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In This Issue

All Azimuth covers a broad range of topics in this issue, ranging from the role and efficacy of the UN to eclectic topics in Turkish foreign policy. The first contribution, by Eric Cox, concerns the role of the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The human rights functions of the UN System are often subject to controversy as critics have questioned the efficacy of basing the human rights review process on the recommendations of peer-states. Since the UPR is conducted by UN member states, it is expected that political favors can be exchanged, resulting in generous reviews for member states under scrutiny. To evaluate this claim, the article tests two hypotheses: a state's human rights record will not impact the numbers of human rights recommendations it receives as part of the UPR; and a state's human right record will not affect the percentage of action-oriented recommendations it will receive. Using data from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset to evaluate the human rights performance of states and weighing them against the UPR's processes in 2014, the article finds that poor human rights performances do indeed correlate with more recommendations to states, thus rejecting hypothesis one. As regards to hypothesis two, the study finds no significant relationship between its human rights performance and the strength of the recommendations it receives. In short, states have great leeway due to the horizontal peer-review process but the UPR is surprisingly relevant and useful for scrutinizing states and recommending relevant corrective measures concerning human rights issues.

The second article, by Ali Fisunoğlu, adopts the SIR (Susceptible – Infectious- Recovered) model from epidemiology, arguing that the way political conflicts tend to diffuse from one country to its neighbors by way of refugee flows exemplifies the behavior of infectious diseases. Specifically, the "infected" country becomes rife with political instability and internally displaced people, who may then move into neighboring countries. What makes this article remarkable is its innovative use of a computer simulation to gauge the dynamic interaction and interdependence of several variables, the most important ones being the intensity of conflict (dependent variable) and a state's relative political capacity (RPC). RPC, defined as a state's administrative competence as measured by its ability to extract resources from its population, is of paramount importance as it acts like the immune system of a country. The research concludes, therefore, that neighboring states with high-levels of RPC are less susceptible to the deleterious effects of civil war in their neighbors.

In the third article, James Scott and Brandy Scott examine the EU's foreign policy in the 1990-2010 period vis-à-vis its allocation of aid for democracy promotion abroad. Democracy promotion is a unique type of aid wholly distinct from other forms as it does seem to have a positive democratizing effect, but the process of how states allocate such scarce a resource like aid remains undertheorized. This article posits a "democracy-security dilemma" in which states face the choice of promoting an ideational agenda that helps to promote democracy or one that seeks to promote practical political, security, and economic goals. Using a series of random effects, generalized least squares, and Heckman selection models the article tests six hypotheses to investigate the conditions in which EU states are more likely to grant democracy promotion aid. The results show that EU countries often prioritize security and stability goals over democracy promotion ones as evidenced by their comparative reluctance to grant democracy aid to states that are highly authoritarian, politically unstable, or

vulnerable to terrorism as compared to already democratizing or more stable countries. In sum we are left with the grim reality that the democracy-security dilemma often seems to tilt in favor of the latter.

Our fourth article, by Ali Murat Kurşun, investigates the development of different notions of territoriality with respect to the construction of borders in the Post-Ottoman Middle East. The Sykes-Picot Agreement is attributed with the emergence of the modern Middle Eastern borders with its allegedly artificial borders. This article argues, however, that the treaty cannot be disaggregated from historical processes in the region or from other contemporary factors concerning the development of territories. Apart from its discussion of the nuances between different territorial concepts, like frontiers, boundaries, and borders, the article delves into specific case histories. It finds that succeeding attempts by the Ottoman government to reorganize its administrative divisions in combination with domestic conflicts, agreements, and practical issues over border demarcations, among other factors, informed the making of the modern Middle East. In sum, this contribution disabuses the reader of the myths surrounding the Sykes-Picot Agreement as the final arbiter of territorial arrangements in the region.

In the fifth article, Şevket Ovalı and İlkim Özdikmenli examine Turkey's alignment preferences using a neoclassical realist framework. The 'Western Question' in Turkey is an important dynamic that informs Turkey's foreign policy behavior in the short-term. While this dynamic manifested itself in more-secular forms of nationalism in earlier periods, modern anti-Westernism in Turkey exhibits a broadly Islamist appeal. By comparatively assessing the contexts of Turkish foreign policy and its relationship with the West during the Cyprus Crisis and the ongoing conflict in Syria, the article concludes that Turkey's relations with great powers at the level of the international system are ultimately the most decisive factor accounting for its long-term foreign policy alignments.

Like our penultimate study, the final article by Tarık Oğuzlu also evaluates the analytical utility of structural explanations. Turkey's foreign policy during the AKP period is often the subject of controversy since many of its policies can also be attributed to unit-level explanations. Turkey's foreign policy shifts, Oğuzlu argues, are not simply the product of domestic politics and the changing preferences of elites but rather a reaction to a changing international system. By providing a stylized overview of Turkey's foreign policy, the study argues that Turkey exhibited a realist foreign policy between 2002-2008 and explored a more-autonomous foreign policy in the 2009-2015 period. As unipolarity and Western primacy gave way to new multipolar configurations, Turkey began to realize that it could not rely indefinitely on the West as a source of security and had to explore alternative foreign policy options.

State Human Rights Performance and Recommendations under the Universal Periodic Review*

Eric Cox
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Abstract

This paper analyzes recommendations made to states under the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in order to determine whether or not the UPR is making meaningful recommendations to states under review. The UPR reviews the human rights of all UN Member States every four years. During the review, each state receives a number of recommendations from other UN member states. This paper uses data from UPR Info to determine if states with better human rights performance as measured by the CIRI human rights data project receive fewer recommendations than states with worse performance. It finds that, even when controlling for other factors, states with worse records on civil and political rights generally receive more recommendations than states with better records. States with lower scores from CIRI on women's economic and political rights receive more recommendations regarding women's issues than states with higher scores. These findings hold regardless of region, suggesting that, at a minimum, the UPR process is identifying violators of human rights.

Keywords: Human Rights, Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, United Nations, global governance

1. Introduction

On 15 March 2006, the United Nations General Assembly passed General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/251 to officially create the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), replacing the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and requiring the HRC to implement a Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a process to regularly review the human rights of every UN Member State. Unlike the process used by treaty bodies such as the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee, the UPR applies to all Member States, regardless of treaty ratifications, and can encompass discussion of any aspect of a state's rights performance.[1] While the General Assembly required the creation of such a mechanism, the details of the mechanism itself were left to the HRC, which, in 2007, passed A/HRC/RES/5/1 which, among, other things, established the mechanism the UPR would follow. Each year, 42 Member States are subject to review.[2] The UPR process itself was not specified

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[1] The Committee against Torture reviews states party to the Convention against Torture, while the Human Rights Committee reviews states party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

[2] During the first review cycle, 48 states were reviewed each year. This changed with the start of the second cycle of the review which began with the 13th session in 2012.

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by the General Assembly; rather, the HRC itself created the overall mechanism. As will be discussed below, the mechanism includes self-reports by states, contributions from civil society organizations, statements by other states, and a public discussion of each state's rights record at which other UN Member States can provide comments or questions to states under review. All Member States have now completed two full reviews. This article examines the nature of the recommendations made to Member States in an attempt to answer the question of whether or not these recommendations reflect states' actual human rights practices.

Much of the scholarly work on the UPR to date has focused on country or region-specific interactions with the process[3] or a focus on a particular subcategory of rights.[4] More systematic work has been done by the NGO UPR-Info, which is compiling information about the recommendations made under the UPR. Scholars using this dataset have provided more systematic accounts of the UPR.[5] This article uses data from UPR-Info to examine the degree to which recommendations made under the UPR reflect a state's actual human rights practice. To do so, it examines reports from the first full cycle of the UPR and reviews made through 2014 under the second cycle, totaling 126 additional states.[6] The article finds that a state's human rights performance does impact the recommendations made to it even when controlling for time, region, and economic size. In short, as a state's human rights performance gets worse, it receives more recommendations through the UPR. While this article makes no claims regarding whether or not these recommendations lead to improvement in human rights outcomes, the finding that, despite criticisms of the UPR, it is resulting in recommendations being made to states in a manner that is reflective of their human rights performance, is important.

This article will proceed by first providing background on the UPR process itself, followed by a discussion both of existing UPR research and human rights research more generally before presenting the data and conclusions.

2. The Universal Periodic Review

Essentially, the UPR consists of three main stages, an initial review of a state's current human rights situation, implementation of accepted recommendations, and a report on progress

[3] Rhona K. M. Smith, "Equality of 'Nations Large and Small': Testing the Theory of the Universal Periodic Review in the Asia–Pacific," *Asia–Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law* 12, no. 2 (2011): 36–54; Rhona K. M. Smith, "'To See Themselves as Others See Them': The Five Permanent Members of the Security Council and the Human Right Council's Universal Periodic Review," *Human Rights Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2013): 1–32; Laura K. Landolt, "Externalizing Human Rights: From Commission to Council, the Universal Periodic Review and Egyp," *Human Rights Review* 14, no. 2 (2013): 107–29; Natalie Baird, "The Role of International Non–Governmental Organizations in the Universal Periodic Review of Pacific Island States: Can "Doing Good" be done Better?," *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 16, no. 2 (2015): 1–37.

[4] Alan Desmond, "The Triangle that could Square the Circle? The UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, the EU and the Universal Periodic Review," *European Journal of Migration and Law* 17, no. 1 (2015): 39–69; Gayatri Patel, "How 'Universal' is the United Nations' Universal Periodic Review Process? An Examination of the Discussions Held on Polygamy," *Human Rights Review* 18, no. 4 (2017): 459–83.

[5] Edward McMahon and Marta Ascherio, "A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council," *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 18, no. 2 (2012): 231–48; Edward McMahon, Kojo Busia, and Marta Ascherio, "Comparing Peer Reviews: The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council and the African Peer Review Mechanism," *African and Asian Studies* 12, no. 3 (2013): 266–89; Rochelle Terman and Erik Voeten, "The Relational Politics of Shame: Evidence from the Universal Periodic Review," *Review of International Organizations* 13, no. 1 (2018): 1–23; Mi Hwa Hong, "Legal Commitments to United Nations Human Rights Treaties and Higher Monitoring Standards in the Universal Periodic Review," *Journal of Human Rights* (02/21, 2018): 1–14.

[6] The order of selection was not entirely random; states elected to the HRC were the first to be reviewed. The data presented here do not use the full second cycle of the review for two reasons. The first is more practical: at the time this data was compiled, not all reviews had been coded by UPR–Info. The second is the lack of updating of other data used to measure the human rights performances of states, making the temporal gap between the measure of the independent variable (state human rights performance) and the dependent variable (recommendations from the UPR) larger. While other databases exist for the independent variable, the comprehensiveness of CIRI led to my choosing it.

made since the previous review.[7] The review is conducted by the UPR Working Group, which consists of all 47 members of the Human Rights Council. The Working Group then uses three documents to guide the review of a Member State: 1) the State Report, a self-critique submitted by the national government under review; 2) the UN Summary Report, which is organized by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and contains reports of treaty bodies and special procedures concerning the state under review; and 3) the Stakeholder Summary Report, a report compiled by the OHCHR containing additional information provided by appropriate stakeholders, including national human rights institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations.

During the UPR Working Group session, the state under review first presents its national report on the human rights situation in the country. The state under review also has the opportunity to address questions submitted in advance. After the national government's presentation, an interactive dialogue takes place. During this time, any UN Member State is allowed to ask questions and make recommendations to the state under review. The state under review is then allowed to respond to oral questions, comments and recommendations made. Additionally, the state under review may make specific commitments to improve human rights.

Following the UPR Working Group session, the troika, a committee made up of three Human Rights Council members, prepares the Outcome Report. This document contains a summary of the recommendations made during the UPR Working Group session and the state under review's responses to those recommendations – states have the option of accepting recommendations, taking them under advisement, or rejecting them. Within two weeks after the Working Group session, the UPR Working Group meets to adopt the Outcome Report. Finally, the UN Human Rights Council must also adopt the Outcome Report before the UPR process is complete.

Over the next four years, the state reviewed has the duty to implement the recommendations contained in the final Outcome Report that it has accepted. According to the OHCHR, "the state has the primary responsibility to implement the recommendations contained in the final outcome." During the following review of a state, the state must provide evidence of how the recommendations made during the previous review have been implemented.[8]

2.1. Current research

Current reviews of the UPR are mixed regarding its effectiveness, noting both strengths and weaknesses. For example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that early in the process certain states, including Saudi Arabia and Mexico, made either significant commitments to improve specific rights or seriously considered comments from civil society regarding the existing rights conditions in their countries during the process. At the same time, HRW also discusses certain shortcomings, including the weakness of having a review that is essentially conducted by peer states. The problem is that the subsequent review tends to be very general with little meaningful inclusion of human rights experts in the final report of the committee. Additionally, states under review need not provide immediate responses – or any response at

[7] This third stage did not occur until the second round of reviews began in 2012.

[8] For a full discussion of the UPR process, see the Human Rights Councils FAQ regarding the UPR at "Basic facts about the UPR," United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed January 11, 2019, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BasicFacts.aspx.

all – to suggestions made during the process.[9] Amnesty International echoed these problems early in the process, particularly noting that the quality of the reviews depended in large part on the states under review.[10] The reviews of the UPR by HRW and Amnesty have largely been anecdotal, though they have provided useful insight on individual country reports. They have not released broad data examining trends in the reports.[11]

As noted above, scholars examining the UPR have examined its effectiveness in different ways. Dominguéz Redondo praised the first session of the UPR for working to depoliticize the process, noting the active participation of so many members of the HRC during the interactive dialogue with Member States.[12] Sweeney and Saito, alternatively, expressed frustration with Member States that stacked the speakers' list during their review session with supporters, thereby limiting the number of critical voices during the process, a frustration echoed by Abebe and McMahon and Ascherio.[13] This theme is also picked up by Davies, who discusses the challenges involved in shifting to a more cooperative approach in dealing with human rights enforcement.[14] A common theme in critiques – and praise – of the new mechanisms is that it is not intended as a review of specific rights practices, but rather is intended to provide advice and assistance to states on how to address human rights concerns.[15]

This early work provided critiques (or support) of the process generally without delving deeply into particular topics or the totality of the review process. More recent works have looked more particularly at the process of the review for particular countries, regions and issues. Smith tests the argument that the UPR treats all states equally. She compares the first cycle review of China and Nauru, finding significant overlap in the countries commenting on their rights practice and the substantive process followed.[16] In a subsequent work, Smith argues that the UPR exposed that the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China), are not paragons of human rights performance as demonstrated by their reviews and that they have not been great champions of the UPR.[17] Landolt uses Egypt's review to argue that the UPR has provided domestic NGOs a new institutional tool to affect rights discourse and practice in their home

[9] "Curing the Selectivity Syndrome: The 2011 Review of the Human Rights Council," Human Rights Watch, June 24, 2010, accessed January 11, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/06/24/curing–selectivity–syndrome/2011–review–human–rights–council#; "UN: Nations show True Colors at Rights Review," Human Rights Watch, February 13, 2009, accessed January 11, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/02/13/un–nations–show–true–colors–rights–review.

[10] "United Nations Human Rights Council: Universal Periodic Review: The Fourth Round of Reviews Yields Mixed Results," Amnesty International, March 9, 2009, accessed January 11, 2009, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/48000/ior420012009en.pdf.

[11] It must also be noted that both Amnesty International and HRW are participants in the process. During the materials gathering phase, both Amnesty and HRW provide recommendations to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for consideration during each state's review.

[12] Elvira Domínguez Redondo, "The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the First Session," *Chinese Journal of International Law* 7, no. 3 (11, 2008): 721–34.

[13] Gareth Sweeney and Yuri Saito, "An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council," *Human Rights Law Review* 9, no. 2 (2009): 203–23; McMahaon and Ascherio, "A Step Ahead," 236–37; Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, "Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council," *Human Rights Law Review* 9, no. 1 (2009): 19–20. Abebe notes that "out of 65 statements during the review of Tunisia, 50 'favorable' statements were made, mainly by African and Muslim countries. …Non–Western countries presented rather critical observations of the human rights situations in the UK…. But Similar reaction towards reports by developing countries were absent." Likewise, U.S. Ambassador Mark Cassayre, in a 2009 speech before the HRC, warned against states abusing the UPR process to shield themselves from criticism.

[14] Mathew Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 35, no. 4 (Oct, 2010): 449–68.

[15] Marisa Viégas–Silva, "El Nuevo Consejo De Derechos Humanos De La Organización De Las Naciones Unidas: Algunas Consideractiones Sobre Su Creación y Su Primer Año De Funcionamiento," *Revista Colombiana De Derecho Internacional* no. 12 (10, 2008): 35–66.

[16] Smith, "Equality of 'Nations Large and Small.'"

[17] Smith, "'To See Themselves as Others See Them.'"

country.[18]

Other works have looked at the UPR's effect on particular categories of rights and the interplay of the UPR with other human rights institutions. For example, Desmond examines the use of the UPR to spread awareness and promote ratification of the UN Migrant Convention,[19] while Patel uses the frame of universalism versus cultural relativism to analyze the approach states have made regarding polygamy in the review process.[20] McMahon, et. al. compare the UPR to the African Peer Review Mechanism.[21] In considering the institutional attributes of the UPR, Baird explores the challenges NGOs in the Pacific region have in being heard in the face of participation by international NGOs that submit more information than the local NGOs.[22] Milewicz and Goodin discuss the capacity of the UPR to improve the deliberative capacity of the UN on human rights issues, including dialogue with states that have poor human rights records.[23] Cowan and Billaud examine the particulars of the three hour review process itself, finding that the manner of review has made it easier for western countries to participate than countries in the developing world, particularly those with limited resources such as small island states. They argue that the UPR is in danger of falling into an "older model of tutelage in which an enlightened West guides a backward non-West in its efforts to 'catch up' with the norms that the West has set.[24] Echoing this more ethnographic study, Carraro uses a survey of member state delegations and interviews that find that the UPR is commonly perceived as highly politicized.[25]

Fewer works have taken a more systematic approach to looking at the recommendations as a whole. McMahon and Acherio, in a first cut of descriptive data, provided a breakdown of the number of recommendations made overall, the strength of those recommendations, as well as the responses to them, all broken down by region, work continued by McMahon and Johnson.[26] More recently, Terman and Voeten and Hong have explored specific types of recommendations on a more systematic scale.[27] Terman and Voeten are concerned with the shaming power of rights; in their study they examine the strength of recommendations states make to strategic partners versus other states as well as the types of responses those recommendations generate. They find that states are more lenient with their strategic partners, but also that states under review are more likely to accept recommendations from those partners. Hong finds that both democratic and non-democratic states that have ratified more human rights treaties are more likely to make recommendations encouraging states to make greater commitments to human rights instruments, while only democracies are more likely to call for specific domestic reforms.

The overall picture painted of the UPR is that it is a politicized process beset by many

[18] Landolt, "Externalizing Human Rights."

[19] Desmond, "The Triangle that could Square the Circle."

[20] Patel, "How 'Universal.'"

[21] McMahon, "Comparing Peer Reviews."

[22] Baird, "The Role of International Non–Governmental Organizations."

[23] Karolina M. Milewicz and Robert E. Goodin, "Deliberative Capacity Building through International Organizations: The Case of the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights," *British Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 2 (2018): 513–33, doi:10.1017/S0007123415000708.

[24] Jane K. Cowan and Julie Billaud, "Between Learning and Schooling: The Politics of Human Rights Monitoring at the Universal Periodic Review," *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 6 (06/03, 2015): 1187–88.

[25] Valentina Carraro, "The United Nations Treaty Bodies and Universal Periodic Review: Advancing Human Rights by Preventing Politicization?" *Human Rights Quarterly* 39, no. 4 (2017): 943–70.

[26] McMahon and Ascherio, "A Step Ahead;" Edward McMahon and Elissa Johnson, *Evolution Not Revolution: The First Two Cycles of the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review Mechanism* (Germany: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016.

[27] Terman and Voeten, "The Relational Politics of Shame;" Hong, "Legal Commitments".

problems, including the possibility that it makes participation by both developing states and NGOs difficult. The larger scale analyses demonstrate that many Member States concur with the view that the process is politicized, and the finding that states are more lenient to their strategic partners (and that states are more willing to listen to strategic partners) does nothing to dispel that possibility. What these studies have not done is to determine whether or not the recommendations made to states under review are reflective of their human rights practice. This article fills that gap by answering the question of whether or not states with worse human rights records receive more recommendations than states with better human rights records.

2.2. Examining the UPR

This article is not making a broad theoretical claim – it is driven by the simple question of whether or not a state's human rights record impacts the results of its review. If the critics of the UPR are correct and states are able to manipulate the system by arranging for friendly speakers who prevent meaningful discussion of a state's rights practice, we should see that reflected in the recommendations made to states. In particular, we should find that there is little relationship between a state's human rights practices and the recommendations made to it during the process. If the proponents of the UPR are correct, we should find that a relationship does indeed exist. This leads to the paper's primary hypothesis.

> H1: A state's human rights record will have little impact on the number of recommendations made to it during the UPR process.

A second question the paper attempts to answer is related to the first: what kind of recommendations are being made to states? UPR info categorizes each recommendation made on a five-point scale reflecting the reality that not all recommendations call for states to take action; indeed some recommendations actually reaffirm poor human rights practices.[28] It is possible that a state may receive a large number of recommendations, but that many of those recommendations are not serious. For example, if a state is able to stack the speakers' list with supportive allies, it may receive a large number of recommendations, but a relatively low percentage of action-oriented recommendations. This leads to hypothesis two:

> H2: A state's human rights record will not affect the percentage of action-oriented recommendations it receives during the UPR process.

2.3. Data

To test this hypothesis, this paper analyzes recommendations made during the first cycle of the UPR in which every Member State of the UN – including the most recent member, South Sudan – went under review, and the first 126 reviews under the second cycle.[29] While the UPR quickly evolved during the first several sessions, this study includes all sessions. As will be discussed later, however, the study will introduce a control for earlier sessions in the statistical analysis. The analysis compares a state's human rights record based on select indicators from the CIRI dataset to recommendations made during the UPR.

[28] See "UPR Info's Database: Action category," UPR Info, accessed January 11, 2019, https://www.upr–info.org/database/files/Database_Action_Category.pdf. Rank 1 refers to recommendations that encourage the state under review to seek help; Rank 2 emphasize that a state should continue along its current trajectory; Rank 3 recommends the state consider change. The final 2 categories encourage a state to take actions with Rank 5 being more specific in its request than Rank 4.

[29] Data for one country in the first cycle, Nicaragua, was unavailable in a usable format from UPR–Info when the data for this project was compiled. The explanation for why only 126 countries in the second cycle is made above.

To determine how many recommendations states received during the UPR, this paper draws on data from UPR-Info.[30] UPR-Info has catalogued every recommendation made under the UPR through both cycles of the process thus far. Each recommendation is categorized according to the thematic issue covered, the nature of the response to the recommendation, and the type of action recommended. The thematic issue coverage is comprehensive: each recommendation is given at least 1 of 54 tags, and a recommendation that references multiple issues may be given more tags.[31]

To prepare the data for analysis, reports for every country were downloaded. If a recommendation was tagged with multiple issues, I counted it as a recommendation for each issue for which it was tagged. If a recommendation had two tags, it was counted as two recommendations. I then summed the number of recommendations in each category.[32] Finally, I totaled all the recommendations made (using the expanded number), then created a subcategory of civil and political recommendations using a summation of eighteen of the categories used by UPR-Info.[33]

To categorize each state's human rights performance, I use the CIRI dataset.[34] In particular, I used the Empowerment Rights Index (new) indicator, which sums seven indicators and ranges from 0 (no government respect for these rights) to 14 (full government respect),[35] and created a summative variable from the Women's Economic Rights and Women's Political Rights indicators. This indicator runs from 0 (no respect for women's rights) to 6 (full respect for women's rights). For all but two states during the first cycle, I used the CIRI indicator for the year prior to their review rather than the year of review under the theory that most information collected for the review will occur prior to the year of the review. The first exception is South Sudan, which first appears in CIRI's dataset in 2011 – its first year of existence and the year it underwent review. The other exception is Ethiopia. Data for the Women's Political Rights indicator was missing for the year prior to its review; however, Ethiopia scored a 2 the year before and the year after data was missing. Therefore, I assigned Ethiopia a 2 for that year. For the second cycle, I used data for 2011, the last year for which CIRI data was available.

Finally, each state was placed into its UN region based on CIRI's categorization. While imperfect, this categorization system uses large enough regions so that each region can be individually analyzed with the exception of North America, which only contains three states. The regions are: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and Caribbean, North America, and Oceania. While these regions do not overlap perfectly with the UN system of categorization, the two are similar.

[30] All UPR–Info data is available at: http://www.upr–info.org/en. Earlier versions of this paper used a dataset created by the authors and research assistants; the original work on that project was developed independently of UPR–Info. Since that original project, UPR–Info has become the standard repository used by those studying the UPR. As a result, this version of this paper uses data entirely from UPR–Info.

[31] "UPR Info's Database: Issue Categorisation," UPR–Info, accessed September 21, 2018, https://www.upr–info.org/database/files/Database_Issues_explanation.pdf.

[32] This method is used to capture the full scope of the recommendations made; this could artificially create more recommendations for some states than others, but the alternative would be to pick one categorization for recommendations that addresses multiple issue areas.

[33] Those 18 are civil society, corruption, counter–terrorism, CP rights–general, death penalty, detention conditions, elections, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, freedom of association, freedom of movement, freedom of opinion, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, minorities, public security, racial discrimination, and torture.

[34] David L. Cingranelli, David L. Richards and K. C. Clay, "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset. Version 2014.04.14," accessed September 21, 2018, http://www.humanrightsdata.com.

[35] Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self–Determination, and Freedom of Religion.

2.4. Testing the hypotheses

To test hypothesis one positing that a state's human rights performance is not associated with the number of recommendations made to a state, this paper uses simple linear regression models. These models are designed to determine if, at a base level, a state's human rights performance as measured by data from a major human rights index is in any way related to the number of recommendations received by a state.

2.5. Primary independent and dependent variables

Models 1-6 are primarily concerned with civil and political rights. The primary independent variable of interest is the CIRI Empowerment Rights Index mentioned above for the state under review. The dependent variable is the summative total of civil and political rights recommendations rated as a four or five for action for each state under review calculated from UPR-Info's data. The dependent variable focuses on action-oriented recommendations rather than all recommendations in order to ensure that what is being measured are reasonable critiques of a state's human rights practice rather than disingenuous or non-specific recommendations made to states so that they can avoid scrutiny.[36] The subset of civil and political recommendations is used rather than using total recommendations as the CIRI Empowerment Rights Index is more concerned with civil and political rights than with other rights covered during the review, including economic and social rights and recommendations related to international institutions.[37]

Models 6-12 are primarily concerned with a similar analysis of recommendations regarding women's issues. In this case, the summative variable from CIRI for Women's Economic Rights + Women's Political Rights is used as the independent variable, with the single category of Women's Rights from UPR-Info being used as the dependent variable. Models 1-12 are primarily concerned with testing hypothesis one regarding a state's human rights performance and the number of recommendations it receives.

Finally, Models 13-18 revert to using CIRI's Empowerment Rights Index as the primary independent variable while using the percentage of recommendations a state receives that are categorized as an action category (receiving a 4 or 5) as the dependent variable. This model tests hypothesis two regarding whether or not a states human rights performance affects its likelihood of receiving a higher percentage of strong recommendations.

2.6. Control variables

Following Achen,[38] this study uses only limited control variables that I have reason to believe may have some impact on the variables of interest. The first set of control variables relates to a state's relative size and influence in the global community. While it is not necessarily the case that influential states will draw more attention, it is not implausible. For example, in 2010, the United States of America received 507 total recommendations while the average number of recommendations for the other 46 states under review was 222.5. To measure the relative size and importance of a country, two variables will be used: the log of state population and log of state GDP. GDP is used instead of per capita GDP as the control is for the state's overall

[36] In other words, it focuses on recommendations scored as either 4 or 5 by UPR–Info.

[37] See David Cingranelli and David L. Richards, "The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project," *Human Rights Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2010): 403–04.

[38] Christopher H. Achen, "Let's Put Garbage–can Regressions and Garbage–can Probits Where they Belong," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22 (2005): 327–28–39.

size rather than the per capita distribution of wealth. As an example, Luxemburg's per capita income is approximately three times that of China's, but I would expect China to draw more attention. For both variables, the number used will be from the year prior to the review, just as with the independent variables from CIRI. These control variables will be used both for the models testing civil and political rights and women's rights. Both variables are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

The second set of control variables is focused on the regions under review. One criticism noted above of the UPR is that states are able to "stack" the review process with friendly states. We may find that some regions are better able to manipulate the results of the process than other regions, or that regions with higher levels of human rights performance may be more likely to make recommendations related to human rights performance. To address this, a separate dummy variable is created for each region in the CIRI database, scored 0 if the state is not in the region and 1 if it is. A separate model is run controlling for each region other than North America.[39]

A final control variable relates to whether the review was in an early or late session of the UPR. As a new institution, the number of recommendations made in early sessions of the UPR was much lower than in later sessions. For example, in the first session, states received an average of 47.4 recommendations, while by session 4 states received an average of 191.3 recommendations. After a slight dip in session 5 to 176.6 recommendations, the average number of recommendations per session rose above 200 and has been fairly stable. This variable codes the first 8 sessions as 0, while the subsequent sessions studied here (9-21) are coded as 1.

3. Results

3.1. Models 1-6

Table one presents results for the first six models which examine the relationship between the Empowerment Rights Index and the number of strong Civil and Political Rights recommendations a state receives. Model 1 contains no regional controls, but does contain the controls for early vs. late sessions, GDP log, and Populations log. Models 2-6 each contain a regional control. No model is run for North America as the region contains only three states.

[39] An alternative way of controlling for region that ran the basic model only on states from a region without comparing them to the rest of the world found similar results for the primary independent variables.

Table 1- Civil and Political Recommendations

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
(Constant)	-31.49**	-20.99	-31.49**	-16.811	-30.85**	-27.67*
	(13.997)	(15.200)	(14.021)	(14.745)	(13.926)	(14.825)
NEW_EMPINX	-3.70***	-3.70***	-3.70***	-3.94***	-3.51***	-3.69***
	(0.370)	(0.369)	(0.431)	(0.375)	(0.379)	(0.371)
Early vs. Late	27.82***	27.99***	27.82***	28.18***	27.76***	27.87***
	(2.696)	(2.689)	(2.700)	(2.667)	(2.682)	(2.698)
GDP_log	3.77***	2.81***	3.77***	2.40**	3.70***	3.660***
	(0.922)	(1.073)	(0.942)	(1.028)	(0.918)	(0.934)
POP_log	0.238	1.155	0.239	1.3723	0.294	0.179
	(1.090)	(1.208)	(1.098)	(1.147)	(1.084)	(1.093)
Africa		-6.09*				
		(3.500)				
Asia			0.0522			
			(3.631)			
Europe				10.63***		
				(3.698)		
LAC					-7.39**	
					(3.565)	
Oceania						-4.44
						(5.648)
R-squared	0.488	0.493	0.488	0.501	0.495	0.489
Adjusted R-square	0.481	0.484	0.479	0.493	0.487	0.480
No. Observations	311	311	311	311	311	311

*Notes: Unstandardized coefficient with standard error in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.*

The way the Empowerment Rights Index is coded, if states with worse records receive more recommendations, the coefficient for that variable should be negative as a higher Empowerment Rights score from CIRI equates to better performance. As can be seen, in each model, the coefficient is negative and is significant at the 99% confidence level. The effect size stays relatively consistent across models; in general, for each point of improvement on CIRI's scale, a state receives almost four additional recommendations.

Turning to the controls, as expected, states with later reviews receive significantly more recommendations, with a significance at the 99% confidence level in models. Likewise, GDP Log is significant in every model, though the effect is slightly smaller in Europe. Population, on the other hand, is not significant in any model.[40] The most interesting control given criticisms of the UPR are probably the regional controls. African and Latin American States receive significantly fewer recommendations than other regions, while European states receive more. The difference in recommendations for both Asia and Oceania was not significant.

3.2. Models 7-12

Table two shows results for models 7-12. In each of these models, the primary explanatory variable is the combined Women's Rights index calculated from CIRI, while the dependent variable is the number of recommendations coded as Women and receiving an action category of 4 or 5 by UPR-Info. All models contain the early vs late, GDP log and Population log controls. As above, models 8-12 each test a different regional control.

[40] Run without GDP, population becomes significant in each model.

Table 2- Women's Rights Recommendations

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
(Constant)	24.02***	23.26***	23.35***	22.22***	23.52***	22.05(***)
	(5.357)	(5.883)	(5.420)	(5.620)	(5.380)	(5.726)
wecon+wepol	-2.20***	-2.21***	-2.38***	-2.07***	-2.26***	-2.15***
	(0.531)	(0.532)	(0.573)	(0.545)	(0.534)	(0.534)
Early vs. Late	11.97***	11.96***	11.97***	11.92***	11.98***	11.94***
	(1.078)	(1.080)	(1.078)	(1.079)	(1.078)	(1.078)
GDP_log	-1.23***	-1.16**	-1.153	-1.05**	-1.22***	-1.20***
	(0.410)	(0.470)	(0.421)	(0.444)	(0.411)	(0.412)
POP_log	1.59***	1.52***	1.57***	1.42***	1.60***	1.65***
	(0.445)	(0.496)	(0.446)	(0.471)	(0.445)	(0.449)
Africa		0.442				
		(1.405)				
Asia			-1.122			
			(1.346)			
Europe				-1.58		
				(1.494)		
LAC					1.42	
					(1.397)	
Oceania						2.20
						(2.261)
R-squared	0.361	0.361	0.362	0.363	0.363	0.363
Adjusted R-square	0.353	0.351	0.352	0.353	0.353	0.352
No. Observations	310	310	310	310	310	310

*Notes: Unstandardized coefficient with standard error in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.*

The results here are similar to the results in Models 1-6. In every model, the effect of improved women's rights in the CIRI scale leads to fewer women's rights recommendations. The controls are somewhat different, however. While GDP is significant for most models, it is not in Model 9 which uses Asia as a control. Interestingly, in every model, the Population log variable is significant and positive, suggesting states with higher populations receive more recommendations regarding women's rights. No region, however, receives a significantly different number of women's rights recommendations.

3.3. Models 13-18

Table three contains results for Models 13-18 which examine the relationship between the Empowerment Rights Index and the percentage of strong recommendations a state receives, introducing the same controls as the previous models. These models have mixed results. While Models 15 and 16 (introducing controls for Asia and Europe respectively), do show that states with a better Empowerment Rights score receive a lower percentage of strong recommendations, the effect is small. The data do suggest that in early vs. late matters in every model, as do both GDP and Population, except in the model looking at Africa. The only two regions that show significance are Africa (Model 14) and Europe (Model 15), both of which have a higher percentage of states receiving strong recommendations at a significant level. Importantly, however, none of these models have a particularly strong fit.

Table 3- Percentage of Strong Recommendations Here

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
(Constant)	90.29***	84.13***	90.39***	96.06***	90.48***	95.91***
	(7.843)	(8.513)	(7.829)	(8.319)	(7.842)	(8.257)
NEW_EMPINX	-0.32	-0.32	-0.50**	-0.42**	-0.26	-0.30
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.240)	(0.212)	(0.213)	(0.206)
Early vs. Late	4.16***	4.06***	4.15***	4.30***	4.14***	4.24***
	(1.511)	(1.506)	(1.508)	(1.505)	(1.510)	(1.503)
GDP_log	-1.14**	-0.57	-0.99*	-1.68***	-1.16**	-1.30**
	(0.517)	(0.601)	(0.526)	(0.580)	(0.517)	(0.520)
POP_log	1.21**	0.67	1.11*	1.66**	1.23**	1.12*
	(0.611)	(0.676)	(0.613)	(0.647)	(0.611)	(3.146)
Africa		3.57*				
		(1.960)				
Asia			-2.97			
			(2.027)			
Europe				4.18**		
				(0.046)		
LAC					-2.22	
					(2.008)	
Oceania						-6.53**
						(3.146)
R-squared	.056	0.066	0.63	0.068	0.060	0.069
Adjusted R-square	.044	0.051	0.047	0.053	0.044	0.054
No. Observations	311	311	311	311	311	311

*Notes: Unstandardized coefficient with standard error in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p0.1.*

3.4. Discussion

The initial read of the data suggests that the UPR process is providing recommendations to states based on their human rights performance at least to an extent. When looking at civil and political rights in particular, states with a higher score on empowerment rights do receive fewer recommendations, contrary to hypothesis one. The control variables do improve the overall fit of the models addressing civil and political rights, particularly the timing of the session and the size of a state's GDP. This second variable suggests that states that are larger parts of the global economy may draw more attention than smaller states, consistent with the expected direction of the control variable.

The regional controls also provide mixed news. While a state's human rights record continues to play a role in determining the number of recommendations a state gets, fears about states "stacking the deck" appear to be supported by the data[41]. African and Latin American states in particular received fewer strong civil and political recommendations than other regions, while European states received more. As noted, however, human rights performance still mattered in determining the number of recommendations a state received.

The data on women's rights also leads us to reject hypothesis one regarding a state's human rights performance and the number of recommendations received. In every region, states with better scores from CIRI on women's rights received fewer women's rights recommendations in the UPR. Further, in this set of models, no region was significant. Stacking the deck on women's rights appears not to be occurring. Unlike the civil and political rights models, population was significant, with larger states receiving more attention. At the same time, GDP worked in the opposite direction; states with larger GDPs received significantly fewer recommendations in all models except that controlling for Asia. Any argument about why these two variables operated in separate directions is speculative; while one could surmise that a stronger GDP results in more respect for women's rights and fewer recommendations, that should be captured by the human rights performance variable and would be better tested using GDP per capita. The control for population, on the other hand, works in the expected direction: larger states receive more attention.

In contrast to the models testing hypothesis one, the models testing hypothesis two find no strong relationship between a state's human rights performance and the percentage of "strong" recommendations it receives. Even in the models where the variable is significant, the effect is small. While this finding could be discouraging to the idea that a state's human rights performance leads it to receive stronger recommendations, the finding for this paper does suggests that the *absolute* number of strong recommendations does go up for states with worse human rights records.

Finally, though the results are not provided here, all the civil and political models were run with a dependent variable using all civil and political recommendations, not just those ranked 4 or 5. All models using women's rights were similarly run using all women's recommendations as a dependent variable. The findings were essentially unchanged – states with worse human rights records receive more recommendations.

4. Conclusion and Next Steps

The UPR has not been perfect. In addition to the anecdotal evidence of states attempting

[41] Sweeney and Saito, "An NGO Assessment," 203–23; Abebe, "Of Shaming and Bargaining," 1–35; McMahaon and Ascherio, "A Step Ahead," 236–7.

to thwart the system or not engage it fully, the process itself has gone through growing pains. Particularly in the early phases of the UPR, few standards appeared to exist as to how to conduct the reviews. Beyond the results reported here, the early outcome reports from the UPR were rarely written in a consistent format potentially leading to considerable inconsistency between reports. Even the writing style used for each report changed over time. Additionally, for the full first cycle and part of the second, states could essentially ignore recommendations or simply choose not to respond. As noted above, this process has already evolved; for example, after the initial sessions the number of recommendations per state began to stabilize.[42] Additionally, the HRC itself has made changes to the process making it more likely that states will engage the recommendations made.

This study also does not consider whether or not the actual recommendations are being implemented. While the NGO UPR-Info released a mid-term report in 2014 that indicated that more than half of accepted recommendations had led to a response by states under review in their mid-term implementation assessments, this report does not necessarily demonstrate that human rights conditions have measurably been improved in states due to the UPR.[43]

The UPR is an imperfect mechanism; its creation was inherently political, a result of the negotiations surrounding the replacement of the Commission on Human Rights. The final review itself is conducted primarily by fellow members of the UN, not necessarily experts, though other stakeholders do have some input. The process itself continues to evolve. Nonetheless, the data presented here suggest that the results of a state's review do somewhat reflect the actual practice of human rights in a state. Future research should examine the degree to which participation in the UPR and the addressing of recommendations leads to measurable improvement in human rights conditions in member states of the UN.

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[42] McMahon and Johnson, *Evolution, not Revolution,* discuss the number of recommendations made across cycles and sessions.

[43] "Beyond Promises: The Impact of UPR on the Ground," UPR Info, 2014, accessed January 11, 2019, https://www.upr–info.org/sites/default/files/general–document/pdf/2014_beyond_promises.pdf.

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A Dynamic Model of the Spread of Intrastate War

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Abstract

The spread of intrastate war has gained increasing prominence, especially in the recent past. This paper studies the spread of intrastate war as a result of another intrastate war in a neighboring country using a system dynamics modeling approach. The model employed is a modification of the SIR, a spread of disease model taken from epidemiology. Revising the SIR model with relevant political and economic variables, the model seeks to explain the mechanism through which an intrastate conflict is spread from an "infected" country to a "susceptible" country. Although diffusion and contagion of civil wars have been widely examined in the past, a dynamic modeling approach has not been adequately used in this area. Consistent with the existing literature, the results of the model suggest that refugees are a means to carry the conflict disease from the initial country by disturbing economic and social dynamics of the host whereas political capacity acts as the immune system, reducing the likelihood of conflict contagion. The results of the simulations, obtained using theoretical parameters, are mainly consistent with the expectations.

Keywords: Intrastate conflict, refugees, state capacity, diffusion of war, system dynamics models

1. Introduction

Several key studies examine the causes of the diffusion, contagion, or spread of war. In this paper, I tackle this important phenomenon and endeavor to explain the dynamics of the spread of war through a modification of the SIR (Susceptible – Infectious – Recovered, which is an epidemiological model that portraits the spread of disease) to better analyze the spread of intrastate war and develop policy recommendations. The modification of the SIR model includes political, social, and economic factors to provide a theoretical illustration of how the conflict in one nation can induce conflict in another and how the spread of conflict can be prevented.

The paper starts with the presentation of the research question and review of the literature on the previous studies that focus on the spread of conflict. This is followed by a comprehensive review of the model of choice for this paper: System dynamics approach. After the examination of the model, the paper proceeds to delve into several factors, which are highlighted in the literature, that explain the spread of conflict, and formalizes these factors into a series of relevant endogenous and exogenous variables to investigate the relationship among these variables using a set of nonlinear, first-order ordinary differential equations

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(ODEs). Based on this formalization, and using theoretical parameters, various scenarios are then simulated to determine which factors are critical to the spread of conflict. As a result of the investigation, the paper concludes with theoretical and policy recommendations

In the modified SIR model, I categorize the initial country, *Country a*, as the infected country that is already experiencing an intrastate conflict. Being infected with the disease of war, *Country a* might spread this disease into a susceptible state, *Country b*, which shares a border with *Country a*. The paper examines the level of conflict as the dependent variable. The main explanatory variable is state capacity, operationalized using Relative Political Capacity (RPC)[1]. The paper also considers other variables, such as GDP per capita in both countries, regime type (or levels of democracy) in both countries, refugees from the initial country, and income inequality of both countries, to explain the spread of intrastate conflict into another country.

The paper argues that RPC acts as the immune system to slow down or stop the spread of war. Thus, if there is an ongoing intrastate conflict in *Country a*, the likelihood that this conflict causes the initiation of an intrastate conflict in *Country b* is going to be lower if *Country b*'s level of RPC is high. Similarly, the probability of conflict spreading to *Country b* is going to be higher if *Country b*'s level of RPC is low. The results of the simulations suggest that the modified SIR model supports these arguments, illustrating interesting dynamic patterns and implications for policymakers.

2. Research Question

As mentioned above, this paper examines the causes and likelihood of an intrastate war spreading into another country. The primary explanatory variable in the analysis is the relative political capacity (RPC), which can be explained as a country's ability to extract resources from its population.[2] The primary dependent variable is conflict, which is measured by the severity of a civil conflict controlled by the population. To evaluate the spread of intrastate conflict from one country to a neighboring country, essentially two propositions are tested:

P1: If there is an intrastate war in the initial *Country a*, the likelihood of *Country b* (*a*'s neighbor) having an intrastate war is low if *Country b*'s RPC is high.

P2: If there is an intrastate war in *Country a*, the likelihood of *Country b* (*a*'s neighbor) having an intrastate war is higher if *Country a*'s RPC is low.

3. Literature Review

As noted above, several scholars have previously examined the causes and spread of wars. Wars can spread through direct mechanisms, such as the flow of refugees or armed rebel groups, ties of the transnational kin groups across borders, or the active action of states to get involved in the domestic politics of their neighbors.[3] Alternatively, wars can spread through indirect mechanisms, like altered perceptions about the likelihood of conflict[4] or by triggering previously dormant grievances between domestic groups.[5] The economic, political, and social

[1] The concepts of state capacity or political capacity are used interchangeably in this paper and are operationalized using RPC.

[2] Jacek Kugler and Ronald L. Tammen, *The Performance of Nations* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012).

[3] Maarten Bosker and Joppe de Ree, "Ethnicity and the Spread of Civil War," *Journal of Development Economics* 108 (2014): 206–21.

[4] Timur Kuran, "Ethnic Dissimilation and International Diffusion," in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, eds. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998): 35–60.

[5] James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, eds. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998): 107–26;

circumstances the country experiences domestically and its historical and contemporary ties to its neighbors are also influential on the causes and spread of conflict.

In several studies, an increased likelihood of conflict is associated with local "hot spots."[6] According to these studies, the location of the conflicts is not uniformly distributed across the globe. Focusing on civil wars, Rustad et al. demonstrate that conflicts are more likely to take place on the periphery of a country, along international borders.[7] Thus, through some diffusion mechanisms, civil conflicts can potentially be transmitted to the neighboring countries. Buhaug and Gleditsch show that having transboundary ethnic ties or shared territorial and natural assets increase the likelihood of cross-border contagion of conflicts.[8]

Hegre shows a strong association between the duration of the civil war and the financial resources available to rebel groups.[9] The improved financial condition of the rebel groups is a result of the capacity of the state. Having such a strong and resourceful rebel group also creates an economic problem by reducing the human capital through migration or killings and disrupting the market and production. Most of the civil wars start in areas with depreciated economic indicators, such as low income, high inequality, and low economic growth. Moreover, this problem does not remain confined to one country, but it can spread to the whole region. Civil war is not an isolated phenomenon, but a contagious one. Civil wars do not only intensify economic turmoil in the country that experiences the war, but they also negatively affect the economy of the neighboring countries. They obstruct trade, cause capital to flee, destroy infrastructure and production facilities, and reduce the level of investments.

Additionally, Salehyan and Gleditsch argue that population movements and refugee flows are essential mechanisms by which conflict spreads across regions.[10] They claim that refugees are a major negative externality of civil wars and can increase the risk of future conflict in both host and origin countries by expanding rebel social networks and increasing competition for the local resources. When faced with the inflow of refugees, governments tend to increase the repression of their citizens to prevent the spread of discontent and potential attempts of rebellion,[11] but the risk of conflict contagion increases despite these efforts.[12]

The flow of the refugees puts a further strain on the economy of the host countries. When they have the choice, refugees tend to migrate to relatively stable economies. Although refugees can have a positive impact on the economy of the host countries by contributing to human capital and entrepreneurship, in most cases, the inflow of refugees causes an increase in security and military spending, and decrease economic growth rates.[13] Furthermore,

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no.1 (2003): 75–90.

[6] Alex Braithwaite, "Location, Location, Location…Identifying Hot Spots of International Conflict," *International Interactions* 31, no. 3 (2005): 251–73; Siri Camilia Aas Rustad et al., "All Conflict is Local: Modeling Sub–National Variation in Civil Conflict Risk," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 1 (2011): 15–40.

[7] Rustad et al., Ibid.

[8] Halvard Buhaug and Kristian S. Gleditsch, "Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 2 (2008): 215–33.

[9] Havard Hegre, "The Duration and Termination of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 243–52.

[10] Idean Salehyan and Kristian S. Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," *International Organization* 60, no. 2 (2006): 355–66.

[11] Nathan Danneman and Emily Hencken Ritter, "Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 2 (2014): 254–79.

[12] Margarita Konaev and Kirstin J.H. Brathwaite, "Dangerous Neighborhoods: State Behavior and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, forthcoming (2019): 1–22.

[13] James C. Murdoch, and Todd Sandler, "Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 91–110; Brian J. Phillips, "Civil War, Spillover, and Neighbors' Military Spending," *Conflict Management and*

refugee flows increase social tensions and grievances by increasing the political and economic inequality amongst different groups in the host country.[14]

Whereas population movements make the spread of war more likely, effective governments have a higher capability to resist the spread of violence from neighboring territories[15] and prevent conflicts from starting and escalating domestically.[16] Capable governments can extract the necessary material and political resources from their populations and adequately allocate these resources to keep the level of satisfaction of their populations high enough. However, if a government is ineffective in doing these things, it is possible for the opposition to become a substitute for the government in critical fields. In addition to already being more prone to civil conflicts, less capable governments are also more likely to fail to accommodate and absorb the flow of refugees.

Kadera has developed a systemic and dynamic model of the spread of civil and interstate wars.[17] She examines three principal components in the model. One component is the transmission mechanism, which covers factors such as geographic distance, openness, and willingness to engage and various other ways international actors expose one another to conflict. The second component, barriers, deals with potential components that slow down the spread of conflict such as neutrality agreements; and the third component, resource constraints, is designed to capture the social welfare trade-off associated with military expenditures. Kadera finds that in all fifty simulation cases there was a positive equilibrium, suggesting that even if states endeavor to avoid the ongoing conflicts in a given region and do not get involved, they still cannot effectively stop the spread of war. Kadera's dynamic model also reveals that systemic characteristics of contagion will move regional engagement towards a positive equilibrium, forcing regional actors to participate. The results also suggest that the aggregate amount of war in a system decreases as barriers are replaced with transmission mechanisms. Overall, lowering the number of interactions in the system reduces the spread of war.

4. Research Design

4.1. The system dynamics approach

The majority of the studies above, as well as other studies that investigate the initiation and spread of intrastate conflicts, employ "traditional" research methods such as regression analysis or the case study approach. This paper, on the other hand, uses a system dynamics approach. The system dynamics approach can alleviate the (especially empirical) drawbacks of the previous studies, including the difficulty to model and empirically model diffusion, which is, in fact, a process rather than an outcome.[18]

System dynamics is a computer-aided approach to policy analysis and design. It applies

Peace Science 32, no. 4 (2015): 425–42.

[14] Lars–Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Halvard Buhaug, *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[15] Alex Braithwaite, "Resisting Infection: How State Capacity Conditions Conflict Contagion," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (2010): 311–19.

[16] Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler, "Power Parity, Democracy and the Severity of Internal Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 2 (1998): 196–209.

[17] Kelly M. Kadera, "Transmission, Barriers, and Constraints: A Dynamic Model of the Spread of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998): 367–87.

[18] Erika Forsberg, "Diffusion in the Study of Civil Wars: A Cautionary Tale," *International Studies Review* 16, no. 2 (2014): 188–98.

to dynamic problems arising in complex social, managerial, economic, or ecological systems -- literally any dynamic systems characterized by interdependence, mutual interaction, information feedback, and circular causality. It can be related to and combined with formal models, like game theory, and extended to agent-based and computational models such as knowledge-based systems and machine learning.

System dynamics modeling incorporates some of the advantages of qualitative and linear quantitative models and ameliorates most of their disadvantages. In systems dynamics modeling, the concepts are precisely defined, which allows for unambiguous communication among scholars. The assumptions are clear so that the limitations of the models are apparent. The logical structure of the models provides an extensive guide to make formal deductions. System dynamics models alleviate the linearity constraint of the regular models by taking into account the linear or nonlinear continuous paths for each variable.

Moreover, through system dynamics, we can talk about and analyze the evolution of various variables together in a system that we are interested in as well as the evolution of the system itself. The ability to evaluate the dynamics of a set of variables is especially convenient when anticipating the changes is useful in a puzzlingly complex system with scarce data. We can easily create a deterministic model to represent a system and introduce uncertainty by using stochastic differential equations or running Monte Carlo Simulations. In this regard, although a system dynamics model is built to represent the reality, it is not constrained by reality. This characteristic makes system dynamics models beneficial for theory development and enables them to study rare-occurring events, such as the spread of civil war into another civil war. It also grants some generalizability to the models and allows for simulating different scenarios, providing clear implications for policy actions.

4.2. The SIR model

The specific dynamic model employed in this paper is a modification of the SIR model. SIR is a dynamic mathematical model that is used to understand the dynamics of an epidemic.[19] SIR was first studied by Kermack and McKendrick in 1927 to find causal factors that explain the magnitude and direction of epidemic diseases.[20] The model focuses on a disease that spreads by contacting infected individuals. The population is subdivided into three classes: (S) Susceptible, (I) Infected and (R) Recovered. These variables (and their rates of change with respect to time *t* are interacted using differential equations):

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\rho SI, \quad \frac{dI}{dt} = \rho SI - \alpha I, \quad \frac{dR}{dt} = \alpha I$$

where ρ is the infection rate and α is the removal rate.

The relationship can also be described using the following compartment diagram:



[19] James R. Brannan and William E. Boyce, *Differential Equations: An Introduction to Modern Methods and Applications,* 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 2015), 536–38.

[20] William Ogilvy Kermack and Anderson Gray McKendrick, "A Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of Epidemics," *Proceedings of the Royal Society A.: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences* 115, no. 772 (1927): 700–21.

Essentially, susceptible individuals are those who have the potential to catch the disease. If and when a susceptible individual catches the disease, she is moved to the infected class. Infected individuals spread the disease and remain in that class for a period of time before they are removed or recovered.

The SIR model provides information about the dynamics and evolution of an epidemic. As discussed above, almost the whole literature on civil war contagion relies on linear models, which only presents results on the final outcomes. The SIR model advances our understanding of internal conflicts by showing how the spread of intrastate wars takes place at each point in time. This enables us to understand whether there are crests and troughs in the severity of the conflict as the time passes, and how these fluctuations impact the social and economic issues (and how these issues impact the severity of the conflict). The specific model employed in this paper uses the SIR structure as its basis, but modifies it to allow for dyadic-level analysis.[21]

4.3. Variables

Using the SIR structure as its basis, the specific model employed in this paper considers three endogenous variables: conflict, economic conditions, and refugees and three exogenous variables: level of democracy, relative political capacity, and inequality. Thus, building on the existing literature, this model investigates the dynamic relationship between refugee flows, economic conditions, and conflict, explained by the exogenous variables as well as each other. The data collected for these variables are used to simulate hypothetical country pairs, as explained below.

4.3.1. Endogenous variables

Conflict in *b* ($Conf_b$): Conflict in a country is measured by the severity of a civil conflict relative to the population. In this case, conflict in *b* is the severity per capita of the civil conflict in *country b*, which is sharing a border with *country a,* where the initial civil conflict starts. This paper endeavors to explain how the interconnections between other variables affect the change of this variable. The data for this variable is available at the Center of Systemic Peace's Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset.[22] The dataset is coded on a (0, 10) scale, 0 representing the most stable situation and 10 representing extermination and annihilation. For this paper, the data is rescaled to [-5, 5] to be able to have accurate cross-case comparisons.

Conflict in *a* ($Conf_a$): This variable is very similar to Conflict in *b*. It is measured by the severity of the civil conflict in *country a*, again relative to its population. However, explaining the initiation of conflict in *a* is not the main goal of this paper. The paper assumes that there is a preexisting conflict in this country at the time t_0. The data for this variable is also available at the Center of Systemic Peace's Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset[23] and is rescaled to [-5, 5] to be able to have accurate cross-case comparisons.

Economic Conditions in *a* ($Econ_a$): Measured by GDP per capita, this variable shows the economic well-being of *country a* in a given year. The data for this variable is taken from the

[21] Michael Altmann, "Susceptible–Infected–Removed Epidemic Models with Dynamic Partnerships," *Journal of Mathematical Biology* 33, no. 6 (1995): 661–75.

[22] Monty G. Marshall, *Major Episodes of Political Violence: 1946–2016* (Maryland: Center for Systemic Peace, 2017).

[23] Marshall, *Major Episodes of Political Violence*.

Penn World Table version 9.0,[24] and rescaled to [-5, 5] with the maximum value corresponding to Qatar's $163,294 per year or $13,608 per month, and the minimum value corresponding to Liberia's $162 per year or $13.5 per month.

Economic Conditions in *b* ($Econ_b$): The same as "Economic Conditions in *a*," except this time it is for *country b* instead of the *country a*.

Refugees (*Ref*): This variable covers the refugees flowing from the *country a*, which is experiencing a civil conflict at time t_0, to *country b*, which is a neighbor of *country a*. It is also relative to the population of *country b*. Positive values for refugees indicate a flow from *a* to *b*, negative values for refugees indicate a flow from *b* to *a*. The data for refugees is available from the United Nations High Committee for Refugees.[25]

4.3.2. Exogenous variables

Democracy in *a* (Dem_a): This variable represents the political institutions in *country a*. The data can be found in the Polity IV index,[26] which ranges from -10 to 10 depending on the political characteristics of the country, -10 being authoritarian and 10 being democratic. It is rescaled to [0, 1] for this paper.

Democracy in *b* (Dem_b): The same as "Democracy in *a*," except this time it is for *country b* instead of the *country a*.

Relative Political Capacity in *a* (RPC_a): "RPC in *a*" is measuring the government's ability to extract resources from its people. The data for this variable is available from Kugler and Tammen.[27] The values for RPC range from 0.066 to 3.68, with the mean 0.99. Again, it is rescaled to [0, 1] here to be able to have accurate cross-case comparisons.

Relative Political Capacity in *b* (RPC_b): The same as "RPC in *a*," except this time it is for *country b* instead of the *country a*.

Inequality in *a* ($Ineq_a$): Based on the GINI coefficient, this variable measures the degree of economic inequality in the *country a*. The data is available from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.[28] It is rescaled to [0, 1], 0 corresponds to perfect equality, whereas 1 corresponds to perfect inequality.

Inequality in *b* ($Ineq_b$): The same as "Inequality in *a*," except this time it is for *country b* instead of the *country a*.

4.4. Equations and depictions of the model

The model consists of a set of interdependent, non-linear, first order differential equations. The conflict functions are following Kadera's formulation that uses an expansion and cost structure.[29] The economic development functions are in line with the principles of transition dynamics and conditional convergence,[30] but also incorporate the costs of war in their formulation. As Figure 1 shows, the interdependent relationship between all variables is a highly complex one.

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[24] Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer, "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table," *American Economic Review* 105, no. 10 (2015): 3150–82.

[25] "Population Statistics," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed May 20, 2018, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview.

[26] Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted R. Gurr, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2016* (Maryland: Center for Systemic Peace, 2017).

[27] Kugler and Tammen, *The Performance of Nations.*

[28] "World Development Indicators," The World Bank, accessed May 20, 2018, http://data.worldbank.org/data–catalog/world–development–indicators.

[29] Kadera, "Transmission, Barriers, and Constraints."

[30] Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala–i Martin, "Convergence,"*Journal of Political Economy* 100, no. 2 (1992): 223–51.



Figure 1: The depiction of the entire model

For this reason, individually explaining each element of the model is the most convenient way to describe the model.

Equation 1: $$\frac{dConf_b}{dt} = \alpha\left(Conf_a \times Ref\right) - RPC_b \times \left(\beta Dem_b + \gamma Econ_b - \delta Ineq_b\right)$$

Equation 1 explains the change in the conflict in *country b* over time. It states that the increasing values of "conflict in *a*" and refugees increase the "Conflict in *b*." "Conflict in *a"* and refugees also augment each other's impacts. This augmentation is observed since conflict in *country a* will increase the conflict prospects in *country b* by several mechanisms, one of which is the increasing number of refugees flowing to *b*. Thus these two variables augment each other regarding conflict prospects in *b*.

The interaction between RPC_b and "democracy in *b,"* and RPC_b and "Economic conditions in *b"* decreases the probability of conflict in *b* whereas the interaction between "inequality in *b"* and "RPC in *b"* increases the conflict. Better economic and more democratic conditions decrease expected conflict in *country b,* whereas inequality increases it. Here, RPC_b is assumed to act as an intensifier for these variables, making their effects more significant, as suggested by Kugler and Tammen.[31] The relationships between the variables forming Equation 1 can be observed in Figure 2.

[31] Kugler and Tammen, *The Performance of Nations*.



Figure 2: Depiction of the change in the conflict in *country b* over time

Equation 2: $$\frac{dConf_a}{dt} = -RPC_a \times \left(\mu Econ_a + \xi Dem_a - \pi Ineq_a \right)$$

Equation 2, depicted in Figure 3, demonstrates the change in the conflict in *country a* over time. It accounts for the evaluation of conflict in *country a* over time, which is very similar in nature to Equation 1. The most significant difference between those two equations is that while no conflict is assumed in *country b* at time t_0, the paper assumes that there already exists a conflict in *country a* at t_0.

As can be observed from Equation 2 and Figure 3, the interactions between RPC_a and democracy in *a*, and RPC_a and economic conditions in *a* decrease the conflict in *a* whereas the interaction between inequality in *a* and RPC in *a* increases the conflict.



Figure 3: Depiction of the change in the conflict in *country a* over time

Equation 3: $$\frac{dEcon_a}{dt} = \left((Econ_a \times \left(Econ_a - 1\right)) + 0.25\right) \times (\varepsilon \left(RPC_a \times Dem_a\right) - \zeta \left(Conf_a \times Ineq_a\right)$$

Equation 3 shows the change in economic conditions in *country a* over time. According to Equation 3, both RPC_a and democracy in *a* positively affect economic conditions in *a* and they augment each other. Regarding economic conditions, the paper assumes that increasing democracy, stratified by higher RPC values, have a positive impact on economic conditions in *country a* over time.



Figure 4: Depiction of the change in the economic conditions in *country a* over time

On the other hand, both conflict and inequality negatively affect "economic conditions in *a*" and they augment each other. It is evident that the conflict within *country a* will have a negative impact on the economy in many aspects, and existing economic inequalities will strengthen these negative impacts. The equation is summarized in Figure 4.

Equation 4: $$\frac{dEcon_b}{dt} = \left((Econ_b \times \left(Econ_b - 1\right)) + 0.25\right) \times \left(\eta\left(RPC_b \times Dem_b\right) - \theta\left(Conf_b \times Ineq_b\right)\right)$$

Equation 4, depicted in Figure 5, is the same as Equation 3. The only difference is that it is for *country b* instead of *country a*. Both RPC and "Democracy in *b"* positively affect "economic conditions in *b"* and they augment each other. Higher levels of conflict and inequality in *a* and their combined effect worsen the "economic conditions in *b*."



Figure 5: Depiction of the change in the economic conditions in *country b* over time

Equation 5: $$\frac{dRef}{dt} = \kappa\left(\frac{Dem_b \times Econ_b}{RPC_b}\right) - \lambda\left(Dem_a \times Econ_a \times RPC_a\right)$$

Equation 5 explains the change in the flow of refugees from *country a* to *country b* over time. According to Equation 5, higher levels of democracy and better economic conditions in *country b* will attract more refugees, whereas a higher RPC in *b* decreases the number of refugees. On the other hand, a more democratic and economically more developed country with a high political capacity would emit fewer refugees. These statements argue that in time of a conflict, people would prefer to live in an economically and politically more developed country. So if they decide to leave *country a* because of the initial internal conflict, they will decide to go to a more prosperous and more democratic neighbor of *a*.

Similarly, if *country a* is more prosperous and more democratic than its neighbors, they will have a higher tendency to stay in their country. Here, RPC is acting like an immunity mechanism. From the point of view of *country b*, higher RPC values mean that *country b* will have a higher capability in preventing refugees coming within its borders. From the point of view of *country a*, higher RPC values mean that *country b* would be more capable of keeping its people within its borders. Thus, people will not be able to leave the country easily. The relationships between the variables forming the Equation 5 can be observed in Figure 6.



Figure 6: Depiction of the change in the flow of refugees from *country a* to *country b* over time

5. Results

The set of differential equations are solved using a graphical ODE solver. Using the ODE Toolkit (v.1.4), I first run a baseline model for two hypothetical less-developed countries with average levels of state capacity (so, with values of RPC = 0.3).[32] The graph represents the behavior of the endogenous variables over time from their baseline. As we can see from the ODE output, the economy of *Country a* is shrinking as the level of conflict in *Country a* increases. As a result of the economic decline in *Country a*, the number of refugees coming from *Country a* to *Country b* increases. The increase of refugees in *Country b* leads to an increase in the level of conflict, which results in a decline in the economy.

[32] This value is chosen based on the actual data. Taking into account the distribution of RPC, the average RPC corresponds to approximately 0.3 after the data is scaled.



Figure 7: Trajectory for Mid_RPC$_a$ & Mid_RPC$_b$, where the Blue line represents Conflict in B, Green line represents Economy of B, Black line represents Refugees, Red line represents Economy of A, and Grey line represents Conflict in A



Figure 8: 3D Visualization of Mid_RPC$_a$ & Mid_RPC$_b$

However, as the level of economy in *Country b* goes down, the country becomes less attractive to refugees, so the number of refugees decreases after the decline in the economy becomes apparent at time 10. The rate of decrease in refugees after its peak point is significant since the level of conflict increases rapidly, and the economy in *Country b* becomes even worse than the economy in *Country a*.

The 3D graph provides a visualization of the primary variables. The graph shows that when *b* has a middle-level RPC and a weak economy, the level of conflict in *b* stays at a high level. It first increases then decreases, because the number of refugees first increases then decreases due to the changes in the economy. However, when the level of economy in *b* is relatively high, the level of conflict slowly increases at a low level. The graph also shows that as time passes and the level of economy decreases, the level of conflict increases.



Figure 9: Trajectory for Mid_RPC$_a$ & Low_RPC$_b$, where the Blue line represents Conflict in B, the Green line represents Economy of B, the Black line represents Refugees, the Red line represents Economy of A, and the Grey line represents Conflict in A

Then, as can be seen in Figure 9, to investigate the first postulate, I change the level of RPC in *Country b* to a lower level, 0.2, while keeping other initial values unchanged. The ODE output yields a similar result. The levels of conflict and economy in *Country a* do not change. However, the relatively low RPC in *Country b* causes a decrease in the level of the economy at a higher speed. As a result, the number of refugees first increases, then decreases. The line even reaches to a negative value, which means that the refugees go back to *Country a* from *Country b*, because *Country b*'s economy is worse than that of *Country a*, and the level of conflict in Country b is higher than that of Country a.

The 3D graph in Figure 10 demonstrates that when the economy in *Country b* is in bad shape, the level of conflict should be very high at the beginning. However, it then quickly decreases as time goes by, because *Country b* gets to an even worse condition than *Country*

a and is not attractive to refugees. However, when the level of the economy is relatively high, the conflict slowly increases, but at a much lower level. Moreover, as time passes and the economy decreases, the level of conflict in *Country b* first increases at a low level, then decreases.



Figure 10: The 3D Visualization of Mid_RPC$_a$ & Low_RPC$_b$

Third, I increase the RPC in *Country b* to 0.45, while keeping other initial values the same as before. As Figure 11 demonstrates, the results change entirely. Although the level of conflict and economy in *Country a* remain the same, those of *Country b* go to opposite directions. With the high level of RPC, the economy in *Country b* increases, at a steady speed before time 13 and at an even higher speed after that. As the gap between *Country a*'s economy and *Country b*'s economy increases, the number of refugees going to *Country b* also becomes larger and larger. In previous scenarios, the level of conflict in *Country b* increases as the number of refugee increases. However, this time, when RPC is high, the level of conflict in *Country b* does not increase. It even decreases after the economy increases sharply. This suggests that when the RPC is high, the country can handle a large number of refugees without experiencing higher levels of conflict.



Figure 11: Trajectory for Mid_RPC$_a$ & High_RPC$_b$, where the Blue line represents Conflict in B, the Green line represents Economy of B, the Black line represents Refugees, the Red line represents Economy of A, and the Grey line represents Conflict in A

The 3D graph in Figure 12 helps us understand this scenario better. Interestingly, when the level of the economy is low, the level of conflict first decreases rapidly then increases slightly, making a u-curve in the graph. However, when the level of the economy is high, the level of conflict is much higher, though it decreases at a steady speed. It is because the superb economy attracts too many refugees, which adds to the likelihood of instability. Furthermore, when looking at both the economy and conflict across time, the model shows that as the level of economy increases, the level of conflict does not change much. This is in line with the first postulate that a high level of RPC in *Country b* will reduce the likelihood of intrastate conflict. Also, when the economy starts at a high level, the decrease in the economy over time results in a decrease in the level of conflict.

Now, we can shift our attention to the second postulate. To test the second postulate, I first lower the level of RPC in *Country a*, while *Country b*'s RPC stays at the middle level and all other initial values remain unchanged. The solution of the model can be seen in Figure 13. As expected, the level of conflict in *Country b* starts increasing from time 5, when the economy is stagnated, and the number of refugees keeps increasing. The low level of RPC in *Country a* triggers refugees to go to *Country b*, which increases the likelihood of instability and hinders the economy there. Even when the number of refugees becomes smaller due to the unfavorable economic conditions in *Country b,* the level of conflict does not drop -- it is negatively related to the economy.



Figure 12: 3D Visualization of Mid_RPC$_a$ & High_RPC$_b$



Figure 13: Trajectory for Low_RPCa & Mid_RPCb, where the Blue line represents Conflict in B, Green line represents Economy of B, Black line represents Refugees, Red line represents Economy of A, and Grey line represents Conflict in A



Figure 14: 3D Visualization of Low_RPC$_a$ & Mid_RPC$_b$

The 3D plot in Figure 14 demonstrates that when the economic situation in *Country b* is good, the level of conflict slightly increases as time passes. However, when the economy is in a bad condition, the level of conflict stays at a relatively high level, increasing at first then decreasing a little, which makes an n-curve in the graph. In addition, when economic performance decreases across time, conflict increases rapidly, which is in line with the second postulate. That is to say that when the level of RPC in *Country a* is low, the number of refugees going to *Country b* is large, which increases the level of conflict in *Country b* and decreases the level of the economy at the same time. Conflict in *Country b* can decline only when its RPC is high enough to keep the economy increasing instead of decreasing, as is shown in the graph.

Finally, I increase the level of RPC in *Country a* to 0.45, keeping other numbers the same as before. Surprisingly, the result does not change much, compared to what we observed in the previous scenario. The levels of economy and conflict in *Country a* are negatively related across time. Even though relatively high RPC in *Country a* reduced the rate that its economy declines, the impact is not evident. Therefore, the number of refugees going to "*Country b*" does not decrease as expected, which increases the likelihood of instability to the same level as the previous scenario. Conflict in "*Country b*" keeps increasing as its economy goes down, though the number of refugees reduces from time 12 and 13 when its economy is no better than that of *Country a*'s.



Figure 15: Trajectory for High_RPCa & Mid_RPCb, where the Blue line represents Conflict in B, the Green line represents Economy of B, the Black line represents Refugees, the Red line represents Economy of A, and the Grey line represents Conflict in A



Figure 16: 3D Visualization of High_RPC$_a$ & Mid_RPC$_b$

The 3D graph in Figure 16 tells the same story. When the economy in *Country b* is doing poorly, the level of conflict stays high and develops in an n-curve across time, while with the good economy, it stays at a low level and slowly increases. Still, as the economy in *Country b* becomes worse across time, the level of conflict increases steadily. Since the level of RPC in *Country b* stays at the middle level, its economy cannot develop due to the large number of refugees, so the level of conflict increases as a consequence. Thus, with a middle-level of RPC in *Country b*, regardless of whether the level of RPC in *Country a* is high or low, the conflict in *Country b* keeps increasing.

The five scenarios provide support for the first postulate: when there is an intrastate conflict in *Country a*, the likelihood of *Country b* having an intrastate conflict is low if its RPC is high, while the likelihood of having an intrastate conflict is high if its RPC is low. However, there is lower support for the second postulate. A change in the level of RPC in *Country a* does not significantly change the likelihood of *Country b* having an intrastate conflict. As long as *Country b*'s RPC is not sufficiently high in developing its economy, the level of conflict increases across time. In other words, the likelihood of having an intrastate conflict in *Country b* depends more on its own RPC than that of *Country a*.

6. Conclusion

The research concerning the spread of intrastate war has received much attention. Many factors related to civil war and its spread have been theorized and empirically tested. In the above dynamic model, civil war is established to be a contagious and transnational phenomenon. According to the model, intrastate conflict or civil war in any county is dependent on the conflict in the neighboring country (*country b*). The conflict in *country a* disrupts its socio-economic and political structures. In addition to the social disturbances, economic instability and lack of security eventually force some people to migrate to another country. The number of refugees migrating from *country a* to *country b* reflects the volume and severity of the conflict.

Thus, the breakdown of the state structure in one country has a domino effect. A major crisis in one country is often followed by a series of crises in the region. Recent crises in North Africa and the Middle East can be considered as examples for this premise. The level of resilience of political and economic structures of *country b* adds to its strength to resist the civil unrest. Thus, relative political capacity and the economic power of a state have a strong relationship with the initiation and further spread of civil war.

Most studies conducted on the spread of civil war have focused on North and Central Africa, Central America, and East Asia. Weak governments in these areas are found to be one of the major causes of frequent civil wars. The countries which are in the neighborhood of a troubled country are more likely to experience civil wars. Among these countries, the ratio of refugees is generally relatively high.

During the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan, Iran, and neighboring Central Asian countries received high numbers of refugees. Especially in Pakistan, where the political capacity is rather low, refugees created problems in several ways. The Pakistani job market could not take in the flow of new workers, which caused wages to decrease. Furthermore, the flow of refugees, the majority of whom were Sunni Pashtuns, caused religious and ethnic tensions. The children of refugees were more likely to attend orthodox Sunni madrassas, and some of

the refugees went back to Afghanistan to join the mujahidin. This, according to Weaver,[33] exacerbated the tensions and caused an increase in sectarian violence and religious and ethnic intolerance.

There are many similar stories from recent history of significant refugee flows followed by domestic turmoil in the host countries. Considering that the world is currently experiencing a record flow of refugees, it is essential to understand the effect of them on the potential spread of civil wars.

In this paper, I seek to devise a general, broadly applicable, and predictive model of the spread of intrastate war to a neighboring country. I do this by formalizing the previous theories of the initiation, escalation, and spread of war into a series of relevant endogenous and exogenous variables. To accurately observe the relationship between these variables, I set up a dynamic system that incorporates a set of nonlinear first order ODEs. The modeling is followed by the simulation of operational outcomes of several scenarios of dyadic interactions to determine which factors are more influential and critical on the spread of war. Finally, I provide policy recommendations by interpreting the simulation outcomes and applying them to current cases to predict probable outcomes. Understanding this issue may also allow us to prevent future cases from happening and better manage the situation if they happen.

The model outlined in this paper benefits from all the aforementioned strengths of dynamic models, but it also suffers from all the weaknesses. Despite lacking the descriptive power of a qualitative model, this system dynamics model allows for both explanation and prediction. Through understanding the determinants of initiation, escalation, and diffusion of wars, we can implement policies to decrease their likelihood. This model enables us to see how these determinants work individually as well as in interaction with each other and over time. Since the specific situation, it focuses on, how an intrastate war can cause another intrastate war in a neighboring country, is a relatively rare event with poor data quality a dynamic model is an efficient and practical method to use to analyze it.

However, the premises of this model are left to be empirically tested in a future study. The empirical test would provide the specific coefficients for each variable analyzed. We could then scale the variables accordingly and set up accurate initial values for the simulations, which would enable the model to provide precise policy recommendations. The model outlined in this paper focuses on two countries, but taking into account the transnational nature of civil wars, they need not be confined to only one or two countries. Thus, using an agent-based modeling approach to model the regional spread using the refugee networks would be another significant improvement.

The majority of the academic work in International Relations and conflict in Turkey uses qualitative techniques,[34] and formal models are an unambiguous minority with respect to the choice of methods.[35] To my knowledge, this is one of the first papers that uses a system dynamics approach in Turkish International Relations and Political Science literature. As the methodological scope in Turkish academia widens, as well as the favorable technical conditions for the increased use of nonlinear and system dynamics models, one can expect the

[33] Mary Anne Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2003).

[34] Oner Akgul, "A Bibliographical Study on the Academic Research of Peace and Conflict in Turkey," (paper presented at the 7th Eurasian Peace Science Meeting, İstanbul, 2018); Cenker Korhan Demir and Engin Avcı, "Turkish Terrorism Studies: A Preliminary Assessment," *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 7, no. 1 (2018): 21–44.

[35] Mustafa Aydin, Fulya Hisaroglu, and Korhan Yazgan, "Türkiye'de Uluslararası İlişkiler Akademisyenleri ve Alana Yönelik Yaklaşımları Üzerine Bir İnceleme: TRIP 2014 Sonuçları," *Uluslararası* İlişkiler 12, no. 48 (2016): 3–35.

more frequent use of such models. Understanding wars from a multi-disciplinary and multi-method perspective is crucial for their successful prevention. Thus, the movement towards a more integrated approach is necessary. Fluency in not just one, but multiple quantitative, qualitative, and methodological approaches are essential to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of each. This will undoubtedly expand the topics that can be studied and enhance the relevance and pertinence of the works produced in Turkish academia in political and international academic domains.

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Appendix: ODE Outputs (Scenarios 1-5, Figures 1.1 through 5.5)

1st Scenario.

Initial values: a= 0.3, b= 0.4, c= 0.6, d= 0.1, e= 0.8, f= 0.3, g= 0.8, h= 0.3, i= 0.8, j= 0.4, k=0.5, l=0.5, m=0.4, RPC_a= 0.3, RPC_b= 0.3, Dem_a= 0.3, Dem_b= 0.5, $Ineq_a$= 0.5, $Ineq_b$= 0.5, $Conf_b$=0, $Econ_a$=0.3, $Econ_b$=0.3, Ref=0.1, $Conf_a$=0.1.



Figure 1.1: $Conf_b$ in the 1st Scenario



Figure 1.2: $Econ_a$ in the 1st Scenario



Figure 1.3: $Econ_b$ in the 1st Scenario



Figure 1.4: Ref in the 1st Scenario



Figure 1.5: $Conf_a$ in the1st Scenario

2nd Scenario.

Initial values: a= 0.3, b= 0.4, c= 0.6, d= 0.1, e= 0.8, f= 0.3, g= 0.8, h= 0.3, i= 0.8, j= 0.4, k=0.5, l=0.5, m=0.4, RPC_a= 0.3, RPC_b= 0.2, Dem_a= 0.3, Dem_b= 0.5, $Ineq_a$= 0.5, $Ineq_b$= 0.5, $Conf_b$=0, $Econ_a$=0.3, $Econ_b$=0.3, Ref=0.1, $Conf_a$=0.1.



Figure 2.1: $Conf_b$ in the 2nd Scenario



Figure 2.2: $Econ_a$ in the 2nd Scenario

Figure 2.3: $Econ_b$ in the 2nd Scenario



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

Figure 2.5: $Conf_a$ in the 2nd Scenario

3rd Scenario.

Initial values: a= 0.3, b= 0.4, c= 0.6, d= 0.1, e= 0.8, f= 0.3, g= 0.8, h= 0.3, i= 0.8, j= 0.4, k=0.5, l=0.5, m=0.4, RPC_a= 0.3, RPC_b= 0.45, Dem_a= 0.3, Dem_b= 0.5, $Ineq_a$= 0.5, $Ineq_b$= 0.5, $Conf_b$=0, $Econ_a$=0.3, $Econ_b$=0.3, Ref=0.1, $Conf_a$=0.1.



Figure 3.1: $Conf_b$ in the 3rd Scenario



Figure 3.2: $Econ_a$ in the 3rd Scenario



Figure 3.3: $Econ_b$ in the 3rd Scenario



Figure 3.4: Ref in the 3rd Scenario



Figure 3.5: $Conf_a$ in the 3rd Scenario

4th Scenario.

Initial values: a= 0.3, b= 0.4, c= 0.6, d= 0.1, e= 0.8, f= 0.3, g= 0.8, h= 0.3, i= 0.8, j= 0.4, k=0.5, l=0.5, m=0.4, RPC_a= 0.2, RPC_b= 0.3, Dem_a= 0.3, Dem_b= 0.5, $Ineq_a$= 0.5, $Ineq_b$= 0.5, $Conf_b$=0, $Econ_a$=0.3, $Econ_b$=0.3, Ref=0.1, $Conf_a$=0.1



Figure 4.1: $Conf_b$ in the 4th Scenario



Figure4.2: $Econ_a$ in the 4th Scenario



Figure 4.3: $Econ_b$ in the 4th Scenario



Figure 4.4: Ref in the 4th Scenario



Figure 4.5: $Conf_a$ in the 4th Scenario

5th Scenario.

Initial values: a= 0.3, b= 0.4, c= 0.6, d= 0.1, e= 0.8, f= 0.3, g= 0.8, h= 0.3, i= 0.8, j= 0.4, k=0.5, l=0.5, m=0.4, RPC_a= 0.45, RPC_b= 0.3, Dem_a= 0.3, Dem_b= 0.5, $Ineq_a$= 0.5, $Ineq_b$= 0.5, $Conf_b$=0, $Econ_a$=0.3, $Econ_b$=0.3, Ref=0.1, $Conf_a$=0.1.



Figure 5.1: $Conf_b$ in the 5th Scenario



Figure 5.2: $Econ_a$ in the 5th Scenario



Figure 5.3: $Econ_b$ in the 5th Scenario



Figure 5.4: Ref in the 5th Scenario



Figure 5.5: $Conf_a$ in the 5th Scenario

Ideas and Interests: European Democracy Aid and the Democracy-Security Dilemma, 1990-2010

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, advanced democracies have enacted explicit strategies of democracy promotion by providing assistance to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations all over the world. This paper examines the factors shaping European Union democracy aid allocation decisions from 1990-2010, weighing the relative impact of ideational concerns (regime type, human rights) and self-interests (political, security, economic). We argue that EU democracy aid reflects a "democracy-security dilemma" as the EU balances ideational reasons for promoting democracy with concerns over political and economic relationships, regional stability, and security. We test our hypotheses with a series of random effects, generalized least squares and Heckman selection models, which provide support for our argument. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the impact and explanation of EU democracy promotion policies.

Keywords: Democracy aid, foreign policy, European Union

1. Introduction

After the Cold War, developed democracies in North America and Europe sought to promote democracy around the world, with democracy aid as a central component their efforts. Informed in part by the democratic peace literature,[1] observers and policymakers alike regularly identified such efforts as a goal combining ideational and strategic/security concerns. As Art argued, supporting democracy is a compelling goal because "democracy is the best form of governance; it is the best guarantee for the protection of human rights and for the prevention of mass murder and genocide; it facilitates economic growth; and it aids the cause of peace."[2] However, as a scarce resource, democracy assistance is allocated

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[1] E.g., Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151–169; Bruce Martin Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Zeev Maoz and Bruce M. Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946–1986," *American Political Science Review* 8, no. 3 (1993): 624–63.

[2] Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 69.

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selectively: some otherwise similar states receive substantial commitments of democracy aid while others receive little or none. How do aid allocators decide where to commit democracy assistance?

To explain the distribution of democracy aid, we argue that donors face a democracy-security dilemma: ideational reasons for promoting democracy are weighed against political, economic, and security/stability interests, all of which may be threatened by democratization. Not only do some potential democracy aid recipients have relationships and preexisting agreements with donors that advance donor security interests, but situational factors related to recipient political context, conflict, and other matters also influence the desirability, efficacy, and potential consequences of democracy aid. In practice, efforts to promote democratization, develop and sustain friendly neighbors and neighborhoods, build security, and maintain stability are at times at odds. We argue that this dilemma, and its balancing, help to account for the patterns of democracy aid distribution.

To test our democracy-security dilemma argument, we examine global European Union (EU) democracy aid allocations from 1990-2010 to examine the democracy-security dilemma and its effects on EU democracy assistance.[3] Specifically, we ask: How has the EU translated the democracy-security dilemma in the practice of democracy aid globally in the 1990-2010 period? Our focus is on EU assistance, not aid from individual EU member states, which is justified for a variety of reasons. Not only is the EU a significant player in global democracy promotion,[4] but EU aid is separate from the foreign aid budgets and decisions of member states. The European Commission is in charge of EU foreign aid: foreign aid priorities and packages are determined by the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development and aid policy-making at the Commission-level is separate from that of member states.[5] Finally, EU democracy aid represents a "hard test" of our democracy-security dilemma argument, since ideational objectives should be *more* salient in EU aid decision-making than in the decisions of EU member states or other donors such as the US, whose national interests should be relatively more prominent.

We first set the context of foreign aid and then focus on democracy aid, laying out the democracy-security dilemma. We argue that the EU balances ideational reasons for promoting democracy with concerns over economic relationships, stability, security, and the potential consequences of regime change, with the balance point tilting toward interests/security over ideational preferences for democracy. We then model EU democracy aid allocations as a function of donor interests, recipient characteristics, and situational factors, weighing the tradeoffs that affect and help to explain the allocations. We conclude with the implications for EU democracy assistance and the democracy-security dilemma.

[3] We have complete data across our variables for this period, and meaningful amounts of explicit EU democracy aid allocations (in the AidData dataset) begin after 1990.

[4] E.g., Peter Burnell, ed., *Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Peter Burnell, "Political Strategies of External Support for Democratization," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1 (2005): 361–84; Richard Youngs, "The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous Strategy?," *Democratization* 9 (2002): 50–62; Richard Youngs, *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe's Mediterranean and Asian Policies* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[5] E.g., Elena McLean, "Donor's Preferences and Agent Choice: Delegation of European Development Aid," *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (2012): 381–95.

2. The EU and the Foreign Aid-Democracy Aid Context

Foreign assistance goals range from the selfless to the selfish,[6] and donors weigh and balance factors such as recipient economic needs and humanitarian concerns with donor economic, political, strategic, and security interests, the latter of which are typically more important to donor allocation decisions.[7] As Palmer et al. bluntly conclude, "donors expect political benefits from their aid."[8]

For example, during the Cold War, the bipolar system and the ideological contest between the US and Soviet Union shaped general foreign aid strategies and allocations, and the balance point among competing goals generally favored security concerns.[9] European foreign aid provisions heavily favored aid relationships with former colonies. The promotion of neoliberal economic reforms was a particular priority, as characterized best by the various Lomè Conventions beginning in 1973 and continuing into the 1990s, and the subsequent formation of the ACP (African, Caribbean, Pacific) Partnership, including many former British, French, German, Belgian, and other member state colonies.[10]

After the Cold War, donor interests adjusted to emphasize strategies and tactics to assist and integrate members of the former Soviet bloc, to pursue economic relationships and opportunities, and to emphasize ideational goals such as human rights and democracy to a greater extent than previously, thus shifting the balance point in the democracy-security dilemma toward democracy.[11] In this context, the EU continued to expand its foreign aid and development focus to a wider range of state recipients beyond former European colonies. With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the European Commission (EC) specifically began targeting aid for the promotion of democracy and human rights through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), one aim of which was to promote regional integration as a means to achieve economic growth and peace and security objectives.

Donor interests after 2001 reflected elevated security concerns about Islamic radicalism and the threat of terrorism and political instability in the context of the Global War on Terror, shifting the balance point between democracy and security back toward security.[12] For the EU, the threat of terrorism prompted a rethinking of previous aid strategies and a concerted

[6] E.g., Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," *Journal of Economic Growth* 5 (2000): 33–63; Christopher J. Fariss, "The Strategic Substitution of United States Foreign Aid," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, no. 2 (2010): 107–31; Tobias Heinrich, "When is Foreign Aid Selfish, When Is It Selfless?," *Journal of Politics* 75, no. 2 (2013): 422–35; Robert D. McKinlay and Robert Little, "A Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral Aid Allocation," *World Politics* 30 (1977): 58–86; Glenn Palmer, S.B. Wohlander, and T. C. Morgan, "Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability," *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (2002): 5–26.

[7] Fariss, "The Strategic Substition"; Heinrich, "When is Foreign Aid Selfish"; James H. Lebovic, "National Interests and US Foreign Aid: The Carter and Reagan Years," *Journal of Peace Research* 25 (1988): 115–35; McKinlay and Little, "A Foreign Policy Model"; Peter Rudloff, James M. Scott, and Tyra Blew, "Countering Adversaries and Cultivating Friends: Indirect Rivalry Factors and Foreign Aid Allocation," *Cooperation and Conflict* 48, no. 3 (2013): 401–23; Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows," *World Politics* 50 (1998): 294–323.

[8] Palmer et al., "Give or Take," 8.

[9] E.g., Anne Boschini and Anders Olofsgard, "Foreign Aid: An Instrument for Fighting Communism," *Journal of Development Studies* 43 (2007): 622–48; Lebovic, "National Interests"; McKinlay and Little, "A Foreign Policy Model".

[10] E.g., Deborah A. Brautigam and Stephen Knack, "Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub–Saharan Africa," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52 (2004): 255–85; Maurizio Carbone, *The European Union and International Devleopment: The Politics of Foreign Aid* (New York: Routledge, 2007); Gordon Crawford, "Whither Lome? Mid–Term Review and the Decline of Partnership," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 34 (1996): 503–18.

[11] E.g., Robert E. Fleck, and Christopher Kilby, "Changing Aid Regimes? US Foreign Aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror," *Journal of Development Economics* 91 (2010): 185–97; Brian Lai, "Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post–Cold War Period, 1991–96," *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (2003): 103–28; James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger and Steven C. Poe, "Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War," *Journal of Politics* 60 (1998): 63–85..

[12] E.g., Fleck and Kilby, "Changing Aid Regimes"; Andrew Boutton and David B. Carter, "Fair Weather Allies: Terrorism and the Allocation of US Foreign Aid," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 7 (2014): 1144–173.

effort to enhance the coordination, quantity, and quality of aid between the Commission and the member states. The EU adopted the European Consensus on Development in 2005, with increased attention to poverty reduction, democracy, and good governance in recipient states.[13]

Democracy assistance is a subcategory of foreign economic aid, and it consists of small, targeted packages designed to support various democratization projects: elections; supporting political institutions such as legislatures, courts, and political parties; and grassroots aid that supports civil society organizations, civic education, and the media.[14] Beyond support for elections and democratic institutions, such aid often bypasses regime officials to assist groups and implement projects directly or through third parties.[15] According to Tierney et al., by the end of the 20th century, the US and other foreign aid donors devoted an expanding share of their foreign assistance budgets to democracy aid, reaching 10-15% of allocations by 2000.[16]

The end of the Cold War elevated the strategic and normative importance of promoting democracy and spurred greater interest in democracy assistance as donors adapted to the changing international environment.[17] In Europe, democracy promotion became official EU policy with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Article 21 of the Treaty states:

> The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.[18]

Maastricht established the CFSP, with Article 21.2.b stating the goal to "consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law." In response, in 1994 the EU set up the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) with a budget of 59.1 million ecu, which grew to over €1 billion by 2016.[19]

The EU expanded its democracy promotion efforts after the Cold War. In 1995, the EU initiated the Barcelona Process with its eastern and southern neighbors. While the main beneficiaries of Barcelona were eastern European countries seeking EU membership, the overall project was a step toward making the Maastricht declarations more than just rhetoric. In 2006 the European Consensus on Development carried a specific focus on the promotion of "democratic values" and promised significant increases in aid to developing countries:

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[13] E.g., Carbone, *The European Union*; Youngs, "The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean."

[14] E.g., Stephen D. Collins, "Can America Finance Freedom? Assessing U.S. Democracy Promotion via Economic Statecraft," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 5 (2009): 367–89..

[15] Sarah Sunn Bush, *The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Collins, "Can America Finance Freedom?"; James M. Scott and Ralph G. Carter, "Distributing Dollars For Democracy: Changing Foreign Policy Contexts and The Shifting Determinants of US Democracy Aid, 1975–2010," *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2017), doi : 10.1057/s41268–017–0118–9.

[16] Michael J. Tierney, D.L. Nielson, D.G. Hawkins, J.T. Roberts, M.G. Findley, R.M. Powers, B. Parks, S.E. Wilson, and R. L. Hicks, "More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData," *World Development* 39, no. 11 (2011): 1891–906.

[17] Eg., Jeff Bridoux and Milja Kurki, *Democracy Promotion: A Critical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2014); Burnell, *Democracy Assistan*ce; Burnell, "Political Strategies"; James M. Scott and Ralph G. Carter, "From Cold War to Arab Spring: Mapping the Effects of Paradigm Shifts on the Nature and Dynamics of U.S. Democracy Assistance to the Middle East and North Africa," *Democratization* 22, no. 4 (2015): 738–63; James M. Scott and Ralph G. Carter, "Promoting Democracy in Latin America: Foreign Policy Change and US Democracy Assistance, 1975–2010," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (2016): 299–320; Scott and Carter, "Distributing Dollars for Democracy".

[18] European Union, Treaty on European Union, 1992, https://europa.eu/european–union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.

[19] European Commission, The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm

> The Community development policy will have as its primary objective the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the MDGs, as well as the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights, as defined in part I (European Consensus on Development 2006).[20]

Then, in 2011 the EU issued its *Agenda for Change*, stating that:

> recognizing that good governance, in its political, economic, social and environmental terms, is vital for inclusive and sustainable development, the EU support to governance shall feature more prominently in all partnerships. The EU action should center on the support and promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, gender equality, civil society and local authorities…

The importance placed on the promotion of democracy by the EU rests on the role democratic values played in making "Europe" peaceful and prosperous. This experience led to broad support for enshrining democracy promotion as a core aim of evolving EU common foreign policy endeavors. Additionally, the EU generally views democracy promotion as an avenue for creating security in insecure places, linking "democracy, human rights, development, and good governance in a virtuous package that will eradicate the root causes of conflicts, failed states, illegal immigration, and terrorism."[21]

3. Democracy Aid and the Democracy-Security Dilemma

Analyses of democracy aid have studied its effects and the determinants of its allocation. With respect to its effects, unlike general foreign aid, which has not been shown to promote democratization,[22] a growing body of literature finds that targeted democracy aid does have positive effects on democratization and its survivability.[23] Evidence also indicates that the choice of recipient and democracy aid type is important to the success of democracy aid.[24]

Analyses of democracy aid allocations are generally informed by the complex calculations around foreign aid allocations. Overall, a variety of determinants shape foreign aid allocations, including recipient development and humanitarian needs; recipient regime characteristics and human rights behavior; colonial legacies; various situational factors, including economic crises, conflict and political changes; donor security/political/economic interests; and political and economic bargaining between donors and recipients.[25]

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[20] "European Consensus on Development," European Union, *Official Journal of the European Union* 2006/C 46/01.

[21] Karen Smith, "The Role of Democracy Assistance in Future EU External Relations," (paper presented at the European Conference on Enhancing the European Profile in Democracy Assistance, July 4–6, 2004, the Netherlands).

[22] Stephen Knack, "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?," *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 251–66.

[23] E.g., Zohid Askarov and Hristos Doucouliagos, "Does Aid Improve Democracy and Governance? A Meta–regression Analysis," *Public Choice* 157 (2013): 601–28; Simone Dietrich and Joseph Wright, "Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa," *Journal of Politics* 77 (2015): 216–34; Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez–Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy–Building, 1990–2003," *World Politics* 59 (2007): 404–39; Tobias Heinrich and Matt W. Loftis, "Democracy Aid and Electoral Accountability," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63 (2017): 139–66; Sarantis Kalyvitis and Irene Vlachaki, "Democratic Aid and the Democratization of Recipients," *Contemporary Economic Policy* 28 (2010): 188–218; James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, "Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid To The Developing World, 1988–2001," *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (2011): 47–69.

[24] Simone Dietrich, "Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocations," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (2013): 698–712; Dietrich and Wright, "Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics"; Richard Nielsen and Daniel L. Nielson, "Triage for Democracy: Selection Effects in Governance Aid" (paper presented at the Department of Government, College of William & Mary, February 5, 2010).

[25] Alesina and Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid?"; Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl, "United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 185–98; Eliana Balla and Gina Y. Reinhardt, "Giving and Receiving Foreign Aid: Does Conflict Count?," *World Development* 36 (2008): 2566–585; Boutton and Carter, "Fair–Weather Allies"; David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E. Pasquarello, "Human Rights Practices and The Distribution of US Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries," *American Journal of Political Science* 3 (1985): 539–63; Cooper Drury, Richard Olson, and Douglas Van Belle, "The CNN Effect, Geo–strategic Motives and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance," *Journal of Politics* 67 (2005): 454–73;

Explanations of democracy aid allocations have built on foreign aid literature to emphasize the role of donor interests, situational factors, recipient need and other characteristics, and ideational factors such as human rights in allocation decisions.[26] Like studies of foreign aid more generally, analyses of democracy aid allocations are informed by the fact that donors have many potential target recipients and limited democracy aid resources to allocate. For both foreign aid and democracy aid, donor interests appear to influence allocation decisions consistently.[27]

The insights of these previous studies lead us to our argument: ideational motives for democracy assistance collide with other considerations, especially political, economic and security/stability concerns. The nexus of these concerns establishes a democracy-security dilemma for donors like the EU, resulting in trade-offs between two valued outcomes. The spread of democracy is in the interests of donors such as the EU because, in general, a more democratic world likely offers greater opportunity to resolve differences and conflicts via peaceful mechanisms, and because the policy goals and political practices of democratic states tend to be more consistent with donor preferences.[28] However, while support for democracies may reflect those interests, regime transitions have also been feared for their potential impact on stability and may threaten donor security interests. In practice, this creates tension between promoting democracy and pursuing political/security interests.[29] Because of the strategic importance of stable relations with a potential recipient, political, economic and security interests, and concerns for stability weigh heavily on democracy aid allocators.[30] Consequently, we argue that donors such as the EU may be *skeptical* of movements away from autocracy and *cautious* about providing democracy assistance, since recipient democratization may not lead to increasingly similar interests with donors and may also threaten existing security relationships.

To understand the democracy-security dilemma in practice, consider the illustration of North Africa, which represents a good example of the dynamics of the democracy-security dilemma. As a region in which democracy has failed to take root, North Africa might initially appear to warrant democracy promotion by donors such as the EU. However, security concerns have often incentivized accommodation and support of these authoritarian regimes. Exacerbating this, democracy promoters in the EU grapple with the absence of

Heinrich, 'When is Foreign Aid Selfish"; Lai, "Examining the Goals"; McKinlay and Little, "A Foreign Polkicy Model".

[26] Dietrich, "Bypass or Engage?"; Simone Dietrich, "Donor Political Economies and the Pursuit of Aid Effectiveness," *International Organization* 70 (2016): 65–102; Dietrich and Wright, "Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics"; Drury et al., "The CNN Effect"; Günther Fink and Silvia Redaelli, "Determinants of International Emergency Aid—Humanitarian Need Only?," *World Development* 39, no. 5 (2011): 741–57; Heinrich, "When is Foreign Aid Selfish"; Heinrich and Loftis, "Democracy Aid and Electoral Accountability"; Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and Leah Long, "Voters Get What They Want (When They Pay Attention): Human Rights, Policy Benefits, and Foreign Aid," *International Studies Quarterly* 62 (2018): 195–207; Richard Nielsen, "Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States," *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (2013): 791–803; Nielsen and Nielson, "Triage for Democracy"; Timothy Peterson and James M. Scott, "The Democracy Aid Calculus: Regimes, Political Opponents, and the Allocation of US Democracy Assistance, 1981–2009," *International Interactions* 44, no. 2 (2018): 268–93; Scott and Carter, "Distributing Dollars for Democracy".

[27] E.g., Peterson and Scott, "The Democracy Aid Calculus"; Nancy Qian, "Making Progress on Foreign Aid," *Annual Review of Economics* 7 (2015): 277–308; Scott and Carter, "Distributing Dollars for Democracy".

[28] E.g., Art, *Grand Strategy*; William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 14–32; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes"; Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "A Kantian System? Democracy and Third–Party Conflict Resolution," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (2002): 749–59.

[29] E.g., Jeff Bridoux and Milja Kurki, *Democracy Promotion: A Critical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2014); Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch, and Nicolas Bouchet, *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama* (London: Routledge, 2013); Lincoln A. Mitchell, *The Democracy Promotion Paradox* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2016).

[30] E.g., Nielsen and Nielson, *Triage for Democracy*; Scott and Carter, "Distributing Dollars"; Peterson and Scott, "The Democracy Aid Calculus".

effective (or receptive) civil society organizations in the states of the region, which limits their use of a common avenue of democracy assistance. Moreover, this limit is compounded by the nature of opposition groups themselves, with the goals of Islamist groups central to this concern. Consequently, donors face questions of whether or not they should exert pressure on North African governments to liberalize/democratize at the risk of jeopardizing relations, complicating the pursuit of other security goals, and generating instability in which potentially hostile Islamist groups gain power.

This democracy-security dilemma manifested itself immediately as the 1995 EU Barcelona Process set up the European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) to establish an area of "peace, prosperity, and security" with 12 eastern European, Mediterranean, and North African countries. Barcelona and the resulting EMP were created to use the attractiveness of and conditionality for potential EU membership to compel economic liberalization and democratization.[31] However, the EU Commission and EU member states shared a concern that promoting democracy in the region could lead to greater instability: "Political liberalization was, they maintained, now seen as the best means of engendering both stability and moderation in the Mediterranean," but, "No EU member state maintained that the democracy promotion agenda should, in the case of the Mediterranean, contain any aspiration to undermine incumbent regimes.[32]

Follow-on initiatives such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), established in 2003-04 both to build and improve upon the EMP, reflected concerns apparent under the EMP and favored economic reform over political reform, especially with respect to the North African members.[33] Further, after the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent Islamic terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, the EU grappled with the democracy-security dilemma in the changing context. In the wake of 9/11 and the European terrorist attacks, the EU tended to downgrade the importance of democratization in favor of security and counter-terrorism, a fact which seemed to only confirm to the authoritarian regimes of the region the relative unimportance of democracy promotion when compared to the strategic interest of stability and peace.[34]

Building on the literature and the North Africa example, we argue that the democracy-security dilemma affects EU approaches to democracy promotion globally in ways that are consistent with the general finding of the foreign aid allocation literature: "donors expect political benefits from their aid."[35] We therefore expect both ideational and interest/security factors to be relevant to EU democracy aid allocations. However, guided by previous scholarship and seen through the lens of the democracy-security dilemma, we expect these sometimes-contending factors to balance in favor of the security end of the dilemma, especially when the forces of democratization potentially undermine key interests of the donor. In effect, we argue that the EU will de-emphasize democracy aid to avoid the risk of destabilizing a regime and/or the relationship it has with the EU. Consequently, if security/

[31] Eur-Lex, Summaries of European Legislation: MEDA Program, accessed February 19, 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar15006.

[32] Youngs, "The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean," 41–2.

[33] Thus far, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia have more or less successfully developed Association Agreements with the EU. Algeria is still undergoing negotiations for their Action Plan, and Tunisia still awaits action. See EEAS, European Neighborhood Policy.

[34] George Joffe, "The European Union, Democracy and Counter–Terrorism in the Maghreb," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46 (2007): 147–71.

[35] Glenn Palmer, Scott B. Wohlander, and T. Clifton Morgan, "Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability," *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (2002): 5–26, 8.

interests dominate, we hypothesize that five related manifestations of that tilt exist.

➢ Hypothesis 1: *the more the EU trades with a potential recipient, the less democracy aid is allocated to the recipient*.

Previous studies emphasizing the importance of donor interests lead us to this trade-democracy aid link, which rests on the premise that the EU prefers stability with trade partners to protect economic ties. As a result, the EU de-emphasizes democracy aid to its trading partners, since democratization may threaten the regime's stability and thus the economic relationship with the recipient country.

➢ Hypothesis 2: *the greater the political interests/affinity between the EU and a potential recipient, the more democracy aid is allocated to the recipient.*

Previous studies emphasizing the importance of donor interests lead us to this link between political affinity/interests and democracy aid, which rests on the argument that recipients in which the EU has greater political affinity/interests are preferred targets for democracy aid, in part because such aid preserves rather than threatens stability in the relationship.

➢ Hypothesis 3: *potential recipients struggling with conflict/political violence are less likely to receive EU democracy aid.*

As previous literature indicates, donors like the EU have interests in stability in their aid targets. Because the EU is concerned with stability, potential recipients experiencing conflict are less preferable as targets of democracy aid. The conflict itself reduces the potential efficacy of democracy aid and such unstable environments constitute risky targets.

➢ Hypothesis 4: *potential recipients experiencing terrorist attacks are less likely to receive EU democracy aid.*

As in hypothesis 3, because the EU is concerned with stability and reluctant to invite terrorist attacks on EU member states, potential recipients experiencing terrorism are less preferable as targets of democracy aid.

➢ Hypothesis 5: *the more democratic a potential recipient, the more EU democracy aid is allocated to the recipient*.

Previous studies indicate that the nature of a potential aid recipient's regime affects democracy aid allocations.[36] If EU democracy aid reflected democracy promotion purposes, we would expect it to be directed to less democratic regimes to encourage and support democratization. However, because we argue that concerns for stability and security are more important, we expect the EU to target more/already democratic regimes, thus supporting democracy rather than risking destabilization and disruption of less democratic regimes.

4. Data and Methods

In sum, we argue that EU democracy aid allocations reflect a balance point in the democracy-security dilemma that favors EU interests and security concerns. To examine the democracy-security dilemma and its impact on global EU democracy assistance allocations we study country-year EU democracy aid to 127 countries from 1990-2010. For our dependent variable, EU democracy aid, we rely on the AidData 2.1 dataset.[37] We select assistance from the EU and aggregate it to the annual, country-level commitments by purpose, differentiating

[36] E.g., Dietrich and Wright, "Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics"; Erasmus Kersting and Cristopher Kilby, "Aid and Democracy Redux," *European Economic Review* 67 (2014): 125–43; Nielsen and Nielson, "Triage for Democracy"; Peterson and Scott, "The Democracy Aid Calculus"; Bernhard Reinsberg, "Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization," *World Development* 75 (2015): 46–61; Scott and Carter, "Distributing Dollars for Democracy".

[37] Tierney et al., "More Dollars than Sense".

between democracy assistance and other development aid with the AidData 2.1 project codes. We identify purpose codes 15000-15199 as democracy assistance, and all others as general foreign aid. In our analysis, we consider both the annualized sum of democracy aid to a recipient state and a dichotomous variable differentiating between democracy aid recipients and non-recipients. On the former, we take the logarithm of democracy aid in constant 2009 dollars.[38]

To gauge the concern for the democracy end of the democracy-security dilemma, we measure regime type/condition with Polity IV data,[39] while acknowledging its limitations.[40] The 21-point Polity2 variable is a composite score ranging from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic), with interregnum and transition scores (-77, -88) replaced with scores of 0 and interpolated scores respectively to reduce missing data, and interruption (-66) scores designated as missing values. If democracy is important, we expect a negative relationship between Polity score and EU democracy aid, as the EU targets less democratic regimes for democracy promotion, while a positive relationship would reflect greater concern for stability, as the EU targets more democratic regimes for support rather than less democratic regimes for democratization.

We include four variables to gauge the role of political, economic and security/stability interests on EU democracy aid allocations.[41] First, for political interests, we measure the foreign policy affinity between recipient states and the EU using United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Voting Data.[42] We measure the affinity of recipient countries with EU member France as a proxy for the EU.[43] Many studies highlight the tendencies of the EU's powerful countries to use their foreign aid budgets to influence recipient states.[44] Affinity is measured using the yearly *s3un* measure between France and all recipients. In this measure, ranging from -1 to 1, higher scores represent similar voting and thus, we argue, similar political interests—between France and a recipient. If political/strategic interests of member states dominate EU democracy aid allocations, we expect a positive relationship between affinity and democracy aid.

Second, for economic interests, we include trade between a potential recipient and Germany, relying on this as a proxy measure for trade with the European Union as a whole. Germany is the world's third largest exporter, German exports comprise over 25% of all

[38] For this value, we calculate log (aid value +1) to adjust for non–recipients (zero values for aid). In practice, this effectively results in a range from 0–20.3 for the logged democracy aid variable.

[39] Monty Marshall and K. Jaggers, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010," (2011) http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.

[40] E.g., Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices," *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2002): 5–35.

[41] Diagnostics indicate no concern for collinearity among these four interest variables.

[42] Erik Voeten, Anton Strezhnev, and Michael Bailey, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data," 2009, hdl: 1902.1/12379, Harvard Dataverse, V17, UNF:6:o5OiqHLeXMiv9Q8w8+3sVw==.

[43] E.g., B. Jolliff Scott, "Explaining a New Foreign Aid Recipient: The European Union's Provision of Aid to Regional Trade Agreements, 1995–2013," *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2018), doi: 10.1057/s41268–018–0163–z. We also measure the affinity of UNGA voting between aid recipients and both Germany and the United Kingdom, using Voeten et al. (2009) data. The correlation coefficient for Affinity between France and Britain is .96, the correlation coefficient between France and Germany is .95, and the correlation coefficient between Britain and Germany is .94. We chose to use only Affinity with France in our analysis as this measure includes the most observations.

[44] E.g., Alesina and Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid"; Mak B. Arvin and Torben Drewes, "Are There Biases in German Bilateral Aid Allocations?," *Applied Economics Letters* 8, no. 3 (2001): 173–77; Jean–Claude Berthelemy, "Bilateral Donors' Interest vs. Recipients' Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors Behave the Same?," *Review of Development Economics* 10, no. 2 (2006): 179–94; Peter Boone, "Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid," *European Economic Review* 40, no. 2 (1996): 289–329; David H. Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Palmer et al., "Give or Take"; Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "Foreign Political Aid: The German Political Foundations and Their US Counterparts," *International Affairs* 67, no. 1 (1991): 33-63.

exports from EU countries, and over 6 million German jobs rely on the export of goods and services with non-EU importers. Given the dominance of the German economy when it comes to EU trade and the extensive role Germany has historically had in spearheading EU economic policy, we believe trade with Germany to be a useful proxy for trade with the EU as a whole. [45] We log the sum of imports and exports, in constant 2009 US dollars, between Germany and each potential recipient. The dyadic data we use to measure trade come from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics. We expect the EU to allocate lower levels of democracy aid to countries with higher levels of trade with the EU, as measured by dyadic trade with Germany.

For stability/security interests, we include two additional variables. We gauge the effect of conflict on EU democracy aid allocations, relying on the Major Episodes of Political Violence data from the Center for Systemic Peace.[46] For each country-year, from this data we identify countries involved in on-going conflicts in a dichotomous variable. In addition, we include a measure for instances of terrorism, relying on the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database.[47] For the period 1990-2010, we aggregate this data to annual country-year counts of the incidents of terrorism. If security/stability concerns dominate the democracy-security dilemma, we expect a negative relationship between these measures and democracy assistance.

Controls. We include five controls in our models. To capture *recipient economic need*, we include annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in current dollars for each country, derived from the Penn World Tables. We control for the effect of *colonial relationships* with a dichotomous measure indicating (0) if the recipient is not a former colony of a European state and (1) if the recipient country is a former colony of a European state, relying on the ICOW Colonial History Data Set.[48] Because the EU has special political and economic relationships with certain states around the world, we control for the impact of two agreements on EU democracy aid allocations: the *European Neighborhood Partnership* (ENP) and the *African, Caribbean, and Pacific States Economic Partnership Agreement* (ACP EPA).[49] To account for these relationships, we use dichotomous measures for membership in each agreement. The variables are coded (0) if a country is not a member of the ENP or ACP and (1) if the country is a member.[50] Finally, to control for the impact of general aid commitments on democracy aid allocations, we subtract EU democracy aid from total EU aid to obtain a

[45] For this value, we calculate log (trade +1) to adjust for zero values. In practice, this results in a range from 0–25.6 for the logged trade variable. Germany, as arguably the most economically powerful and influential state within the EU, has the most to gain by promoting stable trading relationships and democratization. According to the IMF, Germany is the EU's largest trading power, exporting approximately $1.3 trillion of the EU's $5.4 trillion in goods and services per year.

[46] Monty Marshall, "Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) And Conflict Regions, 1946–2015," Center for Systemic Peace, May 25, 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/MEPVcodebook2015.pdf. 'Major episodes of political violence' involve at least 500 'directly–related' fatalities and reach a level of intensity in which political violence is both systematic and sustained (a base rate of 100 'directly–related deaths per annum'). Episodes may be of any general type: inter–state, intra–state, or communal; they include all episodes of international, civil, ethnic, communal, and genocidal violence and warfare.

[47] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. This data includes both domestic and transnational terrorist incidents. In this analysis, we do not distinguish between the two.

[48] Paul R. Hensel, "ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0," last updated November 13, 2018, http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html.

[49] Privileging ENP/ACP members in aid allocations also reflects a preference for the security/interests end of the democracy–security dilemma, as it reflects preferences for partner states tied politically and economically to the EU.

[50] Member countries in the ENP include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Algeria, Belarus, Libya, Russia, and Syria also participate in ENP programs (see, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters–homepage/330/european–neighbourhood–policy–enp_en). ACP countries include 79 developing and least developed countries across the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific regions. The ACP EPA was established in 2000 under the Cotonou Agreement. (see, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african–caribbean–and–pacific–acp–region/cotonou–agreement_en).

measure of "other EU aid," and include its logarithm in constant 2009 dollars.[51]

We conduct our empirical tests in three ways. We begin with simple descriptive and bivariate data to outline democracy aid patterns and trends across the period. Then, we test our argument with a generalized least squares AR(1) model with random effects, appropriate to the time-series cross-sectional data of our study.[52] For our analysis, random effects estimators have the advantage of taking into account both the uniqueness of each country and the effect of time. Unlike fixed effects, this technique controls for effects that are unique to country but constant over time and those that are constant across countries but vary over time.[53] To account for the autoregressive process in the dependent variable (democracy aid), we follow Achen, Drury and Peksen, Rudra and others and apply a standard AR(1) estimator to correct for this process.[54] We lag all independent variables by one year to ensure time order.

Finally, we model the impact of selection effects on EU democracy aid allocations. It is common to model foreign aid decisions as a two-step process to account for selection effects, as some states do not receive aid. In such models, states must pass through the selection stage to be considered for certain amounts of economic and military aid. Thus, aid allocations are subject to censoring and recipients constitute a non-random sample; failure to account for this results in biased estimates.[55] In our data, about 40% of the country-year cases receive no democracy assistance, so modeling a selection effect is appropriate.

Like others,[56] we apply Heckman selection models to aid allocation to control for potential selection bias.[57] The Heckman model estimates a maximum likelihood model for the first stage (selection), producing a nonselection hazard rate (inverse Mills ratio). At the second stage, an OLS model is applied and the nonselection hazard rate is added as a variable to account for the nonrandom sample. Estimates at the second stage are thus consistent and unbiased and reflect the impact of the nonselection hazard rate. To properly identify the model, we rely on the exclusion restriction, by which at least one variable is present in the first stage but not the second stage. For our tests, we model the recipient's economic need (per capita GDP) as the exclusion variable in the selection.[58] We include a lagged dependent variable and lag all our independent variables by one year to ensure proper time order. All results are derived from STATA, version 15.

[51] For this value, we calculate log (aid value +1) to adjust for non–recipients (zero values for aid). In practice, this effectively results in a range from 0–22.2 for the logged other aid variable.

[52] Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, "Time–Series–Cross–Section Issues: Dynamics" (unpublished paper, 2004), accessed February 19, 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228723029_Time-Series-Cross-Section_Issues_Dynamics.

[53] Donald P. Green, Soo Yeon Kim, and David H. Yoon, "Dirty Pool," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001): 441–68.

[54] Chris H. Achen, "Why Lagged Dependent Variables Can Suppress the Explanatory Power of Other Independent Variables," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, University of California at Los Angeles, July 2000); A. Cooper Drury, and Dursun Peksen, "Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy," *International Interactions* 36, no. 3 (2010): 240–64; Nita Rudra, "Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World," *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2005): 704–30.

[55] E.g., Richard A. Berk, "An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data," *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983): 386–97; S. L. Blanton, "Foreign Policy in Transition: Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports," *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2005): 647–67; Meernik et al., "Testing Models".

[56] E.g., Blanton, "Foreign Policy in Transition"; Drury et al., "The CNN Effect"; Fariss, "Strategic Substitution"; Meernik et al., "Testing Models".

[57] James J. Heckman, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," *Econometrica* 47 (1979): 153–61.

[58] We use this variable because development level, as measured by per capita GDP, is a factor determining aid eligibility rather than allocation levels/amounts (e.g., Apodaca and Stohl, "United States Human Rights Policy"). Moreover, because of the differences between democracy aid and foreign/development aid, we expect recipient economic need to be a more general factor guiding recipient choice rather than a determinant of democracy aid amounts.

5. Results

The balance of the evidence indicates that the EU responds to the democracy-security dilemma in ways that are largely consistent with our argument. Overall, EU tradeoffs between ideational and security concerns favor interests/security. Despite the ideational rhetoric, commitments, and concerns, EU democracy aid allocations are best explained as a function of the dominance of the security end of the democracy-security dilemma. We first present descriptive information about EU democracy aid and then discuss the results of our tests.

5.1. EU democracy assistance in context, 1990-2010

To begin, Figures 1-2 provide context for our analysis. Figure 1 presents EU allocations of democracy aid and general foreign aid from 1990-2010. As the figure shows, foreign aid rose steadily in the 1990-2010 period, while limited amounts of democracy aid began in the early 1990s, increasing in 1997-1998. After a surge in 2004, EU democracy aid held relatively steady through 2010. Figure 2 presents evidence on democracy aid as a proportion of total EU aid, again extending back to 1973 to provide long-term context. For the EU, democracy aid remained at less than 5% of EU assistance until 1996, increased to 5-10% of foreign aid in the latter post-Cold War years, and then increased to more than 12% of foreign aid consistently in the Global War on Terror years after 2002. Together, Figures 1-2 indicate that democracy aid emerged as a significant global strategy for the EU after the end of the Cold War.



Figure 1: EU Foreign and Democracy Aid, 1990-2010 (constant 2009 $)



Figure 2: EU Democracy Aid, 1990-2010 (constant 2009 $)

5.2. Explaining EU democracy aid and the impact of the democracy-security dilemma

Given this context, how does democracy-security dilemma affect EU democracy aid? Table 1 presents the first test of our model/argument, a generalized least squares technique with controls for an AR(1) process. The results support three of the five hypotheses of our argument. Overall, these results indicate that the democracy-security dilemma pushes EU democracy aid allocations to favor EU interests and security concerns over democracy.

First, the results support two of the four hypotheses focused on interests/security. Hypothesis 1 receives support, as potential recipients with whom EU political interests/similarity are high receive dramatically more democracy aid than other recipients. A shift of 1 from -0.5 to +0.5 on the political interests/affinity scale is associated with about 10.8% more democracy aid from the EU, which is the largest effect for any factor in the model. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, potential recipients experiencing terrorist strikes receive less democracy aid than other recipients, reflecting the described security/stability concerns. The results indicate that every 10 terrorist incidents in a potential recipient state reduces democracy aid by about a half a percent. The results in Table 1 do not support Hypotheses 1 or 3 however. Neither trade (Hypothesis 1) nor conflict/political violence (Hypothesis 3) is a statistically significant factor in EU democracy aid allocations.

Table 1- The Determinants of EU Democracy Aid, 1990-2010

Independent Variables	Coefficients
Political Interests/Affinity	2.21 (1.02)***
Logged Trade	-.05 (.09)
Terrorist Incidents	-.01 (.003)***
Conflict/Political Violence	.23 (.45)
Democracy/Regime Type (Polity2)	.06 (.03)*
Logged Other EU Aid	.30 (.02)***
European Colony	.39 (.61)
European Neighborhood Partnership	1.12 (.76)
African, Caribbean, and Pacific States Economic Partnership	3.06 (.60)***
GDP Per Capita	-.00004 (.00002)
Constant	1.15 (1.87)
Obs=2228, Groups=128 Wald=365.74 Chi Square=.000	R^2 within=.10 R^2 between=.60 R^2 overall=.26 rho_ar .18

***** = .01 ** = .05 *=.10**
Dependent Variable: EU Democracy Aid (constant 2009 $)
Random-effects GLS with AR(1)

The results in Table 1 also provide support for Hypothesis 5, indicating that democracy aid allocations are guided by cues in recipient democracy/regime type that are consistent with a tilt toward the interests/security end of the democracy-security dilemma. Table 1 shows the EU democracy aid targets already more democratic regimes rather than less democratic ones. This is not consistent with a democracy promotion purpose but, rather, with a preference for security/stability, as we suggest in Hypothesis 5. The results indicate that each 1-point shift toward greater democracy is associated with about 0.30% more democracy aid. This means that countries at the democratic end of the scale receive about 3-5% more democracy aid than countries at the lower end. To further illustrate this effect, Figure 3 shows the distribution of EU democracy aid (in 2009 $) across the Polity2 scale. This figure clearly shows that countries with the greatest democracy deficit (or, greatest democratic demand) receive much less EU democracy aid, while already democratic regimes (Polity2 scores of 7-10) receive much more. If the EU were attempting to *promote* democratization, the opposite should be the case.

Finally, these results hold after controlling for other factors, many of which reinforce the importance of EU interests. Other EU aid and membership in the ACP are positively associated with more democracy aid, while colonial relations with the EU, membership in the European Neighborhood Partnership, and per capita GDP are not statistically significant factors. Although we did not hypothesize about these controls, we note that both other EU aid and membership in the ACP may also be interpreted as indicators of broader political and economic interests, so these results also lend general support for our overall argument. It is also notable that ENP membership does not induce greater democracy aid. We note also that the null findings on colonial relationships as a factor shaping allocations runs counter to other foreign aid research.[59]

[59] E.g., Alesina and Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid"; Heinrich, "When is Foreign Aid Selfish"; Eric Neumayer, *The Pattern Of Aid Giving*: *The Impact of Good Governance on Development Assistance* (London: Routledge, 2005); Schraeder et al.,"Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle".



Figure 3: EU Democracy Aid and Democracy/Regime Type, 1990-2010 (constant 2009 $)

Table 2 presents the second test of our model/argument, employing a Heckman selection model to account for selection effects. The results in Table 2 are consistent with those in Table 1 and provide further evidence in support of our overall argument. These results provide support for three of our five hypotheses.

Table 2- The Determinants of EU Democracy Aid, 1990-2010

Selection: EU Aid Recipient	Coefficients
Political Interests/Affinity	.58 (.20)***
Logged Trade	-.007 (.15)
Terrorist Incidents	-.002 (.0008)***
Conflict/Political Violence	.08 (.08)
Democracy/Regime Type (Polity2)	.01 (.006)*
Logged Other EU Aid	.10 (.007)***
European Colony	.13 (.10)
European Neighborhood Partnership	.23 (.12)**
African, Caribbean, and Pacific States Economic Partnership	.50 (.09)***
Per Capita GDP	-.00004 (.000009)***
Constant	-1.79 (.31)***
Amount: Logged EU Democracy Aid (2009 $)	**Coefficients**
Political Interests/Affinity	-90 (.43)**
Logged Trade	.04 (.03)
Terrorist Incidents	-.002 (.002)
Conflict/Political Violence	.17 (.42)
Democracy/Regime Type (Polity2)	.03 (.01)**
Logged Other EU Aid	.18 (.03)***
European Colony	-.39 (.22)*
European Neighborhood Partnership	.39 (.26)
African, Caribbean, and Pacific States Economic Partnership	-.22 (.22)
Constant	11.12 (.92)***
Obs=2228 Wald X^2=92.82 (.000)	Mills Lambda=.43 (.33) Rho=.22

*****=.01 **=.05 *=.10**

DV: EU Democracy Aid (constant 2009 $) Heckman Selection Model

Two of the four hypotheses focused on interests/security again receive support in the results in Table 2. Hypothesis 2 receives support, as political interests/affinity are positively associated with greater likelihood of receiving democracy aid at the selection stage.

Interestingly, however, while the EU selects countries with greater political affinity to receive democracy aid, once past that selection screen, democracy aid is directed toward those with less affinity. Hypothesis 4 also receives support, with incidents of terrorism negatively associated with democracy aid at the selection stage. Neither Hypothesis 1 nor Hypothesis 3 is supported by the results of this test: trade and conflict/political violence are not statistically significant at either the selection or the amount stage.

Hypothesis 5 is supported as well. The democracy/regime type measure is statistically significant at the selection and amount stages, showing that more democratic regimes are both more likely to receive EU democracy aid, and to receive greater amounts. At the amount stage, a 1-point shift toward democracy is associated with about .15% increase in democracy aid; countries at the democratic end of the scale receive 1-2% more democracy aid than those at the autocratic end. Again, this is not consistent with a democracy promotion purpose.

Our control variables show results generally consistent with those in Table 1, though more of them are statistically significant. In Table 2, all controls are statistically significant at one or both stages. Recipient economic need, as measured by per capita GDP, increases the likelihood of receiving democracy aid (selection stage). Membership in the European Neighborhood Partnership and membership in the ACP are positively and significantly associated with EU democracy aid at the selection stage. Other EU aid positively and significantly affects EU democracy at both the selection and amount stages. Finally, less EU democracy aid is directed to former European colonies (amount stage) than other potential recipients. As noted earlier, these results may also be interpreted as further evidence of the impact of political and economic interests on EU democracy aid allocations.

6. Conclusion

What explains the selective allocation of EU democracy aid? We have theorized that the need to balance principles and interests generates a democracy-security dilemma that helps to explain democracy aid allocations and, especially, the conditions under which such aid is directed to the promotion of democracy. Our evidence indicates that the democracy-security dilemma leads the EU to balance ideational reasons for promoting democracy with political, economic, security and stability concerns in such a way that the balance point tilts toward security over democracy. Our tests model EU democracy aid allocations as a function of donor interests, recipient characteristics, and situational factors and support our argument. Although our evidence does not provide uniform support for all our hypotheses, it substantially supports four of the six we derive from our argument, partially supports a fifth, and, overall, suggests that political and security/stability interests are particularly powerful factors when the EU gives democracy aid.

Broadly speaking, our findings contribute to the foreign aid-democracy aid literature studying aid allocations and suggest that translating declaratory policy of democracy support into practice is challenged when such commitments collide with other considerations, especially political, economic and security concerns. When such concerns are present, political and security interests appear to trump ideational/democratization commitments, exposing a gap between rhetoric and reality when it comes to promoting democracy. Concerns over established relationships and preexisting agreements that advance donor security interests, desires to develop and sustain friendly neighbors and neighborhoods, and the need to build security and sustain stability are sometimes at odds with interest in and efforts to

promote democratization. When they are, it appears the balance point on the democracy-security dilemma tilts in favor of security. This core finding from our analysis sheds light on the sometimes-contradictory findings of previous studies and indicates how ideational and interest-based concerns intersect in democracy aid allocations.

Our evidence also raises important questions about current challenges facing democracy promotion, with recent anti-democratic trends especially important. As the stability of democracy worldwide is challenged, should we expect the provision of democracy aid to respond in kind? Or given the appearance of anti-democracy trends even within traditional democracy aid *donors* in both Europe and North America, might we expect to see the provision of democracy aid worldwide trend downwards as well? How will the balance between principles and interests in democracy aid allocation be affected by these changes? Perhaps even the fundamental premise of democracy aid is changing entirely as a result of the need to balance principles and interests. Our results suggest that democracy aid may be less about supporting "democratization" per se, and more about reinforcing and supporting stability in existing democratic states. If this is the case, then might we expect to see significant shifts in global democracy aid allocation trends and a noticeable reduction of the willingness of donors to allocate aid to semi-democratic states undergoing democratization?

Finally, our analysis suggests some intriguing routes for further study. For one, the possibility that donors work to complement or supplement each other in a kind of democracy promotion network in which different donors specialize in different approaches or areas warrants attention. Also, comparative analysis of democracy aid by the EU and its individual member states offers promising insights on a range of issues, such as whether EU member states balance the democracy-security dilemma differently in their national foreign aid programs and to what extent the democracy promotion goals of member states are used to influence democracy aid programs at the EU level. Furthermore, are there regional variations in the effects of the democracy-security dilemma on democracy aid allocations such that the balance point between principles and interests vary by different regions? Additionally, foreign policy context matters as well,[60] and the balance point on the democracy-security tradeoff may well shift according to that context. Thus, disaggregating the time period into sub-periods to reflect changing contexts, problems, and prospects might reveal a more dynamic process and variation in the relative importance of interest-based and ideational factors in those different sub-periods. Finally, our analysis suggests that the potentially reciprocal relationships between democratization, democracy promotion, and democracy aid merits further study of its own.

Since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has been embraced by the EU and most other Western donors as an important foreign policy strategy that combines ideational and strategic/security concerns. In practice, however, the simple and powerful rationale behind democracy aid[61] tangles with other interests, often generating the need for trade-offs. EU democracy aid since 1990 reflects those trade-offs, driven by a "democracy-security dilemma" as it balances ideational reasons for promoting democracy with concerns over political and economic relationships, regional stability, and security. The balance appears to favor interests.

[60] E.g., Scott and Carter, "Distributing Dollars".
[61] E.g., Art, *Grand Strategy*.

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Deconstructing the Sykes-Picot Myth: Frontiers, Boundaries, Borders and the Evolution of Ottoman Territoriality

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Abstract

This study aims to evaluate the emergence of the Sykes-Picot order and deconstruct its mythologization by proposing an evolutionary assessment of border understanding. This study addresses the following primary research questions: How did the interplay of domestic, regional, and international developments lay the groundwork for the formation of the Sykes-Picot territorial order? How was the administrative structure and regional divisions before the Sykes-Picot agreement and to which border categorizations did these structures correspond? Was the Sykes-Picot agreement the only international intervention that affected the borders of the region or were there other international interventions before the Sykes-Picot agreement? This study argues that the history of Middle Eastern border formation is not only an international one but also involves many aspects that have not widely been taken into consideration. In doing so, this paper adopts a critical historical perspective to analyze the evolution of Middle Eastern borders. This paper proposes a three-tracked evolutionary analytical framework (frontiers, boundaries, borders) to analyze the emergence of borders and applies it to the emergence of Ottoman territoriality. This study concludes that the Sykes-Picot agreement is only one, complementary part of a long process in the emergence of Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Keywords: Ottoman territoriality, Sykes-Picot Agreement, Middle Eastern borders, border studies

1. Introduction

In November 1915, Mark Sykes, advisor to British Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener, and French former consul in Beirut François Georges Picot were tasked by their respective governments to craft an acceptable post-war partition map for the Middle East. Keeping all the interests and considerations of their governments in mind, Mark Sykes and François Georges Picot reached an agreement in January 1916 about the division of the Ottoman Arab territories, and with Russia's approval in May 1916, Sykes and Picot finalized their agreement for establishing zones of influence in the region.[1] Although the terms agreed on by Sykes and Picot and exchanged by the two governments did not turn into a real agreement and were ultimately further modified by other arrangements, they were highly instrumental in influencing the current borders of the Middle Eastern states.

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[1] Eugene Rogan, "A Century After Sykes-Picot," *Cairo Review*, 2015, 102, https://cairoreview-b23.kxcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CR19-Rogan.pdf.

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The explanations and recommendations about the post-Arab Spring Middle Eastern order have been primarily constructed upon the differing narratives of the Sykes-Picot arrangements. While the overwhelming bulk of the discussions blamed the Sykes-Picot order as the main source of the contemporary quagmire in which the Middle East struggles, the nascent actors of the post-Arab Spring chessboard have also asserted their commitment to wiping out the traces of the legacy of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Sykes-Picot metaphor has incrementally become firmly associated with almost all the geopolitical predicaments the Middle Eastern states have had to face. Behind the emergence of the Sykes-Picot myth as a springboard for these debates and analyses lays a two-fold argumentation about the order believed to be established by the same agreement. The first part involves problematizing Sykes-Picot as having drawn "artificial" borders dividing societies that were once united, into different political structures. The second part stresses the method the Sykes-Picot agreement followed rather than its consequences, and argues that it was a "top-down" implementation of territorial arrangements that failed to take local realities into consideration.

Departing from the above arguments, a recently emerged popular literature has started to challenge this one-dimensional perception about the formation of the modern Middle Eastern borders by arguing that there is not only the international aspect embodied in the Sykes-Picot agreement but rather there is the combination of a series of domestic, regional and international factors that together set the ground for the formation of the modern Middle Eastern territorial order. However, despite these recent popular studies' positive steps in revealing the historical continuity of the interplay between local, regional and international factors, they are mostly either specific case studies that chronologically analyze the historical evolution of specific Middle Eastern borders from a historical perspective, or speculative essays that do not provide deeper insights.[2]

Against this backdrop, it seems to be relevant to delve into the historical interplay between domestic, regional and international factors that actually constitute the background of the formation of the Sykes-Picot order from a theoretical and historical perspective to understand the validity of the above-mentioned arguments. This study argues that it is not only the Sykes-Picot Agreement that formed the geopolitical order of the modern Middle East but rather both the domestic and other regional and international arrangements that had long before started to pave the way for the formation of the modern Middle Eastern borders, leaving the Sykes-Picot Agreement as one of the subsequent phases of the evolution.

Departing from this hypothesis, this study mainly addresses the following primary research questions: How did the interplay of the array of domestic, regional, and international developments lay the groundwork for the formation of the Sykes-Picot territorial order?

[2] Pınar Bilgin, "Thinking Postcolonially about the Middle East: Two Moments of Anti-Eurocentric Critique" (Center for Mellemoststudier, June 2016); Pinar Bilgin, "What Is the Point about Sykes–Picot?," *Global Affairs* 2, no. 3 (May 26, 2016): 355–59, doi: 10.1080/23340460.2016.1236518; Nick Danforth, "Stop Blaming Colonial Borders for the Middle East's Problems," *The Atlantic*, September 11, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/stop-blaming-colonial-borders-for-the-middle-easts-problems/279561/; Adam Garfinkle, "The Fall of Empires and the Formation of the Modern Middle East," *Orbis* 60, no. 2 (2016): 204–16, doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2016.02.001; Rashid Khalidi, "The Persistence of the Sykes–Picot Frontiers in the Middle East," *London Review of International Law* 4, no. 2 (July 2016): 347–57, doi: 10.1093/lril/lrw019; Elias Muhanna, "Iraq and Syria's Poetic Borders," *The New Yorker*, August 13, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/iraq-syria-poetic-imagination; Marina Ottaway, "Learning from Sykes-Picot," Middle East Program Occasional Paper Series (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2015), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/learning-sykes-picot; David Siddhartha Patel, "Repartitioning the Sykes-Picot Middle East? Debunking Three Myths," Middle East Brief (Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, November 2016), https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB103.pdf; Gareth Stansfield, "The Remaking of Syria, Iraq and the Wider Middle East," *RUSI,* July, 2013, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201307_bp_the_remaking_of_syria_iraq_and_the_wider_middle_east_final.pdf.

What was the nature of the administrative structure and regional divisions before the Sykes-Picot Agreement and to which border categorizations did these structures correspond? Was the Sykes-Picot Agreement the only international intervention that affected the borders of the region or were there other international interventions before the Sykes-Picot agreement?

To explore these questions, this paper adopts a critical historical perspective in analyzing the evolution of the Middle Eastern borders. In doing so, this paper proposes an evolutionary analytical framework to analyze the emergence of borders by looking at the process from the perspectives of frontiers, boundaries, and borders. In this regard, this study attempts to contribute to the ongoing literature about the geopolitics of the Middle East and particularly the Sykes-Picot myth by putting a border studies perspective at the core of its narrative.

The first section of this study will evaluate the theoretical/definitional discussions regarding the borders and will put them into an evolutionary perspective. The second section will delve into the evolution of Ottoman territoriality from a border studies perspective to explain the background of the emergence of modern Middle Eastern geopolitics. The next sections will deconstruct the Sykes-Picot order by looking at the domestic, regional, and international developments that paved the way for the contemporary borders. The concluding section highlights the continuations in the historical domestic and international borders and partitions put forward by Sykes-Picot.

2. A Three-Pronged Evolutionary Typology of Borders: Frontiers, Boundaries, and Borders

Borders represent the end-point of states' common identities and values while outside of these borders this harmony disappears. As argued by Minca and Vaughan-Williams, borders help states to 'spatialize the political' and thus provide them with the ability to transform their geopolitical imaginations into more concrete and manageable beings[3]. Indeed, as borders create a physical limitation of a sovereign's authority, they both physically divide societies into opposing entities and are themselves also created by those same opposing entities. However, although borders in general are products of dichotomies and at the same time represent a dichotomy or opposition between the adjacent entities themselves, they also serve to reveal and create a more concrete and coherent "reality" inside them.[4]

It is an acknowledged fact that even the first rudimental forms of social structures, i.e. tribes, had an elemental understanding of territoriality mainly embodied in undefined zones rather than defined and well-established areas, and would be later developed further in line with the maturing of political organization.[5] The historical examples of the Chinese and Roman empires have been utilized to prove the literature's emphasis on the causal relation between political maturity and the emergence of borders. Indeed, these historical cases reveal the transition towards borders as fixed barriers rather than unfixed and undefined vague zones. For instance, as Elden argued, the experience of ancient Greece showed that in this earliest example, the boundaries between *polies* were somewhat known but not strictly divided; rather there were vast lands between the cities. However, the example of the Roman territorial system demonstrated the emergence of the frontier understanding within the idea

[3] Claudio Minca and Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Carl Schmitt and the Concept of the Border," *Geopolitics* 17, no. 4 (October 1, 2012): 759–61,doi: 10.1080/14650045.2012.660578.

[4] Muhanna, "Iraq and Syria's Poetic Borders."

[5] Stephen B. Jones, "Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 49, no. 3 (1959): 242.

of *terra nullius* / empty land.[6]

Early literature on geopolitics has portrayed borders as the territorial representations or "manifestations" of states.[7] The French revolution and the rising trend of rationalism in philosophical thinking was also echoed in geopolitical writings, which began to think rationally on natural borders before being opposed by the German understanding of national borders.[8] The classical geopolitical writings and their emphasis on borders took shape around the idea of preventing undesirable conflicts by establishing or redrawing more proper borders between neighbor states. These works paid attention to borders in a more functional way but did not intend to make conceptual discussions on the terminology of borders and mainly used the various terms of frontier, border and boundary interchangeably. However, more detailed and conceptual works have argued that these terms represent different meanings and notions. For instance, while describing surveys along the southern borders of Afghanistan in 1897, A. H. McMahon used the three different terms intentionally: frontier, border, and boundary. McMahon wrote that "the southern *border* of Afghanistan from the Gomal river to the Persian *frontier*", but "The Koh-i-Malik-Siah mountain marks the southern point of the *boundary* between Afghanistan and Persia, as agreed by those two governments" (italics mine).[9] In these sentences, McMahon intentionally made a differentiation between the terms border, frontier and boundary, describing a river as a "border", an undefined area towards Persia as a frontier, and the result of an agreement as a boundary.

2.1. Frontiers as indefinite zones of transition

Four years before McMahon published his surveys in Afghanistan, in an essay submitted to the American Historical Association in 1893, the famous American historian Frederick Jackson Turner examined the role of the "frontier" in American history and argued that it was the frontier that drove the fate of America. His conceptualization of frontier considers frontiers to be the layers of a progression and the junction between the civilized and the uncivilized.[10] Therefore, these frontiers represent the direction towards which the expansion should move. Because they represent the line between the civilized and the uncivilized, they should be taken under control by a progressive actor and "tamed".[11] Prescott drew attention to the fact that, apart from using the term in its political sense, political geographers also use the term in order to refer to the "zone" between the settled and the unsettled.[12] Thus, there appears two categorizations for frontiers: political frontiers and settlement frontiers. Newman and Paasi argued that political frontiers are different from settlement frontiers in the sense that political frontiers are encompassed by "international boundaries" whereas settlement frontiers separate the unoccupied and the unpopulated areas from the populated and established areas within

[6] Stuart Elden, "Why Is the World Divided Territorially?," in *Global Politics: A New Introduction*, ed. Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss, Second edition (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 226–27, http://eu.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/view/action/uresolver.do?operation=resolveService&package_service_id=3039366920002418&institutionId=2418&customerId=2415.

[7] David Newman and Anssi Paasi, "Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography," *Progress in Human Geography* 22, no. 2 (1998): 187.

[8] Jones, "Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time," 248.

[9] A. H. McMahon, "The Southern Borderlands of Afghanistan," *The Geographical Journal* 9, no. 4 (1897): 393, doi: 10.2307/1774479.

[10] K. J. Rankin and Richard N. Schofield, "The Troubled Historiography of Classical Boundary Terminology," in *Revised Version of a Paper Presented at the 30th Congress of the International Geographical Union, Glasgow, Scotland, 15-20 August 2004* (University College Dublin. Institute for British-Irish Studies, 2004), 4, http://researchrepository.ucd.ie/handle/10197/2245.

[11] Newman and Paasi, "Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World," 189.

[12] J. R. V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, 2nd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 36.

the territories of a given state.[13] Malcom Anderson conceptualized frontiers as international boundaries, while Ladis Kristof made a clearer conceptualization of frontiers, describing them not as restriction lines but as open and directed towards the outside; since they are at the edges of the states they represent a "zone of transition".[14] In sum, frontiers are permeable zones for both the insiders and the outsiders; in some cases, they divide the uninhabited and settled areas, and in other cases they play a facilitator role for transition, with their open, indefinite and moveable characteristics.

2.2. Boundaries as fixed lines of separation

Starting from the 17th-18th centuries and intensifying in the 19th-20th centuries, the indefinite zones of transitions, i.e. frontiers, began to undergo a process of transformation. These indefinite zones started to become more definite, and were transformed into 'lines of separation'. These lines or boundaries differed from frontiers in the sense that they were definite, recognized, and agreed upon. Thus, 'boundaries' can be understood as well-established formations in comparison with 'frontiers'. While frontiers are directed towards the outside, boundaries are "inner-oriented", legally defined and accurate.[15] Custred drew attention to one of the most important characteristics of boundaries, that they are drawn in a way that they are certain, and that they designate the end-point of a state's landholding.[16] While the formation of frontiers take shape according to inhabitation, the formation of boundaries is based more on politics and is state-centered. During the process of boundary formation, the understanding of the territoriality of different societies is constituted in both a physical and discursive manner in which the state plays an important role.[17]

2.3. Borders as multiplex social and political institutions

Borders present an overarching conceptualization and understanding that involves different types of territorial and social constructions in an integrated way. In this sense, it can be argued that the term border refers to a territorial notion that is mobile, extensive and includes social realities. Therefore, borders are not only the delimited lines on maps and agreements but also the processes by which these delimited and agreed lines become actual with the interactions and the effects of the societies in/outside of the border.[18] Thus, whether it is a legal and strict line like boundaries or a broader social phenomenon like borders, the main purpose of such entities is to legally and socially create divisions in order to ensure differentiated systems that maintain their legitimate sovereignties. For instance, Gasparini described borders as representations of the "shared end of the system," dividing the sphere of sovereignty at a national level.[19] In the words of well-known border studies scholar Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, borders are "about people; and for most settled territories that are predominantly about inclusion and exclusion, they are woven into varied cultural, economic

[13] Newman and Paasi, "Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World," 189.

[14] Rankin and Schofield, "The Troubled Historiography of Classical Boundary Terminology," 1–3.

[15] Rankin and Schofield, 3.

[16] Glynn Custred, "The Linguistic Consequences of Boundaries, Borderlands, and Frontiers," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 26, no. 3 (December 1, 2011): 265, https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2011.675716.

[17] Anssi Paasi, "Generations and the 'Development' of Border Studies," *Geopolitics* 10, no. 4 (December 1, 2005): 669, doi: 10.1080/14650040500318563.

[18] David Newman, "On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 18, no. 1 (March 2003): 15, https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2003.9695598.

[19] Alberto Gasparini, "Belonging and Identity in the European Border Towns: Self-Centered Borders, Hetero-Centered Borders," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 29, no. 2 (April 3, 2014): 167, doi: 10.1080/08865655.2014.916067.

and political fabrics.[20] Bounded territories and borderlands are the outcome of the continual interactions and intersections between the actions of people (agency) within the constraints and limits placed by contextual and structural factors (structure)". Similarly, David Newman argued that borders as institutions are the mechanisims that decide the included and excluded based on legal rules, which could be strict or flexible.[21] In sum, the 'border' concept presents an integral and comprehensive perception that holistically involves existential and functional aspects.

A further important classification regarding border making is the difference between borders on a map and borders on the surface, i.e. delimitation and demarcation. It can be argued that the conceptual differentiation between the practices of delimitation and demarcation is actually a modern development that emerged in the late 19th century. Delimitation can be defined as the process, mostly on paper, of identifying, designating and specifying of a "boundary site", while demarcation is the process of practically applying these delimited lines on the ground.[22] The boundary delimited on the map may differ from the border demarcated on the surface, and in some cases, a territory may actually be the product of a mapping practice. Winichakul, for example, introduced the term "geo-body" to explain the process of creating nations and territories through mapping.[23]

3. The Evolution of the Ottoman Territoriality: A Border Studies Perspective

Before delving into the Ottoman case, a short classification of 'territory' should be provided. The mainstream argument in the literature is to portray territory either in its relation to the state or in its relation to a set of actions. In other words, territory is conceptualized either as a consequence of the existence of a state or as part of a strategy.[24] Territory is by nature an ontological component of a state, i.e. without a territory it is not possible to think of a state. However, territory takes on a new meaning along with the strategic aspirations of a given state. In terms of strategy, territory is related to the expansion or shrinking of a given state's lands. It is thus about a state's relations with its neighbors, whereas the first perspective is more related to domestic arrangements. In this article the Ottoman case is analyzed from the perspective of the first classification, that is, territorial evolution in relation to the 'state' of the Ottoman Empire, not from a behavioral/strategical perspective. Moreover, as Goettlich argued, the understanding here is based on the "linearization of borders" that established the modern understanding of the term of territoriality, rather than the limited focus on sovereignty.[25] Therefore the main rationale behind the following discussion is to show the link between the Ottoman territorial administration with regard to the broader understanding of sovereignty and the later developments of modern boundary making. Since this is not primarily a historical study, it does not delve into detail and instead uses an analytical narrative aiming to explain the history of the borders by applying the terminology

[20] Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, "Special Section: Borders, Borderlands and Theory: An Introduction," *Geopolitics* 16, no. 1 (January 31, 2011): 3, doi: 10.1080/14650045.2010.493765.

[21] Newman, "On Borders and Power," 14–15.

[22] Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, 69.

[23] Winichakul demonstrated in the example of Siam that nationhood may be created on maps. However, this study does not take this view in the example of the Middle East, but rather tries to demonstrate the interplay between various factors. Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (University of Hawaii Press, 1994).

[24] Stuart Elden, "Thinking Territory Historically," *Geopolitics* 15, no. 4 (November 19, 2010): 757, doi: 10.1080/14650041003717517.

[25] Kerry Goettlich, "The Rise of Linear Borders in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* (March 16, 2018), doi: 10.1177/1354066118760991.

and conceptualizations explained in the previous section.

The Ottoman Empire took control over the regions of Syria, Iraq and Anatolia starting in the beginning of the 16th century (1516). In fact, although the geographical and human conditions in the Middle East had created some borders, in Islamic societies sovereignty was not based on land but on people. Therefore, while the location of the sovereign would become the center, anyone that recognized this sovereignty would be acknowledged as a part of this center without any conditions with regards to boundaries. Subjects accepted as *Dar al Islam* (Abode of Islam) the geographies governed by Muslim rulers or where Islamic rules were valid. Therefore, they were far from a real understanding of boundaries. Theoretically, they would see regions accepted as Dar al Islam as a whole within one border. As Abbas Kelider argues, despite being from different countries and ethnicities, Islamic societies saw their Islamic identity as their national identity.[26] The same cannot be said for the non-Muslim subjects of the previous Islamic empires, however the Ottoman *millet* system attached importance to their religious identity so that they also perceived their religious identity as part of their national identities. In the Ottoman case, with the beginning of the empire's shrinkage in the 18th century, a transformation and change took place in the reverse direction and a new administrative system based on different divisions such as *eyalet* (province), *vilayet* (governorate), *hadd-i fasıl* (border line) and *tahdid-i hudud* (delimitation) started to emerge.

3.1. Eyalets as frontiers

In early Ottoman sources, Ottoman administrative divisions were described mainly in connection with the ruler. In the classical era, the rulers of large areas were called *beylerbeyi* (governor). Even though this administrative division was reflected in the commanders appointed to that area, they assumed the name of that area as their title, eg. the *Beylerbeyi* of Aleppo, Damascus, Saida, etc. Therefore, their powers were naturally limited to the area assigned to them. These *beylerbeylik*s outlined the edges and the defense of border areas.[27] Herein, it is possible to argue that the *beylerbeylik* system corresponded well to the frontier concept explained above, in that they were mobile while not having definite limits and mostly protected by military units.

Selim I founded the Arab province that included Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Hijaz, the Alâüddevle province (conquered in 1515) and the Diyarbekir province (conquered in 1517, first tahrir in 1518). These provinces were subsequently divided into *sanjak*s-- small units of administrative districts placed under vilayets. As of 1520, the Arab Province had fifteen *sanjak*s.[28] It can be said that the provinces represented a flexible frontier system given that the system was not fully settled around these dates. In fact, this system began to shift again after the 1530s. The sovereignty established over Iraq on the one hand, and the new structures founded in the seas and North Africa (excluding Egypt) on the other hand, created flexible territorial limits in the context of frontiers. After the Arab regions came under Ottoman control, the Arab Province was created to include modern day Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Hijaz (part of present-day Saudi Arabia). The changes in the territories of the empire and the needs mainly stemming from taxation later prompted the rearrangement of

[26] Abbas Kelidar, "States without Foundations: The Political Evolution of State and Society in the Arab East," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28, no. 2 (1993): 316.

[27] Halil İnalcik, "Eyalet," *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (TDV İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1995), 549, http://www.islamansiklopedisi.info/dia/pdf/c11/c110350.pdf.

[28] İnalcik, "Eyalet," 549.

the Arab Province. To this end, Aleppo, Damascus and Egypt were organized into separate *beylerbeylik*s. The narrowing and expanding boundaries during the creation of the Damascus *Eyalet* throughout the first half of the 16th century is a good example of the emergence of flexible *eyalet* borders. Even though there were no major changes, it is possible to observe six changes to the Damascus *Eyalet*'s limits between when the Ottomans took over that region and 1565. For example, the Anatolian cities of Adana, Urfa, Antakya and Malatya were part of the Damascus *Eyalet* in 1522 but in 1565 the *eyalet* was severely narrowed, coming much closer to today's borders. On the other hand, the territory of modern-day Palestine/Israel, Jordan and parts of Lebanon were kept in the Damascus *Eyalet*. Beginning in 1549, Aleppo was taken out of the Damascus *Eyalet* and made an *eyalet* on its own while some cities in Anatolia removed from the Damascus *Eyalet* were included in the Aleppo *Eyalet*.

In the beginning of the 17th century, the Empire had 32 *eyalet*s under the responsibility of almost the same number of *beylerbeylik*s, however it should be noted that these numbers were changing constantly and no historical account is able to show an exact number. In this context, the *Eyalet*s of Damascus, Tripoli, Aleppo and Raqqa were founded in the region. In sum, it is possible to assume that *eyalet*s determined symbolic and administrative needs and also served as frontiers. They served as frontiers since most of the above changes and delineations were results of the empire's expansion and the resulting need for better territorial administration. As the territories expanded, need for further organization of the *eyalet*s emerged and this is a clear demonstration of *eyalet*s as movable frontiers.

3.2. Vilayets as boundaries

With the 19th century, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II wanted to make a new *eyalet* arrangement to rebuild the central power of the state and his own authority. Beginning in 1812, he reorganized former *eyalet*s into "*müşiriyet*", taking military and financial obligations into account.[29] Mahmud II's radical rearrangements abolished the *timar* system, the empire's traditional land regime. At this point, the Tanzimat projected a new land regime. This was the aim of the Ottoman Land Code, which was announced after the Tanzimat.[30] When all these developments proved to be insufficient, the administration of the Ottoman countryside was rearranged with the provinces charter (*vilayetler nizamnamesi*), which was put into application in 1864 and 1871. With this rearrangement, *vilayet*s replaced *eyalet*s and their geographic boundaries were made clearer. The country was divided into *vilayet*s, *vilayet*s into *mutasarrifate*s (lieutenant governorship), *mutasarrifate*s into *kaza*s (district) and *kaza*s into *nahiye*s (sub-district) and villages. This administrative division was mentioned in detail in the empire's yearbooks (*Salname*) and shown clearly on new maps. Just like *eyalet*s, *vilayet* boundaries experienced some changes from time to time but the overall arrangements remained the same until the collapse of the empire. In a way, these quick changes were a signal of a move towards the boundary concept, which is based on fixed and agreed borders.

Following the Empire's 1864 arrangements, more definite *vilayet* boundaries were drawn and every *vilayet* came under the rule of a governor. One of the most notable things here is that when the Syria Province was established, the ancient word 'Syria' was also used by the Ottomans to replace the Damascus *Eyalet*. Iraq as a region was always referred to as Southern

[29] İnalcik, "Eyalet," 550.

[30] İlber Ortaylı, *Imparatorluğun en uzun yüzyılı* (Timaş Yayınları, 2008), 245–46.

Iraq (Iraq-i Arab–Arabic Iraq)[31] and was comprised of the Baghdad and Basra *vilayet*s. Mosul in the north was always thought of as an entity independent from Iraq. After the publication of the 1864 charter and between the time of the establishment of the new *vilayet*s and 1918, the new Syria *Vilayet* was comprised of four *sanjak*s: the *Sanjak*s of Damascus, Hama, Hauran and Maan (Karak). The boundaries of the Syria *vilayet* were defined as an area that included the surroundings of modern-day Jordan and Damascus, with Mount Lebanon being kept outside of Syria as a privileged *sanjak*. Long after the 1864 arrangements, the Beirut *vilayet* was founded as an independent area from the Damascus *eyalet.* It included a part of modern-day Syria as well as mandate Palestine, and was comprised of five *sanjak*s: Beirut, Acre, Tripoli, Latakia and Belka (Nablus). The Jerusalem *Sanjak* was directly governed from Istanbul because of its religious peculiarities. It was comprised of its center, the Jerusalem district, and the districts of Jaffa, Gaza and Halilurrahman (Hebron).[32] Here, the most important conclusion to be drawn from these developments is the fact that the emergence of *eyalet*s as well-defined territorial units happened at a time when the idea of further expansion had come to an end. Thus, after the possibility of further expansion disappeared, well defined, stable boundaries for these territorial units were needed, not moving frontiers. The Ottomans thus devised a new land regime and reorganized the territorial units accordingly so that the boundaries of each unit would become more definite. These agreed upon boundaries remained largely unchanged until the collapse of the empire.

4. Deconstructing the Sykes-Picot Order: Domestic, Regional, and International Factors

Moving on chronologically, it can be argued that modern Middle Eastern borders are not only the result of the Sykes-Picot agreement, but rather the outcome of the interaction between specific domestic, regional, and international developments. In this section the following developments with regards to the Middle Eastern borders will be analyzed: Domestic Factors (the Egyptian crisis and the Aqaba border, the Mount Lebanon Concession, and the sacred boundaries of Palestine); Regional Factors (the Persian Gulf, the Ottoman-Iranian Border, and border arrangements in Yemen); International Factors (the Sykes-Picot Agreement).

4.1. The Egyptian crisis and drawing of the Aqaba border

The Egyptian Question began with the French invasion in 1789 and developed initially as a domestic issue before turning into an international problem and leading to discussions over the Egypt-Syria border.[33] The Governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, expanded his influence over large areas, taking advantage of the special circumstances of the Ottoman Empire. Creating trouble for the Ottoman Empire after their emergence in middle Arabia, the Wahhabis captured places sacred for Muslims. Muhammad Ali was tasked with removing the Wahhabis from these areas. His son Ibrahim Pasha's success against the Wahhabis in 1818 resulted in Muhammad Ali's seizure of coastal parts of the Ottoman-held Gulf of Basra as well as the Hejaz.[34] He later expanded his rule around Sudan as well. With the help of the

[31] Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 77.

[32] *Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye'nin 1313 senesine mahsus istatistik-i umumiyesidir* (İstanbul: Nezaret-i Umur-i Ticaret ve Nafia, 1316), 2–4.

[33] Peter Partner, *A Short Political Guide to the Arab World* (Literary Licensing, LLC, 1960), 19–20.

[34] Zekeriya Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı hâkimiyeti: Vehhabî hareketi ve Suud Devleti'nin ortaya çıkışı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998).

French, Muhammad Ali's army became a major threat to the central authority while at the same time being an indispensable force on its behalf. In fact, the Ottoman government asked for Muhammad Ali's help during the Greek rebellion, for which he demanded to rule over the Syria province as well. The Ottoman government on the other hand, which sought to unite Egypt and Syria and create an independent state, did not grant this wish. Nevertheless this conflict continued to grow and turned into a crisis in 1832. Using the failure to return fugitives that fled to Acre as a pretext, Ibrahim Pasha besieged Acre Castle and did not comply with Istanbul's request to lift the siege. Ibrahim Pasha was able to advance as far as Kütahya in Western Anatolia. In return for Ibrahim Pasha's withdrawal from Anatolia, the rule of the Damascus and Hejaz *eyalet*s, which include Saida, Tripoli and Jerusalem, was given to the Muhammad Ali Pasha. Ibrahim Pasha's rule over the province of Syria lasted nearly 10 years. Muhammad Ali Pasha sent a diplomatic note to the European states in an aborted attempt to enlist them to help him gain independence for Egypt. He then met with consuls in Alexandria with a new proposal that the Ottomans allow his family to inherit the areas he ruled. The new sultan, Abdülmecid, sought to reconcile with Muhammad Ali Pasha by pardoning him and accepting the inheritance claim over Egypt. Nevertheless, Muhammad Ali Pasha also demanded inheritance of Syria, which he had ruled for ten years. In the meantime, foreign states completed their talks and prepared the London Protocol, dated 15 July 1840, that would allow Muhammad Ali Pasha's family to inherit Egypt. After long discussions, a decree from the Istanbul government, based on the London Protocol, granted autonomy to Egypt in 1841, and the boundaries were decided in a similar way to delimitation. Over the course of time, because the boundaries were not demarcated on the ground, another disagreement emerged in 1904 in the Aqaba area, located now on the Israeli border. With an agreement reached on 1 October 1906, a demarcation was made in this region for the first time. Under the agreement, borders were defined with poles, leaving Aqaba in Ottoman territory and Taba in Egypt.

4.2. The Mount Lebanon concession

The region remained calm during periods of strong governors but problems reemerged whenever state authority appeared weak. Ibrahim Pasha's rule in the region, despite being a de facto situation viewed by the Ottomans as illegitimate, was a precursor to new problems. Both Ibrahim Pasha's apprehensions about traditional prerogatives and foreign states' interference increased clashes in the region and caused the 1840 Druze-Maronite problem.[35] The clashes between Christian Maronites (mostly peasants) and Abrahamic Druzes (mostly land owners) continued until 1860 and resulted in a civil war in which tens of thousands Christian Maronites were killed by Druzes. The Europeans, particularly France, were keen on backing Maronite rights and supported them. On the other hand, the Ottoman's open-door policy after the 1838 Ottoman-British agreement gave foreign states a large radius for action.[36] Foreign states' economic relations with Mount Lebanon and Beirut advanced and they began to apply political pressure. The Ottoman Empire, taking the European states' demands into account, came up with a solution in 1842 that projected the division of the region between two *kaza*s (district governorships). By choosing a governor from both the Druze and Maronite populations, the Ottomans created a divided administration. However, this geographical division was far from a lasting solution as the Maronites were

[35] Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 2 edition (London : New York: Pluto Press, 2012), 12–13.
[36] Engin Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (University of California Press, 1993), 29.

not geographically concentrated in one region in Lebanon. District governors reported to the governor of Saida and were seen as community leaders with undefined administrative powers.

Amidst diplomatic pressure coming from Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria, the Ottoman Foreign Minister Shekib Effendi issued a regulation (the Reglement of Shekib Effendi) in September 1846 and announced that the current situation would continue in Lebanon (a Christian district governor in the north and a Druze district governor in the south, both reporting to the Beirut centric Saida *Vilayet*). This new regulation more clearly defined the new administrative structure in an 8-point program explaining the operations of two district governors and their powers. However, the program did not mention boundaries. Yet, it is possible that the boundaries of two districts were the traditional boundaries accepted in the past. This means that the Ottoman Empire avoided creating new problems by demarcating two districts. On the other hand, the traditional boundaries were defined in accordance with the areas where both sides (Maronites and Druzes) were the majority, meaning it was defined according to demographic distribution.

In 1860, clashes recommenced between the Druzes and Maronites, resulting in further international intervention. Without going into details, it is important to note that these events resulted in the most significant foreign intervention in the region during the Ottoman era. Foreign states participating in the Paris protocol proposed to the Ottomans that Mount Lebanon get privileges before they would send representatives to Beirut to observe the new arrangements on the ground. Their five-point proposal suggested transforming the two-district system into a more unified *mutasarrifate*, and projected how the administrative structure would operate. Per the new proposal, Mount Lebanon would become a privileged *sanjak* within the Ottoman administrative structure and a non-local Christian *mutasarrif* would be appointed. The *sanjak* would be divided into seven districts, each having local district governors, taking the demographic majority into account. Even though *mutasarrifate*'s administrative division was clearly outlined, there were no mentions of boundaries, just as in the reglement of Shekib Effendi. While the *mutasarrifate* would be a sub-unit part of the Damascus *vilayet*, the government in Istanbul wanted the *mutasarrifate* to report directly to them. These proposals were put into effect with an additional protocol signed on 9 June 1861 and revised in the Lebanon Charter of 1864 following review. This document defined the jurisdiction of officials and how the privileges would be applied and, as has been argued, it ensured a peace that lasted almost half a century.[37]

4.3. The sacred boundaries of Palestine

In both Eastern and Western literatures, Palestine was a common term for the area between the Mediterranean Sea in the west and the River of Jordan and the Dead Sea in the east.[38]. In *Tuhfetu'l-Kibar fi Esfâr el Bihâr*, the 17th century Ottoman source, Katip Çelebi included two Palestine maps.[39] The first was of the Mediterranean region, showing contemporary Palestine and the Damascus *Eyalet* as "*Arz-ı Filistin*" (Land of Palestine) in what was most probably the first appearance of the name Palestine in Ottoman maps. The second map, the

[37] Akarli, *The Long Peace*.

[38] Dima W. Nazer et al., "Water Footprint of the Palestinians in the West Bank," *JAWRA Journal of the American Water Resources Association* 44, no. 2 (April 2008): 450, doi: 10.1111/j.1752-1688.2008.00174.x.

[39] Katib Çelebi, *Tuhfet ül-kibâr fi esfâr il-bihâr* (Müteferrika, 1729).

İklim-i Ceziretu'l-Arab (Geography of the Arabian Peninsula), had a clearer delimitation for Palestine. In the explanations accompanying the second map, the boundaries of Palestine extended from the Gaza and Jerusalem Liwas in the southwest up to the Sinai Desert, between the Mediterranean Sea and Arish. In the southeast, it extended to the Dead Sea and the River of Jordan. In the north, the border went from the River of Jordan to Kaysariye.[40] It is possible to argue that these given boundaries were those defined by religious sources, which is why we may call them "sacred boundaries". The administrative structure in the Ottoman era, as discussed before, did not allow for the showing of Palestine's borders clearly, as these lands were a natural part of Syria during the Ottoman period. There were no boundaries to separate it from Syria nor any racial, historical or peripheral obstacles to ensure it. For this reason, Palestine was a part of the *Bilad al Sham* (Greater Syria) *vilayet*s.

The Ottoman government unified the *sanjak*s of Jerusalem, Acre and Nablus under the Acre province in 1831 to counter Muhammad Ali Pasha's advances. The boundaries of the area offered to Muhammad Ali Pasha by Sultan Abdulmecid were: from Re's Nafûra until the Mediterranean coast, in the north where the Sisban River meets Lake Tiberias following the western edges of the lake, the side of River Jordan and west of the Dead Sea. In 1872 the Ottoman Empire created a province within the boundaries of the proposal above, independent from Damascus. The new province included Acre, Nablus and Jerusalem. The 1831 arrangements had come out of political necessity while the 1872 arrangements were the result of the new land regime declared in 1864 (which was explained above). The main difference between these two arrangements is related to the position of Jerusalem, which was finally regarded as an independent unit in 1873. The northern boundary of this new province established in 1872 extended to the line separating Acre and Beirut and included all places considered sacred for Jews and Christians, such as Safed, Tiberia, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron). However, the Ottoman government realized that it would not be possible to administer these areas under one province and therefore abolished this province. In the following year, 1873, Jerusalem became an administrative subordinate of the government in Istanbul. Regardless of the purposes for the administrative arrangements in the areas including the presence of sacred sites, Jerusalem remained the center point of the middle and southern areas even after 1873. The districts of Gaza and Yaffa reported to Jerusalem. Even areas such as Nablus and Nazareth were brought under Jerusalem. There is no doubt that these arrangements made for a stronger argument that this region be an administrative entity independent from its surroundings. Another map published by the Ottoman Eighth Army in 1915 shows more definite borders of Palestine. On this map, Palestine's territory includes Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre, its northern borders extend to Tyre and the Litani River,[41] and it includes a significant part of the Beirut region. In both the Sykes-Picot agreement and during the British Mandate era, the boundaries of Palestine appeared very similar to the definition of Palestine in the last years of the Ottoman Empire.

4.4. The Persian Gulf: the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Agreement

Since 1903 Britain had been demanding the delimitation and demarcation of the boundaries between the Ottoman territories and the territories under its influence or occupation. To this end, the British presented the Ottomans with a fait accompli in three geographies. The first

[40] Çelebi, *Tuhfet ül-kibâr*.
[41] *Filistin Risalesi*, 1915.

was in the Red Sea in Yemen, the second was in the Persian Gulf, and the third was along the Ottoman-Iranian border stretching from the Persian Gulf to Doğu Beyazıt.

In the 16th century, Ottoman sovereignty stretched as far as Muscat, Oman, however in practice de-facto sovereignty stretched up until 1916 from the coasts of Basra-Kuwait to the area of the present-day United Arab Emirates. There was no fixed boundary between the Ottoman empire and Oman. Nevertheless, as Britain had started to settle in Oman and began expanding its zones of influence to the territories of the Ottoman empire, the boundaries between them started to become meaningful. While the British Raj (British government in India) was obtaining economic concessions (navigation in the Shatt al Arab, Tigris and Euphrates) from the Ottoman empire, they were also trying to restrict Ottoman sovereignty in these regions with unofficial delimitations by making secret agreements with some of the local leaders. As a matter of fact, this rivalry constituted the most important aspect of Ottoman-British relations before the First World War.[42]

The Ottoman Empire, since 1870, with an attempt to turn this situation in its own favor started to implement new arrangements designating its de facto areas of sovereignty. For instance, the Ottomans made their military presence felt in the east of Saudi Arabia and Qatar with a military operation it carried out through Baghdad.[43] Before this military operation, the Ottomans persuaded the sheikh of Kuwait, Abdullah al Sabah, to connected the sheikhdom to the Baghdad *vilayet* as a district governorate. Since these regions were considered under the classical understanding of the Ottoman empire, it is possible to portray these arrangements as restorations rather than the creation of new administrative structures. These restorations were needed because the British had been making secret deals with various Arab sheikhdoms on the Persian Gulf and was trying to exert influence against Ottoman sovereignty. Thus the restorations and the military operation ended the possible advance of the British in the Persian Gulf and to some extent limited the British influence. Bahrain, which had recently become a point of concern for the British, and the Muscat Imamate were excluded from these restorations. In fact, local leaders were demanding to be included in these restorations but the Ottoman central administration, considering the possible British objection, excluded in particular Bahrain – although they were claiming it was part of the empire - from these arrangements.[44] Completed in 1871, these arrangements also confirmed Ottoman sovereignty over Eastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. What is important here is that the Ottoman-British struggle for influence had started from this date on and rose to the surface on every occasion.

Herein it is worth highlighting two important developments that escalated tensions. The first was the internationalization of the Mesopotamian oil reserves, and the second was the rapprochement between the Ottomans and the Germans and the German obtainment of the Baghdad railway concession in 1903.[45] This railway concession was seen by the British as a major threat to both its interests in the Persian Gulf and its presence in India. Added to the existing Ottoman-British rivalry, the possibility of the railway being extended to Kuwait

[42] Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudia Arabia, and Qatar* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 3.

[43] Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf*.

[44] Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hâkimiyeti: Vehhabî Hareketi ve Suud Devleti'nin Ortaya Çıkışı*, 94–98.

[45] Ernst Jäckh, *Background of the Middle East* (Cornell University Press, 1952), 16–17; Ali Okumuş, *Osmanlı Coğrafyası'nda petrol mücadelesi: Kalust S. Gülbenkyan ve Türk Petrol Şirketi* (İstanbul: Taş Mektep Yayıncılık, 2015), 103–6; Stefanos Yerasimos, *Milliyetler ve sınırlar: Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Ortadoğu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 205.

further complicated question and created the necessity of delimiting the boundaries and defining the areas of sovereignty. To this end, the Ottoman and British empires entered into negotiations in 1909 and as a result İbrahim Hakki and Edward Grey signed the Anglo-Ottoman agreement on 29 July 1913.[46] Although Britain recognized Ottoman sovereignty over eastern Arabia (Ahsa and Qatif) and some parts of Qatar, they considered Kuwait and Bahrain as different cases. Britain was completely rejecting Ottoman sovereignty over Bahrain, and for the Kuwait case, was proposing its recognition as an autonomous entity by drawing definite boundaries. Moreover, the British agreed on Ottoman sovereignty over the emirate of Najd/Saudi and delimited some parts of the Ahsa/Qatif region. The discussions over Kuwait mainly centered on the question of the islands along its coasts. Ultimately, a solution regarding Kuwait's sovereignty was found as Britain recognized the autonomous Qatari government, which was loyal to the Ottomans, in exchange for drawing boundaries for Kuwait that would not be touched by the Ottomans.[47] These developments in the Persian Gulf were remarkable in the sense that they did not only show the ambiguities of the Ottoman territoriality but also demonstrated the role of borders as multiplex entities. As explained in the theoretical discussion above, unlike frontiers and boundaries, borders are not only related to political and strategic aspects of territoriality but also include economic, social, and cultural levels as well. In this case, the interplay between Anglo-Ottoman political rivalries, the economic developments in the region (oil, railways), and the cultural patterns of the sheikdoms (autonomy) all contributed to the arrangements in the territorial Persian Gulf. Without considering all of these aspects together, it was not possible to came up with these arrangements. Thus, this episode appears to be a good demonstration of the emergence of borders as multiplex entities.

4.5. Ottoman-Iranian border making and the Istanbul Protocol of 1913

In 1821, in asserting claims about the Ottoman violation of borders, Iran occupied some cities in eastern Anatolia, such as Bayezid, Bitlis, Mus, and Ercis. In the wake of this, the Ottoman Empire and Iran signed an agreement in 1823 in Erzurum, however this agreement did not bring about a change but rather reconfirmed the terms of the 1746 agreement.[48] Border issues between the Ottomans and Iran became an international matter along with the rivalry between Russia and Britain over Iranian territories. As a result, a new agreement signed in 1847 in Erzurum called for the establishment of a demarcation commission that would involve British and Russian commissioners as well. The commission worked for four years between 1848 and 1852 and tried to identify the position of the Ottoman Iranian border on the ground. Meanwhile, related work both on maps and on the ground continued, until finally, in 1869 they produced a joint map titled Carte Identique.[49] Once more, however, British-Russian rivalry over Iran prevented the implemention of this joint map by both parties. Indeed, having an influence over Iranian territories was crucial for Russia's historical strategy of opening towards the south, and thus a British-Russian rivalry in the region became inevitable.

As a consequence of this rivalry, Iran was partitioned into influence zones between Russia

[46] Mahmoud Haddad, "Iraq before World War I: A Case of Anti-European Arab Ottomanism," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 132–33; Zekeriya Kurşun, *The Ottomans in Qatar: A History of Anglo-Ottoman Conflicts in the Persian Gulf* (The Isis Press, 2002), 124–28.

[47] Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf*, 162–64; Kurşun, *The Ottomans in Qatar*, 128–36; Yerasimos, *Milliyetler ve snırlar,* 210.

[48] Sabri Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 1843-1914* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 52–57.

[49] Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, *Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran* (Universal-Publishers, 2007), 140.

and Britain. While Russia held influence over the north of Iran, Britain's influence zone was the south. Taking these into account, the Anglo-Ottoman Convention on 29 July 1913 also touched upon the Ottoman Iranian border and included its delimited maps. Although the Ottomans never exchanged the signed copy of the agreement, the British insisted on its implementation and physical demarcation on the ground. In that vein, Russia was also pressing for clearly demarcating the Ottoman-Iranian border. Finally, on 17 November 1913, the Ottoman Empire and Iran signed the Istanbul protocol,[50] according to which the remaining non-delimited quarter of the Ottoman-Iranian boundary would be demarcated by a boundary commission. This boundary commission included both Ottoman and Iranian commissioners as well as British and Russian commissioners.[51] The commissioners started their boundary work from Shatt al Arab and completed their work by demarcating the remaining portion of the Ottoman-Iranian boundary.[52] Although the Ottoman-Iranian boundary does not have any direct relation with the Sykes-Picot agreement, it became more of an issue since it was the most important demarcation example in the region and was directly related to the British claims over Mesopotamia that would emerge in the subsequent years.

4.6. Ottoman-British border arrangements in Yemen

After Britain had settled in India, they began showing great interest in the Arabian peninsula due to its strategic position vis-à-vis the Indian ocean. As a matter of fact, Britain occupied Aden in 1839 on the grounds that its trade had been under threat due to local insurgencies, and attached Aden's administration to Mumbai.[53] As a response to this occupation, the Ottoman Empire restructured its administration in Yemen in 1872. While the British were engaging in bilateral relations with various tribes in the region in order to exert influence over them, the Ottomans entered negotiations with Britain starting from 1873 and demanded the British not make contact with the local leaders of Nevahi Tis'a around Aden.[54] This demand was not met by Britain, which instead moved forward on bilateral agreements with various local leaders around the region.[55] Following these developments, Nevahi Tis'a became the main subject of discussion regarding Ottoman-British boundary arrangements.

The root of these discussions was that as Britain attempted to expand northward in an attempt to preserve its status in Aden, they had to face with the Ottomans. This question was brought to the agenda again and again as British interests in the region grew and as the Germans gained more influence in the Ottoman Empire. Britain's main target was to divide Yemen into two, as North Yemen and South Yemen, and delimitate the boundary between North Yemen and Aden in the south. Throughout history, however, there had never been a boundary separating the north and the south in Yemen but rather there were tribal zones, which were not defined. Furthermore, separating the north and the south in Yemen did not serve any purpose for the Ottoman Empire. However, as Britain repeatedly raised the issue

[50] For the full text of the protocol see Melike Sarıkçıoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran hudut sorunları 1847-1913* (Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013), 181–92.

[51] Ali Murat Kurşun, ed., *Osmanlı İran sınırından anılar* (İstanbul: Taş Mektep Yayıncılık, 2014), 4.

[52] C. H. D. Ryder, "The Demarcation of the Turco-Persian Boundary in 1913-14," *The Geographical Journal* 66, no. 3 (1925): 237, doi: 10.2307/1782977.

[53] R. J. Gavin, *Aden under British Rule, 1839-1967* (Hurst, 1975).

[54] Thomas Kühn, "Shaping and Reshaping Colonial Ottomanism: Contesting Boundaries of Difference and Integration in Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1919," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 2 (September 18, 2007): 315–31.

[55] Ali Akyıldız and Zekeriya Kurşun, eds., *Osmanlı Arap coğrafyası ve Avrupa emperyalizmi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), 37–38.

and pressured for change, the Ottomans had to consent to work on boundary delimitation starting in 1901.[56] To this end, several boundary commissions were established and meetings were held in the capitals of the two states regarding the boundaries in Yemen. These joint commissions executed several boundary protocols in 1903, 1904 and 1905, and produced delimited maps to be consulted in the demarcation process. The Ottomans attempted to string the question out by bringing up such issues as Yafa, Dali, and Jalila, which ultimately were not solved in the boundary protocols. However, the question of Nevahi Tisa was provided a solution with the application of the 1913 protocols regarding the Persian Gulf. In addition, the Anglo-Ottoman South Yemen boundary agreement was signed on 9 March 1914 in London and came into force with the exchange of the treaty by the two countries on 06 June 1914.[57] The Ottomans signed this agreement on the condition that it would not make any concessions on the 550-mile square land near the Red Sea. Significantly, the agreement not only delimitated the boundary between North and South Yemen but also set bounds to Ottoman sovereignty in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. In the end, Britain accepted Ottoman sovereignty over the territories stretching from the Nevahi Tisa boundary to Ujayr in the Persian Gulf (today located in the Eastern Saudi Arabia). In return, Ottoman sovereignty in Aden, Nevahi Tis'a, Hadramawt, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Muscat was terminated.[58]

5. Conclusion

Against the backdrop of domestic and regional factors that paved the way for the formation of today's modern Middle Eastern borders, it is possible to argue that the articles of the Sykes-Picot agreement were a logical follow-up to this process. As the above investigation suggests, previous domestic and regional developments played a role in the delimitation of British and French zones of influence under Sykes-Picot. This is not to say that the Sykes-Picot agreement was legitimate or that it corresponded perfectly with the local and regional realities, but it is possible to find traces of the previous developments adding a new dimension to discussions about its artificiality or legitimacy.

The Skyes-Picot agreement proposed five different zones of influence and included two indirect influence zones marked as A and B (see map below): 1) French direct control would be introduced over some parts of southeastern Anatolia and the coasts of the Ottoman provinces of Syria, Aleppo and Beirut (blue zone); 2) France would have indirect control over the Arab state that would be established on the interior territories of present-day Syria and northern Iraq, including Mosul (illustrated as A in the map); 3) Britain would directly control the south of Iraq and the western side of the Persian Gulf including Kuwait and the coasts of Basrah; 4) Britain would have indirect control over the Arab state established on the present territories of Jordan, the West of Iraq, and some parts of eastern Arabia (illustrated as B in the map); and 5) an international administration would control Palestine, including present Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.[59]

[56] Thomas Kühn, "Ordering the Past of Ottoman Yemen, 1872-1914," *Turcica* 34 (2002): 189–220.

[57] Fadhl Al-Maghafi, "More than Just a Boundary Dispute: The Regional Geopolitics of Saudi-Yemeni Relations" (SOAS, University of London, 2012), 192, http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/15941/2/Al-Maghafi_3478_vol2.pdf.

[58] Akyıldız and Kurşun, *Osmanlı Arap coğrafyası,* 283–317; Ş Tufan Buzpınar, "Abdülhamid II and Sayyid Fadl Pasha of Hadramawt," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 13, no. 13 (1993): 227–39.

[59] John Felton, *The Contemporary Middle East: A Documentary History* (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2008), 13.



Figure 1. Map of the Sykes-Picot Agreement

These partitions of the Sykes-Picot agreement went along with Britain's and France's historical missions in the region. As was mentioned before, The French had, starting from the 17th century, established ties with the Levant region. They had installed various representatives in the region and founded several powerful consulates, and had an important say in the region's trade relations. On the other hand, France was also enjoying an interventionist position with regard to the crisis of the region as experienced in 1840 and 1860-61. The regions allocated to French direct control covered geographies whose delimitation had before completed after 1864, such as Aleppo and Syria and the newly emerged *vilayet* of Beirut. The regions in Anatolia that were allocated to French control were extensions of these geographies, but could also be considered as tactical moves as, in this way, it would be much easier for Britain to distract the French from gaining interest in Mosul.

This planning allowed the creation of the Syrian and Lebanese states in the coming years and the drawing of their boundaries in line with this historical continuity. It would be seen surprising that Mosul was left to French indirect control since the British had been demanding Mosul from the very beginning. Moreover, Britain had strong historical ties to Mosul and had been enjoying navigation on the Tigris river. However, historical continuity seems to again

play a role here since Mosul was seen as an historical part of Anatolia and it seems that for this reason Sykes and Picot decided to leave Mosul under indirect French control. Another possible justification for this decision might have been the fact that the British army at that time was located far away from Mosul and had been heavily defeated in Kut al Amare.

When the regions under British direct control were evaluated, it was evident that Britain since the beginning of the 19th century had established strong relations with these geographies. Indeed, Britain had signed many protection agreements with several Arab emirates in the Persian Gulf and had in fact started their military operation toward Iraq from these regions. Although Britain was heavily defeated in Kut al Amare when the Sykes-Picot agreement was signed, they were nevertheless able to draw near to Baghdad and the region was under their military control. Historically, Iraq constituted an integrity consisting of the Ottoman Baghdad *vilayet*, the Basra *vilayet*, its coasts and the southern regions. Therefore, in consideration of this historical integrity, this region was placed under direct control of Britain as a whole. There was no boundary to be drawn here except for Mosul, since the Ottoman Baghdat and Basrah provinces had long before been well delimited.

The decision of establishing an international administration over Palestine was again stemming from historical reasons. Not only Muslims but also different groups of both Christians and Jews had interests in Palestine. As was discussed in the previous section, the driving factor behind the delimitation of Palestinian borders were the sacred texts. For this reason it was decided to postpone seeking a solution to the Palestinian issue by establishing a provisional international administration.

This study has examined the Sykes-Picot order with an attempt to deconstruct its mythologization by proposing an evolutionary assessment of border understanding. Departing from current discussions on the artificiality of today's Middle Eastern borders, this study took the position that the history of Middle Eastern border formation is not only an international one but involves many aspects that have not yet been taken into consideration.

In doing so, this study first argued that the concept of border can be used as an analytical tool by perceiving it as an evolutionary process under the three-layered category of frontiers, boundaries and borders. Second, this study applied this evolutionary border understanding to the historical Ottoman administrative structure in order to show how the frontier-like *eyalets* were transformed into more definite boundary-like structures. The main aim behind revealing the evolutionary process behind *eyalet*s and *vilayet*s was to show how the domestic arrangements provided a ground for future arrangements. Third, this study attempted to portray the Sykes-Picot agreement as a complementary part of a long process rather than portraying it as the only reality. To this end, this study categorized different border formation cases within the Ottoman Arab geography on the basis of dominating domestic, regional and international factors. In this regard it tried to cover how the British-French, British-German, and British-Russian rivalries as well as domestic and regional local power struggles had significant impacts on the cases of Aqaba, Lebanon, Palestine, the Persian Gulf, Iran, Yemen, and finally on Sykes-Picot itself.

Indeed, in the evolving tradition of Global History and Global International Relations, the importance of local knowledge and domestic developments as opposed to Euro/Western centric accounts is growing. The geopolitics of the Middle East appear to be one of the most important subjects of this tradition. This study aimed at portraying the Sykes-Picot dominated Middle Eastern geopolitical narrative as being biased. Indeed, both the developments during

the Ottoman Empire and the realities of the region had already paved the way for the emergence of a regional geopolitical order well before Sykes-Picot. From this perspective, the Sykes-Picot agreement can be portrayed as a complementary or even logical final factor. Indeed, there is no doubt that the Sykes-Picot agreement served to imperial purposes and produced a partition protocol, however, while making that argument, it is not possible to neglect the full realities and experiences regarding the history of the region.

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Ideologies and the Western Question in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Neo-classical Realist Perspective

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Abstract

Growing anti-Western sentiments around the world are currently manifesting themselves through divergent ways ranging from peaceful resistance movements to various forms of political violence. In the Middle East, unlike the earlier partially secular and nationalist Cold War anti-Americanism, the current popular anti-Western political movements are heavily equipped with Islamism, which appears to be an all-inclusive ideology and political movement for almost all dissidents. This applies to Turkey as well, despite its relatively long history of secularisation. This research particularly aims therefore to discuss the role of nationalism and Islamism on anti-Western sentiments in Turkish foreign policy through the lens of neo-classical realism and a new, broader conceptual framework: The Western Question. The research examines the contours, contents, and consequences of the problem through comparing two cases, namely the Cyprus problem of the 1970s and the crisis with the West that has surfaced after Turkey's involvement in the Syrian Civil War.

Keywords: Turkey, Western Question, Neo-Classical Realism, United States, European Union

1. Introduction

Even before the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923, modernization had been closely associated with the so-called Western model and the 'West' had appeared for at least a century to be the most convenient and unrivalled model. The Western model had deep impacts not only on the restructuring of the Turkish state and society but also on the country's foreign policy orientations. While the Western inspired reforms have faced formidable challenges and even reversals in domestic politics especially after the 1950s, the Western orientation has remained mostly untouched in the domain of foreign policy as manifested in the country's aligning with the West for over 50 years regardless of the ruling parties' ideological orientations. Yet in the history of Turkey there are certain moments of estrangement from the West, which are dramatically different from other cases of policy divergences between Turkey and major

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Western powers. In this study, the term "Western Question" is offered to refer to those unique moments in the history of relations between Turkey and the Western world.

The Western Question refers to strategic considerations in Turkish foreign policy in the form of a recurrent pattern which usually manifests itself among policy circles through severe criticism of the country's alignment with the West. In this regard, the phrase "West" is assumed to address a broader political, economic, and cultural context rather than a robust geographical demarcation. With reference to the lexicon of Turkish politics, the term West is basically used interchangeably but in a disjunctive way to describe the USA and Western European states as well as their common values and institutions.

In order to understand Turkey's "Western Question", one must know the historical roots of the Turks' somewhat 'schizophrenic'[1] perception of the West, which involves both a quest for belonging to the Western civilization and a deep unease about the Western powers' imperial agenda. Cultural transfers from Europe to Ottoman society started in the early eighteenth century, and were soon institutionalized and extended to non-military spheres. Nevertheless, this accelerated 'Westernisation' in the nineteenth century was accompanied by the peripheralization of the Ottoman state in the European economy and politics. Resentment towards the gradual loss of sovereignty and the fear of collapse began to grow even among the intellectual/political current known as '*Batıcılar*' (pro-Western group).[2] The Treaty of Sèvres, which partitioned Ottoman territory amongst Western major powers and local groups supported by them, made this fear a reality in 1920. Although it was soon rendered invalid, the psycho-political legacy of the treaty remained and was passed on to later generations, known as the 'Sèvres Syndrome'.[3] It was frozen until the 1960s, at first because of mutual protectionist policies and Turkey's successful avoidance of European political problems during the interwar years and World War II, and then because of the fervour of involvement in the "free world" in face of perceived threats from the Soviet Union. The alignment with the West soon started to produce significant bilateral problems due to power asymmetry, but structural entanglements and legal treaties in economic, military and political fields restrained Turkey from taking any sustainable radical action. Nevertheless, the fear and suspicion continued to exist and at times it was deliberatively operationalized by policymakers.

What makes the Western Question in Turkish foreign policy different from the occasional crises that arise, lurks in its particular characteristics. First, it goes beyond a single-issue conflict to comprise a set of complicated, distinct but at the same time inter-related issues. Second, contrary to the narrow bilateral problems, it involves more than one actor; e.g. the EU, US, NATO, which makes the problem much more difficult to resolve. Third, compared with the occasional short-term disagreements, it is an enduring impasse that is likely to produce unexpected consequences from time to time. Finally, unlike other issues on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy, it mobilizes the electorate around the ruling parties through the excessive use of an anti-Western rhetoric and thereby creates a rally-around-the-flag effect.

Two periods in Turkish-Western relations, the Cyprus crisis of 1974-1980 and the Syria crisis of 2011-2017, are revisited in this study as instances of the Western Question. The

[1] Tanıl Bora, *Medeniyet kaybı – milliyetçilik ve faşizm üzerine yazılar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006).

[2] Abdullah Kaygı, *Türk düşüncesinde çağdaşlaşma* (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992).

[3] For the Sevres Syndrome, see Hakan Yılmaz, "Euroscepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion," *South European Society and Politics* 16 (2011): 188.

context of the former crisis dates back to the 1960s, when the perennial state of emulation and suspicion towards the West had resurfaced. The US had gained a great freedom of action on Turkish soil in the 1950s on the pretext of defending Turkey,[4] but this was resented and being actively challenged by Turkish public opinion in the 1960s. While anti-Americanism was at the outset exclusively an ideological element of the orthodox socialist movements, it soon gained a crosscutting character. It is plausible to argue that nationalism with an anti-imperialist tone, unleashed by the de-colonization wave of the 1960s, had appealed mainly to the leaders and the parties on the left wing of the political spectrum. On the other hand, this ideology also served as an escape valve for the right-wing parties to avoid electoral pressures, particularly on issues of national interest. Even though Schweller[5] defines ideology as a domestic variable, we argue that the national and international ideational contexts cannot be separated from each other, and formulating ideology solely as a domestic intervening variable would be to miss the Zeitgeist of the 1970s in the Middle East. Since anti-imperialist nationalism embedded in a national developmentalist economic and political framework was the all-inclusive ideology of the Middle East until the end of the 1970s, Turkey's Western Question has also been resurrected around it.

After the 1980s, political Islam consolidated itself as the main ideological equipment of Anti-Western movements in the Middle East. Despite the resistance of secular military and civilian elites, the moderate Islamist AKP's (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, Justice and Development Party) electoral success in 2002 was a remarking victory in Turkey and the party's accomplishments inspired all other Islamic parties in the MENA region. Unsurprisingly, for the purpose of reducing the power of the military, which was necessary for the party to consolidate its power after 2002, the AKP pursued a pro-Western foreign policy in its early years. Following its victory in the 2011 elections, the tide gradually turned against the West and an anti-Western foreign policy discourse with an Islamic tone not only manifested itself in the foreign policy choices of the elites but also became an instrument to mobilize the masses and for extracting the country's resources. Unlike the anti-imperialist secular nationalism of the 1970s, the Western Question in Turkish foreign policy has been resurrected around Islamic nationalism.

The steadily growing literature on Turkish foreign policy has addressed growing anti-Westernism in various ways and has no doubt made relevant contributions to our understanding of Turkey's future relations with the West. In the case of Turkey's deteriorating relations with the EU, for instance, de-Europeanization became an analytical tool for researchers and provided insights into the policy implications of this specific phenomenon.[6] In addition, Turkey's disenchantment with the West and its 'unruly' engagement in the Middle East have also dominated scholarly debates in recent years, with this literature mostly focusing

[4] For the bilateral relations during the 1950s see Ayşe Ö. Atmaca, "The Geopolitical Origins of Turkish-American Relations: Revisiting the Cold War Years," *All Azimuth* 3, no. 1 (2014): 19–34; Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US–Turkish Alliance: From 'Cold War' to 'War on Iraq'," *Turkish Studies* 6 (2005): 342.

[5] Randall L. Schweller, "Neo–classical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy,* ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 247.

[6] See Senem Aydın–Düzgit, "De–Europeanization through Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of AKP's Election Speeches," *South European Society and Politics* 21 (2016): 45–58; Senem Aydın–Düzgit and Alper Kaliber, "Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey De–Europeanizing?," *South European Society and Politics* 21 (2016): 1–14; Birgül Demirtaş, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: A Europeanized Foreign Policy in a De–Europeanized National Context?," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 17 (2015): 123–40; Şevket Ovalı, "From Europeanization to Re–nationalization: Contextual Parameters of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Studia Europea* 3 (2012): 17–38.

on whether such a move can be interpreted as an *axis shift* or activism seeking to produce political and economic escape valves for strained relations with the West.[7]

If Turkey's ongoing commitments to NATO and the EU as well as Ankara's longstanding partnerships with the West are considered, framing the problem as an *axis shift* produces a distorted narrative and remains counterintuitive in this context. On the other hand, de-Europeanization, as a conceptual framework, lacks the transatlantic dimensions of the problem, and remains mostly incapable of explaining the complex dimensions of the problem. The Western Question as a concept offers a broader framework with a special emphasis on the intricate web of geopolitical conflicts, policy divergences and relations.

Yet, it is still necessary to explain why some crises but not others (such as the rejection of sending Turkish troops to Iraq in 2003) ended up with deeper estrangement. This is why we analyse these instances of the Western Question by employing neo-classical realism. It helps us to reveal the ideational context of disputes without disregarding systemic imperatives. Neo-classical realism, with its emphasis on the role of both systemic incentives and intervening unit level variables, provides an insight for examining the influence of domestic intervening variables such as the state structure, state-society relations, elites' perceptions on Turkey's relative power and their immediate responses/foreign policy behaviours to systemic pressures through the lens of an ideational context in which these intervening variables operate. Additionally, neo-classical realism primarily focuses on why states react differently to similar systemic incentives and therefore Turkey's different reactions to similar systemic incentives fits well to this theoretical framework.

Within this scope the study falls into four sections. First, the theoretical and conceptual framework is introduced. The way that neo-classical realism brings together the role of systemic incentives and the power of ideas is explored in order to understand two instances of the Western Question. The next section examines the causes and trajectory of the first of these instances, the Cyprus crisis, which led to considerable policy change and strife between Turkey and the West between 1974 and 1980. In the section that follows, a currently resurrected Western Question in the aftermath of the Syrian Civil War is dealt with. After these two descriptive sections, the last section comparatively analyzes the cases in terms of systemic factors, ideational context, domestic intervening variables and their impacts on short-term foreign policy behavior as well as long-term policy outputs. Hypotheses developed through an application of neo-classical realism are thereby tested. The article concludes with our findings regarding the nature of the Western Question and predictions about the future of relations between Turkey and the West.

2. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

A neo-classical realist approach to foreign policy analysis necessitates the examination of the domestic and individual level variables as well as systemic level ones, since the former seem to cause different state responses to similar systemic incentives. According to Talieferro,

[7] See Şaban Kardaş, "Türk dış politikasında eksen kayması mı?," *Akademik Ortadoğu* 5 (2011): 19–42; Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?," *Turkish Studies* 9 (2016): 3–20; Tarık Oğuzlu and Mustafa Kibaroğlu, "Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who's to Blame?," *Turkish Studies* 10 (2009): 577–593; Ziya Öniş, "Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and A Critique," *Insight Turkey* 13 (2011): 47–65; Ahmet Sözen and Devrim Şahin, "Perception of Axis Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: An Analysis through 'Butterfly Effect'," *İzmir Review of Social Sciences* 1 (2013): 47–63; Özlem Tür, "Economic Relations with the Middle East Under the AKP: Trade, Business Community and Reintegration with Neighbouring Zones," *Turkish Studies* 12 (2011): 589–602.

Lobell and Ripsman[8] 'neoclassical realism builds upon the complex relationship between the state and society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neorealism about the constraints of the international system'. In other words, neo-classical realists stress the primacy of the systemic imperatives in determining the foreign policies of states, but they also incorporate domestic and individual level variables into their analysis[9]. However, in the final analysis, as Kitchen[10] argues, 'such variables are considered analytically subordinate to systemic factors, the limits and opportunities of which states cannot escape in the long run'.

Borrowing the main argument of neorealism, neo-classical realism argues that states' foreign policy outputs are dependent on their relative material power capabilities. Yet, as Devlen and Özdamar[11] argue, 'although in the long run relative power capabilities may determine foreign policy *outcomes*, foreign policy *behaviour* may not reflect those underlying structural constraints in the short term'. In this regard, neoclassical realism does not only provide an explanatory insight on states' short term foreign policy behaviours, but also unveils the 'transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour'[12].

The process of linking relative material power capabilities to foreign policy behaviour is completed by two interrelated unit level variables: First, the actual elites/leaders and their perceptions of the system and their states' relative powers;[13] and second, domestic structures which could limit or enable the leaders for using, extracting and mobilizing the state's resources for their foreign policy objectives.[14] Such an approach to foreign policy analysis clearly raises the necessity of exploring the effects of ideologies or ideas on the elites' responses/foreign policy behaviours to the systemic incentives[15] because 'strategic beliefs exist more in the realm of ideology than in that of pure cognition'.[16] Neo-classical realism's interest in the role of leaders and the power of ideas are borrowed from classical realism[17] and in this manner it aims to explain how the ideational context filters the threat perceptions, relative power capabilities and foreign policy outputs.

Understood as such, the central question of neo-classical realism on the role of ideational factors in foreign policy choices is formulated by Rippsman, Talieferro and Lobell[18] as follows: "Given the causal primacy of systemic (material) variables, under what conditions are collective ideational variables at the unit level more likely to play an intervening role

[8] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy", in *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy,* eds. S.E. Lobell, N.M. Ripsman and J.W. Taliaferro, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 13.

[9] Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," *International Security* 29 (2004): 164; Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 49.

[10] Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neo–classical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation," *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 118.

[11] Balkan Devlen and Özgür Özdamar, "Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis," in *Rethinking Realism in International Relations,* ed. Annette Freyberg–Inan, Ewan Harrison and Patrick James (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 138.

[12] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51 (1998): 147.

[13] Devlen and Özdamar, "Neoclassical Realism," 137; William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19 (1995): 97.

[14] Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 151.

[15] Jeffrey W. Talieferro, "State building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource–Extractive State," *Security Studies* 15 (2006): 467.

[16] Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 31.

[17] Brian Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism," *Security Studies* 17 (2008): 303.

[18] Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 158.

between systemic pressures, on the one hand, and the specific foreign and security strategies states pursue at a given time?"

Similarly, the following excerpt from Kitchen[19] also underlines the role of ideas in the neo-classical realist approach to foreign policy;

> A theory of ideas however, whilst incorporating these insights about the character of domestic politics, focuses on how prevailing ideas influence the type of foreign policy response to structural imperatives. It can therefore explain how similarly structured states may respond in different ways to similar threats by reference to differing prevailing ideas within the state, whether that be as a result of the particular individuals advocating the ideas, broader cultural preferences, national history or whatever. The response as understood through the prism of ideas can then account for both overreaction and underreaction, as well as for the pursuit of goals unrelated to the notion of threat.

Ideas shape and drive the responses / policy behaviours to systemic incentives and they also appear to be one of the most significant instruments of foreign policy elites for extracting resources, increasing morale, constructing consent around the government, and legitimizing policy behaviours.[20]

The application of a neo-classical realist model of foreign policy therefore requires an examination of the role of ideologies on short-term foreign policy behaviors and the role systemic incentives have on long-term foreign policy outcomes. The application of a neo-classical realist model of analysis to the selected crisis reveals how the Western Question emerges and reconstitutes itself under different ideological contexts but with similar systemic incentives. Even though the structure of the international system/the independent variable is different in selected crises and time intervals, it is obvious that the structure produces similar pressures that eventually end up with Turkey's long-term foreign policy outcomes, namely Ankara's realignment with the West. In both of the selected crises, the ideational context, beyond any doubt, is decisive in Turkey's formulation and implementation of its short-term policy responses, while the systemic incentives determine the long-term policy outcomes.

At this point it is noteworthy to mention the similarities and differences between neo-classical realism's and non-conventional social constructivism's emphases on the role of ideational context, or the subjective environment in which foreign policy decisions are assumed to be made. [21] Like neo-classical realism, non-conventional constructivism considers the role of the subjective environment as a significant factor that influences leaders' perceptions of the world and themselves. Moreover, neo-classical realists and non-conventional constructivists also argue that the subjective environment; e.g. ideologies, religion, faith, culture, history and individual identities, even determine what constitutes national interest for a nation and

[19] Kitchen, "Systemic Pressures," 132.

[20] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 61–2; Schweller, "Neoclassical Realism," 247; Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism," 38.

[21] Conventional constructivists adopt a structural approach which argues that state identity and identity related interests are formed through systemic interactions between states and they disregard the role of domestic factors. For further information on conventional constructivism see, Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On the other hand, non–conventional constructivists, through the lens of a cognitive approach, prioritize ideational context/subjective environment as the main determinant of identity related foreign policy formulations, choices, preferences and outcomes. Therefore, non–conventional constructivism with its emphasis on the deterministic role of domestic dynamics remains within the ontological domains of FPA (Foreign Policy Analysis) literature. For non–conventional constructivism's insights on the role of subjective environment in which foreign policy decisions are taken, and their critique of Wendt's conventional systemic approach see Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interest," *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (1996): 275–318; Thomas Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," *European Journal of International Relations* 5 (1999): 259–89; Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post–Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (1993): 297–320.

what constitutes an existential threat.[22] The major difference between the two approaches is that while non-conventional constructivists prioritize the role of subjective environment in foreign policy decisions and outcomes, neo-classical realism argues that domestic intervening variables are likely to influence short term foreign policy behaviours that are subordinate to systemic incentives. The short-term foreign policy behaviours and long-term policy outcomes of the Ankara governments on the selected crises display the explanatory value of neo-classical realism in the realm of foreign policy analysis. Even though social constructivism could also offer insights to understanding Turkey's ideological deviations from the confines of realpolitik, Ankara's surrender to systemic imperatives makes neo-classical realism a much more valuable analytical tool in the last instance.

Throughout the history of modern Turkey, a monolithic portrayal of the West as an elusive partner rather than a reliable ally has become a self-fulfilling prophecy in times of crises in which Turkey's interests diverge from those of its Western partners. However, none of those crises inflicted lasting damages, as the formidable challenges within the context of the Western Question are considered. Among the many conflicts between Turkey and the West, most of which were limited and superficial, two specific cases deserve to be addressed separately in terms of what we suggest calling the 'Western Question'; the Cyprus problem and the Syrian Civil War. What makes these cases unique and more conspicuous than the other crises with the West could be found in their common characteristics, which should be examined in a broader context. First, both crises have culminated in Turkey's engagement into armed conflicts. Second, they have eventually made Turkey's alignment with the West highly questionable in domestic political circles and somehow contributed to the formation of a grand coalition around the government. Third, both crises have brought about Turkey's rapprochement with the non-Western world and a reorientation of its foreign policy. Fourth, these two crises have evolved into protracted conflicts over the years and impelled Turkish decision makers to deal with multiple interconnected issues and multiple actors within the West. Fifth, both cases have been equipped with anti-Western ideological stances, namely a secular developmentalist nationalism that manifested itself in a highly anti-imperialist tone in the 1970s and as Islamist nationalism after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. Despite their differences, the common characteristics of these two cases directly point out the distinguishing features of the problem in Turkish foreign policy formulated as the Western Question.

The above-mentioned characteristics of the Western Question also reveal some questions that the following parts of the research should address. Why do some crises but not others instigate the Western Question, i.e. resurface Turkey's primordial mistrust towards the West? Or, why does Turkey have occasional deep crises with the West despite ongoing structural entanglements and decades of formal alliances? We argue that an historical analysis based on the role of ideologies in their own contexts that is identical to each selected crisis can provide the reader with the answers. In this regard, the following sections on selected crises will not only address the roots and dynamics of the Western Question, but will also display the influence of ideology as a domestic intervening variable as well as the role of systemic incentives that forced Ankara to return to the confines of realpolitik.

[22] Weldes, "Constructing National Interest," 284.

3. Rise of the Western Question: From the Johnson Letter to the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation

While frictions between Turkey and the US concerning US military installations and personnel started as early as 1960, it was the Johnson Letter that marked the beginning of an era of unrelenting suspicion towards the US on both the right and left wings of the political spectrum in Turkey. Violation of the consociational character of the newly established Cyprus Republic by Greek Cypriots and the escalating aggression against the Turkish Cypriots in 1963 had become a concern for Turkey. When the US government received reports about Turkey's intentions to send troops to Cyprus for protecting the Turkish Cypriots, US President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü in June 1964, patronizingly reminding Turkey of its obligations as a NATO member and threatening not to protect Turkey if this non-consensual act led to any involvement by the Soviet Union.[23] Upon this development, Turkey banned the use of bases on Turkish soil for reconnaissance planes in 1965[24], embarked on developing its economic and political relations with the Eastern Bloc and Third World countries, forced the US to revise some articles of the 1954 Status of Forces Agreement in Turkey's favour, and forbid 'off-site' use of military bases with the Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in 1969.[25]

It is important to state that the abovementioned anti-American decisions were made by the right-wing *Adalet Partisi* (AP, Justice Party) governments that ruled between 1965 and 1971. Although it would be a 'left-of-centre' politician—Bülent Ecevit—who would decide to intervene in Cyprus against American wishes in 1974, right-wing governments under Süleyman Demirel were going to play a certain role during the accumulation of tensions before 1974. It was his conservative and pro-NATO AP that signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with the USSR on 26 March 1967.[26] Having already overdrawn its IMF quota and unable to receive loans from the West, Turkey finally positively replied to the USSR, which had been following a consistent non-forcible policy of developing friendly relations with Turkey and offering financial and technical assistance for industrial projects since the 1950s, in the hope of restoring Turkey's confidence and encouraging it to limit American economic and political influence.[27] Demirel later conveyed that the US was quite uncomfortable with the treaty, and the US ambassador has asked him 'if Turkey was changing axis'.[28]

The Demirel governments' tense accommodation with the US were also linked to the rising tide of anti-American sentiments and protests against US military installations and personnel. The symbol of this anti-American mobilization was leftist university students' protest against the visit of the US Sixth Fleet to İstanbul in 1968, in which some US sailors were thrown into the sea. When the US demanded from the Turkish government to ban

[23] "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, June 5, 1964," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey,* ed. James E. Miller (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), accessed February 15, 2018, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1964–68v16/d54.

[24] Nur B. Criss, "A Short History of Anti–Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," *The Journal of American History* 89 (2002): 473–74.

[25] Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla ilişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I: 1919–1980,* ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 690–99.

[26] Cissy E.G. Wallace, "Soviet Economic and Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries: The Turkish Case" (PhD diss., London School of Economics, 1990), 112, accessed February 15, 2018, http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1177/1/U048631.pdf.

[27] Duygu B. Sezer, "Peaceful Coexistence: Turkey and the near East in Soviet Foreign Policy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 481 (1985): 118; Wallace, "Soviet Cooperation," 104–9.

[28] Baskın Oran, "Dönemin bilançosu," in *Türk dış politikası, cilt I, 1919–1980,* ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 676.

opium poppy cultivation in Turkey in 1970 on exaggerated accusations about Turkish illegal producers' role in the heroin trade, this further provoked anti-American sentiments, not only among the urban masses but also among the farmers.[29]

All these tensions that had been accumulating for two decades ended up with the emergence of a deep Western Question in 1974, triggered by domestic variables --the rise of the RPP to power, led by a new and assertive leader, Bülent Ecevit-- as well as an external variable, the military intervention in Cyprus. Following the general elections in October 1973, the left-wing *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP, Republican People's Party) and the Islamist *Milli Selamet Partisi* (MSP, National Salvation Party), which had managed to become the second large party in the right-wing after the AP, established a coalition government. Both parties were advocating developing heavy industry and greater independence from the US. At the time of the intervention in Cyprus, the coalition government had already been in deep discord with the US because of its decision to revoke the opium ban on 1 July 1974.

On 15 July 1974 a military intervention in Cyprus, supported by Greece and by pro-enosis Greek Cypriots, took place. Five days later Turkey launched the 'Cyprus Peace Operation'. The international community considered the initial phase of the intervention as a legitimate act arising from Turkey's internationally recognized guarantor state status. However, as the Second Geneva Conference, which had been convened to discuss the political future of Cyprus, continued, Turkey launched a second operation on 14 August, during which it took control of about 40 per cent of the island. This act was harshly protested and regarded as illegitimate by most countries, including the US and Western European states.

Outcomes of the operation for Turkish foreign policy were devastating. The US Congress, already considering punishing the Turkish government for its recent position on the opium issue, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey despite objections from the US government. Arms sales to Turkey were halted in February 1975, and military credits worth $200 million were suspended.[30] In response, the Turkish coalition government led by Demirel unilaterally abolished the Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement and closed down US bases in Turkey except those working as NATO missions. The activities and rights of the remaining American personnel were curtailed.[31] The project of strengthening Turkey's national defence capacity based on national sources already underway since the early 1970s was accelerated, and many national military investments such as the establishment of ASELSAN (Military Electronics Industries Inc.) in 1975 and İŞBİR (Power Generation Machinery Factory) in 1978 were made in a few years.

Under these conditions, Turkey began to look for greater flexibility and increased regionalization. A major foreign policy outcome of the crisis was a revitalisation of the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement that had been halted in the first half of the 1970s. According to Wallace, the USSR 'courted Turkey with aid and with diplomatic support', the latter referring to the Soviet position of not publicly condemning Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus dispute.[32] In 1976, a Joint Intergovernmental Soviet-Turkish Commission on Economic Cooperation, which would meet annually to discuss new projects and trade opportunities, was established.

[29] Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures During the Cold War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (2000): 126; Aylin Güney, "Anti–Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44 (2008): 473.

[30] Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla ilişkiler," 706.

[31] Criss, "A Short History," 476; Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla ilişkiler," 707.

[32] Wallace, "Soviet Cooperation," 189.

As a result, the trade volume between Turkey and the USSR surged. Both Turkish exports to and imports from the USSR tripled over the next years.[33]

An even more striking indicator of improved economic relations was the massive amount of credits. In 1978 Turkey was granted industrial development credits from the USSR, amounting to $1.2 billion, the second largest pledge that year by the USSR to a developing country.[34] Guan-Fu studied Soviet gross disbursement to non-socialist developing countries between 1965 and 1979 and found that Turkey received $3,188 billion in this period, which constituted 25 per cent of all Soviet disbursements.[35] On 23 June 1978, the Political Document on the Principle of Good-Neighbourly and Friendly Cooperation was signed, stipulating mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and regimes.

Turkey did not intend to cut off its ties with the US and NATO after the embargo; yet nor did it spend much effort to repair the relations. The US government lifted the ban on commercial sale of arms in October 1975 and sought for restoring its installations through an agreement with Turkey. As the US government regained control over the Congress, the embargo was completely lifted on 12 September 1978. When the talks resumed in 1979, Turkey insisted on clear guarantees against the possibility of facing with an embargo again in the future.[36] In the meantime, Turkey rejected two US demands to use the İncirlik base for its acts against the Islamic revolution in Iran and did not allow for US U-2 reconnaissance flights over the USSR.[37] This show of muscle may have played a role in reaching an agreement with the US. The new Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1980, was to be ratified by a cabinet decree after the coup in Turkey on 12 September 1980.

The wide reach of Turkey's Western Question in this period may be observed in Turkey's rift with the EEC. Protocols that regulated the parties' liabilities during the phase of 'transition' to the customs union had been signed in 1970 but Turkey did not take any meaningful steps towards customs union as all successive governments had doubts about conditions that might hinder the development of national industry.[38] 'One famous leftist slogan of the day about the Common Market, as the EEC was commonly known at that time, was that "they are the 'commons' or 'partners' and we are the 'market'"'.[39] Turkey's trade deficit with the EEC rose, and its attempts to gain concessions in the textile and agriculture sectors as well as free movement for Turkish workers failed. The EEC's severe reaction against Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and its improved relations with Greece were other negative factors.[40] In this context, in October 1978 the CHP government suspended its obligations for association. Although the relations with Europe further deteriorated over the next decade because of the severe violation of human rights by the military regime, Turkey eventually realigned with the US in 1980.[41]

[33] Michael M. Boll, "Turkey between East and West: The Regional Alternative," *The World Today* 35 (1979): 365; Wallace, "Soviet Cooperation," 113.

[34] Orah Cooper and Carol Fogarty, "Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the Less Developed Countries, 1954–78," *Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade* 21 (1985): 65, 71.

[35] Gu Guan–Fu, "Soviet Aid to the Third World: An Analysis of Its Strategy," *Soviet Studies* 35 (1983): 76–9.

[36] Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla ilişkiler," 708–12.

[37] Güney, "Anti–Americanism in Turkey," 475.

[38] İrfan Neziroğlu and Tuncer Yılmaz, ed. *Hükümetler, programları ve genel kurul görüşmeleri, cilt 5, 26 Mart 1971–17 Kasım 1974* (Ankara: TBMM Yayınları, 2013).

[39] Yılmaz, "Euroscepticism in Turkey," 190.

[40] Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy," 131–32; Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Arat, "AET'yle ilişkiler," in *Türk dış politikası, cilt I, 1919–1980,* ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 848–50.

[41] For external variables of realignment see Güney, "Anti–Americanism in Turkey," 475–76.

4. The Syrian Civil War and Resurrection of the Western Question

The outbreak of the civil war in Syria in late 2011 marked a new period in the history of Turkey's relations with the West and the Western Question has been resurrected around this war. By early 2012, neither the US nor the EU was willing to start a new war in the Middle East. From the very early days of his administration, US President Obama declared his departure from traditional US foreign policy strategy; a retreat from expansion of the US role in world politics, shifting the focus from Europe to Asia and redefining global leadership on the basis of 'economic competitiveness and diplomatic influence rather than military primacy'[42]. This posture manifested itself even after the allegations that the Assad regime had launched a chemical weapons attack in 2013 on the opposition forces. In the US President's own words, the US was 'not contemplating putting US troops in the middle of someone else's war'.[43] Yet, DAESH (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham / The Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant) expansion in the region as well as Russia and Iran's involvement in the Syrian civil war, forced the US administration to revise its strategy towards Syria.

By early 2014, how to cope with the growing DAESH threat without any large scale long term combat units or partners on the ground, was the most significant strategic problem facing the US and, given the group's battlefield success against DAESH, a partnership with the YPG (People's Protection Units), the Syrian branch of the terrorist organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), appeared to be the most suitable alternative for achieving US interests. After the establishment of the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) in October 2015, an umbrella organization dominated by the YPG, cooperation between the YPG and the US military shifted to a regular basis, and from 2015 until early 2018 the US committed itself to arming the Syrian Kurds against DAESH. The tension between Washington and Ankara reached its peak on 14 January 2018, when the US announced the formation of an SDF-based border force in Syria to prevent the resurgence of DAESH. A few days later, Turkey announced the beginning of an extensive military offensive against the YPG controlled Afrin enclave in Syria.

Though the US-YPG partnership seems to be the main cause of the emerging Western Question in Turkish foreign policy, for Çağaptay,[44] 'the honeymoon…ended in the summer of 2013'. The conflicting interests surfaced in May 2013 during the Obama-Erdoğan meeting regarding the future of Syria and the fate of the Assad regime, and strained relations rapidly evolved to the re-emergence of the Western Question with the involvement of much more complicated issues onto an agenda of already problematic relations. Without doubt, the clash between Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen and then Prime Minister Erdoğan caused the tension-ridden Turkey-US relations to hit a new low point.

As the country's Kemalist establishment was virtually eliminated after the AKP's electoral victory in the 2011 elections, the disagreements between Gülen and Erdoğan swiftly surfaced. In 2012, the chief of the Turkish National Intelligence Agency, Hakan Fidan, was summoned by the Istanbul prosecutor to testify in an investigation on the PKK, as a suspect. Erdoğan's

[42] Amir Stepak and Rachel Whitlark, "The Battle over America's Foreign Policy Doctrine," *Survival* 54 (2012): 47.

[43] "Transcript: President Obama's August 31 Statement on Syria," *Washington Post,* August 31, 2013, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript–president–obamas–aug–31–statement–on–syria/2013/08/31/3019213c–125d–11e3–b4cb–fd7ce041d814_sto ry.html?utm_term=.e197b25864fe.

[44] Soner Çağaptay, cited in Tim Arango, "Growing Mistrust between U.S. and Turkey Is Played Out in Public," *New York Times,* December 23, 2013, accessed February 20, 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/world/ europe/growing–mistrust–between–us–and–turkey–is–played–out–in–public.html.

response in 2013 was to announce the government's decision to close down all prep schools that prepare students for the university exams. It was a major blow to the Gülen movement because those schools constituted a source of funds and recruitment for the movement.

The conflict evolved into an open war after the alleged corruption probe against Erdoğan's family and three ministers in his government. Amid the corruption probe of December 2013, Erdoğan threatened to expel foreign ambassadors and blamed them for engaging in provoking actions against the government.[45] According to him, the entire corruption probe was a plot organized by the followers of Gülen in the judiciary and the police to topple a democratically elected government, and they were being supported by foreign powers. Finally, the failed coup organized by the Gülenist officers against the government in July 2016, sparked one of the most significant crises in Turkey-US relations, as Gülen was being given shelter by the US, and Turkey's demands for his extradition were ignored by the US authorities.

Turkey's Western Question in the aftermath of the Syrian Civil War is also associated with Ankara's deteriorating relations with the EU since 2011. Whereas a massive exodus of Syrian refugees and Turkey's sectarian pro-Islamist foreign policy in the MENA region were the main sources of discontent on the EU side, the EU's unwillingness to lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens and to open new chapters in Turkey's bid for EU membership were the main points of bitterness on the Turkish side. Even though the Joint Action Plan of 2015 had seemed to resolve the migration problem between Turkey and the EU, the European Commission's 2016 report on Turkey, which brought harsh criticism on Turkey's new legislation lifting parliamentarians' immunity from prosecution, independence of the judiciary and freedom of expression,[46] has further worsened the relations. The tension has led to serious diplomatic rifts between Ankara, Greece, Germany and the Netherlands. As Germany and Greece have granted asylum to the coup plotters, the ties between Turkey and the EU have become even further strained.

If only external uncertainties and threats were to be taken into account, Turkey's deteriorating relations with the West could have resulted in a new Turkish-Russian rapprochement, since Turkey's threat perceptions and fear of isolation in the Middle East could only be transcended by developing closer relations with Russia. But this time, unlike in the late 1970s, relations between Moscow and Ankara have also relapsed due to their divergent policies in Syria. Starting in the fall of 2011, while Turkey was beginning to actively support regime change in Syria[47], Russia had become Assad's biggest backer. In the summer of 2013, because of the friction with both the West and Russia, Turkey found itself isolated, a position coined as "precious loneliness" by İbrahim Kalın, the chief foreign policy advisor to the then Prime Minister.[48] With Turkey's downing of a Russian SU-24 warplane on 24 November 2015, the existing tension between Ankara and Moscow turned into a political crisis which would last until late 2016.

[45] Tim Arango, "Turkish Premier Blames Foreign Envoy for Turmoil," *New York Times,* December 22, 2013, accessed February 20, 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/world/middleeast/16–more–arrested–as–corruption–inquir y–in–turkey–widens.html.

[46] European Commission, "Turkey 2016 Report, SWD 2016 (366) final," November 9, 2016, Brussels, 5–7.

[47] Meliha B. Altunışık, "The Inflexibility of Turkey's Policy in Syria," *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook* (2016): 58, accessed February 20, 2018, http://www.iemed.org/observatori/arees–danalisi/arxius–adjunts/anuari/med.2016/IEMed_Med Yearbook_2016_keys_Turkey_Syrias_ Policy_Benli_Altunisik.pdf.

[48] "Turkey not 'lonely' but dares to do so for its values and principles, says PM adviser," *Hürriyet Daily News,* August 23, 2013, accessed February 20, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey–not–lonely–but–dares–to–do–so–for–its–values–and–principles–says–pm–adviser—53244.

5. Comparative Analysis and Model Application

The application of a neo-classical model of foreign policy analysis to the selected crises requires the comparison of the independent variables, ideational contexts, domestic intervening variables, and their impacts on short-term foreign policy behavior as well as the long-term policy outputs. At that point, it is noteworthy to mention that, such a comparison should also extricate the role of domestic intervening variables and systemic incentives since a neo-classical realist model prioritizes the independent variable (the structure of the international system), which is assumed to be the most significant determinant on long term foreign policy outputs.

It is true that the history of relations between Turkey and the West since 1950 is one of 'abundant drama and posturing',[49] as the rise and decline of bipolarity has given Turkey numerous opportunities to test and stretch the limits of its place in the Western alliance. Yet, the alienation from the West in the 1970s and since 2016 are quite different from ordinary disputes in terms of scale and scope. In order to understand these exceptional moments of strife, it is vital to analyse the realm of ideology because it constitutes the ideational environment in which political leaders, governments, as well as defence and foreign policy bureaucrats operate. This ideational context shapes the way these actors interpret the international system and Turkey's relative power in it, which determine the short-term policy outputs. The major common element of the ideological sphere in the 1970s, not only in Turkey but in most of the capitalist periphery, was a populist nationalism, embedded in a developmentalist economic strategy.

The aim of national developmentalism was to promote economic development, which may be accomplished through an import substitute industrialization model and a certain extent of social peace among major economic actors mediated by the state. This strategy required a great deal of populism. All major political actors in Turkey between 1960 and 1980 adopted developmentalism, yet they operationalized it in different ways. Even Demirel, who was the most reliable politician in the eyes of business circles and the US governments throughout the 1960s and 1970s, reflected this ideational environment in his focus on heavy industry.[50]

The Ecevit-led CHP got the rising left-wing anti-imperialist wind behind the idea. Ecevit adopted 'populism within', with references to a fair distribution of wealth and to a rich Anatolian civilizational legacy, and 'nationalism outside', with an anti-imperialist and pro-independence discourse.[51] The MSP, on the other hand, brought together nationalism, anti-communism, anti-Westernism and the search for justice and development, with a distinct call for a reorganization of state and society through an Islamic ethos. Ecevit and Erbakan, both assertive in foreign policy, were coalition partners during the Cyprus Peace Operation and were later labelled as 'the conquerors of Cyprus' by their followers.

It must be noted that the 1970s witnessed the beginning of the erosion of secular elements in nationalism. Not only was a separate Islamist party established for the first time and served

[49] Ömer Taşpınar, "The Anatomy of Anti–Americanism in Turkey," *Brookings Institute,* November 16, 2005, 2, accessed February 15, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/wp–content/uploads/2016/06/taspinar20051116.pdf.

[50] Tanıl Bora, "Süleyman Demirel," in *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce,* cilt 9, *Dönemler ve zihniyetler,* ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 505, 508.

[51] Tanıl Bora and Nergis Canefe, "Türkiye'de popülist milliyetçilik," in *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce,* Cilt 4, *Milliyetçilik,* ed. T. Bora and M. Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), 648–49; Yeliz Dönmez and Cem Bico, "Bülent Ecevit," in *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce,* cilt 4, *Milliyetçilik,* ed. Tanıl Bora and M. Gültekingil (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), 449–51.

as an indispensable partner in all three coalition governments of the decade, but Islamic elements were also increasingly incorporated into the conservative and nationalist traditions in the right-wing through the medium of anti-communism and the idea of Turkish-Islamic synthesis that implied a neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy.[52] The right-wing was first and foremost anti-communist[53] and Washington was regarded as an ally in that framework. Anti-communism was the glue for the 'Nationalist Front' coalitions of the AP, MSP and MHP between 1975 and 1977. Nevertheless, although waging a feud against the supposedly Soviet-backed labour movement in Turkey, they welcomed Soviet economic support, and maintained a pro-independent and nationalist position in their relations with the West.

Despite the weak and fragile one-party or coalition governments, there was a continuous and strong foreign and defense policy bureaucracy in the 1970s. Foreign ministry bureaucrats and the military were both homogenous groups trained along secular, nationalist and anticommunist principles to serve for the cardinal aim of survival and continuity of the state. Although there had been some intrusions from the left into both institutions in the 1960s, leftist elements were largely purged; the army's role and autonomy were expanded through the revised National Security Council and the newly established Supreme Military Administrative Court[54]; and a centralised and systematised secular, nationalist and anti-communist ideology for the army was produced.[55] This army was to reequilibrate Turkey in the Western alliance and largely take over the foreign policy making process in the 1980s.

The ever-mounting debt crisis is the last variable that must be examined to understand both the alienation from and realignment with the West. The structural reasons behind Turkey's crisis were an overdependence on imported inputs and a relative stagnation in exports. Despite these problems, a considerable injection of foreign sources (credits, foreign aid and immigrant remittances) had made high levels of growth sustainable until 1977, making overdependence on imports and credits a chronic illness. Convertible deposits and other sorts of short-term and high interest rate loans delayed but aggravated the crisis, which broke out in 1977 with severe disruption in foreign trade indicators.[56] New credit channels were conditional upon stability agreements with the IMF, which would be impossible to implement given the strong labour movement and political polarization. When Western sources were unavailable, Turkey turned to the USSR. However, by 1980, the détente was over, and the US was determined to provide no space for its allies but joining the new Cold War as well as implementing neoliberal economic programs.

In the broad ideational context of the 1970s, based on a populist nationalism with an anti-imperialist tone, and under the effect of domestic intervening variables hitherto discussed, certain short-term foreign policy outcomes emerged. Turkey's immediate response to cope with its isolation in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus intervention was the rapprochement with the USSR, and the unilateral annulment of the 1969 Joint Defence Cooperation Agreement that was governing US military operations in Turkish territory, and investments on a national

[52] Mustafa Şen, "Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of Justice and Development Party," *Turkish Studies* 11 (2010): 61–4.

[53] Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy," 119.

[54] Ali Bayramoğlu, "Asker ve siyaset," in *Bir zümre, bir parti – Türkiye'de ordu,* ed. Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2004), 79–82.

[55] Tanıl Bora, "Ordu ve milliyetçilik," in *Bir zümre, bir parti – Türkiye'de ordu,* ed. Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2004), 172–7.

[56] Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye iktisat tarihi 1908–2002* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003), 121–3, 140–1.

defence industry that would reduce Turkey's dependency on foreign arms sales. However, none of Turkey's responses were manifestations of a major re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Under Cold War circumstances, a full-scale Turkish-Soviet rapprochement that could transcend the economic cooperation between Ankara and the Kremlin was unsustainable. The Demirel and Ecevit governments, on all occasions, asserted that Turkish-Soviet cooperation had been an economic cooperation and not a political one that could undermine Turkey's commitments to NATO. Both were well aware that, despite important investments, Turkey's national defence industry was still far from meeting the demands of the military in a conflict intense environment. Furthermore, no matter how much credits Turkey received from the USSR, it was not comparable to the resources provided by the West. By 1980, the foreign policy elites' deep-rooted anti-communism, and the takeover of the pro-American military junta regime had transformed the Cold War's systemic pressures into an expected policy output; Turkey's re-alignment with the US in the long run.

Table 1- Comparative Analysis

Conjuncture	**Structure of International System / Independent variable**	**Ideational/ ideological context**	**Domestic intervening variables**	**Short-term Foreign Policy Behaviour**	**Long-term Foreign Policy Outcomes**
Cyprus Crisis (1974-1980)	Bi-polar	Developmentalist populist nationalism	• Short-lived and fragile one party (JP-RPP) or coalition governments • Assertive foreign policy elites • Strong military bureaucracy • Debt crisis	• Efforts for greater nationalization of defence industry • Non-submissive and demanding attitude towards the US • Alienation from the EEC • Rapprochement with the USSR	Realignment with the West
Syrian Civil War (2011- early 2017)	Unipolar	Islamic nationalism	• Strong AKP governments • Assertive foreign policy elites • Weak military bureaucracy • Relatively stable economy	• Efforts for greater nationalization of defence industry • Alienation, Isolation, Loneliness	Realignment with the West is expected

Contrary to the Cold War's bipolar structure imposing restraints on the actors' foreign policy responses, the unipolar post-Cold War system was expected to afford all actors more space to manoeuvre at the regional sub-systemic levels.[57] But unsurprisingly, these different systems are likely to impose realignment with a major power, and almost three decades that have rolled by under the uncertainties of the post-Cold War period have demonstrated that alignment with a major power remains a necessity to survive in the Middle East even for regional powers like Turkey. However, the findings of this research demonstrated that, between 2011 and early 2017, Turkey remained isolated and alienated, and it in fact took at least five years for Ankara to respond to systemic pressures enforcing Turkey to realign itself with at least one of the major powers in the Middle East. In other words, external balancing strategy against the West, which manifested itself through Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, was not a preferred option on the table until mid-2017.

[57] Randall L. Schweller, *Maxwell's Demon and the Golden Apple: Global Discord in the New Millennium* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), 83.

Additionally, similar to the post Cyprus Crisis period's internal balancing strategy, attempts for a nationalization of the Turkish defence industry gained momentum. According to data reported by SASAD (Savunma ve Havacılık Sanayi İmalatçılar Derneği / Defence and Aerospace Industry Manufacturers Association), the total amount invested in research and development between 2012 and 2016 steadily increased from 772 Million USD to 1.254 Million USD, in which government support to the projects reached a larger share than the private sector's equity capital ratio.[58]

In the Syrian Civil War case, Russia and Iran appeared as the challengers of US hegemony at the regional level but, unlike in the late 1970s, the belt that would transmit systemic pressures and incentives into the Turkish bureaucracy and foreign policy elites had to operate in an Islamic nationalist context. From 2011 onwards, the AKP's transformation from pro-Western Islamic liberalism to anti-Western Islamic nationalism not only resulted in an intense Islamization of the country but also penetrated the ideational/ideological context of foreign policy, in which Ankara's threat perceptions and responses were shaped.

It can be safely argued that religion, and in the Turkish case, Islamic nationalism, is affecting the Turkish leaders' threat assessments and their perceptions of the world. Islamic nationalism portraying the West as a hostile bloc 'attempting to corrupt the country',[59] once championed by the AKP's predecessor RP (*Refah Partisi*, Welfare Party) seemed likely to be abandoned by the AKP in its early years.[60] Despite the frictions between Ankara and the West, foreign policy elites had indeed adopted a pro-Western posture for consolidating the party's power inside and outside. Yet, Islamic nationalism and its framing of the West as an enemy began gaining momentum after 2011. The ending in disappointment of the bid for Turkey's EU membership, the sectarian pro Muslim Brotherhood ideology and policy formulations towards the Middle East,[61] the emergence of fundamental incompatibilities between Turkey and the West regarding the civil war in Syria, and the AKP's third electoral victory in the June 2011 general elections, all led to the creation of a new ideological context in which Islamic nationalism began to manifest itself. Expressions and statements such as the 'Crusaders',[62] 'remnants of the Nazis',[63] 'coup-plotters',[64] 'no one can stop the rise of Islam in Europe' and 'Muslim countries must unite and defeat the successors of Lawrence of Arabia,'[65] which began appearing frequently in the speeches of the foreign policy elites demonstrated how the ideational/ideological context had begun to shape Ankara's foreign policy choices and discursive acts after 2011.

At that point, it is plausible to argue that a consensus between foreign policy elites,

[58] SASAD, "Performance Report, 2016," 16, accessed February 20, 2018, http://www.sasad.org.tr/sasad–savunma–ve–havacilik–sanayii–performans–raporu.

[59] Erhard Franz, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey," in *The Islamic World and the West: An Introduction to Political Cultures and International Relations,* ed. Kai Hafez (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 164.

[60] Serdar Güner, "Religion and Preferences: A Decision– theoretic Explanation of Turkey's New Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8 (2012): 222.

[61] Nuri Yeşilyurt, "Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East during Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective," *All Azimuth* 6, no. 2 (2017): 70.

[62] "Erdogan accuses EU of 'crusade' against Islam," *Deutsche Welle,* March 17, 2017, accessed February 20, 2018, http://www.dw.com/en/erdogan–accuses–eu–of–crusade–against–islam/a–37979126.

[63] "Erdoğan'dan Hollanda'ya Çavuşoğlu tepkisi: bunlar Nazi kalıntısı," *Cumhuriyet,* March 11, 2017, accessed February 20, 2018, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/696342/Erdogan_dan__Hollanda_ya_ Cavusoglu_tepkisi__Bunlar_Nazi_kalintisi.html.

[64] "Erdogan accuses West of 'writing the script' for Turkey coup," *The Telegraph,* August 2, 2016, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/02/erdogan–accuses–west–of–writing–the–script–for–turkey–coup/.

[65] Middle East Media Research Institute, "Special Dispatch, No 5962," February 9, 2015, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.memri.org/reports/anti–west–statements–turkish–president–erdogan–and–pm–davutoglu–muslim–countries–must–unite.

bureaucratic structures, and public opinion, was built around the government's Syria policy and this consensus enabled the foreign policy elites to extract and mobilize the resources essential for the pursuit of foreign policy objectives without any limitations. The civilianization of the National Security Council and the diminishing role of the military in politics between 2007 and 2011 through a series of trials based on 'fabricated evidence'[66] removed the possible restraints that could have been imposed by the bureaucratic structures on the government's policy choices. Moreover, consent by the public, whose perceptions are not independent from the domestic ideational/ideological context on the definition of threats, also allowed the government to formulate and implement foreign policy strategies without any further restraints. In a 2017 survey conducted by Kadir Has University's Center for Turkish Studies,[67] almost 40 per cent of participants described Turkey as an 'Islamic Country' and, unsurprisingly, the US ranked first in the threat perceptions of respondents, with 66.5 per cent, a sharp increase compared with the 41.7 per cent in 2013.

This application of the neo-classical realist model to the selected crises in different time intervals reveals the influence of systemic incentives on Turkey's long-term policy outputs. As the theoretical model puts forward, the completely different ideational/ideological contexts of the Cyprus and Syria crises have produced different short-term responses, but at the end these domestic variables have remained analytically subordinate to systemic incentives. In the first case, Turkey realigned itself with the West to survive in the early 1980s. In the second case, Turkey's realignment with the West is likely to happen since the country is on the threshold of a serious economic crisis. Even though the recent s-400 missile deal and cooperation in Syria seems like a rapprochement with Russia, Turkey remained isolated at least until the end of 2016. Between 2011 and 2016, Turkey did not make any pragmatic or instrumental moves towards Russia for securing its own strategic interests in Syria, a pattern of short-term behavior that is completely different from Ankara's efforts to instigate greater cooperation with the USSR during the Cold War.

Last but not least, the neo-classical realist model's emphasis on the determining role of systemic incentives over long term policy outputs, specifically, realignment with the West, is likely to be validated in both cases. While reconciliation with the US was the hallmark of the military junta regime in the 1980s, the current economic crisis and surrounding threats will likely force Turkey to realign itself with the West. The recent agreement on a plan between Turkey and the US regarding the removal of YPG forces from the Syrian town of Manbij; Erdoğan's declaration of Britain as an ally, strategic partner and friend during his visit to London in May 2018, and emphasis on the necessity of developing trade relations in the post-Brexit period, can all be taken as the early signs of Ankara's realignment with the West.

6. Conclusion

The findings of this research demonstrate that Turkey had developed different short-term foreign policy behaviours to similar systemic incentives. In the aftermath of the Cyprus Crisis, Ankara's immediate responses were rapprochement with Russia, assuming a demanding and non-submissive attitude towards the US, and alienation from the EEC. However, the Syrian

[66] Pelin T. Kadercan and Burak Kadercan, "Turkish Military as a Political Actor: Its Rise and Fall," *Middle East Policy* XXIII (2016): 84.

[67] "2017 Survey on Turkish Foreign Policy," Kadir Has University, Center for Turkish Studies, 2017, accessed February 20, 2018, http://www.khas.edu.tr/en/news/270.

Civil War has resulted in a complete alienation and isolation of the country at least up until late 2016. In both cases, the attempts for greater nationalization of the defence industry have been pursued as an internal balancing strategy, whereas rapprochement with Russia to escape the pitfalls of isolation in the Middle East was an external balancing strategy. In this regard, the differences between Ankara's short-term policy responses can easily be found in the domestic level intervening variables such as the elites and institutions whose threat perceptions have been shaped in completely different ideological contexts. Whereas populist developmental nationalism affected the responses of the foreign policy elites to the emerging crises in the 1970s, Islamic nationalism framing all the foreign powers as enemies has brought Turkey to an impasse. What is common in these different ideological contexts is an historically rooted suspicion towards the West, which has become an intrinsic part of the Turkish political culture.

In an intense environment of Islamization, misperceptions of its own relative power, miscalculation of risks, the hubris feeding Ankara's lust for the idea that Turkey's moment had arrived in the new order after the Arab Spring,[68] the diminishing role of the secular bureaucracy, and electoral victories of the ruling party AKP, have all ultimately resulted in the country's souring relations with nearly all powers in the region. Undoubtedly, the fear of being isolated and alienated in Syria and a souring of ties between Ankara and the West has paved the way to Russian-Turkish rapprochement in the late 2016. After Turkey's downing of the Russian warplane, such a rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow could hardly be predicted. Yet, continuing frictions with the West, security concerns stemming from the instability in Syria and economic hardships caused by Russian sanctions made it clear that, "Turkey could no longer afford a Cold War with Moscow".[69]

Different from the actual Cold War's technical, industrial and financial cooperation, the rapprochement then, has extended to include cooperation against terrorism, and facilitating peace in Syria through creating de-escalation zones. None of these policy outputs, however, has sparked as many concerns in the West as has the S-400 missile deal between Ankara and Moscow. On 29 December 2017 Turkey announced the signing of a deal on Russian supply of S-400 anti-aircraft surface to air missile defense system, which is not compatible with NATO's radar network. Facing criticisms for the move, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu denied the comments that Turkey's axis had shifted from the Euro-Atlantic alliance to Russia[70]. As Çavuşoğlu confirmed, the current rapprochement with Russia cannot be an alternative to Ankara's partnership with the West, nor is it sustainable. Historically rooted threat perceptions, geo-political rivalries in the Caucasus, Balkans, Transcaucasia, Black Sea and Central Asia, as well as diametrically opposite ideologies of Ankara and Moscow are the major obstacles facing an envisaged trajectory on Turkish-Russian relations that could replace the partnership between Turkey and the West. Therefore, the systemic incentive is likely to result in Turkey's re-alignment with the West in the long run, as was the case in the 1980s.

[68] Henry J. Barkey, "Erdoğan's Foreign Policy is in Ruins," *Foreign Policy,* February 4, 2016, accessed February 20, 2018, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/04/erdogans–foreign–policy–is–in–ruins/.

[69] Jeffrey Mankaff, "Russia and Turkey's Rapprochement: Don't Expect an Equal Partnership," *Foreign Affairs,* July 20, 2016, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016–07–20/russia–and–turkeys–rapprochement.

[70] "Turkey's FM: NATO countries reject purchase of S–400 defence systems from Russia," *Middle East Monitor,* November 24, 2017, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor. com/20171124–turkeys–fm–nato–countries–reject–purchase–of–s–400–defence–systems–from–russia/.

Under the spotlight of these findings and recent developments, it can be safely argued that the Western Question in Turkish foreign policy cannot be resolved without addressing the root causes of the problem. Acknowledging the fact that foreign policy decisions are not made in a de-ideological context, anti Westernism, intrinsic to the Turkish political culture, is not a simple conjunctural problem that Ankara can easily overcome, but it can be managed if certain discursive and practical policy adjustments are made. Revising the state of emergency conditions and normalization of the country may lead to the restoration of Turkey's relations with the West. In relation to that, abandoning the hostile rhetoric that is regularly used to create a grand coalition around the government in the domestic politics can be another option that the foreign policy elites can assume for escaping the vicious cycle in the foreign policy domain. Foreign policy elites' insistence on framing the West as an enemy may serve for certain practical purposes, such as guaranteeing new electoral victories at home, but it cannot safeguard the country's national interests in a conflict prone environment. However, as of yet, no earlier signs of normalization have yet been observed on the Turkish side since the uncertainty in Syria still exhibits risks for national security.

Last but not least, even if Turkey adopts a discursive shift and a policy change that can foster a new process of dialogue with its partners in the West, the Western Question in Turkish foreign policy is still likely to remain unsolved since the US and the EU continue to disregard the country's security concerns. Ankara's requests for Fethullah Gülen's extradition have fallen on deaf ears in Washington and the US continues to support the YPG in Northern Syria as a partner in the war against DAESH. Setbacks in Turkey's long bid for EU membership are also another matter of concern feeding the anti-Western sentiments in Turkish society and among foreign policy elites. As the right-wing parties in growing numbers of EU member states gain electoral victories, the tension between the EU and Turkey is likely to persist.

Despite significant setbacks in the past, Turkey has remained a staunch ally of the West for at least 60 years and even though the Western Question is likely to affect Turkey's relations with the West in a negative manner, the uncertainties generated by the system itself are manifesting themselves mostly in the regional conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War. Under these circumstances, Turkey's re-alignment with the West can be anticipated due to the existence of the following factors. First, neither Turkey nor its Western partners have interests in further straining the relations. In an extremely challenging environment where Russia and Iran are militarily engaged in the Syrian Civil War with an aim to expand their spheres of influence, a souring of ties between Turkey and its Western partners can not contain them but instead could easily create much *more* space for both Moscow and Tehran. Second, Turkey's fragile economy and unsustainable debt cannot allow Ankara to continue its aggressive posture towards the West. Thus, either voluntarily or involuntarily, common threats perceived by Turkey and its Western partners are expected to impose a rapprochement between the troubled allies.

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Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order

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Abstract

This article argues that there is a close relationship between the structure of the international system/order and how states define their foreign policy interests and then act accordingly. The main contention is that Turkey's foreign policy performance since 2002 can be partially read as Turkey's effort to adapt to external developments at international and regional levels. As the international system has evolved from a unipolar order (in which the United States, in cooperation with its European allies, provided the main public goods in an hegemonic fashion), into a post-unipolar era, Turkey has accelerated its efforts to pursue a more multi-dimensional and multi-directional foreign approach. Rather than arguing that there is a direct causation between the independent variable of systemic factors and the dependent variable of Turkey's foreign policy performance, this article understands the external environment as a 'context' in which Turkish decision makers have responded to Turkey's responses to foreign policy developments.

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, international system, liberal international order, Middle East, rising powers

1. Introduction

There is a relationship between the structures of the international system/order and how states define their foreign policy interests and then act accordingly. Turkey's foreign policy performance since 2002, when the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power, can be partially read as Turkey's efforts to adapt to the external developments taking place at international and regional levels. Despite the fact that foreign policy is generally informed by a combination of internal and external factors, this article underlines the importance of the latter.

The goal here is not to explain and demonstrate Turkey's foreign policy as an outcome of external factors in the sense of causality. Instead, the goal is to underline the importance of the external environment as a 'set of constraints and opportunities', which has not only helped the ruling elites fulfill their domestic political agenda, particularly during the first decade of the twenty-first century, but has also had a role in forming the preferences and behaviours of Turkey's foreign policy.

The political calculations of the ruling AK Party governments, particularly in civil-military relations, the geopolitical imaginations of the ruling elites, consecutive electoral victories of the ruling party, and the strong leadership of then Prime Minister Erdogan, have influenced

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how Turkey interprets the external developments taking place at regional and systemic levels. Therefore, it would not be wrong to ask whether Turkey's foreign policy preferences and behaviors would have been different had another political party ruled Turkey during this period, for instance the Republican People Party. A neo-classical realist would likely say that Turkey's interpretation of the external environment during the time period under consideration would have been different, mainly because these two political parties adopted different political values and geopolitical imaginations. Nevertheless, this is a hypothetical question and requires sophisticated speculation. Even though unit level variables have played a role in shaping Turkey's responses to external stimuli over the last sixteen years, as the proponents of neo-classical realism claim[1], this article does not aim to show how these unit level variables have been factored into the ruling elites' interpretation of the external factors.

On the other hand, the major difficulty limiting the explanatory power of structural realism in this study is that Turkey's foreign policy preferences since 2002 seem to have been informed by both systemic and internal factors simultaneously. The fact that Turkey's responses to external developments during this period seem to have strongly reflected the political calculations of the ruling AK Party governments dilutes the explanatory weight of structural realism. The difficulty in differentiating the impact of systemic/external factors from the impact of unit-level factors is a major constraint, mainly because both appear to have expected the same foreign policy preferences to be adopted.

Against this background, this article does not argue that there is a direct causation between the independent variable of systemic factors, and the dependent variable of Turkey's foreign policy choices and behaviors. The goal is to modestly demonstrate how Turkey's responses to the external developments at regional and systemic levels have largely agreed with structural realist expectations. Although the reality of the external environment is filtered through decision makers in reference to their political calculations, worldviews, and foreign policy visions,[2] this article argues that Turkey's foreign policy performance over the last sixteen years appears to have vindicated structural realist expectations. Turkey's foreign policy choices have closely varied with the changing dynamics of polarity at systemic and regional levels, as well as with evolving views on the legitimacy of the US-led liberal international order.

Turkey's foreign policy before the global financial crisis in 2008 reveals that Turkey's choices almost always accorded with structural realist expectations. Turkey followed a pro-western/pro-European foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, not only because this suited the political calculations of the ruling elites, but also because the strong legitimacy of the US-led liberal international order (as well as a power imbalance in favor of western powers) did not allow Turkey any other credible choice. A neo-classical realist would theoretically argue that the internal political calculations of the ruling AK Party, particularly as regards its legitimacy needs against diehard skeptics in the military and secular opposition, have led AK Party elites to interpret the constitutive norms of the US-led western international order order legitimate and pave the way for a pro-western Turkish foreign policy. This does not change that the way Turkish foreign policy unfolded during this era accorded well with the strategic interests of western powers, particularly in the Middle East.

[1] Steven E. Lobell, Norin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., *Neoclasical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[2] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007814; Brian Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism," *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 294–321, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410802098917.

Structural realism holds that as the international order shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity, the maneuvering capability of states, particularly middle and small powers, increases. Transition times offer countries more opportunities in their foreign policies. As the primacy of an existing global hegemon is disputed by rising potential hegemons globally, the maneuvering capability of regional powers like Turkey increases. The Obama administration's strategies of 'retrenchment' and 'nation-building at home' should be seen as external developments which strengthen Turkey's foreign policy agency. The internal crises within the EU and the gradual rise of non-western powers, particularly China and Russia, seem to have contributed to the power vacuum at systemic and regional levels. Turkey has certainly taken advantage of this in its foreign policy. This is why Turkey could easily adopt an 'order constituter role' in the Middle East during the developments associated with the so-called Arab Spring.

The Russian military involvement in Syria in late 2015, the election of Donald Trump to US presidency in late 2016, Trump's continuing efforts to undo the legacy of Obama, the increasing penetration of China into the Middle Eastern theater, the growing geopolitical rivalry between Shi'a and Sunni power blocks, and Turkey's worsening security situation at home have caused a realist revival in Turkish foreign policy over the last three years. This also suggests that Turkey's maneuvering capability in the Middle East has steadily decreased, as other regional and non-regional powers have increased their efforts to shape the course of developments on the ground in their favor. Within this time period, and in the context of the continuous decline of western-world primacy in global politics, Turkey put more effort into forging cordial relations with rising non-western powers.

Some caveats are in order though. First, this essay does not offer a detailed and comprehensive analysis of Turkish foreign policy as it has evolved since 2002. For a detailed explanation of the core issues occupying Turkey's foreign policy agenda, readers would do well to resort to other sources. Second, the main focus is on Turkey's Middle East policy; developments in this region, rather than others, have decisively affected Turkey's foreign policy interests and behaviors. Third, this essay does not engage in a theory application exercise that tests the major assumptions of structural realism or neo-classical realism in light of Turkey's foreign policy. Rather, the goal is to offer a modest explanation of how changes in the structure of international order over the last sixteen years might be reflected in the evolution of Turkish foreign policy.

What follows is a short description of the changes occurring in the structure of the international system, in the context of material and normative dimensions. Whether the international order evinces the features of unipolarity, bipolarity, or multipolarity would be bound to have an impact on how states shape their foreign policy interests and behaviors. The article will then focus on the changes in Turkey's foreign policy performance since 2002 until now. I will divide the time period under consideration into three; the first covers the years between 2002 and 2008, the second between 2008 and 2015, and the third covers the last three years. During each period, Turkey's foreign policy record shows some notable differences, in sync with changes observed in the structure of international order.

2. The Changing World Order

Since the early years of the twenty-first century, the center of gravity of international politics has gradually shifted from the Transatlantic region to the Pacific/Indo-Pacific region. As the

primacy of western actors in international politics has come under strong challenges from the growing power capabilities of non-western powers, most notably China, they have also contested the ideational and normative underpinnings of the US-led liberal international order. The world is now going through a transformation process; 'Pax-Americana' is gradually giving way to a post-American world order in which a group of non-western countries are becoming more influential than ever in shaping the course of international developments.[3] This transformation seems to have accelerated since the financial crisis in 2008, which primarily affected the United States and many EU members.

Since the early 1990s and until 2008, the United States, in partnership with its European allies within NATO and the European Union, dictated international politics. This period was the heyday of the 'liberal international order'. Not only did it gradually expand to include former communist countries in central and Eastern Europe, but also the immense material power capabilities of the United States allowed her to pursue primacist strategies all around the world. The occupation of Iraq in 2003, and the United States' military involvement in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11 (9/11) attacks, epitomized the excessive self-confidence of American decision makers in promoting liberal democratic order.[4] Until 2008, the rise of China was not central to American strategic considerations and the European Union was at the apex of its power. The security strategy concepts of Americans and European alike demonstrated the exuberance, optimism, and self-confidence in western capitals. Neither the national security strategies adopted by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations in the US, nor the first-ever security strategy document of the EU adopted in 2003, mentioned great power competition and ideological polarization as potential threats to liberal international world order.[5] Many circles in the West took comfort in Fukuyama's thesis that the history came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and with the growing appeal of liberal-capitalist democracy as the only game in town.

Even though the 9/11 attacks on the US homeland dented the image of the United States as the omnipotent global hegemon, and criticisms of the American approach to the global war on terror intensified following the US occupation of Iraq, it was primarily following the financial crisis of the late 2000s that a sense of decline began to percolate down to the western elites in the United States and members of the EU. Not only has the feeling of optimism eroded, but also the specter of non-western powers challenging the primacy of western powers has begun to haunt many westerners. As the Russian resurgence and Chinese revival took root, the calls for accommodating rising non-western powers in the institutional structure of the liberal international order began to be heard more loudly. The revised security strategy of the European Union (issued in the summer of the 2016), and the first national security strategy of the Trump administration (issued in December 2017) demonstrate that western powers feel threatened by the rise of non-western powers. Both documents suggest some ways to deal with the resurgence of concerns for traditional security, as well as the worldwide emergence of illiberal authoritarianism.[6]

[3] G. John Ikenberry, "The Plot against American Foreign Policy: Can the Liberal Order Survive?," *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 3 (2017): 2–9, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-17/plot-against-american-foreign-policy.

[4] Constance Duncombe and Tim Dunne, "After Liberal World Order," *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (2018): 25–42.

[5] "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf; and "National Security Strategy," May 2010, http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/; "European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World," December 2003, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world.

[6] "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/

Since 2008, there have been disputes all over the world over the values of multiculturalism, openness, tolerance, and universal human rights. The morality of universal cosmopolitanism has gradually given way to the morality of relative communitarianism as rising non-western powers, primarily China and Russia, have increasingly offered non-western conceptualizations of international political order. Non-interference in states' internal affairs, primacy of state sovereignty, authoritarian leadership, the strengthening of national identities, state-led capitalism, spheres of influence mentality, multipolarism in global governance, primacy of great powers in international relations, mercantilist trade practices, investment in military power capabilities, an increased use of economic power instruments in the name of securing geopolitical gains, and the questioning of the principle 'responsibility to protect' are some of the points that Russian and Chinese leaderships have been vehemently prioritizing over the last decade.[7] This does not suggest that countries like China have not benefited from the liberal international order, particularly in the field of economics. However, China's gains from the liberal-capitalist global order mainly emanate from western sponsorship, rather than from China acting as a convicted disciple. So long as the western powers, particularly the United States, assumed that China would turn out to become a responsible stakeholder and gradually transform into a liberal democratic polity, they tolerated China's rise and its inappropriate trade practices and non-democratic political values. The West was able to endure some economic losses relative to emerging powers, so long as it had self-confidence.

The western powers have not been immune to such currents either. The last decade has witnessed the rise of populist and illiberal political movements in key western countries. The internal criticism of liberal democratic practices has severely affected the attractiveness of a liberal world order.[8] As the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump to presidency in the United States demonstrates, the forces of illiberalism, populism, protectionism, and xenophobia have gained ground in key western countries.

Parallel to the shift in material power capabilities across the globe and the growing challenges posed to the normative foundation of the liberal international order, realpolitik foreign policy practices and pragmatic concerns in defining national interests have become more pronounced than moralpolitik practices and normative concerns. Power politics and 'sphere of influence' mentality have experienced a revival over the last decade. As geo-economic and geo-political motivations have become more decisive in states' foreign policies, the dynamics of alliance relationships have also gone through a radical transformation. During the last decade, long-term identity based alliance relationships have been replaced with short-term, pragmatic, and issue-oriented strategic partnerships.[9] The practice of forming interest-oriented cooperation initiatives within multilateral and bilateral frameworks has gained ground in recent years. In today's world, countries of different value orientations, geographical locations, power capabilities, and threat perceptions are no longer bound to define each other categorically as enemies or friends. The notion of 'frenemy' has

uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; and "European Union Global Strategy, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy," June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf .

[7] Alexander Lukin, "Russia in a Post-Bipolar World," *Survival* 58, no. 1 (2016): 91-112, doi: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1142141; and François Godement, "Expanded Ambitions, Shrinking Achievements: How China sees the global order," (Policy Brief, March 2017, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, UK), http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/expanded_ambitions_shrinking_achievements_how_china_sees_the_global_order.

[8] Michael J. Boyle, "The Coming Illiberal Order," *Survival* 58, no. 2 (2016): 35–66.

[9] Thomas S. Wilkins, *"'Alignment'*, not *'Alliance'* – The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment," *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 1 (2012): 53–76.

already become an identity signifier in interstate relations. The practice of coalitions defining missions has gradually given way to the practice of missions defining coalitions. As opposed to Cold War bipolarity, and the unipolar order during the first two decades of the post-Cold War era, the practice of illiberal authoritarian states engaging in pragmatic outcome-oriented cooperation with liberal-minded states is now conceivable.

In today's international order, the ideological polarization of opposing power blocks is not as sharp and rigid as it was during the Cold War era. The interconnectedness between liberal western powers and illiberal authoritarian powers is much higher now than it was between western capitalist and eastern communist countries during the Cold war era. This suggests that we now live in a multiplex world order.[10] Not only are there more actors in international relations, but also the issues have become so complex that dealing with them increasingly requires global perspectives. This world order leads states with various power capabilities to adopt multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy strategies; aligning a particular group of countries against others in a long-term structural manner is no longer an option.

Even though the debate on the decline of the West still lingers, and many question the idea of declinism in the United States,[11] it is now clear that the United States, under Trump's presidency, no longer wants to play the leader of the liberal international order. This creates enough room for non-western rising powers to act more assertively and become more visible across the globe.

3. Pro-Western Realism in Turkish Foreign Policy, 2002-2008

During the first decade of the AK Party rule, Turkey adopted a pro-western, pro-European stance in its foreign policy, for strategic reasons, with more engagement in non-western environments, particularly the Middle East. Not only was Turkey highly committed to joining the EU, but also it increasingly showed its desire to support the promotion of western values to non-western geographies. Turkey's 'EUropean' foreign policy in the Middle East is a testament to how attractive the liberal international world order is in the eyes of Turkish decision makers.[12] Its willingness to take part in the US-led Greater Middle Eastern Initiative also suggests that a key foreign policy interest of Ankara was to transform the Middle East to reflect liberal democratic values.

Leaving aside the internal motivations of the AK Party politicians to accelerate the national Europeanization process, Turkey's perception of international order was that Western primacy in international relations was second to none, despite all counter challenges. Given the unipolar world order, Turkish rulers assumed that adopting the liberal democratic values of the western international community would provide the most appropriate solutions to Turkey's structural economic, social, and political problems. In parallel to increasing Europeanization and democratization efforts at home, Turkey was seen by western powers as a successful role model for countries in the greater Middle Eastern region. The transformation of the Hobbesian security environment in the Middle East into a Kantian one was considered to be vital to Turkey's efforts to successfully complete its economic development process, as well as maintain its territorial integrity and societal cohesion.

[10] Amitav Acharya, "The Future of Global Governance: Fragmentation May Be Inevitable and Creative," *Global Governance* 22 (2016): 453–60.

[11] Barry R. Posen, "The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony," *Foreign Affairs*, February 2018, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-02-13/rise-illiberal-hegemony.

[12] Tarik Oguzlu, "Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 125, no. 4 (2010-2011): 657–83.

During this time period, Turkey's Middle Eastern policies were undoubtedly European in nature. Similar to China's peaceful rise and development policy in East and South East Asia, Turkey wanted to help transform its near abroad, ensuring that regional developments did not hamper Turkey's internal transformation process. The instruments of Turkish foreign policy, the style of decision-making process, and the content of foreign policy choices adopted in regional issues sounded very European. Turkey pursued a realist foreign policy with a liberal tool kit. Despite the fact that the 'strategic depth' doctrine and the 'zero problems with neighbors' foreign policy mantra of the ruling elites were considered by some to be Turkey's efforts to pursue a neo-Ottomanist agenda in an imperial fashion, during this era Turkish foreign policy was everything but imperial. Turkey's engagement in thr Middle East was inspired by a strategic motivation to transform the region into a stable and secure environment with European values and practices so that Turkey itself did not feel threatened. Working to alleviate perennial security problems with neighbors to the south, particularly Syria and Iran, and helping to create an EU-like regional integration process, were among the main pillars of Turkey's regional policies in Middle East.[13] The fact that non-democratic and authoritarian nature of the political regimes of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors had not prevented Turkish decision makers from developing cordial and functional relationships with them can be seen as an indication that, during this era, Turkey embraced a realist foreign policy.

As a long time member of the western international community, Turkey's goal was not to spoil the existing liberal international order. Despite the fact that Turkey, similar to many other rising powers, felt that the current order was unjust and favored the primacy of western powers, Turkish rulers had not radically overhauled the concept of the liberal international order in their foreign policy. Turkey was quite satisfied with the liberal democratic values of the order; however, it wanted non-western powers to have more voice and better representation in existing international institutions so that the international order was a better reflection of the current distribution of material power capabilities.

Despite Turkish rulers paying a great amount of attention to improving relations with Russia and coming closer to China, one can hardly say that there were a lot of people arguing in favor of an Eurasian-centered stance in Turkey's international orientation. Though Turkey's response to the Russian invasion of Georgia in the summer of 2008 was much milder than that of the United States and many EU members, Turkey felt uneasy with Russia's use of brute force in dictating its terms to neighboring countries. Ankara did not perceive that the Russian challenge to the post-modern security order in the European continent was positive.[14]

4. Liberal Optimism in a Search for Strategic Autonomy, 2008-2015

Following the second electoral victory in the parliamentary elections of the summer of 2007, and the election of Abdullah Gul to presidency despite all counter efforts, AK Party rulers felt self-confident enough to set an identity-based transformation process in motion at home and in relations with external actors. This coincided with the gradual deterioration of Turkey's relations with western actors, and the steady decline of western primacy in global politics

[13] Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, "From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's Relations with Syria and Iran," *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 5 (2008): 495–515.

[14] Ziya Oniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey and Russia in a Shifting Global Order: Cooperation, conflict and asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent region," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (2016): 71–95.

following the 2008 global financial crisis. As a result of cooling relations with the EU and growing differences with the US, Turkey began a continuous search for strategic autonomy. The onset of accession negotiations with the EU in 2005 did not set Turkey on an irreversible European path. Growing European opposition to Turkey's prospective EU membership (on the grounds of ideational and normative factors) seems to have been reciprocated by a dwindling Turkish determination to fulfill the membership criteria. The economic crisis in Europe made EU membership even less attractive. [15] Deteriorating relations with the US, mostly in the context of diverging strategic priorities in the Middle East, further eroded the western dimension in Turkish foreign policy.[16]

In the years between 2008 and 2015, there were strong normative and moral considerations in Turkish foreign policy practices, particularly in the Middle East. Amid the revolutionary changes taking place in the Middle East in the context of the so-called Arab Spring, Turkey began to pursue a transformational regional policy; Turkish decision makers appear to have believed that Turkey's hour had finally arrived.[17] Since the onset of revolutions across the region until the middle of 2015, Turkey's number one foreign policy goal was to bring about a new regional order, with Turkey playing a leading role in strengthening representative democracy and regionalism. Playing a lead role was in line with Turkey's determination to help erase the imprint of external actors in the region, and replace it with new power blocks that would align their interests with an AK Party-ruled Turkey.

During this time, it became clear that the gap between Turkey's ends and means was too difficult to bridge in the short-term. Despite warning calls that Turkey would likely suffer from a gap between its expectations and capabilities, particularly in Syria, AK Party rulers ignored them and continued to believe that Turkey was on the right side of history. The assumption was that Turkey would eventually benefit from its moral position in the region, no matter which developments might temporarily alienate the country. After all, the alleged loneliness would be precious.[18]

The quest for strategic autonomy was mainly informed and aided by the retrenchment policies of the US under Obama, as well as the increasing failure of the European Union to craft a convincing approach towards the Middle East in the midst of its structural problems at home.

The determination of the Obama administration to scale down the American presence in the Middle East (by gradually withdrawing US soldiers from Afghanistan and Iraq), and stay away from the internal war in Syria, seems to have motivated Turkey to play a more assertive role in the region.[19] Following the economic crisis in 2008, both the US and EU members began to focus their energy and capital on fixing economic and social problems at home, while decreasing their external engagement in nation-building and democracy-promotion activities abroad. President Obama's 'leading from behind' strategies in war zones of the greater Middle East, and the adoption of the 'pivot-to-Asia' policy in the early years of his

[15] Tarik Oguzlu, "Turkey and the European Union: Europeanization without membership," *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 2 (2012): 229–43.

[16] Tarik Oguzlu and Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey and the US in the 21st Century: Friends or Foes?," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 20, no. 4 (2008): 357–72.

[17] Ziya Onis, "Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest," *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3 (2012): 1-19.

[18] David Gardner, "Turkey's Foreign Policy of 'Precious Loneliness'," *Financial Times*, November 16, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/69662b36-7752-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7.

[19] Andreas Krieg, "Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East," *International Affairs* 92, no. 1 (2016): 97–113.

second term, seem to have enabled regional countries like Turkey to demonstrate a growing degree of strategic autonomy in their external relations.

Likewise, Obama's 'strategic patience' and 'retrenchment' policies paved the way for China, Russia, and other non-western rising powers to increase their assertiveness and agency in foreign policies. Obama's assumption that if the US outsourced some of its security responsibilities to others, peace and stability would be more likely to arise, seems to have led many countries to conclude that the US had entered a period of terminal decline, and that a post-American world order would be constructed sooner than later. It was not a coincidence that Turkey's quest for strategic autonomy coincided with Obama's admission that he was the first American president in an emerging post-American world.

One should also note that during this time period, neither Russia nor China stood against core American interests in the Middle East and East Asia. Russia was put under US-led economic sanctions in the wake of its annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its support of Russian speaking separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. China was trying to challenge western primacy in East Asia, while avoiding global responsibilities as much as possible. Establishing the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, setting in motion the One Belt One Road initiative, investing in anti-access area denial military capabilities, tying neighboring countries to Beijing through a web of economic cooperation initiatives, and disputing the legal status of reefs and islets in East and South China Seas are all examples of China's efforts to become the regional hegemon in East Asia.[20]

When American willingness to outsource security responsibilities to regional players combined with the relative absence of non-western global actors in the Middle Eastern theater, it was not difficult for Turkish rulers to clamor for regional leadership and aggressively pursue an order-creator role to the south.

5. Realism Redux in the Emerging Multipolar World Order, 2015-2018

As Turkey has been disappointed by the turn of developments in the Middle East from early 2015 onward, particularly in Syria, a sense of realism seems to have come back to Turkish foreign policy. The liberal optimism that appears to have inspire Turkey's increasing self-confidence during Obama's presidency has gradually come to an end with three systemic developments. First, Trump, during the election campaign and during his first year in office, severely accused the Obama administration of deconstructing American leadership in Middle East. To Trump, Obama's pursuit of 'leading from behind' and 'outsourcing responsibility to regional actors' policies seems to have emboldened other players to dictate developments in the region. The Trump administration wants to play a more assertive role in Middle East, particularly in the context of international efforts to defeat ISIS, to support Syrian Democratic Forces-PYD in northern Syria as a strategic ally, and to help contain Russia and Iran's influence in the region. Turkey felt disappointed by the Obama administration's reluctance to offer overwhelming support to anti-Assad opposition groups in Syria. But the Trump administration's policy of continuing military aid to the PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups in northern Syria in the name of defeating the Islamic State, and containing Russian and Iranian influence in the region, has aggravated Turkey's security concerns.[21] Many Turks

[20] Liu Feng, "China's Security Strategy towards East Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 2 (2016): 151–79, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow003.

[21] Ahmet K. Han and Behlül Özkan, "Turkey and United States in Syria: Allies, Frenemies, or Worse?," (On Turkey series,

now see the US as the primary security threat to Turkey. Anti-Americanism has never been so high in Turkey, a longtime member of NATO since 1952.[22]

Second, Russia's military involvement in Syria in late 2015 appears to have radically changed the security and political dynamics on the ground, most importantly by helping the Assad regime reclaim some lost territories and gain international legitimacy. Third, Iran's efforts to help bolster the Assad regime have gained a new impetus following the recapture of the territory held by ISIS, particularly Mosul in Iraq, and Raqqa in Syria. Faced with the Trump administration's determination to scrap the nuclear treaty signed with Iran in summer 2015, and further isolate the Iranian regime, Tehran appears to have decided to pursue a more assertive and bolder regional policy than before in order to preempt American belligerence.

When these systemic effects combined with Turkey's growing exposure to PKK-PYD affiliated terrorism threats since 2015, it appears Turkish decision makers concluded that Turkey requires a new foreign policy mentality. In recent years, Turkey has not proven to be an influential actor in shaping the developments in its neighborhood. Some have even underlined the misery of Turkey by pointing out that the 'zero problems with neighbors' policy has now been replaced with the unwanted outcome, 'zero neighbors without problems'.

Due to the worsening security environment in the region, and its negative consequences on Turkey's internal peace and stability, Turkish decision makers have now opted for a new foreign policy line that increasingly demonstrates the primacy of conventional security concerns. Following the replacement of Ahmet Davutoglu by Binali Yildirim as Turkey's prime Minister in the spring of 2016, Turkey appears to have embarked on a realist foreign policy stance; its operational logic is to decrease the number of Turkey's enemies while increasing the number of its friends. The ideological zeal of helping transform the region to reflect Turkey's domestic values (under the stewardship of AK Party governments), has gradually given way to the more realist concern of preserving Turkey's territorial integrity and societal cohesion amidst the re-emergence of traditional security concerns to the south.

Combined with the ominous coup attempt of July 2016, Turkey's rulers have now put security concerns at the center of their domestic and foreign policies. The practice of dealing with traditional security problems through further politicization seems to have now been replaced by practicing resecuritization at multiple fronts. The revival of the infamous siege mentality has now engendered the 'security first' approach in Turkey's external relations. The question of whether a country is friend or foe to Turkey is now being increasingly answered on the basis of that country's support, or lack thereof, to Turkey's war against multiple sources of terrorism threats (i.e., PKK/PYD forces in Syria, the FETO terror organization at home and abroad, the Islamic State, and the leftist DHKP-C terrorist organization).

In light of deteriorating relations with the United States and diminishing prospects of Turkey's accession to the European Union, Turkish decision makers have lately invested much more capital and energy into improving relations with Russia and China. The debates on whether Turkey should join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union or the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization have intensified in recent years. The more Turkey felt excluded from the western international community, the closer it came to non-western rising powers.

September 15, 2017, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington DC), http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-and-united-states-syria-allies-frenemies-or-worse.

[22] A survey conducted in 2017 by Kadir Has University has found that the US is the biggest threat with the percentage of 66,5. For more information about the survey: http://www.khas.edu.tr/news/1588.

Russia's military involvement in the Syrian theater in September 2015, combined with America's refusal to convincingly buttress anti-regime forces, seems to have produced two specific outcomes in Turkey's security thinking. First, Turkish rulers have realized that Turkey's ability to help shape the course of developments in the Middle East has now significantly weakened in the presence of Russian military elements. Russian and Iranian support to Assad seems to have bolstered the ability of the Damascus regime to remain in power. Second, closer relations with Russia are now seen as vital to Turkey's ability to defeat the PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups in northern Syria. Without the tacit Russian approval, Turkey's military incursions of northern Syria, first in August 2016 and then in January 2018, might not have been possible. Turkey's efforts, in close cooperation with Russia and Iran, to contribute to the solution of the Syrian crisis through diplomatic means (the so-called Astana and Sochi processes), have also intensified following Russian's more decisive penetration into Syria.

Improving relations with Russia has become important in terms of Turkey's worsening relations with western powers in the wake of the July 2016 coup attempt. The eroding trust of western powers seems to have brought Turkey much closer to Russia. It is now believed in Ankara that western powers are not happy to see Turkey become a regional heavyweight that continuously criticizes the legitimacy of western policies in Middle East.

It is against this background that Turkish rulers increasingly voice that the world is bigger than five, and that Turkey's efforts to develop cordial and pragmatic relations with non-western rising powers should proceed as quickly as possible. Signing up to Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, showing interest in developing joint projects with China (within the framework of the One Belt One Road initiative), contributing to global and regional governance initiatives (such MIKTA and MINT), buying a S-400 missile defense system from Russia, and establishing military bases in faraway regions (such as Qatar and Somalia) are all noteworthy examples of these efforts.

Of particular importance are Turkey's increased efforts to deal with the worsening security environment in its own region through unilateral initiatives. Turkey's organization of two military operations in northern Syria, the Euphrates Shield and the Olive Branch, testifies not only to Turkey's diminishing trust in its western allies, but also to its growing predisposition to act unilaterally when the pushed.

6. Conclusion

This article argues that the structure of the international order and the way Turkish foreign policy has unfolded over the last fifteen years are closely interrelated. As the international system has evolved from a unipolar order in which the US (in cooperation with its European allies), provided the main public goods in a hegemonic fashion, into a post-unipolar era, Turkey has accelerated its efforts to pursue a more multi-dimensional and multi-directional foreign approach.[23] The gradual erosion in the relative weight of western powers in international politics, and the concomitant rise in the influence of non-western powers, appears to have increased Turkey's maneuvering capability and bargaining power in its foreign policy.

As Turkey moved away from a predominantly pro-western foreign policy understanding to a more strategic autonomy, analysts have increasingly asked whether this has signified a

[23] Tarık Oguzlu and Emel Parlar Dal, "Decoding Turkey's Rise: An Introduction," *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 4 (2013): 617–36.

shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy.[24] A more accurate description would be that as Turkey has become more powerful and as the world has moved much closer to a post-American order, Turkey has begun to adopt bolder and more assertive foreign policy stances. Turkey's economic power, as relative to neighboring countries, has grown spectacularly. The three-fold increase in Turkey's GDP over the last fifteen years has allowed Turkey to increase investments in its military-industry, and adopt an autonomous course of action in its foreign policy.

Despite Turkey still valuing its NATO membership and its prospective membership in the European Union, in recent years Turkey has had an increasing tendency to come closer to Russia and China, and become more active than ever in Middle East. Whether this is called 'Middle Easternization', 'Eurasianism', or 'strategic autonomy', one can safely argue that Turkey no longer views its external environment from a predominantly pro-western perspective.

The weakening of westernism in Turkish foreign policy cannot be solely attributed to the gradual erosion of western primacy in global politics. In recent years, Turkey has had more anxiety concerning security, and American policies in the Middle East over the last fifteen years have played the key role. The image of the West as Turkey's ultimate security provider has eroded, as many US-led policies in the post 9/11 Middle East seem to have endangered Turkey's sense of security.

The growing appeal of the 'Beijing model', as well as resurgent nationalism as manifested in Putin's Russia, has hollowed out the normative underpinnings of the US-led liberal international order. Turkey seems to be one of those 'swing' states that has shown a growing willingness to accommodate non-western powers in international politics.

One should also admit that both Russia and China appear to approach Turkey from an instrumental perspective; driving wedges among NATO allies, in this case particularly between Turkey and the United States, would likely increase their bargaining power with the United States. Worth noting is that neither Russia nor China is willing to admit Turkey to the international organizations that they lead as full members.

This suggests that Turkey comes closer to these countries and other non-western international organizations in its efforts to help soft-balance western powers. Turkey has not proven that it is a revolutionary state aiming at radically overhauling liberal international order. Provided that the liberal international order would more convincingly reflect the existing balance of power in today's world, Turkey would likely opt for the current liberal order.

[24] Ekrem T. Başer, "Shift-of-axis in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkish National Role Conceptions Before and During AKP Rule," *Turkish Studies* 16, no. 3 (2015): 291–309.

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Abstracts in Turkish

Devletlerin İnsan Hakları Performansı ve Evrensel Periyodik Gözden Geçirme Kapsamında Öneriler

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Öz
Bu makale, BM İnsan Hakları Konseyi (HRC) Evrensel Periyodik İnceleme (UPR) kapsamında devletlere verilen tavsiyeleri analiz ederek UPR'ın inceleme altındaki devletlere faydalı önerilerde bulunup bulunmadığını belirlemeye çalışmaktadır. UPR, her dört yılda bir BM Üyesi ülkelerin insan hakları durumunu gözden geçirmektedir. İnceleme sırasında, her üye ülke diğer üyelerden bir takım öneriler alır. Bu makale, "UPR Info"dan gelen verileri kullanarak, CIRI insan hakları veri projesi tarafından değerlendirildiği üzere insan hakları performansı daha iyi olan devletlerin, daha kötü performans gösteren devletlerden daha az öneri alıp almadığını belirlemeye çalışmaktadır. Diğer değişkenler sabitken bile, medeni ve siyasi haklar konusunda sicilleri daha kötü devletlerin, genellikle daha iyi sicillere sahip devletlerden daha fazla öneri aldıklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Kadınların ekonomik ve siyasi hakları konusunda CIRI'den daha düşük puan alan devletler, kadınların sorunları hakkında daha yüksek puan alan devletlerden daha fazla öneri almaktadır. Bu bulgular bölgeden bağımsız olarak, UPR sürecinin insan haklarını ihlal edenleri tespit ettiğini öne sürmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsan Hakları, İnsan Hakları Konseyi, Birleşmiş Milletler, Evrensel Periyodik İnceleme, küresel yönetişim

Ülke İçi Savaşın Yayılımının Dinamik Bir Modeli

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Öz
Ülke içi savaşın yayılması hususu, özellikle yakın geçmişte giderek önem kazanmıştır. Bu makale, sistem dinamiği modelleme yaklaşımını kullanarak bir ülkedeki savaşın komşu bir ülkeye yayılmasını incelemektedir. Kullanılan model, epidemiyolojide hastalık yayılımı modeli olarak kullanılan SIR modelinin bir modifikasyonudur. SIR modelini ilgili siyasi ve ekonomik değişkenler kullanarak revize eden model, ülke içi bir çatışmanın "enfektif" bir ülkeden "sağlam" bir ülkeye yayılma mekanizmasını açıklamaya çalışır. Her ne kadar iç savaşların yayılması ve bulaşması geçmişte geniş ölçüde incelense de, dinamik modelleme yaklaşımı bu alanda yeterince kullanılmamıştır. Mevcut literatürle uyumlu olarak, modelin sonuçları, mültecilerin, yerleştikleri konağın ekonomik ve sosyal dinamiklerini bozarak çatışma hastalığını kendi ülkesinden taşıyan bir araç olduğunu, siyasi kapasiteninse bağışıklık sistemi olarak hareket ettiğini ve çatışmanın bulaşma olasılığını azalttığını göstermektedir.

Teorik parametreler kullanılarak elde edilen simülasyonların sonuçları genel olarak beklentilerle uyumludur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ülke içi çatışma, mülteciler, devlet kapasitesi, savaşın yayılması, sistem dinamiği modelleri

Fikirler ve İlgi Alanları: Avrupa Demokrasi Yardımı ve Demokrasi-Güvenlik İkilemi, 1990-2010

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Öz
Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana, gelişmiş demokrasiler, dünyanın her yerindeki hükümetlere, siyasi partilere ve sivil toplum gruplarına ve organizasyonlarına yardım sağlayarak açıkça demokrasiyi teşvik etme stratejilerini yürürlüğe koymuştur. Bu makale, düşünsel kaygıların (rejim türü, insan hakları) ve kişisel çıkarların (siyasi, güvenlik, ekonomik) göreceli etkilerini tartarak 1990-2010 yılları arasındaki Avrupa Birliği demokrasi yardımı kararlarını şekillendiren faktörleri incelemektedir. AB demokrasi yardımının "demokrasi-güvenlik ikilemini" yansıttığını, çünkü AB'nin demokrasiyi teşvik etmek için düşünsel nedenleri, siyasal ve ekonomik ilişkiler, bölgesel istikrar ve güvenlik konusundaki kaygılarla dengelediğini iddia etmekteyiz. Hipotezlerimizi, argümanımızı destekleyen rastgele etkiler serisi, genelleştirilmiş en küçük kareler yöntemi ve Heckman seçim modelleri ile test ediyoruz. Bu çalışma, elde edilen bulguların AB'nin demokrasi teşvik politikalarının etkisi ve açıklaması üzerindeki sonuçlarının tartışılması ile sona ermektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi yardımı, dış politika, Avrupa Birliği

Sykes-Picot Mitini Yıkmak: Hatlar, Hudutlar, Sınırlar ve Osmanlı Teritoryalitesinin Evrimi

Ali Murat Kurşun
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Öz
Bu çalışma, Sykes-Picot düzeninin ortaya çıkışını değerlendirmeyi ve sınır anlayışının evrimsel bir değerlendirmesini önererek mitleştirilmesini bozmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma şu temel araştırma sorularını ele almaktadır: Yerel, bölgesel ve uluslararası gelişmelerin etkileşimi, Sykes-Picot toprak düzeninin oluşumu için nasıl temel attı? Sykes-Picot anlaşmasından önce idari yapı ve bölgesel ayrımlar nasıldı ve bu yapılar hangi sınır kategorilerine girmektedir? Sykes-Picot anlaşması, bölgenin sınırlarını etkileyen tek uluslararası müdahale miydi veya Sykes-Picot anlaşmasından önce başka uluslararası müdahaleler var mıydı? Bu çalışma,

Orta Doğu sınırlarının oluşum tarihinin sadece uluslararası tarihten ibaret olmadığını, aynı zamanda geniş bir şekilde dikkate alınmamış birçok yönü olduğunu savunuyor. Bunu yaparken, bu makale Orta Doğu sınırlarının gelişimini analiz etmek için eleştirel bir tarihsel bakış açısı benimsemiştir. Bu makale, sınırların ortaya çıkışını analiz etmek için, hatlar, hudutlar ve sınırları kapsayan üç aşamalı bir evrimsel analitik çerçeve önermekte ve bu çerçeveyi Osmanlı topraklarının oluşumuna uygulamaktadır. Bu çalışma, Sykes-Picot anlaşmasının, Orta Doğu jeopolitiğinin ortaya çıkmasında uzun bir sürecin tamamlayıcı bir parçası olduğu sonucuna varmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı toprakları, Sykes-Picot Anlaşması, Orta Doğu sınırları, sınır çalışmaları

İdeolojiler ve Türk Dış Politikasında Batı Sorunu: Neo-Klasik Realist Perspektif

Şevket Ovalı
Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi
İlkim Özdikmenli
Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi

Öz

Dünyanın dört bir yanında artan Batı karşıtı duygular, barışçıl direniş hareketlerinden çeşitli siyasi şiddet biçimlerine kadar farklı yollarla kendilerini göstermektedir. Orta Doğu'da, Soğuk Savaş döneminin kısmen seküler ve milliyetçi Amerikan karşıtlığının aksine, şu anki popüler Batı karşıtı siyasi hareketler, hemen hemen tüm muhalifler için kapsamlı bir ideoloji ve politik hareket olarak görünen İslamcılığa büyük ölçüde sahiptir. Bu, nispeten uzun laikleşme geçmişine rağmen, Türkiye için de geçerlidir. Bu araştırma özellikle milliyetçilik ve İslamcılığın Türk dış politikasındaki Batı karşıtı düşünceler üzerindeki rolünü neo-klasik realizm ve daha yeni geniş bir kavramsal çerçeve aracılığıyla tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır: Batı Sorunu. Araştırma, 1970'lerin Kıbrıs sorunu ve Türkiye'nin Suriye İç Savaşı'na müdahil olmasından sonra Batı ile arasında bir krizin ortaya çıkması gibi iki vakayı karşılaştırarak sorunun hatlarını, içeriğini ve sonuçlarını incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Batı Sorunu, Neo-Klasik Realizm, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Avrupa Birliği

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Değişen Dünya Düzeninde Türk Dış Politikası

Tarık Oğuzlu
Antalya Bilim Üniversitesi

Öz

Bu makale, uluslararası sistemin/düzenin yapısı ile devletlerin dış politika çıkarlarını nasıl tanımladıkları ve sonuçta buna göre davrandıkları arasında yakın bir ilişki olduğunu savunmaktadır. Ana tartışma konusu ise, Türkiye'nin 2002'den bu yana dış politika

performansının, Türkiye'nin uluslararası ve bölgesel düzeydeki dış gelişmelere uyum sağlama çabası olarak kısmen okunabileceğidir. Uluslararası sistem tek kutuplu bir düzenden (ABD'nin Avrupalı müttefikleri ile işbirliği içinde başlıca kamu mallarını hegemonik bir tarzda sağladığı) tek kutupluluk sonrası bir döneme doğru ilerlerken, Türkiye, daha çok çok-boyutlu ve çok-yönlü bir yaklaşıma doğru çabalarını arttırmıştır. Bu makale, sistemik faktörler bağımsız değişkeni ile Türkiye'nin dış politika performansı bağımlı değişkeni arasında doğrudan bir nedensellik olduğunu iddia etmek yerine, dış çevreyi, Türkiye'deki karar vericilerin Türkiye'nin dış politikadaki gelişmelere verdiği yanıtlara cevap verdikleri bir 'bağlam' olarak ele almaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, uluslararası sistem, liberal uluslararası düzen, Orta Doğu, yükselen güçler

Aims and Scope

All Azimuth, journal of the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, is an English-language, international peer-reviewed journal, published biannually. It aims:

- to provide a forum for academic studies on foreign policy analysis, peace and development research,
- to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements in the dialogue between the "center" and the "periphery",
- to encourage publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches.
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- to highlight works of senior and promising young scholars,
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