprochement with the East, be it Soviet influence or any alliance with the Middle East, Central Asia or Caucasus. Iran is ethnically, linguistically and theologically distinct from the rest of the Middle East. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the Persian Gulf have close ties with the U.S. Thus, Iran has distant relations with its neighbors to keep up the revolutionary principles. The interference traumas of the Pahlavi era have resulted in the formulation of the 'negative balance' doctrine.[49] It requires equal independence from eastern and western powers.[50] These ideals are obviously possible through self-reliance or self-sufficiency. According to Abrahamian, this policy creates an alternative development path, "a non-communist and non-capitalist road to development".[51] Economic independence is the key for political independence and regional influence. These values of the revolution are openly reflected in the constitution.[52]

In the early years of the Revolution, Musavi and Rafsanjani implemented the aforementioned nativist values.[53] Particularly during the first years of the Revolution, Tehran employed the principle of non-alignment and non-participation in great power conflicts. Choosing a side would mean being in the influence zone of a foreign power. This would

[45] Gi-Wook Shin, "South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 8 (1996): 792.

[46] Clifton Sherrill, "Iranian Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist View" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, The Hyatt Regency New Orleans, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 9, 2014), 19.

[47] "Recent damage inflicted on Iran by U.S. will gain a response" Khamanei.ir, January 9, 2018, accessed February 2, 2018, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/5394/Recent-damage-inflicted-on-Iran-by-U-S-will-gain-a-response.

[48] The term 'Westoxification' or '*Gharbzadegi'* is popularized by the novelist Jalal al-e Ahmad in his book with the same name published in 1962.

[49] Ehteshami, "The Foreign Policy of Iran," 285.

[50] Most famous slogans during the Revolution were "*Esteghlal, Azadi, Jomhouri Eslami*" meaning "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic;" and "*Nah Sharghi, Nah Gharbi, faghat Jomhoori Eslami*" meaning "Neither East nor West, only Islamic Republic."

[51] Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 38.

[52] The §2(6/c) declares that the Islamic Republic is based on "negation of all forms of oppression, both the infliction of and the submission to it, and of dominance, both its imposition and its acceptance." According to the §3(13) of the Constitution, it is the responsibility of the Iranian state to afford "self-sufficiency in scientific, technological, industrial, agricultural, and military domains, and other similar spheres." *See* "Iran (Islamic Republic of)'s Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1989," The Constitute Project, accessed February 10, 2018, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=en.

[53] Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," *Middle East Journal* 43, no. 2 (1989): 212.

contrast sharply with the spirit of the Revolution. In order to build a 'global Islamic front'[54] against Western imperialism, idealism to export the regime has also gained weight.

Anti-Zionism is another significant knot in revolutionary Iran's ideological texture. Although Israel and Iran do not share any borders, their animosity stems primarily from Israel's close ties with the U.S. According to Tehran, Israel has the capability to influence Washington's policy on Iran.[55] Moreover, the Palestinian case represents the cause of the Revolution: to support the oppressed against the neocolonialists. Palestine is of both Arab and Sunni nature, yet Iran does not hesitate to provide support for it. Supporting Palestine is an opportunity to avert allegations on Iran's sectarianism, to create a common denominator with the Arab World and, as a power-projection-opportunity, to reprove the 'Judeo-Western political and cultural onslaught on the Muslim world.'[56] Post-revolutionary Iran, with its messianic Shi'ism, caused noticeable tensions with the Arab neighborhood. However, speaking on behalf of the Muslim world, supporting the common cause of Palestine and claiming to be the representative of Islam in the international platform created more tensions with the Arab Middle East, where 'Iran's identification with the Shia has also been a handicap, and has hampered its ability to reach and influence Sunni groups with any significant degree of effectiveness.'[57] The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 underwired Iran's stance vis-à-vis Israel. Iran found the chance to intervene in a country and establish contact with a Shia community. This created the opportunity to export its own regime and expand its range of influence, in addition to finding a chance to sharpen its enmity against Israel, and condemn Israel's actions and existence. Tehran considers Israel unlawful according to international law, and illegitimate due to its establishment pattern and settlements.[58] Moreover, it is an open enemy of the *ummah*, the Islamic society. Iranian leadership convicts Zionism for being a racist, exclusionary ideology. Then Zionism shall be opposed by all who values human rights.[59]

The revolutionary ideology is incomplete without mentioning the theological component. Iran's Islamic identity is markedly sectarian, based on Shi'ism. The Shi'a identity is structured upon neither East nor West vision. Khomeini uttered that "the revolution was undertaken in the name of those dispossessed and oppressed by a corrupt and un-Islamic government".[60] Ali Shari'ati is the ideologue of the Revolution. He has produced his works by fusing modern socialism with traditional Shi'ism.[61] Shari'ati holds that resistance against imperialism is a teaching of Islam that we learn through the historical incident of Qarbala. Shari'ati listed the ills of contemporary Iran as "world imperialism, including multinational corporations and cultural imperialism, racism, class exploitation, class oppression, class inequality and *gharbzadegi* (intoxication with the West)".[62] Only by complete independence from all extraneous powers can Iran heal from these illnesses.

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[54] Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends and Means," in *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact,* ed. John Esposito (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 44-45.

[55] Farhad Rezaei and Ronen A. Cohen, "Iran's Nuclear Program and the Israeli-Iranian Rivalry in the Position Revolutionary Era," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 41 (2014): 442.

[56] Meir Litvak, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Holocaust: Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism," *The Journal of Israeli History* 25, no. 1 (2006): 268.

[57] Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam," *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (1988): 739.

[58] IV. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War of 12 August 1949. The Section III (Occupied Territories) §49 prohibits occupying state to "deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territories it occupies" that is applicable on the occupation of West Bank, the East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights.

[59] Ray Takeyh, *Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic* (New York: Times Books, 2006), 199.

[60] Zaccara, "Iran's Permanent Quest," 198.

[61] Ervand Abrahamian, "Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian revolution," *Merip Reports* 102 (1982): 24-8.

[62] Abrahamian, "Ali Shariati".

Both Sunni and Shia Islam accept the Mahdi concept; Shi'ism still politicizes it. Shi'a view supports that the world lacks justice. The return of the *Mahdi* will bring equity and order. Likewise, Iran wants to export its revolution to teach the rest of the Muslim world how to free themselves from imperialism in order to set a just system for their inhabitants. The export of the Revolution promises Iran a more conversant setting. Among the Sunni Arabs in the Persian Gulf region and secular Turkey, Iran could not extend its power or establish trustworthy ties to form alliances against the West.

Besides, Shi'ism facilitates Iran's transnational ties with Shi'a communities in Lebanon, similar to those in Iraq or Yemen. Those ties are veins of Iranian influence into Arab states for spreading the Revolution. Shireen Hunter asserts that Shi'a ideology makes a simple division: the oppressor and arrogant powers, and the oppressed and downtrodden nations".[63] Not only the U.S. and England are oppressors according to Iran, but also most Middle Eastern countries. The export of the Revolution would replace unjust and illegitimate governances with independent and equitable Islamic governances.[64] Resistance is the key for the salvation of oppressed communities. Yet Iran does not accept pursuing sectarian politics. For Tehran, their support for the cause of Sunni Palestine and Hamas is the proof of their nonsectarian FP.

Revolutionary ideology marked Iran's FP in the first years of the Revolution, and it made a come-back in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when U.S. President Bush included Iran in the axis of evil. Bush announced that Iran is an ally of the terrorists, that it "aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror" and sponsors terrorists, while "an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom".[65] In order to balance against the U.S., Iranian leadership has gone back to the revolutionary ideals that remind the nation of anti-Westernism, anti-Zionism, third-worldism and anti-imperialism. Khamenei slammed the remarks of Bush, saying Iran "is proud to be the target of the hate and anger of the world's greatest evil, we never seek to be praised by American officials". In consistence with revolutionary principles, he accused America of opposing the will of people, opposing popular movements, supporting undemocratic regimes, selling lethal weapons and creating an unjust economic system.[66]

Conservatives are the major defenders and implementers of the classical ideological values of the Revolution. Pragmatists also stick to these values but they assume that revolutionary ideology is evolutionarily in line with Iran's interests and the international context. According to pragmatists, Iran is better off opting for an approach that reduces frictions with the U.S. for security, economic and political interests.[67] The intensity of the values depend on the cases Iran face. Ahmadinejad has escalated the ideological leverage in his rhetoric during the nuclear dispute through emphasis on "resistance, justice, and independence".[68] The Arab Spring uprisings have stimulated the ideology-oriented foreign policy from 2011 onwards. The Iranian leadership has interpreted the uprisings as 'Arab Islamic Awakening.'[69] Then again, during the nuclear negotiations and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy

[63] Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam," 734.

[64] Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam," 734.

[65] "President Delivers State of the Union Address," The White House, January 29, 2002, accessed February 4, 2018, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.

[66] "A Nation Challenged: The Rogue List; Bush's 'Evil' Label Rejected by Angry Iranian Leaders," *The New York Times*, February 1, 2002, accessed February 6, 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/01/world/nation-challenged-rogue-list-bush-s-evil-label-rejected-angry-iranian-leaders.html.

[67] Sanam Vakil, "Iran: Balancing East against West," *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 53.

[68] Homeira Moshirzadeh, "Discursive Foundations of Iran's Nuclear Policy," *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 4 (2007): 523.

[69] Przemysław Osiewicz, "The Iranian Foreign Policy in the Persian Gulf Region under the Rule of President Hassan Rouhani: Continuity of Change," *Przegląd Strategiczny* 7 (2014): 258.

Agency (IAEA), Ahmadinejad adopted pragmatist elements to his policy.[70] The presidency of Rouhani from 2014 on seems to be more pragmatic than his predecessors; however, his 'prospects of policy change are constrained by internal barriers.'[71] His pragmatic FP is significantly limited by Khamenei, since he has the final say in critical decisions. Ramazani points out that "the spiritual pragmatic paradigm (…) has deep roots in Iran's diplomatic culture (…) these attributes have survived change and have influenced generations of Iran's foreign policymakers and diplomats and their negotiating style".[72]

In a nutshell, the revolutionary ideology is a composition of Shia theology and anti-imperialism that affects the FP in various intensities depending upon the international power distribution and Iran's perceptions of international phenomena. Mullahs, who have the last word in decisions, guarantee the ideology. Therefore, ideology cannot be downplayed and as soon as a threat emerges then the ideological FP gears up.

4.3. Complex decision making mechanism

The complex *political system* of *Iran* combines elements of democracy with the institutions of the Islamic Revolution. There is a major duality between the democratically elected president and the *Velayat-e faqih*. Iran's regime situates the parliamentary democracy under the ultimate authority of the *faqih*. The multiplicity of the state organs and the involvement of (elected or appointed) revolutionary bodies in various degrees of the decision making create the complexity. The actual head of state and commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces is the *faqih*. He is the ultimate authority and has the last word from national security in foreign policy issues. A natural constituent of democratic systems, transparency, is limited in Iran. Opaqueness was also the case under the single-person authority of the Shah. Milani states that after revolutions (like the French Revolution), a vacuum occurs in which power oscillates from one group to another. However, this vacuum did not occur in Iran, where 'Khomeini was the revolution and the revolution was he.'[73] Khomeini set the principles of the revolution and he left his mark on all FP actions until his death, from his support for the students that seized the U.S. Embassy to the war with Iraq. With respect to the Middle East region, especially the Persian Gulf, Khomeini called on them to free themselves from foreign (the Soviet) influences and "find safety under the security umbrella of Iran".[74] Khomeini did not hesitate to extend his aspiration "to create an Islamic-led international order".[75]

The power sharing between the elected president and the *faqih* with respect to FP making is, as might be expected, controversial. The presidents bring their own foreign policy vision and agenda. They try to run their program without clashing with the ideals of the *faqih*. The framework drawn by the Revolution is a rigid one, which undermines the effectiveness of the individual FP agendas by the static ideology. The most visible clash was during the presidency of Ahmadinejad, who attempted to strike up a nuclear deal with the West; Ayatollah Khamenei sided with the opposition in the parliament.[76] As a result, challenging the permanent leader on

[70] Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Reflections on Iran's Foreign Policy," *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs* 1, no. 1 (2010): 11-43.
[71] Akbarzadeh, "Iran's Syrian Foreign Policy Objectives," 128.
[72] Ramazani, "Reflections on Iran's Foreign Policy," 75.
[73] Mohsen M. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From monarchy to Islamic Republic* (New York & Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 197.
[74] Ramazani, "Ideology and Pragmatism," 7.
[75] Ramazani, "Ideology and Pragmatism," 7.
[76] "Is this really the end for Ahmadinejad?," *Foreign Policy*, November 25, 2009, accessed March 11, 2018, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/25/is-this-really-the-end-for-ahmadinejad-2/.

a sensitive issue put Ahmadinejad into a bind. Ahmadinejad's collision with the revolutionary institutions has proven that, although elected governments implement their own FP agenda, they are still strictly bound by the predetermined ideology.

After the death of Khomeini, the constitution was revised in 1989 to clarify the offices and their duties and obligations. The revised constitution established two bodies: the Council for the Expediency of the System and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). The expediency council is appointed by the *faqih*. Its duty is to mediate and resolve conflicts between the parliament and the Guardian Council of the Constitution (GC). The duty of the GC is to evaluate the consonance of *majlis* decisions with Shia theology and revolutionary values. The SNSC appears as an organ central to FP decision making. According to the §176 of Iran's Constitution, the SNSC is established to 'safeguard the national interests and preserve the Islamic Revolution, the territorial integrity and national sovereignty.' The president, who also heads the council, appoints the Secretary of the SNSC. However, the approval of the *faqih* is necessary for SNSC decisions to go into effect. When Iran enters into international treaties, *majlis* holds the ratification power. However, the GC can veto all decisions of the majlis. The aforementioned expediency council arbitrates between the *majlis* and the GC; therefore, it has a behind-the-scenes role in foreign policy making.

During the presidency of Ahmadinejad, Ali Larijani headed the SNSC; he was accountable to the *faqih* and he was Iran's chief nuclear *negotiator.* As Larijani repeatedly underlined the peaceful character of the uranium enrichment program, Ahmadinejad's aggressive rhetoric against the West distressed the nuclear negotiations and discredited the reliability of Larijani's warrants over Iran's intentions.[77] As in this example, the dual voice of the Iranian state confuses their interlocutors, and divergent ideas are announced on sensitive issues.

The presidents are free to set their own FP agenda and style. They adjust the intensity of revolutionary principles on their own. The concentration of anti-Westernism in the rhetoric of, for example, Ahmadinejad and Khatami, are obviously different. Although both of them have called for a change in the U.S. relations, Khatami, as a reformist, called for repairing the mistrust with the U.S. by introducing the policy of Dialogue of Civilizations.[78] In his public talks, Khatami continued to emphasize the Islamic and revolutionary values and actually promoted "interfaith dialogue" and "faith based movements".[79] Conversely, the conservative president Ahmadinejad said that change is possible through an "effective policy shift by the U.S".[80] He has questioned the Holocaust, voiced suspicions regarding the operation against al-Qaida leader Osama-bin-Laden and called the 9/11 attacks fabricated facts.[81]

Iran's FP is primarily based on power and threat balancing. In this sense, threat perceptions play a significant role. The foremost concern of Iran is the preservation of the regime and territorial integrity. The key force in guaranteeing security is the Islamic Revolutionary

[77] "Iran's chief nuclear negotiator resigns," *The Washington Post*, October 20, 2007, accessed February 12, 2018, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/20/AR2007102000302_pf.html.

[78] "Khatami suggests warmer relations with U.S.," CNN, January 7, 1998, accessed February 12, 2018, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/.

[79] Turan Kayaoğlu, "Constructing the Dialogue of Civilizations in World Politics: A case of global Islamic activism," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 23, no. 2 (2012): 129-47.

[80] "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calls for change in US relations but says nuclear issue is 'closed'," *The Telegraph*, February 17, 2009, accessed March 12, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/4683971/Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad-calls-for-change-in-US-relations-but-says-nuclear-issue-is-closed.html.

[81] "Iran president makes 9/11 claims after UN walkout," CNN, September 23, 2011, accessed March 12, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-15028776.

Guard Corps (IRGC; *sepah-e pasdaran.*) The Guard Corps emerged as a crowded military force during the Iran-Iraq War. In the aftermath of the war, it was downsized with expanded duties and economic opportunities.[82] The difference between the IRGC and the regular army is that the duty of the Guard is not limited to external threats; they are also responsible for ensuring the persistence of the revolutionary structure. The regular army is solely responsible for external threats; the army is known to be loyal to the Shah.[83] Therefore, the IRGC is established as a *coup d'état* prevention. Due to its double role in politics, the IRGC grew as one of the most powerful political players in Iran. They are strictly committed to revolutionary values. They fight against counter-revolutionary movements and gather intelligence about possible threats. The IRGC does not have a direct role in FP making, but it is an effective role. Formally, the Guardian Council evaluates bills and international agreements (among other items) for concordance with revolutionary values.[84]

The IRGC is the main executor of revolutionary FP ideals. Recently, they have suppressed anti-Assad rallies in Syria. Other nations find their activities in the region suspicious. The IRGC is accused of having ties with terrorist organizations. Bush included Iran in the axis of evil due to claims that the Guards deliver help to al-Qaeda members and logistics to the Palestinian Authority.[85] The Guards' responses to threats and opportunities are reactive in nature. For instance, in return to the axis of evil speech, the Guards warned the U.S. of destroying "oil fields in the Persian Gulf, which produce much of the oil used by the United States" if it kept threatening Iran.[86] The IRGC runs the ballistic missile program and has conducted tests since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that the global community sees as provocative actions. Two test missiles were marked in Hebrew reading 'Israel must be wiped off the Earth.' The Guard states that Iran's right to defense cannot be limited and the tests have proven Iran's "full readiness to confront all kinds of threats against the Revolution, establishment and territorial integrity".[87] In other words, Iran is trying to sustain military balance with the U.S.

Moreover, the IRGC has an internationalist mission that aims to export Iran's revolutionary ideals via the Shia populations of the Shia crescent region to stretch Iran's influence through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The Quds Brigade of the IRGC is particularly active in projecting Iranian influence and supporting al-Assad's regime in Syria. The commander of the Quds Force has affirmed Iran's support for the Palestinian resistance movements.[88] The Quds Force is also known as Iran's primary apparatus to sponsor Hezbollah in Lebanon. Via the Quds Force, the IRGC has been conducting Iran's struggle with the West and extending the influence of Iran to Mediterranean shores via the Shia communities among MENA states. Therefore, the IRGC appears as a significant bearer of Iran's foreign policy in the region.

[82] The Revolutionary Guards have an extensive control over the Iranian economy. They operate through holding companies, which are known as *bonyads*; and they dominate roughly 2/3 of Iran's GDP.

[83] Behbod Negahban, "Who Makes Iran's Foreign Policy: The Revolutionary Guard and Factional Politics in the Formulation of Iranian Foreign Policy," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 12 (2017): 33.

[84] Ehteshami, "The Foreign Policy of Iran," 295.

[85] Said Amir Arjomand, *After Khomeini: Iran under his successors* (Oxfod: Oxford University Press, 2009), 194-96.

[86] "Iran's Khatami backs anti-U.S. protest points to 'unfounded assertions' by U.S. leaders," CNN, February 9, 2002, accessed March 10, 2018, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/02/09/iran.warning/index.html.

[87] "Iran fires ballistic missiles a day after test; U.S. officials hint at violation," CNN, March 9, 2016, accessed March 11, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/09/middleeast/iran-missile-test/index.html.

[88] "IRGC commander Soleimani reaffirms full support for Palestinian resistance groups," PressTV, December 11, 2017, accessed March 13, 2018, http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/12/11/545286/Qassem-Soleimani-IRGC-Quds-Force-Ezzeddin-alQassam-Brigades-Islamic-Jihad.

Concisely, Iran's FP is a product of a unique administrative apparatus that blends religious authority with democratic legislature officially, and military forces unofficially. The system of checks and balances functions in favor of authoritarian hierarchy instead of democratic transparency. The democratically elected representatives run their own FP until clerics perceive external threats; then they take over control. The military forces are the most influential body in threat assessment and response.

5. Conclusion

Iran is living in an instable geography and has the sophisticated goal of becoming a regional power. It is trying to produce a FP to materialize its regional aspirations while trying to produce defense policies against treacherous regional conditions. Those policies occasionally contradict one other. The government is trying to adjust the doses of religious ideology in response to national interests. The FP agenda is full of important items; international negotiations, economic expectancies, regional conflicts and the relations with the Western world are all part of the agenda. Today the president Rouhani is limited by the Supreme Leader, besides an unfavorable balance of power and regional impediments. The U.S. administration is critical of the nuclear deal; the IRGC keeps testing ballistic missiles despite international warnings. Moreover, Iran's rivalry with Saudi Arabia is heating through proxies. Comprehending Iranian foreign behavior in this chaotic picture requires a multilevel framework provided by neoclassical realism. This article maintains that Iran is merely a mission-oriented state with tremendous domestic and international security concerns. The regime has constructed a political system with little elbow room for the democratically elected representatives. This sensitive threat perception mechanism is run by fierce 'victimism' and independence motivations. The reactions are shaped via theological paths and nationalistic rhetoric. The elected representatives decide on their own FP agenda and style until a perceived hegemonic threat occurs that demands a response from the clerics, owners of revolutionary Iran.

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After the Failed Military Coup: The Need for the Organizational Reform in the Turkish Military

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Abstract

The failed military coup of July 15, 2016, led by the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), indicates that military reform in Turkey at the operational level needs to be re-considered as an extremely urgent issue. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments have made very notable structural changes in the military and have tried to control the military politically and organizationally. The need for military reform in Turkey derives from two primary reasons: the tendency of coup action and the need to improve the military's effectiveness. This article highlights the importance of reforms actualized at the strategic level during the Justice and Development Party era. It also points out the need for organizational reform in the military; reform which should be done by the civilian government in order to cope with challenges.

Keywords: Military reform, civil-military relations, AK Party, failed coup, Turkish General Staff

1. Introduction

Turkey shifted towards democracy in 1950 when its Democratic Party won the elections. Since then, there has been a fierce struggle between democratically elected political leaders and military cadres due to the military leaders' recurrent involvement in the politics. The first *coup d'état* in 1960 displayed a pro-coup structure in military against government relations. Subsequent military coups reproduced the somewhat militarist tradition ranging from military presence in society to the active involvement of military actors in politics. Essentially, the militarist tradition in Turkey was not 'produced' after the fall of the Democratic Party. It has a much longer history. One may even argue that this tradition was partially a by-product of the modernization which began in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, through consecutive military coups, the security sector, in particular the military, has strengthened its position against politicians structurally and functionally. The National Security Council (NSC) functioned as a key institution[1] in making military behind-the-curtain actor-shaping security and foreign policies even during the period of elected civilian governments. This security structure changed the role of elected governments from decision-makers to decision-

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[1] Ersel Aydınlı, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Doğan Akyaz, "The Turkish Military's March Toward Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2007): 80.

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practitioners. However, this traditional civil-military pattern faced a grave challenge in the early 2000s. The European Union's (EU) demands for democratization in civil-military relations coincided with the election of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in 2002. The AK Party not only used the EU as an anchor to transform the domestic balance between elected bodies and the military, but also followed cooperation-based foreign policy.

The AK Party government's first attempts to make changes in the foreign and domestic politics of Turkey began with accelerating the process of joining the EU. Many regulations and legislative amendments were put into effect and these changes made a positive effect in reducing the military's privileged role in politics. One of the most radical reforms was to redesign the structure and composition of the NSC to make it more of a civilly-controlled body. Amendments in 2001 and 2003 reduced the number of four-star generals in the NSC and added more ministers. These changes ensured that the decisions made by the NSC are accepted as advice rather than prioritized to government. The new composition and structure of the NSC meant that the elected governments gained an upper hand in determining Turkey's security agenda. These new regulations, which attempted to promote civilian control and make the government's role more effective at the expense of military cadres, consolidated the new structure of the NSC.

Whereas important changes were made at the strategic level of civil-military relations, Turkey witnessed a failed and bloody coup attempt on July 15, 2016. The following questions were raised by numerous individuals after the coup attempt: How was this coup attempt made despite democratic reforms, and how did many generals, officers and noncommissioned officers of FETO infiltrate the military? This article argues that satisfactory and effective changes were not materialized at the operational level in the military. Strategic level changes and transformations in civil-military relations are not alone adequate to prevent coups. The Turkish military needs both strategic and operational level changes in order to strengthen itself. This article illustrates that in addition to implementing reforms at the strategic level, reforms at an operational level are also necessary to uproot the militarist tradition and strengthen the military's operational abilities.

The article is composed of four sections. The first section examines the traditional security culture in Turkey and reviews the literature on civil-military relations. It addresses the realist security culture/tradition and the emergence of the military's historically privileged role over civil authority. The article then deals with the notable military reforms at the strategic level during the AK Party era which were in line with the EU integration process. The article explains the normalization of the military's role, in particular the NSC, within the context of the democratization of civil-military relations. The next two sections highlight that strategic level changes in military reform alone is not enough; they also debate the weakness of the current operational/organizational level changes in the military by offering options for operational level changes in legal and organizational perspectives including a new formation for the Turkish General Staff (TGS).

2. Civil-Military Relations and Military Reform

There is sufficient literature which verifies the need to reformulate and institutionalize civil-military relations on the principles of civil control. In this context, the importance of maintaining a forceful military with civil control has been stressed by leading experts and scholars on civil-military relations. Building a strong army to combat security threats and

preventing the army's intervention into politics are at the center of the debate.[2] The difficulty of ensuring civilian authority over military while providing a strong army has been one of the most important topics of 'security sector reform' and 'coup-proofing'. The main focal point of security sector reform has been meeting the security and democracy deficit of the armies.[3] In other words, security sector reform is reformulating the role of army.[4] On the other hand, as James T. Quinlivan makes clear, "'coup-proofing' [is] the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup."[5] However, Pilster and Böhmelt argue that coup-proofing is not an instrumental tool in democracies.[6] Regime type plays an important role in military operation ability, and armies bound by democratic principles are more effective.[7] The traditional civil-military relations theory highlights the need for the separation of civilian and military institutions and civilian control over the army in order to prevent military intervention in politics. The concordance theory pays special attention to the need for interaction and cooperation among three groups of actors: the military, political elites and society. In other words, the fundamental way to prevent a possible coup is through harmonization of these three elements.[8] In Turkey's case, concordance was visible among military, political elites and society from 1980 to 2002.[9] But traditionally it has been difficult to create military reform in Turkey due to its security culture.[10]

Contrary to this traditional approach, Richard S. Wells defines civilian control over the army as a 'political process' rather than an establishment of new institutions.[11] Douglas L. Bland offers a different approach and argues that the theory of shared responsibility could be successful in solving the dilemma. Bland suggests a shared understanding of responsibility between civilian authority and military elites.[12] Beyond these arguments, the current literature

[2] Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 151-52.

[3] Heiner Hänggi, "Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction," in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector in Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, ed. Bryden, Alan and Heiner Hänggi (Verlag Münster: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces-DCAF Publications, 2004), 4.

[4] Timothy Edmunds, "What are Armed Forces for? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe," *International Affairs* 82, no. 6 (2006): 1065.

[5] James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 133.

[6] Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Böhmelt, "Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 4 (2012): 355-72.

[7] Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Böhmelt, "Coup-proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967-99," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 331-50; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998): 259-77.

[8] Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces & Society* 22, no. 1 (1995): 12; Rebecca L. Schiff, "Concordance Theory: A Response to Recent Criticism," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 277-83.

[9] Nilüfer Narlı, "Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (2011): 215-25.

[10] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Hull: The Eothen Press, 1985); Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey's Security Culture and Policy towards Iraq," *Perceptions* 12 (2007): 87; Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (2000): 199-200; Ramazan Erdağ, "Türkiye'nin stratejik kültürü ve dış politikada yansıması [Turkey's strategic culture and reflection of foreign policy]," *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi* 8, no. 1 (2013): 47-70; Murat Yeşiltaş, "The Transformation of the Geopolitical Vision in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 4 (2013): 661; Narlı, "Concordance and Discordance," 216; Tuncay Kardaş, "Security Governmentality in Turkey" (PhD diss., University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2005); Christian Rumpf, "The Military, the Presidency, and the Constitution: A Comparative Approach to the Weimar Republic, France 1958, and Turkey 1982," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988); Ali Balcı, *Dış politikada hesaplaşmak: AK parti, ordu ve Kemalizm* [Confronting through foreign policy: AK party, military and Kemalism] (İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2015); George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988).

[11] Richard S. Wells, "The Theory of Concordance in Civil/Military Relations: A Commentary," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 272.

[12] Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no .1 (1999): 7-25.

on civil-military relations, military reform and Turkish civil-military relations studies focus only on political decision making. This article claims that operational/organizational level reform, which strengthens the army and makes coups less likely, is also needed. In this sense, it proposes changes at the operational level for the TGS.

A conventional security/defense policy plan is composed of three levels: strategic (or political), operational (or organizational) and tactical. The strategic level, as determined by politicians, focuses on the political aims and goals of any military or defense operation. The operational level covers the planning of a specific type of operation. The tactical level is concerned with the issues and modes of operation while conducting units. The operational level "is the vital link between tactics and strategy."[13] The Turkish-led Operation Euphrates Shield provides a perfect example of the interaction of the three levels: At the strategic level the decision is made to have military intervention in Syria, and the government is the decision maker. The government, of course, consults with top officials of the military and intelligence agencies, but ultimately makes the final decision alone. At the operational level these political aims (preventing terrorist attacks from northern Syria and clearing the Cerablus and al-Bab from the terrorist organization DAESH (*ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil-'Iraq wa ash-Sham*) turn into an operation, (Operation Euphrates Shield), and the concept of military planning-operation and personnel structure is formed by military planners (TGS) in order to achieve the adopted strategic/political goals. At the tactical level all subordinate (conducting) units like the Turkish Joint Special Task Force (TJSTF) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) try to accomplish their mission in the field under operational command.

3. Change at the Strategic Level: Reshaping the NSC and Understanding National Security

At the first stage, the strategic level, the harmonization and the democratic relations of the civil-military relationship is evaluated. The military, an essential organization in any country, is normally supposed to fulfill its functions under the control of a democratically-elected government. In Turkey's case, however, civil-military relations have varied over time, and the military and its highly ranked officers have been superior to governments in many periods since Turkey's establishment. Zeki Sarigil argues that from the establishment of the republic to the 1960 *coup d'état* (known as 'civilocracy'), the military operated under civil governments. The military coup of 1960 changed this natural relationship structure radically; it changed the roles of government and military, and the era of 'militocracy' began. The privileged role of the military continued until the 2000s.[14] The EU membership process, which started at the end of the 1990s, promoted reforms in Turkey's civil-military relations. During the Europeanization period, the civil-military balance began to turn in favor of civil governments, and civilian actors/government became more effective than the military in building defense/security policy.[15] After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, in which Turkey gained candidacy status to the EU, Turkey was encouraged to adopt democratic norms, in particular those concerning civil-military relations. In this sense, Turkey, in order to fulfill

[13] David T. Zabecki, *The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2006), 11.

[14] Zeki Sarigil, "The Turkish Military: Principal or Agent?," *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 1 (2014): 170-76; Tanel Demirel, "2000'li yıllarda asker ve siyaset: Kontrollü değişim ile statüko arasında Türk Ordusu [Military and politics in 2000's: Turkish Army between controlled change and status quo]," *SETA Analiz* 18 (2010): 8.

[15] Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, "The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 5 (2009): 803.

the Copenhagen political criteria, started to take steps to normalize its civil-military relations at the strategic level.[16] Normally, at the strategic level, the decision-making mechanism (the civil-authority government) consults with the military and attempts to benefit from this experience, but the government ultimately makes the final decisions.[17] On the contrary, in Turkey the NSC became the decision-maker in national security policies, especially after the 1960 military coup. In other words, the governments governed but not ruled, and the military ruled but not governed.[18] But in Turkey, in some cases, the military also governed: it provided sanitary water, education, transportation and health services in hard-to-reach rural areas.

An important security policy builder, the NSC was composed of a President, a Prime Minister, a Chief of General Staff, a Minister of State and Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of National Defense, Interior Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Transport and Labor and Force Commanders according to 1961 Constitution, Article No. 111, and with the Law No. 129. The 1982 Constitution, Article No.118, and Law No. 2945 changed the initial structure of the NSC after the 1980 military coup. With the 1982 regulations, the number of government members was reduced and a General Commander of the Gendarmerie was added to the NSC; thus the newly-emerged NSC included a President, a Prime Minister, a Chief of the General Staff, Ministers of National Defense, Interior Affairs, Foreign Affairs, a Commanders of Land, Sea and Air Forces and a General Commander of the Gendarmerie. This formulation strengthened the NSC's military position in the 'establishment' as compared to the 1961 Constitution. Moreover, with this change, it was accepted that the decisions of the National Security Council should primarily be made by the Prime Minister to the agenda of the cabinet. This meant that the policy-maker at the strategic (or political) level of security policy was the NSC instead of the government. The first attempts to reshape the NSC were achieved in 2001. With the amendments made in the 1982 Constitution, Article No.118, on October 17, 2001, decisions made by the NSC were now accepted as advice to government. These amendments also increased the number of civilian members in the NSC by adding Deputy Prime Ministers and a Minister of Justice.

At the beginning of the 2000s, the civil-military reform process at the strategic level accelerated during the AK Party rule. The crucial steps the AK Party made towards normalizing civil-military relations, reshaping the NSC and gaining political authority over the military have continued since the party came to power in 2002. In 2003, 2004, 2006, 2010 and 2011, following the EU Reform Packages, many changes were made in the structure of the NSC and in legal regulations. On January 18 and August 7, 2003, with the amendments made in the Law No. 2945 to harmonize with the constitutional amendment of 2001, the NSC was transformed into a national security 'advisory' body to the government. The task description of the NSC was revised and restricted. The principle of holding the meeting once every two months instead of monthly was accepted. It also opened the door to appointing a civilian secretary general to the NSC. Civilians can now been appointed to

[16] Şule Toktaş and Ümit Kurt, "The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF)," *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 3 (2010): 388-89; Aydınlı, Özcan, and Akyaz, "The Turkish Military's," 77-90; Metin Heper, "The European Union, and the Military and Democracy in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics* 10, no. 1 (2009): 33-44; Nil S. Şatana, "Civil-Military Relations in Europe, the Middle East and Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 2 (2011): 279-92; Arzu Güler and Cemal Alpgiray Bölücek, "Motives for Reforms on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 17, no. 2 (2016): 251-71.

[17] Tanel Demirel, "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Reflections on Two Notable Patterns of Civilian Behavior," *Turkish Studies* 4, no. 3 (2003): 2.

[18] Steven A. Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2007).

the position of secretary general of the NSC from 2004 onward. The NSC's authorization to access public institutions was limited. In 2004, amendments were made to the Constitution in the framework of harmonization efforts with the EU. With these amendments, State Security Courts were removed and the implementation of the representation of the TGS in the Council of Higher Education (*YÖK*) and the nomination of the NSC to the Radio and Television Supreme Council (*RTÜK*) membership were terminated. The Secretary General of the NSC was removed from Communications High Board and, most importantly, military expenditures were opened to the Court of Accounts.

The Protocol on the Cooperation for Security and Public Order (*EMASYA*), which gave authority to the military to intervene in social events without the authorization and request of governor, dated back to 1997, but was repealed in 2010. This same year, with the acceptance of the constitutional amendment by the people on September 12, further steps towards normalization of civil and military relations were achieved. With this amendment, the Supreme Military Council's (*YAŞ*) decisions were opened for judicial review. Previously, military courts were tasked to try military crimes committed by military personnel and the actions taken against them for crimes against military personnel or military service and duties. It allowed civilian courts to try military personnel for crimes which defied Turkish (criminal) civilian law, including crimes against constitutional order and state security.

In 2012, the 'National Security Course', compulsory in all high schools since 1926, was removed from high school curriculums.[19] Finally, a development that can be considered to be the most important stage in normalizing civil-military relations occurred in 2013. The government changed the most criticized law article, Law No. 211, Article 35, which defines military duties and is shown as the legal basis of military coups. Before this change, Article 35 recognized the military to be the guardian of the Republic against internal and external threats.[20] The amended article redefined the military's duty as "to protect the Turkish homeland against threats and dangers to come from abroad, to ensure the preservation and strengthening of military power in a manner that will provide deterrence, to fulfill the duties abroad with the decision of the Parliament and help maintain international peace."[21] This amendment eliminated the military's role as guardian and directed it, in particular, to be concerned with external threats to the state.

Another important aspect related to the NSC is its decisive role in forming the country's defense and security policy, the 'National Security Policy Document', also known by the popular name 'Red Book' (*Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi-Kırmızı Kitap*). Turkey's national security strategy document is formed and prepared by the Secretariat of the NSC and, once approved by the NSC, becomes a national security policy for government. After approval by the NSC, no one, including parliament or other public institutions, can make any change within the document.[22] The document can only be revised in years ending with zero or five. Revisions made to the document (most recently in 2015) by the AK Party governments reflect the steps that were taken at the strategic level.

[19] Tim Jacoby and Alpaslan Özerdem, *Peace in Turkey 2023: The Question of Human Security and Conflict Transformation* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013), 126.

[20] Bilgiç, "The Military," 807.

[21] "Turkish Parliament OKs change on coup pretext article," *Hürriyet Daily News*, June 14, 2013.

[22] Ümit Cizre, "Demythologyzing the National Security Concept: The case of Turkey," *The Middle East Journal* 57, no. 2 (2003): 221.

It can be argued that from 1960 to 2002 the military played an important role not only in defense/security planning but also in designing domestic politics through direct and indirect intervention in political life and by redesigning political parties and leaders in Turkey. At the beginning of the 2000s, in particular under AK Party rule, Turkey made very important progress in normalizing civil-military relations. At the strategic level, the military returned the security/defense political power (which did not actually belong to it) to the government. In other words, during the AK Party era, governments began to set the security agenda while the military began to act similarly to those in other democratic countries; that is, the government both ruled and governed.

4. The Failed Coup and Re-organization of the Military Architecture

On one hand, the AK Party governments made radical and brave changes to strategic-level reform in civil-military relations, incomparable even to former periods; on the other hand, Turkey witnessed a failed but bloody military coup attempt led by FETO on July 15, 2016. Studies on civil-military relations and the power of the military in Turkish politics have predominantly focused on the NSC's role and the attempts made to reformulate it. After the adaptation of EU norms and the changes at the strategic level of the national security policy architecture, in particular the reformulation of the NSC, it was argued that the military coup era had come to an end. Nevertheless, the failed military coup shows that this argument was not accurate.

Nonetheless, the failed military coup was different from past experiences in many ways. First, it was carried out by a terrorist organization made up of civilian and military members. Second, it was directed by parties outside of the military; in particular by FETO's civilian members. And third, it was repelled by the public. After the failed military coup, the government took rapid steps toward reforming the military. Many generals, officers and noncommissioned officers who were involved in the coup were purged from the army. Military high schools, colleges and academies were closed and all military colleges and academies were re-opened under the new establishment of the National Defense University. Military hospitals, their personnel and equipment were transferred to the Ministry of Health. The composition and member structure of the YAŞ was modified and a number of military members were replaced by government members. In the first YAŞ meeting after the failed coup, for the first time in history, many non-staff colonels became generals. It was now possible for the President and the Prime Minister to receive information and give orders to the military under the force commanders. All force commanders, as well as the administration of shipyards, factories, and industrial establishments that had been under control of the military, were assigned to the Ministry of National Defense (MOD). Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Command were directly assigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[23] Even though some changes were made at the operational level in the military after the failed coup, a comprehensive approach is still needed and special attention should be paid to the military's transformation at this level.

4.1. At the operational level: Reform of the General Staff

Current debates on military reform at the operational (or organizational) level in Turkey roughly revolve around two basic patterns: The integration of the TGS to the MOD, and the

[23] Deniz Zeyrek, "TSK sil baştan [TAF de novo] ," *Hürriyet*, July, 31, 2016, accessed May 20, 2017, .com.tr/tsk-sil-bastan-40177172.

replacement of compulsory military service with professional service.[24] Apart from these two arguments, reform and reformulation of the TGS have not been thoroughly discussed and it is 'typically' seen as a sphere devoted to military. Military reform at the operational level requires change that goes beyond these arguments and should be dealt with by government. The AK Party government, during their 15-year rule, gradually carried out critical changes at the strategic level on national security issues, and rearranged civil-military relations which then enabled government to conduct final decisions. However, it's hard to say that these adaptations were seen at the organizational level until the failed coup. There are two important challenges at this stage in reforming the TGS: 'exceptionalism' and 'dysfunction'.

At the operational level, one of the most important initiatives was "The Defense Reform Report", prepared by an expert group (Head of the Working Group was undertaken by Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu) and initiated by Turkey's Presidency in 2013. The report begins with a comprehensive analysis of global and regional transformation since the end of the Cold War. After briefing the civil-military transformation after the end of the Cold War, the report also deals with TAF's duties and necessary capabilities. The report makes a comparative analysis of Turkey's defense management, defense system supply and logistics, defense expenses and supervision of the defense budget among allies and developed countries. The report suggests enhancing professional military service, upgrading the training levels of officers and non-commissioned officers, keeping defense spending at least in the world average and increasing the number of experts in the Court of Accounts, especially in defense expenditures.[25] Although the report offers practical suggestions (such as the gradual removal of compulsory military service), the acts of transferring the exterior security of the prisons to the Ministry of Justice and the land borders' security to the Ministry of Interior have not been deeply discussed.

The report draws attention to the need for an air defense system, a combined rapid reaction force similar in structure to NATO's Rapid Reaction Force (NRF), due to the risks and security threats that Turkey faces. In terms of TGS and MOD relations, the report presents two approaches: The first argues that defense management should be conducted by the TGS, and missions aside from military duties should be carried out by MOD. The second approach suggests that the current relationship between the TGS and the MOD should not be changed in the short term within Western examples and for EU process reasons.[26] In other words, the report considers the TGS as a player at the strategic level. This article goes beyond this argument and proposes that the TGS should be a player at the operational level, and the strategic level should be left to politics.

Many security reform studies and constitutional-legal amendments have ignored the restructuring of the TGS. For instance, the death penalty has been abolished in criminal law but in Military Criminal Law, No. 1632 article 20, the death penalty still exists. In another case, the Ombudsman Institution was established in 2012 but only 'the military activities' of the TAF are excluded from the scope of that institution. Actually, the Ombudsman Instuition

[24] Levent Ünsaldı, *Türkiye'de asker ve siyaset* [Military and politics in Turkey], trans. Orçun Türkay (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2008), 144-77; İsmet Akça, *Türkiye'de askeri-iktisadi yapı: Durum, sorunlar, çözümler* [Military-economic structure in Turkey: Situation, problems, solutions] (İstanbul: TESEV Publications, 2010).

[25] Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, "Savunma reformu raporu" [Defense reform report], 2014, accessed November 20, 2017, https://www.memurlar.net/common/news/documents/602402/2014-08-22-savunmareformu.pdf.

[26] "Outgoing President Gül urges gov't to allow Parliament scrutiny over defense expenditure," *Hürriyet Daily News*, August 22, 2014, accessed July 14, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/outgoing-president-gul-urges-govt-to-allow-parliament-scrutiny-over-defense-expenditure-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=70787.

is also essential for military's activities. Similarly the TGS is dismissed in the scope of the Ethics Board of Public Officers.

The need for reform of the TGS at the operational level emerges from two aspects: First, even in 2016 it appeared to be a (albeit limited) coup-generating mechanism in the military, although large segments of the military did not participate in the coup attempt. Second, the military's operational ability needs to be strengthened against external threats. Of course "[t]o change institutions and the way of thinking proves to be a daunting task."[27] Reform at an organizational level should begin with the institutional name. The traditional name of the military in Turkey is TAF, yet at no point is 'TAF' among the official institutions that are named in the general budget. Although its official website uses the acronym TAF (www.tsk.tr/HomeEng), the official name is 'General Staff'. Furthermore, many laws and legal regulations involving the military begin with TAF.[28] In order to harmonize the common usage of the intuitional name, the article offers to rename the military the 'Turkish Armed Forces Command' (TAFC). This change could remove the complexity of the name and strengthen the Chief of General Staff's operational command by making it the 'TAF Commander' to all subordinate units of the military (Land, Navy, Sea and Special Forces) rather than chief. The current position of the Chief of General Staff resembles a strategic coordination authority between civilian authority (government) and military, rather than an operational commander.

A second policy change relates to organizational structure. Currently the TGS is likely composed of four Chiefs of General Staff, and they each have independent headquarters and directories (Land, Navy, Sea and Special Forces). In order to reinforce the command and operational capacity of the military, the TGS needs to unify all headquarters (Land, Sea, Air and Special Forces) as 'a joint force' under the TAFC. The TAF Commander (replacing the Chief of General Staff) would create plans for, command and directly control the four forces. This name suggests that within a unique and joint headquarter structure, the TAF Commander's could be assured full command and control over all activities of the Land, Navy, Sea and Special Forces directories. With this change, the four Deputy Commanders of TAFC should be responsible for Land, Navy, Sea and Special Forces, instead being the force commanders. This could prevent the risk of coup by subordinate units of the military independent from the General Staff. A successful example on a micro-level of this security architecture has been applied in the Operation Euphrates Shield as the Turkish Joint Special Task Force.

Third, according to Article 7 of the Law No. 1324 on the Duties and Authorizations of the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of General Staff is "responsible to the Prime Minister for his duties and authorities". As understood from the text of law, this responsibility is defined as belonging personally to the Chief of General Staff. Although the Chief of General Staff is described as the "Commander of the Armed Forces in Peace and War" in Article 1 of the same law, and this responsibility should be institutionally understood, no organic link has been established between the Chief of Staff and the state organization. In order to fill this gap, institutional reform debates have focused on attaching the TGS to the MOD.

As Tanel Demirel rightfully argues, without transforming the MOD into a defense and national security institution, putting the TGS under the control of the MOD may not

[27] Peter M. E. Volten, "Transatlantic Security, Defence and Strategy: Badly Needed Reforms," *All Azimuth* 4, no. 1 (2015): 54.

[28] For example, Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law No. 211, Turkish Armed Forces Disciplinary Law No. 6413, Turkish Armed Forces Supply Law No. 5668, Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Mobilization Regulation etc.

be functional.[29] The MOD, with its current structure, is a long way from being a national security institution. If the TGS was to be attached to the MOD, the Turkish MOD could be strengthened both in terms of its physical conditions and its civilian personnel (exemplified in the US MOD, the Pentagon). The functional role of the ministry is to supply the current needs of the military and conduct military procurement. By accepting the constitutional change of April 16, 2017, it might be presumed that the TGS will be put directly under control of Turkey's Presidency as a National Intelligence Service. In terms of a second operational reform debate, abolishing compulsory military service and replacing professional soldiers reflects down-top professionalism. To be sure, professional soldiers may conduct more active and effective combat. As Samuel Huntington stressed, "[t]he military profession is expert",[30] so military personnel training should focus on military duties and operational troops should be composed of well-trained and well-equipped personnel.

During the Cold War, militaries were composed of units that were conventional and large in number. But force structures of militaries have changed since the end of the Cold War. In the case of land forces, many countries have minimized land force units and changed the force structure from division-regiment to brigade-battalion. Turkey has followed this path and minimized divisions to brigades, and regiments to battalions, in order to enhance maneuver capability. But the number of the ranks of major generals (two stars) and colonels has remained the same as in the division-regiment establishment. In order to balance the rank architecture and to rejuvenate the age of being a general, one might consider removing the ranks 'colonel' and 'major general', or reducing the waiting period for promotion in these ranks. Another aspect of the personnel structure of the military is that there are no normative regulations or norms for promotions. Although the structure and composition of the High Military Council (*YAŞ*) was changed after the failed military coup on July 15, 2016, the lack of criteria for promotion, in particular for moving from colonel to general,[31] provided fertile ground for FETO members to infiltrate the military's top ranks. All the colonels evaluated in YAŞ are potential candidates for becoming a general, and the one who is able to get the most votes from its members is promoted. In this instance, customs were taken into account for the promotions, and FETO members' officers who seemed to be the most faithful to the system were promoted.

With the constitutional amendments in 2010, the way to judge YAŞ decisions was opened but the promotion process and retirement due were excluded[32] and remained closed. In the text which was first presented to the Parliamentary Constitutional Commission, the way to judge all YAŞ decisions would be opened, but the promotion process and retirement due to cadres was excluded in the Commission. With the constitutional change that was accepted in April 16, 2017, the way to judge YAŞ decisions on the promotion process and retirement due to cadres can be opened.[33]

Another point that needs special attention is the force deployment of the military. When

[29] Demirel, "2000'li yıllarda [in 2000's]," 25.

[30] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations* (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 70.

[31] The terms of general has two meaning in military terminology. One of the meaning refers to general status (cover all general one, two, three and four stars) the other refers to highest general rank four stars general only.

[32] Oya Armutçu and Bülent Sarıoğlu, "YAŞ'ın terfi ve emeklilik işlemleri yargı denetimi dışı [YAŞ's promotion and retirement procedures are not subject to judicial review]," *Hürriyet*, March, 20, 2011, accessed May 10, 2017, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yas-in-terfi-ve-emeklilik-islemleri-yargi-denetimi-disi-17321142.

[33] Cem Duran Uzun, "Cumhurbaşkanlığı sisteminde yargı [The judiciary in the Presidential system]," *SETA Analiz* 192 (2017): 19.

military coups in Turkey are examined from past to present, the country-wide deployment of military has been designed to suppress the people during military coups instead of countering regional threats. After the failed coup, the government moved armored troops from centers like Mamak and Etimesgut in Ankara to other cities in Turkey. Military elites were able decide the location of military bases and had the control to change them. In this sense, the locations of military bases should be re-evaluated due to regional and global security risks and threats.

Many reform proposals of civil-military relations focus on controlling the military through civilian actors, namely governments. In order to prevent coups and ensure coup-proofing, these proposals, suggestions and reforms address the military's intervention in politics. Studies on civil-military relations attracted the attention of international-relations scholars within the recent coups of many countries. Theory of civil-military relations has stressed the need for the separation of the military from the political arena. Strategic-level reform studies of civil-military relations have emphasized the strength of the army on one hand, and preventing the military's engagement in politics on the other. Turkey has made important reforms at the strategic level, especially in the EU accession process. Recent reforms in Turkey and other countries at the strategic level have served them well in terms of providing civil control over militaries. For example, the NSC, the institution over which the military elite is most influential in Turkish politics, was restructured during the course of reform studies by making sure that political actors are more numerous and more effective in the decision-making process. But the coup attempt led by FETO on July 15, 2016 has shown the need for reforms at the operational level. In short, this article suggests the need for military reform at the operational level in Turkey.

5. Conclusion

Turkey has been undergoing significant changes and transformations under the AK Party rule since 2002. Two of the reform agendas of the AK Party are improving civil-military relations and re-organizing the military. As a motivating and constitutive factor, Turkey's membership in the EU has made these reforms necessary; the AK Party government has accelerated the reform process of civil-military relations that began before its rule. Notable changes at the strategic level were achieved with the EU reform packages and the government has normalized institutional relations with the military. The democratic consolidation of the government over the military has strengthened the government's role in setting national security policies and security agenda. However, reform at the operational (organizational) level in the military was not considered to be a priority and has been left in the responsibility of the military.

This article points out the military reforms that have occurred at the strategic level, and goes on to propose organizational changes at the operational level. It also proposes a new composition of the TGS as TAFC with a new joint-force structure. The main goal of this proposal is to empower the military and prevent it from intervening in politics by leaving decisions at the strategic level to politicians.

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Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-go-round

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Abstract

At some point during 2013, Turkey's political authority began to treat the in-country development and production of long-range air and missile defense systems as a priority. Soon after, they announced their decision to favor a Chinese offer that came complete with licensed production and the promise of technology transfer. Yet, with this decision came NATO's objections and challenges around integration and information security. The 2015 decision to rollback the pro-China decision, and opt instead for the indigenous development of air and missile defense systems (in close conjunction with a foreign technological and industrial partner) was triggered by Turkey's disillusion with the content of China's technology transfer package. Subsequently, this new partner became a team comprising France and Italy; Turkish industry tied itself to this team in developing Europe's next-generation missile defense capability. Then came the Turkish government's 2017 decision to purchase off-the-shelf, standalone S-400 systems from Russia. This decision was an anomaly, and had all the characteristics of a top-down decision cycle running afoul of technical, operational, and industrial criteria. Turkey's political figures have justified the S-400 order by citing the benefits of in-country production, access to technologies, not to mention the West's refusal to sell comparable systems; but these justifications have been refuted by the Russian side and/or in discordant statements by Turkish institutions, authorities, and political figures themselves.

Keywords: Air defense, missile defense, Turkish defense policy, Turkish defense industry, NATO

1. Prologue

Turkey's 2013 preference to have a Chinese supplier to meet its pressing air and missile defense needs, followed by Ankara's more recent order for Russia's S-400 systems, brought about a rush of analyses and commentaries – both scholarly and otherwise. The majority dwells upon the political and strategic ramifications with respect to Turkey's defense and security ties with Russia, NATO, the U.S., and the West at large. A few sought to identify and elaborate on the technical, technological, and operational aspects, as well as the consequences of Ankara's consecutive decisions to acquire air and missile defense systems from non-Western suppliers. Systematic and scholarly attempts to scrutinize Turkey's actions within the context of a historical continuum (by paying tribute to organizational, industrial, and long-term policy objectives) are even less common. Through this article, we seek to fill this gap by analyzing, in consummate detail, Turkey's efforts and initiatives to meet

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its air and missile defense requirements over the last three decades. We attempt to reveal the dynamics and outcomes of the complex interplay between technical, technological, operational, organizational, and defense industrial factors and considerations underlying Turkey's air and missile defense endeavor. This enables us to judge whether the disparate, seemingly contradictory, and at times perplexing decisions made in Ankara fit into a larger and predictable pattern, or whether they stand out as anomalies and improbable exceptions.

2. Turkey's Threat Picture and Responses

Turkey's geographic environment abounds in airborne threats. These threats involve the classical elements of air power in the form of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, as well as the more problematic ballistic and cruise missiles. At present, four regional states (Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Greece) possess air forces on a par with, or superior to, Turkey's.[1] Eight states in the region (Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Greece) have short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of reaching Turkish territory.[2] Likewise, six states in Turkey's immediate vicinity (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Syria, Israel, and Greece) field advanced cruise missiles.[3] This is a an environment under a serious air and missile threat; the complexity of this threat is likely to increase due to recent setbacks in efforts to contain the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons in the region. Aircraft, especially ballistic missiles, are ideal delivery platforms for such weapons of mass destruction.[4]

To counter and eliminate the threat of air and missile threats, over the years Turkey has relied on its large inventory of fighter aircraft. Ground-based elements of air defense supplement this inventory. A comprehensive network of detection and tracking sensors (used to assign and direct fighter aircraft and surface-to-air weapons to their airborne targets) is a less visible, yet equally important aspect of its defense system. These sensors comprise air search radars, mostly supplied and sustained through NATO programs and funds. Not to be overlooked is the critically important command-control-communication (C^3) infrastructure, which connects friendly aircraft, ground-based defenses, and sensors with each other to constitute a fully integrated, multi-layered, and closely coordinated air defense effort. Turkey's dedicated air defense C^3 infrastructure is structured in close conjunction with NATO's – through what's called ACCS (Air Command Control System).[5]

The additional challenges and complications caused when an adversary employs cruise and ballistic missiles warrant a special entry here: Cruise missiles fly very long distances at very low altitudes, enabling them to take advantage of the earth's topographic features to avoid detection and engagement by air defense sensors and weapons. Unless defenders use specialized tactics and hardware, cruise missiles leave them little warning time to take defensive measures. When these missiles get close to their targets, they can be intercepted by *close-in* defense weapons, but the size of the area and the number of targets that can be protected with such last-resort defenses is limited.

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[1] Appraisal of classical elements air power based on quantities of 4th generation combat aircraft in the inventories of Turkey and other regional states, drawn from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2014* (London: Routledge, 2014).

[2] Sıtkı Egeli, "Turkey Embarks Upon Ballistic Missiles: Why and How?," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 56 (2017): 6–7.

[3] Data on regional cruise missile inventories compiled from author's own archive.

[4] Henry Sokolski, "In the Middle East, Soon Everybody Will Want the Bomb," *Foreign Policy*, May 21, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/21/in–the–middle–east–soon–everyone–will–want–the–bomb/.

[5] Giles Ebbutt, "NATO ACCS Passes Major Milestone," *Jane's International Defence Review*, May 2013, 16.

In contrast with low-flying cruise missiles, ballistic missiles can quickly climb to the upper layers of the atmosphere and into space, creating an extra challenge for defenders. This is a completely different aerodynamic sector, where they cannot be tracked or intercepted by traditional air defense sensors and weapons. Fighter aircraft and air-search radars become irrelevant when pitted against ballistic missiles. The current generation of long-range/high-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems fares slightly better, and with some enhancements, they could be partially effective against incoming ballistic missiles in the last phase of their flight. During this *terminal* phase, ballistic missiles have re-entered the earth's atmosphere and they are in a steep, high velocity dive toward their targets. However, only a small area can be protected with terminal-phase defenses (i.e., the size of a city). More significantly, ballistic missiles travelling farther than 1,000 kilometers cannot engage in this terminal phase due to the excessive approach speeds. The only practical and reliable way to stop longer-range ballistic missiles is to intercept them when they are still in space, or when they are re-entering the atmosphere. *Exo-atmospheric* or *upper-tier* interceptors are necessary at this point – modern day equivalents of the Reagan-era *Star Wars* gadgets. Dedicated early-warning satellites (powerful missile tracking radars positioned close to an adversary's missile launch areas), and a dedicated, fully automated C^3 architecture (to run and coordinate the entire effort) need to supplement these terminal and upper-tier interceptors, creating an even larger challenge. Unfortunately, these specialized and cutting-edge technologies are so advanced and expensive that only a handful of countries possess exo-atmospheric missile defense capabilities. The U.S. leads the race by far, having spent over $1 trillion on missile defense since the 1950s. Israel is second thanks to financial and technological backing from the U.S.[6] Russia, China, and India have active programs to field comparable upper-tier interceptors, whereas France and Italy have opted to combine their strengths and create a collaborative scheme. This is where the list stops. Other states either buy missile defense systems from the U.S., or rely on Washington's protective umbrella, extended through bilateral or multilateral arrangements. The most prominent and concrete among the arrangements is NATO's EPAA (European Phased Adaptive Approach) – a U.S.-led scheme that Turkey and other European members of the Alliance have relied on for missile defense since 2011.[7]

3. Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Efforts

If we shift our focus to Turkey's air defense posture, in which fighter aircraft traditionally have been the dominant element, the Turkish military has not been without ground-based elements of air defense.[8] From the mid-1950s onwards, Turkey received a relatively large number of *Nike Ajax* and *Nike Hercules* SAM batteries from the U.S.[9] These were long-range air defense missiles, aimed at engaging large targets flying at medium and high altitudes. Since no replacements were forthcoming, they were kept in service well into the 2000s, though their worth in modern air combat was already nominal. Throughout those years, the only other air defense weapons to supplement the Nike Hercules batteries were the large

[6] Stew Magnuson, "Hypersonic Weapons Race Gathers Speed," *National Defense Magazine*, last modified October 10, 2015, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2015/August/Pages/HypersonicWeaponsRaceGathersSpeed.aspx.

[7] Sıtkı Egeli, *Füze tehdidi ve NATO füze kalkanı* (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2014): 32–7.

[8] Can Kasapoğlu, "Turkey's S–400 Dilemma" (EDAM Foreign Policy an Security Paper Series 2017/5, July 2017): 1.

[9] For comprehensive overview of Turkey's air defense systems, see Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz and Arda Mevlütoğlu, "Turkey's Air Defense Umbrella and S–400" (ORSAM Report 213, September 2017), http://orsam.org.tr/files/Raporlar/213/213_eng.pdf, 14–15.

inventory of anti-aircraft artillery and low-altitude, very short-range SAMs operated by army and air force units.

The Gulf War of 1991 was a wake-up call for Turkey. Fortunately, the Iraqi *Scud* missiles (or the chemical warheads that those missiles might carry) did not target Turkish territory. Still, the war exposed the serious shortcomings of Turkey's modern air defense capabilities, as well as its complete lack of preparedness in the face of ballistic missile threat. Responding to Turkey's stress calls, NATO allies deployed a handful of *Patriot* SAM batteries to provide rudimentary capability. But controversy and divergences between NATO allies prior to this deployment raised serious doubts in the minds of Turkish military planners and the public alike.[10]

Shortly after the Gulf War was over and NATO Patriots were withdrawn, Turkey initiated a scheme to acquire modern air defense systems to replace its outdated Nike Hercules batteries. Yet the fervor died out quickly, and when there was an opportunity to select U.S.-made hardware (financed through the *Gulf Defense Fund*) instead of Patriots missiles, the Turkish air force opted for 80 additional F-16 fighter aircraft.[11] Although the Turkish military still kept its requirement for modern air and missile defense systems, funding these systems was not a high priority. Instead, in mid-2000s, the Turkish air force ordered second-hand *I-Hawk* SAM batteries from U.S. Army stocks. They were medium-range (40-50 kilometer) air defense systems devoid of any tangible missile defense capacity. The second-hand I-Hawks were already 30 years old, and only a 'stop-gap' solution until they could acquire modern air defense systems. All the while, the year 2003 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq witnessed yet another contentious round of NATO Patriot deployment to Turkey.[12]

4. T-LORAMIDS and the Chinese Ordeal

In 2003, only months after the AK Party government came to power, Turkey introduced a new policy in defense procurement and defense industry activities. Licensed- and joint-production were replaced by the *indigenous development model*, in which in-country production was extended to include local design and development of most categories of defense equipment.[13] Air defense systems were among the hardware that would be developed locally. In 2006, Turkey's defense industry and procurement authority SSM (Undersecretariat for Defense Industries) ran a feasibility study; the study concluded that shorter range air defense systems could be developed by Turkey's rapidly expanding defense industry, whereas technologically-demanding long-range air defense systems should be purchased abroad.[14] Based on the study's findings, the SSM's Executive Committee, headed by Prime Minister Erdoğan, decided on three parallel air defense projects: two nationally developed low- and medium-altitude SAM systems, and one foreign-made long-range SAM solution (to be procured through industrial cooperation). Contracts for the first two projects were signed in 2009 and 2011, and they were subsequently named *Hisar-A* and *Hisar-O*. Progress on the third project, which came to be known as T-LORAMIDS (Turkey's Long-Range Air and Missile Defense System), was not nearly as smooth or conclusive.

[10] Serhat Güvenç and Sıtkı Egeli, "NATO'nun füze savunma sistemi ve Türkiye," *Ortadoğu Analiz* 40 (2014): 22.
[11] Güvenç and Egeli, "NATO'nun füze savunma sistemi ve Türkiye," 22.
[12] Güvenç and Egeli, "NATO'nun füze savunma sistemi ve Türkiye," 22.
[13] "Savunmada ortak üretim dönemi bitiyor," *Hürriyet*, July 7, 2015.
[14] "Bayar: füzede öncelik Çin'de," NTV, last modified December 6, 2013, https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/bayar–fuzede–oncelik–cinde,TWJHZ1VNDEOACLqV3OBNKg.

In 2009, T-LORAMIDS began with the launch of a formal tender for 12 SAM systems comprising search/engagement radars, 72 launchers, and 288 missiles – all to be manufactured and sustained with extensive involvement of Turkish industry.[15] T-LORAMIDS, with a $4-billion budget cap, demanded an air defense system that would be effective against aircraft up to 120 kilometers away. Its capability to intercept ballistic missiles was a secondary requirement. In the words of SSM Undersecretary, the category of air defense systems that T-LORAMIDS sought were "… more successful against aircraft, but it was almost impossible for current technology to provide complete protection against ballistic missiles".[16]

After several extensions, in 2011 Turkey received proposals from four contenders: the U.S. offered Patriot, Russia came up with *Antey-2500 (S-300V)*, China proposed *FD-2000*, and the Eurosam joint-venture between France and Italy tabled *SAMP-T*. The ensuing evaluation process was painstaking. Besides the cost and performance of the offered systems, delivery schedules and the extent of Turkish industry's involvement were compared, and laboriously scored, by SSM. At the beginning of 2013, when the results were finally presented to the Executive Committee, SSM was faced with shocking news: Turkey's top political figure was not happy with off-the-shelf procurement of such a big-ticket item, nor did he find it acceptable that there was no upper-tier missile defense capability in the competition. Instead, Prime Minister Erdoğan instructed the SSM to proceed with an indigenous project aimed at the in-country development of more capable missile defense systems.[17] Paradoxically, less than a month before, the SSM Undersecretary had publicly announced that Turkey chose to concentrate on developing short and medium-range air defense missiles because longer-range systems in the class of Patriot went beyond Turkey's capabilities; there was no point in pursuing the impossible.[18]

Why such an about-face? Besides Prime Minister Erdoğan's obvious motivation to invest this extensive capital in local industries, developments in the preceding months may have altered his thinking and priorities. One development was the June 2012 shooting of a Turkish RF-4E reconnaissance plane by Syria's air defenses off the Mediterranean shores. This incident convinced Erdoğan of the value and strategic significance of ground-based air defenses (which was retrospectively recognized by those in his inner circle).[19] Likewise, Turkey's concerns over the sporadic use of ballistic missiles in Syria's civil war, and the now customary bickering over NATO's 2012 deployment of Patriot batteries to Turkey, must have reinforced Ankara's conviction.[20] Another development during this period was Ankara's diplomatic crossfire with Tehran and Moscow over Turkey's acceptance of NATO missile defense radar on its territory. In response to the *Kürecik radar*, Russia and Iran blatantly threatened Turkey, suggesting that their ballistic missiles would now be targeting Turkey.[21] Coupling this threat with increasing concerns over Iran's rapidly advancing nuclear weapons

[15] Unless cited otherwise, data on T–LORAMIDS compiled from multiple issues of *Savunma & Havacılık* magazine, 2009–2014 period.

[16] "SSM Head Bayar: Turkey's Attack Helicopter has Good Export Prospects," *Today's Zaman*, September 23, 2013; "HQ–9 ve Patriot'un yetenekleri kısıtlı," *Hürriyet*, February 17, 2014.

[17] Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, "Turkey Abandons USD4 Billion T–Loramids SAM System Buy," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 30, 2013, 5.

[18] "Yerli tabanca için hareket," *Hürriyet*, December 14, 2012.

[19] Mehmet Acet, "Sırada ne var?," *Yeni Şafak*, October 30, 2017.

[20] "Turkey Considers Patriot Deployment," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, November 14, 2012, 14; "NATO Sets up Missile Defense Shield in Turkey," Deutsche Welle radio, January 20, 2013, https://www.dw.com/en/nato–sets–up–missile–defense–shield–in–turkey/a–16535457.

[21] "Tehran Threatens Ankara with New Missile System," *Hürriyet Daily News*, July 3, 2012; "Moskov'dankalkanuyarısı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 24, 2011.

program, it is not surprising that Turkish leadership wanted to acquire full-fledged missile defense capabilities.

Faced with the Prime Minister's shift in priorities, SSM quickly adapted to the changing circumstances, and instead of cancelling the ongoing competition, it came up with a middle-ground formula, which combined the wishes of the political authority with the existing framework of the T-LORAMIDS competition. Accordingly, the contenders were asked to supplement their offers with a comprehensive package for technology transfer that would enable Turkish industry to develop more advanced air and missile defense systems.[22] Apparently, this last-minute addition did not, however, elaborate which technologies the Turkish authorities were seeking. Some contenders complained, without effect, that technological cooperation in support of a complex indigenous development scheme constituted a different requirement and must be handled as a separate program.[23]

Late in the summer of 2013, SSM finished evaluating the revised proposals containing provisions for the transfer of technology, and merged these into a delicate evaluation and scoring formula. In September 2013, the findings were again presented to the Executive Committee. This time, the committee reached a decision and announced a winner: China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and its offer for the FD-2000 systems. Europe's Eurosam came in second, and the U.S. Patriot offer, third. Russia's S-300V proposal was eliminated altogether due to its excessive price, nearly 2.5 times the price of the lowest bid.[24] Understandably, the news of a Chinese air defense system coming out on top in a NATO country vibrated strongly around the world. Yet, for immediate observers, the outcome was hardly surprising.[25]At $3.4 billion, the Chinese offer was not only below SSM's forecasted budget, but $1 billion less than the second lowest bid. The Chinese contender scored highest on technical and performance grounds. CPMIEC's delivery schedule, contractual terms and conditions, and financial package, as well as industrial cooperation and technology transfer offers, were superior.[26] With highest points on all accounts, the Chinese win was the outcome of a *bottom-up* decision-making process, supported and endorsed by all actors from end-user and procurement bureaucracy to political authority.

Nonetheless, as the events of the next two years would reveal, the selection process was neither flawless, nor was its end result truly actionable. The first drawback and consequent stumbling block was related to the transfer of technology. To accommodate the political authority's desire for in-country development, the requirement was added in haste to the original T-LORAMIDS framework. Apparently, SSM's description of *technology transfer* was vague, and the commitment from the Chinese winner was imprecise and open-ended. Two years later, when contract talks with China were about to collapse, Turkish authorities admitted that the high-level, abstract and slogan-like commitments for technological cooperation were of little value because they did not lead to an agreement during contract talks.[27] Instead, they admitted that all the details, objectives, and recipient entities of technology transfer should

[22] Lale Sarıbrahimoğlu, "Turkey to Buy and Co–develop T–Loramids SAM," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, March 27, 2013.

[23] İbrahim Sünnetçi, "CPMIEC ve EuroSam'ın gözünden T–LORAMIDs," *Savunma ve Havacılık* 166 (2014): 43.

[24] "Başbakan Erdoğan: füze için teklif gelirse düşünürüz," *Bugün*, October 25, 2013.

[25] Burak Ege Bekdil, "Turkey May Adopt Chinese Air Defense System," *Defense News*, June 24, 2013, 1.

[26] Interview with SSM Undersecretary in Cansu Çamlıbel, "Turkey Cannot Ignore Western Concerns over Missile Deal," *Hürriyet Daily News*, February 17, 2014.

[27] SSM Undersecretary İsmail Demir's comments in "Stratejik hava savunma sistemleri ve Türkiye'nin yol haritası," panel discussion organized by SETA, October 26, 2015, video, 2:10:38, accessed July 13, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2A3A_3Y73Q.

have been identified at the outset. Consequently, despite countless rounds of meetings to bridge the gaps, the parties' inability to agree on the scope and content of technology transfer prevented any progress, and led to the demise of not only the Chinese offer, but the whole T-LORAMIDS project.[28]

A second shortcoming of the T-LORAMIDS evaluation process concerned the SSM and its Executive Committee's failure to sufficiently consider the ramifications of selecting a non-Western supplier for a complex defense system (which would be connected to NATO's air defense architecture) on Turkey's foreign relations and alliance ties. As Turkish authorities later admitted, the prime focus of SSM's evaluation during this first phase was limited to "such technical criteria as local content, industrialization and technical proficiency, (whereas) the ramifications and consequences with respect to international relations and the global conjuncture were not among the principal factors".[29] In the words of a prominent analyst of Turkey's defense programs, "for an extremely complex technical and political problem, it turned out that the evaluation was done on purely technical grounds, without involvement of strategic, political and legal dimensions. However, these are strategic systems with direct consequences for national security, foreign relations and military relations."[30]

Not surprisingly, NATO strongly objected to Turkey's decision to select a Chinese supplier, and this created immediate strain on Turkey's relations with its allies. While recognizing each allied nation's right to choose their own defense equipment, NATO's Secretary General stressed, "seen from a NATO perspective, it is of utmost importance that the systems nations plan to acquire can work and operate together with similar systems in other allied nations. That's what we call interoperability."[31] The critical keyword to achieve such interoperability was *integration*, implying the integration of new Turkish-owned systems with NATO's existing electronic and digital architecture. In the words of NATO's Secretary General, "the Alliance had difficulty understanding how Turkey would manage to integrate an air defense system manufactured by China by using the technology of its NATO allies."[32] The U.S. shared NATO's worries over interoperability and integration, and it has previously imposed sanctions on the Chinese winner of the competition for violating Washington's Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act. Thus, any Turkish companies who interacted with the CPMIEC risked being subjected to the same sanctions.[33]

On the other hand, it would be unfair and inaccurate to claim that the SSM and Turkish air force overlooked the importance of NATO interoperability. Integrating Turkey's new air and missile defense systems with Turkish, thereof NATO's air defense C^3 architecture, was a paramount technical requirement from the beginning of the T-LORAMIDS competition.[34] In fulfilling its air defense mission, it was critical to have NATO interoperability, because the new SAM systems were expected to become part of Turkey's multi-layered, closely coordinated air defense architecture, which was in turn intermeshed with NATO. When defending against ballistic missiles, interoperability with NATO becomes even more critical,

[28] "Demir: technology transfer issue main problem in air defense system bid," *Daily Sabah*, July 21, 2014.

[29] Demir's comments in "Stratejik hava savunma sistemleri," panel discussion by SETA.

[30] Interview with Arda Mevlütoğlu in "Turkish Defense Industry has achieved much, but More Ahead," *Daily Sabah*, November 9, 2015.

[31] "Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 23, 2013, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_104257.htm.

[32] "NATO'nun yanında Çin yapımı sistem olmaz," *Milliyet*, October 2, 2013.

[33] Burak Ege Bekdil, "Controversy Deepens over Chinese Air Defenses for Turkey," *Defense News*, October 7, 2013, 8.

[34] For Turkish air force perspective, see interview with General Abidin Ünal in "Türk hava sahasının 7/24 yılmaz bekçisi: MHK ve HFS Komutanlığı," *Savunma ve Havacılık* 168 (2015): 63.

in fact indispensable; without satellite early-warning and dedicated radar cueing (only available through NATO), SAM systems do not have a high chance of detecting, let alone intercepting, incoming ballistic missiles. Moreover, from 2011onward, parts of Turkey had already entered the protective umbrella of NATO's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) comprising upper-tier interceptors effective against longer-range ballistic missiles. Ankara had even agreed to host EPAA's forward-deployed missile tracking radar on its soil.[35] The focus of NATO and its EPAA had been on longer-range missiles, hence on upper-tier interception. For shorter-range ballistic missiles, allied states were expected to resort to their lower-tier, terminal phase assets – the category of SAM system Turkey sought under T-LORAMIDS. Unless Turkey's lower-tier solution could talk and cooperate with NATO's upper-tier systems, which could only be achieved through NATO's dedicated C^3 structure, dependable and full-fledged protection against ballistic missiles was rendered impossible.

Interoperability being so important, Turkish officials had devised what they thought was a workable technical solution. Accordingly, the new SAM systems purchased under T-LORAMIDS would not be connected directly to NATO's infrastructure. Instead, they would be integrated into Turkey's own C^3 network, which in turn is already integrated with NATO's. A Turkish company would develop and deliver the necessary interface between missiles systems and Turkey's air defense network. While designating the Chinese company, SSM had already secured a commitment to get all the interface data necessary for such integration. Since Turkey would perform the entire integration work, Turkish authorities were convinced that there was no risk of China gaining access to classified NATO information and technology.[36] With this assumption in mind, they tried to comfort NATO: "Our allies should trust us. Once the Chinese system has been installed, no reverse information flow."[37] Yet, only months later the same Turkish officials recognized that "there were some concerns that we can accept regarding information security and interoperability. We are taking precautions."[38]

One of NATO's primary concerns was within the realm of software and cyber security. From an engineering point of view, it would be possible to integrate a Chinese system with NATO assets. However, NATO officials pointed out that the built-in software could be compromised by digital backdoors planted by Chinese developers' intent on gaining access to NATO data. The perception of China as a prime suspect of cyber espionage did not help. Like all air defense systems in its class, China's FD-2000 was a very sophisticated system, interwoven and run by complex software. Therefore, there would always be uncertainties with respect to security gaps, cyber access, and hacking.[39] To minimize, or ideally, eliminate such risks, NATO procedures foresaw that all systems handling NATO-classified information would be subjected to NATO's advance security approval and accreditation. In the exceptional circumstances of systems originating from non-member nations, they would add an additional layer of scrutiny and NATO certification.[40] These were long-established NATO procedures, and not created solely for Turkey's Chinese system. There was a presumption that Turkish officials would be well-informed of the requisites, and have dialogue with their

[35] Egeli, *NATO füzekalkanı*, 53.

[36] SSM Undersecretary Murad Bayar's comments in İbrahim Sünnetçi, "Eylül 2013 SSİK toplantısı kararları," *Savunma ve Havacılık* 157 (2013): 102.

[37] Bekdil, "Controversy Deepens".

[38] Çamlıbel, "Western Concerns".

[39] "Korgeneral Hodges: NATO Çin yapımı füzeye izin vermez," *Hürriyet*, October 23, 2013.

[40] "Enclosure 'F' on Infosec," Document C–M (2002) 40 on Security within NATO," June 17, 2002, accessed July 10, 2018, http://cryptome.org/nato–cm2002–49.htm.

NATO counterparts during the evaluation process. Yet it appears that Turkish officials did not consult with NATO prior to their selection of a Chinese system. The outcome, as subsequently put forth by Turkish authorities, was deemed "the China accident".[41] Turkish officials argued that a similar integration had been permitted for Greece's Russian-origin S-300 missiles. Yet, owing to the same NATO procedures, Greek S-300s had never been fully linked to the NATO system for operations in a dynamic coalition environment.[42]

Another concern was the industrial and information security aspect in the relationship between Chinese and Turkish industries and militaries. Normally, an industrial cooperation program entails extensive interaction between parties throughout the licensed production, delivery, initial system set-up, activation, on-site support, after-sale support, and future modification and upgrade phases – all of which meant Chinese nationals would be working with the equipment side-by-side their Turkish counterparts. The SSM Undersecretary could not have described the situation better: "We might be able to protect the data technically, but there will be a lot of interaction with the Chinese through this [process]. Is there a risk? Of course. They [the Chinese] are around, they're in the next room. That could be a risk."[43] These were hardly comforting comments for Turkey's Western allies, and Ankara sought the allies' understanding and consent for the NATO integration process.

The limited scope of Turkey's suggested integration formula was another technical ambiguity. Turkish authorities were convinced that it would be enough to develop an interface to connect the Chinese systems to Turkey's C^3 systems, because a Turkish network had already been integrated with NATO's. Yet, interoperability with NATO is not limited to the air defense command-control infrastructure. It calls for additional layers of interoperability, among them IFF (identify friend or foe) and *Link-16* combined air-picture communications terminals, all of which Turkish air force had envisaged installing on Chinese systems. Each installation required unique security approval and accreditation by NATO's Office of Security – a challenge hardly voiced or addressed by Turkish authorities.

Meanwhile, it would be inaccurate to place the entire weight of NATO objections on technical grounds. However viable they may be, it is plausible that NATO employed and somewhat exaggerated these technical stumbling blocks to justify their own objections at political and even commercial levels. On the political front, the supply and successful integration of a Chinese solution in NATO's 'Holy Grail' of air and missile defense architecture risked tainting the Alliance's image of cohesion and solidarity. Using NATO's scarce economic resources to fund a potential adversary like China was a politico-financial consideration, which did not score well with NATO. Lastly, the equation had a commercial and arms trade dimension; awarding a multibillion-dollar contract to a Chinese competitor signified not only the loss of profits for European and U.S. manufacturers, but also risked creating a credible competitor who could tab on similar requirements elsewhere in the world.

In addition to the challenges presented in achieving NATO interoperability, which had gone far beyond what Turkish decision-makers had anticipated, the existing U.S. sanctions on the Chinese winner of the T-LORAMIDS competition added to the complications. It is still not clear if Turkish decision-makers knew about the sanctions prior to their selection

[41] SSM Undersecretary Murad Bayar comments during NATO Industry Forum, cited in Joshue Kucera, "Turkey Insists it is Solving Chinese T–Loramids Dilemma," *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*, November 14, 2013.

[42] Kucera, "Turkey Insists".

[43] Kucera, "Turkey Insists".

of CPMIEC, but once the decision was made, they quickly dismissed them as non-binding and irrelevant. "True that the Chinese firm is in U.S. sanctions list", contended SSM Undersecretary, "but it is not a NATO or United Nations list".[44] Developments would soon prove otherwise. Hardly two months had gone by when the Turkish defense industry's flagship *Aselsan* discovered first-hand the relevance of U.S. sanctions. When Aselsan asked the world's leading investment bank to advise and underwrite its public offering, it was faced with a blunt rejection letter, stating, "If it is possible that you will work with the Chinese company, CPMIEC, we would not work with you".[45] Elsewhere, American officials were quick to remind their Turkish counterparts that dealing with a sanctioned Chinese company risked legally hampering existing and future cooperation between U.S. and Turkish defense companies.[46] For Turkey's fledgling defense industry, which had traditionally relied on U.S. markets for a sizable portion of its exports and purchased items, this was the harbinger of the major difficulties that lie ahead if Ankara went through with the Chinese deal.[47]

In November 2015, Turkish authorities announced that the T-LORAMIDS project, and together with it the selection of CPMIEC, was cancelled. In retrospect, selecting a Chinese solution was a bold step, taken without appreciating and anticipating the full range of technology transfer, foreign policy, alliance ties, and interoperability ramifications. Irrespective of the contrary official statements and media stories, the insurmountable ambiguities and shortcomings of the pro-China decision were indicative in the developments that took place first few months after the decision. Even more astonishing was the length of time it took for Turkish authorities to recognize this and reverse their decision.

5. Ascent of Indigenous Track

Throughout 2014 and 2015, while the Chinese winner was in contract negotiations with SSM, there were less visible developments taking place. One concerned the progress of in-country development of air and missile defense systems, and the other focused on attaining the same goal through cooperation with European partners. The two initiatives were not necessarily perceived as in competition with one another, but they certainly progressed to the detriment of the Chinese deal, and eventually helped bring about its demise.

In December 2013, ten weeks after SSM selected the Chinese company, Turkey's largest defense contractor, Aselsan, announced that they were ready to develop a long-range air defense system. Contending that outside sources would never give Turkey the sensitive technologies it needed, Aselsan officially applied to SSM for in-country development.[48] No doubt Aselsan's new self-confidence was boosted by its successful test-firing of the Hisar-A, low-altitude SAM only a few months earlier.[49] From then on, regardless of how ambitious and risky it might be, indigenous development became the prime track of Turkey's air and missile defense endeavor. SSM negotiated and conducted studies with local industries from 2014 to the beginning of 2018; in January 2018, SSM and Aselsan signed a hefty development contract for the *Hisar-U*. This was the Hisar family's long-range offspring, whose low- and

[44] Sünnetçi, "2013 SSİK," 102.
[45] Erdal Sağlam, "Merrill Lynch Refuses to Serve Turkish Defense Firm," *Hürriyet Daily News*, December 5, 2013.
[46] Sağlam, "Merrill Lynch".
[47] "Turkish Arms Exports up 20 Percent," *Hürriyet Daily News*, December 11, 2014.
[48] "Aselsan uzun menzilli milli rokete talip oldu," Haberturk TV, December 13, 2013, accessed July 16, 2018, https://www.haberturk.com/tv/gundem/video/aselsan–uzun–menzilli–rokete–talip–oldu/106317; "New Options Emerge in Disputed Air Defense Deal," *Hürriyet Daily News*, April 8, 2014.
[49] "Türkiye'nin ilk yerli füzesi atıldı," *Sözcü*, October 6, 2013.

medium-altitude derivatives were already being test-fired. The Hisar-U contract, worth circa €500-million, foresaw the delivery of one system ready for operational testing by 2021.[50]

Parallel to the slow but steady progress toward in-country development, a more curious dialogue between SSM and two European governments has been taking place. Despite the Chinese win, SSM had never excluded European and U.S. contenders from the T-LORAMIDS competition. They continuously asked the contenders to extend the validity of their proposals. SSM argued that if contract talks with the Chinese failed, they would invite the second-ranking European, and third-ranking U.S. contenders back for consideration. What is striking under the light of future developments is that Russia and its offer for S-300V was excluded altogether, and Ankara turned down Moscow's pleas to renew its offer.[51]

Compared to the Americans, the French and their Italian partners were more active and determined in their efforts to roll back the outcome of T-LORAMIDS and create a new opportunity. Capitalizing on the government-to-government dialogue initiated by the French President's January 2014 visit to Ankara, the French-Italian company Eurosam held several rounds of meetings with Turkish officials and industries.[52] They offered an expanded version of the technological cooperation proposal they had already made for T-LORAMIDS. Instead of the licensed-assembly of Eurosam's existing SAMP/T solution, Turkish companies were invited to take part in the joint-development and subsequent joint-production of a new generation of missile-defense-capable SAM systems alongside French and Italian industries. Representing the next iteration of their current SAMP/T, the new system would be capable of intercepting longer-range ballistic missiles (presumably in the 1,000 to 3,000-kilometer bracket). As subsequent events prove, the Eurosam offer was appealing to Turkish authorities and industries alike.[53] In addition to satisfying Turkey's long-standing need to counter the threat posed by long-range ballistic missiles, it also held the promise of introducing Turkish companies to cutting-edge missile defense technologies. By taking advantage of European industries' experience and head start in this field, Turkey could expect to minimize the risks and costs associated with developing complex and advanced systems.

By mid-2014, Turkey was showing keen interest in the Eurosam offer.[54] Prime Minister Erdoğan acknowledged the problems over joint-production and technology transfer within the Chinese offer, and announced that Turkey was communicating with France about joint-production.[55] The talks involved the Turkish, Italian, and French governments, as well as their respective defense companies. The negotiations were laborious and detail-oriented, slow and time-consuming. During this long process, there were gestures like Italy's 2016 deployment via NATO of a SAMP/T battery to Turkey to replace the U.S. and German Patriots that had been abruptly withdrawn.[56] Finally, in July 2017, the parties announced that they had signed a *framework agreement*, followed by a *Letter of Intent* in November of the same year. In these agreements, Turkey, France, and Italy committed to jointly defining their air and missile

[50] "Milli füze savunma sisteminde imzalar atıldı," *C4 Defence*, January 16, 2018, accessed July 16, 2018, http://c4news.me/MZvHr.

[51] "Rusya füze ihalesine dahil olmak istiyor," kokpit.aero, May 7, 2014, accessed May 8, 2014, http://kokpit.aero/fuze–ihalesinde–rusya–teklifi–yeniledi.

[52] Burak Ege Bekdil, "French Industry Seeks a Comeback to Turkish Market," *Defense News*, March 10, 2014.

[53] Sünnetçi, "CPMIEC gözünden" 43; "ASELSAN, EUROSAM ve ROKETSAN, hava ve füze savunma sistemi için el sıkıştı," *MSI* 148 (August 2017): 10.

[54] "Turkey Turns to Europe for Billion–Dollar Missile Deal," *Daily Sabah*, June 10, 2014.

[55] "Turkey to Continue Missile System Talks with France," *Daily Sabah*, September 8, 2014.

[56] "NATO Chief Welcomes Italy's Deployment of Missile Defense in Turkey," *Daily Sabah*, June 14, 2016.

defense requirements for the future. Symbolically enough, they signed the document on the sidelines of a NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels.[57] Crowning the entire process, the French, Italian, and Turkish governments jointly awarded a contract to Eurosam and its Turkish industry partner in January 2018, allocating them with funds to proceed with the concept definition studies of Europe's new tripartite missile defense solution, intended to become operational by the mid-2020s. Eurosam presented the scheme as a 25-year, €11-billion effort comprising the development of not only ground-based solutions, but also next-generation ship-based air and missile defenses.[58] In fact, the scheme opened the door to another outstanding Turkish requirement, envisaging in-country construction of *TF-2000* air defense frigates. In stark contrast with Turkey's geostrategic circumstances, TF-2000 requirements did not call for ballistic missile *shooter* capability, and confined the vessels' mission to assisting NATO's missile defense effort with onboard radar and data link.[59] Following the cooperative scheme with Europe, the new missiles may as well have been designated for the TF-2000 frigates. This would bring the benefit of adding missile defense capability to TF-2000, therefore diversifying Turkey's missile defense options.

What is important here is that the cooperative scheme with Europe is not seen and treated as being in contradiction or competition with Turkey's own efforts to develop indigenous systems. In the eyes of Turkish authorities, "cooperation [with Europe] is part of Turkey's own air and missile defense effort, [as it has been structured] in a manner to assist SSM's local development model".[60] This translates into a situation in which the Hisar-U contract is envisaged by SSM as an instrument to augment Turkish industries' capabilities in the joint program, allowing the opportunity to maximize the weight, contribution, and gains of Turkish industries.

6. S-400 Bombshell

In retrospect, the period following the November 2015 cancelation of the T-LORAMIDS project was interesting. Local industries pressed ahead with preparations for in-country development, becoming the first and foremost route for Turkey to acquire long-range air and missile defense capabilities. In parallel, international cooperation created a shortcut to advanced technologies and capabilities required by upper-tier missile defense had come to constitute the second viable route. Then, what could be treated as a third route, there were sporadic reports of Turkey's interest in acquiring stopgap, off-the-shelf long-range air defense systems which would meet urgent operational requirements, and fill the void left by the cancellation of T-LORAMIDS.[61] Most likely, SSM contacted foreign manufacturers and received their price-and-availability inputs. However, there were no signs of resolute follow-up activity.

[57] "ASELSAN el sıkıştı," 10; "Turkey, France and Italy to Strengthen Cooperation on Missile Defense: Sources," Reuters, November 8, 2017, accessed November 10, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us–turkey–defence/turkey–france–and–italy–to–strengthen–cooperation–on–missile–defense–sources–idUSKBN1D829I.

[58] "Turkey Awards Missile System Study to Franco–Italian Group, Turkish firms," Reuters, January 5, 2018, accessed January 10, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/france–turkey–defence–eurosam/turkey–awards–missile–system–study–to–franco–italian–group–turkish–firms–idUSL8N1P02NS.

[59] "TF–2000 HSH fırkateyni," Turkish Navy official website, accessed February 15, 2015, http://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/denizweb/turkce/modernizasyon/firkateyn_projeleri.php.

[60] "ASELSAN el sıkıştı," 10; "Uzun menzilli bölge hava ve füze savunma sistemi (umbhfss) basın bülteni," SSM press release, June 4, 2018, accessed June 14, 2018http://www.ssm.gov.tr/WebSite/contentList.aspx?PageID=1178&LangID=1.

[61] Burak Ege Bekdil, "Turkey Mulls Stopgap Air Defense Acquisition," *Defense News*, November 15, 2015.

Meanwhile, throughout 2015 and 2016, there were tectonic shifts in Turkey's domestic and political circumstances. Particularly in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East, Turkey's objectives and interests were rapidly becoming divergent, even contradictory with those of its Western allies, and especially with the U.S. In this sense, Washington had lost confidence in Turkey as a proficient and dependable ally under AK Party rule. Turkey's steady drift toward authoritarianism made matters worse. Negative perceptions and mistrust were reciprocal. Turkish leadership was extremely disturbed and suspicious of Washington's choice to have armed Kurdish groups as its principal ally in Syria. One outcome was Turkey's eventual rapprochement with Russia, whose relations with Ankara had recently hit an all-time low (due to Turkey shooting down a Russian aircraft along the Syria-Turkey frontier). By mid-2016, while Turkey was inching toward amending its ties with Russia, a bombshell in the form of a botched coup d'état was dropped in Ankara. It was a truly traumatic event that deeply impacted Turkey's entire range of domestic and foreign policy dealings and equations.

From the perspective of Turkey's long-standing requirement for air and missile defense systems, the impact was immediate and dramatic. Only three weeks after the coup attempt, President Erdoğan paid an official visit to Moscow; during the visit his Russian counterpart expressed that Moscow wanted to supply Turkey with the *S-400* – the more advanced offspring of the S-300 (eliminated from T-LORAMIDS due to its prohibitive price). Ankara was receptive: Turkey's foreign minister stated, "we are forced to cooperate with other partners in buying and selling weapon systems, because there are NATO allies who refuse to sell us air defense systems or share (technology) with us".[62] By October of the same year, Turkey asked that Russia submit a formal proposal for the S-400.[63] In February 2017, Turkey's Defense Minister announced that they would buy the S-400.[64] The following month, he revealed Turkey's decision to use the S-400s as a standalone weapon, and not seek integration with NATO. He went on to stress that while Turkey sought the same from its NATO allies, it did not see acceptable levels of clarity and solidarity in favorable pricing and technology sharing.[65] In May 2017, he announced that talks on technical aspects were finalized, and the order would be placed once financial issues were sorted.[66] These financial issues held up the process longer than the technical ones. The contract, which was signed toward the end October, took effect before the end of 2017.[67] The order was for one battery (plus one optional battery), due for delivery during the first quarter of 2020 (subsequently moved to July 2019). In the words of President Erdoğan, with production of the first units already underway, S-400 was a "done deal".[68]

Once more, Turkey was at the crosshair of its Western allies' harsh criticism. A top NATO official warned, "The same way that nations are sovereign in making their [defense

[62] "Yıllardır krize neden olan dev projeyi Ruslar istiyor!," *Milliyet*, August 16, 2016.

[63] "Turkey awaits Russia's Offer in Missile System Procurement Process," *Daily Sabah*, November 7, 2016.

[64] "Bakan Fikri Işık'tan S–400 açıklaması," CNNTurk, February 22, 2017, accessed February 23, 2017, http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/bakanfikriisiktans400aciklamasi.

[65] "Bakan Işık'tan S–400 açıklaması: NATO sistemine entegre etmiyoruz," Diriliş Postası, March 16, 2017, accessed July 18, 2018,https://www.dirilispostasi.com/turkiye/bakan–isiktan–s–400–aciklamasi–nato–sistemine–entegre–etmiyoruz–5a7854a818e540432e750718 ().

[66] Interview with Defense Minister Fikri Işık in TRT Haber, cited in Hakan Kılıç, "Füze tartışmasına Milli Savunma Bakanı son noktayı koydu," kokpit.aero, July 5, 2017, accessed July 8, 2017, http://www.kokpit.aero/fuze-tartismasi-bakan-isik?writer=23.

[67] "Rostec CEO Reveals Bulk of Russia's S–400 Deal with Turkey," TASS News Agency, November 2, 2017,http://tass.com/defense/973803; "S–400 sistem tedariki basın açıklaması," SSM Press Release, December 29, 2017.

[68] "S–400 füzelerinin teslimat tarihi belli oldu," t24, April 4, 2018, accessed April 5, 2018, http://t24.com.tr/haber/s–400–fuzelerinin–teslimat–tarihi–belli–oldu,597115.

acquisition] decisions, they are also sovereign in facing the consequences of that decision".[69] Washington's sanctions on the Russian manufacturer of S-400 further complicated things, as Turkish parties risked having the same sanctions extended toward them.[70] Ankara had gone through the same cycle less than three years ago over its pro-China decision; this new round of tensions and difficulties could not have been unexpected. What had changed? What made Turkish decision-makers opt for a trail they knew would be full of tensions and obstructions?

First and foremost was the deep trauma left by the botched coup, and the consequent shift in Ankara's threat perceptions. The survival of Turkey's regime and its top leader was now at stake, and Turkey could not count on traditional allies anymore. They were deemed to be supportive and complicit, if not directly behind the coup d'état.[71] The turn of events during the coup had shown that the main danger to Turkey's rulers came from the air, and exposed the need to immediately resurrect effective air defenses over critical targets (e.g. presidential palace and parliament).[72] Turkey's traditional western allies could not be trusted, because the need may well rise for protection against their weapons. Turkey's indigenous, but very short-range, solutions were hastily deployed. Conveniently enough, Russia, who had helped the Turkish government during the botched coup, was gracious enough to offer the world's most capable long-range air defense system. From this perspective, if the purchase of S-400s risked straining relations with NATO and the U.S., then that was a price Turkish leadership was ready to pay. For Turkish decision-makers, the S-400 deal carried the additional benefit of mending ties with Russia, and winning its cooperation in the Syrian quagmire. Moreover, by cozying up with Russia, Ankara was sending a message to its NATO allies that they had other options. The deal was also beneficial for Moscow: in addition to monetary gains, the S-400 offer was a skillful maneuver that would drive a wedge between Turkey and its NATO allies.

7. Fallacy of Three Justifications

Underlying strategic-level considerations aside, Turkish authorities justified the decision to the public with three elements: first, the S-400's favorable price; second, NATO allies' failure to meet Turkey's quest for technology transfer and joint-production; and third, the U.S. and Europe's refusal to sell Turkey air defense systems in the first place.[73]

The contention on favorable price is impossible to verify or refute with a high degree of certainty, because from the onset, the S-400 deal was littered with insufficient or inconsistent information. The Turkish and Russian parties' differing and interchangeable use of terms (e.g., system, battery, and battalion) further complicated the picture. In the final analysis, the Russians announced a price of circa $2.5 billion for four batteries.[74] The Turkish defense minister did not provide a price figure, but confirmed the quantities: two systems, each comprising two batteries, for a total of four batteries.[75] The SSM press release issued

[69] "NATO Official: Turkey Faces 'Consequences' If Purchase of S–400 Completed," *Defense News*, October 25, 2017.

[70] Barçın Yinanç, "Turkey could Face US Sanctions for S–400 Purchase," *Hürriyet Daily News*, February 1, 2018.

[71] Adam Withnall, "Erdogan Blames Foreign Powers for Coup and Says West is Supporting Terrorism," *The Independent*, August 2, 2016.

[72] "Külliye ve Meclis'e füze kalkanı," *Milliyet*, July 28, 2016; "Artık onlar koruyacak," *Hürriyet*, July 27, 2016.

[73] "Erdoğan'dan S–400 yorumu: NATO'da bu imkanları yakalayamıyorsak, başımızın çaresine bakarız," Sputnik, March 12, 2017, accessed March 15, 2017, http://sptnkne.ws/dMgN; Defense Minister in TRT Haber interview, cited in Kılıç, "Son nokta".

[74] "Rusya: Türkiye, 4 adet S–400 bataryasını 2.5 milyar dolara satın aldı," Sputnik, December 27, 2017, accessed December 29, 2017, https://tr.sputniknews.com/savunma/201712271031570715–rusya–rosteh–turkiye–s400–batarya/.

[75] "S–400 sistemi için S–400 füze savunma alay komutanlığı kurulacak," *Habertürk*, January 4, 2018; SSM, "S–400 sistem tedariki".

soon afterward clarified that the firm order was for one system (comprising two batteries), whereas the second system was optional. Turkish sources have never identified the exact makeup and quantities of the system elements at stake, but it may be possible to guess judging from Russian deployment practices. Accordingly, Turkey's firm order for one system (battalion) would normally comprise two batteries of nine quadruple launchers each, for a total of 18 launchers and 72 ready-to-fire missiles. When the second optional system (and its two batteries) is added up, the total would become 36 launchers and 144 missiles. If the $500-million price tag cited in Russian sources for each S-400 battery is to be trusted, then the price figure for four batteries (and their 36 launchers) comes out at $2 billion – close enough to the $2.5-billion value announced by Russian authorities.[76] Back in 2013, the price quotes for 72 launchers (and 288 missiles) stood at $3.4 billion for China, $4.4 billion for Eurosam, and $8.8 billion for Russia's S-300V. Now, Russia supplied half the quantity of launchers and missiles in return for $2.5 billion – a discount of sorts, but nowhere close to Chinese or European price quotes during T-LORAMIDS, and this despite the fact that the S-400 contract did not include any T-LORAMIDS cost-drivers like local content, in-country final assembly, and offset trade.

Regarding Turkish officials' contention that S-400 was preferable due to Russia's acceptance of joint-production and technology transfer, is a lot easier and straightforward to reach a fair judgment: no such provision is part of the S-400 contract. Observations to this effect belong to the realm of ignorance, disinformation, or 'alternative facts'. On this, the Russian side has been very open and consistent throughout: "the consensus has been on off-the-shelf transfer; sharing of technologies has never been at stake" declared Putin's top military advisor.[77] Other defense officials stressed that the S-400's internal control (source) codes would never be shared with Turkey.[78] Referring to Turkish demands for localization, the S-400's Russian manufacturer touched the bounds of arrogance: "without the necessary infrastructure, it is impossible to manufacture anything. You need training, training in high technologies. The Turks understand this, too. We can provide them with all the documentation, but this would not generate any results."[79] Interestingly enough, Turkish authorities close to the subject have been playing to the same tune. For instance, the Turkish Defense Minister has been clear in his statements that the S-400 was an off-the-shelf deal to meet urgent needs, and that technological know-how was a matter to be discussed if Turkey decided to exercise an optional clause of the contract at a later stage.[80] Months later, President Erdoğan confirmed that joint-production applied to the second and third phases of the program; he had proposed joint development of the S-500.[81] Owing to their experience with Chinese talks, Turkish procurement officials must have been well aware of the limited value of abstract and inarticulate reference to technological cooperation. Pointedly enough, in an official press release on the occasion of the S-400 contract, the SSM underlined the importance of ongoing

[76] Yekaterina Chulkovskaya, "Is Russia's Planned Missile Sale to Turkey the Real Deal?," Al–Monitor, May 10, 2017, accessed May 15, 2017, https://www.al–monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/russiaplanmissilesaleturkeymilitary.html.

[77] "Putin'in askeri danışmanı: S–400'leri vereceğiz, teknolojisini değil," *Cumhuriyet*, September 29, 2017.

[78] "S–400 Dispute Highlights Ongoing Difficulties in Turkey's Rapprochement with Russia," Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 6, 2017, accessed November 10, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/s–400–dispute–highlights–ongoing–difficulties–turkeys–rapprochement–russia/.

[79] "Rusya duyurdu…S–400 sevkiyatı henüz netlik kazanmadı," *Hürriyet*, December 7, 2017.

[80] Kılıç, "Son nokta"; "It's a done deal: Turkey plans to deploy Russian air–defense system in 2019," *Defense News*, November 28, 2017.

[81] 24 TV (@yirmidorttv), "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Putin'e S–550 füzesini birlikte yapmayı teklif ettim," Twitter, June 13, 2018, 11:47p.m., https://twitter.com/yirmidorttv/status/1007001580229390336.

activities with "other countries and companies" to support Turkey's local development program – a clear reference to the Turkish industry's technological cooperation with their French and Italian counterparts.[82] Paradoxically, Turkish authorities at all levels continue citing technology transfer and joint-production as the main reasons for Turkey's choice of S-400s, whereas no such technological or industrial content is to be found in the current iteration of the S-400 contract.[83]

Lastly, regarding the frequent contention by several high-ranking Turkish officials that NATO allies declined to sell Turkey air defense systems, there appears to be a similarly puzzling picture.[84] Complaints about NATO allies', and especially Washington's double standards and lack of responsiveness in handling Ankara's demands for defense hardware, are fair and well founded. Even U.S. officials acknowledge that overly strict American export controls pushed Turkey into the arms of Russia.[85] On the other hand, though, the following commentary by Turkey's presidential spokesperson reveals a double standard on Ankara's part, too:

> …we long made negotiations on Patriots, […] but we couldn't get a result, [because] the most important criterion for us is joint production, that is to say making a deal which will provide technology transfer. Unfortunately, we have not managed the reach an agreement to produce Patriots. But, Russia took a quick step in terms of joint production and thus S-400 has been implemented. Turkey does not have any concerns on buying Patriots, provided that the same conditions are set, namely joint production. So, the ball is on the U.S. court now.[86]

There are a number of sticking points in this line of contention. First, if Turkey's most important criterion has been joint-production, then Russia and its S-400 are exempt. Then, it is not possible to talk about a level playing field between Russia and NATO members because the latter are asked to fulfill a daunting criterion which does not apply to Russia: Russia was allowed to supply its S-400 off-the-shelf, but Turkey's NATO allies are expected to meet strict technology transfer and localization preconditions. Have Turkey's NATO allies ever been asked to supply their systems off-the-shelf under the same conditions that apply to Russia? If so, was their response negative? Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient public-domain information to provide an answer. Yet, the following comments from Turkey's defense minister may indicate that there have always been additional demands in the talks with Western suppliers: "U.S. and European countries' attitude was not receptive. Their proposals were not competitive and did not include the sharing of technology, meaning I would sell this system, you would get and set it up as is. You can't even touch a single bolt. We cannot accept such understanding. This made S-400 talks imperative for Turkey".[87] In retrospect, whereas the obstructions by the Congress may indeed prevent the supply of Patriots to Turkey,[88] it appears highly implausible that France and Italy – having already

[82] "Uzun menzilli hava savunma sistemi çalışmaları sürüyor," SSM Press Release, June 4, 2018, accessed July 24, 2018, https://www.ssb.gov.tr/WebSite/contentList.aspx?PageID=1178&LangID=1.

[83] "Statement by Presidential Spokesperson Ambassador İbrahim Kalın," April 5, 2018, accessed April 7, 2018, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/spokesperson/1696/92051/statement–by–presidential–spokesperson–ambassador–ibrahim–kalin.html.

[84] "Turkey Defiant on Purchase of Russian S–400 Anti–Missile Weapon," *Defense News*, July 11, 2018.

[85] Ellen Mitchell, "Air Force Secretary Advocate Export Control Fixes Amid Controversy over Turkey," *The Hill*, May 29, 2018.

[86] "Statement by Presidential Spokesperson".

[87] Kokpit.aero, "Füze tartışması".

[88] Interview with MFA Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu'nun Zeit Online'da Yayımlanan Mülakatı," interview by Michael Thumann, *Zeit Online*, March 9, 2018, accessed March 12, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri–bakani–sayin–mevlut–cavusoglu_nun–zeit–online_da–yayimlanan–mulakati_–9–mart–2018.tr.mfa.

accepted Turkey's participation in the joint-development of their next-generation air and missile defense system – would have second-thoughts on selling their current-generation SAMP/T systems to Turkey.

No doubt all three justifications of the S-400 order are tangled in varying degrees of inconsistency and misrepresentation. In stark contrast with the September 2013 pro-Chinese decision, the outcome of a bottom-up process, the S-400 order is a good example of *top-down* process: the decision made first, through political deliberations, and justifications generated afterward. Rapidly-changing political circumstances in and around Turkey, and the corresponding shift in leadership's threat perceptions, must have weighed in heavily to produce such an outcome. Of course, such a high-level political decision had its own procession, rationale, and justification. Therefore, instead of questioning its wisdom, we shall focus our analysis on scrutinizing the industrial, operational, and military ramifications of the ruling.

8. S-400's Operational Appraisal

In the industrial and technological dimension, the decision to favor the off-the-shelf procurement of S-400s is not in line with Turkey's much-cherished goal of attaining indigenous air and missile defense capabilities. In its current shape, the S-400acquisition does not bring direct benefits to Turkey's defense industries, nor does it provide a solution, which would be interoperable, and therefore complementary to Turkey's future air and missile defense setup. This setup is being developed locally in close conjunction with Western, and more specifically, European technologies and standards. It would be unfair to discount the likelihood of prospective cooperation with Russian industry in this domain. Alternately, Turkey's first-hand experience with T-LORAMIDS suggests the insurmountable challenges in defining and operationalizing technological cooperation on an *ex post facto* basis, i.e., after the contract is signed and payments are made. Even if it could overcome these difficulties, successful technological cooperation with Russia would constitute a parallel, in fact competitive, effort to Turkey's current priority of developing its own air and missile defense solutions, run in close conjunction with European industrial partners.

With respect to the S-400's ability to satisfy Turkey's operational needs, thereby contributing to the overall defensive posture of the country, we first focus on the air defense dimension. Turkish authorities have already announced that S-400s would be used standalone, with no digital exchange of threat and targeting information, nor any coordination or cooperation with other assets of Turkey's existing air defense architecture. S-400is a long-range air defense system, with performance characteristics unmatched by any rivals. Its search radar is capable of detecting airborne targets up to a range of 600 kilometers, and the system can shoot down targets up to a range of 150 kilometers.[89] With improved, mission-specific missiles, the effective range could be extended to 250, even 400 kilometers. Yet, propaganda notwithstanding, the S-400 is bound by the same laws of physics which impose restrictions on all long-range air defense systems. Due to earth's curvature, after roughly 40 kilometers downrange, S-400 radars cannot see targets flying at low- and medium-altitudes. The more rugged the topography, the higher becomes the altitude below which S-400 radar is blinded. This is not good news for countries like Turkey, who have mountain chains and rough terrain.

[89] S–400 technical information drawn from Korkmaz and Mevlütoğlu, "Air Defense Umbrella," 18–9.

When Russia deployed its S-400 to Syria, this provided vivid examples: U.S. cruise missiles flying through depressions between mountains were not detected by the Russian S-400 battery, deployed less than 50 kilometers away. Russia's fix was to immediately deploy two airborne early-warning (radar) planes to Syria, and link up its S-400 battery to high-mountain radars and batteries, so as to reduce gaps in radar coverage – all illustrating the imperative to operate as part of multi-layered, fully-integrated air defense architecture.[90] When used in standalone mode, the performance and effectiveness of even the most advanced air defense system is reduced to the level of medium-range air defense systems – such indigenous examples would soon be joining Turkey's inventory through the Hisar-O project. Even worse, faced with complex and multidimensional threat scenarios involving cruise missiles, extended-range precision-guided munitions, and low-flying aircraft, a standalone S-400 battery's own survival would be in jeopardy. This is a flaw Russian planners must already realize, for they have been attempting to sell Turkey point-defense systems to protect the S-400 batteries.[91] Not surprisingly, this standalone employment does not align with Turkey's expectations for its new air defense systems – a point underlined earlier by the Turkish air force: "Fielding a single type of air defense system does not solve the problem. What is needed is layered air defense (combining different types of air defense systems). The assignment of different target types to different air defense systems must be done centrally, using an integrated command-control system and its dedicated software."[92] This is a far cry from what standalone S-400s would be delivering to Turkey.

In the realm of ballistic missile defense and how S-400s contribute to it, the prospects are even dimmer. There is little doubt that S-400 has a robust missile defense capability built around its dedicated 9M96E missiles, which are believed to be capable of terminal phase interception of incoming ballistic missiles at an altitude of 27 kilometers. This is roughly equal to Patriot's PAC-3variant and its ERINT missiles, implying that they could intercept ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 1,000 to 1,300 kilometers. It is quite possible that 9M96E missiles are included in Turkey's S-400 order. Yet, the more advanced 40N6E missiles, reputed to have an exo-atmospheric intercept altitude of 185 kilometers, have been in customization tests since 2008.[93] Even when they finally reach operational status with the Russian military, they may never be supplied to export customers, at least not in the foreseeable future. Consequently, the missile defense potential of Turkish S-400s is confined to the terminal phase. Besides, devoid of satellite early warning and cueing from dedicated missile tracking radars (such as the one at Kürecik), it is doubtful that S-400 batteries would have enough reaction time or precision to detect and engage incoming missiles with their own radar. Even overlooking such uncertainties, as the top Turkish air force authority in charge of air and missile defense once described, "Long-range air defense systems become point defense systems when pitted against ballistic missiles. The restraint is not only the shortness of their intercept distance; it also concerns the fact that longer-range ballistic

[90] Tom Cooper, "Russia's Air Defense in Syria Have Some Big Problems," War Is Boring, October 6, 2017, accessed July 24, 2018, https://warisboring.com/russias–air–defenses–in–syria–have–some–big–problems/.

[91] "Rusya: Türkiye'ye Pantsir hava savunma sistemleri gönderemeye hazırız," Sputnik, April 25, 2018, accessed April 30, 2018, https://tr.sputniknews.com/savunma/201804251033173104–rusya–turkiye–pantsir–hava–savunma–sistemi/.

[92] Demir's comments in "Stratejik hava savunma sistemleri," panel discussion by SETA.

[93] "S–400 in Syria: Russia Gives Stark Warning to Turkey," Sputnik International, November 26, 2015, accessed November 27, 2015, https://sputniknews.com/military/20151126/1030773123/s400–air–defense–russia–syria–su24.html; "Russian S–300 Missile Systems Capable of Targeting Near Space Enter Service," RT, March 12, 2015, accessed March 20, 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/239961–near–space–missile–defense/; "Rusya, S–400 için uzun menzilli füze denemelerini tamamladı," kokpit.aero, July 4, 2018, accessed July 10, 2018, http://www.kokpit.aero/s400–uzun–menzilli–fuze–deneme.

missiles cannot be intercepted at all. This makes upper-tier missile defenses compulsory. And lower-tier missile defense assets must be integrated with upper-tier. This is a dimension to keep in mind while shaping Turkey's missile defense architecture."[94] This is yet another feat that the standalone S-400s cannot not hope to meet.

As a sub-category air defense mission, we should also reference the S-400's *A2/AD* role (deploying long-range weapons to prevent opponents from entering a certain theater, and depriving them freedom of action in this theater). Russia's deployment of S-400s in western Syria to create a no-fly zone provides a good example. Ankara could not have failed to notice the S-400's success in restricting Turkish and American aircraft inside Syrian airspace. It is no secret that Turkish leadership had similar ambitions to set up no-fly zones over Syria, or depending on circumstances, over other conflict zones as well.[95] What is frequently overlooked is that employing S-400s in standalone mode would diminish their worth for A2/AD as well as no-fly zone contingencies. A standalone S-400 could not hope to positively identify friendly aircraft. This points to a situation in which deploying S-400s in a certain theater would deprive not only the opponents, but also the Turkish air force, of freedom of action, simply because there is no way to ensure that friendly aircraft are not inadvertently targeted by S-400. Besides A2/AD scenarios, this is a serious shortcoming with detrimental impact on routine air defense deployments, as well as on operations inside Turkish airspace.

The impact goes beyond national contingencies to affect joint NATO operations even more severely. "[S-400's] mere presence creates technical challenges for allied assets deployed onto the territory of that country," reminded a top NATO official.[96] In daily parlance, this means that NATO allies will not be willing to take the risk of having their aircraft accidentally or inadvertently targeted; consequently, they will not allow their aircraft to operate where Turkish S-400s are present. The end result is a significant loophole in NATO's collective defense guarantees toward Turkey. In this sense, NATO allies' concerns and objections go beyond the safety of their aircraft flying in Turkish airspace, and extend into the realm of electronic and information security. A top NATO official explained the point with extraordinary detail and precision:

> [S-400] system itself is less an issue as the database that will have to be built to make it operational. The value of the system is in the database [which] will be collected on the territory of a NATO ally, with all allied assets present in Turkey being mapped and logged into Russian systems. Russian personnel will be on the ground to instruct the Turkish military how to operate the complicated radars and fire control systems, handing Moscow critical intelligence on what NATO assets are in the country, where they are, and what kind of capabilities they may have. Just as it would be hard to imagine that NATO experts would be sitting in Russia for several months and feeding the database, it is hard to imagine that Russian experts will be sitting in a NATO ally and feeding a Russian system with NATO data.[97]

Turkish authorities did not deny the possible involvement of Russian civilian and military specialists, and said Turkey was trying to ease NATO's concerns by entrusting S-400 setup

[94] Ünal, "7/24," 63.

[95] Samuel Hickey, "Turkey's New Missiles," *Foreign Affairs*, October 20, 2017, accessed July 22, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2017–10–20/turkeys–new–missiles.

[96] Aaron Mehta, "NATO Official: Turkey Faces Consequences If Purchase of S–400 Completed," *Defense News*, October 25, 2017.

[97] Paul Mclearly, "Top NATO General (A Czech) To Europe: Grow Up," Breaking Defense, March 7, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/top–nato–general–a–czech–to–europe–grow–up/, accessed July 4, 2018.

and activation tasks with Turkish personnel trained in Russia – assuring no Russian presence in Turkey.[98] Whether NATO allies would be satisfied with these arrangement remains to be seen. All the while, the S-400 impasse takes its toll on various dimensions of Turkey's relations with NATO allies. At the forefront is the F-35 program, through which Turkey hoped to acquire its next-generation fighter aircraft. By citing Turkey's S-400 order, the U.S. Congress took steps to suspend deliveries and, ultimately, exclude Turkey from the program. This amounts to no less than an arms embargo, damaging defense relations beyond repair. There is a widespread expectation that Turkey could be subjected to U.S. sanctions, because its S-400 order will be assessed under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which is already applied to Russia.[99] TheS-400 is not the root cause of Turkey's rift with the U.S; a lot of the blame goes to the U.S. in the complex interplay of misperceptions and miscalculations.[100] Irrespectively, the S-400 has come to represent a highly visible example of defiant behavior; it holds the potential to trigger wider restrictions on defense material and technology transactions. Despite major strides in defense production in recent years, Turkey relies heavily on its NATO allies for most defense equipment, and its fledgling defense industry remains deeply enmeshed in its Western counterparts. If the flow of spares and components is interrupted, or offset trade contracts suspended, Turkey's defense industry and military are poised to suffer significantly.[101] However unfair and unjustified such restrictions may be, their outcome is an important variable to factor in the S-400 cost-benefit tally.

Leaving the NATO dimension behind, our analysis will not be complete without identifying yet another national-level consideration: electronic security and dependability. S-400 is a very complex system comprising several types and layers of electronic hardware and software. Since the system will be arriving in an off-the-shelf, 'as is' configuration, and since software codes are not part of the deal, there would be no way to guarantee that the S-400s will not be compromised electronically. An intrusion would always be possible through more conventional means of electronic warfare, as well as the more fashionable methods of cyber attack. Presumably, its Russian manufacturers would know the system's vulnerabilities better than anyone else; Russia would find itself in the best position to intrude or obstruct S-400 operations. The range of geopolitical contingencies likely to necessitate Turkey's use of S-400s all include Russia, either as a stakeholder, opponent, or potential spoiler. All of Turkey's regional adversaries are already in cordial terms with Russia. Under such circumstances, would the S-400 work as advertised? This is a question which may never be answered with a high degree of confidence. There is little value to claims that the S-400 would be more or less as dependable and reliable as its counterparts.

9. Conclusion and the Way Forward

Our analysis reveals three concurrent courses for Turkey to meet its air and missile defense requirements. The first and foremost is developing such systems indigenously – a noble,

[98] "Russian Experts may be Employed to Service Turkey's S–400s – Turkish Top Diplomat," TASS, last updated December 14, 2017, http://tass.com/defense/981091; Emanuel Scmia, "Turkey's Controversial S–400 Missile Transfer is Done Deal," *Asia Times*, June 30, 2018.

[99] Serkan Demirtaş, "S–400s Becoming A More Difficult Issue for Turkey–NATO Ties," *Hürriyet Daily News*, March 14, 2018.

[100] Sıtkı Egeli, "Fighter Jet that could Break US–Turkey Defense Relations," Middle East Institute, June 26, 2018, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/fighter–jet–could–break–us–turkey–defense–relations.

[101] Selim C. Sazak and Çağlar Kurç, "Turkey's Slow–Cooking Crisis With Its Allies Is Coming to a Boil," *Defense One*, June 22, 2018, accessed June 25, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/06/turkey–crisis–allies/149203/.

well-founded cause given Turkey's geopolitical circumstances. The second course, in close coordination with the first one, aims at a technological and industrial collaboration with European NATO allies to promote upper-tier missile defense capability – something that goes beyond Turkey's current technological and financial confines. Contracts for both courses were signed at the beginning of 2018, and work is already underway.

The third course concerns the off-the-shelf procurement of stopgap systems to meet urgent operational needs, because the other courses take a long time to materialize. In 2013, the prospect of using a Chinese system to meet urgent requirements collapsed for two reasons: the failure to find a workable solution for NATO interoperability, and an ill-devised focus on technology transfer. In 2017, Turkey tried again, but with Russia. The decision reflected Turkey's extraordinary political circumstances and the corresponding shift in threat perceptions. As a shortcut to immediate deployment, the S-400 deal attempted to circumvent restraints imposed by NATO interoperability, and perhaps the delivery schedule and pricing as well. But in doing so, it did not meld well with Turkey's other two, prioritized courses. Nor did it match well with Turkey's operational requirements. Consequently, the S-400 deal will find itself under constant strain and questioning.

In retrospect, Turkey cannot and should not be spending three or four times over to meet the same requirement. First and second courses for in-country and collaborative development are already underway, and they can be expected to eventually merge into a single program. The third prospect, aimed at satisfying urgent operational requirements, must be well aligned with in-country and collaborative efforts, and fully conform to operational requirements. Arguably, the only alternative that could live up to this tall order is an off-the-shelf acquisition of Europe's existing air and missile defense solution so as to meet urgent needs. Paradoxically, this may well be the only option decision-makers in Ankara have not yet diligently exercised.

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The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Prospects for Change and Continuity

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Review article of two books:

1. Mahmood Sariolghalam, *The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Theoretical Revision and the Coalition Paradigm* (Tehran: Center for Strategic Research, CSR Press, 2005, 236 pp.).
2. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit, eds. *Iran in the World: President Rouhani's Foreign Policy* (repr., Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 206 pp., USD 79.20, eBook).

1. Introduction

Over the past four decades, there have been a variety of trends and developments in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Within a framework of basic principles and fundamentals, the various administrations have shown different tactical behaviors in their approach to foreign policy. Conversely, despite critical shifts and developments in the domestic, regional, and international stages, some behaviors have basically remained unchanged. Since the 1979 revolution, despite major changes in the dynamics of domestic politics, structural developments in neighboring regions (especially the Middle East), and a shift in the global balance of power, Iranian foreign policy priorities have proven considerably consistent. Several Iranian administrations, from former presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami to current President Hassan Rouhani, have sought different approaches, but they have failed to adapt a new vision; the main pillars of Iran's foreign policy—Pan-Islamist, Pan-Shia, anti-Western, anti-Imperialist, anti-Zionist and pro-Resistance Front—have remained stable. Many scholars believe that Iranian foreign policy principles and practices have remained stable because they emphasize self-sufficiency, indigenization, exceptionalism, and resistance.[1] Taken together, these principles intensify Iran's isolation in the international arena.

There are four key forces that illuminate the lack of dynamism in Iran's foreign policy. First, in the foreign policy decision-making process, there is a constitutional mandate that

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[1] Seyyed Jalal Dehghani Firoozabadi, *Foreign Policy of Islamic Republic of Iran* [in Farsi] (Tehran: SAMT Publications, 2009), 14–29; Rouhollah Ramezani, *An Analytic Framework for Examining the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran,* trans. Ali-Reza Tayyib (Tehran: Ney Publication, 2009): 117–23; Mohammad-Kazem Sadjadpour, *Conceptual and Research Frameworks for Examining the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran: International and Political Studies Institute, 2007), 23–7.

gives power to the office of the Iran's supreme leader, while limiting presidential power. The supreme leader emphasizes the preservation of the religious and ideological foundations of the 1979 revolution, while the president focuses on the country's internal and executive affairs; the constitution limits the president's influence over foreign policy. The second force is the prioritization of national security over other strategic interests. National securities, and the perceived threats of the United States' hostile policies, directly influence Iranian static foreign policy priorities. The third key force is Iran's ongoing international blockage by the West, and its need to keep pushing back. Iran has a fear of regime change as posed by the regional containment policy of Western powers. This is the reason why Iran has maintained its anti-Western/anti-American ideological stance. Finally, maintaining the domestic political order remains a primary driving force of Iran's ruling elite. 'Revolutionism' and pan-Shiism serve to continue Iran's revolutionary domestic political order, constructed in opposition to capitalism and imperialism.[2] Theoretically speaking, while the international system and structural conditions drive Iran's foreign policy priorities, domestic political factors have also played a major role in shaping Iran's foreign policy over the past four decades.

In attempting to understand the nature of continuity and the possibility of change in Iran's foreign policy, many questions emerge from the literature:[3] To what extent has there been continuity and change in Iran's foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution of 1979? What type of coalitions and geo-political logic would allow for shifts in Iran's foreign policy? Have reformist presidents created meaningful foreign policy change in Iran? Is Iran's new moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, able to initiate structural foreign policy change? What are the prospects for change in Iranian foreign policy? These theoretical and practical concerns highlight the need for stronger academic contribution on the main drivers that underlie Iran's foreign policy. This review article will focus on two frequently referenced books, both of which aim to provide answers from an Iranian viewpoint, to the previous questions.

2. No Feasible Coalition Paradigm

The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Theoretical Revision and the Coalition Paradigm, authored in Persian by Mahmood Sariolghalam, professor of international relations at Shahid Beheshti University of Tehran, provides an empirical framework for understanding Iran's foreign policy coalition paradigm in a systematic way. In an attempt to study the possibility of changing the dominant paradigm of Iran's foreign policy, he seeks an answer to the following question: Considering the capacity and nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran, what type of coalition and transnational alliance, and based on which intellectual and geographical logic, is feasible within the framework of goals and national strategy of the country? In order to find an answer to this question, he raises sub-questions regarding the possibility of developing coalitions and alliances with neighboring southern regions, the Islamic bloc, northern neighbors, and the eastern geographical areas, to meet the major

[2] Mahmood Sariolghalam, "Prospects for Change in Iranian Foreign Policy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 20, 2018.

[3] Amir Mohammad Haji Yousefi, "The Prospect of Iranian Foreign Policy: Interaction or Confrontation," in *Iran, Politics and Future Studies*, ed. Mojtaba Maghsoudi (Tehran: University Press Publications, 2012), 64–72; Seyed Hossein Seifzadeh, *Iranian Foreign Policy* (Tehran: Mizan Publication, 2005); Seyed Jalal Dehghani Firoozabadi and Ali Akbar Assadi, "Revolution and Foreign Policy of Iran: The First Decade Revised," *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 157–84; Seyed Javad Tahaii, "Imam Khomeini and the Foundations of the I.R.I's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Relations International Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (2009): 42–7.

national goals of Iranian foreign policy. This book, presented in eight chapters, summarizes the results of a remarkable collection of the author's theoretical and empirical research.

In the second chapter, the author uses the *political realism* approach to distinguish what is and what should be: idealism in foreign policy leads to catastrophes and tragedies. He then combines decision-making theories and foreign policies at a tri-level analysis (bureaucracy, decision-making groups, and individuals) and concludes that the *individual variable* is vitally important in Iran's foreign policy decision-making process. Because of the legal and practical supremacy of agent over structure in Iran's political system, individuals rather than structures play a decisive role in formulating and implementing Iran's foreign policy. The scientific study of this domain and the individual decision-making structure in this field will have a positive impact on rational foreign policy. The author also believes that the Middle East region is at a "pre-positivistic" stage, where emotional and ideological decision-making is halting the path toward rational foreign policy.

From the point of view of Sariolghalam, the basic principles of Iranian foreign policy are based on the country's political geography, its enormous energy resources, its sensitivity to independence and national sovereignty, and the tendency of Iranian culture for Western science, technology, and culture. In the third chapter, the author classifies the macro-goals of Iranian foreign policy into three categories: (1) developing the economy and preserving territorial integrity and national sovereignty; (2) defending Muslims and liberation movements, and fighting against Israel and the West (especially the United States); (3) establishing an Islamic society based on Shi'a principles. Sariolghalam believes that reaching these goals depends on a transnational coalition and alliance as well as on rational decision-making in foreign policy.

In the next chapters, taking into account the neighboring regions, the author asks if cooperation, coalition, and alliance will ever be possible with the southern and northern regions, Islamic blocs, and the great eastern communities. He also questions to what extent this cooperation, coalition, and alliance could fulfill the macro-goals of Iran's foreign policy and national security. As for coalition and cooperation with the southern region of Iran (i.e., the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf), the author, after analyzing the regional state, conflicts in the Middle East, and the involvement of foreign forces in them, concludes that "deep instability and dependence" in the southern region of Iran is not contributing to the formation of such a coalition and strategic cooperation. In the northern regions, the fragile political-social state, intra-regional tensions, isolationism, and the economic capabilities of the Central Asian and South Caucasian republics represent the most important obstacles to the unification or coalition of Iran with these countries. As for attitudes toward the Islamic bloc, the author believes that distrust, the legitimation crisis, sectarianism, and deep ethnic and religious differences between Islamic countries on one hand, and the structural-security dependency of the majority of Islamic countries to the West on the other, have provided the political ground for the reluctance of these countries to develop economic cooperation, a security coalition, or a strategic partnership with Iran. In chapter seven, "Attitudes Towards the Great Eastern Community", the author deals with the socio-political developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the structural instability in these countries; he conducts a comparative study of the capabilities of the great Asian powers, including Japan, China, India, and assesses Iran's strategic importance to them. He concludes that the great powers of Asia do not link Iran's activism in the Middle East to their security and economic destiny, and therefore feel no strategic need to establish a political coalition with Iran. It seems that Japan,

China, and India only attach importance to Iran's capabilities in the field of energy exports, and it's role in oil transit and pricing in OPEC.[4]

Finally, Sariolghalam summarizes his research findings in three points. (1) As long as the legal foreign policy conflicts associated with the links between the ideological dimensions and the transnational dimension in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran are not resolved, it will not be possible to design a theoretical and practical national strategy or develop a coalition and regional alliance. (2) All neighboring states to the Islamic Republic of Iran are either on the decline or have deep structural, political, and security dependency. Although temporary co-ordination with these countries and blocs is natural, regional coalitions and alliances will not be feasible. (3) The Islamic Republic of Iran does not have the foundations for an ideological transnational coalition with any other country in the region; revolutionary countries and countries who protest the international order, such as Iran, do not have the necessary foundation for economic, technological, scientific, and security exploitations on the international and regional stages. (4) The cultural, geographic, and economic characteristics of Iran make it impossible for the country to develop sustainable security coalitions at national and international levels. This feature represents Iran as an international political unit that must work with major powers to manage crises and regional issues, or to even play a significant regional role. (5) If the Islamic Republic of Iran manages to develop constructive relations with the great powers (especially the West), the key decision makers of Iran's foreign policy can then provide the groundwork for a security coalition in the Persian Gulf, political-economic alliance with Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq (in order to confront Israel's growing regional power), a security coalition with India within the framework of eastern and northeastern security, an economic coalition with the GCC, and political and economic cooperation with Europe, Japan, and China.

Finally, considering the various periods, the dynamics of domestic politics and the political principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the possibility of change in Iran's foreign policy (especially on sensitive issues such as Iran-US relations), Sariolghalam concludes that no change is expected in the current Iranian foreign policy for three reasons: (1) the lack of a link between the country's foreign policy and the global economic system; (2) the ideological nature of sovereignty in the political system: (3) and the tendency to maintain existing foreign policy approaches by considering the interrelationships between legitimacy and national security and foreign policy. As long as Iran's domestic order is based on the religious and revolutionary ideological system, the foreign policy will contribute to the continuation of this revolutionary domestic order, and possible change in foreign policy will depend on changes in domestic politics. It seems that the author has managed to prove the research hypotheses by providing empirical evidence.

3. An Illusory Chance for Change in Foreign Policy

Iran in the World; President Rouhani's Foreign Policy, by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit, is an edited volume evaluating President Hassan Rouhani's foreign policy during his first two years in office. The book includes case studies of neighboring countries and American-Iranian relations by highlighting Iran's long-contentious nuclear issue. President Rouhani came to power in Iran in 2013 promising to reform the country's long-contentious

[4] Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

foreign policy. Unlike Mohammad Khatami's liberal-pragmatic vision or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's ideological-populist stance, Hassan Rouhani is bent on pursuing a centrist-pragmatic vision in Iran's foreign policy. Contrary to what many believe, Iran's foreign policy is not exclusively shaped within the context of Islamic discourse and ideology, fluctuating between revolutionary idealism and pragmatic realism. Pragmatism has always been an integral part of Iran's foreign directions, and can be traced in hotly-debated foreign policy issues like it's *détente* with the US or it's support of specific forces in the Levant, neither of which have ideological links to Iran. President Rouhani won the presidency primarily because he promised to bring a measure of rationality and pragmatism to Iran's inefficient foreign approaches. Unlike Ahmadinejad's revolutionary discourse and confrontational practice in foreign policy, President Rouhani's administration has pledged to de-securitize and normalize foreign relations, improve the deteriorating economic condition, end the long-standing nuclear dispute, and mend ties with neighboring countries.

In this timely volume, Akbarzadeh examines the Islamic Republic's foreign policy at a time of profound change and transition, highlighting some of the inherent tensions and milestones of the Rouhani administration as it charts a new course for Iran's regional and global roles. This book, which concentrates on elements of continuity, and domestic and external drivers of change, brings together many interesting insights of Iran's contemporary politics and foreign relations.

The first chapter of the book provides practical and theoretical questions regarding the possibility of meaningful change in Iran's foreign policy during Rouhani's first term in office; these enable the reader to have a general look at Iran's contemporary foreign policy. By looking at Rouhani's foreign policy toward neighboring countries, as well as the high-profile American-Iranian relationship, this volume addresses the following critical questions: Has Iran's new president created meaningful foreign policy change? Can Rouhani achieve a lasting rapprochement with the United States? Does Rouhani's experience of the presidency add greater depth to our understanding of Iranian foreign policymaking?

The book is composed of ten chapters, with an insightful discussion by Akbarzadeh in the first and tenth chapters. Akbarzadeh argues that as Rouhani came to power in 2013, despite Ahmadinejad's stubborn style, which had seriously damaged the country's international image, Iran has re-emerged as a regional power. Rouhani was widely hailed as a reformist who could improve Iran's international position by adapting a new pragmatic vision. However, he shows that for all of Rouhani's moderation, it would be naïve to expect that he would fundamentally undermine the Iranian theocratic system. Rouhani is a revolutionary and a regime insider who is deeply embedded in the Iranian political system.

Early in his presidency, Rouhani even enjoyed the support of the Supreme Leader, who articulated that the time had come for Iran to exercise "heroic flexibility" in foreign policy, especially on nuclear negotiations. Rouhani set out an ambitious plan for foreign policy reform in the first term that was defined by four inter-related themes: rebuilding the economy, resolving the nuclear issue, ending Iran's international isolation, and regional engagement. Rouhani quickly put these pledges into action by rebuilding relations with the US as his top priority. Within two months of inauguration, he had held a historic phone call with US President Barack Obama, becoming the first Iranian and US presidents to speak directly since the Iranian revolution in 1979. Over the following three years, Rouhani and Obama fomented an unprecedented thaw in American-Iranian relations, leading to a resolution of the

nuclear issue known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)[5] and a significant improvement in Iran's international reputation as Iran began welcoming western dignitaries to Tehran. Soon after, Rouhani and foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif started to normalize relations with neighbors, discussing friendship, and presenting Iran as the region's rational actor. This outreach was often complimented by soft power initiatives, especially through Iran's extensive regional network of charitable trusts.[6]

However, in spite of the Rouhani administration's efforts to formulate a new constructive vision in foreign policy, he faced enormous obstacles in domestic politics and in the international arena. According to Akbarzadeh, the international arena has presented a variety of challenges: the deteriorating situation in Syria, an increase in sectarian tensions across the region, the persistent security challenges in Afghanistan, and the hardening of Israel's stance on Iran. These issues have combined to create an inhospitable environment for Rouhani's planned détente. In the domestic sphere, which Akbarzadeh gives more weight to, Rouhani has encountered powerful domestic opponents, particularly among the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Iran's conservative elites and hardliners in the parliament. Indeed, the interaction between Iran's chaotic domestic politics and the changing international environment has undermined Rouhani's diplomatic attempts and has imposed considerable barriers to pursuing his foreign policy agenda. Rouhani's foreign policy agency was further undermined after the meteoric rise of Jihadists (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. This rise has quickly changed the domestic balance of power in favor of conservatives and hardliners in Iran, in particular the IRGC, who were running Iran's Middle East policy. As Akbarzadeh argues, it was expected that Rouhani would face a difficult path in foreign policy change. Unlike his two moderate predecessors, Mohammed Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani, Rouhani's legacy in Iranian politics is a poor one; while he continues to enjoy the support of the Supreme Leader, his legacies are faltering under the weight of conservative political pressure.

In the last chapter, by taking all the book's previous discussions into account, Akbarzadeh presents a general look at the prospects of Iranian foreign policy in Rouhani's presidency. He claims that while President Rouhani has made progress in the American-Iranina relationship, nuclear negotiations, and some bilateral relationships, his broader success has been hampered by regional political developments, particularly in the Middle East and the domestic politics competition. Further, Akbarzadeh contends that Rouhani's future success will be guided by emerging regional tensions, including whether Iran's neighbors will accept the terms of the nuclear agreement. Although Rouhani's election victory endowed him with the popular mandate to change the foreign policy of Iran, the newly elected reformist president faced no shortage of obstacles in the first two years of his presidency. He quickly discovered both internal and external barriers to bringing Iran out of international isolation and dealing with the country's long-standing issues. This is not to say that regional events, especially developments in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the Kurdish issue, completely thwarted Rouhani's efforts at re-engagement.

[5] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal, is an agreement on the nuclear program of Iran reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany), and the European Union.

[6] Such as: *Bonyad–e Farabi* (Farabi Foundation), *Bonyad–e Mosta'zafin va Janbazan* (Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled), *Bonyad–e Panzdah–e Khordad* (15 Khordad Foundation), *Bonyad–e Resalat, Bonyad–e Sa'adi*, *Bonyad–e Shahid va Isargaran* (Martyr's and Veterans' Foundation). Although all of these organizations were established outside the formal structures of the three branches of government, they were nonetheless linked to the formal structures. The mentioned *bonyads* perform not only humanitarian and economic functions inside Iran but also serve as a source of the Islamic revolution's soft power through various aid projects in strategically targeted countries, especially within Iran's neighborhood.

From Akbarzadeh's point of view, Rouhani enjoyed some success on the international stage during his first two years in office. This included attaining détente with President Obama and signing the nuclear agreement (JCPOA-5+1 nuclear negotiations), both remarkable achievements that enabled Rouhani to reverse some of the damage that his predecessor had inflicted upon Iran's international reputation. However, Rouhani's diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with neighboring countries have been less successful. Afghanistan and Iraq see the benefits of mending relations with Iran, especially under the mild-mannered President Rouhani. However, Saudi Arabia and other Arab Sheikhdoms remain wary of Iran's regional ambitions, particularly after signing JCPOA; these ambitions continue to overshadow the relationships and impede Rouhani's constructive agendas in foreign policy. Regardless, progress on the country's most contentious nuclear issue and the prospect of sanctions relief galvanized Rouhani's popular mandate in domestic politics, and allowed him to keep his conservative critics at bay. Despite these historical achievements, the overall gains of Rouhani's moderate foreign policy agenda were considerably hampered by the developments in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Iran's burgeoning influence failed to win it friends across the region, and Iran, under the Rouhani administration, faced trepidation by some neighbors and regional rivals like Saudi-Arabia, Turkey, and Israel. Further, the negative view of Iran as bent on destabilizing the region and expanding its influence through sub-state actors gained prominence in this period, particularly in the wake of Iran's support for both Shi'a militias and Hezbollah.

Under such critical circumstances in the region, as Akbarzadeh shows in his book, even the nuclear agreement, which had long been hailed as the key to regional stability in the Middle East, was perceived as a tool that would give Iran the green light for regional domination. Iran's regional competitors perceived an imminent threat from Iran, especially after the Resistance Front's operational progress in Syria and Iraq. In fact, it appeared that for many of Iran's Sunni neighbors, the combination of Iran's pariah status and the international sanctions regime had helped keep Iran in its box for the past decade. With the easing of economic sanctions, Iran would be able to exercise an increasingly assertive foreign policy, as already shown in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. This was a major factor behind Saudi Arabia's decision to amass a Sunni coalition to repel the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. Likewise, ISIS's rise, although providing strategic spaces for Iran to maximize its structural power and influence on the regional stage, provided an impediment to Rouhani's strategic plan of international engagement. Many of the Arab states came to view Iran's role in Iraq through the lens of the Syrian conflict, where Iran had backed the Assad regime while the rest of the Arab states backed the largely Sunni opposition. As this book claims, while Iran and its neighbors were technically fighting on the same side of the battle against ISIS, as the group emerged, rather than highlighting shared interests, interstate and ideational rivalries deepened.

Domestic obstacles played a significant role in curtailing the complete realization of Rouhani's foreign policy program. While Rouhani was able to implement foreign policy change in Iran's relationships with Armenia, Azerbaijan, the UAE, and the KRG, he had little influence over the Iraq, Yemen, and Syria portfolio. This was because contemporary ties with Iran-Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have been characterized by military considerations, meaning that the IRGC has had the upper hand in the relationships for decades. In fact, Rouhani's near paralysis in this sphere illustrated the scale of limitations of presidential power in Iran, particularly in portfolios that fall within the strategic interests of the Supreme

Leader Ayatollah Khamenei or the IRGC. It is highlighted in this chapter that Iran's problems no longer revolved exclusively around the nuclear issue, so signing a deal and reviving Iran's economy was only part of the challenge.

Rouhani's challenges were exacerbated by the fact that his success in dealing with some issues inadvertently intensified others. This has already been seen in Iran's progress on the nuclear issue, which in turn led to serious concerns in Tel-Aviv, Riyadh, and some other Arab capitals in which Rouhani's administration did not appear to have a clear strategy to alleviate the pervasive concerns over Iran's growing power throughout the neighboring regions. This book concludes that because of the significant limitations that president Rouhani has faced in the decision-making process of Iranian foreign policy, in particular on strategic issues, no considerable shift and change in Iran's foreign policy is expected (also the case in the former reformist administration).

4. Concluding Remarks and the Way Forward

As illustrated in the two books that were reviewed, Iran's foreign policy dynamics are products of overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, motivations, foundations, and actors. From the Iranian viewpoints, Iran's top decision-makers are apparently motivated, at least to some extent, by the perception of threat to their regime and their national interests. They surely believe that the US and other hostile powers in the region are pursuing a "regime change" strategy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran. This perception of threat significantly shapes Iran's static foreign policy behavior, in which no agency can shift its long-standing directions. Iran's foreign policy often appears to reflect differing approaches and outlooks among key players with highly different authority. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who melds political and religious authority, has repeatedly stressed that the US has never accepted the Islamic revolution and seeks to overturn it through support for domestic opposition to the regime, imposition of economic sanctions, and support for Iran's regional adversaries. On the contrary, Iranian reformist leaders, especially president Hassan Rouhani, emphasize that Iran should not have any permanent enemies. He maintains that a pragmatic and constructive foreign policy will result in an easing of international sanctions under the JCPOA. To understand who is ultimately in charge of the decision-making, it should be noted that according to Iran's constitution and in practice, Iran's Supreme Leader has the final say over all major foreign policy decisions.

All in all, in spite of Rouhani's multilateral diplomatic efforts, Iran's foreign policy toward the US is characterized by significant continuity. On one hand, these are pertinent to Iran's reproduction of institutionalized images and its practices of enmity toward the US, and to the significant deficits of trust and mutual understanding between the two states since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This reality identifies several changing power dynamics within the Iranian political spectrum, as well as significant geopolitical developments in the region, which are likely to act as long term 'push or pull' elements in formulating Iranian foreign policy; this limits the Rouhani administration's ability to maneuver in the course of foreign policy change. On the other hand, in attempting to negotiate with Iran, pressures and threats, direct or indirect, military, economic or diplomatic, can prove to be highly counterproductive.

Over the last four decades, in the internal structure of Iran there have been occasional flexibilities, some compromises, concessions, and balancing political acts in domestic politics with regards to culture, education, economy, and the social atmosphere. Ironically, the anti-

American and anti-Israeli foundations of Iran's foreign policy behavior have remained solid and very consistent at the regional and international levels. Two separate illusions have overshadowed this Iranian foreign policy behavior: first, that the Muslim world will embrace Iranian foreign policy and the revolutionary message that has not yet been materialized; second, the illusion that began in the 1990s that Iran would be able to separate the American and European objectives, allowing Iran to build an alliance with European states separate from the US. Both illusions have failed in the way that Iran has conducted its foreign policy.

The anti-Western doctrine, regional activism (in particular in the Middle East), and developing nuclear capabilities, provided ample opportunities for Iran's foreign policy key decision-makers to maintain the configuration of power within Iran. In other words, Iranian foreign policy has been at the service of maintaining domestic political order instead of pursuing ideological objectives. This foreign policy behavior has been substantiated by ideological-religious narratives, populist impulse, political isolation, and a resistance to alliances to pursue national goals in the regional and at the international level. We need to then look at the foreign policy decision-making structure in Iran. The group that makes the decisions is fundamentally an introverted group with little global exposure, and has a domestic agenda separate from Iran's national economy due to limited alternative narratives.

To date, neither the JCPOA, nor the newly imposed American sanctions, nor any particular American policy or strategy in the region has reduced Iran's regional influence and changed its staunch foreign policy course.[7] In the eyes of Iranian leaders, the American withdrawal from the JCPOA and the new economic sanctions that the Trump administration has placed on Iran are undoubtedly influenced by Israel and Saudi Arabia; both fear the growth of Iranian influence and power in the region.[8] The immediate consequence is that Iran will be able to more freely pursue its nuclear program; this greatly alienates the US from its European allies over Iran's nuclear issue. Three EU signatories to JCPOA urge the US not to tear up the Iranian nuclear deal, and believe no better alternative has been suggested by the Trump administration.[9] Growing tension between the Americans and Europeans on the Iranian nuclear deal is widening the strategic gap between the US and its EU allies over Iran's regional role, especially in the Middle East.[10]

Whether the JCPOA continues to operate despite the American's withdrawal, Iran will be an increasing challenge to the US and its regional allies' strategic interests in the Middle East, in particular in the Levant, Iraq, and Yemen. Although the American withdrawal from JCPOA has exacerbated Iran's economic conditions, it has led to greater unity in the domestic sphere. It has increased Iran's confidence in maintaining and maximizing its influence and power

[7] Amy Myers Jaffe, "The Complicated Geopolitics of U.S. Oil Sanctions on Iran," Council on Foreign Relations, May 25, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/complicated–geopolitics–us–oil–sanctions–iran.

[8] Zack Beauchamp, "2 Winners and 5 Losers from Trump's Iran Deal Withdrawal," VOX, May 8, 2018, https://www.vox.com/world/2018/5/8/17329052/iran–nuclear–deal–trump–winners–losers; Oliver Holmes, "Iran deal: How Trump's actions could flare violence in Middle East," *The Guardian*, May 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/09/iran–deal–how–trump–actions–could–flare–violence–in–middle–east; Adam Entous, "Donald Trump's New World Order: How the President, Israel, and the Gulf states plan to fight Iran—and leave the Palestinians and the Obama years behind," *The New Yorker,* June 18, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/donald–trumps–new–world–order.

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to contain adversaries throughout the neighboring regions. In the predictable future, Iran's foreign policy priorities will most likely focus on a continued confrontation with the Western world, and the West's regional allies in the Middle East. Unless unexpected internal and external developments occur and a paradigm shift emerges, Iran's foreign policy—neither direct confrontation nor normalization with the West—will remain unchanged.

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Abstracts in Turkish

Hükümet Değişiminden Çok Toplumsal Değişim: Arap Ayaklanmasından Sonra Müslüman-Çoğunluk Ülkelerde Dini Ayrımcılık

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Öz

Bu çalışmada Arap Ayaklanmalarından sonra Müslüman çoğunluğa sahip ülkelerde, 2009-2014 yılları arasında hükümetlerin din politikasındaki ve dinsel azınlıklara yönelik toplumsal ayrımcılıktaki değişimi Din ve Devlet 3 (RAS3) veri seti kullanılarak ve 49 Müslüman çoğunluğa sahip ülkeye ve bölgeye odaklanarak incelenmiştir. Geçiş dönemindeki topluluklardaki dinsel çoğulculuk üzerine parça parça var olan literatürün üzerine, Arap Ayaklanmaları sonrasında dinsel azınlıklara karşı hükümetlerin din politikasındaki ve toplumsal ayrımcılıktaki değişiklikleri açıklamak için inşa ediyoruz. Bu literatür, Arap Ayaklanmasını yaşayan ülkelerde diğer Müslüman çoğunluğa sahip ülkelere kıyasla her türlü ayrımcılığın artabileceğini ve özellikle toplumdaki din ayrımcılığında daha belirgin bir artış görülebileceğini çünkü toplumsal davranışların geçiş dönemlerinde hükümet politikasından daha hızlı değiştiğini savunmaktadır. Sonuçlar kısmen bu tahminlere uygundur. Arap Ayaklanması yaşayan ülkeler ile diğer Müslüman çoğunluğa sahip ülkeler kıyaslandığında; hükümetlerin din politikasındaki değişimleri açısından aralarında önemli bir fark bulunmamakla birlikte, Arap Ayaklanmasını yaşayan ülkelerde ayaklanmayan ülkelere kıyasla toplumsal din ayrımcılığı önemli ölçüde artmıştır. Din politikalarının ve dini ayrımcılığın doğasını anlamak, bölge siyasetinin dinamiklerini ve bölgedeki çatışmaların nasıl önlenebileceğini açığa çıkarmak için fırsat sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Ayaklanması, dini politika, toplumsal ayrımcılık, geçiş dönemindeki rejimler

Rekabetçi Cihadizm: Cihadist de facto Devletlerinin Hayatta Kalma Stratejilerini Anlamak

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Öz
IŞİD ile ilgili tartışmalar, IŞİD'in nasıl kavramsallaştırıldığı, amacının ne olduğu ve temel egemenlik alanını nasıl başarılı bir şekilde koruduğu ile ilgili sorulara değinmektedir. Bu çalışma, IŞİD'in cihatçılığı hayatta kalma stratejisi olarak kullanan de facto bir devlet olduğunu önererek bahsedilen soruları yanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır. "Rekabetçi cihatçılık" terimi, IŞİD'in cihatçılık temelinde Suriye ve Irak gibi metropol devletleri ile rekabet ettiğini iddia etmek için kullanılmıştır. Bu radikalleşmeye eğilimli Müslümanları çekmenin yanı sıra, metropol devletlerin cihatçılıklarındaki açıkları göstererek yabancı savaşçıları çekmeyi amaçlayan kasıtlı bir stratejidir. Araştırmanın gösterdiği üzere, ISIS bu oyunda yabancı savaşçılar için bir mıknatıs olarak başarılı olmuştur. Böylece askeri kabiliyetlerini artırabilmiş ve hayatta kalmaya devam edebilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: rekabetçi cihatçılık, De facto devletler, yabancı savaşçılar, DAEŞ

Çoklu Dualiteler: İran'ın Dış Politikasındaki Örüntüleri Aramak

Tuğba Bayar
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Öz
Bölgenin en önemli aktörlerinden biri olarak, İran'ın büyük güçlerle (ayrıca bölgesel güçler ve devlet dışı aktörlerle) etkileşimleri dikkatli inceleme altına alınmıştır. Bu makalede, tarihsel bir yaklaşım ele alınmış ve İran'ın dış politikasını incelemek için bir çerçeve önerilmiştir. Çerçeve, İran'ın dış politikasının bağımsız ve aracı değişkenlerini belirlemek için neo-klasik realist teori ışığında çok boyutlu bir yaklaşımla yapılandırılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, İran'ın dış politikasının bağımsız değişkenlerinin jeopolitik konumu, tehdit algılayış biçimi ve güç dengesi politikaları olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Belirtilen sistemsel değişkenlerin milliyetçilik, teolojik ve devrimci ideoloji ve politika oluşturma mekanizmalarından geçerek süzüldüğü görülmüştür.
Anahtar Kelimeler: dış politika, dış politika analizi, İran, Neo-klasik Realism

Başarısız Askeri Darbe Sonrası: Türk Ordusunda Örgütsel Reform Gereksinimi

Ramazan Erdağ
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Öz
Fethullah Terör Örgütü (FETÖ) liderliğinde 15 Temmuz 2016'daki başarısız askeri darbe girişimi, Türkiye'deki operasyonel düzeyde bir askeri reformun son derece acil bir konu olarak yeniden ele alınması gerektiğini göstermiştir. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti) hükümetleri, orduda kayda değer yapısal değişiklikler yaparak orduyu politik ve örgütsel olarak kontrol etmeye çalışmışlardır. Türkiye'de askeri reform ihtiyacı iki temel nedenden kaynaklanmaktadır: Darbe eylemi eğilimi ve ordunun etkinliğini artırma ihtiyacı. Bu makalede, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde stratejik düzeyde gerçekleşen reformların önemi vurgulanmaktadır. Ayrıca orduda sivil hükümetin zorluklarla başa çıkması için yapılması gereken örgütsel reform ihtiyacına işaret edilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: AK Parti, sivil-asker ilişkileri, başarısız darbe, Askeri reform, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı

Türkiye Hava ve Füze Savunması Atlı Karıncasını Anlamak

Sıtkı Egeli
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Öz
2013 yılında bir noktada, Türkiye'nin siyasi otoritesi, ülke içi kalkınma ve uzun menzilli hava ve füze savunma sistemlerinin üretimini öncelikli olarak ele almaya başladı. Kısa bir süre sonra, lisanslı üretim ve teknoloji transferi vaadi ile birlikte Çin'den gelen bir teklifi tercih etme kararını açıkladılar. Ancak, bu kararla birlikte NATO'nun entegrasyon ve bilgi güvenliği ile ilgili itirazları ve meydan okuması geldi. Çin yanlısı kararın geri alınmasına ilişkin 2015 kararı ve bunun yerine hava ve füze savunma sistemlerinin yerli gelişiminin (yabancı bir teknolojik ve endüstriyel ortak ile yakın bir şekilde) tercih edilmesi, Çin'in teknoloji transferi paketinin içeriğine olan ilgisizlikle tetiklendi. Daha sonra bu yeni partner Fransa ve İtalya'yı kapsayan bir ekip oldu; Türk endüstrisi, Avrupa'nın yeni nesil füze savunma yeteneğini geliştirmek için kendini bu takıma bağladı. Ardından 2017'de, Türk hükümetinin Rusya'daki bağımsız S-400 sistemlerini satın alma kararı geldi. Bu kural dışı karar teknik, operasyonel ve endüstriyel kriterleri kapsayan yukarıdan aşağıya bir karar döngüsünün tüm özelliklerine sahipti. Türkiye'nin siyasi aktörleri, S-400'ü, Batı'nın benzer sistemleri satmayı reddetmesinde dahil olarak, ülke içi üretimin ve teknolojilere erişiminin faydalarına değinerek meşrulaştırmış, ancak bu gerekçeler Rus tarafınca reddedilmiş ve/veya Türk kurumları, yetkilileri ve siyasi şahsiyetleri kendileriyle çelişkili ifadeler vermiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hava savunması, füze savuma, Türkiye savunma politikası, Türkiye savunma sanayi, NATO

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