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• to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements in the dialogue between the conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries,

• to encourage publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches,

• to highlight works of senior and promising young scholars,

• to transcend conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries,

• to publish works that are of a high academic standard

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In This Issue

Our summer 2020 special issue presents a selection of works from the 4th Annual All Azimuth Workshop that we held in Istanbul in May 2019. In the first article, Erik Ringmar draws parallels between the development of the IR discipline, the intellectual dependence of non-Western theorizing on Western theorizing, and the political dependence of non-Western states on Western ones. Ringmar discusses by analogy the potentially fatal flaws of non-Western IR replicating the same disciplinary practices as core IR, likening this disciplinary tendency to the lionization of Western-style nation states in much of the world. For instance, the creation and emulation of nation-states, where none had existed before in the non-Western world, has resulted in untold miseries. In the same way that it should be possible to disabuse ourselves of the sacrosanctity of the nation-state as the only viable form of modern political organization, so too must non-Western IR extricate itself from the disciplining effects of the IR discipline and become a revolutionary science.

The second article, by Deepshikha Shahi, examines the evolving notion of the “dialogical” approach, which has become a central component of the Global IR debate. Despite its much-vaunted status as a remedy to the West-centrism of the discipline, dialogue, Shahi argues, has not effectively materialized. This is because extant dialogue proceeds along unsettled contestations in a way that provincializes non-Western philosophical and IR traditions, as well as their thematic, linguistic, and conceptual components, compartmentalizing them into specific spatio-temporal contexts whilst also conceding universality to their Western counterparts. Overall, Shahi warns that non-Western IR should neither engage in the kind of dialogues that reproduce the derivative discourses of Western IR, nor should it opt to carve out an exceptionalist discourse that parochializes its contribution.

In the third article, Helen Turton investigates the core-periphery dichotomy in the IR discipline and disrupts its common geographic connotations. Turton finds that such a binary ignores stratification within the global core and periphery. In fact, Turton locates a distinct IR core/periphery within traditionally core designated countries, between elite U.S.-based institutions and other institutions, and another stratification within the periphery itself. The existence of the latter is particularly surprising since key universities serve to reproduce core-periphery disciplinary hierarchies. The stratification of the discipline therefore occurs through not only the core’s control over institutions of publication but through the linguistic and intellectual cores in the periphery, usually in the form of English-language institutions with IR research programs, all of which replicate and reinforce IR’s intellectual hierarchies.

In the fourth article, Homeira Morshirzadeh brings clarification to the concepts of dialogue and pluralism in the Global IR conversation. Morshirzadeh argues that the Global IR dialogue should be seen as a part of a broader civilizational dialogue. Civilization in this context is defined as large cultural units which, despite some differences, share ontological, epistemological, and praxiological perspectives. Given the heterogeneities of such a broad frame, civilizational dialogue presents as much an opportunity for intracivilizational dialogue as it does for intercivilizational dialogue. Crucially, it is argued that for any civilizational dialogue to be meaningful, it must be conducted on equal terms and consistently with the principles of pluralism, which in this case means that the goal of dialogue should be to promote mutual understanding or possibly reaching some form of synthesis rather than
proselytizing the interlocutors.

In the fifth article, Deniz Kuru traces IR’s “global turn” and the rising conversation that is Global International Relations. Kuru not only discusses the various meaning of Global IR and its emergence as a disciplinary phenomenon but discusses its merits as a novel and useful research program. An emphasis on Global International Relations, along with Global Intellectual History, can help to improve the discipline by reconnecting with history. Moreover, such a move could potentially help to locate the history of IR in a wider Global Intellectual History.

The sixth article explores one practical area in which the Global IR conversation could be expanded: IPE. Melisa Deciancio and Cintia Quiliconi argue that the mainstream IPE discipline has formed around an Anglo-American debate on the mainstream perspectives of mercantalism, liberalism, and Marxism, woefully neglectful of the contributions of the global periphery. Deciancio and Quiliconi not only qualify this exclusion but show how the global periphery has provided original contributions to the IPE discipline though research on decolonization and development in Africa, state-led development in China, and Dependency Theory and Regionalism in Latin America.

In the penultimate article, Nathan Andrews examines the diversity of the IR discipline by way of a pedagogical investigation into IR course syllabi from the top 15 institutions in the Global North and South, with an emphasis on African institutions. Andrews finds that top institutions in the Global North tend not to feature alternative or non-Western perspectives in their syllabi. Their counterparts in the Global South, meanwhile, are hardly better in this case, although the latter are more likely to include scholarship critical of mainstream approaches. The evidence, therefore, points to the persistence of exclusionary practices in the IR discipline. In addition, Andrews also finds that IR is still biased in favor of male scholars, as evidenced by the limited number of female scholars in the reading lists. Overall, it is concluded that IR needs to move past not only its geographical exclusionary practices, but also intellectual ones by promoting more alternative and critical scholarship as opposed to mainstream approaches.

Our final article, by Yongjin Zhang, evaluates the Chinese School of IR and its contributions to the broader discipline. In this process, Zhang explores the labelings of “national schools” in IR and how such conceptualizations are employed in practice. Interestingly, it is argued that the core has invented labels like the “Chinese School” which consigns the knowledge production therein to a distinct but “inferior universe of knowledge” than Western IR. Zhang then explains how Chinese scholars have proactively adapted this label to underscore the Chinese School’s role as a counterpoint to the US-based IR core’s claims. Zhang ultimately concludes that school-labelling matters as this has become a “site of contestation of geopolitics of knowledge” and one that needs to be understood as part of our efforts to foster a truly global IR.
Alternatives to the State: Or, Why a Non-Western IR Must Be a Revolutionary Science

Erik Ringmar
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Abstract
The idea of the sovereign state is at the core of the Western understanding of international politics. If we are serious about coming up with non-Western theories of international politics, it is the state that must be questioned. This article suggests some ways in which this can be done. Only once we have unthought the state can we reconstruct international politics as a more equitable, and peaceful, world order.

Keywords: Non-Western IR theory, the state, empires, pan-Africanism, Ottoman Empire

The academic study of international relations is dominated by Western methods, theories and values. In the decades after the end of the Second World War, IR was all about how to avoid a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union, how to organize a Western-led international system, and how to make sure that all poor, newly decolonized, countries became loyal members of it. Theories of international relations – Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and so on – were, despite their considerable differences, attempts to address the same, Western, concerns.

But times have changed. The memory of the Second World War is now fading fast and even the competition between the US and the USSR is starting to look remote. Instead new countries are on the rise – China, India, Brazil, even Turkey. These rising powers often have other concerns, other values, and other perspectives on relations between states. Not surprisingly, many have grown impatient with the academic study of international relations as it has been conducted up to now. Hence the demands for a new, non-Western, IR which can help make sense of the world to other people than Westerners. The only question is what such a non-Western IR possibly could be. Although suggestions certainly have been provided, there is no consensus on an answer and it is not clear how to proceed. As a result, even critics continue, despite themselves, to rely on the assumptions of the existing discipline. What indeed is the alternative? This is the question which will occupy us here. The conclusion which we will arrive at is that a more radical approach is called for. A non-Western IR must be a revolutionary science. That is, a non-Western IR must provide an alternative to the metaphor that has organized the academic study of international relations up to now — the notion of an anarchical system which takes the sovereign nation-state as its subject. The article concludes by suggesting a few alternatives to this Western prejudice.
1. The Problem of Political Independence

On September 18, 1909, the English journalist G.K. Chesterton published an article in the *Illustrated London News* in which he discussed Indian nationalism.1 “The principal weakness of Indian Nationalism,” he wrote, “seems to be that it is not very Indian and not very national.” What the Indian nationalists are saying is:2

> Give me a ballot-box. Provide me with a Ministerial dispatch-box. Hand me over the Lord Chancellor’s wig. I have a natural right to be Prime Minister. I have a heaven-born claim to introduce a Budget. My soul is starved if I am excluded from the Editorship of the *Daily Mail*.

The fact that the Indian nationalists want all these institutions, Chesterton concluded, is evidence that they really want to be English. As a result, “[w]e cannot feel certain that the Indian Nationalist is national”.3 One of their publications is called the *Indian Sociologist*, he added. “It is all about Herbert Spencer and Heavens knows what. What is the good of the Indian national spirit if it cannot protect its people from Herbert Spencer? What are the young men of India doing that they allow such an animal as a sociologist to pollute their ancient villages and poison their kindly homes”.4

M.K. Gandhi, who visited London in September 1909, read Chesterton’s article when it first appeared and, according to a biographer, he was “thunderstruck” by the argument.5 When writing the introduction to an essay by Leo Tolstoy on Indian nationalism the same fall, Gandhi echoed Chesterton’s conclusions. “India, which is the nursery of the great faiths of the world,” as he put it,

> will cease to be nationalist India, whatever else she may become, when she goes through the process of civilization in the shape of reproduction on that sacred soil of gun factories and the hateful industrialism which has reduced the people of Europe to a state of slavery, and all but stifled among them the best instincts which are the heritage of the human family.”6

On his way back to South Africa by boat, Gandhi developed the argument in *Hind Swaraj*, the only book he ever wrote devoted to the topic of Indian independence.7 In order to obtain home rule, he insisted, we must first make sure that we have a home which is truly our own.8

> This is a fundamental point which many Indian nationalists have forgotten. They want the tiger’s nature, but not the tiger. That is, they want to make India English, but if that comes to pass it will no longer be “Hindustan” but instead “Englistan.”

For a country to be truly independent, it must be defined in independent terms. India must be herself, not a version of Britain. Starting from this premise, the rest of the book is an elaboration on what home rule, in the true sense of the word, really means.

This is the argument that Ashis Nandy picked up, and gives a psychoanalytical twist, in his *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*, published in

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2 Chesterton, “Matthew Arnold”.
3 Chesterton, “Matthew Arnold”.
4 Chesterton, “Matthew Arnold”.
A country which frees itself on someone else’s terms, Nandy concludes, is never going to be truly free. The rhetoric of the first generation of nationalist leaders — in India and elsewhere — may have sounded anti-European, but in practice they were in cahoots with their former colonial masters. The nationalists grabbed power for themselves while promising to perpetuate the European model. There were, for a while, a few dissenting voices who advocated alternative solutions, but it was always clear that the Europeans only would grant sovereignty to states that were similar to their own, and to leaders who had gone to European schools and spoke European languages. As soon as the first generation of nationalist leaders had taken control of their respective countries, including their military and natural resources, there was no going back. This is how all independent states came to have their own territories and fortified borders; their capitals, armies, foreign ministries, flags, national anthems, and all the other paraphernalia of European statehood. From now on the political struggles concerned who should control the sovereign state, but the notion of sovereign statehood itself could no longer be questioned.

The world as it existed before the Europeans colonized it had not been organized in the European manner, and as a result there was at the time of decolonization no pre-existing nation-states waiting to become independent. The European carve-up of the world had created territories which had little or nothing to do with pre-colonial boundaries. Instead the sovereign states had to be “built,” and soon scores of development experts descended on the capitals of the non-Western world dispatching advice on “state-building.” Likewise, there were few “nations.” There were “clans,” “tribes” and “ethnic communities” to be sure, but there were next to no nations such as Europeans defined them. As a result, there was no political subject who could use the state to express its aspirations. Instead what the Europeans referred to as “tribalism” always threatened to tear the state apart. The development experts were thus forced to give advice on “nation-building” too. In fact, the twin-projects of state and nation-building have kept both political leaders and development experts busy for the last fifty plus years. They are still busy at it.

This is how a form of neo-imperialism was incorporated into the post-colonial world. Dependence was built into the system of independence. By modeling itself on European examples, an independent country would at best become a slightly inferior version of the real thing. At worse, the result would be a “failed state” — a state without functioning government, no proper administration, and no monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. A failed state, that is, is a state that is unable to live up to European standards. But why on earth should a non-European state be able to successfully emulate a European one? The task is difficult enough under the best of circumstances, but impossible if the population is destitute, the country is rich in natural resources, and power and wealth belong to the warlords with the biggest guns. Non-Europeans are not very good at being European. Europeans, let’s face it, are so much better at it.

But there were successful cases too, to be sure — states like Israel, Turkey and China PRC. These were powerful states and they created nations for themselves which were no less viable than their European counterparts. In each case, however, a high price was paid for these achievements. In the struggle for statehood, other political entities were wiped out, peoples were displaced and genocides committed. Thus there is today a Turkey but no

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Kurdistan, an Israel but no Palestine, a China but no Uyghuristan or Tibet. And yet the losers in these struggles did not quietly go away but have continued to insist on their political rights ever since. The conflicts caused in this way cannot be solved since the European conception of statehood does not allow for two different states to exist on the same territory at the same time. Moreover, the nations that were created by these successful states were nothing but simplified, superficial, cartoons. Thus in the case of Turkey, the rich traditions of Islam and the Ottomans were replaced by Atatürkism; in the case of Israel, the Yiddish traditions of Europe and the Mizrahi and Sephardic traditions of Spain, North Africa and the Middle East were replaced by Zionism; and in China, Confucian morality and the whole legacy of the imperial tradition were rejected in favor of Marxism and the Maoist personality cult.

2. The Problem of Intellectual Independence

There is a problem of intellectual independence that accompanies the problem of political independence. By taking the European nation-state as the unexamined presupposition of their analyses, non-Western scholars of international relations are forced to start from European assumptions. Such a non-Western IR will never be truly independent, and the scholars who practice it will be like the nationalists who Chesterton, Gandhi and Nandy discussed — they too want to get rid of the tiger while appropriating the tiger’s nature. Western IR is not wrong, they argue, but unfair. What they want is not really a different kind of IR, but instead an IR in which they themselves play a more prominent role. This, paraphrasing Chesterton, is what they say:

> Give me a tenured position at an Ivy League university. Make me key-note speaker of the international conference. I have a natural right to be president of the International Studies Association. I have a heaven-born claim to run the CUP book series. My soul is starved if I am excluded from the editorship of *International Organization*.

These are certainly legitimate demands. There is no doubt that non-Western scholars are underrepresented in the academic study of international relations. And yet, this is also one of the ways in which the Western intellectual hegemony over the discipline is maintained.

Slightly differently put, the problem is that non-Western IR scholars are forced to make concessions to what Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962, referred to as a “normal science”\(^\text{10}\). You cannot do science alone, you need collaborators, but for collaboration to be possible there must be common standards and assumptions; there must be people who work on the same problems, in the same way, and who communicate with each other by means of a shared vocabulary. This is what a normal science provides. Normal science is made up of the assumptions, theories, methodologies, received opinions and standard operational procedures that scientists rely on in their daily work. Given that research always is supposed to be innovative and “path-breaking,” it is easy to make fun of normal science, yet there would be no science without it. If you want to make a contribution, it must be made to a normal science.

Differently put, your discipline disciplines you. Or, to be more precise, by subjecting yourself to a normal science, you come to discipline yourself. Unless you do what you are expected to do, you will never have a career, get into print or be invited to conferences. And, the more marginal you are in relation to a normal science, the more eagerly you are likely to

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subject yourself to its requirements. It is only by behaving yourself according to the standards of your discipline that you will be taken seriously by your colleagues. This in the end is the social logic which makes non-Western IR scholars conform. A non-Western IR which is at odds with normal science will always look unnormal, that is, amateurish or simply as incorrect.

A normal science, Kuhn continued, is united around a “paradigm”. Although Kuhn himself was notoriously imprecise in his definition of this concept, we could think of paradigms as constructed around metaphors. Before a normal science can come to be established, the field we study must first be configured as a field of a certain kind. This is what metaphors do. A metaphor provides us with an ontology; it opens up a certain world, which we go on to explore. Normal science proceeds as we investigate the entailments which a certain metaphor makes available. The study of international relations illustrates the logic.

In Western IR the metaphor of an “anarchical system” provides the ontology from which normal science proceeds. International politics, normal IR scholarship tell us, is made up of sovereign units — “states” — which act independently of each other, but whose interactions at the same time influence whatever they do. An anarchical system consists of interacting, self-directing, parts. Exploring this metaphor, scholars soon come up with any number of entailments — they talk about “security dilemmas,” “arms races,” “balances of power,” “collective action problems,” and so on.

But, as we pointed out, this description never fit the world as it had existed outside of Europe before the era of colonization. In the rest of the world, there were no European-style states and no European-style nations. Instead both had to be created, and these creations often failed. As a result, the master metaphor of the anarchical state system was never able to properly describe an existing, non-European, empirical reality. Instead, it was empirical reality that had to be rearranged in order to fit the requirements of the metaphor. If there was a mismatch between the two, IR scholars and development experts concurred, it was reality, not the theory, which was at fault. This was, it should have been obvious, not an attempt to study the world, that is, but instead an attempt to radically transform it. By applying the master metaphor of an anarchical system of sovereign states, an international system which did not exist was going to be created. The world was to be remade in the West’s image.

At the time of decolonization, some Western IR scholars worried that academics in the newly independent states would fail to behave as they were expected. Perhaps non-Western IR scholars would start insisting on some alternative, non-Western, way of conceptualizing international politics? Perhaps they would seek to question, and undermine, the master metaphor which guided the discipline? Yet, as it turned out, there was no need to worry. Non-Westerner IR scholars were always prepared to discipline themselves. They too, after all — just like the new generation of nationalist leaders who ran their countries — stood to gain from their subordination to the Western model. It was by providing intellectual support for their respective state and nation-builders that non-Western IR scholars assured careers, and prestige, for themselves. Occasionally, they would even be invited to contribute to the

11 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
13 Michael P. Marks, Metaphors in International Relations Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
discipline as it was practiced in the West. This is how non-Westerner IR scholars condemned themselves to a subordinate position. This is also how non-Western academia came to be filled with failed attempts to emulate Western models. Not surprisingly, the non-Western world is littered with failed Harvards. Harvard, on the whole, is far better at being Harvard than any of the universities we find in the non-Western world.

3. Alternatives to the Nation-State

A genuinely non-Western IR must start from a different premise. The metaphor of an anarchical system is derived from European experiences and European history, we said; it was in Europe and nowhere else that an anarchical system of sovereign states came to be established. Other, non-European, international systems have been organized in different ways, with other norms, rules and institutions. There are other metaphors, that is, around which an alternative normal science could be organized. Such a substitution of one master metaphor for another is what Kuhn referred to as a “revolutionary science” — “those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one”. A truly independent, non-Western, IR should aim to bring about such a substitution. A non-Western IR must be a revolutionary science.

History should be our inspiration here. The past is a different country and it was organized in different ways. This includes its international relations. Thus, we have much to learn *inter alia* from the tribute system of imperial China, from the relations that obtained between the Yoruba city-states, and from the logic of the empires constructed by the Aztecs, the Mongols and the rulers of Mali. These international systems were not necessarily more peaceful than the European system, but they were different, and by learning more about them, we will come across alternative ways of conceptualizing international politics. But the present has much to teach us too. Here we should let the “failed states” show us the way. By understanding why states “fail,” we will learn more about alternatives to Western conceptions. What looks like a failure, that is, can often be understood as an alternative, non-Western, way of organizing social and political relations. And then there is the future. Globalization — the trans-border flow of ideas, images, technologies, people, drugs, disease, money, weapons and pollution — means that states no longer can control their borders, run their economies autonomously, or shield their citizens from outside threats. States are surely not about to disappear, but sovereignty — their most vaunted possession — is in rapid decline.

So what are the alternatives to the state and to the anarchical state system? These are some suggestions.

3.1. Stateless societies

Today the world is completely divided up between political entities. All territory belongs to one state or another and no land belongs to more than one state. States are mutually exclusive and together exhaustive of political space. Yet this has not always been the case. It was only as a result of the introduction of farming some 12,000 years ago that the first states appeared. Before that, during some 95 percent of human history, we were hunters and gatherers who moved around in response to the seasonal variations in the availability of food. And even

15 Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 92.
after the introduction of farming, there were pastoralists. Since pastoralists continuously move their animals from one pasture to another, they have little respect for borders and are difficult for political authorities to control. It was only late in the nineteenth-century that the government of the United States finally subdued the Native Americans and that the Chinese government was able to police its borders with Mongolia. Yet there are still pastoralists in the world today; indeed, there are still societies of hunters and gatherers.

Somalia is everyone’s favorite example of a “failed state,” yet the country has strong nomadic traditions which continue to provide order, justice and security even in the absence of a state. Rather than fixing the failed state which is Somalia, perhaps it is the institutions of nomadic society that should be restored? This suggestion goes against the well-established prejudice which says that nomads represent a prior, and thereby inferior, stage in human history, one that inevitably must disappear. But what if this is not the case? After all, the lives of most of us are daily becoming more, not less, nomadic. Pushed and pulled by the forces of global capitalism, we too are increasing required to move around in order to make a living for ourselves. As a result, new kinds of political institutions are required — political institutions which we can take with us we cross borders. By learning more about nomadic societies, we learn more about how stateless societies function. In this way the nomads of the past can provide advice to the nomads of the future. The pastoralists of Somalia are us.

3.2. Thalasocracies

Not all political entities have a territorial base, some are based on water. From *thalassa*, the Greek for “sea,” and *kratos*, “power,” a “thalasocracy” is a political entity that stretches out across water rather than land. The Phoenician and the Minoans were thalasocracies, and so were the classical Greek city-states and Carthage, Rome’s foe. Southeast Asia too has had plenty of thalasocracies, including Srivijaya and Majapahit, two flourishing kingdoms based in the archipelago of today’s Indonesia. In the absence of agriculture, the power of thalasocracies is founded on trade. It is by encouraging exchange, and controlling trade routes, that they grow rich. This also means that thalasocracies are quick to pick up on influences coming from outside, and as such they often serve as examples to others. This is also how the Greek city-states — fanning out across the eastern Mediterranean — picked up influences from Egypt, the Near East and beyond.

Thalasocracies operate according to a different logic than agriculturally-based states. Thalasocracies can be immensely powerful, but they make no claim to sovereignty. They cannot insist on the inviolability of their borders since they have none; they are also impossible to invade since they have no territorial extension. Thalasocracies are not boxes with an inside and an outside, instead they are networks made up of nodes. If one of its

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cities is destroyed, resistance can continue from another city in the network. The map of a thalasocracy looks like a subway map — it tells us exactly how to get from point A to point B, but it provides next to no geographical information. Instead the power of a thalasocracy rests on its navy. It was sea power which allowed the Vikings of Scandinavia to make their annual trips to England to collect taxes, and which much later allowed the English to keep their world-wide empire together. For a non-Western IR that is looking for alternative ways of conceptualizing international politics, thalasocracies provide plenty of suggestions.

3.3. Stadtluft macht frei

Another alternative to the sovereign state is the self-governing city. Cities, from the ancient Greeks onward, have often been independent, with its inhabitants — the “citizens” — taking an active part in the running of their common affairs. Cities are often republics and proud of their liberties. In addition, cities are commercial hubs, and the burghers — the merchant classes — play a prominent social and political role. Since commerce requires partners, cities have established links with other cities, creating networks which resemble those of thalasocracies. Cities too are nodes in commercial networks. A good example are the cities that thrived on the east coast of Africa between the tenth and the fifteenth centuries CE. Cities such as Kilwa Kisiwani, Malindi, Mombasa and Zanzibar, were founded by merchants from Oman and Persia, but it was by means of African traders that gold and ivory came to be exported to every conceivable location around the Indian Ocean. Shards of Chinese pottery have been found in Kilwa and coins minted in Kilwa have turned up in Australia.

Trade can only flourish if one’s partners can be relied on to deliver goods and pay debts; there must be common standards of weights and measurements; a way to translate prices between different currencies; and procedures for drawing up, and enforcing, commercial contracts. In the absence of a sovereign state it is not clear how this can be achieved. And yet, networks of cities have often overcome such challenges. Through repeated interaction, the commercial connections gradually come to be overlaid with networks of trust. On this basis, medieval European merchants, such as the members of the Hanseatic League, established a Lex mercatoria, a merchants’ law, with courts that adjudicated cases in the absence of a sovereign power. In Italy, in particular, cities have remained important to this day, and they are arguably still a main source of identity and allegiance. Likewise, Londoners, New Yorkers, Shanghaïnese and Istanbulites have far more in common with each other than they do with people in the countryside that surrounds their cities.

3.4. A new Ottoman Empire

The European idea of the nation-state has had particularly disastrous consequences in the

25 Chapurukha M. Kusimba, The Rise and Fall of Swahili States (Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 1999).
30 Saskia Sassen, Global Networks, Linked Cities (London: Routledge, 2016)
case of the Middle East. A part of the world with plenty of ancient history, the Middle East has more than its fair share of religions, languages and ethnic groups. It was this intricate pattern that nationalism set out to simplify. Arab, Turkish and Israeli nationalism destroyed ancient communities, led to state repression, genocides, expulsions and war — not least once the two superpowers during the Cold War decided to support the nationalist regimes.  

By contrast, the Ottoman Empire — the international system that preceded the nationalist era — was both more pluralistic and less repressive. The Ottoman Empire was made up of a multitude of different peoples, each ruled by its respective civil codes. The fact that the Ottoman Empire was so large, its constituent parts so difficult to control, and that during its last hundred years it was in economic decline, allowed for a great measure of political independence within the imperial structures.

Imagine a world in which the Ottoman Empire was not abolished in 1923, or a world in which a political structure such as the Ottoman Empire could be recreated. Here people of different ethnicities would be able to share the same political space, and everyone would get to live in the country of their imagination. A Jew could easily imagine herself living in Israel, while her Palestinian neighbor could imagine himself living in Palestine. And some, perhaps, would once again identify themselves as Ottoman. In addition, an updated version of the Ottoman Empire would provide far better protection for persecuted minorities like the Yazidis, Mandaeans, Samaritans, Zoroastrians and the Copts; and Jewish culture would still flourish in Cairo, Istanbul and Baghdad. Moreover, the oil wealth of the Arabian peninsula would no longer prop up repressive regimes, and put money in the pockets of Western arms manufacturers, but instead benefit the peoples of the empire as a whole.

### 3.5. Pan-nationalism

During the 1950s and 60s, there were still those who argued that the former colonies should not form nation-states of their own but instead unite into larger political entities. Pan-Arabism advocated unity for all Arabs, and Pan-Africanism unity for Africans; there have even been advocates of Pan-Turkism. Only in this way, the argument went, would the former colonies be strong enough to stand up to the West. This project too was nationalistic, in other words, but the nations in question were far larger than the nationalism pertaining to individual colonies. The pan-movements were secular and they often embraced socialist principles. Pan-Africanism was officially endorsed by leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania. “For it was as Africans that we dreamed of freedom,” as Nyerere put it in 1966. “Our real ambition was African freedom and African government. The fact that we

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38 Adi, *Pan-Africanism*. 
fought area by area was merely a tactical necessity”.

A few attempts at political unification were indeed undertaken. Egypt and Syria were officially united into the United Arab Republic between 1958 and 1961; Jordan and Iraq were united for six months in 1958; and Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar held discussions about a union in the early 1960s. Yet in the end, the pan-nationalisms were powerless against the nationalisms of the nation-states. State-nationalisms gave power — total, sovereign, power — to those who controlled them, whereas the pan-nationalisms gave access to no political or military structures. The rhetoric of unity has survived, but it is today mainly reserved for speeches at the meeting of the Arab League and the African Union.

The petty nationalisms of the nation-states are a betrayal of the promise of these far larger communities, yet this is not to say that people in Africa or the Arab world have stopped thinking of themselves as members of them. Borders both in Africa and in the Arab world are still porous, and influences spread quickly from one location to the next. Witness the rapid dissemination of pro-Nasser enthusiasm in the 1950s, the impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978/79, or the Arab Spring of 2011/12. Or consider a political entity such as ISIS, or an organization such as Al-Qaeda, that appeals to loyalties that transcend the nation-state. ISIS and Al-Qaeda are unacceptable responses to these sentiments, but the pan-national loyalties remain — and are still waiting for a political expression. And yet, the old pan-nationalisms are no doubt in need of an update before they are ready for the twenty-first-century. For one thing they cannot embrace the original, simple-minded, version of socialism, and pan-Arabism possibly cannot embrace secularism either.

3.6. The failed states of Europe

State failures do not only happen in poor countries in Africa; they happen in Europe too. Indeed, the European Union is premised on state failure. The aim of the EU, as it originally was conceived, was to provide a supra-national institutional framework which could deal with the failure of European states to live in peace with each other. State sovereignty, as the two world wars amply had demonstrated, was a disaster, and the EU was designed to limit and control it. If the idea of a sovereign state actually would have worked, no EU would have been needed.

More recently, the challenges posed by globalization have provided an additional rationale for supra-nationalism. While European states remain, their borders have become increasingly permeable, and this has resulted in a loss of control. Sovereignty, if it is to mean anything at all, must be pooled. The EU can set food standards, limit the power of Internet companies, and deal with global warming and border-transgressing pandemics in a way that none of its member states can. The individual nation-states have failed once again, and that is why the EU is needed. In a referendum on June 23, 2016, a majority of the people of Great Britain rejected this argument, insisting that state sovereignty still is a viable option. Whether they are right or wrong remains to be seen. Meanwhile, support for EU membership is increasing in the rest of Europe.

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In fact, the EU too can be understood as a return to an earlier form of political organization. The international system of the European Middle Ages was not made up of sovereign states after all, but of political entities of many different kinds which were united in a continent-wide community. Most of life was local, and highly diverse, but medieval culture was also strikingly uniform — united around a shared set of religious beliefs and one language of learning. It was this *pluribus unum* which was destroyed by the establishment of the sovereign state in the early modern era. Closing this parenthesis — putting an end to the age of the sovereign state — the EU constitutes a return to the normal, and far more viable, pattern of political interaction. The essentially decent, rather incompetent, imperialism of the European Union represents the best hope for world peace.

### 3.7. A politically correct colonialism

The anarchical system of sovereign states does not only result in inter-state warfare but it also makes domestic atrocities possible. The doctrine of non-interference in the “internal affairs” of each state gives protection to dictators who commit crimes against their own populations. The list of genocides is long, sad, and well-known. Recently the idea of non-interference has been questioned by those who argue that the world community has a “responsibility to protect” those who are subject to atrocities, even if this means violating state sovereignty.

It is thus thought legitimate to invade a country as long as it prevents or stops a far greater harm. Such “liberal interventions” are controversial since there always is a suspicion that they are undertaken for less than perfectly altruistic motives. This is particularly the case since it is always Western countries that intervene in non-Western countries.

Liberal interventions, and the responsibility to protect, resemble colonialism, which also took place behind a smokescreen of benevolence. Outside of Europe, the memory of colonialism is still strong, and often actively rekindled by nationalist leaders. The colonies were exploited economically, their traditional ways of life destroyed, and their inhabitants mistreated. Yet what still hurts more than anything is the condescension of the Europeans. Everywhere they went, the Europeans were convinced that they were superior to the natives. It is this attitude that nationalist leaders still refer to in their rhetoric. Indeed, anti-colonial resentment still provides a main basis of their support. And yet, a case can be made for a new form of colonialism — a politically correct colonialism without condescension, based on civil liberties and democratic ideals, and not necessarily undertaken by Europeans.

If self-determination equals atrocities and genocide, alternative political arrangements — condominiums, protectorates, mandates, trusteeships, federations, partnerships, affiliations — will suddenly become far more attractive. The intervention of the African Union in Sudan, 2004–07, and Somalia, 2007–present; and the UN administration of Kosovo, 1999–2008 and Cambodia, 1992–93, provide possible models, yet there is no reason why such arrangements should be only temporary. There are parts of the United States that would benefit enormously from international supervision. A politically correct form of neocolonialism too provides an alternative to the European state-system.

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4. Conclusion

The academic study of international relations is dominated by Western methods, theories and values, yet the rise of non-Western powers has increased the demand for non-Western perspectives. At the same time it is far from clear what a non-Western IR might be. The argument made in this article was that the non-West’s intellectual dependence on the West parallels the non-West’s political dependence. As Chesterton, Gandhi and Nandy have pointed out, a country which makes itself free on someone else’s terms will never be truly free. Likewise, a non-Western IR which mimics Western models condemns itself to an inferior status. Western states are so much better at being Western states, and Harvard is so much better at being Harvard.

In both cases it is the uncritical acceptance of the master metaphor of an anarchical system made up of sovereign nation-states which is to blame. The former colonial masters were only ready to grant independence to political entities which resembled their own, and a new generation of nationalist leaders were quick to spot the advantages this presented. As leaders of independent states, they too were now going to be rich and powerful. The fact that few nation-states actually existed mattered less since both states and nations were to be “built.” The normal science of international relations, as practiced in the West, proceeded on this basis. Yet the task was not to scientifically describe the world, but to create a world in the West’s image. The non-Western IR scholars who lent their efforts to this project were complicit in the subjection of their discipline and in the subjection of their countries. But then again, they too benefited. They got tenured jobs in the leading universities of the newly independent states — and occasionally they were even invited to conferences in Europe and North America.

This is why a non-Western IR cannot be a normal, but must be a revolutionary, science. A truly independent non-Western IR must reject the attempt to create a world in the West’s image. A non-Western IR must reject the master metaphor of an anarchical state-system based on sovereign nation-states. There are, we suggested, a number of ways in which this can be done. There are alternatives to the nation-state. We can learn what these alternatives are by investigating the history of non-Western international systems, by following the lead of states that “fail” in our contemporary world, and by thinking about a future in which the idea of sovereignty is redundant. States are not about to disappear to be sure, but their sovereignty is rapidly dissipating. A revolutionary science of international relations is, arguably, also an exercise in world-making, but the world which it makes is more evenly balanced than the one in which we have lived for the past 400 years. It is also, at least potentially, a world which is more peaceful and just. The day when a revolutionary non-Western IR becomes the new normal science, we will all be living in a different, and better, world.

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Foregrounding the Complexities of a Dialogic Approach to Global International Relations

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Abstract

The ever more global character of today’s International Relations (IR) is no longer satisfied with one-sided stories about how things have gone with either the West or the non-West. Rather, the ongoing discussions on Global IR persuade both the West and the non-West to squarely unfold their own narratives. As the theories and practices of contemporary international relations have remarkably acquired a ‘Global’ impetus, a lot of premium is being put on a ‘dialogic approach’ – that is, an approach to Global IR that insists upon a deeper two-way communicative-action between the West and the non-West. Although the dialogic approach to Global IR seeks to resolve a wide range of cognitive differences between the West and the non-West, it more often than not remains thwarted by a few unsettled contestations: (i) History vs. Philosophy, (ii) Chronology vs. Covariance, (iii) Language vs. Concept, (iv) Culture vs. Economy, and (v) Single vs. Plural. This paper sets out to shed light on these unsettled contestations in an endeavour to intellectually improve the prospects of a dialogic approach to Global IR.

Keywords: Global IR, Eurocentrism, Dialogue, Western IR, non-Western IR

Descriptions of the state of the art in international relations usually oscillate between the diagnosis of an impoverished present and visions of a better future based on dialogue…If dialogue is so highly appreciated, why is there so much monologue?1

1. Introduction

In a bid to transcend the barriers of an impoverished present and to carve a better future, the theories and practices of contemporary international relations (IR) have strikingly acquired a ‘Global’ impetus. The intensifying discussions on Global IR seek to dilute the already problematized ‘Eurocentric’ nature of IR knowledge2 – which is built upon the misconception that Western history and Western political theory are world history and world political theory – by placing it into a non-Western, or broader, Global, context.3 Against this backdrop, a lot...
of premium is being put on a ‘dialogic’ approach to Global IR – that is, an intellectual strategy that emphasizes deeper dialogues, two-way communications, and ideational-exchanges between the West and the non-West. Although the dialogic approach to Global IR aspires to ‘reconcile’ a wide range of cognitive differences between the West and the non-West, it more often than not remains thwarted by a few unsettled contestations: (i) History vs. Philosophy, (ii) Chronology vs. Covariance, (iii) Language vs. Concept, (iv) Culture vs. Economy, and (v) Single vs. Plural. This paper intends to not only scrutinize the disruptive nature of these unsettled contestations – which tend to trim down ongoing dialogic drills into disjointed monologues – but also detect possible pathways to improve the prospects of a dialogic approach to Global IR. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section illustrates the conceptual evolution of ‘dialogue’ in Eurocentric IR. The second section articulates how the contextual shift of ‘dialogue’ from Eurocentric IR to Global IR is still problematic: in fact, the potential of a dialogic approach to Global IR remains somewhat under-exploited due to the failure to recognize some frequently encountered hurdles that systematically undermine West–non-West interactions. Finally, the third section suggests some measures to facilitate an effective West–non-West dialogue that could probably strengthen a conscientious pursuit of Global IR.

2. ‘Dialogue’ in Eurocentric IR: State-of-the-art

How did the idea of dialogue evolve over time in Eurocentric IR? At the very outset, it is imperative to acknowledge that the term ‘dialogue’ in IR encompasses a plurality of meanings. Deriving from the Greek concept of dia-logos (‘meaning-through’), the myriad implications of dialogue in IR – as collaborative-meaning-making-ventures – have come a long way from Thucydides’ ‘dialectical argumentation’ (as expressed in the Melian dialogue), to Habermasian rational-difference for strategic-bargaining and ‘communicative-action for consent-seeking’, to Bakhtinian ‘avoiding of the two extremes of monologue and war’, and ‘description of the human condition’ or ‘mode for being-in-the-world’, to ‘awareness of the always absent “other” that evades the enclosure acts in conversations’, to ‘interaction between different methodological backgrounds’, to ‘ability to change the regulative idea of science’ and ‘recombine analytic components of competing theories’; to ‘engaged pluralism as a
potential remedy to long-enduring knowledge-problems’, 13 and to the discipline’s capacity to share knowledge through ‘cross-paradigmatic or inter-epistemic synthesis’ based upon an ‘endless journey through time and space that, given the unpredictable circumstances we encounter along the way, forces us to adapt on the spot over and over again’. 14

Retrospectively speaking, most of these implications of dialogue developed as corollaries to the ‘great debates’ in IR. While Thucydides’ Melian dialogue came to be associated with the first great debate (or ‘idealist-realist debate’), 15 ‘dialogue as methodological interaction’ developed into an extension of the incomplete second great debate (or ‘history–science debate’). 16 Likewise, ‘dialogue as engaged pluralism’ carried forward the unfinished business of the third great debate (or ‘interparadigmatic debate’), 17 and ‘dialogue as inter-epistemic synthesis’ advanced as an investigation of the fourth great debate (or ‘positivist–post-positivist debate’). 18 Although it is persuasively argued that the ‘great debates’ are the most established means of telling the disciplinary history of IR (or, for that matter, the conceptual progression of ‘dialogue’ in IR), 19 a few IR scholars have begun to interrogate not only the utility of ‘great debates’, 20 but also the lack of differentiation between ‘dialogue’ and other forms of human communication such as ‘debate’. 21 In fact, some IR scholars have rightly questioned the dominant tendency among present-day IR scholars to prefer ‘debate’ over ‘dialogue’, and ‘pluralism’ over ‘synthesis’. 22

Notably, the varied insinuations of dialogue – which remain interior to the margins of ‘great debates’ – suffer from a habitual Eurocentric bias: for instance, James N. Rosenau conceives a Eurocentric notion of ‘global dialogues’ which omits the Third World as one of the unavoidable major perspectives; 23 and Andrew Linklater imagines a Eurocentric existence of ‘dialogic communities’ which displays an inside-out-prejudice by attributing the West’s development of higher levels of rationalization and morality to its own unique ability to learn and borrow from other non-Western cultures. 24 Under these circumstances, it is no

  14 Hellmann, “Are Dialogue and Synthesis Possible,” 149.
  20 Hartmut Behr and Michael C. Williams observe: ‘The history of the discipline of International Relations [as it proceeds through the ‘great debates’] is usually narrated as a succession of theories that would pursue different ontologies and epistemologies and focus on different problems. This narrative provides some structure to a multifaceted field and its diverse discussions. However, it is also highly problematic as it ignores common problems, intersections and mutual inspirations and overemphasizes divides over eventual commonalities. Rather than such overemphasis, we suggest instead negotiating between ‘IR theories’ and elaborating their shared foci and philosophies of science in order to provide new perspectives on and approaches to international politics’. Hartmut Behr and Michael C. Williams, “Interlocuting Classical Realism and Critical Theory: Negotiating ‘Divides’ in International Relations Theory,” Journal of International Political Theory 13, no. 1 (2017): 3.
  22 Hellmann, “Are Dialogue and Synthesis Possible”.
  24 This problem of ‘inside-out-prejudice’ which is frequently encountered during global dialogues is what John M. Hobson and Alina Sajed call ‘Eurofetishism’ whereby, all too often, the non-West is considered as distinct from the West such that a completely ‘relational’ conception of the West – one in which the non-West shapes, tracks, and inflects the West as much as vice versa – is either downplayed or dismissed altogether, thereby missing ‘global interconnectivities’. Hobson and Sajed, “Navigating Beyond the Eurofetishist Frontier”. Andrew Linklater, “The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory,” in Critical Theory and World Politics, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); Alexander Anievas, “On Habermas, Marx and the
wonder that several IR scholars across the world (in both West and non-West) have started to call for an expansion in the scope of dialogue by moving it exterior to the margins of ‘great debates’. It is assumed that a truly Global interdisciplinary of international studies – which is free from parochialisms of different sorts (geographical, linguistic, methodological, and political) – is achievable via dialogue between not only ‘subfields and specializations’, but also ‘West and non-West’. While the dialogue between West and non-West aims to grant the academic discipline of IR a Global (read non-Eurocentric) character, it is undeniable that the performance of dialogue in the context of Global IR is also not hassle-free.

3. ‘Dialogue’ in Global IR: Persisting Puzzles

So, what are the enduring dilemmas of dialogue under the ambit of Global IR? From a Global (or say, non-Eurocentric) standpoint, the likelihood of dialogue subsists on numerous platforms – such as ‘inter-civilizational’, ‘inter-cultural’, ‘inter-religious’ (or ‘interfaith’), ‘inter-regional’ and so on. Since all these platforms – which stimulate different trajectories for West–non-West dialogues – are invariably significant, it is convincingly proposed that Global IR is not limited to a single global dialogue. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan assert:

Global IR is not limited to a single global dialogue as some mistakenly interpret our position… Global IR does not expect that IR community should engage in a single global conversation about theory or method… what matters for Global IR is not how many conversations [about how many theories and methods] are going on, but who is excluded from each of these… [In fact], Global IR cannot resolve, nor is it primarily concerned with, interparadigmatic and ‘isms’ debate in IR… Global IR calls more for synthesis than for choosing one approach over the others.

But then, how would ‘West–non-West synthesis’ become practicable if multiple global dialogues in Global IR fail to encourage non-Western narratives to at least ‘speak to’ (if not resolve) the prearranged ‘isms’ debate foundational to Western IR? One way out can be traced in those non-Western approaches that show a willingness to ‘speak to’ the ‘isms’ debate (and the associated perceptions of ‘objectivities’/‘subjectivities’) in Western IR, albeit on calculated terms and conditions of retaining the ‘West–non-West cognitive gap’ (read ‘parentheses’). Walter D. Mignolo comments:

Inter-cultural dialogue, or inter-epistemic dialogue between epistemologies, based on the premise of objectivity without parentheses, could prove deadly when agencies defending opposite objectivities [or scientificities] without parentheses confront each other. Dialogue


Objectivity in parentheses, on the other hand, opens up the doors for true inter-epistemic (and intercultural) dialogues.

While ‘objectivity in parentheses’ keeps the choice of multiple global dialogues open, its near-compulsory preoccupation with the ‘West–non-West binary’ quite reasonably raises a few eyebrows. Kimberly Hutchings warns:

There is a politics to the West/non-West distinction that is bound up with predominant models for dialogue in IR; rethinking these models of dialogue implies a new politics, and therefore also, I will suggest, a move away from the West/non-West binary as a way of characterising the participants in dialogic exchange oriented towards the expansive transformation of disciplinary imaginaries.

Most certainly, a dialogic exchange oriented towards the expansive transformation of disciplinary imaginaries demands a move beyond colonial/post-colonial/de-colonial binaries of ‘all-powerful West vs. powerless non-West’, or, for that matter, ‘non-Western silence vs. non-Western defiance’. To be sure, the binary style of global dialogues – situated upon ‘subject-object dualism/s’ – remain ever-ready to invent and include new ‘subject-positions’. However, scholarly competition among these ‘subject-positions’ – which claim to unleash multiple binary styles of global dialogues – leads to a greater or lesser degree of ‘sameness’. Kamila Pieczara explains:

Some resemblances of dialogue are based upon pressures produced by competition, which through selection lead to sameness. Like in Waltz, competition produces a tendency toward sameness of the competitors...It is because of competition, spurring imitation, and ultimately leading to sameness that makes for – in the words of Thomas Biersteker [2009] – ‘intellectual reproduction’ in the field...Although [many] non-Western scholars see the reality of their regions differently, they [more often than not] strive to squeeze their observations into existing ['dualist' Western] IR frameworks [that promote ‘binaries’].

And even if the non-Western scholars do not strive to squeeze their observations into dualist Western IR frameworks, their observations are still interpreted through customary binaries: for example, the non-Western expressions such as China’s tribute system, guanxi or tianxia are recounted using the customary Westphalian binaries wherein ‘China’ directly connotes the People’s Republic of China, rather than seeing the method as a holist governing system of the world. Thus, by design, the binary style of global dialogue/s reinforces dualist Western IR frameworks and, in so doing, inclines toward ‘solidifying existing stereotypes’ and ‘fuelling narcissistic turf war’. Alternatively, the non-binary style of global dialogue/s

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29 Echoing a similar sentiment, Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney proclaim: ‘Neopositivism not only occupies the throne of science [or objectivity], granting it the power of the ‘god trick’...but also its followers cannot help but try and convert others [i.e. ‘non-believers’] into believers from this elevated position. In consequence, a pluralist science [or objectivity] of IR...would entail either inviting non-believers to the table...or subsuming scholarship done by those who share a vaguely similar wager (such as in the global South) as inferior or ‘substandard’...a dialogue between distinctive perspectives or wagers...may be nearly impossible to sustain in practice given the current structure of global intellectual production’. Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney, Claiming the International (New York: Routledge, 2013), 2.


31 Hobson and Sajed, “Navigating Beyond the Eurofetishist Frontier”.

32 Sabaratnam, “IR in Dialogue”.


– which sometimes speaks back to the West, and at other times occurs for reasons ‘Otherwise’– plans to avoid undesirable self-perpetuating divisive labelling mechanism that accentuates (not synthesizes or reconciles) disciplinary boundaries.36 Indeed, it is this non-binary-style of global dialogue/s – for instance, the one that hunts for a reconciliation of ‘Eurocentric dualism’ with a few up-and-coming models of ‘non-Eurocentric monism’ – that suitably stands to leverage a conscientious pursuit of Global IR.37 But then, it is crucial to recall that the non-binary style of global dialogue/s too faces some problems. The next section methodically foregrounds these often unidentified problems that regularly obstruct an effective West–non-West dialogue.


The problems that hinder an effective West–non-West dialogue (including non-binary style of global dialogue/s) are mostly rooted in a few unsettled contestations: (i) History vs. Philosophy, (ii) Chronology vs. Covariance, (iii) Language vs. Concept, (iv) Culture vs. Economy, and (v) Single vs. Plural. Since it is held that the ‘problem functions as its own solution’, in what follows, an attempt has been made to expose each of these unsettled contestations, so that the problems inherent in them could, then, work as their own solution.38

4.1. History vs. philosophy

Lately, the non-Western parts of the globe have contributed several IR theories that emanate from their ancient/medieval/modern ‘philosophical heritage’: for instance, Tianxia (‘all-under-heaven’) from China; Advaita (‘non-duality’) from India; Basso Ostinato (‘recurrent underlying motif’) from Japan; Ubuntu (‘collective personhood’) from Africa; Dhikr; Takrar and Tawil (‘repetition, lack of repetition, and interpretation’) from Turkey etc.39 However, whenever a non-Western philosophical heritage is activated to comprehend contemporary realities of IR, its capabilities are more often than not restrictively evaluated on the basis of its ‘historical limits’: that is to say, a philosophical heritage is considered fertile only to the extent that it succeeds within the temporal-spatial boundaries of its origin. As such,
history is mobilized as a tool to truncate philosophy. Nevertheless, the historical readings of a philosophy have their own limits: supposedly, if a philosophy works at a particular temporal-spatial point (i.e. historical juncture), it does not mean that it would work forever; likewise, if a philosophy does not work at a particular temporal-spatial point, it does not mean that it would not work ever. Hence, whenever ‘History vs. Philosophy’ dispute crops up to distort an effective West–non-West dialogue, the question that one needs to ask is this: why should we accept ‘history’ (or records of the past) as a natural limit to human future potential?

4.2. Chronology vs. covariance

Since ‘history’ normally acts as a guide to examine the present, it inadvertently gives birth to another perplexity – namely, the perplexity pertaining to ‘chronological battle’ over who came first in (re)producing a particular idea/concept/method/theory. An example of this chronological battle can be found in confrontations over the actual ‘pioneer of realpolitik’ in IR: because the realpolitik of Kautilya’s *Arthaśāstra* (2-4th century CE) appeared much before the realpolitik of Machiavelli’s *The Prince* (1532), it is considered appropriate to label Machiavelli as ‘Italian or Mediterranean Kautilya’, not Kautilya as ‘Indian Machiavelli’. However, such a chronological battle is unfruitful in terms of its ability to support a West–non-West dialogue: although it revitalizes the status of Kautilya’s *Arthaśāstra* as a potent non-Western device to attack the Eurocentric roots of contemporary IR, it encourages a narrow re-reading of the extra-ordinarily comprehensive ‘eclectic philosophical foundation’ of this classical text which neatly goes beyond Machiavelli’s *The Prince*. Clearly, such a chronological battle demonstrates how ‘competition produces a tendency toward sameness of the competitors’. Besides, it occasionally creates a flawed impression that a particular idea/concept/method/theory has to always historically travel from one place to another before showing up at both the places. In fact, whenever a chronological battle tries to circumscribe a West–non-West dialogue, one can start to rethink through Helmuth Plessner’s concept of ‘covariance’: since the concept of ‘covariance assumes that intrinsically (or genetically) related ideas can be generated in historically and culturally distant spaces’, anybody located at any temporal-spatial point could concentrate and capture the freely floating ideas which are provincially neither Western nor non-Western. So, instead of ‘provincializing’, an effective West-non-West dialogue must insist upon the task of ‘non-provincializing’ a particular idea/concept/method/theory.

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40 In fact, the dominant theoretical frameworks in Eurocentric IR – guided by diverse philosophies of realism, liberalism and constructivism – have been commonly stumped by ‘change’, thereby indicating that none of these philosophies could work forever. Jack Snyder (2004, 61) writes: ‘Realists failed to predict the end of the Cold War, for example. Even after it happened, they tended to assume that the new system would become multipolar (“back to the future”, as the scholar John J. Mearsheimer put it). Likewise, the liberal theory of democratic peace is stronger on what happens after states become democratic than in predicting the timing of democratic transitions, let alone prescribing how to make transitions happen peacefully. Constructivists are good at describing changes in norms and ideas, but they are weak on the material and institutional circumstances necessary to support the emergence of consensus about new values and ideas. With such uncertain guidance from the theoretical realm, it is no wonder that policymakers, activists, and public commentators fall prey to simplistic or wishful thinking about how to effect change’. Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” *Foreign Policy* 145 (2004): 52–62.


43 Pieczara, “Two Modes of Dialogue”.

4.3. Language vs. concept

As of now, the tactic of ‘provincializing’ has been seen as a remedy to the problem of Eurocentrism in IR. However, the ideas/concepts/methods/theories originating from the ‘non-Western provinces’ are many a time recognized merely as ‘linguistic’, not ‘conceptual’, additions to the already existing body of Eurocentric IR knowledge. In other words, the supplementary influx of Chinese, African, Indian or Arabic linguistic terms is hailed as a sufficient proof of the enhanced ‘globality’ of IR; it is barely assessed if this enhanced globality (resulting from the influx of alien terminologies) is capable of offering novel concepts to deal with the challenges of contemporary global politics. In a way, it is presumed that the Eurocentric IR knowledge ‘knows it all’; what non-Eurocentric IR knowledge could do is to inclusively participate in ‘politics of knowledge’ which, in turn, would lead to the awakening of non-Western linguistic resources to offer a ‘derivative discourse’ (or conceptual imitation/replication) of the same Eurocentric IR knowledge, thereby manufacturing nothing more than ‘analogies’. Although the Western curiosity surrounding the non-Western linguistic additions (or ‘analogies’) is appreciable, an effective West–non-West dialogue requires a different kind of intellectual temperament: such an intellectual temperament not only presupposes that the same concept can possess different meanings in different milieus, but also confesses that there are different concepts (in both Western and non-Western traditions) that presently remain denigrated and, therefore, prohibited from the mainstream Eurocentric IR knowledge. As such, the entrance of a non-Western ‘vocabulary’ to IR knowledge is not essentially about ‘linguistics’; it could also be about ‘concepts’: even if these non-Western concepts presently remain at the outskirts of formal IR knowledge, they, nonetheless, continually affect the mind-set of various actors who keenly shape the realities of today’s IR.

4.4. Culture vs. economy

Similar to the trend of delimiting non-Western IR knowledge to ‘language’ (not ‘concept’), there is an obvious propensity to compartmentalize non-Western IR knowledge as ‘cultural’ (or ‘spiritual’), not ‘economic’ (or ‘material’). Arlene B. Tickner writes:

[The] non-Western experiences with nationalism have been premised upon opposition and difference to imported models. However, Partha Chatterjee [1986] explains that anti-colonial nationalism in the African and Asian contexts is also characterised by a fundamental contradiction entailing imitation and rejection vis-à-vis modernity and tradition. At the same time that the bearer of modernity, the colonial power, is to be rejected, it is also to be imitated by way of its ‘universal’ methods; similarly, traditional practices considered to pose an obstacle to progress are rejected, while they are also revered as the bearers of national identity. In consequence, such [non-Western] experiences...are characterised by a dual process consisting of: (1) replication and emulation of those material practices (law, statecraft, economy, etc.) imposed by the coloniser, in order to erase difference; and (2) careful guarding of spiritual practices, where cultural identity resides, in order to preserve cultural distinctiveness.

Dirk Messner, During a formal discussion at the international conference on Futures of Global Cooperation (Centre for Global Cooperation Research, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, 8-10 November, 2017).

Rösch and Watanabe, “Approaching the Unsynthesizable”.


This stereotypical post-colonial/de-colonial way of putting the ‘cultural/spiritual’ and ‘economic/material’ domains in separate boxes (which, in turn, implies preventing the non-Western experiences from uniformly intervening in both the boxes) is highly detrimental to an effective West–non-West dialogue, especially in the era of Global IR which witnesses both the ‘culturalization of the economic’ and ‘economization of the culture’. As Global IR – specifically after 2008 global financial crisis – confronts the ‘economy as a cultural system,’ the economic undertones of non-Western cultural voices must be readily affirmed and proactively incorporated in the dialogic approach to Global IR.

4.5. Single vs. plural

As global dialogues deal with divergent Western and non-Western voices while making efforts to resolve different sorts of political-economic-cultural-crises within the prevailing neoliberal world order, they inevitably face a core unresolved tension: that is, the tension between ‘single’ (read ‘universal’) and ‘plural’ (read ‘particular’). Friedrich V. Kratochwil illustrates:

[Q]uite different from the philosophical argument that we are part of just another episode of the [single] relentless historical process leading to ever more inclusive forms of political organization, the spread of universalism [by Eurocentric IR] is strongly counteracted by the equally strong assertion of particularities [or non-assimilative pluralities by non-Eurocentric post-colonial and de-colonial IR]. Precisely because the packed imagery of the visionary global culture [involving the conceptualisations, mechanisms, and policies of ‘dialogue’ in Eurocentric IR] is either trivial or shallow.

This ‘single vs. plural’/‘universal vs. particular’ tension – that unrelentingly circumvents the dialogic approach to Global IR – provokes an intellectual tussle between ‘Eurocentric IR’ and ‘non-Eurocentric post-colonial and de-colonial IR’. Deepshikha Shahi simplifies:

In an effort to challenge the universalist claims of Eurocentric IR, the non-Eurocentric post-colonial and de-colonial IR present a holistic view of reality: a holistic view that emphasizes upon combining the ‘missing particularist narratives of/from the non-Western parts’ with the ‘provincialized particularist narratives of/from the Western parts’ for seizing the whole/holistic reality of IR. However, this holistic view of reality presented by post-colonial and de-colonial IR recommends the same Eurocentric dualism: while Eurocentric IR maintains the separation between the West and the Rest, the non-Eurocentric post-colonial and de-colonial IR reverse this knowledge-situation and retain the separation between the Rest and the West.

While the West claims universality and, therefore, conveniently confines the non-West to a ‘local’ domain, the non-West too eagerly appropriates for itself the ‘local’ domain as a reaction against the West’s arrogant claim to universality. However, this reactionary

49 Contrary to the post-colonial compartmentalization of ‘materialism/economy’ and ‘spiritualism/culture’, Ghanshyam Shah (2013) offers a re-reading of Gandhi’s famous work *Hind Swaraj* (originally published in 1909) to reveal how the elements of both spiritualism and materialism are mutually enmeshed in the philosophical schools of not only the the West, but also the non-West (including India). Ghanshyam Shah, *Re-reading Hind Swaraj: Modernity and Subalterns* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2013).


54 In this context, it is relevant to recall the role of International Studies Association (ISA) which, in its bid to manufacture ‘global dialogues’ in IR, often invites and arranges the voices from the non-West (‘local’ domains) along ‘all women’ or ‘all young’ or ‘all non-white’ discursive panels: rather than boxing these non-Western voices along particular gender, age or racial grounds, it
reduction of non-Western intellectual projects into a ‘regional’ discourse applicable only
to a ‘local’ domain is exceedingly problematic: in fact, a few post-Western intellectual
projects (e.g. the ones inspired by non-Western philosophies of Sufism, Advaita etc.)
generate a ‘universalist’ discourse that is capable of explaining/describing the general
realities of international relations (as applicable to the entire Globe), without suppressing
the ‘particularist’ realities of international relations (as applicable to a ‘local’ domain). Thus,
whenever ‘single vs. plural’/‘universal vs. particular’ tension disrupts an effective West–
non-West dialogue, one needs to make the following twofold observation: (i) the West does
not exhaust the universalist explanations/descriptions of international relations; in fact, the
non-West does (and can) add to the universalist explanations/descriptions of international
relations; (ii) the dialogic approach to Global IR must not compulsorily subscribe to
‘universal vs. particular’ or ‘single vs. plural’ tension;55 it could, rather, transcend this tension
by inculcating an intellectual attitude that upholds ‘universal along with particular’ or ‘single
along with plural’.

5. Concluding Remarks

Principally, the complexities of a dialogic approach to Global IR are offshoots of a broader
‘politics of knowledge’. As the pioneer of this politics of knowledge, the West had self-
assigned a ‘white-man’s burden’ which, in turn, eventually manifested into its legitimized role
as a conventional knowledge-producer in IR (and other social sciences). On the flip side, this
meant not only the subjugation of the non-West as a valid knowledge-producer, but also the
allocation to the non-West the fixed role of a knowledge-consumer. For a prolonged period,
both the West and the non-West (un)critically moved ahead with this status-quoist ‘knowledge-
power equations’. However, lately, both the West and the non-West have deliberately entered
into a polemical mode which allows an unprecedented opening to heterodox IR theorizations
stirred by alien knowledge-forms. In fact, this opening to heterodox IR theorizations is
motivated by the need to pursue the ‘Global’: the main challenge facing contemporary IR
is how to make it Global by extending its theoretical-practical grounds beyond Eurocentric
biases. And one of the most treaded pathways to address these Eurocentric biases has been
the inclusion of non-Western worldviews. But it is pertinent to bear in mind that the greater
inclusion of non-Western worldviews – for instance, the incorporation of Chinese, Indian,
or Brazilian voices in global dialogues – cannot make IR less Eurocentric or more Global
if the following slippery slopes are ignored: (i) if non-Western voices nurture a ‘derivative
discourse’ of the same Western IR (e.g. if Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra is uttered as the Indian
version of the same Western Realism); (ii) if non-Western voices foster an ‘exceptionalist
discourse’ which is narrowly applicable to the experiential realities of a native time-space
zone (e.g. the post-colonial and de-colonial debates that sanction a rigid division between
the particularist politico-experiential realities of the colonizing and colonized worlds).

55 Eurocentric IR compulsorily subscribes to ‘universal vs. particular’ tension as its dualist frameworks presume that there
cannot be a ‘non-perspectival perspective’. (Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)). For instance, Iris M. Young argues: ‘It is impossible to adopt an unsituated moral
[or theoretical] point of view. And if a point is situated, then it cannot be universal…hence, [all universal accounts of realities
provide] monological [not dialogical] accounts of human agency’. Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990), 104. By contrast, the origins or applications of Sufi non-Eurocentric IR cannot be strictly
tied down to specific spatio-temporal locations/centers of situated knowledge-forms. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see
Deepshikha Shahi, ”Introducing Sufism to International Relations Theory: A Preliminary Inquiry into Epistemological, Ontological,
Although the politics of knowledge was imposed by the West on the non-West in a binary fashion, a conscientious pursuit of Global IR today calls for a fresh politics of knowledge wherein an effective West–non-West dialogue cautiously plays out on non-binary, or say non-retaliatory, terms and conditions.

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Abstract
Disciplinary depictions using the core-periphery distinction are often premised on a ‘blurred’ and/or monolithic understanding of the core. For instance, the ‘core’ is often conceptualized broadly to include Western Europe and North America, or narrowly to refer to just the United States. Simultaneously the corresponding disciplinary self-images often refer to the core and the periphery as fixed and homogenous entities, which overlook the often diverse tendencies and hierarchies within the predefined space. This article therefore seeks to highlight the changing geographies of the core/periphery distinction in order to reveal the presence of different cores because there are different core properties. What this means is that the ‘core’ can appear in surprising spaces and occupy geographies that are normally associated with the periphery. In order to specifically illustrate certain workings and reach of the ‘core’ within spaces typically conceptualized as ‘peripheral’ this article will draw on existing data and research. The resultant empirical sketch will show how the ‘core’ is able to extend its reach and produce further epistemic hierarchies within peripheral spaces. In locating IR’s different cores and their hidden geographies this article aims to destabilize the core-periphery distinction in order to move beyond this disciplinary and disciplining archetype.

Keywords: Periphery, core, epistemic hierarchies, international relations, disciplinary self-images

1. Introduction
In the discipline of International Relations (IR) the terms core and periphery are often used to capture the geography of unequal relationships of power and patterns of disciplinary dominance. As Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin state the core-periphery is “a spatial archetype in which the periphery is subordinate to the authority of the centre. Within this archetype the centre represents the seat of authority”. Whilst IR scholars frequently use the spatial dichotomy to highlight disciplinary exclusions in order to challenge them, the properties and boundaries of the core and periphery are not agreed upon, leading to competing understandings and therefore ‘fuzzy’ conceptions. For example, the ‘core’ is often conceptualized broadly to include, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, North
America, and Western Europe, or narrowly to refer to the United States alone. However, these blurred geographical understandings of the core do not prevent those included in the respective delineated ‘cores’ and ‘peripheries’ from taking on a homogenous form. Meaning, that while the geographical borders of where the core is may shift, once decided upon, the core and periphery become fixed spatial entities with homogenous inhabitants. Resultantly, such monolithic conceptions tend to overlook the often diverse tendencies and stratified power relations within the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ in order to give the terms categorical and visual functions and discipline those within each space.

The use of the terms core and periphery by scholars are premised upon different ways in which the core operates and thus gains its core status, which in turns prescribes the spatial limits of the core and periphery. For instance, the ‘core’ of the discipline has often been understood as a linguistic core. The most prestigiously perceived and influential journals in IR are arguably all English language journals. Theoretical texts are largely written in English and the major international conferences (for example ISA’s Annual Convention) are ones where English is the language of presentation and communication. Consequently, English is often seen as the lingua franca of IR and social sciences more generally. Resultantly comparatively little international academic attention is paid to non-English language scholarship by the core. The linguistic core is not the only way that the core is conceived. There are other core properties that have been captured in the literature. For instance, Turan Kayaoglu, Yong-Soo Eun and Kamila Pieczara and Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan discuss an intellectual core, whereas Pinar Bilgin, Jonas Hagmann and Thomas Biersteker, and Peter Marcus Kristensen point to an institutional core. Therefore, depending on the way one sees the function or property of the core its spatial dimensions will shift. This means that there are different cores, which occupy different spaces within IR.

The aim of this article is to problematize conceptions of the core and periphery in IR, and in doing so the article will make two claims: Firstly, the article will argue that there are different ways of conceptualizing the ‘core’ which result in different perceptions of where

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6 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is There non Non-Western IR Theory? Ten Years On,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 17, no. 3 (2017): 341–70.


the core/periphery spatial boundaries reside. Secondly, the article will highlight hidden functions of the core and reveal the reach of the core within spaces usually perceived to be peripheral, thereby arguing that the core can appear in ‘surprising’ disciplinary spaces that are usually associated with the periphery. In making these claims the article will destabilize the categories of the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ through showing the degrees of core stratification and aim to disrupt the way these categories condition IR scholars in order to facilitate a move beyond this distinction.

In order to do so the article will proceed as follows: Firstly, it will highlight the different geographies used when depicting the core and periphery in the literature to show the contested boundaries. Through reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that the geographies shift because different scholars are referring to different core properties, which results in the existence of different cores. The literature points to three different core/periphery relationships in the discipline of IR. These are 1) a linguistic core; 2) an intellectual core; and 3) an institutional/pedagogical core. The spatial configurations of these different core/periphery relationships will be presented in the second part of the article to show the reach of the ‘core’ and the creation of stratified power relations as a result of the construction of the ‘core’ within spaces normally conceptualized as peripheral. The third and final part of the article will offer a critical reflection of the findings and make a case for moving beyond the core/periphery disciplinary depiction.

To reveal the different cores that operate in the discipline of IR this article will utilize existing data and research on the discipline of IR. The article will draw on the 2014 TRIP faculty survey data\(^\text{10}\), the 2018 Journal Citation Report for the subject area International Relations, the 2019 QS University World Rankings for Politics and International Studies, existing scholar biographical information, and recent data produced by scholars working in the area of the ‘sociology of IR’ through their examinations of citation patterns\(^\text{11}\), and journal content\(^\text{12}\). In revealing the ‘hidden’ workings of disciplinary power this article aims to draw attention to overlooked core dynamics so that they can be further investigated and challenged. Before revealing unseen sites of disciplinary authority the article shall first highlight the multiple depictions of the core and periphery employed by IR scholars in a first step to disturb this disciplinary imaginary.

2. Where is the Core and Periphery in the discipline of IR?

As noted in the introduction some depictions of the ‘core’ are more expansive than others, meaning they include more countries/geographically-bounded areas. Viewing conceptions of the core on a spectrum, the broadest belongs to scholars who argue that the ‘core’ of International Relations comprises the ‘West’. The West is presented as including Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the United States and Western Europe.\(^\text{13}\) The term is used to capture the domination of Western thinking in IR that took hold because of

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10 The 2014 TRIP surveyed IR faculty/staff members in 32 different counties across the globe. The survey examined the teaching and research trends in IR as well as foreign policy views. For the full survey and methodology see; https://trip.wm.edu/charts/.


12 Helen Louise Turton, International Relations and American Dominance: A Diverse Discipline (Oxon Routledge, 2016).

‘Western power’. It signifies a shared intellectual and economic history, and a worldview. Consequently, the periphery is designated as the spatial area outside of the West and takes on the label of the ‘non-West’.

Moving along the spectrum, the next conception of the ‘core’ that populates that literature is that of the ‘Anglosphere’ or rather the ‘Anglophone’ countries. In this understanding the core consists of Australia, parts of Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. A shared language links this core; English. This conceptualization represents the dominance of a way of writing and communicating IR. To clarify, this understanding does not represent shared ideas, but rather a way of communicating those ideas and forums for dissemination. However, all is not equal within this ‘core’. Wayne Cox and Kim Richard Nossal present a stratified view of this core; the United States is at the apex of the core, followed by the UK and the countries of what they term the post-imperial world (Australia, Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand) occupy the lower limits of the centre.

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Not only is there stratification within the core there is also a corresponding hierarchy within the periphery. In defining the Anglosphere as the core, Western Europe is often placed in a semi-peripheral position. It is excluded linguistically but is not as excluded as what Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews term the ‘true-periphery’. Scholars in the semi-periphery have a degree of access and impact upon the centre due to their production of theory and research that has been acknowledged by the Anglosphere in publication channels. In this understanding one’s status is dependent upon one’s ability to contribute to English language discussions which take place in high-ranking international journals, which renders true-peripheral scholars as those “who hardly even have a place in the ‘House of IR’”.

Another commonly used understanding of the core is where the core consists of the United States and the United Kingdom. Writing in 1985 Kal Holsti captured this core;

Hierarchy seems to be a hallmark of international politics and theory. Most of the mutually acknowledged literature has been produced by scholars from only two or more than 155 countries: the United States and Great Britain. There is, in brief a British – American intellectual condominium.

Holsti’s depiction of IR is still shared by current commentators who all note that IR’s center is located in the US and UK. This understanding is premised on volumes of theory produced and institutional presence. The US and the UK have been awarded core status by certain scholars because each geographical locale has produced influential theoretical works, and arguably the majority of IR theory work. Furthermore, these IR communities

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18 Cox and Nossal, “The ‘Crimson World’,” full pages.
19 Jörg Friedrichs and Ole Wæver “Western Europe: Structure and Strategy at the National and Regional Levels,” in IR Scholarship Around the World: Worlding Beyond the West, eds. Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 261–86.
20 Aydinli and Mathews, “Are the Core and the Periphery Irreconcilable?,” 291.
21 Kristensen, “International Relations in China and Europe,” 162.
have been claimed to host the key journals, publication presses, professional associations and universities.24

However, there is a shared understanding by those who use this conceptualization that the US is the more dominant partner. Drawing on Johan Galtung’s theory of imperialism,25 Jörg Friedrichs notes that the core is divided into a ‘centre of the core’ and a ‘periphery of the core’.26 The US thus occupies the central space and the UK the outer limits of the core. While the UK might have disciplinary authority and power, it arguably does not exercise as much influence as the US over the ‘periphery’.

The periphery is this understanding of the core is the ‘rest of the world’.27 What is interesting in this depiction of the core is that those who employ it often do so for the purpose of constructing ‘European IR’ (usually understood as Continental Europe excluding the UK) as a counter-core force.28 European IR is often presented as a potential challenger to the US-UK IR monopoly, thereby altering the core-periphery dynamics either to become a new core or part of the core itself. The reason that ‘Europe’ is awarded challenger status is again due to the role of theory. The volume of works produced in Europe is no longer the discipline’s ‘best kept secret’ as scholars in the US and UK are beginning to engage with such works.29

The final and the narrowest conception of the core belong to scholars who argue that the core of the discipline is the United States and the US alone.31 The term ‘American core’ features

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26 Friedrichs, European Approaches to International Relations Theory, 6.
31 See for example; Klaus-Gerd Giesen, “France and Other French-Speaking Countries 1945-1994,” in International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations, eds. Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen (Oxon: Routledge,
prominently in the discipline and this understanding is used to make the corresponding claim that IR is an American dominated discipline. In this conception the periphery comprises a vast space (i.e. the rest of the globe!), which inevitably means that certain IR communities are more peripheral than others. Those who argue that the US is the core of IR tend to organize the periphery hierarchically in the following manner: the UK is the least peripheral within the periphery; then the other Anglophone countries, Western Europe, Israel and Japan (i.e. those countries with a strong IR presence). Followed by China, Eastern European countries, Latin and South America, Russia, South East Asia and then ‘the rest’. However, as Jörg Friedrichs and Ole Wæver note “regardless of whether we define them [countries/regions] as peripheries or semi-peripheries” all other IR communities “stand in a centre-periphery relationship to the American mainstream”.

![Figure 4: US Core](image)

By illustrating the different conceptions of the core and periphery in the literature we can see that the boundaries of the core and periphery shift. What is included or excluded in the depictions depends on the perspective of the author and/or the claims that he/she wishes to make about the discipline. In other words, there are different core/periphery imaginaries because there are different and competing dominant disciplinary trends and hegemonic mechanisms in the global discipline that scholars wish to critique.

3. IR’s Different Cores

Depictions of the core tend to be co-terminus with either ‘nation-states’ or regions, which then overlooks, as Peter Marcus Kristensen argues, that there are peripheries within the core (i.e. certain Universities/preferred academic trends) and cores within the periphery (for example particular cities/capitals within specific countries). Meaning that certain depictions

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33 Friedrichs and Wæver, “Western Europe,” 262.
34 Turton, *International Relations and American Dominance*, 8.
miss the diversity and stratification within the core and periphery.\textsuperscript{35} Yet this stratification emerges because the core/periphery frameworks that have been used to highlight patterns of dominance and inequality draw upon different understandings of what it means to belong to the ‘core’. If we use these different conceptualizations and begin to construct an image of IR based on the different properties that have been awarded to ‘the core’ then we can begin to produce more nuanced depictions of where the core actually is and what it means to use the term ‘core’. In doing so we begin to disturb certain depictions and draw attention to parts of the ‘core’ that may exist within the commonly perceived ‘periphery’ allowing us to problematize and resist certain disciplinary dynamics and imaginaries. The article will now present IR’s different cores and their corresponding geographies, and in doing so will challenge the above core/periphery illustrations.

3.1. Linguistic core

As mentioned in the above section one of the ways in which the core is located is through its linguistic properties. It is argued that English is the lingua franca of IR\textsuperscript{36} and academia in general,\textsuperscript{37} which means that English-speaking countries (the United States, parts of Canada, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and the UK) are conceived to be ‘core’ due to their linguistic dominance and therefore advantage over other countries. The core position is due to the reality that unless research is written in English it stands little chance of being recognized and disseminated on an international level.\textsuperscript{38} Non-English language research may attract attention within the confines of the national setting but unless it is translated or originally written in English it is unlikely to be picked up on the international scholarly radar and dispersed.\textsuperscript{39}

Furthermore, the majority, if not all, of the perceived prestigious/influential IR journals are published in English. The TRIP 2014 Faculty Survey, for example, provides proof of the perceived influential roles of specific English language journals. When asked to ‘List the 4 journals that publish articles with greatest influence on the way IR scholars think about international relations’ the top 10 journals were: \textit{International Organization} (53.44%), \textit{Foreign Affairs} (38.36%), \textit{International Security} (33.33%), \textit{International Studies Quarterly} (25.4%), \textit{World Politics} (20.77%), \textit{European Journal of International Relations} (18.92%), \textit{American Political Science Review} (13.23%), \textit{Foreign Policy} (12.7%), \textit{Millennium} (10.98%), and \textit{Review of International Studies} (9.13%).\textsuperscript{40}

Therefore, if one aims to enter into global debates then one is presented with a pressure to publish in English. The advantageous position that Anglophone scholars find themselves in means that their research stands a much higher chance of being accepted which effects the international composition of published research. Non-English speaking scholars are presented with an immediate hurdle to overcome in the quest to get their work recognized in

\textsuperscript{35} Kristensen, “Revisiting the “American Social Science,” 247.

\textsuperscript{36} Biersteker “The Parochialism of Hegemony,” 324.


\textsuperscript{39} Friedrichs, \textit{European Approaches to International Relations Theory}, 8; Paasi, “Globalisation, Academic Capitalism, and the Uneven Geographies of International Journal Publishing Space,” 769–89.

\textsuperscript{40} For more information on the responses to the 2014 survey and the rationale of the TRIP project see give full report by Daniel Maliniak et al. at https://trip.wm.edu/data/our-surveys/faculty-survey
the supranational academic community, and thus placed in a subordinate or rather peripheral position. Commenting on publication practices in Poland Anna Dusak and Jo Lewkowicz claim “English has become much more readily available and is seen as necessary to succeed: its ideological position has changed and there is now a great demand for opportunities to learn and practice English”.

The dominance of English as the language of IR has meant that ‘cores within the periphery’ have emerged in areas of Western Europe (especially parts of Scandinavia and Switzerland), Eastern Europe (in particular parts of Hungary, Poland and Estonia), Latin America (specifically Universities in the capitals of Colombia, Peru and Brazil), the Middle East (for example the University of Tehran offers undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in Political Science that are taught in English) South Africa, and parts of Asia (especially highly ranked Universities in parts of China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore) where scholars and students are taught in English and encouraged to write and publish in English. This trend is intensified by the number of English-Speaking Universities opening up ‘satellite’ or rather branch campuses in ‘peripheral’ countries. For example, the University of Nottingham (UK) has a campus in Malaysia offering a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate degrees taught in English including one in Asian and International Studies. The pressures to provide graduates with skills to enter the global marketplace and to be mobile has resulted in the emergence of English speaking hubs within ‘non-English’ speaking countries, thereby creating ‘cores’ within the periphery due to the adoption of the language of the ‘centre of the core’.

We can further see that the reach of the linguistic core extends beyond the ‘Anglophone’ countries if one looks at the 2018 Journal Citation Report (JCR) for International Relations. There are 91 journals ranked in the 2018 JCR and 87 of them are published solely in English. The four journals not published solely in English are multi-language journals, which means that they are published both in English and the national language of the country of publication. The dominance of English language publications in the JCR may not appear surprising or destabilizing to this particular core/periphery imaginary, yet if we look at the country of publication for each of the 91 journals we see evidence of the functioning of the linguistic core in the ‘periphery’ understood as non-Anglophone countries. For instance, as we can see from table one, 9.89% of the journals ranked in the 2018 JCR are from Western Europe, and 7.69% are from East and South East Asia. Roughly, a fifth of the journals ranked (20.88%) are published/managed in countries outside of the Anglosphere, despite all the journals are published in English.

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42 Duszak and Lewkowicz, “Publishing academic texts in English,” 110.
45 For an overview of the aim JCR and measurements used to calculate the annual report see; https://clarivate.com/products/journal-citation-reports/
46 The four multi-language journals ranked in the 2018 JCR are: International Journal the Canadian journal published in English and French; Internasjonal Politikk published in English and Norwegian; Uluslararası İlişkiler which is published in Turkish and English; and the Brazilian journal Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional which is published in English and Portuguese.
Table 1- Geographical area of publication for journals ranked in the 2018 JCR for the subject category International Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Area of Publication</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>34.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin and South America</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>42.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>9.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe (including Russia)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>6.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The emergence of English language practices and standards within IR’s journals is partially due to the requirements of Clarivate Analytics (the company who compiles the JCR and sets the standards for entrance into its many databases, journal archives, intellectual property management etc.). To be included in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), and therefore the JCR, numerous selection criteria have to be met. Clarivate Analytics, and formerly Thomson Reuters’s, selection process for the journals it covers is based on three key elements: Citation Data, Journal Standards, and Expert Judgment. Within the category of ‘Journal Standards’ we can see the operation of what Kim Richard Nossal refers to as the core’s ‘linguistic imperialism’. The journal standards criterion is comprised of a number of different factors: timeliness, international editorial conventions, English-language bibliographic information, and peer-review.

Therefore, the SSCI does index and rank a number of foreign language journals as the selection process only asks for a minimum of abstracts or summaries in English, and all the bibliographic information. However, Clarivate Analytics/Thomas Reuter’s preference for the full text to be in English can be seen from the comments of key figures within Thomas Scientific. James Testa (Vice-President Emeritus for Editorial Development) openly claimed that Thomson Scientific “tries to focus on journals that publish their full text in English.” Whereas Dr Eugene Garfield (creator of the Impact Factor, ISI Founder and Thomson Reuter Chairman Emeritus) stated, “If editors truly want wider notice of their journals by the international research community, they ought to publish articles, titles, abstracts, and cited references in English”.

The clear preference for articles to be written and published in English is due to

47 In order to capture the geographical distribution of journal publishers in IR I adapted the 2014 TRIP survey categories and divided the globe into 12 different regions; 1) United States of America; 2) Latin and South America; 3) Canada; 4) United Kingdom; 5) Western Europe; 6) Eastern Europe including Russia; 7) East Asia; 8) South Asia; 9) South East Asia; 10) Middle-East and North Africa; 11) sub-Saharan Africa and 12) Oceania. For the full breakdown to see exactly which countries were included in each category please see the appendix.

48 Clarivate Analytics was formerly the Intellectual Property and Science division of Thomson Reuters. In 2016 Thomson Reuters created Clarivate Analytics as a spin off independent company and sold it to private equity firms – including Onex Corporation – for $3.55 billion. For more see David Bond, “Thomson Reuters in $3.5bn sale of IP and science business,” Financial Times, July 11, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/81697a1f-4778-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86eb.


50 Nossal, “Tales That Textbooks Tell,” 171.


52 Testa, “The Thomson Scientific Journal”.

subscription rates and higher revenues. Publishers opt to create, maintain, and encourage the production and management of English language IR journals from countries outside of the Anglosphere because they can be guaranteed a bigger global audience and therefore subscription/download charges for their publications. For example, in 2001 the journal *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* was launched. This publication is the official journal of the Japan Association of IR, and correspondingly is based in Japan and has an editor that is institutionally based at one of Japan’s Universities. However, the journal is published by Oxford University Press and all articles are written and published in English. The journal publishes a lot of scholarship from East-Asian academics thereby introducing such scholarship to a global audience and ensuring international dissemination. For instance, as of June 2019, the most read article in IRAP is by Yoshiko Kojo, who is a Professor in the Department of Advanced Social and International Relations at the University of Tokyo.

However, it seems that non-English speaking scholars find themselves in a Catch-22 type situation. As Duzak and Lewkowicz claim: “On the one hand, publishing in English is a way to gain international recognition. On the other, non-native speakers may face numerous linguistic, formal, organizational and ideological barriers which may influence their decision to look to the local market for publishing opportunities.”

Language privileges a certain mode of thought, a certain culture and a certain way of constructing the truth. Therefore, language is an exclusionary mechanism by its very nature, a form of domination, which results in subjugation. In this case the subjugation of non-native English speakers, and the emergence of ‘peripheral’ scholars adopting ‘core properties’ in order to challenge and resist their peripheral situation. Through looking at the core/periphery through the analytic gaze of language we can see the workings and reach of the core, in that the core has used its dominance to encourage others to assimilate and adopt the core language thereby creating cores within peripheries, or rather establishing subjugated cores within peripheries (the periphery of the core). As we can see from figure five the linguistic core extends into areas commonly depicted as peripheral, thereby occupying ‘new’ geographical terrain. Certain countries contain ‘linguistic cores’ in that English is the predominant mode of ‘speaking’ IR in specific contexts (such as particular University campuses) thereby creating epistemic hierarchies within certain states. Rather than being co-terminus with nation states as a whole the ‘peripheries of the core’ occupy particular geographical locations/areas within a given country. Resultantly there is stratification and the emergence of new hierarchies of power within particular countries as a result of the reach of the centre of the core. This ‘new’ imaginary (represented in figure five) draws attention to this stratification, and how the economy of knowledge in IR results in multi-level hierarchies.

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55 See Volume 18(1) January 2018 of the journal *International Relations of the Asia Pacific* to see Yoshiko Kojo’s most read article ‘Global Issues and Business in International Relations: Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Medicines’.


57 Turton, *International Relations and American Dominance*, 119.
3.2. Intellectual core

According to Andrew Hurrell; “as far as IR theory is concerned, nothing is really changing. It is still a neo-imperialist field of enquiry and control over the intellectual means of production has hardly shifted.” Hurrell in essence is arguing that there is an intellectual core in IR, and this core is a Western one. When academics in IR talk of a ‘core’ they often refer to an intellectual or rather theoretical core, which takes the form of a volume of knowledge/intellectual production emanating from specific Western countries, and then the ‘core’ uses this dominance in volume to establish global theoretical preferences/practices. On the surface the popular geographical imaginary of an intellectual Western core and non-Western periphery seems to be upheld. Despite theoretical pluralism in recent years a growing body of literature and academic discussion (via conference themes, workshops) have lamented the lack of ‘non-Western IR theory.’ The notion that theoretical knowledge is produced in the West and consumed in the non-West continues to populate the discipline.

However, a closer look reveals that the landscape is changing, especially if we redefine what we mean by ‘non-western IR theory’ and accept hybrid theoretical efforts as ‘non-Western’ theoretical products. Often non-Western theoretical scholarly works are discounted because they are not conceived to be novel theoretical productions due to the incorporation of

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Western elements/concepts/points of reference/ideas. The standard set by certain academics for non-Western theory to be conceptualized as a ‘non-Western theoretical endeavour’ is for the theoretical work to be something entirely new, without any reference to Western concepts, literature etc. This high benchmark is often coupled with a commitment to implicit Western standards of epistemology and therefore what constitutes ‘legitimate knowledge’. As Amitav Acharya argues:

A good deal of what one might bring into IR theory from the non-Western world may indeed be ‘worldly knowledge’. But other sources could be religion and cultural and spiritual knowledge that might not strictly qualify as ‘this-worldly’. They may lie at some vague intersection between science and spirituality or combine the material with the spiritual.

Non-Western theoretical accounts that draw on spiritual or religious texts have been excluded from being awarded the status of ‘theoretical knowledge’ due to their ‘non-worldly’ basis. As Aydinli and Biltekin note “when a periphery scholar nevertheless attempts to ‘do theory’, their work is likely to be dismissed as not ‘being theory’.” Hierarchies of knowledge in IR work to exclude grassroots and religious knowledge, thereby creating the impression that there is no non-Western theory. However, if we accept such sources of knowledge and include ‘hybrid’ theoretical efforts then one begins to see the emerging plethora of non-Western IR theory in existence thereby destabilizing the West/Non-West, core/periphery imaginary.

For instance, Homeira Moshirzadeh charts the development of IR theorizing by Iranian scholars based on Islamic texts. Whereas Karen Smith examines the theoretical contributions of African IR scholars. There is also a growing body of scholarship that has addressed the production of ‘Chinese IR theory’, with the works of Yan Xuetong, Qin

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Yaqing\textsuperscript{73}, and Zhao Tingyang\textsuperscript{74} being acknowledged as IR theory. Looking to Latin and South America, Carlos Escude’s Peripheral Realism\textsuperscript{75}, and Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto’s Dependency Theory\textsuperscript{76} are further examples of the existence of ‘non-Western IR theory’.\textsuperscript{77} In their 2018 article Erser Aydinli and Gonce Biltekin\textsuperscript{78} analyse through citation scores the global recognition of 18 ‘non-Western’ IR theory works. Whilst some of the works examined, unfortunately did not amass recognition by the ‘centre of the core’ as measured by their citation numbers, one hopes that by drawing attention to such works through publication and discussion forums this will emerge in time. There is clearly still a large asymmetry in terms of volume of IR theory produced in ‘West’ compared to the ‘non-West’, but to solely focus on the imbalance helps to overlook the theoretical development taking place and the agency of peripheral scholars.

This exceedingly brief snapshot does not account for all the theoretical developments underway that could be categorized as ‘non-Western’.\textsuperscript{79} The aim of this short overview is to show, as Raewyn Connell argues, that “theory does emerge from the social experience of the periphery, in many genres and styles”.\textsuperscript{80} We need to recognize the multiple theoretical efforts that exist in the ‘non-West’ and challenge the existing geographical depiction that is based on a skewed understanding of what constitutes theory. To do so gives agency and recognition to different IR communities, and helps to limit some of the perverse effects that have emerged in the ‘search for non-Western IRT’. For example, claims of non-Western ‘ethnocentrism’ and the critique of ‘national schools of IR’ work to delegitimize such scholarship,\textsuperscript{81} whereas claims relating to authority/authenticity of voice work to exclude and marginalize self-identified ‘peripheral’ scholars. When reflecting on ‘who or what is Asian IR’ Amitav Acharya notes the danger of reducing Asian IR to the work of scholars of Asian origin, based in Asia;\textsuperscript{82}
Locating IR’s Core…

Excluding or any kind of downgrading of their work [for example academics of Asian origin working in Western institutions] would be not only unfair, but also intellectually questionable. It also deprives scholarship on Asian IR a rich source of quality and breadth (especially in terms of theoretical and comparative perspectives), a good deal of which continues to come from outside of Asia. While indigenization is important, I would call for including any scholar anywhere working on Asian international issues as part of the Asian IR community.

Resultantly certain theoretical works can be (and have been) delegitimised from being categorised as ‘non-Western’ due to questioning the legitimacy of the positionality of the authors. Whereas other works have been uncritically adopted and legitimised because of the author’s ‘origins’, thereby overlooking the potentially negative implications of such work.

The ‘search for non-western IR theory’ has had a number of counter-productive implications, which often work to make less visible this growing body of theoretical scholarship. Hence it is key that scholars adopt a broader conception of what constitutes IR theory in order to recognize non-Western theoretical contributions. If we redefine what we mean by ‘non-Western IR theory’, and employ this understanding, a different geography of the discipline emerges.

![Figure 6: Intellectual Core](image)

If we adopt the different theoretical core/periphery imaginary depicted in figure six, then this would challenge the use of the problematic term ‘non-Western’. The concept of non-Western sets up a binary and reinforces the ‘non-West’ as the other and as the exceptional. The label ‘non-Western’ reifies otherness, essentialises the non-West whilst also presenting it as something ‘exotic’. Hence if we acknowledge hybrid theoretical productions we highlight the mutually constituting relationship between the ‘West’ and ‘Non-West’ thereby blurring the boundaries and reshaping the ‘core and periphery’, to show that there are ‘peripheries

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of the core’ within peripheral spaces. This then opens up the possibility for examinations of power, hierarchies of knowledge etc. within other spaces. As Odoom and Andrews note “we also need to be aware that, like all stories from other parts of the world, many African [and other] stories are prone to class, gender and other biases. Certainly stories are a reflection of power relations: who has a voice, and whose voice is capable of being heard”.87 There are epistemic hierarchies in each IR community and this leads to exclusions and marginalisation. The ‘non-West’ is not immune from such disciplinary power relations, hence it is important to recognise the existing hierarchies and stratification of power within spaces that are typically considered peripheral. One needs to critically assess and challenge epistemic hierarchies within states not just between them.

Claims concerning IR’s intellectual core extend beyond the theoretical realm to the methodological. Assertions of American methodological dominance have been used to justify and explain depictions of the US as the core of IR. For instance, Thomas Biersteker has claimed that IR suffers from an American rationalist hegemony.88 By this Biersteker means that the discipline of IR is dominated by rational choice methods as these are the core’s (US) preferred methods of studying international politics. According to the arguments of Biersteker,89 Jørgensen and Knudsen,90 Steve Smith,91 and others, the US is in the authoritative position and has determined that IR should be studied using methods aligned to rational choice principles. This methodological centre arguably places all other methods in a subordinate position, and scholars who choose not to adopt such methods are allegedly marginalized due to their peripheral status.

Recent investigations into the global discipline of IR however have begun to question this assumption and therefore the depiction of the US as the core methodologically. The journal investigation conducted by Helen Louise Turton revealed that the methods associated with rational choice such as game theory, formal modeling and statistical analyses were not the dominant methods in the global discipline.92 These methods were used in the US but other national IR communities were not adhering to the US’s preference and instead adopting methods of their choosing. Thereby leading one to question whether the US can be the intellectual core of IR if other methods are populating ‘core spaces’, such as American journals, American Political Science Departments etc.93

Methodological nationalism is this sense does not refer to the naturalization of a given unit, which in the case of IR would be the state.94 Rather than referring to the assumption that the state is the natural organizing principle of study here methodological nationalism refers to the national methodological preferences of different IR communities. It seems that numerous IR communities have their own preferred means of studying IR. For example, Jonas Hagmann and Thomas Biersteker have argued that Europeans “tend to complement rational choice perspectives with reflexive and historical works, as opposed to the US schools,
which complement those with formal theory and quantitative works”.

We can therefore infer that there is not just a transatlantic divide between the US and Europe, instead there are different methodological preferences within Europe. One only has to look at the trends within British IR, French IR, and Scandinavian IR to see the different methodological preferences operating.

The methodological preferences found in different European countries also differ from the methodological trends found in other IR communities such as Australasia, Latin America and so on. It appears that each IR community has its own methodological core, in other words a preferred and popular means of conducting inquiry into international relations. Arguably, each IR community establishes a domestic methodological core and periphery, and then uses this domestic hierarchy to recognise, promote, and approve scholarship from other countries. Before one can map the specific geography of IR’s many methodological cores, more research is needed into the methodological preferences of particular IR communities, in order to explore how domestic hierarchies, emerge, and why certain ways of conducting inquiry have not travelled in the same way as certain concepts, language, and theories.

Nonetheless, using the intellectual core as a means of conceptualising the discipline we are asked to pay further attention to domestic hierarchies and their emergence and how dominant internal preferences set standards by which to view and judge domestic and international scholarly works. The intellectual gaze of the global discipline highlights that the core/periphery imaginary works in complicated and intersecting ways, producing stratifications and exclusions within both core and peripheral spaces, once again revealing ‘cores’ in places commonly understood to be ‘peripheries’.

3.3. Institutional core

The institutional core of the discipline of IR is claimed to comprise the United States of America and the United Kingdom. This is due to these IR communities having the preeminent scholars, journals, university departments, professional associations etc. This seeming British and American institutional core is reflected in the 2014 TRIP survey. When asked to “list the four presses that publish books with the greatest influence on the way IR scholars think about international relations” the top 10 publication presses were all located in the US and UK. In terms of the “five best PhD programmes in the world for a student who wants to pursue an academic career in IR?” the following universities were selected by the 2231 respondents; Harvard University (66.61%), Princeton University (47.96%), Stanford University (39.62%), Columbia University (32.77%), University of Oxford (27.16%), Yale University (25.68%), London School of Economics (23.67%), University of Chicago (19.09%), University of Cambridge (16.67%), and the University of California, Berkeley (13.94%).

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95 Hagmann and Biersteker, “Beyond the Published Discipline,” 302.
96 Hellmann, “Methodological Transnationalism,” 32.
98 Turtun, International Relations and American Dominance, 86.
100 Maliniak et al., “TRIP 2014 Faculty Survey”.
A similar set of core US-UK institutions emerges when one looks at the institutional basis and PhD awarding institutions for key IR scholars. The 2014 TRIP faculty survey asked scholars to list which scholar’s work has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years.\(^{102}\) Looking at where the top ten scholars are institutionally based and where they did their PhD’s table two shows that based on scholarly perceptions the disciplinary imaginary depicted in figure three seems to reflect this core-periphery dynamic.\(^{103}\) However, if one explores the findings of metric based assessments – such as the QS University World Rankings - this imaginary does not reflect the one depicted in figure three, and suggests that the institutional core occupies a much larger geographical area, including spaces normally considered peripheral.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scholar</th>
<th>Current/Most Recent University of Employment</th>
<th>PhD Awarding Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Wendt - 37.98%</td>
<td>Ohio State University – USA</td>
<td>University of Minnesota - USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Keohane - 25.91%</td>
<td>Princeton University- USA</td>
<td>Harvard University - USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Waltz - 22.22%</td>
<td>Columbia University – USA</td>
<td>Columbia University - USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mearsheimer - 19.39%</td>
<td>University of Chicago - USA</td>
<td>Cornell University - USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Nye - 17.71%</td>
<td>Harvard University – USA</td>
<td>Princeton University - USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Huntington - 11.65%</td>
<td>Harvard University – USA</td>
<td>Harvard University - USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Buzan - 10.9%</td>
<td>London School of Economics – UK</td>
<td>London School of Economics - UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Fearon 9.58%</td>
<td>University of California, Berkeley – USA</td>
<td>University of California, Berkeley - USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen M Walt - 6.84%</td>
<td>Harvard University – USA</td>
<td>University of California, Berkeley - USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martha Finnemore - 6.3%</td>
<td>George Washington University – USA</td>
<td>Stanford University - USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coding the 2019 top 200 universities as ranked by QS for the subject area Politics and International Studies by geographical area\(^{104}\) one can see that there are esteemed IR centres in universities outside of the US and UK. Table three shows that 63.87% of the highest ranked universities in the world for IR are located outside of the US and UK, with 34.14% in ‘non-Western’ countries. There are other institutions of IR, such as the discipline’s journals, that are also located outside of the West. Returning to table one, we see that there are a number (20.88%) of influential IR journals based in countries normally designated as ‘semi-peripheral’ or peripheral’.

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\(^{102}\) Ibid.

\(^{103}\) The biographical data was accessed through a web based search which directed me to the institutional profiles of the named scholars. Such profiles listed their research areas of expertise, past employment and educational history.

\(^{104}\) The same 12 geographical categories as previously listed were used to capture the global distribution of IR’s top ranked universities. For more details on the codes used, see the appendix.
Locating IR’s Core…

Table 3- Location of top 200 universities for Politics and International Studies as ranked by QS by geographical area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Region of Top 200 Universities</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>21.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin and South America</td>
<td>14.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>14.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>25.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe (including Russia)</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>11.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>6.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the influential role that journals have in shaping the field in terms of making decisions about what is or isn’t published, the institutional affiliation of the scholars who oversee such assessments was explored in order to see where such significant scholars are based. The scholarly profiles of the Editor’s in Chief/Lead Editors for the 91 journals listed in the 2018 JCR were examined and their institutional location was coded using the previous geographical categories. A total of 133 scholars were examined and their institutional affiliations is mapped in figure seven. A similar pattern emerges when one compares the different institutional locations of IR’s top universities, ranked journals and journal editors. Whilst the majority are located in the UK and US, a significant proportion are based in Western Europe, East Asia and Oceania as one can see in figure seven. This means that the core is larger than commonly depicted, it goes beyond the UK and US to include Australia, Canada, and Western Europe, with peripheries of the core in particular parts of East and South East Asia – or more specifically certain locations/universities within China, Japan, Singapore and South Korea.

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106 Each journal webpage specified who the current Editor(s) in Chief or Lead Editor(s) are and where they are based. This information was then noted and coded using the same 12 geographical categories. Only the Editor(s) in Chief were investigated as opposed to the whole editorial board. As it is the Lead Editors who work in consultation with the board members, advisory boards, reviewers and authors in order to make the final decision on an article.
Viewing particular metrics of institutional success, the prestige of Australian, Canadian, East Asian, Latin and South American, South East Asian, and Western European universities and journals is clear. However, there is a gap between scholarly perceptions as demonstrated in the TRIP survey and such metrics. This gap prompted an exploration of scholarly choice, in terms of where particular scholars decided to undertake their doctoral research. Accounting for scholarly institutional decision making, revealed a slightly different institutional map of the discipline. In order to investigate the decisions of key IR scholars and therefore institutional figures, the biographical profile of the Editors in Chief/Lead Editors of the 91 journals listed in the 2018 JCR was investigated in order to determine where these scholars had conducted their doctoral research. Similarly, the biographical profiles of all permanent faculty/staff members of the top 25 Universities for Politics and International Studies as ranked by QS from 2016-2019 were investigated and the findings coded using the previous geographical categories. To get an insight into the choices of key IR scholars the biographical profiles of the staff at the top 25 QS ranked universities from 2016-2019 were explored to determine where they had obtained their doctorate. The decision to look at only the top 25 Universities was due to the Universities ranked by QS as being those who also featured on the TRIP Survey. A closer look at the staff at the ‘top IR institutions’ was needed in order to investigate scholarly choice around institutions, but also institutional perceptions of prestige and success. As this provides an insight into the institutional hiring practices of the ‘top universities’ in terms of which doctoral programmes hold merit and esteem. The decision to look at the top 25 over three years was to get a slightly broader sense of the institutional apex of IR. The top 25 largely remained the same, however a total of 30 University Departments were examined as a result, see the appendix for the full breakdown.

The geographical location of the PhD awarding institution was noted for 133 journal editors and 1343 faculty members based at universities in Australia (3), Canada (1), East Asia (2), South East Asia (1), United Kingdom (5), United States of America (15), and Western Europe (3).
Figure eight shows that the geographical profile is less diverse, and concentrated around a smaller set of countries. The most attended universities by the sample of scholars investigated were located in the US, UK and Western Europe. Whilst one cannot assume the reasons why these universities were selected (funding/scholarships offered, resources, location of supervisor, prestige, familial support etc.) the findings nonetheless do indicate the workings of a central institutional core in terms of universities with attractive and desirable doctoral programmes.

The 1343 faculty members of the top 25 universities ranked by QS from 2016-2019 attended a total of 171 different universities for their doctorates. Not only was the overall geographical dispersal narrower when compared to figure seven, when looking at which universities were the most heavily attended a similar pattern to that represented in table two emerged. There was a particular set of universities (see table four) – the ‘centre of the core’ – that were the most heavily attended, and these universities occupy a particular geographical space in the US and UK.
Table 4- Top ten most attended universities for doctoral studies of the staff based at the top 25 universities for the subject area Politics and International Studies as ranked by QS and the 2018 JCR IR Editors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
<th>2019 QS Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harvard University – USA</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford University – UK</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California, Berkeley – USA</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale University – USA</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton University - USA</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia University - USA</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford University – USA</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Chicago - USA</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London School of Economics – UK</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Michigan - USA</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables two and four highlight the inner workings of the institutional core. Whilst the overall institutional core is geographically more encompassing than just the UK and US as commonly perceived, the ‘centre of the core’ constitutes a small group of universities located in the UK near London, and in the East and West coasts of the US. The institutional ‘centre of the core’ occupies a similar geographical terrain as the depiction given by Peter Marcus Kristensen. Through using citation patterns to locate the institutional core of IR, Kristensen notes that the centre of the core is comprised of certain universities in “California, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey and Washington DC”. The results from this brief inquiry show that there is an elite set of institutions that rank highly in both metrics and scholarly perceptions. The prestige and the possibilities of career advancement due to the reputations of such institutions further encourages students to attend these institutions to undertake their doctoral studies. This reinforces the high esteem of such institutions and embeds a self-reaffirming cycle that maintains the working and position of ‘the centre of the core’, which occupies particular locations within the United States and the United Kingdom.

Figure 9: Stratification of IR’s Institutional Core

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Kristensen, “Revisiting the ‘American Social Science‘,” 262.
Kristensen, “Revisiting the ‘American Social Science‘,” 262.
Figure 10: IR’s Institutional Core

This section has looked at publication presses, journal editors, institutional choices of key scholars, and university rankings to reveal the stratification of the institutional core of IR. There are other institutions of IR such as professional associations, conferences, citation networks, and university syllabi that have not been examined here. However, existing studies into such institutions reveal a similar set of institutional hierarchies as presented here, which help support the argument that the institutional core simultaneously occupies both a wider and narrower geographical space than commonly perceived (as figures nine and ten show). Meaning there are different core/periphery institutional geographies due to the stratification of power relations and therefore the workings of the core/periphery is much more complex and intersecting than commonly depicted. It is important to reveal the different power dynamics so that they can be further investigated and challenged. We need to ensure that the accompanying exclusionary mechanisms, hierarchies and institutional pressures will not go unchecked and that particular institutional barriers to scholars can be problematized.

4. The Implications of the Core/Periphery Imaginary

This article has clearly demonstrated that the discipline of IR has a series of different cores that occupy different geographical spaces (see figures five, six and ten). If one seeks to locate the ‘core’ in IR, then one needs to first delineate the specific ‘core’ one is looking for (linguistic, intellectual, institutional etc.), and secondly acknowledge the various stratifications and existence of ‘peripheries of the core’. Resultantly this means that the boundaries of the core and periphery are in flux and there are different core/peripheries occupying very different geographical spaces. As such, one can question the analytical value of this popular disciplinary imaginary due to its shifting dimensions. Through showing the stratification of IR’s different cores and revealing the workings of the core in spaces normally considered peripheral the

111 For example see; Grenier and Hagmann, “Sites of Knowledge (Re)Production,” 333–65; Hagmann and Biersteker, “Beyond the Published Discipline,” 291–315; Kristensen, “Revisiting the “American Social Science”,” 246–69; Turton, International Relations and American Dominance.
core/periphery binary has been destabilized, and therefore its continued use requires a more nuanced application. However, even if one were to adopt the label and use it in a more refined and reflective manner, the function of employing the terms would continue to have similar disciplinary effects.

Signifying an IR community as belonging to the core or the periphery unifies, and homogenizes those within both sides of the dichotomy as the designation awards each community with a certain set of properties based on the conceptualization of the ‘core’ in use. The result of this homogenization is that the often-diverse tendencies and stratified power relations within the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ are ignored in order to give the terms categorical and visual functions. This means that a somewhat false image of equality, access and mobility is produced, as the terms focus on the power relations between the core and periphery, thereby overlooking the asymmetries within each category. Consequently, both core and peripheral scholars are disciplined within each space.

Furthermore, when a country is labeled as a peripheral it not only becomes subordinated it also becomes depicted as consumptive and/or passive. Those who use the core/periphery relationship tend do so to highlight that there are few producers and many consumers of IR, this results in an uneven configuration of knowledge flows from the center to the margins and the establishment of exclusionary mechanisms. In each of the different workings of the core (linguistic, intellectual, institutional) the conventional wisdom depicts the core being the producer/center of knowledge and the periphery as the consumptive, dependent relation rather than the resistant ‘other’. Images of dependency have led to claims that peripheral scholarship is ‘nothing other than what is has been taught’, it is simply a replication of core research, thereby lacking agency. When one challenges the asymmetry of power within IR and uses the terms core/periphery to help demonstrate/critique dominant and authoritative trends, one actually reinforces negative images of the periphery. As Audrey Alejandro claims, the use of such terms unfortunately “performs the self-same hierarchical and exclusionary system it denounces”.

Recently there have been studies into ‘peripheral scholarship’ to break these depictions. Efforts have focused on detailing the novel theoretical efforts underway, and highlighting the different ways IR is studied and practiced. However, such research is often done with 1) reference to the undisturbed core, thereby reifying the marginal position of ‘peripheral’ scholarship; 2) without addressing the ways in which the periphery may already be shaping the core; or 3) acknowledging that areas of the periphery may actually be peripheries of the core. The premise behind much research, as outlined above, is that knowledge flows in a

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118 Arlene Tickner and David Blaney, eds., Thinking International Relations Differently (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).
unidirectional manner. Therefore, even if the periphery is presented as generating new modes of practicing, teaching, theorizing IR for example, the assumption is that by very nature of its peripheral position it will not impact upon the core and is passive, thereby unifying scholars within again and overlooking the motives and agential decisions of such scholars.

Acknowledging the different cores, helps prevent a degree of homogenization but it still subsumes difference within these realms and therefore can help to promote erroneous disciplinary images that have disciplinary effects. By focusing on points of commonality to make categories work, we overlook differences. We can be at risk of presenting homogenous images of scholars within certain regions, which may unintentionally reinforce the asymmetrical power relations that were the very object of critique. This is due to sites of disciplinary power going unchecked. A focus on the core/periphery and therefore unifying those within the periphery through their shared marginal status means we overlook diversity, especially a diversity of production and a diversity of power relations within the periphery. We also overlook a series of exclusionary mechanisms within the periphery and the marginalization of ‘peripheral scholars’ by ‘peripheral scholars’.

The main aim of this article has been to challenge the existing use of the terms core and periphery in IR and to draw attention to the stratification of power within states, so that particular sites of disciplinary power are challenged. We need to expand our imaginary of the core/periphery beyond nation states to look at hierarchies within countries and therefore the extensive reach of the ‘core’. We need to critically examine the specific workings of the core in the ‘peripheries of the core’ that exist in ‘non-Western’ spaces so as to challenge existing mechanisms that further marginalize scholarship within these locations. We need to look at whether scholars are encouraged/persuaded to adopt ‘centre of the core’ traits and/or whether this is an agential decision taken to resist and challenge existing power relations, resulting in recognition and exchange.120

5. Conclusion

In locating IR’s different cores and the corresponding hidden geographies, this article has attempted to destabilize the core-periphery distinction ultimately in order to move beyond this disciplinary and disciplining archetype. Because of the implications of this dichotomy, whilst this article may draw attention to a more complex working of disciplinary power, and work to establish agency and recognition for ‘hidden cores’, the continued use of the core/periphery archetype risks the trap of essentialism. In blurring the distinctions between the two categories, and revealing hidden mechanisms and workings of disciplinary power, the overarching argument is for the discipline to collapse the use of this particular disciplinary boundary in order to prevent homogenizing exclusions.

In highlighting the changing geographies of the core-periphery and thereby drawing attention to the operation of other epistemic hierarchies, I do not mean to erase the overarching inequalities of power in the global discipline of IR. Asymmetry remains, and the workings of the centre of the core presents scholars outside of this space with a series of difficult realities and decisions. For instance, decisions about which language to write in, where to study, where to publish, and whether to take the risk and develop IR theory.121 It is because of the existing asymmetry of power in IR that we need to be careful about the terms we use to depict

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120 Turton and Freire, “Peripheral Possibilities,” 537.
the unequal distribution of power to ensure that these do not have ‘counter-productive’
consequences, such as homogenisation, removal of agency/recognition and working to
make invisible the construction of epistemic hierarchies within states. We need to ensure
that the terms we use allow us to fully examine the reach of disciplinary power and in turn
explore how academic elites are able to construct additional barriers for scholars and exclude
particular forms of knowledge. As such, there is a need to look at the workings of particular
hierarchies within certain commonly perceived ‘peripheral’ spaces and to challenge these as
well as the larger global asymmetries of power.

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Appendix

1. Codebook: The following codes were used to determine the geographical composition of IR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Geographical Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Latin and South America (including the Caribbean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Canada (including Greenland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Eastern Europe (including Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>South East Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The categories include the following countries:

**United States of America:** Puerto Rico, and the United States of America

**Latin and South America:** Antigua, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

**Canada:** Canada and Greenland.

**United Kingdom:** England, Northern Island, Scotland and Wales.

**Western Europe:** Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Canary Islands (Spain), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Vatican City.

**Eastern Europe:** Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

**East Asia:** China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Tibet

**South Asia:** Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

**South East Asia:** Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

**Middle East and North Africa:** Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco (incl. Western Sahara), Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey (incl. Turkish Cyprus), United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, etc.), Yemen.

**Sub-Saharan Africa:** Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,


### 2: Breakdown of the top 25 Universities as Ranked by QS for Politics and International Studies:

From 2019-2016 the top 25 Universities as ranked by QS were noted and the current biographical profiles of the staff at these institutions was investigated. The profiles of permanent and full time members of staff were explored, this meant that Emeritus, Teaching Assistants and part-time Research Associates were not included.

The breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
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<td>Harvard University</td>
<td>Harvard University</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>The University of Tokyo</td>
<td>Freie Universitaet Berlin</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Locating IR’s Core…

| 19 | Freie Universitaet Berlin | University of California, Los Angeles | Cornell University | The University of Tokyo |
| 20 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology | Freie Universitaet Berlin | Stanford University | Cornell University |
| 21 | University of Toronto | University of California, San Diego | New York University | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| 22 | The University of Sydney | Johns Hopkins University | Massachusetts Institute of Technology | University of California, San Diego |
| 23 | SOAS University of London | SOAS University of London | The University of Sydney | The University of Hong Kong |
| 24 | The University of Tokyo | George Washington University | University of California, San Diego | The University of Toronto |
| 25 | The University of Melbourne | The University of Hong Kong | University of Copenhagen | Leiden University |

The highlighted universities above are those that did not appear in the rankings for four consecutive years. However, many of the highlighted universities appeared twice or more. The only universities that feature once in the rankings from 2019-2016 are; The University of Melbourne, University of Copenhagen and Leiden University.

Looking at the above universities by geographical location the breakdown is:

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<td>South East Asia</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Idea of Dialogue of Civilizations and Core-Periphery Dialogue in International Relations

Homeira Moshirzadeh
University of Tehran

Abstract
The idea of dialogue of civilizations, as was envisaged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, includes multi-layer, multi-actor dialogues. Civilization, when defined as “correspondence between material conditions of existence and intersubjective meanings,” has epistemological and ontological elements that constitute the parameters of knowledge. One may easily claim that the existing knowledge of international relations has its roots in Western civilization and, if it is to become a truly global body of knowledge, it has to be nourished by contributions from various civilizations, mostly belonging to the “periphery”. Yet, even this is not enough if we just reach an archipelago consisting of various islands of knowledge without a connection to each other. What may help bridging these islands is dialogue. Dialogues among IR scholars from different civilizational backgrounds may lead to more mutual understanding and even may lead to some common grounds found in-between. Dialogues can be conducted both at inter-civilizational and intra-civilizational levels as civilizations cannot be taken as monolithic wholes. This article seeks to clarify the meaning and implications of dialogue of civilizations in IR. Furthermore, the way in which dialogue of civilizations in the discipline can be conducted and the expectations thereof are discussed.

Keywords: IR, dialogue, core-periphery, dialogue of civilizations, post-Western IR

[We live in a world produced almost entirely by human enterprise and thus by human thought… If we look carefully at what we generally take to be reality we begin to see that it includes a collection of concepts, memories and reflexes coloured by our personal needs, fears and desires all of which are limited and distorted by the boundaries of our language and the habits of our history, sex and culture. It is extremely difficult to disassemble this mixture or to ever be certain whether what we are perceiving - or what we may think about those perceptions - is at all accurate.]

1. Introduction
It might be argued that IR as a discipline is not an absolutely “American” discipline as it used

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to be.\textsuperscript{3} Perhaps following Hoffman’s advice,\textsuperscript{4} it has become more historical and less policy-oriented and this has helped it to a degree to become more interested in political theory and philosophy and thus more inspired by European thinkers. We have also witnessed significant contributions to it from European scholars and perspectives over the last few decades. This might also be due to the fact that the political elite in other Western countries, unlike at the time when Hoffman wrote, have become increasingly interested in and have found ways to influence what is going on outside their own societies and this in turn has led to more interest in the academic field of International Relations. Even institutional pressures for publishing articles in international journals may have been involved in the de-monopolization of IR.

It may, however, still be argued that IR is mostly “Western” or Eurocentric in its conceptualization of and approach to the international. When we look at the content of journals and books on international life, we find out that not only the majority of authors are from Western societies, but that even if they are not, the concepts, theories, arguments, and methods they apply are often Western and even the issues they attempt to cover are mostly those more significant from a Eurocentric point of view. In the words of John Mearsheimer, it is “Anglo-Saxon [and other Western] scholars who dominate the IR discourse”.\textsuperscript{5} This has led many IR scholars to look for a “Global international relations (IR)”.\textsuperscript{6}

One may challenge the “Western-ness” of IR due to the fact that it is universal in character even if produced by Westerners/Americans and the result is a “benign hegemony”;\textsuperscript{7} that Western practices when done in non-Western contexts may result in unexpectedly “different” results;\textsuperscript{8} that even “Western” IR is not something monolithic and purely Western;\textsuperscript{9} and that there is nothing purely non-Western in even the most traditional non-Western approaches. Yet the fact that Western/American IR is hegemonic (even if, “benign”), that West and non-West are not separated by clear boundaries, that they are not monolithic, and that they are hybrid does not imply that scholars from non-Western and in particular peripheral contexts and/or all relevant perspectives have had their voice heard in the discipline or do not need to. A plurality of voices in the discipline, particularly from diverse socio-economic and cultural backgrounds, is in itself a step towards the democratization of the field. But these voices should not be limited to the particular context from which they emerge, and they should be heard and able to contribute to the discipline worldwide. Otherwise there would be just an archipelago consisting of various islands of knowledge without a connection to each other. What may help bridging these islands is dialogue.

One may suggest that if so far most of the relations of societies, cultures, and civilizations have been the result of “an unconscious history of the dialectics of civilizations,” we now may enter into a “conscious” level of dialogue among them\textsuperscript{10} at least for better understanding or mutual influence. Another argument is that since it has become clear that conceptual tools used by IR scholars are not sufficient for understanding key international dynamics, voices

\textsuperscript{4} Hoffman, “International Relations,” , 59–60.
\textsuperscript{7} Mearsheimer, “A Global Discipline of IR?”.
from peripheral countries should be heard and discussed\(^\text{11}\) to “save” the discipline. Or, to go even further, one can justify such a dialogue on the basis of “the link between knowledge and power”\(^\text{12}\) and as a step to make IR a truly global discipline.\(^\text{12}\)

Thus the idea of dialogue between the core (mostly Western) and periphery (mostly non-Western) within the field is not only favorable but also necessary. The question is how this dialogue can be conceptualized and conducted, and what can be expected of it. My main argument is that if it can be seen as a part of civilizational dialogue, we may have a better, more clarified understanding of it since “the key philosophical assumption behind the idea of dialogue of civilizations represents a challenge to the Western-centric matrix of contemporary practices and thinking in IR”.\(^\text{13}\) This idea, as was envisaged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, includes multi-layer, multi-actor dialogues and, as I have argued elsewhere, every individual or group can participate in and contribute to civilizational dialogue.\(^\text{14}\) This includes dialogues among communities of scholars of different disciplines. Furthermore, the idea has the same ethical concerns of critical tradition shared by the proponents of post-Western IR.\(^\text{15}\)

In what follows, a short review of the literature is presented. Then I attempt to give a more clarified conception of what I mean by dialogue and civilization and hence the dialogue of civilizations. In the third section, its implications for IR as a discipline will be discussed. I end up with some concluding remarks.

### 2. Going Beyond Western IR: A Necessity

The idea of Eurocentrism of IR and the necessity of going beyond it has long been discussed. Donald Puchala challenged the existing IR assumption that “Western analytical concepts are universally acceptable and unquestionably valid” and rightly observed that “relatively few Western analysts of International Relations pay much attention to non-Western thinking pertinent to their field.” He even suggested that perhaps non-Western interpretation of international reality might be better than the dominant Western understanding.\(^\text{16}\)

Inayatollah and Blaney critically discussed the approach of IR to the issue of difference.\(^\text{17}\) According to Acharya and Buzan IR theories are mostly “produced by and for the West” and rest on an assumption that “western history is world history.”\(^\text{18}\) Even non-mainstream IR theories, from Marxism\(^\text{19}\) to Critical Theory\(^\text{20}\) have been shown to be Eurocentrist in their


approach to international relations.

Acharya and Buzan’s attempt to search for IR theory in non-Western societies began with the publication of a special issue of the *Asia-Pacific Journal* in 2007, with the contribution of scholars who explained why there is no non-Western IR theory in Asian countries in the stricter sense of the word while at the same time showing that a kind of IR theory can be traced in various countries and cultures. Later they co-edited a book in which they addressed the absence of IR theory outside the West in a broader sense, including in the Islamic World as well as China, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and India.21

In *International Relations Scholarship around the World*, contributors sought to show the ways in which international life is understood around the world outside the “Anglo core”: from Russia to Asia, the Middle East to Africa, and from different parts of Europe to Latin America.22

Thus the idea of a more global international relations urged “the IR community to look past the American and Western dominance of the field and embrace greater diversity, especially by recognizing the places, roles, and contributions of “non-Western” peoples and societies”.23 The theme of the 2015 International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention, “Global IR and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies” emerged under the presidency of Amitav Acharya, a well-known IR scholar who has for long advocated the idea of a global IR.

In 2016 a special issue of *International Studies Review* was devoted to a series of articles and a forum on global IR that ranged from reviewing the existing state of IR worldwide,24 admitting and celebrating the dominance of American scholarship in the field,25 looking for a more diverse field,26 discussing the roots of the “Western-ness” of the discipline and finding ways to get out of it,27 showing the agency of the South/non-West in international politics in practice,28 finding a way to go beyond the existing international order through dialogue of civilizations,29 presenting some insights from the South,30 and criticizing aspects of non-Western IR.31

Most of these works suggest that there are non-western/peripheral understandings of

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21 See different chapters in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).
22 See Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, eds. *International Relations Scholarship around the World* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).
25 Mearsheimer, “A Global Discipline of IR?”.
29 Petito, “Dialogue of Civilizations in a Multipolar World”.
international life that have been neglected or marginalized in IR. As Acharya rightly asserts, “the current parochialism and ethnocentrism of ‘International Relations’ as a field of study, especially its dominant theoretical approaches, are unacceptable and perhaps untenable.”

Thus some IR scholars have suggested that dialogue is the way to make a global IR possible while others have attempted to show the pitfalls and problems involved in such an endeavor. Here I argue that we may conceptualize core-periphery dialogue in IR within the frame of dialogue of civilizations.

3. Conceptual Clarification

What do we mean by “civilization”? Sometimes it is taken to be the opposite of “barbarism” to refer to a specific stage in human life with a high level of social and cultural development, and sometimes it is taken to be a process by which such a stage is reached. Both of these definitions can be argued to be unclear and subjective and that even they carry with them evaluative assumptions.

A more general and less evaluative definition of civilization is to see it as an equivalent of culture; as a way a life. This is its usage in a more anthropological sense with an emphasis on the plurality of civilizations to show the difference. Yet what should be avoided is to assume the superiority of “our civilization” over others.

Here I use the two terms civilization and culture almost interchangeably to point to civilizations as large cultural units in each of which, despite internal differences and dynamics, there are some important shared “ontological, epistemological, and praxiological perspectives”. Some shared worldviews, values, historical experiences, and a sense of identity distinguish various civilizations/cultures.

In some works, including Samuel Huntington’s, the concept of civilization relies on “an essentialist version of the anthropological concept of culture”. In this understanding civilization is taken to be a monolithic fixed entity. The fact that cultures and civilizations change makes this understanding problematic. That is why others emphasize the dynamism and fluidity of civilizations. Dallmayr, for example, sees civilization not as “a secure possession but a fragile, ever-renewable endeavor.” From this point of view, “it has the character more of a verb than a noun”. Civilizations and cultures, according to Ashis Nandy, are more like an “open-ended text” than a “closed book”. This latter understanding helps us avoid assuming some given character for civilizations.

I take civilization, as any other human grouping and community, as a social construct
or collective intentionality. They are more like “arenas in which human beings define their own and others’ identities; narrate their destiny and history; depict their utopias”. Therefore, like other groupings, they are constituted and reconstituted through “narratives” and “creative actions”. They are fluid, in constant change, partly due to their encounters and partly due to internal dynamics. That is why although civilizations signify identities, civilizational identities are always blurred.

Plurality of civilizations is one of the manifestations of the variety of human beings which should be celebrated. As this plurality is what guarantees reality and its continuity, each and every different perspective is a contribution to the world and humanity, and this difference should not be denied, ignored, or suppressed.

It is important to note that individuals or groups may not find themselves belonging to just “one” civilization. What is the civilizational identity of a Turk or an Iranian? Do they both belong to the Islamic civilization? At one level, they may. At the same time, a Turk might see herself belonging to Eastern Roman civilization and an Iranian to Persian/Iranian civilization. This example of simultaneous dual sense of civilizational belonging or identity has important implications for dialogue of civilizations and makes any claim of representing a civilization problematic.

Thus when civilizations are taken as fluid, dynamic, and intermingled, dialogue of civilizations would mean a world-wide dialogue including both intra-civilizational and inter-civilizational levels.

Dialogue is usually defined as a “focused conversation”. It has its root in the Greek word dialogos: “Logos means ‘the word’ or … the ‘meaning of the word’. And dia means ‘through’ - it doesn’t mean two. A dialogue can be among any number of people, not just two”. What differentiates dialogue from monologue is that a monologue “represents the reflexive absence of an other.” In the words of Mikhail Bakhtin, an extreme form of monologism “denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities”. Thus dialogue is necessarily between the different.

What makes “critical dialogue” possible is “the overlap of self and other”. As “our worldview, our culture, and our self are partial, parochial, and perhaps invalid in some significant way,” through dialogue “we require others both to affirm the veracity and to expose the limits of our vision”.

This can be achieved, in a Bohmian sense of dialogue, through “suspension”; an attention-based practice that gradually “helps individuals become less identified with their habits of mind and points of view. Learning to be less embedded or reified in one’s perspective and

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48 See Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference.
way of thinking about the world, participants gradually develop a more flexible basis of relationship to their reasoning and emotional processes, as well as how they come to know these processes”. 51

There can be a genuine dialogue between the parties only if they meet on equal grounds. As Bohm, Factor, and Garrett suggest,

Any controlling authority, no matter how carefully or sensitively applied, will tend to hinder and inhibit the free play of thought and the often delicate and subtle feelings that would otherwise be shared. Dialogue is vulnerable to being manipulated, but its spirit is not consistent with this. Hierarchy has no place in Dialogue. 52

What does dialogue lead to? Some believe that in dialogue, like other forms of argumentation, reaching an agreement or a shared position is important. As the interlocutors engaged in an argumentation have differing claims/positions, they try to persuade each other of the “truth” of their claim. If one side is more convincing in its truth claims, the other side should give in; and if they conclude that there is some truth in both claims, they may reach a synthesis or a new via media can be achieved. Some other understandings of dialogue, however, see it just as a path towards mutual understanding and not reaching agreement. From this point of view, cross-cultural dialogues lead to a new “plural future”. 53

These views are not necessarily inconsistent and can be seen as complementary. We should accept that dialogue “is not concerned with deliberately trying to alter or change behavior nor to get the participants to move toward a predetermined goal” and that such an attempt “would distort and obscure the processes that the Dialogue has set out to explore. Nevertheless, changes do occur because observed thought behaves differently from unobserved thought” (emphasis added). 54

Furthermore, in a dialogue, unlike other forms of argumentation, “influence goals” -- goals related “to the relationship between the arguers as well as goals dealing with the maintenance of the interaction itself” 55 -- are as important as reaching an agreement, and even they might be regarded as the primary goal. In the words of Bohm,

In dialogue it is necessary that people be able to face their disagreements without confrontation and be willing to explore points of view to which they do not personally subscribe. If they are able to engage in such a dialogue without evasion or anger, they will find that no fixed position is so important that it is worth holding at the expense of destroying the dialogue itself . . . What is essential is that each participant is, as it were, suspending his or her point of view, while also holding other points of view in a suspended form and giving full attention to what they mean. 56

In dialogues, parties understand their (possibly different) definitions of situations, their self-understandings, their understanding of the other, and the parties’ interests and priorities. Yet “understanding proceeds in a tensional ‘polarity of familiarity and strangeness (fremdheit)’, in that a person entering a dialogue must allow himself/herself to be ‘addressed’

52 Bohm, Factor, and Garrett, “Dialogue-A Proposal”.
53 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, 12.
and possibly challenged and disturbed. Hence, dialogical understanding (as the ‘true locus of hermeneutics’) always hovers in the ‘in-between’’.57

Mutual understanding, which is the least we expect from dialogue, can be attained through the “fusion of horizons”.58 The result is a “transformation or extension of their value criteria”.59 In this process the parties may incorporate at least a part of each other’s value criteria. This implies being open to others, trying to place oneself in the position of the other, and not imposing one’s criteria upon others.60 In the words of Wierzbicka, “each party makes a step in [the] direction of the other, not that they [necessarily] reach a shared position”.61

Therefore, dialogue is useful even if the parties just reach a better understanding of each other. Yet mutual “understanding may lead to the recognition of common grounds and this may lead to shared reason in the process... dialogue itself affects the existing repertoires of the parties and may lead to more shared elements in the future”62 (emphasis added). In general, if we accept that in a dialogue nobody should try to win, if there is no attempt to gain points, or to make one view prevail, then “everybody gains”.63

As in any cultural (or civilizational) exchange, in dialogues we should be aware of the instability and ambiguity of cross-cultural signifiers, take culture as a changing construct, and instead of seeing cultures and civilizations as monolithic entities we should see them as a plurality and mixture of cultures.64 Thus dialogue of civilization exists at various levels and does not necessarily lead to a final point.

The idea of dialogue of civilizations presumes the existence of difference among people from various historical and cultural backgrounds and underlines the necessity of respecting differences. At the same time, it seeks to enrich human life at all levels through mutual understanding and reaching some common grounds for collaborative actions. Furthermore, by denying any monolithic understanding of civilizations and emphasizing their fluidity, no attempt for finding “the” authentic or even “an” authentic civilizational voice is pursued. Hence no one can assert to re-present a civilization.

The possibility of “the overlap of self and other” would be recognized in the process of dialogue. This enables them to see where reaching shared reason or consensus is possible and where it is not. Even in areas where there are enormous differences, there is still room for mutual learning if all parties are prepared to be changed – and not to attempt to assimilate others. Arguing is here “a learning mechanism by which actors acquire new information, evaluate their interests [and knowledge, one may add] in light of new empirical and moral knowledge”.65 Then in areas where differences remain, mutual respect can leave room for the coexistence of differences and pluralism may seem to be more feasible.

57 Dallmayr, “Christianity and Civilization,” 126.
62 Moshirzadeh, “Intercivilizational Dialogue and Global Governance”.
An important point is that as dialogue helps participants to “shift from a more identified first-person perspective to a witnessing third-person perspective of the very contents of ... mind and consciousness”, when dialogues take place frequently within and among civilizations, “suspension” may gradually change participants’ “fundamental relationship to the thinking process and the underlying habits of mind and points of view…by putting them in high relief against a background of awareness”.

4. Core-Periphery Dialogue in IR

If we have found that existing IR with all its conceptual, methodological, and theoretical tools has difficulties in understanding what is going on at the global level, one reason for this might be that its parochial conceptual tools and epistemological foundations are not as universal as they usually pretend to be. This has made looking at other understandings of international life necessary. If we are going to move beyond the Western-ness of IR, other voices from all civilizational backgrounds and perspectives should be listened to and be learnt from, and they too in turn should learn from the existing IR. This needs to be done through dialogue. In what follows I address the way in which such dialogue can be conducted and what its possible outcomes might be.

4.1. How to conduct dialogue?

If we are going to move beyond the Western-ness of IR, we must think of different strategies for the core/West and periphery/non-West to follow.

Western IR may look at the history of the non-Western world to find ways that could lead to alternative international politics. This has, to a degree, been followed by some of the English School writers in the past. It may also look for alternative frameworks of understanding through consulting non-Western sources. This is what we can see in Robert Cox’s reference to Ibn Khaldun or Puchala’s reading of non-Western radical understandings of international relations. These attempts might be seen as a kind of indirect dialogue with the non-West/periphery.

So far the periphery has only been in indirect dialogue with the Western IR. Attempts by non-Western IR scholars to apply Western theories to non-Western contexts or finding similarities between various IR theories and various endogenous traditional philosophical, historical, moral, religious sources can also be interpreted as such.

Yet the periphery may also seek for particular versions of IR in different countries based on local/national history, culture, and experiences. An alternative to it would be specific versions of IR at the regional/civilizational level. Some of these versions may find their ways into publication by IR journals or by international publishers. They may, at best, be reviewed by some Western scholars, without necessarily influencing dominant Western ways of doing IR theoretically, methodologically, or substantively even if they somehow help the periphery to go beyond the hegemonic discourse of IR. Can they lead to the formation of an international/global IR? They may, I believe, lead to what Vasilaki calls particularism or at best pluralism.

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69 Puchala, “Some Non-Western Perspectives.”
70 Vasilaki and Buzan criticize such particularism. From a postcolonial view, although is critical of Western IR and prioritizes
within IR. If their presence is accompanied by dialogue with existing IR, however, it can help the formation of a global discipline that besides pluralism may experience new ways of thinking, redefinition of basic concepts, revising assumptions, and the like.

Another strategy would be various versions of postcolonialism that “question and subvert those relations of domination that conventional IR takes for granted”.\textsuperscript{71} Postcolonialism on the one hand makes us aware of the way in which the non-West has been constructed to make domination and authority over the Orient/non-West possible and on the other hand, goes beyond the very division of West/non-West. It looks for hybridity, provincialization, and contrapuntal reading. Postcolonialist re-reading of international history, its critical approach to Eurocentrism, essentialism, authenticity, Orientalism in reverse, and subalternity\textsuperscript{72} can be seen as a call for revising our understanding of international relations. Some brilliant work along this line has been published as a way to go beyond “Western” IR.\textsuperscript{73} The problem, however, is that, postcolonialism might not go much beyond criticism or showing the lack of authenticity of the West’s or the rest’s work. One may say that postcolonialist work discloses the “dialectics of civilizations”\textsuperscript{74} in the past. As for dialogue, it might be argued, that it could undermine the possibility of dialogue by questioning the very possibility of subaltern groups having an effective voice.\textsuperscript{75} Yet within the framework of dialogue of civilizations, if we do not look for “authentic” or “essential” identities, this does not seem to be a major problem. Furthermore, postcolonialism is one of the best critical approaches that can make the “core” more aware of the limitations of its outlook, and the periphery aware of the difficulties in claiming to have an authentic voice, and in this way contribute to the internationalization of IR.

Therefore, all these endeavors can be seen as a part of dialogue of civilizations. Yet we need something more: a more conscious and direct involvement in dialogues among IR scholars from various civilizations. In core-periphery dialogue within IR, authors from various societies, with various civilizational/cultural background, different histories, different understandings, and perhaps even different criteria for an acceptable knowledge, present their ideas to and enter into a focused conversation with each other in order to make IR a thoroughly international endeavor.

As it was mentioned above, a very basic condition of dialogue is to recognize all participants as equal. This equality in the context of the IR community is necessarily the equality of the different. At the same time, it requires all equals to see their ideas, understandings, assumptions, and even findings as limited, contingent, and modifiable.

The participants’ engagements should be on equal grounds. Hutchings rightly argues that “If what shapes the mode and outcome of dialogue is something beyond dialogue, then the

\textsuperscript{71} Vasilaki, “Provincialising IR?,” 8.
\textsuperscript{73} See Bashiriye, “From Civilizational Dialectics to Civilizational Dialogue”.
\textsuperscript{74} See Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”.
value of dialogue itself comes into question". These engagements may be in different forms, each of which can be a realization of power-knowledge nexus, from the meaning of dialogue to the meaning of truth, from concepts defining the field to epistemological and ontological assumptions taken for granted.

Of course these considerations have long been discussed in the field and the result has been the recognition of pluralism—meaning at least to de-monopolize knowledge/truth claims. This can be a good beginning. But its full realization in practice needs some practical steps including a sort of “affirmative action” or “positive discrimination,” as de-monopolization requires being able to present one’s ideas to others in the first place. For example, in terms of the chances for publication in well-known journals of the field, translation of the work already published in the native languages of non-English speaking IR scholars, and the like.

Then dialogue requires that participants’ approaches, conceptualizations, assumptions, etc. be listened to, evaluated, asked about, criticized, and discussed. But more than that, every participant has to be open to change his or her own approach, conceptualization, assumptions on the basis of that dialogue. If core-periphery dialogue is going to be similar to past experiences of “dialogue” in the field (for example, with Feminism) with a “continuing hegemony of mainstream understandings of the nature, point and purpose of dialogue”, then again nothing is going to shift “in terms of underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions”. This will result in a “ghettoization” of works from the periphery.

Let us take an example. Katzenstein looks for a more pluralist IR with a variety of “voices, questions, approaches, methods, and standards of what constitutes good work” and rightly suggests that “global IR will not converge on ‘common best practice.’ Instead the dialogue of global IR will serve the purpose of articulating and reinforcing rich diversities that will require more intellectual empathy and capacious thought.” Yet he speaks of “one shared language” that makes one hesitant about the limitations it might impose upon that plurality. Even within the “Western” IR, this shared language has been a matter of debate and may become an obstacle in West-non-West dialogue. If, for example, some IR scholars from the Islamic world do not accept the “secular” language of existing IR, that standard of “shared language” locates them outside of the community altogether, and makes any dialogue with them impossible. Perhaps it is better to go further and think of different paradigms in more Kuhnian terms that speak in different “languages,” and the dialogue among which may (at least, sometimes) need “translation”.

In practice one of the best places for dialogue is in IR publications. Yet, as in a fully Bohmian sense dialogue should be conducted with the physical presence of participants, one may suggest both ISA conventions as well as other conferences and workshops. As such dialogues work best in groups of twenty to forty people facing one another in a single circle, particular arrangements can be envisaged in international conferences, seminars, and workshops to have panels with the intention of conducting a dialogue of civilizations.

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77 Such considerations have been followed by the ISA since a few years ago. See Acharya, “Advancing Global IR”.
78 Hutchings, “Dialogue between Whom?,” 646.
79 See Katzenstein, “Diversity and Empathy”.
82 “A group of this size allows for the emergence and observation of different subgroups or subcultures that can help to reveal some of the ways in which thought operates collectively” (Bohm, Factor, and Garrett, “Dialogue-A Proposal,” 6).
4.2. What to expect from dialogue?

Civilization, when defined as “correspondence between material conditions of existence and inter-subjective meanings,” has epistemological and ontological elements that constitute the parameters of knowledge. Dialogue of civilizations can be seen as the basis for a non-ethnocentric International Relations by introducing new diversity to the field through alternative epistemologies, different ontologies, and various understandings of the subject matter of this field. But what does this diversity lead to?

In one understanding, as was mentioned, dialogue is intended to lead to some sort of (shared) “truth”. This seems to be the objective of the dialogue of civilizations as was envisaged by Khatami: “speaking and listening is a bilateral—or multilateral—effort aimed at reaching truth and understanding” (emphasis added). Yet here the basis of objectivity and truth should also be changed to a discursive/dialogical one. Khatami, not unlike Habermas, is critical of two positions of skepticism and monopolized understanding of truth and criticizes the dominant technical notion of knowledge that “leads to power instead of constraining power”. The difference between Habermas and Khatami is in former’s insistence on the necessity of a shared modern lifeworld for conducting dialogues. Khatami sees the capacity in all civilizations to find dialogues as a way to reach truth and he also sees much shared in human life to make speaking of (at least a minimum) shared lifeworld meaningful. What he does not take into account, however, is that ways of argumentation are not necessarily the same in various cultures. Therefore, what one finds persuasive in one culture might not make sense at all in another. And this is what makes dialogue across cultures with the aim of reaching truth somehow problematic. Here is where we need a sort of translation effort in dialogue.

If one does not take the expectations from core-periphery dialogue that far, what are other possible outcomes? A very minimal expectation is to have everyone’s voice presented to the community of scholars so that at least a precondition of true dialogue can be met. A step further that can be envisaged is not to “displace but subsume existing IR and enrich it with the infusion of ideas and practices from the non-Western world”, sourcing IR from epistemological concepts as well as practices and interactions in the non-Western world. Yet as Shani argues, the ontological premises of Western IRT need to be “rethought” not merely “enriched” by the addition of new voices from the periphery/non-Western civilizations.

Not only the West, but also all parties may need to rethink their understanding of international relations. But how? David Bohm rightly argues that thought needs attention and that “through dialogue we might change our collective thought processes and find solutions to problems without being misled by our assumptions”. Therefore, dialogue with others helps all parties to reconsider their thoughts and even their way of thinking. “Suspension” in a Bohemian form of dialogue, involves attention and listening. It makes “a less attached, yet poised and attentive relationship with our knowledge, beliefs and perspectives” possible. By

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86 Shani, “Toward a Post-Western IR,” 723.
Dialogue of Civilizations…

suspension, we slow down our mind so that we can discover and learn.89

Furthermore, dialogues could reveal the agency of peripheral actors so far mostly hidden in IR. At one level this hiddenness of agency can be pursued within the IR community: others too have something to say and share. This would give the opportunity to marginal forces to have their voices in the field. At another level, non-Western peripheral agency can be shown to have existed throughout history. Hurrell believes that Western IR needs “to understand much more about the agency of the apparently ‘powerless’”90 and Buzan asks Western scholars to see “what difference would it make if the history of peoples other than Europeans was what underpinned the discipline?”91 Ideas such as these can be thought over and discussed more in dialogues. The history that has so far informed much of IR theorizing could be rewritten and this might lead to changes in our understanding of international politics and its dynamics.

If we accept that International Relations is dominated by hegemonic discourses or theories serving specific interests and that it is not free from power relations,92 indeed if we even see the whole discipline as being “hegemonic”,93 dialogue at various levels especially at the intercultural level may be seen as a means towards shaping new counter-hegemonic understandings that may result in new versions of international critical theory.

This would be an epistemological challenge against the more or less dominant positivist understanding of knowledge with all its monopolistic claims in this area. One of its main implications is the rejection of value-free knowledge and the emphasis on reflection on both what exists and what should exist.94 Critical theorists realize that the actor and the observer cannot be separated and that they are themselves involved in “the reproduction, constitution and fixing of the social entities they observe”.95 It seems that critical theorists like their postmodern counterparts are ready to reject “disciplinary closure”.96

However, one may see exclusionary practices inside Western critical theory as well. This is what can be avoided by intercultural dialogues that can lead to various non-Eurocentric versions of critical theory in international relations.97 Thus the dialogue may lead to co-fertilization of Western and non-Western critical approaches.

5. Conclusion

As Hurrell suggests, the way in which societies are organized and “their various conceptions of what the good life entails” should be brought together and reconciled if solutions to global problems are to be found.98 If the ultimate ideal of IR as a discipline is to reach a more

91 Buzan, “Could IR Be Different?”.
peaceful world through a better understanding of it, then the contribution of all civilizations to this understanding will be an inevitable requirement that also functions as a basis for non-Eurocentric approaches to international relations within a discipline that seeks to conceptualize, interpret, and explain international life. Furthermore, in the process of dialogue all parties can rethink their approaches, conceptual devices, definitions, and assumptions.

Yet one must be aware that, at its early stages, dialogue “will often lead to the experience of frustration”. One reason might be that dialogue means being consecutively challenged and having to accept changes in attitudes and understandings and it may jeopardize the ontological security of scholars. Therefore, some institutionalized routines need to be established to prevent this so that an ongoing multi-party dialogue may emerge leading to a new global IR.

The new IR may prove to be not only more democratic and fair but also in a better position to understand and explain international life and thereby make a change in a world that perhaps more than at any time in its recent history needs a change to put an end to violence, threats, and injustice. Thus dialogues within the IR community worldwide may be seen as not only an endeavor to do more justice in the discipline but also to reach a better world.

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Dialogue of the “Globals”: Connecting Global IR to Global Intellectual History

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Abstract
This study aims to provide an exploratory analysis of Global IR, by pointing to its novelty as a tool for expanding our disciplinary frameworks, and furthermore, by connecting it to the quite simultaneously emerging field of Global Intellectual History. Such an approach enables a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics that have led to an overall focus on the “global.” The first part elaborates how the idea of Global IR has emerged as a novel disciplinary tool, and pinpoints the various meanings it has gained. Second, the focus shifts to the novel scholarship of Global Intellectual History. Elaborating this field’s most significant contributions will make it possible to emphasize the useful role it can play in furthering the idea of Global IR in a more historically (self-)conscious manner. The importance of this approach will also be underlined by referring to the increased relevance of disciplinary critique in the specific context of IR-history (dis)connections. The third part turns its attention to various cases (as vignettes) that aim to visualize how connecting these two new “Globals” (i.e. Global IR and Global Intellectual History) could provide the discipline of IR with a better means to deal with the past and present of global politics. Therefore, by explaining the conceptual, ideational, and geo-epistemological divergences and commonalities whose roots can be more concretely studied through a broader engagement with Global Intellectual History, the article clarifies the advantages of this “inter-Global” connection. It concludes by discussing the value of Global IR in terms of its potential role for broadening the discipline not just in ways that are more (IR-)introspective but also in its bridge-building capacity to other fields with similar concerns, extending to Global Intellectual History and beyond, and provides a brief list of initial suggestions.

Keywords: Global IR, Global Intellectual History, History and IR

1. Introduction
In recent years, there seems to have emerged a new turn in the discipline of International Relations (IR), but one that does not come up with another theoretical perspective to be employed.1 Rather, it concerns the very disciplinary foundations of IR, going even beyond its debates on philosophy of science,2 or ontology.3 This novelty concerns an overwhelming...
interest in overcoming the Western-centric nature of the discipline. However, it is not necessarily overlapping with the postcolonial approaches in IR that have been the usual source when one encounters this type of critique. The recent calls for a “Global IR” provide a broader, and at times more mainstream-supported attack on the past and present of the discipline, calling for making geo-epistemological and also geo-ontological revisions in our way of looking at the world, and hence at IR. This new perspective promises a different outlook within our disciplinary enterprise, and mostly in a way that recognizes the actual changes in the domain of world politics, or as Buzan and Acharya recently stated, in the world of international relations (“ir” without upper scale letters).4

This study aims to provide a dual structure in order to address the issue of a possible dialogue between the emerging Global IR and the similarly novel approach in the discipline of History, namely Global Intellectual History. The article first elaborates the emergence of the idea of Global IR, underlining its definitional variations. In this regard, I also provide a quantitative study on the usage of the concept of Global IR (but also Global International Relations), explaining its growing popularity in the aftermath of Amitav Acharya’s presidential speech at the International Studies Association (ISA), which later became an article in 2014 in its flagship journal *International Studies Quarterly* (ISQ).5 Finally, the main features of Global IR are explored via a close engagement with Acharya and Buzan’s most recent take on this quest for globalizing the discipline.6 This serves also as a connection to the discussion of Global History, and more specifically Global Intellectual History, as tools at the disposal of the Global IR project.

In the second part of the study, the emphasis shifts to the relevance of a new historiographical approach, one that is located at the intersection of Global History and Intellectual History. By examining the significance of Global Intellectual History, I aim at showing the multiple promises of this field of research in the realization of Global IR. First, there follows an examination of Global History and the consequent emergence of Global Intellectual History. Subsequently, I underline the usefulness of this approach for Global IR by providing a number of vignettes that point to potential benefits of this type of research. Later, the study turns its attention to a possible triangulation effort in the context of interdisciplinary cooperation. In this regard, I pinpoint the importance of combining Global IR and Global Intellectual History with the insights of (Global/International) Historical Sociology in order to connect the study of ideas to their institutional and structural dimensions. Here also lies a certain promise for advancing IR among other social sciences. The conclusion, in turn, considers the prospects of these connections, especially between Global IR and Global Intellectual History and provides a list of to-dos which could further the project of Global IR.

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6 Acharya and Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations*. As this work presents a more up-to-date take on Global IR, I use it as my main focus, yet first analyze the impact of Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR)” as this presented the first detailed engagement with Global IR in a more mainstream fashion (one that I show below to have played a leading role in paving the way for popularizing the idea of Global IR).
2. Global IR for the Mainstream – Redefinition and Popularization

There are a number of varying definitions for the idea/approach of Global IR. However, interest in it has witnessed a dramatic rise in the last couple of years. Before approaching the various engagements within IR, I propose to focus on Acharya’s 2014 piece and point to its leading role in widening the usage of the concept, making it thereby a popular and more familiar perspective in IR scholarship. Based on this, I offer a brief discussion on varying understandings of Global IR, returning consequently to the approach put forward by Acharya (and Buzan). This prepares the way for the later parts on Global Intellectual History.

In order to check whether Acharya’s ISA presidential address, which became an ISQ piece in 2014, had a major impact in making the concept a popular one for IR scholars around the globe, I looked at two widely used sources: Google Scholar and Web of Science. The analysis sought to gauge for the temporal frequency of the usage of both “Global International Relations” and “Global IR.” In this framework, it became clear that the former has been used also in broader senses, e.g. the wider structure of world politics, etc. This resulted in more than 1000 texts for the period until 2019. Of this, some 100 were found in the years up to and including 2000, whereas more than 300 new texts were published up to and including 2013. Afterwards, I focused on individual years, and found a visible tendency of continuous increase (from some 47 in 2014 to 175 alone in 2018). This means that even the more diversely employed concept of “Global International Relations” (which in many individual instances was in fact employed as global international relations) still points to the growing influence of the idea of a disciplinary “Global International Relations” from 2014 on (see figure 1).

In the more specific instance of “Global IR” (where the search was secured by additionally checking for “international relations” in order to detach it from similar but unrelated usages of the shortening “IR”), the results emphasized in an even more evident manner the popularity of the concept starting in 2014. Prior to 2001, it was used in only seven works, and there were in total merely some 100 pieces before 2014. In that year there followed some 30 new publications, only to increase to circa 110 in 2017 and 134 in the following year. The total has risen from some 150 in 2014 to more than 500 four years later (see figure 2).
An analysis of the Web of Science records provides us with an even clearer picture. There is just one article referring to “Global International Relations” prior to Acharya’s 2014 piece. On the other hand, in its aftermath, there would be already 16 works using this concept, showing that his article has played the role of a popularizing factor for this rather recent labelling. When gauging for the impact of “Global IR” in a separate manner, one finds 29 studies in the area of IR, with only two of them preceding Acharya’s article. This
again underlines the effect his ISA speech and ISQ piece seem to have had on the broader employment of this concept.

In addition to these figures, the citation numbers of Acharya’s article also demonstrate its significant role, with some 250 by Google Scholar and close to 90 by Web of Science.7 These findings suggest two important insights. First, Acharya’s piece has played a path-breaking role in making the concept of “Global International Relations”/“Global IR” a freshly popular label for the wider IR community. Second, this novelty is reflected in the concept’s broader usage within the last couple of years.8 In light of this, it becomes useful to turn our attention to the different ways in which Global IR can be understood and the changes it could implement for the discipline. Such a broader overview can demonstrate both the multiple meanings Global IR has taken on and the greater relevance of the approach developed by Acharya (and Buzan, with whom he frequently cooperates in this area), as related to this preceding analysis.

Although Acharya’s article has been shown to play a major role in popularizing “Global IR,” we still need to be careful when approaching this concept, for its usage has not seen a single path commonly followed by all. In this regard, I want to explain certain divergences that emerge in its employment, and clarify the reasons for such differences among IR scholars. First, it is important to acknowledge the role played by postcolonialist scholars9 and later decolonial approaches10 for overcoming the Western-centric nature and structure of the discipline.11 Their distinct call is itself not of a very old origin, having started to significantly impact IR in the 1990s. Developments in other fields, most famously Edward Said’s study on Orientalism and Foucauldian approaches had a visible influence in this context. The main theme of postcolonial scholars has been to call for a more inclusive IR that would, through this less Western-centric understanding of its role and contents, become a better tool for understanding more than just the Western world and its impact. It would also offer an explanation about how the broader world and its “international relations” function. In this framework, a specific focus was on concepts like the Global South, with at times has focused largely on differences between the North and the South. The time was seen as having arrived for the latter to have finally (or once again) a say in world politics and in its study. Decolonial contributions later enriched this approach by further emphasizing the problematic nature

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7 I am just looking, again, at the ISQ piece. However, there were also other articles of his that helped to make the idea of Global IR more familiar, and not infrequently, more popular to IR scholars. See, for instance, Amitav Acharya, “Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions,” International Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2016): 4–15.

8 It is also important to state that as ISA president, Acharya was able to determine the program theme of the February 2015 conference which was titled “Global IR and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies.” This organizational aspect could also be seen as further impact of Acharya, but via his presidential role. The continuing influence of the concept is also visible in the title choice for the March 2020 ISA conference: “Multiple Identities and Scholarship in a Global IR: One Profession, Many Voices.” Both testify to possible legitimizing and popularizing dynamics that further the spread of “Global IR” as the new disciplinary approach.


not only of the Western dominance in knowledge production but also the multiple ways in which this knowledge was assumed to be of universal validity, further strengthened by the power political hegemony of Western powers.\textsuperscript{12} In these analyses, there exists an urgent need for overcoming these obstacles in order to pave the way for the non-Western sources of knowledge and their promotion.

Alternatively, one should also take into account the various scholarly communities who consider the necessity of widening IR by taking in insights from local/national/regional IR scholarship. While this has also been partially a quest of earlier postcolonial scholars, the limits of such an approach have led to multiple debates on the actual ways of undertaking this task. On the one hand, there exist scholars who underline the structural constraints of such contributions within IR, pointing to non-Western scholarship’s failure to come up necessarily with original contributions, mostly due to the perceived manners of reproducing earlier Western-derived knowledge.\textsuperscript{13} On the other hand, there are scholars who insist on the benefits of a sustainable focus on the insights to be gained by turning our attention more closely to homegrown theorizing in IR, with its inclusion of non-Western sources of ideational and material backgrounds.\textsuperscript{14}

A historically more self-conscious approach would require us to remember the days of the interwar International Studies Conference (ISC) that held regular meetings in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{15} Its scholarly and institutional membership structures as well as congresses used to bring academics and representatives of earlier think tanks and philanthropic foundations together, and without the hermetically sealed off disciplinary structure that we witness today: political scientists, sociologists, historians, legal scholars, and others were involved in what we could call Global Studies.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, following such a path would lead us to think of calls for “Global IR” as a move that pushes the discipline closer to its historical roots. In this sense, the ISC and interwar IR are not that distant from this call, serving partially as proto-Global IR, both with their global membership structure and international participation (beyond the West, but not necessarily beyond the North) in its annual gatherings.

Another way to engage with the recent “global turn” in IR could lead us to perceive, at least some of the usages of the concept, as part of the discipline’s often witnessed tendency for fads and fashions. This signifies an inclination for using concepts without much careful analytical consideration of their specific and broader meaning. In the specific case of “global IR,” where it is now possible to observe a very significant increase in the frequency with which this concept is employed (as discussed above), one should take care not to miss the forest for the trees. Not all uses of the concept refer to the same idea. Therefore, at a time when even a recent textbook edition has a subsection on “global IR” discussing, respectively, IR theories in China, India, Latin America, the Islamic world, and Africa, one needs to differentiate between these varying associations of “Global IR.”\textsuperscript{17} Regional specifications

\textsuperscript{12} See fn. 10. \\
\textsuperscript{13} Pinar Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 5–23. \\
\textsuperscript{17} On Global Studies as a growing study field see Mark Juergensmeyer, Manfred B. Steger, Saskia Sassen, and Victor Faessel, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Global Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). \\
\textsuperscript{17} See Gert Krell and Peter Schlottke, Weltbilder und Weltdichtung – Einführung in die Theorie der Internationalen Beziehungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), 419ff.
of IR do not necessarily end up bringing about a globalized IR, but can indeed act as further mechanisms of parochialism, especially if regional compartmentalization does not add up to a more globalized IR.

At this juncture, let us shift our focus to Acharya’s call for a “Global IR” and briefly elaborate on his understanding of what it stands for. His interest in broadening IR does not derive just from his period as ISA president, but has earlier origins in his work on the relevance of non-Western IR theories, including his co-authored article-later-turned-into-book (with Buzan) where they tried to answer the question “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory.” Later on, this quest for broadening the knowledge sources of IR went beyond a narrow focus on theories, with his interest extending towards the direction of globalizing IR. This meant making the discipline more familiar and inclusive with broader engagement of processes that had origins, changes, modifications, or renovations in non-core regions of IR.

Now we have a more developed analysis by Acharya and Buzan that encompasses virtually all the history of IR and “ir”, based on the assumed centenary of the discipline’s 1919 post-World War I foundation, and published on this (mythical) 100th anniversary. In their The Making of Global International Relations – Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary, the two scholars employ a heavily externalist account of disciplinary history, one that discusses the prospects of a Global IR at times of an emerging post-Western world. It is in this book that one finds the most up-to-date conceptualization of Global IR within the frameworks employed by Acharya and Buzan. For the authors, their approach’s distinction from the postcolonial approaches is quite clear, with the former seen as open for both mainstream theories and postcolonial or critical approaches. Global IR, for the two scholars, is, in consequence, not to be interpreted as a rejection of mainstream theories, a point they put forward very explicitly.

The question that necessitates an answer relates to their own definition of what the aim and the contents of Global IR are to be. According to Acharya and Buzan, it should not be seen as “a theory or method,” but rather to be understood as “more a framework of inquiry and analysis of international relations in all its diversity, especially with due recognition of the experiences, voices and agency of the Non-Western peoples, societies and states,” actors which are seen as having remained largely overlooked by IR. In this regard, their approach to Global IR emerges like a much needed disciplinary aggiornamento, which refers to the need for updating the discipline and its frameworks of study, theorizing and teaching in a rapidly post-Westernizing world.

At the same time, theirs is a certain type of via media approach, not atypical in IR scholarship. Its positioning seems to accept not a few of the postcolonial assumptions,
trying, however, to find a less critical location; one which would make Global IR more suitable to mainstream scholars. In an interesting move, the two authors emphasize Global IR as an approach that does not try to challenge “any particular theory” by offering “an alternative.” Rather, their goal is for Global IR to make the discipline “truly global” by offering means of overcoming its “mainly West- and indeed Anglosphere-centric” nature.

They relate the concept of Global IR to seven dimensions around which it could be structured. As the consequent discussion is based on some of these elements, a brief exploration of them is of much importance. First, the concept emerges from what they call a pluralistic universalism, with the concomitant readiness for “recognizing and respecting the diversity of humankind.” It is “grounded in world history,” making it broader than the usual focuses on “Greco-Roman, European or US history” that structure and generate much of IR scholarship. Third, extant theories and methods are to be subsumed, not supplanted. Fourth, “the study of regions, regionalisms, and Area Studies” are to be integrated into the discipline. Also, it rejects those frameworks that are grounded “on national or cultural exceptionalism.” Furthermore, there is not just “the state and material power,” but more than one form of agency playing a role in world politics. Lastly, globalization is not seen as merely influencing processes of “the diffusion of wealth, power and cultural authority,” considering also the role of interdependence and “shared fates.”

Later on, the authors also provide a list of items that should present the research agenda of Global IR. These include “discovering new patterns, theories and methods from world histories,” dealing with recent global power shifts that relate to the demise of “Western dominance,” engaging with “regional worlds” with all their interconnections, integrative employment of IR and “Area Studies knowledge,” as well as “[e]xamining how ideas and norms circulate between global and local levels,” and inter-civilisational processes of “mutual learning.” At the same time, they tie Global IR to IR theorizing by pointing to certain sources for a more global IR theory, seeing not only in contemporary Critical IR, postcolonial leaders or the practices of world politics such sources, but also in classical traditions, and in the thought of historical figures.

Acharya and Buzan take care to refrain from constraining Global IR to becoming a spatializing or totalizing concept, disconnecting it, respectively from a mere insistence on being geographically all encompassing, or just inclusive of all issue areas. The “global” presents for them at the same time “an intersubjective notion” with all the concomitant references to “interdependence and linkages between actors … and areas”. The two scholars recognize the significance, in this context, of paying special attention to “the origins and meanings of concepts and practices” as “their autonomous, comparative and connected histories and manifestations” matter a lot.

Based on Acharya and Buzan’s understanding of the “global”, their explorations of Global IR’s dimensions, its research agenda, and the elaboration of “possible sources of theorizing across regions,” there emerges a distinct framework. It is these features listed above that

Acharya and Buzan, The Making of Global International Relations, 300.
Acharya and Buzan, The Making of Global International Relations, 300.
provide in turn the basis on which to connect the discussion on Global IR to this article’s second focal point, to wit, Global Intellectual History. As is visible in Acharya and Buzan’s emphases, Global IR offers a way of tackling the new world politics of a post-Western world, without necessarily creating hermetic separations between the West and the non-West. Indeed, it is the artificiality of such an approach against which the authors explicitly warn us already at the very start of their book.29

In the aspects of Global IR that they explored, and that I emphasized above, there are certain ones which lead us to the direction of Global History, and more specifically Global Intellectual History. Let us now turn to these references, explain the only implicitly defined role for History in these new functions of Global IR, and discuss, in the following part, in more detail how the connection between Global IR and Global Intellectual History could serve to the actual realization of the former.

The most directly tackled issue concerns the role of history. While they do not spend much time discussing History as a discipline (with even some of the index entries for “History [the academic discipline]” not in fact reflecting History as a discipline), one cannot easily overlook the focus on it. Indeed, they keep repeating the formula of world history/ies when asking for a disciplinary approach (theoretical and empirical) that would not merely base itself on Western history, or Western sources of history. Looking back at the issues of Global IR’s dimensions and research items, this emphasis is clearer. What gets repeated in these lists is the relevance of broadening not merely the empirical pool of historical observations, which are criticized for having largely remained contained to a Western(-centric) past, but also the neglected importance of following the trajectory of change that various ideas can undergo (during their global voyages across tempo-spatial variations).

On a related level, one finds in their listing of Global IR’s features and tasks the readiness to deal with the contingencies of world politics that also affect the realm of ideas. Furthermore, their calls for rejecting regional or national exceptionalisms, and looking more for inter-civilizational ties lead us even more to the direction of Global Intellectual History, which is the very historiographical domain that engages with these aspects of the past. Similarly, their invitation for more work on connections between local and global level connections, when it comes to the circulation of ideas, pushes the scholarship towards the similarly developed research agenda of this new direction in History. Acharya and Buzan’s focus on interactions, interdependencies, and linkages testifies therefore further to the impact Global (Intellectual) History can make, a point I elaborate in the consequent part, explaining simultaneously the main contributions of this novel historiographical approach.

3. Global Intellectual History for Global IR

So far, the discussion has related to the brief history of the idea of a, or for some the, “Global IR.” Besides the multiple meanings of this concept, I have also aimed to show how its usage by Acharya (and Buzan) could serve us for developing helpful ways of shifting mainstream IR to a more non-Western, to wit, more post-Western direction. In this regard, one should acknowledge that such a restructuration is not essentially a process merely limited to the domain of IR. On the contrary, it affects the broader social and human sciences. Therefore, the second part of this article will focus on a neighboring discipline, History, in order to

29 See the acknowledgement section in Acharya and Buzan, The Making of Global International Relations, vii, fn. 1.
connect its own recent “global” turn, especially in the field of Intellectual History, to IR’s present concerns for its disciplinary accommodation to a more global field of research. The differentiations and definitional variances elaborated in the first part will serve as the basis for engaging with Global Intellectual History. The consequent discussion will serve as a means of presenting tools, which would enrich the quest of Global IR in broadening our understanding of world politics, with a special contribution to come from our past.

The turn to the global has already affected History as a discipline. While some historians see in this a quest to reflect the changes in world politics, economies and societies that emerged as a result of globalization and the transformations brought about by its new dynamics,30 others assert that a more inclusive historiographical approach does not necessitate the ontological background of globalization as we know it.31 In the context of these intra-disciplinary debates on the origins of a global turn in History, it is useful to comprehend that the concept, similar to its IR usages, is bereft of a single definition. Stated differently, Global History has differing meanings for various scholars.32 Nevertheless, it is possible to understand it, in a more inclusive manner, as a way of dealing with the past that tries to go beyond the 19th century product of national(istically shaped) history. Here, the focus is once again on the actors, factors, and structures that are not to be confined to the boundaries of the nation-states.33

Transnational dynamics and connections, waves of globalization, and their consequences as well as engagement with historical issues beyond temporal or spatial limits are among the main dimensions studied by Global History.34 In this context, four significant vectors play a connective role: diffusion, outreach, dispersal, and expansion.35 Such an approach also relocates Europe from its central position towards a broader but sub-global world that also includes the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin.36 Some scholars like John Darwin define Global History as an approach that enables us to study globalization with its “very long history,” rejecting associations with just the current wave of globalization.37 As Jürgen Osterhammel, a leading scholar of Global History suggests, one can still talk, not unlike in Global IR, of different types of Global Histories, reaching from comprehensive “histories of ‘something’”, universal histories, movement histories to competition histories of “material progress and backwardness,” network histories of expansion and connection histories with their focus on interactions and transfers.38

In recent years, the impact of a more global engagement with the past has also generated a major impact on a specific subfield of History, namely Intellectual History.39 For a long

32 For a comprehensive but brief introduction to the subject see Akira Iriye, Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future (Palgrave Pivot, 2013).
34 Belich, Darwin and Wickham, The Prospect of Global History, 3.
36 Belich, Darwin and Wickham, The Prospect of Global History, 4.
time focusing on thinkers and their ideas mostly in the confines of their national frameworks, Intellectual History has at other times tended to mostly extend itself to a Western-centric analysis of the impact these ideational forces had on the “others”/the Rest by supposing a one-way influence that reaches the peripheries from the core. However, the “global turn” has reached by now also the shores of Intellectual History, engendering in the process a novel historiographical approach: “Global Intellectual History.” Following Lovejoy, the “founding father” of the history of ideas/intellectual history, it becomes again important to underline that “ideas are the most migratory things in the world.” In this sense, this turn is for some also a return to the field’s origins.

This recently elaborated way of studying the past is seen by its promoters as a means of widening the field of Intellectual History by making use of the fresh insights that come from Global History. In Moyn and Sartori’s path-opening collection, the two editors emphasize that one is “at a threshold moment in the possible formation of an intellectual history extending across geographical parameters far larger than usual.” However, they are also careful in not constraining themselves with a geographical framework, stating later that Global Intellectual History could also focus more on “mediators and go-betweens” or “popularizers and the intellectual vulgate.” In this regard, the focus is on the intermediaries, those who function as transmitters of inter-regional knowledge. Most importantly, these carriers are not merely connecting the West to the non-West, but act also in the other direction. At the same time, these people process the various books, ideas, peoples’ opinions with which they interact and add (as well as subtract) their own insights to these elements. Furthermore, what emerges is not merely a trans-national, and trans-border history but also one that engages with the shifts, (mis)translations, ideational overlaps and (re)formulations.

Global Intellectual History aims to demonstrate the intricate ways in which our past has been marked by globally influential phenomena, processes, and people. What is of utmost importance is to highlight both the globality of these dimensions and the possibility of presenting a globally structured history regarding their roles and functions. It is about overcoming “scholarly parochialism” and methodological nationalism. It can be either a scholarly instrument, in the sense of a more comparatively developed framework, or a focus on an event from the past, which shows clear signs of globally marked patterns
of interactions.\textsuperscript{52} Beyond the question of whether the scholarly choice plays a bigger role than the “givenness” of “the global,”\textsuperscript{53} what matters most is the explanatory enrichment that is produced by a history dealing with ideas that takes on a global dimension. That is, we need to engage with non-national terms, and not to “scal[e] up” taken-for-granted “national frameworks to the global level.”\textsuperscript{54} Yet, it is important to stress that the exact definitional outline of the “global” is not clearly put forward, and depends in many instances on the scholar’s preference.\textsuperscript{55}

When it comes to the distinct features of Global Intellectual History, it is useful to underline the way it focuses on the actors. Here, unlike the usual pathways of Intellectual History, the focus is on those individuals, but also groups/collectives, which find or consciously situate themselves at the intersections of an idea’s global voyage. Multiple tools are offered to study these, ranging from a focus on the ideas in their circulation, to the interactions between individuals across varying geo-epistemological contexts,\textsuperscript{56} all the while trying to overcome certain nationalistically formed claims for ontological difference that end up reproducing various centrisms that resemble the Eurocentric problematique.\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, it is important to underline that in this novel setting, Western intellectual history cannot be taken for the whole of intellectual history.\textsuperscript{58}

4. Vignettes for the dialogue of “the Globals”

The preceding section provides us with a basis upon which to develop a combination of the insights and goals of Global IR with those of Global Intellectual History. In order to do this, I offer some vignettes that should help in two aspects: demonstrating potential ways of putting Global Intellectual History to the use of Global IR, and simultaneously, illustrating disciplinary overlaps in this process. The brief elaborations will serve at the same time in further exploring the insights of Global Intellectual History within a more IR-pertinent context.

However, prior to these undertakings, a brief overview of the extant connections (literature-wise) is of much pertinence. An important early contribution is an article by Phillips discussing the significance of, more broadly, Global History, for the project of Global IR, explicitly referring to Global IR’s emphasis on a different take with history.\textsuperscript{59} More recently, it has become possible to pinpoint works that offer studies at the crossroads of Global IR and Global Intellectual History.\textsuperscript{60} Due to its concomitant focus on ideas and the
expansion of international society, it is possible that the scholars from the (broader) British sphere would be most at ease to come with similar work in the future. Also, there is a recent article that provided a study on a 20th century Japanese intellectual, which openly asserted its aim to answer Acharya’s call for Global IR. Finally, a leading international historian, Armitage offers important works in the area, but outside of the realm of Global IR.

As shown in the preceding elaborations, based on the promises of Global Intellectual History, it becomes possible to connect Global IR to the former. I propose now some vignettes that would function as exploratory tools in furthering the quest for a more globally shaped IR. This way, I aim to show how recent innovations from within Global Intellectual History could help support the ongoing efforts for globalizing IR.

In Global IR literature, many discussions have focused on the relevance of finding local sources of knowledge, which could, in turn, be employed both for a better comprehension of various non-Western localities, as well as for developing distinct theories that would make use of these different insights. In this context, ideas and their carriers matter a lot. However, taking the 19th century with its wide-sweeping dynamics of change into account, not to mention the dynamics of globalization associated with the last couple of decades, one needs to be careful in stating the case for local knowledge. For much of this knowledge is, to different extents, already a result of its interaction (according to different perceptions in the form of impregnation, intoxication, innovation) with Western-derived ideas. However, at the same time, studies shaped by approaches related to Global Intellectual History caution us from conceptualizing these connections as one-way processes where the non-West is merely at the receiving end. In this regard, it is important to demonstrate the role of “transnational circulation” in the development of “social thought”.

For instance, let us take the case of the idea of positivism, which became a significant ideational source in the reformist and independentist movements in many regions including the Middle East in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. By understanding the ways in which this idea/ideology gained adherents throughout the Ottoman Empire, it becomes possible to notice both the different mechanisms that led to its variation among the local political elites and intellectuals, and to explain how the intellectual journeys changed its overall ideational

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Global IR nor with Global Intellectual History directly, positioning itself as a work of Intellectual History. Another example could be Buzan and Lawson (2016), with its focus on the 19th century that tries to go beyond the usual Eurocentric frameworks and deals with what they call the global transformation, locating the birth of modern international relations in this era. Rosenboim's more recent work even shortly refers to Global Intellectual History, but does not overlap with the interests of Global IR. See Or Rosenboim, “Threads and Boundaries: Rethinking the Intellectual History of International Relations,” in Historiographical Investigations in International Relations, ed. Brian C. Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot (The Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought. Cham: Springer International, 2019), 97–125.

61 Felix Rösch and Atsuko Watanabe, “Approaching the Unsynthesizable in International Politics: Giving Substance to Security Discourses through Basso Ostinato?,” European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 3(2017): 609–29. They refer to him multiple times and offer also an Intellectual History that is conscious of the insights from Global (Intellectual) History literature. Yet, they do not directly talk of Global Intellectual History as such.

62 See David Armitage, “The International Turn in Intellectual History,” in Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History, ed. Darrin M McMahon and Samuel Moyn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 232–52, for his effort to move Intellectual History to an international direction, where he asserts that ideas are naturally beyond-the-national. See especially p. 234. It is important to stress that Armitage (2013), although much praised, would not be in line with many Global IRers’ quest for less Western-centric studies.


64 Hill, “Conceptual Universalization,” 140; and p. 151 on the transnational intellectual field that was also developing during the 19th century outside of Europe.

65 See M. Sait Özervarlı, “Positivism in the Late Ottoman Empire: The ‘Young Turks’ as Mediators and Multipliers,” in The Worlds of Positivism, ed. Johannes Feichtinger, Franz L. Fillafer, and Jan Surman (Cham: Springer International, 2018), 81–108.

66 Following Bell, “Making and Taking Worlds,” 261, this focus can provide a significant contribution to Global Intellectual History, as one also needs to look at how “world makers themselves are made”.

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luggage, generating unexpected outcomes also in the sphere of international relations. As many of the modernizing elites were heavily influenced by positivism, considering the features and transformations of this outlook could play a much needed role in offering more illuminating studies on the post-Ottoman Empire restructurations in this region.

A further element, which one can also approach in a different and more comprehensive manner, with the help of Global Intellectual History, is the impact and influence of transmitting agents. As already pointed out above in discussing the approach of Acharya and Buzan, IR could become more global by engaging intensively with the role of scholars and thinkers from across the globe. It is at this crossroads that the greatest contributions can originate from more ties to Global Intellectual History. The position of agents with their transnational connections was shown earlier to be one of the distinct features of this novel historiographical turn. At the same time, such a focus should not merely be about connecting the non-West to the West, for it also promises new insights into intra-Western interactions that have been often ignored. With the role of German émigré scholars for the development of IR only lately emerging as a topic of research, it becomes clear that much more needs to be done in order to expand our knowledge about various channels of scholarly interaction, be it direct influence, issues of (mis)translation, or conceptual journeys that at times create more enriched meanings. Most importantly, paying such attention to scholarly undertakings within IR also enables us to be more careful when dealing with the realm of ideas. Otherwise, there awaits often the looming threat of seeing ideas as “timeless entities” leading to their “reification or hypostasisation”.

In the realm of ideas, Global Intellectual History warns us about the dangers of a “modernist bias,” meaning that we should not just focus on the modern era when we look for the global. However, in line with the relevance of the late modern period for IR, I want to point to a 20th century case, a detailed study of which could present us with a better understanding of global politics. Decolonization, leading to a large number of newly independent states is usually taken into consideration in the context of the concomitant West-East confrontation, with less

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67 According to Samuel Moyn, “On the Nonglobalization of Ideas,” in Moyn and Sartori, Global Intellectual History, see especially 190, it is still possible that some ideas do not get globalized. In this regard, he is critical of the built-in tendency of certain approaches to give the subaltern agency the role of merely fulfilling their pre-ordained destiny in the context of West-East connections and interactions. This is the idea of autoglobalization. However, the case of positivism shows that these ideas were changed, and/or enriched, by non-Western recipients.


69 It is important to add that this feature would make it still not in line with the expectations of some Global Intellectual Historians who favor overcoming the premise that leading ideas originated in Europe and were later on globalized via indigenization elsewhere. See for example Janaki Bakhle, “Putting Global Intellectual History in Its Place in Moyn and Sartori, Global Intellectual History, 232–33. Yet, my example shows also sings that reject a unilinear influence, the aspect that forms part of Bakhle’s critique, for the very world political consequences of the “original” ideational influence led to unexpected outcomes in the Middle Eastern context.


attention being paid to North-South cross-cutting ties. In this regard, the distinct Yugoslav position under Tito’s co-initiated project of the Non-Aligned Movement\textsuperscript{76} could emerge as a useful topic of analysis when it comes to the voyage of ideas and the people who carry, receive, modify and transfer them further. Such a shift of emphasis would be in line with expectations of Global IR in the sense of a broader global outlook, especially when it comes to Yugoslavia’s relations with the Global South, thanks to its leading role in this movement. In addition, such a focus could show that a non-Western, non-Southern state could have ties to countries of the Global South in a way that was not merely shaping both actors’ ideational worlds (social imaginaries)\textsuperscript{77} but also changing ideas and mental approaches that had their earlier impact in other contexts of relationships (such as race).\textsuperscript{78} Under circumstances when Yugoslavia itself followed a distinct type of socialism, in its own West-East interaction,\textsuperscript{79} it is clear that a closer engagement with ideas and their differing meaning would generate a much-needed history on Yugoslavia’s role at the intersection of the ideological and geographical dimensions.\textsuperscript{80} This would be a further example of a globally structured intellectual history to IR; one that would also overcome the latter’s Western-centric nature where even Europe’s non-Western regions remain below the radar.

5. Conclusion
The preceding sections established a connection between Global IR and Global Intellectual History, with the addition of some vignettes above that served to elaborate a number of additional aspects of relevance for this interdisciplinary move. This closing section first emphasizes how to create an even broader interdisciplinary framework when it comes to study and understand “the global” in a more comprehensive manner, pointing to a possible triangulation between Global IR, Global Intellectual History, and Global Historical Sociology. Finally, I conclude by putting forward a number of suggestions on how to make the most of Global IR in terms of its prospects in turning IR into a leading player in the broader focus on “the global.” Particularly, this pertains to doing it in a manner that can indeed overcome the discipline’s Western-centric engagements with its subject matters and in the context of its theorizing efforts.

After having shown the usefulness of paying more attention to Global History, and more specifically to Global Intellectual History, for realizing the aims of Global IR, it is also important to acknowledge that one should not stop at this. On the contrary, there is an open space for research with its not much taken paths that includes also other branches of social sciences. In this regard, combining Global IR and Global Intellectual History could


\textsuperscript{80} Acharya and Buzan, The Making of Global International Relations, 308, mention how the Bandung Conference had a major impact on the idea of sovereignty. The Yugoslav role at the Non-Aligned Movement, especially in its context of Yugoslav-African educational cooperation and university students could provide further insights into how such relationships redefined extant ideational frameworks and had an impact on mentalities. Their consequent influence on world politics is not to be ignored.
serve as just one of many novel approaches to develop. A special role could pertain to the domain of (International) Historical Sociology, or its recent expansion in the shape of Global Historical Sociology. As Osterhammel has also pointed out, with History taking a global turn, it is now easier to relate it, and Intellectual History specifically, more easily to Historical Sociology. This demonstrates to us as scholars of IR the advantages of broadening our interest in neighboring humanities and social sciences in ways that would enable Global IR to connect to similarly formed research interests, gaining in the process new insights and a chance to contribute to this broader focus on “the global.” It is even possible therefore to imagine a triangulated effort connecting the political, the sociological, and the historical.

In light of these interdisciplinary connections, a turn towards a/the Global IR also offers the discipline a means of playing a vanguard role in the broader fields of humanities and social sciences. This can be done thanks to its relatively early-comer status in the “global turn.” As both Global History and (Global) Historical Sociology are rather unsecure within their own fields, IR’s leading role in the study of the “global” in a truly global manner could also make it a prominent player in this turn. Such a move would also contribute to overcome growing fears on the discipline’s unsuccessful competition with other social sciences.

I want to conclude with some further suggestions that refer to our tasks and options ahead. First, a closer focus on Global Intellectual History necessitates a more intensive employment of archival research, or getting familiar with the relevant secondary literature. Much of this can also require comprehensive linguistic skills in order to access documents directly. Second, IR scholars should also be prepared to go beyond their usual textual horizons, following recent calls for dealing with non-textual material in gaining access to the knowledge and ideational frameworks of various cultures. Such a readiness could pave the way for evaluating different societies within the confines of their, at times distinct, practices of producing and sharing knowledge.

Third, intra-IR theoretical or paradigmatic differences will still play a major role in determining our ways of engagement. Notwithstanding Acharya and Buzan’s preference for non-discrimination among theories (but merely a wish for their broadening by interaction with non-Western sources), especially realism could have difficulties in realizing the promises of Global IR. However, even there it seems important to underline how a close attention for ideas could play a significant role in furthering this theory itself. By understanding how an idea like Realpolitik has undergone a dramatic conceptual transformation before reaching the realist shores, it becomes clear that there is much to be gained with a focus on Global Intellectual History. Fourth, engaging with Global Intellectual History means not only looking at the

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85 For a similar effort that focuses on the connections between Historical Sociology and Global History see Andrew Zimmerman, “Conclusion: Global Historical Sociology and Transnational History – History and Theory Against Eurocentrism,” in Global Historical Sociology, edited by Julian Go and George Lawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 221–40.
86 Osterhammel, “Global History,” 42.
89 Acharya and Buzan, The Making of Global International Relations. 306.
historical past, but also focusing on the intermediaries, popularizers, transmitters, that is, agents who have developed, changed, (mis)translated, and vulgarized existing ideas. In this regard, Global IR’s much emphasized quest for a more intensive engagement with classical thought, as well as different past and present thinkers and political leaders, needs to be strengthened by turning our attention to recent methodological, and epistemological debates that emerged with the impact of Global (Intellectual) History.

Last but not least, Global IR carries in itself, perhaps unconsciously, the seeds of a gradual return to its earlier interwar years, to a time when it used to be more interdisciplinary in its approaches. Here lies thus a novel promise that should lead us to re-think our discipline’s role in a period of globality, with all its opportunities and dangers. Engaging with neighboring disciplines, be it History or Sociology, with their specialized subfields that offer possibilities for intensive cooperation, is the step ahead.

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93 See fn. 15.


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Dialogue of the “Globals”...


Widening the ‘Global Conversation’: Highlighting the Voices of IPE in the Global South

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**Abstract**

The field of IPE has traditionally being conceptualized as an Anglo Saxon construct, in this paper we argue that it is critically important to reflect on the way IPE has developed outside the mainstream, in the periphery, focusing on the case studies of Africa – in particular South Africa; Asia – in particular China; and South America, in order to start a conversation that engages with the contributions of peripheral IPE. By bringing to light the way IPE has been approached in these regions of the world we identify problems, ideas, and concerns different from those in the North and which also call attention to the necessity of a conscious reading of these works and to opening a dialogue and comparison among them. The paper explores the contributions made by IPE in Africa, Asia and South America in order to discuss the possibility of widening IPE’s ‘global conversation’ including peripheral approaches.

**Keywords:** International Relations, dialogue, political economy, Global South

1. **Introduction**

In 2008 Benjamin Cohen in his book “International Political Economy (IPE): An Intellectual History” proposed a global conversation within the IPE field. However, the center of that ‘global’ dialogue was American and British IPEs, focused on English speaking authors and approaches as he mainly explored the composition of IPE in the United States and Europe. Along the same lines, in the last decades several authors have started to reflect about academic fields like International Relations (IR) and IPE, in close connection with the growing development that those fields have had around the globe. This development has spurred a number of criticisms about Western approaches in both IR\(^1\) and more incipiently

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in IPE,\textsuperscript{2} that strive to develop new lines of research that bring the periphery\textsuperscript{3} to the center of the scene, constructing alternative contributions to those imposed and/or disseminated from the centers of world power. Thus, lately, some relevant studies have emerged on the role that national and regional schools occupy within social sciences and the work of numerous scholars has aimed at making them more ‘global’.\textsuperscript{4} As Beigel points out, “the main differences between mainstream academies and peripheral circuits are not precisely in the lack of indigenous thinking, but in the historical structure of academic autonomy”\textsuperscript{5}; in other words, the scarce recognition and awareness of peripheral knowledge in mainstream debates. A global approach to IPE does not mean just setting the lens at the global level; on the contrary it means as Narlikar brings up that “we no longer allow the marginalization of the ‘rest’...from the mainstream debate. It means not being ‘critical’ for the sake of it, but engaging with content from the South/ the regions – be it theoretical or empirical- on its own terms. The two keywords that define this content are inclusiveness and pluralism”\textsuperscript{6}. 

Political economy is about the sources of political power and its uses for economic ends; it is about the co-constitutive relations among the market, the state and the society. As power distribution varies around the globe, so does development and its approach to it. As Benjamin Cohen puts it, “the field of International Political Economy (IPE) teaches us how to think about the connections between economics and politics beyond the confines of a single state”.\textsuperscript{7} However, not all states look alike. As ideas and knowledge travel, so do disciplines. The way IPE developed in the center set the main bases of its study in other regions of the world, focusing on the way markets and power operate worldwide. However, when approaching the way IPE developed in the periphery, particularities emerged, and a whole set of conceptualizations and questions that differ in great manner from those in the center have appeared. Markets, states and power are main concerns in the capitalist world we live in but the way we think about that interaction changes if we are on one side of the globe or the other(s). Enquiries, ideas, methodologies and analysis in the periphery are proof of that. Thinking capitalism from the core - namely Europe and the US - has a completely different approach than thinking it from other areas of the world; thinking capitalism from the perspective of developed countries is completely different from thinking it from that of the developing world or as an emerging economy. Problems and approaches vary depending on how you are inserted in the international economy structure, if you are a rule maker or a rule taker, if you are a producer of manufactures or a commodity exporter, if you are a creditor or a debtor.

Within this framework, we highlight the global character of IPE not in its scope but mainly in the recognition of its theoretical and empirical roots. We also ask, what are the main drivers that IPE has experienced in Africa, China and South America? We compare


\textsuperscript{3} We adopt the center-periphery distinction to point out the difference between mainstream American and European academic circuits and those in the periphery of knowledge production and circulation.


\textsuperscript{5} Fernanda Beigel, The Politics of Academic Autonomy in Latin America (Routledge, 2016).


\textsuperscript{7} Cohen, International Political Economy, 1.
these regions in order to understand how peripheral IPE has developed and also to highlight its main and barely recognized contributions within the mainstream IPE. Since IPE as a field started to develop in the 1970s in the core, it is assumed that its main ideas then traveled to the periphery in the following decades; but in fact, many of the main IPE questions were being explored in Latin America and other regions as development debates or dependency debates much before this decade. In this sense, it is important to consider whether IPE’s conversation can be international given that ‘globalizing’ fields of research can also constitute a trap to achieve those knowledge international standards. As globalization itself became a way of homogenization and westernization of the rest of the world, making disciplines more global (despite such efforts’ good intentions) could also be, on the one hand, the way the mainstream comprises concepts and ideas from other regions of the world but does nothing with them and, on the other hand, the ways in which the periphery embraces mainstream and critical IPE concepts to adapt its own IPE production to mainstream standards imposed from the North. In this sense, we can think of IPE as being global in its subject study, but we can question its globalizing scope in Western academic terms showing the risk that internationalization creates for the way different parts of the world approach IPE in its own terms. Making it global can also mean making peripheral problems more diffuse, blurry and imperceptible, which can imply that the only ones capable of thinking about and developing solutions to those problems are the same ones that cause them. In this sense, inclusiveness can only be assured if we are ready to take into account excluded voices and pluralism can only be achieved if we are willing to recognize alternative ideas, theories and even practices.

In this paper we address the way IPE developed outside the mainstream, in the periphery, focusing on the case studies of Africa – particularly South Africa; Asia - particularly China; and South America in order to call for a deeper and stronger conversation among peripheral countries and with the intention of enhancing a debate about their own production and debates leaving aside mainstream standards. We assume the core to be mainstream Western or Anglo-Saxon IPE (specially developed in the US and the UK), while the periphery will be constituted by non-western and Global South approaches. Bringing to light the way that IPE has been addressed in these regions of the world will allow us to identify problems, ideas, and concerns different from those in the North, and also call attention to the necessity of conscious reading of these works in order to develop suitable solutions to the market-power dynamics affecting ‘the rest of the world’. It seeks to explore the contributions made by locally grounded IPE in order to open up discussion about the possibility of widening IPE’s ‘global conversation’ to include peripheral approaches and embracing its contributions in an inclusive way.

2. From Decolonization to Foreign Aid: The Basis of the IPE Field in Africa

African IPE has been almost entirely unexamined, and disciplinary reflections on it are mostly nonexistent. Although IPE as a field of research--as considered in Western universities--is quite new, in African research institutions studies on development and political economy relations date back to the 1960s when IR was first being institutionalized as a discipline. In
fact, development studies pioneered the studies of IR along with debates on decolonization. As can be seen in the Latin American case, in Development Studies a political economy dimension was present from the beginning but not considered within Western/mainstream IPE standards as part of the field. Structural and institutional factors were assigned a key role in the development process. As Ohiorhenuan and Keeler pointed out, in the initial phase of the field, the state was also assigned a large role in promoting development almost as an historical imperative.\(^{10}\) Dependency theorists in the 1960s and 1970s explicitly introduced a political economy dimension to analyze the asymmetric relationships among the industrial primary producing countries.\(^{11}\) As such, Development Studies considered within the wider definition of IPE have a long tradition in Africa. Questions of poverty, development, and underdevelopment have always been key in the debates concerning African IPE.\(^{12}\)

In Africa, IR works that “travelled” were developed more from outside the continent\(^{13}\) than from within, often defined and oriented by the dominant international and geopolitical agendas of the day.\(^{14}\) In Western IR, although they haven’t been completely absent, African states have not constituted a key core theoretical concern of either IR or IPE. This lack of attention by the IR field is still surprising. Where there have been attempts at bringing Africa into the fold, it has been done from the perspective of ‘what can Western IR do to incorporate Africa’, rather than ‘what can we learn from Africa.’\(^{15}\) a trend that is similar in all the regions addressed in this paper. In fact, the literature on colonialism and imperialism in Africa existed parallel to the development of mainstream western IR but was left aside by it.

Within IPE, the main change was made during the postwar and postcolonial era, when world system theory and ‘development studies’ began considering Africa as part of the debate. These investigations acknowledged that the economic governance structures of the former colonial metropole directed the postcolonial economies.\(^{16}\) However, we argue that as development studies have always been separated from IPE, and African countries were only included in the analysis as ‘case studies’ but not as agents of knowledge production, the local contribution of African IPE has been under-recognized in Western IPE.

After political independence, the preoccupation was the search for economic and social independence. During the 1970s, debates within African IPE were mainly focused on inequalities, but the orthodox paradigms were more preoccupied with notions of modernization, political capacity, and political responsiveness, as well as with concepts of development, adaptation, integration, and unity. Social scientists borrowed from the Latin American ‘dependentist’ school in their aim to develop their own approach to local problems. Scholars such as Samir Amin and Walter Rodney focused their research on the causes of Africa’s underdevelopment.\(^{17}\) This line opened the path to a neo-Marxist approach led by

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\(^{11}\) Ohiorhenuan and Keeler, “International Political Economy”.


\(^{14}\) Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent* (Routledge, 2004).

\(^{15}\) Smith, “Reshaping International Relations.”


\(^{17}\) Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale* (Monthly Review Press, 1974); Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal
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Amin and Segun Osoba, who criticized other scholars for being super-structural and state-centric, and for assuming the state in the developing world as an autonomous actor rather than an instrument of foreign states and global capitalism. Along with Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems approach most African representatives of this school highlighted the external constraints imposed on African societies, and focused their attention on emerging class conflicts. However, as Ofuho points out, although providing new insights into the role of capitalism in constraining African development, this approach was not in vogue for long: “Dependency theory imposed uniformity in the study of contemporary Africa, thus treating the continent as if it were a homogenous entity. In concentrating upon external sources of dependency, it also failed to consider the intricacies of the domestic political upheavals that engaged in the continent during the 1970s and the 1980s”.

Along the same lines, Algerian jurist, Mohammed Bedjaoui, provided the most elaborate legal-theoretical articulation of how to accomplish the economic objectives of the New International Economic Order. Bedjaoui criticized the existing formal structure of international law, as organized to systematically favor former imperial powers, reflecting and enabling the structural inequality of the global economy.

In the 1990s, the centrality of neoliberal economic arguments began to be challenged from African IPE with a pragmatic perspective. After more than two decades of liberal market reform throughout much of Africa, belief in the positive power and effects of markets alleviating the African economic condition began to be opened to empirical contestation in the region. There was no firm consensus on the effects of liberal market reforms in Africa, but a powerful and growing African perspective began to argue that these reforms not only failed to improve the African condition, but made it worse. The importance of this perspective as a criticism of the liberal paradigm cannot be overstated, because if true, the liberal assumption in international relations of open markets offering opportunities for mutual gain was out of necessity opened up to question.

Despite the contributions outlined above, African IPE as a constituted and institutionalized field is quite new by Anglo-Saxon academic standards. Scholars working on the field have been mainly based in universities’ departments and think tanks that emerged in order to deal with African IR, particularly Africa’s place in the global economy and African security issues. In South Africa, for example, The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and to a lesser extent the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISSUP) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) have led the debates on IR.

References:


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*Development* (Hassocks: Haverster Press, 1977); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Verso Trade, 2018); Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale*. 
and, to a lesser extent, IPE. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) based in Dakar, Senegal has been mainly focused on security and education issues, but has included some IPE works among its publications.24

Regarding the dissemination of African IPE works, we found that IPE journals are scarce in Africa. The most specialized journal both in terms of relevance and theme, is the *Review of African Political Economy* (ROAPE), which has been published by Taylor & Francis since 1974. Although not specifically international, this journal brings together the main debates by African and non-African scholars about Africa’s IPE. The first article of the first issue was Samir Amin’s seminal work “Accumulation and development: a theoretical model”.25 The most relevant journals publishing IR issues, both based in South Africa, are *Politikon*, the journal of the South African Association of Political Science (SAAPS), and the *South African Journal of International Affairs* (SAJIA) published by SAIIA.

In recent decades African IPE has been addressing the specificity of African economies, marked by the participation of foreign actors in their economic structure, also discussing foreign aid and its consequences, issues which have marked a strong part of African IPE debates. In South Africa, although not much IPE doctoral work has been produced, such specialization is to be found in university teaching at Cape Town, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Rhodes and Stellenbosch. More recent African IPE has focused, firstly, on the political and economic implications of foreign aid, especially addressing the administration of these funds and the political and economic implications they have on the continent.26 The actors involved in the administration of the funds also differ from other regions of the world. Compared to Latina America or Asia, a large percentage of the capital entering and exiting African economies either is mediated by public-sector organizations and/or NGOs, or is not captured in official records.


Though the IPE field started to develop in the 1970s and took off in the mid 1980s it was not until the 1990s that it began to emerge in China. Song27 attributed the neglected of IPE in China to the following reasons: mutual isolation of universities from research institutions in a situation in which scholars studying international politics knew little about international economy and vice versa, and an approach based on policy-oriented research and applied studies, given that academic research in China has a close link with national policies. In this sense, the Marxian theoretical approach was central until the 1990s when western IPE as a set of concepts caught on quickly among Chinese scholars.

There was an important level of academic insularity in China that was understandable, given the relatively limited involvement that the country experienced in international markets in the 1970s and 1980s.28 In this sense, the dominant approaches to studying China’s international relations and IPE overemphasized the national level of analysis and

were built on statist and realist notions of international relations that are also reflected in the way in which IPE has emerged as a field of enquiry within China itself. Most academic explanations of China’s reforms, and even its foreign policy, have been based on domestic politics and have paid less attention to the international dimension. Song argues that “the divides which separate disciplines and institutions are still very deep in China,” and that this is a consequence of “the social setting in which the study of IR and IPE in China takes place – namely, the dominance of policy related research, the residual ideology, and the fact that the state remains a very powerful force in current China.” These factors combined reinforce the separation of disciplines and have obstructed the emergence of an IPE field, which considers the importance of non-state actors and economics in general.”

Given that IPE is by definition multidisciplinary and international in its underpinnings, the separation of disciplines and the focus on domestic rather than international variables have worked as impeding forces to the development of the field.

Nonetheless, some ideas have gained traction and influence, but with some important differences from the basic assumptions of IPE in the West. Particularly, the roots in Marxian thinking as the official doctrine since 1949 and China’s socialist economy were simply too powerful, preventing changes in global prices or international economic forces from affecting domestic prices, domestic supply and demand. According to Chin, Pearson and Yong

As Marxist ideology dominated Chinese society until the 1980s, academic studies in IPE strictly followed the Communist Party line. Triggered by economic reforms after 1980, the previous hard stand taken by the government was softened in order to justify the need of inviting foreign capital, technology, and professionals to China. As they were mainly from the West, the inflow of information including international institutions, whether regionally or politically orientated (NATO or the European Union) or economy-related (the IMF and World Bank among others), this interaction taught the Chinese how to deal with or make use of their functions in the world.

The global rise of China and particularly China’s ‘open policy,’ and its deeper engagement with the global economy allowed a more suitable environment for Western IPE to become known by Chinese scholars. In the 1990s a new momentum triggered by the promotion to a higher level of the open-door policy supported by Deng Xiaoping to open China up to foreign investments vis-à-vis high-speed economic growth, allowed for the introduction of mainstream IPE. Concepts such as globalization and interdependence began to be widely discussed in China and, given the more open times, IPE escaped the typical fate of Western international relations theories that usually were suspected, selectively introduced, criticized and modified.

In general, the development of IPE in China is divided into three phases. The first phase,

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29 Xinning, “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics.”
31 Chin, Pearson, and Yong, “Introduction–IPE with China’s Characteristics”.
which lasted until the 1990s, marked a period in which a Marxist view and structuralist ideas dominated the field. The second phase, which started in the 1990s, is when the field became institutionalized as the Ministry of Education recognized IPE as an official subject to study in international politics and diplomacy. While the very first texts on IPE lean on classical Marxist views, later ones began to incorporate Western ideas as the IPE field blossomed in many universities. Finally, a third period began in the 2000s, as Western IPE became fully incorporated in Chinese academia and began to share similarities with the Global North debates.

Looking within China there is a diversity of IPE views, but three concepts have been key in Chinese IPE: development; hegemony; and globalization. These concepts have been related with the Chinese need to respond to changes in official policy and the norms of the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In this sense, we agree with Chin, Pearson and Yong that Chinese IPE is powerfully induced by political power and the role of the CCP defining the parameters of the policy and academic debates, which are closely intertwined and which set ideas as the dominant and correct approach.

Finally, in terms of publishing venues, there are various journals that publish IPE articles in China, among the most relevant appear to be *Comparative Economic and Social Systems, International Economic Review, International Politics Quarterly, Studies on Marxism, and World Economics and Politics*, most of which are published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. *The Journal China Political Economy* is an online journal that was launched in 2018 and is managed by an editor on Nanjing University. However, taking a look at the articles that are published we see a trend in which IPE topics are not the majority of the issues addressed in these publications. They also tend to publish mainly Chinese authors, showing that, despite embracing Western IPE, true internationalization of their journals is still rare.

As Chin, Pearson and Yong point out, there are various institutions that currently offer programs that study IPE, among them Renmin University China (People’s University), which was the first to incorporate the study of IPE in the 1990s, as well as also other institutions such as Fudan University and Peking University that developed specialized programs in the late 1990s or start of the 2000s. In a similar vein, recently, in 2011, the CASS created the Institute of World Economy and Politics. The spread of programs, journals and academics shows that the IPE field is gradually consolidating in China and is embracing new approaches related to the West.

4. **Dependency, Development and Regionalism in South American IPE**

Diana Tussie points out that, in South America, IPE had two strong pushes: the first ignition marked by the impulse of Dependency theory; and another more recent one, in the 1990s, with the creation of Mercosur, the re-launching of the Andean Community and the blossoming of the regional integration debate. This second stimulus gave a less deterministic tone to academic

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36 Chin, Pearson, and Yong, “Introduction–IPE with China’s Characteristics”.
37 Chin, Pearson, and Yong, “Introduction–IPE with China’s Characteristics”.
research that at the same time initiated a dialogue and a more intimate interaction with public policy. Both show the great amount of changes that have marked the development of IPE, granting them their own characteristics and altering their course. This approach to IPE and theoretical developments transcended national borders to become a phenomenon of regional scale. That is why it wouldn’t be accurate to address these contributions as exclusively of one country, although much of the debate was in fact driven by Raúl Prebisch, an Argentine intellectual. Since its beginnings, Latin American IPE has been a phenomenon that developed at the regional level and that stimulated studies on this and other branches of the discipline in many Latin American countries. While various scholars in Latin America have emerged from development, others have close ties with Economic History and Sociology, enabling spaces for situated knowledge and even more important, methodologically, for considering wider conceptions of agency. 

Within this framework, the study of regions and regionalism acquired special relevance. This does not imply that this has been the only contribution of Latin American IPE but it has been the one that emerged as one of the most relevant research issues within the IR discipline, along with the more preponderant studies of foreign policy and international security. Latin American versions of Developmental Sociology and Developmental Economics, based on structuralism, critical sociology and dependency theory, were expressions of the ability of social scientists in the region to confront dominant ideas in the international debate questioning conventional wisdom and transforming it to reinvent it. This origin opened up the door to multidisciplinary works, allowing a fertile ground for IPE to grow.

In Latin American IR, field attention has mainly been centered on such issues as the Cold War, Defense, and Security, and national and regional Foreign Policies, with indifference and even denial given to the gravity of economic forces and market operators. It is in part for this reason that IPE constantly calls into question analyses that presume an excessive autonomy of economics over politics. For Guzzini, for example, IPE emerged as a reaction, partly in favor and partly against, the much more systemic--but restricted--neorealist IR theory proposed by Kenneth Waltz.

By the end of the 1970s, political economy gained strength from scholars’ discomfort with the distance between abstract models of political and economic behavior and what was really happening in Latin American economies and politics. At the same time, economic crises were becoming increasingly politicized while concerns within political systems on economic factors started to increase.

Economics and Economic Sociology were key fields in Latin America that contributed to the development of an approach to IR where new actors and processes were included in a field that, as noted earlier, was traditionally centered on the State as the main actor and producer of international relations. The inclusion of economic variables and forces into the dynamics of foreign relations was mainly motivated, in its beginnings, by the regional integrationist

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41 Tussie, “Relaciones internacionales y economía política internacional”.
42 Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (Routledge, 2013).
proposals as the peripheral place of the region in international economic relations was assumed. As a result, from the first works of Argentine engineer Alejandro Bunge and his proposal to create a Southern Customs Union, to the integrationist project of the 1960s, led by Raúl Prebisch and Latin American developmentalists, studies on regional integration have marked and promoted IPE in Latin America. As a result, by the 1960s, center-periphery tensions established a new understanding of international politics. At the same time, the IR field started to be recognized as an autonomous discipline as it was institutionalized in universities in the context of a growing sense of urgency regarding the political and economic dependence of the region. Thus, three schools can be seen as key in the development of IPE in South America: structuralism; dependency; and autonomy; all three of which have close links to the analysis of practical problems that the region was experiencing.

Until the 1980s, IPE was marked by studies on regional integration and regionalism, constituting also one of the main contributions from Latin America to global IR and with a clear Southern perspective closely related to the emergence and development of regional organizations. In a way, to draw parallels with the European process, while the theory of European regional integration had its roots in the Social Sciences, Latin American regional integration has its roots in Latin American political economy and, more specifically, in a regional vision of IPE.

This Latin American IPE knowledge production was developed in a group of regional institutions, among the most important ones highlighted in the literature being the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC), created in 1948; the Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO), founded in 1957; the Institute for Integration of Latin America (INTAL), originated in 1965; the Latin American Council for Social Sciences (CLACSO), organized in 1967; and the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA) and the Argentine Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES), both dating from 1975. Over the years, many universities in the region have been addressing IPE topics inspired by the debates produced by these regional institutions.

In the 2000s, new agendas and approaches to South American regionalism emerged, accompanying the creation of new regional organizations such as the Bolivarian Alliance of the People of Our Americas (ALBA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), regional groupings that were labeled by the literature as postliberal, posthegemonic, and post-trade. These
approaches delineated a new set of conceptualizations to explain the turn in policy. Since UNASUR and CELAC had a rich agenda of functional cooperation, they opened up the studies of sectoral agendas of cooperation in regionalism, ranging from defense, drugs and security, health, and migration to infrastructure, energy and the environment. This new set of regional arrangements and the variety of issues and evolving agendas bringing them together led to the debate on what kind of regionalism and overlapping of institutions the region was experiencing.

Many of the debates on regionalism and regional cooperation were published not only in books but also in South American journals. In terms of specific journals publishing IPE articles in South America, for those that belong to the Scimago-Scopus database, we can only mention the *Brazilian Journal of Political Economy*, but there is a group of journals in political science and international relations that tend to publish IPE articles even though are not exclusively dedicated to IPE topics. Among them the most relevant ones publishing IPE articles are *Colombia Internacional* (Colombia), *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (Brazil), and *Estudos Internacionais* (Brazil). There has also been an important trend in the region to create new International Relations and Political Science journals that publish IPE articles, among them we can mention *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales and Desarrollo Económico* (Argentina), *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política* (Uruguay), *Contexto Internacional* (Colombia), *Lua Nova* (Brazil), *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* (Brazil), *Revista de Sociología e Política and Carta Internacional* (Brazil); and *Análisis Político and Desafíos* (Colombia), as being among the most relevant ones.

5. IPE and the Limits of the Global Conversation: Bringing the Periphery in

Political economy has always been part of IR and as such, IPE (and IR in general) has been considered a discipline designed by and especially outlined by the experiences and problems of the US and European central countries. This reality determined not only who dominated the field but also which tools and debates would constitute its mainstream. In recent years, this deep and ponderous intellectual dominance has led to many reflections from different parts of the world on the task of developing their own approaches or recovering local and regional ones to offer a broader vision of the discipline, alerted by its narrowness and by the denial of the existence of voices, experiences, knowledge, and perspectives from outside the centers. Also exposed have been the limitations of theories and approaches developed by presented at LASA Congress, San Francisco, May 25, 2012).


the centers to explain—and specially to modify—the realities of the periphery. Therefore, the reflection has focused on the one-way street in the circulation of knowledge between center and periphery, and, for the focus of this paper, how that circulation has marked the way IPE has developed in other parts of the world.

It is known that IPE has achieved its greatest development in the English-speaking world, both in methodological and theoretical terms. As Benjamin Cohen points out, "globally, the dominant version of IPE (we might even say the hegemonic version) is one that has developed in the United States, where most scholarship tends to stay close to the norms of conventional social science" and where ‘the other’ is only British IPE. As a result, on the one hand, geographically, Anglo-Saxon academia became the reference point for the development of IPE in the world, while on the other hand, the study of ‘the other’ has been mainly focused on the transatlantic dialogue between North American and British IPE. In theoretical terms, the conversation tends to leave behind Marxism, critical IPE studies and many idiosyncratic views that do not encompass a dialogue with Anglo-Saxon mainstream IPE or incorporate their methodological standards.

To make this scenario even more complex, in the periphery, the adoption of theories and ideas from the centers were largely accepted indiscriminately without considering the structural differences among geographies. When compared with the experience of the US and European countries, the study of IPE in the periphery may seem relatively recent, but it is certainly not absent or completely new. While the development of IPE in the center came about due to challenges arising from the dynamics between markets and power, in other regions of the world the field and its main formulations developed in association with the emergence of real challenges from both the international economic scenario and the different strategies of insertion into the global economy developed by those regions. IPE in the periphery has been marked by the struggle for economic development, access to credit and foreign aid, debt payment, regional integration to access a better international insertion, and adding value to its exports. These concerns put the focus on different needs and required different approaches from those of developed countries to understand their realities.

The discussion on the place that periphery has in mainstream debates has been mainly addressed by IR scholars. Several authors have pointed out the narrowness of IR theory that has arisen from the Western world centers does not serve to explain the reality of those located in the periphery because they left aside voices, experiences, knowledge and perspectives from outside of the centers. For this reason, in recent years we have witnessed an increasing reflexivity among IR scholars to incorporate a new agenda for research and to bring other IR perspectives to the center of the stage, different from those imposed from the Anglo-Saxon debates. Thus, many scholars have gathered around the need to outline a global agenda centered on the place that regional and national schools have within the IR field.

59 Cohen, International Political Economy.
60 Cohen, International Political Economy, 3.
63 Deciancio, “International Relations from the South.”
Widening the ‘Global Conversation’…

This attempt has seen only limited efforts within IPE. However, some efforts have been made among scholars in and from the periphery to think IPE differently and bring to light the specificity of the field to think their own realities, understand their own problems and policy challenges, and design their own solutions to them. In this sense, bringing together the way IPE developed in places like Africa, Asia, and South America allows us to search and encourage new channels of dialogue among Global IPE scholars. IPE from the south brings a class relational and inequality perspective that it has been left aside by mainstream debates. The following table compares the way in which IPE has evolved in the three regions explored here, in terms of topics, theoretical approaches, and the main centers that played a key role encouraging the underpinnings of the field.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions/Dimensions</th>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Theoretical approaches</th>
<th>Centers that originated IPE thinking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Decolonization, Development, Foreign aid</td>
<td>Marxism, decolonial studies, mainstream IPE (specially from studies made from abroad)</td>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), Institute for Strategic Studies (ISSUP) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Hegemony, globalization, development</td>
<td>Marxism, and recently mainstream IPE</td>
<td>Renmin University China (People’s University) Fudan University, Peking University and the CASS Institute of World Economy and Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>Development and regionalism</td>
<td>Marxism, structuralism, recently new eclectic approaches</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO), Institute for Integration of Latin America (INTAL), Latin American Council for Social Sciences (CLACSO), Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration

6. Conclusions

Robert Cox pointed out that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose”. In the case of the regions addressed in this paper we have demonstrated that in IPE, locally grounded theory has sought to speak for excluded and marginalized groups in the case of Africa; Marxism and the state in the case of China; and development and the public sector in Latin America. The main issue is that traditional IPE grounded in the North does not consider these types of debates as part of the IPE field. Given that mercantilism, liberalism and Marxism and its derivatives have been considered as the classic underpinnings of current IPE, most peripheral ideas have been unacknowledged in western IPE debates. For this reason, reflections like the one proposed here are intended to encourage greater reflexivity among IPE scholars in an attempt to incorporate a new agenda for research or to bring alternative IPE perspectives to light. It is with this goal in mind that increasing numbers of scholars have begun gathering around the need to outline a global agenda centered on the place regional and national schools have within the IR and IPE fields.”

64 Lavelle, “Moving in from the Periphery”; Shaw, “The Political Economy of African International Relations.”
66 Deciancio, “International Relations from the South.”
Proof of the lack of recognition of alternative traditions can be found in Cohen’s recent reedition of his book *Advanced Introduction to International Political Economy*, in which he diagnoses that the Latin American state of IPE is unproductive, fragile, and anemic; and in which he cites only a few academics in that tradition who have recently published on IPE, selecting mostly those that live and work in the Global North. In the case of China, Cohen, while recognizing that the field is thriving, nevertheless concludes that the field has not managed to provide any transformational contributions. Unfortunately, he does not address at all the state of the field in Africa. In our view, his assessment of IPE has a bias toward recognizing theories that come from the North and neglecting the contribution of IPE from the Global South due to scarce knowledge of how the field is developing in those regions.

Cox has also suggested that one’s orientation towards parts and whole is not so much chosen but acquired through disciplinary socialization, and in this sense, our main aim in this paper has been to call attention to how IPE has developed in three different regions in order to highlight how disciplinary socialization has molded the idiosyncrasy of IPE in those cases. We also disagree with the way mainstream IPE has ignored Global South IPE, particularly sharing with Cohen his concern about the ideas that proclaim a new era of technical sophistication and intellectual elegance coming at the price of descriptive and practical credibility. Peripheral IPE will always be practical and problem-solving given the needs of the countries in which it develops. In this sense, as Narlikar recommends a detailed context-sensitive understanding is key to spark a dialogue about how concepts and ideas travel across regions and cultures expanding the horizon of the IPE field.

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68 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 118.

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Widening the ‘Global Conversation’…


International Relations (IR) Pedagogy, Dialogue and Diversity: Taking the IR Course Syllabus Seriously

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Abstract
The field of International Relations (IR) has experienced different waves of ‘great debates’ that have often maintained certain theoretical and methodological frameworks and perspectives as core to the field whereas others are seen as peripheral and merely a critique of the former. As a result of this segregation of knowledge, IR has not become as open to dialogue and diversity as we are made to believe. To be sure, aspects of the extant literature speak of IR as being ‘not so international’, a ‘hegemonic discipline’, a ‘colonial household’, and an ‘American social science’, among other derogatory names. Informed by such characterizations that depict a field of study that is not sufficiently diverse, the paper investigates the relationship between pedagogical factors and dialogue in IR. In doing so, it provides preliminary results from a pilot study in February-April 2019 that sought to examine different graduate-level IR syllabi from leading universities in the global North and South (Africa in particular). In particular, the objective was to decipher what course design, including required readings and other pedagogical activities in the classroom, tells us about dialogue and the sort of diversity needed to push IR beyond its conventional canons.

Keywords: IR course syllabi, pedagogy, dialogue, diversity, Western/non-Western

1. Introduction/Background
In light of the persistent dominance of certain types of knowledge, theories and methodologies, there have been repeated calls for better interaction, communication or dialogue in International Relations (IR) scholarship. One of the earliest accounts of the Western dominance of IR is Stanley Hoffman’s article that specifically called IR an ‘American Social Science’.


Over the last two decades, scholarship that questions the lack of non-Western or ‘Third World’ perspectives in the theory and practice of IR has bourgeoned. These include contributions from Ole Wæver,2 Steve Smith3 and Arlene Tickner4 among other significant contributions.


Overall, the evidence points to an established critique of the status quo in IR.

Much of the contributions noted above have contested the very origins of the field of study. As a distinct field of study, IR is assumed to have been born in 1919 at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth with the foundation of David Davies as the Woodrow Wilson Chair, subsequently followed by chairs established at the London School of Economics and Oxford after Montague Burton.6 ‘Assumed’ is used here to denote the point that what we know as the origin of IR is what has been transmitted from one generation to the other though it is also known that the origin, nature, scope and purported exceptionalism of IR as told in the story remain ‘foundational myths’.7 For instance, scholars argue that stories we have heard about 1648 and 1919 are myths that perpetuate the definition of the ontology of Western ‘Self’ as opposed to the ‘Other’.8 Also, Schmidt has shown that IR was studied long before World War I and that idealism was not predominant in the interwar years as the history of IR tells us.9 Others believe that these mainstream accounts of IR origins present a ‘West Side Story’ that places Western civilization at the centre of history while silencing other forms of knowledge and views about the world.10 These pieces of evidence point to the fact that none of what we have been taught by our IR professors can be taken as given. What is troubling is the fact that the design and content of current IR course syllabi remain grounded in some of these foundational myths about the field of study as well as the main events and actors that give meaning to some of the core theories of IR.

More problematically with respect to engagement and dialogue with non-Western perspectives, IR, rather than becoming a dynamic field, has become a field rehashing the same old arguments in the same box. How teachers of IR tell the story about the field’s origin (often framed around the logic of ‘great debates’) is, however, usually misrepresented, leading to the assumption that the field has experienced both ontological and epistemological pluralism. Nearly two decades since Smith argued that this purported diversity was far from the truth,11 the situation is not necessarily better today.12 This prevalent phenomenon underscored the need for an All Azimuth workshop in 2019 on disciplinary development in IR to examine what organizers characterized as “the persistent core [as opposed to peripheral] exclusiveness in the realm of IR theorizing in particular”13 despite the emergence of what is believed to be ‘theoretical innovations’ emerging from the global South.14

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9 Schmidt, “Lessons from the Past.”
11 Smith, “The Discipline of International Relations.”
13 Email correspondence with lead workshop organizer, Prof. Ersel Aydinli.
At the same time, it is also necessary to note that IR has not remained an entirely static field. For instance, many course syllabi (some of which are the focus of this contribution) now include weeks devoted to feminist, critical and postmodern theories although the linear manner in which these discussions are proffered in syllabi still give precedence to what comes before as core to the field of study. There is no doubt that interventions from feminist and postmodern scholarship, for example, have added much to our collective understanding of the world. Nevertheless, these important interventions have not necessarily adequately dealt with other equally important issues or even necessarily helped to ensure broader representation. Jackson insists that while constructivism and feminism as part of the neo-positivist agenda for instance can be seen as an effort to incorporate “novel cases and causal factors,” their inclusion in IR theorizing still leaves “the more fundamental philosophical and methodological issues untouched.” As a result, though these efforts do help to expand the box of mainstream IR, they remain firmly situated in Western historicity.

The focus of this contribution is therefore to understand whether the current pedagogical preferences of IR instructors, as seen from their course syllabi content, help to advance dialogue or diversity. I define dialogue as overt openness to alternative ideas, perspectives and worldviews. Diversity is the outcome of such outward openness to ‘the other’. Seeing ‘Western’ as including countries of Europe and North America, I follow the definition of Western IR as “the canon of thought that has developed around UK and particularly US practices of the IR discipline.” Western scholarship, which is described as a ‘world of thinking’ as opposed to the geographical location of such scholarship, is also regarded as “scholarship that perpetuates Eurocentrism in the sense that it celebrates theories, methods and research practices popularised in a particular area of the world without due regard to the diversity of perspectives existing elsewhere.”

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine the extent to which the predominance of Western IR in graduate-level course syllabi hinders the dialogue and diversity that need to be maintained in IR. In line with this objective, the next section of the paper examines the concepts of dialogue and diversity in order to briefly frame the ways in which they have been explored in the scholarship. This is followed by a discussion of the methodology used to collect the preliminary data that informs the subsequent analysis of graduate-level IR course syllabi in some leading universities in the world, which entails the bulk of the paper. The conclusion reflects on some strategies that can be used to address the identified lack of dialogue or diversity in IR scholarship.

2. Debating Dialogue & Diversity in IR

Dialogue and diversity have been some of the buzzwords in IR. In fact, the debates around these notions are often impassioned particularly due to the understanding that much of the world outside of core countries in the West are marginalized in IR. As a result, it is believed


18 See Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International
that through “dialogue within as well as between cultures and locations, East, West, North, South” IR can become a truly ‘universal’ or ‘global’ field of study that best engages with alternative perspectives that facilitate a fuller understanding of the world. By so doing, IR could (re)discover its sense of purpose and meaning for all of its audiences. This expectation underlies the idea of pluralism, which is “a core premise upon which ‘non-Western’, ‘post-Western’, and ‘Global’ IR projects are all founded.” A recent contribution has broken down the concept of dialogue to explore its essence in IR, considering the fact that dialogue in itself can be scripted or staged – in which case it fails to reveal the essence of a true two-way communication. According to Eun, dialogue can be seen as an “intersubjective practice of deliberation,” which is quintessential to the ideas from which the notion of deliberative democracy has gained meaning.

As used in IR, dialogue entails multiple routes of communication among diverse perspectives although this is usually characterized as a two-way (or binary) interaction between Western and non-Western IR or between the core and periphery. The act of reconciling these hitherto disparate perspectives is to ensure diversity and recognize multiple kinds of knowledge and the centres of knowledge production. As such, Eun believes that for a meaningful dialogue to be had in IR, “a broad definition of what counts as scientific methodology for international studies must first be achieved.” In other words, dialogue cannot begin unless equal scientific validity is granted to diverse approaches to the study of IR.” The idea of ‘equal scientific validity’ here implies that the actors involved in the dialogue should be treated equally and their knowledge or contribution to the said dialogue should be treated as equally valid. In essence, dialogue in IR entails talking and listening to each other instead of talking at, talking over or blatantly refusing to recognize ‘the other’. Yet despite how reasonable this description of dialogue in IR sounds, we can for now think of it as merely an idealistic vision because it does not adequately capture what happens in practice.

In a previous contribution elsewhere to discussions around the lack of diversity or absence of non-Western perspectives in IR, a colleague and I highlight four interrelated reasons why alternative worldviews could make a difference: First, it will make the field of study become properly qualified as ‘international’. Second, it de-centres the status quo by shifting the field from the myopia of dominant perspectives. Third, alternative worldviews lead the field towards ‘pluri-versality’ rather than universality. Fourth, it reveals the potential of imagining a ‘post-racist’ field of study resulting from “a decolonisation of the subject matter, management of knowledge and of concepts and methods, and academic independence or, potentially, interdependence.”

To many writers, the imperial heritage of IR informs why the notion of dialogue has become merely a buzzword instead of facilitating diversity by

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22 Eun, “Beyond ‘the West/non-West Divide’ in IR,” 439.
23 Eun, “Beyond ‘the West/non-West Divide’ in IR,” 440.
24 Odoom and Andrews, “What/Who is Still Missing in International Relations Scholarship?,” 45.
centering marginalized voices and interpretations. Permit me to quote at length an interesting excerpt from Aydinli and Mathews, which further underscores the persistent lack of dialogue between core and periphery IR scholars:

The four arguably leading IR journals, which set the cutting-edge agenda for the discipline, *International Organization*, *International Security*, *International Studies Quarterly*, and *World Politics*, have an average of less than 3% of their contributors coming from the periphery, and less than 12% coming from outside the United States. This result ultimately reveals to us the best picture of how infrequently not only the traditional periphery but all scholars outside of the United States are being recognized. Perhaps most ironic is the case of the *International Studies Quarterly*. As the flagship journal of the ISA, an association whose very constitution dictates that it promotes *inter-group dialogue* [emphasis mine], less than 10% of its contributors over the past decade have come from outside of the United States, and less than 1½% have come from the periphery.

The observations above are no doubt somewhat dated but the situation is not necessarily better today, as noted above. An important question worth asking is this: If dialogue is not occurring effectively, why is that the case and, in other words, what are the structural problems within core-periphery disciplinary relations that limit such dialogue? For this question, it is important to briefly reflect on both epistemic imperialism and academic dependency as perspectives that provide a nuanced understanding of the persistence of some key issues that underscore the imbalance in the production and consumption of IR knowledge. Along the lines of cultural imperialism, epistemic imperialism explains the tendency to privilege one’s ways of knowing or theorizing over others based on the perception of one’s own superiority. Alatas characterizes academic dependency as “a condition in which the social sciences of certain countries are conditioned by the development and growth of the social sciences of other countries to which the former is subjected.” These two concepts are co-constitutive in the sense that they both explicitly point to imperialism or neo-colonialism (and ultimately Western-centrism or Eurocentrism) as a key driver of the core-periphery divide in IR in particular and the social sciences in general. In essence, “the structural inequality that dependency theorists refer to has translated into epistemic inequality – a case where some ‘knowers’ have more recognition and privileges than others, often racialised ‘others’.”

In other words, the context of the unequal power structures that govern the global capitalist economy underlie how the ‘big powers’ in economic and social terms also tend to be the ‘big powers’ in the social sciences, a phenomenon which further perpetuates the epistemic authority and dominance of certain privileged voices and ‘knowledge holders’ in leading countries. This also explains the persistence of the apparent exclusiveness of core (as opposed to peripheral) actors and perspectives in IR theorizing. Within the context of this

paper, dialogue and diversity are used interchangeably. Despite what may be considered as analytical differences, these concepts both illuminate the essence of purposive communication and cross-pollination that will ensure that IR addresses the “representational deficiency” that has been described in this paper thus far.

3. Methodology

The methodology for this study followed three stages. Stage one entailed a search for leading (mostly ‘top’ 25) IR departments in the world using the 2019 Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings. Since many non-Western IR departments did not immediately feature in the ranking of top IR departments in the world (see Table 1), the search was subsequently refined to specifically look for top African universities with an IR department or school. However, this was not straightforward either as the continent appeared fragmented into either the Arab Region, Emerging Economies or South Africa as part of the BRICS. Ultimately, a search performed on February 28, 2019 for the top world-wide and African universities by the subject area of ‘Politics & International studies’ (under the social sciences category) produced 666 total entries, of which only 15 African countries appeared. This number was therefore categorized as the ‘top 15’ IR departments in Africa based on their respective positions in the retrieved list of global universities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World-Wide</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. University of Oxford</td>
<td>1. University of Cape Town (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Stanford University (n/a)</td>
<td>2. University of the Witwatersrand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
<td>3. Stellenbosch University (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Harvard University</td>
<td>4. University of Johannesburg (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Princeton University</td>
<td>5. University of KwaZulu-Natal (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. University of Cambridge (n/a)</td>
<td>6. American University in Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. London School of Economics &amp; Political Science</td>
<td>7. University of Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Yale University</td>
<td>8. University of Pretoria (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. University of Michigan</td>
<td>10. University of Dar Es Salaam (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Columbia University</td>
<td>11. University of Ibadan (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. University of California, Los Angeles</td>
<td>12. Makerere University (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. University of California, Berkeley</td>
<td>13. Cairo University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. University College London (n/a)</td>
<td>14. University of Nigeria Nsukka (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>15. University of South Africa (n/a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s amalgamation of the 2019 THE World University Rankings

The second stage involved retrieving core graduate-level IR course syllabi from the 30 universities listed above. This process entailed visiting the websites of respective departments of politics and IR, retrieving course syllabi that were already available online or emailing instructors. As this was intended to be a preliminary survey of what is out there in existing syllabi, I relied on information that was readily available online but in the case of Africa I had to email instructors as almost nothing was posted online. Thus, “n/a” in Table 1 means that

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33 Odoom and Andrews, “What/Who is Still Missing in International Relations Scholarship?,” 43.
course syllabi were not available because no core IR course is taught at the graduate level, the syllabi were not available online and email solicitations to instructors did not yield positive results or the program website was not functioning at the time of the search. Overall, the syllabi retrieved covered core IR courses taught over the period of 2014 and 2019.

Once the syllabi were retrieved, stage three of the methodology entailed an analysis of the syllabi content to explore what they contain, what they exclude and whether the pedagogical preferences of the instructors help to advance dialogue or diversity in IR.34 For instance, the analysis entailed counting how many times a particular article/book/author is used in all syllabi and how the various weeks are designed to incorporate alternative theories beyond the usual suspects such as realism, liberalism, the English School and constructivism. This analysis was meant to examine whether equal amount of space was given to Western and non-Western perspectives – something that was deciphered from the titles and authorships of the weekly readings assigned in respective syllabi.

The diversity of outcome, or lack thereof, resulting from this search is notable. The world-wide rankings are dominated by universities located in the U.K. and U.S. – meaning that the leading universities in the world are found in the rich and industrialized countries. Times Higher Education evaluates institutions through five performance indicators, namely teaching, research, citations, international outlook and industry income.35 High-ranking institutions possess substantial tuition rates, leading to higher incomes, better facilities, and increased research productivity (i.e. number of publications and citations). Likewise, institutions located in industrialized nations have greater access to public funding for research, a factor dependent upon national policy and economic circumstance.36 These universities can also attract funding from the commercial marketplace.

Together, the factors noted above provide hints to the relative inequality between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ nations in terms of the quality of higher education.37 In this context, however, South African universities stand out as leaders in knowledge production and consumption due to what Bond38 has characterized as ‘South African sub-imperialism’, which is informed by the neoliberal stance the South African government adopted in the post-apartheid era, with national elites collaborating with Western financial powers to facilitate the entry of transnational capital into the country. Overall, the THE Rankings tend to reproduce inequality not only between the ‘rest of the world’ and Africa, but also among universities in Africa. The preliminary analysis offered here reveals a systemic poverty of diversity in rankings of higher education institutions on the African continent. To what extent this structural issue impacts the content of IR syllabi at the graduate level is an open-ended and perhaps unanswerable question in this particular paper.

4. Findings: What’s in a Course Syllabus?

Out of the 12 Western Universities listed above from which syllabi were retrieved, seven

36 “World University Rankings 2019”.
offered a core IR course at the PhD level and five at the Master of Arts (MA), Master of Science (MSc) or Master of Philosophy (MPhil) levels for degrees in Political Science and/or International Relations. Oxford University and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) were the only two universities to offer a full year-length IR course. The course names vary minimally between “Theories of IR,” “IR Theory” or simply “Seminar on/in IR,” except for the University of Oxford which offers “The Development of the International System and Contemporary Debates in IR Theory” and the University of Michigan which offers a “Proseminar on World Politics.” Stanford University and University College London both offer graduate-level courses in IR though their syllabi were not included in this study. The University of Cambridge does not offer a core IR seminar course for its MPhil in International Relations and Politics; instead, students are offered a free choice from a list of related courses. Cambridge represents an anomaly in this regard, as the other universities mandate that graduate students take a core or compulsory course in IR theory.

Out of the 15 African Universities listed in Table 1, I was able to retrieve five syllabi from the University of Witwatersrand, American University in Cairo, University of Ghana, University of Western Cape and Cairo University – representing south, west and north Africa. The course titles were along the lines of either “Theories of IR” or “Advanced Studies in IR.” The University of Nigeria Nsukka does not offer graduate-level programs in Political Science and/or International Studies. Both Stellenbosch University and University of South Africa do not offer IR courses for their graduate degrees in Political Science and/or International Politics/Studies, but an array of other courses are available. In the case of the University of Johannesburg, graduate students participate in research by dissertation only, and therefore there is no graduate IR seminar course. The University of Cape Town, the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the University of Western Cape and Makerere University, while offering graduate-level courses in IR, did not have syllabi available online nor were email solicitations to department heads or course instructors successful in obtaining relevant syllabi.

Furthermore, the University of Pretoria offers master’s degrees in Diplomatic and Security Studies, but there is no information online as to the courses offered at the graduate level and email solicitations to the coordinator of the program were unsuccessful. Similarly, the University of Dar es Salaam, while providing undergraduate courses in IR and an MA in IR, did not have information online about postgraduate courses and emails to the department head remained unanswered. The webpage of the College of Social Sciences for postgraduate programs had also not been updated since the 2015/2016 academic year. In this regard, part of the challenge in retrieving syllabi from African universities is that some websites were no longer functional at the time searches were performed in March 2019 or there was little to no information on the graduate programs offered. In another example, the website for the Department of Political Science at the University of Ibadan was not working at the time of searching in March 2019 and email solicitations were unsuccessful in retrieving syllabi.

Most syllabi from Western universities trace the theoretical progression and methodological development of IR in a linear fashion, focusing on realism, neorealism, classical liberalism, liberal institutionalism, constructivism and the English School. There are slight variations among syllabi in terms of curriculum design, including Harvard University, which groups theories between material, social, rationalist and psychological approaches to IR, and the
University of Michigan which groups research into areas of interest. The common goals shared between syllabi include: (1) understanding the structure of the international system and explaining state behaviour, (2) grasping the casual mechanisms associated with various political phenomena, and (3) evaluating the empirical implications of various theoretical approaches. The classical texts of IR’s major traditions dominate all Western syllabi, particularly the realist, liberalist and constructivist writings of the authors listed in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Top 24 Most Cited Scholars in IR Syllabi from Western Universities

In analyzing the retrieved syllabi, I chose to count the number of times various authors appeared rather than singular texts, as I believe the former approach can give us a better idea of representation in terms of whose voice and expertise counts in the field of IR. In the data collection phase, I accounted for the required or mandatory readings to the exclusion of supplementary or recommend readings for each course. Figure 1 reveals that the traditions of realism, liberalism and constructivism remain at the core of Western IR curricula, with American and European men cited most often. Nine out of twelve syllabi focus solely on Western approaches to IR and Euro-centric debates within the field. Critical and non-Western perspectives are given little to no space in Western IR syllabi, except the University of Oxford and LSE which dedicate multiple weeks to non-conventional theories, as well as Harvard University which reserves one week for the topic of gender and race and particularly include Vitalis in the introductory week. Interestingly, when one collates the data on assigned readings in the syllabi of African universities, European and American theorists still dominate the curriculum (as can be seen in Figure 2).

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41 If a book was listed as a mandatory text, I counted it once rather than each assigned chapter to avoid inflating data points.
The postgraduate IR seminar taught at the University of Ghana shares some similarities with those of Western universities in that the “course does not sacrifice the classical theories that continue to give the field its heartbeat.”\(^43\) This is in a way reflected in the predominance of mainstream theorists in the list of 24 most cited scholars, as shown in Figure 2. Unlike the syllabi of most Western universities, however, “sufficient space is given to emerging theories that demonstrate that the field of International Relations, just like any dynamic field in the social sciences, is theoretically abreast with the challenges of change in the global system.” Like the University of Ghana, the course at the University of Western Cape emphasizes the importance of understanding IR’s traditional theories and concepts but takes a more critical approach by asking “why does theory matter? Which world views are held about theory?”\(^44\) These questions at the very least open up avenues for students to not take established theoretical perspectives as given.

It was not possible to compare the frequency of authors in Western vs. African syllabi due to methodological limitations, namely the fact that only four African IR syllabi were surveyed compared to 12 from Western universities.\(^45\) Any quantitative analysis or infographic would skew the results due to this numeric discrepancy. Thus, a qualitative approach is more appropriate in this context to reflect on general trends. One interesting finding was that while scholars of the global South are placed at the periphery of IR’s Western core in the syllabi of European and American universities, instructors at African universities are more likely to incorporate contributions by non-traditional or critical scholars in their syllabi, thereby helping to advance dialogue and diversity in IR. Three out of four\(^46\) of the collected syllabi from African universities devote an equal amount of time to conventional and critical theories, including Marxism, postcolonialism, feminism and poststructuralism. This finding

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\(^45\) Though five syllabi were retrieved from Africa-based institutions, one was in Arabic and therefore not currently included in this analysis.

\(^46\) The postgraduate IR course at the University of Witwatersrand represents an anomaly among both Western and African universities in that the curriculum focuses solely on applied theory and qualitative and quantitative methods used to conduct research in IR. Thus, the course revolves around themes such as topic selection, the literature review, methods for collecting data, ethics, and writing.
further suggests that more dialogue is being encouraged by scholars of the global South than is the case in the global North.

5. Does IR Course Design Matter for Dialogue and Diversity?

To sum up the key findings of this paper, excluded from nearly all Western IR syllabi examined are feminist, Marxist, postcolonial, structural and ‘non-Western’ approaches to the study of IR. Most Western graduate-level IR syllabi continue to focus on Euro-centric scholarship, with critical contributions to the field sitting at the margin, save the University of Oxford, LSE and Harvard University which make a conscious effort to include ‘subaltern’ voices in the study of IR. Essentially, these three universities are the only ones among their Western counterparts that overtly engage with IR’s imperialist origins, with the goal of exposing students to alternative approaches. This is done by listing readings by theorists such as Robert Cox, Robbie Shilliam, Amitav Acharya, Immanuel Wallerstein, Ann Tickner, Laura Sjoberg and Arlene Tickner. The point, however, is that most of these scholars were not among the most cited across the 16 course syllabi in both Western and African universities – with many of them receiving only one or two counts across the respective syllabi examined.

The findings suggest that there is limited openness to alternative ideas, perspectives and worldviews in the IR courses of Western universities. While some instructors are upfront in recognizing the limitations of the field in terms of its Euro-centric roots, few put diversity into practice through their pedagogical preferences. At least as can be deduced from the design of core IR courses, ‘marginal perspectives’ remain at the periphery of these syllabi. If IR is to become ‘truly global’ in scope, IR instructors need to go beyond the Western canon towards critical understandings of the international order and of modernity itself. As Shilliam writes, they must “engage with non-Western thought in ways that refuse to render it exotic to, superfluous to or derivative of the orthodox Western canon of social and political thought.”

This means that designing core IR courses such that the “course does not sacrifice the classical theories that continue to give the field its heartbeat,” as described in the University of Ghana syllabus, is not necessarily a useful direction toward moving the field beyond its orthodox canons even if the same syllabus includes certain non-Western perspectives.

The hegemony of American and European theorists leads to African institutions adopting their writings in the IR syllabi, further resulting in a dearth of non-Western perspectives. Using the 2014 TRIP survey, Wemheuer-Vogelaar and colleagues investigate claims that there is a division of labor within IR wherein scholars in the West are responsible for theory production while the non-West supplies data and local expertise for theory testing. They find that non-Western scholars do not value IR scholarship from the global South significantly more than Western scholars, which is consistent with the findings in this paper. Perhaps this so-called ‘division of labour’ explains why some of the 15 African universities sampled (e.g. University of Nigeria Nsukka, Stellenbosch University, University of South Africa and University of Johannesburg) do not have an existing graduate-level course on IR theory. It can also explain why the postgraduate IR course offered at the University of Witwatersrand focuses primarily on applied theory and qualitative/quantitative methods used to conduct

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47 Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds.”
48 Shilliam, International Relations and Non-Western Thought, book summary (n.p.).
49 University of Ghana, “POL6162.”
research in IR as a way of preparing students for their empirical research projects.\textsuperscript{51} Yet these notions around a purported division of labour between Western and non-Western IR scholars, which are informed by epistemic imperialism, augment the North-South divide in IR and leads to the dependency on knowledge (i.e. theories and perspectives) propounded in the West.\textsuperscript{52} What this means is that accounts of Western scholars are deemed to be theoretically significant to the field while contributions by non-Western scholars maintain the stereotypical categorization as ‘area’ or ‘development’ studies.

The findings in this paper underlie the argument that dialogue and diversity are two things that are still lacking in IR course syllabi. Theories from the non-West remain unrecognized within and outside IR’s Western core. Likewise, critical theories are treated as an afterthought – a mere critique of historically dominant narratives. This means the sort of dialogue or pluralism that scholars have postulated\textsuperscript{53} is far-fetched. Yet, the opposite seems true for non-Western scholars (at least the professors teaching the IR courses in African universities examined here). Although Western scholarship tends to be central to most of the syllabi, students are exposed to alternative perspectives that critique aforementioned Western theories. In a way, this trend is more progressive towards the dialogue needed to move IR beyond its orthodox canons.

Apart from the general lack of representation in the top-cited scholars across syllabi, a question worth examining is whether mainstream IR remains a white man’s club. From both Figures 1 and 2, the answer to this question appears to be a straightforward ‘yes’. The results, thus, augment research that has shown a prevalent gender citation gap in IR which explains the dominance of male-authored readings assigned in syllabi.\textsuperscript{54} As seen in Figure 1, only Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have been able to significantly penetrate the male-dominated list of top-cited scholars across the syllabi examined here. The same old white men who were involved in the ‘great debates’ many decades ago remain the ones students of the 21st century are reading with the same old texts that are often twice or even thrice as old as the students reading them. This point is not to suggest that the ‘classics’ are not important. In fact, every discipline needs these seminal texts as a way of ‘disciplining’ students on the contours of an established field of study. The argument, however, is the fact that overemphasizing the significance of the classics hinder purposive dialogue with alternative (‘other’) perspectives. Especially considering research evidence that questions the very premise upon which some IR classics were founded,\textsuperscript{55} these texts that are central to mainstream IR are not necessarily sacrosanct. Additionally, their prominence in IR syllabi is also surprising considering the growing scholarship that examines IR theorizing and other innovations ‘from elsewhere’.\textsuperscript{56} Overt openness to some of these perspectives and worldviews will, therefore, require IR syllabi to move beyond the current characterization of mainstream IR as a white man’s club.

\textsuperscript{52} Alatas, “Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in Social Science.”
\textsuperscript{55} See Teschke, The Myth of 1648; De Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR”; Shilliam, International Relations and Non-Western Thought.
\textsuperscript{56} See Aydinal and Bitkekin, Widening the World of International Relations; Smith, “Reshaping International Relations”; Compaoré, “Rise of the (Other) Rest?”; Kim, “Will IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics be a Powerful Alternative?”.
6. Conclusion

It is worthy of note that focusing on graduate-level course syllabi alone does not present us with a complete picture of how well IR is doing with regard to dialogue and diversity. For instance, the paper does not sufficiently account for the structural and logistical constraints that tend to undermine IR instructors’ efforts to frequently revise their syllabi in light of the need for broader engagement. Nonetheless, course syllabi still serve as a starting point in mapping what we teach and learn in the classroom and how that informs the ‘international’ nature of IR – and that is precisely why this paper has chosen to engage with the field from that standpoint.

The discussion in this paper shows that despite increased awareness of the issue of and need for dialogue and diversity, there is still a largely accepted continuation of the dominance of the core in IR. The awareness is evidenced in syllabi that have no doubt made efforts to include theories and theorists beyond the usual suspects along the lines of realism, liberalism and constructivism. In some instances, instructors provide a background that contextualizes the knowledge that students are going to be exposed to in a manner that seeks to critique what is dominant. Yet, the findings also show that there is the need for more purposive engagement with critical non-Western scholarship. What does it mean to think critically about IR? How can we constructively imagine and identify new questions, worldviews and methodological approaches that can help move the field forward if we are not open to dialogue and diversity? This paper represents a starting point for thinking beyond IR’s current philosophical, theoretical, empirical as well as pedagogical limitations.

One can concur with Eun who argues that “rather than unquestioningly applying Western-centric IR theories or developing non-Western indigenous knowledge to replace those theories, we need to focus on promoting dialogue between them, with the aim of creating complementary understandings of our complex world.” But the fact is that this intersubjective understanding of the complex world IR scholarship attempts to explain is not evidenced in either IR practice and pedagogy. In particular, the continued peripheralization of critical theories and scholars in Western syllabi problematizes the global relevancy of IR theory and reveals a persistent lack of diversity in the field of study. Increased dialogue between Western and non-Western scholars is needed to push IR beyond its Euro-centric understandings of the world. For instance, incorporating African experiences and African scholarship into the IR syllabi could help open the field to new areas of inquiry. Yet, it is troubling to see in the few syllabi examined that African IR professors still have work to do in incorporating such insights into the design of their core IR courses.

In conclusion, the findings in this paper point to a closure of the field to ‘other’ voices and worldviews. The representation that is needed to enhance dialogue should not be thought of as merely geography-bound since there are many IR scholars in multiple sites (i.e. both core and periphery institutions) who are the helm of the fight for diversity. In addition to being wary of how we continue to define what constitutes the canons of IR, the way forward will entail the need for IR professors to include more non-mainstream readings in their course syllabi in order to curtail the citational privilege core Western theorists have gained in the existing scholarship. This will ensure that the future generation of IR spearheads (or prodigies of IR

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57 Eun, “Beyond ‘the West/non-West Divide’ in IR,” 449.
58 Smith, “Has Africa got Anything to Say?”; Odoom and Andrews, “What/Who is Still Missing in International Relations Scholarship?”.
scholarship) are exposed to alternative worldviews, approaches and methodologies that could open up the field to informed dialogue.

Bibliography


The Chinese School, Global Production of Knowledge, and Contentious Politics in the Disciplinary IR

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Abstract

Chinese studies of International Relations constitute today an integral part of the claim of IR as a global discipline. This paper starts by providing a critical evaluation of the contribution made by the so-called ‘Chinese School of IR’ to the global production of knowledge. Against this background, it teases out a curious case of ‘schools of IR’ as commonly labelled in the global IR theoretical conversation and looks at how such labels have been used by the ‘core’ to create a parallel but explicitly inferior universe of knowledge production to localize theoretical noises from the ‘peripheries’. Situating the Chinese School of IR in such global context, it considers how ‘school’ label has been proactively appropriated by Chinese scholars to engage in a purposely contentious politics in the disciplinary IR, which questions the claim of the American ‘core’ as the creator, depositor, and distributor of universal knowledge, and seeks to unveil the geo-historical linkage between the political and the epistemic. School labelling therefore matters, it is argued, because it has become a site of contestation of geopolitics of knowledge and reflects the perils and promises in our collective pursuit of constructing a truly global IR.

Keywords: The Chinese School, global IR, knowledge production, theoretical conversation, contentious politics

1. Introduction

At its centenary, International Relations (IR) can genuinely claim to be a global academic discipline. This is in sharp contrast to the disciplinary status of IR fifty years ago as evaluated in The Aberystwyth Papers.¹ Evidence of the institutionalized globality of IR as a discipline is everywhere around us in terms of 1. subjects taught and research degrees offered at Universities around the world; 2. academic and policy-related journals dedicated to the subject of International Relations published in different countries all over the world; 3. research monographs and books published in all different languages globally; 4. unprecedented global flow of everyday knowledge exchange in cyber space and through other means; and 5. global contribution to the production of IR knowledge. Whether there is a purported global IR or not is, however, altogether a different question. The intellectual hegemony of the Western (trans-Atlantic) IR is arguably still largely intact. There is a discernible core and periphery relationship in the global production of knowledge. The calls for ‘worlding beyond the West’...
and for the production of non-Western and post-Western IR scholarship only emphasize daunting challenges posed by geopolitics of knowledge in constructing a truly global IR.²

This paper discusses IR disciplinary growth in China over the last forty years as constitutive of the globalization of IR as an academic discipline. It provides first some reflections on the disciplinary growth of IR in China and the intellectual engagement between the Chinese and the global IR epistemic communities over the last forty years. This is followed by a critical assessment of the contribution made by the purported Chinese School of IR to global production of knowledge and conscious efforts of Chinese scholars at theoretical innovation and local production of global knowledge. Reflecting on the social contentions on and ongoing debates about the Chinese School of IR, it considers the ‘School’ labelling as a site of contestation for geopolitics of knowledge and reflects on the perils and promises of contentious politics for our collective pursuit of a truly global IR.

2. IR in China at Forty: Some Reflections

IR as an academic discipline and distinct intellectual activity is relatively new in China. At the beginning of the opening and reform in 1979, disciplinary IR as we understand today was virtually non-existent in China.³ Over the last forty years, enduring efforts have been made to construct IR as an academic discipline in China with increasingly intensified intellectual engagement with the global IR epistemic community. IR in China today is a well-established and thriving academic discipline. There is in the first instance the proliferation of university departments on international studies as well as vibrant development and institutionalization of research agenda and teaching curriculums,⁴ so much so that it is claimed recently that the academic excellence achieved by some post-1980s Chinese scholars is better than that of Ph.D. scholars trained in European universities, thanks to the internationalization of IR teaching and research in China.⁵ Also noteworthy is the dramatic growth of research institutes and think tanks for international studies and foreign policy matters both at the national and provincial levels and in numerous universities, in addition to those under the umbrella of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.⁶ The scholarly community of Chinese IR has become arguably one of the most dynamic and certainly the fastest growing national branch of global IR epistemic community, both in terms of the number of researchers, and increasingly, in terms of the output of publications. With the emergence of a self-conscious


³ A number of notable signposts in the disciplinary growth of IR in the 1980s are noted recently by Yan Xuetong (2018). Peking University started to recruit postgraduate students in international studies only in 1978; the first in China. The first article that introduced Western IR theory to China was published only in 1981. The first batch of academic positions dedicated to IR appeared in Chinese universities no earlier than 1983. It was not until 1985 that the first translated book about IR theory was published in China. The first national IR theory conference was held in Shanghai only in 1987.


epistemic community of IR and the growing regional and global networks of IR scholars working in China, the intellectual world of Chinese IR has changed dramatically over the last forty years.\(^7\)

This rigorous and dramatic disciplinary growth of IR in China must be understood and appreciated against a set of historically contingent circumstances out of which it precariously began. In the first place, it is changing political circumstances in the post-Mao China, particularly the opening and reform launched in December 1978 dubbed as China’s ‘second revolution’. It is the ‘burying of Mao’, metaphorically, that proved decisive in the emancipation of the mind in China and in creating intellectual space and securing institutional opportunities for the disciplinary IR to take roots, arguably for the first time, in China.\(^8\) The growth of disciplinary IR, however, still has to battle with often repressive political and intellectual conditions, (self-)censorship and political control under an authoritarian government which are not always conducive to the production of knowledge. It has also been deeply entangled with complex policy needs and national interests of a rising China.

Secondly, between 1949 and 1979, revolutionary China amounted to, in the words of a prominent Chinese scholar, ‘a desert of social sciences’. Little genuine social science research existed in those years. Following the Soviet model in higher education, in Chinese universities, disciplinary destruction rather than disciplinary construction in social sciences was the order of the day. This cannot be accounted only by the devastation of the Cultural Revolution, when all Chinese universities and research institutes were either closed down, or stopped operating at their full capacity, for a decade. Even more devastating perhaps is the near-total intellectual insulation of Chinese scholars from the disciplinary development in and dialogue with the West in almost all social science disciplines between 1949 and 1979, when no meaningful intellectual conversation took place largely as a consequence of China’s alienation from international society, when revolutionary China lived in ‘angry isolation’.\(^9\)

For all intents and purposes, when the ‘paradigm wars’ in IR started with the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* in 1979 in the United States, there was virtually no direct ‘professional communication’ between Chinese and Western scholars in political science and IR. The intellectual world of Chinese IR, if any, was a *terra incognita* of the disciplinary IR flourishing in the West then.

1979 opened, therefore, great opportunities for Western IR to expand into and claim the Chinese disciplinary world of IR as a *terra incognita* and for the Chinese construction of IR as an academic discipline in China. It is, however, the personal intervention of Deng Xiaoping, China’s would-be paramount leader, that enabled Chinese and Western scholars collectively to take up these opportunities, rendering possible the global expansion of IR into China. In a speech made on 30 March 1979 at the Party’s theoretical works meeting, Deng remarked,

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\(^8\) Yan, “Academic Research”.

We have neglected for many years research of political science, law, sociology as well as world politics. We need to catch up now in a timely manner. We have admitted that we lag behind the West in natural sciences. We should also admit that we also lag behind the West in social sciences.10

This is the third historically contingent circumstance. The growth of disciplinary IR in China started understandably from an active learning process focused on knowledge acquisition from the existing scholarship produced mostly in the West. The sharp learning curve of Chinese IR, perhaps unsurprisingly, has been overwhelmingly influenced by IR scholarship from the United States. This was a period when ‘a romantic view of the West dominated, and scholars copied Western scholarship without much regard for Chinese perspectives and ideas’.11 By one account, 85 key theoretical works in English that have been translated into Chinese were published by five major presses in China by March 2007, more than 90% of which are American. Like other national IR scholarly communities around the world, scholars in the emerging Chinese IR epistemic community ‘follow the American debates and teach American theories’.12 The internalization of the American IR theoretical discourse in China (or to put it differently, the colonization of Chinese IR’s intellectual terrain) can perhaps best be illustrated by the fact that even Chinese academic debates on the prospect of China’s peaceful rise was originally ‘structured around the three mainstream IRTs’.13 Self-identified Chinese realists, Chinese liberals and Chinese constructivists grappled among themselves with the question of whether China’s peaceful rise is possible, largely reproducing the same debate as in the United States.

The bitter-sweet irony of this engagement is that while the growth of disciplinary IR in China has helped this ‘not so international’ discipline go global, it has not produced a global IR that is in any manner inclusive of Chinese voices, experiences and knowledge claims. Rather, it has produced and reproduced an asymmetric core and periphery structure of communication in this highly stratified discipline. In so doing, the growth of disciplinary IR in China has conceded to American intellectual hegemony and self-marginalized, perhaps unwittingly, Chinese voices, knowledge claims and ambition for theoretical innovation. Yet, it is from the margins of the globalized discipline that Chinese IR scholars have launched fierce contestations to, if not a revolt against, the intellectual hegemony of Western IR theories. Such assertions from the margins are undoubtedly aimed at seeking the recognition of knowledge claims made by Chinese scholars in the globalized discipline still dominated by the West. However, in making conscious efforts to find their own voices and to bring Chinese tradition to bear on the understanding and theorization of IR, Chinese scholars, through these contestations, have already begun to address a number of concerns on what Amitav Acharya calls ‘a new agenda of international studies’, contributing to facilitating

the emergence of a ‘Global IR’ as ‘a truly inclusive discipline, recognizing its multiple and diverse foundations’.  

As I have argued somewhere else, the diffusion of Western IR has played a constitutive role in the disciplinary growth of Chinese IR and in the making of Chinese international theory. The long march to theoretical innovation in Chinese IR is accompanied by sustained Chinese intellectual engagement with trans-Atlantic IR as complex social processes of change that have brought into being the intellectual world of Chinese IR. More specifically, I have highlighted three epistemic turns in the IR disciplinary growth in China in terms of local knowledge production, namely, from epistemic ignorance to epistemic optimism, from epistemic optimism to epistemic scepticism, and from epistemic scepticism to epistemic reflexivity, in these long social processes. It is the latest epistemic turn to purposive reflexivity, it is argued, that has led to promising indigenous production of knowledge in China, as international studies in China have moved decisively from simply knowledge acquisition to knowledge production/creation.  

The rapid rise of China and China’s changing role in global politics, in this reading, provides stimulus for the latest epistemic turn in Chinese IR in three ways. It accentuates Chinese scholars’ awareness of the deficiency of the explanatory power of existing trans-Atlantic IR theories. It makes it imperative to have a theoretical construct and research agenda that cater to understanding a rising China’s strategic challenges and meeting the policy needs of a rising power. It has provided central empirical problems and analytical puzzles to theorize IR from a distinctive Chinese perspective, among which are China’s changing identity in global politics, its integration into international society, and the prospect of its peaceful rise. One could add also the question of the legitimacy of rising Chinese power and therefore also the legitimacy of the post-American liberal global order. To the extent that IR theory constructs the world that it purports to describe and is constitutive of the reality that it addresses, to paraphrase Acharya and Buzan, Chinese scholars have a major interest in being part of the game.  

A symposium was held in November 2018 at Tsinghua University in Beijing to reflect on Chinese IR at forty. Participants offered an upbeat assessment of the achievements of Chinese international studies in terms of knowledge production and theoretical innovation and celebrated home-grown theoretical discourses in four subfields, namely international politics, international security, international political economy, and diplomatic studies. While acknowledging that through learning/borrowing and knowledge acquisition, disciplinary IR in China has significantly narrowed its knowledge gap, there is also unmistakable recognition of the limits of such learning and acquisition. Exhortations have been made for not only

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14 Acharya, “Global International Relations,” 647.
16 Qin, “Development of International Relations”.
18 Acharya and Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western IR Theory?,” 207.
catching up with Western IR, but also ‘transcending’ it through theoretical innovation and new knowledge production in promoting disciplinary progress. The imperative has also been noted for the Chinese IR epistemic community to further emancipate the mind, and for the importance of participating in dialogue with global IR epistemic communities with an open mind.19

3. The Chinese School of IR and Global Production of Knowledge

Participants at the Tsinghua Symposium noted in particular a decisive and bold move from knowledge acquisition to knowledge production/creation in Chinese IR in the last fifteen years or so with coordinated efforts at intellectual creativity and with clear articulation of theoretical ambition.20 Symptomatic of this move from theoretical learning to theoretical contestation and innovation are the ongoing debates centred around the construction of a Chinese School of IR and on how China’s own national experience, knowledge claims, and cultural heritage can and must be brought to bear upon the creative production of local knowledge about the ‘international’.

Intellectually, Chinese debates on whether the distinctive national social experience of China should be taken into consideration in pursuit of constructing China’s own international theory can be traced to the 1980s. It was at the first national conference on international relations theory in Shanghai in 1987 that the question of developing an IR theory ‘with Chinese characteristics’ was first raised. The call was arguably intuitive, mimicking ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and it is mainly the politics of legitimation of the subject that was behind this call. More than twenty years later, similar calls—whether it is for developing an IR theory ‘with Chinese characteristics’, or for ‘indigenizing IR in China’, or for constructing ‘a Chinese School of IR’—are no longer a reflection of just concerns for political legitimation. They are also backed up by intellectual justifications. They are consciously reflective of and driven by growing epistemic skepticism about the existing theoretical claims in Western IR and the intellectual discontent with their inability to explain the specific problems China is confronted with as it rises. At a national conference on IR theories held in Shanghai in 2004, an explicit call was issued for theoretical innovation, which would ‘embody the Chinese characteristics, incorporate both Marxist international thought and the scientific core of Western IR theories, and cultivate the Chinese cultural heritage’.21 They amount to purposive contestations to, if not a revolt against, the dominance of Western IR theories and are expressive of the intent to make Chinese IR differently different.

If these attempts at theoretical innovation and contestations by Chinese scholars have led to a number of claims and hypes heralding the arrival a Chinese School of IR, it should be noted that assertions about the feasibility, inevitability or desirability of constructing such a School have also been and continues to be heavily contested.22 It is also noteworthy that

20 “A symposium on International Studies in China”.
a self-consciously reflexive Chinese IR epistemic community has emerged and that battle cries and flag-waving are real in the construction of a Chinese School of IR. In one sense, the Chinese School of IR can perhaps best be characterized as a broader conversation or in Randall Collins’ words ‘coalitions in the mind’ based on the shared belief in the possibility and desirability of constructing a Chinese School of IR and firm commitment to and strong interests in its construction. Rather than one homogenous school of thought, it is a conversation about how to theorise a distinct perspective on world politics that draws on Chinese cultural resources and is informed by a historically contingent situation of China’s rise to a global power status. Through the geo-epistemic lens, the putative Chinese School is marked by profound disagreements among its advocates as to the agenda, the methodology, and the focus of empirical research for the Chinese School project, and its possible theoretical contribution to knowledge production. This is amply demonstrated in the four attempts at theoretical innovation by Chinese scholars discussed below. That said, it is these ongoing theoretical contestations among Chinese scholars and their critics and innovative production of IR scholarship centred around the construction of a Chinese School of IR that constitute one of the most contentious, arguably perhaps one of the most productive and also the most promising, non-Western sites of IR knowledge production.

Four cases of home-grown knowledge production and theoretical innovation by Chinese scholars have recently captured the attention and imagination of the global IR epistemic community. They are worth discussing briefly here. The first is Yan Xuetong’s moral realism. It is closely associated with the so-called Tsinghua Approach (School) of International Relations, which refers to a distinctive research program carried out by Yan Xuetong and his team at the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University. It goes back to ancient Chinese history and philosophy to explore how ancient Chinese philosophers conceptualized power, authority, hegemony, war, order and justice and how morality informs interest. This is an exercise of archaeology of knowledge. Its purpose is to rediscover ancient Chinese international thought as an intellectual source for theoretical innovation. The publication of Ancient Chinese Thought and Modern Chinese Power by Princeton University in 2011 disseminated some findings of the research program beyond the Chinese IR epistemic community and attracted a lot of attention internationally. Yan is explicit about the possibility of ‘creating a new IR theory on the basis of both ancient Chinese international thought and contemporary IR theory’, i.e. Chinese historical data including thought can be made


25 For example, Yan is a self-professed realist and methodological positivist and is sceptical of the feasibility and desirability of constructing a Chinese School of IR, whereas Qin is a leading constructivist and a most vocal advocate of Chinese School of IR.

meaningful by social scientific methodology to enrich contemporary IR theories.\textsuperscript{27} Such attempts at theoretical innovation have led Yan to produce what he terms ‘moral realism,’ as a distinct international relations theory.\textsuperscript{28}

In the words of Yan, ‘Moral realism is an international relations theory that deliberates how the political leadership of great powers determines the fate of their rise or fall, thus the structural change of the international system’.\textsuperscript{29} Put differently, moral realism takes political leadership of great powers defined in terms of morality as the key variable in understanding the power transition integral in the systemic transformation of international relations. Such leadership can be categorized as inactive, conservative, proactive, or aggressive at the national level, and as tyranny, hegemony, and humane authority at the international level. Moral realism is therefore a binary theory which suggests that whereas a state’s power defines its strategic interests, types of political leadership informed by moral considerations determine strategies for achieving those interests. For Yan, the central theoretical puzzle that moral realism must crack is why a rising state is able to displace a dominating hegemon even when it is inferior to the latter in terms of economic power, technological invention, education system, military strength, and political system. Yan claims that through the lens of moral realism, China will be able to change the international system in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century if it practices the moral principles of fairness, justice, and civility both at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{30} Yan’s articulation of moral realism has been most systematically elaborated in his 2019 book \textit{Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers} published by Princeton University Press.\textsuperscript{31}

Second, is Qin Yaqing’s construction of a relationality theory of world politics. Qin is a leading Chinese constructivist scholar, who translated Alex Wendt’s \textit{Social Theory of International Politics} into Chinese. Qin shares with Yan an aspiration for theoretical innovation by ‘taking inspiration from Western theories and engaging them with Chinese culture, practices and worldviews’.\textsuperscript{32} Like Yan, Qin goes back to ancient Chinese philosophical tradition for inspiration. Qin’s research project is, however, completely different from Yan’s in important aspects. Qin aims to construct a theory of relationality (vis-à-vis rationality) to understand the dynamics of international relations by reinventing Confucian relationalism. That is to say, Qin takes the Chinese idea of ‘relationality’ as the hard core of his theoretical construct by giving ‘relationship’ ontological status, and theorizes it ‘following social science principles’, and more specifically those of social constructivism.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{27} Xuetong Yan, \textit{Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power}, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe, trans. Edmund Ryden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). It should be noted that Yan Xuetong and his Tsinghua associates are not the first, nor the only, group of Chinese scholars to explore ancient Chinese history and philosophy as valuable sources for the studies of international relations. Ye Zicheng of Peking University, for example, published his manuscript \textit{China’s Diplomatic Thought during the Spring-Autumn and the Warring States Periods} in Hong Kong in 2003. This was followed up in 2006 by an article co-authored with Wang Rihua on ‘Schools of Diplomatic Thought during the Spring-Summer and the Warring States Periods’. None of these previous works, however, makes an explicit claim of theoretical innovation or contribution to existing IR theories.
\bibitem{29} Yan, “An International Relations Theory,” 102.
\end{thebibliography}
Qin insists that culture shapes all social theories as background knowledge and calls for constructing ‘a multiverse of knowledge’ of IR.\textsuperscript{33} This immediately provincializes Western IR and legitimizes his theoretical project. Qin is scathingly critical of individualistic rationality-based IR theories for providing only one particular perspective in understanding and interpreting International Relations. For Qin, culture enables theoretical innovation. Digging deep into the background knowledge of Chinese thought and civilization, Qin’s \textit{Relational Theory of World Politics} published by Cambridge University Press in 2018 provides a theory at once contrasting and complementary to the existing (Western) IR theories. Qin sees non-Western IR (his own theoretical construction included) ‘as significant dialog partners that reflect the reality of world politics and enrich the theoretical treasure house through knowledge production for a truly global IR project.’\textsuperscript{34}

In both instances above, there is an unequivocal struggle to bring the Chinese consciousness and Chinese sensibilities to theoretical innovation. Both projects are motivated by an explicit claim that Western IR theories are inadequate, and possibly deficient, without taking seriously Chinese experience, ideas and knowledge claims. However, it is also clear that even these bold moves to contest existing IR theories cannot escape from the prevailing theoretical tools, and they can hardly dispense with the dominant positivist epistemological and methodological assumptions. There is indeed hardly any intention to challenge these assumptions, which in fact inform and are embedded in the theoretical framing of both projects. After all, in so far as IR is part of the ‘colonial expenses’ of social sciences, there is an acute intellectual dilemma to wrestle with in Chinese (and probably any non-Western) intellectual attempts at knowledge production and theoretical innovation. That is that Western IR is both indispensable (largely because of the advantage of its head start) and inadequate (because of deeply entrenched Euro-centric bias).

Third is Tang Shiping, who is the winner 2015 ISA Annual Best Book Award. In his award-winning book \textit{The Social Evolution of International Politics} published by Oxford University Press in 2013, Tang is scathingly critical of all the key grand theories of international politics, ranging from offensive realism, defensive realism, neoliberalism, to the English School and constructivism, in their failure to provide a genuinely endogenous explanation of the systemic transformation of international politics. The root problem for all these grand theories is, in his words, ‘the transformation power of time has been largely, if not completely, missing in all of the grand theories of international politics’. In his words, ‘these three theories [i.e. offensive realism, defensive realism, neoliberalism/the English School] legitimate grand theories of international politics because they roughly capture three distinctive eras of international politics: a world that we had experienced; a world that we have been experiencing; and a world that we may be making’.\textsuperscript{35} It follows that the \textit{transformation} of international politics that SEP (social evolution paradigm) tries to explain is no different from that already embedded in


\textsuperscript{34} Qin, “A Multiverse of Knowledge,” 416.

the grand historical narratives provided by those grand theories, which ‘have been looking at roughly the same human history’. In macro-historical terms, the transformative history of international relations moves, in his words, ‘from the initial paradise-like (but still self-help) anarchy to the “nasty, brutish, and short” Hobbesian (Mearsheimer’s) offensive realism world, then to a Lockeian (Jervis’s) defensive realism world, and then to a more rule-based world’. Tang’s ambitious project seeks to advance the social evolution paradigm (SEP) as ‘a powerful and indispensable paradigm for social sciences’. The SEP is superior, he suggests, to the existing grand theories, as it ‘not only provides genuinely endogenous explanations for the systemic transformations of international politics but also neatly resolves some of the great debates among IR theories’.

Unlike Yan and Qin, Tang makes no effort to bring Chinese knowledge claims to his project, although there is extensive analytical engagement with empirical studies of Chinese history in both Chapters 2 and 3. For Tang, existing grand IR theories are inadequate, not because of their neglect of Chinese and non-Western experience and knowledge claims. It is rather because they have largely ignored the transformative potential of temporality in the evolution of the international system.

Finally, there is Zhao Tingyang, a Chinese philosopher. The philosophical intervention of Zhao Tingyang in Chinese IR theoretical debate and innovation was largely unanticipated but most productive in generating debates about how ancient Chinese history and philosophy as a critical resource could and should be drawn upon for innovative theorization of IR. It starts with the publication of his *Tianxia Tixi* (The System of All-under Heaven) in 2005. Zhao’s works since 2005 have sought to advance a philosophical critique of the worldview prevailing in Western philosophy and IR theory. It is his sustained attack on the ontology and epistemology of Western political thought that inserts him in the meta-theoretical debate in the existing IR scholarship.

The key claim that Zhao has made is that today’s world is a non-world, i.e. philosophically and institutionally it is not a world in its true sense. The only world that prevails today is a geographical one institutionally failed and politically abandoned. The ontological world understood and interpreted by Western philosophy is a problematic one because it is a world constituted by rational state actors, who pursue their narrow national interests. The world-ness of the world is sadly missing because Western political theory and international theory justify national interest in governing world politics, thus denying the world its world-ness. The existing institutions created by and for powerful states do not promote universal wellbeing. ‘The failure of world politics is essentially the failure of [Western] philosophy.’

The Kantian vision of perpetual peace and its modern incarnation (i.e. democratic peace),

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for example, fail to transcend, let alone overcome, the cultural and spiritual divides among civilizations. The idea of a ‘federation of free states’, constructs insiders and outsiders in the world and does more to divide than unite the world. So does Western philosophy.

Zhao calls for ‘a philosophical renewal of all-under-heaven’ and argues for an imaginative and creative use of ancient Chinese political thought, particularly the idea of Tianxia (all-under-heaven) to foster an all-inclusive (or non-exclusive) worldview and to imagine a world that is of all and for all, where nothing is ‘foreign’ or ‘pagan’. Viewing the world as a whole is an epistemological principle first used by Laozi. As Chinese philosophy always considers the world more as a political body than a scientific object, it is a political epistemology not a scientific one that informs ancient Chinese philosophy. ‘Chinese philosophy deals more with the problems of relations (how close is this view to Qin’s?) and the heart, whereas Western philosophy concentrates more on the truth and the mind.’ A global political philosophy constructed around the idea of Tianxia is to cultivate a worldview equivalent to, in his words, ‘a mind at peace, free from the trap of thinking in terms of war, enemy, winner and loser. It is different as political mentality from those of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Marx, Freud, Schmitt, Morgenthau, and Huntington, and different in a practical sense from the hegemonic order of Pax Romana, Christian cosmopolitanism and democratic peace under US leadership.’

For Zhao, ‘a philosophical renewal of all-under-heaven’ is indispensable in search of such a global political philosophy. It entails ‘rethinking China’; and ‘the historical significance of “rethinking China” lies in recovering China’s own ability to think’.

Regardless of the contested nature of the claim of a Chinese School of IR, these four cases discussed above show beyond doubt that there have been conscious efforts by Chinese scholars at IR theoretical innovation in the last decade or so and that one can speak with confidence today of a distinctive Chinese contribution to global IR theoretical knowledge production. It should be also clear that they are very different in terms of epistemological claims made, methodological approaches adopted and their understandings of the purposes of theoretical pursuit articulated, even when they all (with the exception of Tang Shiping) conscientiously draw on ancient Chinese political and philosophical thought. It is heartening to see that these most notable Chinese contributions to global theoretical knowledge production have started to be recognized through publications by prestigious university presses such as Cambridge, Oxford and Princeton as mentioned above. Yet, the Chinese School labelling remains as contentious as ever in the existing core and periphery structure of global knowledge production, which remains largely intact. What does the school labelling then tell us about the geopolitics of knowledge and contentious politics in disciplinary IR?

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41 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 9.
42 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 10.
43 Zhao, The System of Tianxia, 7.
44 Zhao, The System of Tianxia, 7.
4. ‘School’ Labelling and Contentious Politics In Disciplinary IR

If it is broadly accepted that all ideas and IR theories develop in a specific historical, social, cultural and geographical context, why is it that only some are labelled after specific geocultural/geographical sites such as the English School and the Chinese School, while others are simply called theories and paradigms? Why are ‘isms’, such as liberalism, realism, and constructivism, not considered part of a wider ‘American School’? What does such labelling do, and what purposes does it serve? Why do labels matter? Answers to these questions depend contingently on the perspective from which one is speaking, the dominant and privileged core, or the marginalized and underprivileged peripheries of the discipline. They are closely related to geopolitics of knowledge and to the contentious politics behind the (epi)phenomenon of school labelling in the asymmetrical structures of knowledge dissemination and exchange.

For those sitting at the dominant and privileged core, School labelling has been used to serve for the following three purposes. In the first instance, there is a certain ‘repressive tolerance’ involved in the use of geographical and institutional labelling of schools of thought by the ‘core’. It grants recognition of its existence, but not as a theory on a par with other (American) theories. It is not a pure coincidence that in a broader geopolitical pattern of the sociology of ‘schools’ in IR, such labels are conferred almost exclusively on international thought produced outside the United States. Theoretical knowledge produced in the American core is mostly referred to prestigiously as theories and paradigms, thus privileging theoretical knowledge produced in the United States as ‘untainted’ by its geocultural origins. This effectively creates parallel but hierarchical universes in the production of disciplinary knowledge. The labelling of geographical and institutional schools conveniently relegates them to a different and arguably inferior universe of knowledge production and circulation. It thus becomes an integral part of a strategy of ‘dominance by neglect’ by the core.

Secondly, for sceptics and critics at the core, a repressive use of the school label serves the purpose of singularizing and homogenizing ideas. It implies that all thought under the given geographical or institutional denominator can be described in singular terms. This serves to impose a greater degree of homogeneity within the school. Compared with American IR, which presents itself as pluralistic, these schools of thought would look hopelessly parochial and provincially monotonous. Yet, as demonstrated in earlier discussions of this paper, there is significant epistemological and methodological diversity within the Chinese School, even though the notion of a singular ‘Chinese School’ seems to suggest otherwise. Significant differences also exist between pluralism and solidarism in the English School, which can in part be attributed to different geo-epistemic positions privileging international society vis-à-vis world society perspectives.

Thirdly, for the ‘core’, labelling schools of thought with a geographical and institutional prefix is useful for localizing ideas, thus denying their potential for developing a universal theory. The use of national labels by the core, such as Chinese, Indian, and Korean, has so far proved effective in localizing those theoretical noises from the peripheries, and

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45 This part of the paper draws heavily from Zhang and Kristensen, “The Curious Case of “Schools””.
even in delegitimizing their counter-hegemonic protests against the dominance of the American ‘core’. From the perspective characteristic of IR as an American social science, geographically labelled ‘national’ schools are invited into the global field only as ‘schools’ that are local, applicable solely to their particular geographical context, constructed and developed exclusively for their own nation-state, and perhaps only for the consumption of their nationals.

Clearly, school labelling affects how such theorizing efforts on the peripheries and semi-peripheries may be invited into the conversation in the heartland of the discipline, i.e. their positionality in a globalized American social science. School labelling in this understanding has helped reinforce and reclaim the centrality of mainstream IR theories and the universality claims of the American ‘core’, as well as marginalizing, if not totally discrediting or delegitimizing, alternative approaches as inherently locally bounded.

If school labelling has been used by the core to reinforce its dominance as suggested above, why should school labelling have been so willingly appropriated by their proponents on the disciplinary peripheries, particularly in the non-Western IR epistemic communities? What particular strategic purposes has school labelling served in promoting theoretical innovation beyond the West?

For its proponents beyond the West, school labelling has been actively appropriated for three strategic and political reasons. First, geographical school-making on the peripheries carries special political significance and is purposely contentious. It is true that for some, particularly those advocating national schools, this is meant to assert a particular national identity through producing alternative theories. But for others, waving the flags of national schools of IR beyond the West is not aimed solely at alternative knowledge production. Rather, it is also a purposeful political contention, as many feminist, post-colonial and green battle cries have been. It serves to make a political point to disturb the status quo, to articulate a protest over the prevailing disciplinary fashion, and to engage in a kind of academic insurrection, or ‘epistemic disobedience’, in the words of Walter Mignolo, against the theoretical and intellectual hegemony of either its Eurocentrism reincarnation or an American social science manifestation.46

Secondly, the appropriation of national geographical school labels by those on the peripheries can be read as a strategic way to decentre and provincialize, perhaps even nationalize, American IR, and expose the self-serving interests of its pretentiously universalist epistemology. In asserting their legitimacy, emerging non-Western schools have often claimed to be counter-hegemonic, in particular against the dominance of American IR as an intricately differentiated structure of authorities that privileges a singular site for knowledge production with a particular conception of what is credible and legitimate knowledge. Looking through geo-cultural lenses, challenging the universalist claims of American IR theories through theoretical innovation by non-Western IR schools is to assert knowledge

claims from the putative peripheries and semi-peripheries of the discipline in its existing geography of knowledge. It not only attempts to break down the prejudices embedded in the existing knowledge system, but also questions the claim of the American ‘core’ as the creator, depositor, and distributor of universal knowledge.

Thirdly, geographical school-making becomes an articulation of ‘an epistemic awakening’. In highlighting the global power differential in the geopolitics of knowledge-making, it unveils the geo-historical linkage between the political and the epistemic. It lays bare the nature of the ‘epistemic violence’, as Gayatri Spivak would have it, historically committed by Eurocentrism ‘understood as a way of conceiving of and organizing knowledge’, which continues to obstruct and undermine ‘Southern’ or ‘non-Western’ approaches to knowledge.47 School labelling is political, as it is integral to a collective action to redress epistemic injustice which contributes to the oppression of those at the margins and their claims as knowers.48 From a sociology of knowledge stance, it is important to stress that this is primarily a move in disciplinary politics, not necessarily a product of great power politics, as the most externalist accounts, and many critics of new schools, would have it.

5. Final Remarks
The globality of IR as a discipline is unmistakable today. So is the global contribution to the production of knowledge of IR from multiple non-Western sites, as the discussions of the Chinese School of IR above demonstrate. From the perspective of contentious politics in disciplinary IR, non-Western school labelling and making constitutes an intervention into the uneven geopolitical structures of IR under the conditions of inequalities of power, as it calls into question the modern and colonial foundation of the control of knowledge while also creating an opening for alternative sources and foundations for theoretical pursuit and construction that are inclusive of a richer variety of voices, experiences and knowledge claims. In that sense, IR knowledge production from multiple non-Western sites should be celebrated as an important step towards constructing a truly global IR.

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Abstracts in Turkish

Devlete Alternatifler: Ya da, Neden Batı-dışı Bir Ul İ Devrimci Bir Bilim Olmalı

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Öz


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Deepshikha Shahi
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Uluslararası İlişkilerde Medeniyetler Diyalogu ve Merkez-Çevre Diyalogu Düşüncesi

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çünkü medeniyetler yekpare bütünler olarak alınamaz. Bu makale Uluslararası İlişkiler’de medeniyetler diyalogunun anlamını ve sonuçlarını açığa kavuşturmaya amaçlamaktadır. Ayrıca, disiplin içindeki medeniyetler diyalogunun nasıl yürütüleceğini ve bu diyalogdan beklentilerin neler olabileceği tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ul, diyalog, merkez- çevre, medeniyetler diyaloğu, Batı sonrası Ul

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Öz

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okumalar ve sınıftaki diğer pedagojik faaliyetler de dâhil olmak üzere hangi ders tasarımının, diyalog ve U'yi var olan geleneksel kriterlerin ötesine itmek için gereken çeşitliliği sağladığı çözmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ul ders müfredatı, pedagoji, diyalog, çeşitlilik, Bat/bati-dişi

Çin Okulu, Küresel Bilgi Üretimi ve Disiplinlerarası Uluslararası İlişkilerde Tartışmalı Siyaset

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Öz

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çin Okulu, küresel Ul, bilgi üretimi, teorik konuşma, tartışmalı siyaset
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