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In This Issue

This issue of *All Azimuth* features seven research articles on a diverse range of subjects in addition to our usual commentary and review article. In the opening article, Bean and Comor take a critical look at the newest orientation toward social network data collection and analysis in US public diplomacy studies. They warn against the revival of the Cold War mindset amidst efforts to take advantage of the recent technological advancements. In the next article, Demir and Avcı undertake a similar task of systematic review, this time of terrorism studies in Turkey and conclude that as a field it has much room for improvement, particularly with respect to the rigorousness of the research methods employed and engagement with the global field’s terminology and theoretical accumulation.

The third article is by Aydınlı and Biltekin, who argue for a definition of original theorizing in the periphery and a typology for such theorizing, which would potentially help reinvigorate the attempts to widen the world of international relations theory. Taking on this call, Kuru elaborates on the pitfalls homegrown theorizing may encounter by looking at the mistakes of core Western scholarship, such as ethnocentrism, exclusion and silencing. Exemplifying how a non-Western perspective may enrich international relations conceptualization efforts, Kavalski undertakes an interpretative journey of China’s IR concepts, particularly, the notion of *guanxi* – one of the two terms that goes into the Chinese phrase for International Relations. He argues that the best way to translate *guanxi* is to take it as relationality rather than relations, which provides a new opportunity to redefine international relations as a co-dependent space rather than a back and forth between two distinct agents. In her article, Moshirzadeh explains the ways in which the Iranian IR community responded to calls for development of endogenous/indigenous theories to reflect Iranian/Islamic points of view and shows how contextual factors, such as lack of international agency and intellectual autonomy, limited sources of inspiration, the dynamism of the IR community, the uneasy relationship between academia and government, have limited such attempts. In the final research article, Shimizu introduces a neglected methodological tradition from Japanese international relations (IR) – the culturalist methodology -- and argues it has great potential to contribute to contemporary post-Western international relations theory (IRT) literature by posing radical questions about the ontology of IR. Looking into concepts of ‘international cultural relations’ (*kokusai bunka*) and ‘regional history’ (*chiikishi*), he highlights how Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention among ‘equal’ nations on the basis of state borders are limiting and not universal.

This issue’s commentary comes from Professor İlter Turan, the current president of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). He argues that Turkey has many highly qualified scholars and a very large potential for future work in IR, and suggests that better collaboration with governments and universities to develop better PhD programs, participate in PhD consortiums, and establish stronger links with the international community are ways to give Turkish scholars an even stronger voice in the international academic community. Finally in her review article, Tafuro Ambrosetti reviews T.V. Paul and his colleagues’ newest edited book, *Status in World Politics*, exploring why a deeper reflection on the identity of rising powers is central to the analysis of their status expectations, and calling for a cross-breeding between the literatures on status and soft power.

We hope you enjoy this new issue, and do not forget to visit the journal’s new website www.allazimuth.com which offers free access to past issues and online first articles.
Data-Driven Public Diplomacy: A Critical and Reflexive Assessment

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**Abstract**

This essay presents a critical and reflexive assessment of contemporary efforts to innovate the measurement and evaluation of public diplomacy. Analyzing a recent and pivotal report called “Data-Driven Public Diplomacy,” it explains how the institutional and ideological residue of the Cold War underwrites these initiatives in the context of American activities in its contemporary “War on Terror.” Inspired by Marx’s concept of the fetish—an under-represented conceptual approach to public diplomacy research—the authors critique the thinking of public diplomacy scholars and officials, arguing that both an omnipresent past and a powerful form of technological fetishism are discernible in the “Data-Driven Public Diplomacy” report. An outcome of the type of thinking represented in the report, they conclude, has been the pervasiveness of contradictions and, in this area of foreign policy, disempowering implications.

**Keywords:** Public diplomacy, Cold War, technological fetishism, measurement and evaluation

1. **Introduction**

Succinctly defined, public diplomacy (PD) has been a means of advancing a country’s assumed interests through the efforts of various agencies and actors to shape the thinking and ideals of foreign publics. PD has historically involved an array of activities: from propaganda broadcasts to educational exchange programs to embassy-sponsored cultural events. With technological developments (e.g., television, satellites, and the internet), innovations in PD have followed. The rapid development of digital, social, and mobile media has compelled PD officials in many countries to make use of new technologies in ways that go well beyond message dissemination.\(^1\) Increasingly, it is expected that the precise results of communication efforts should be measurable. While empirical outputs (e.g., the number of messages a particular PD program distributed) have long been reported, capabilities associated with digital

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technologies have opened the door to what some call “the holy grail” of PD: measurable impacts—uniquely detailed assessments of what a particular policy or program achieved in terms of its influence on public thinking at a level heretofore unavailable to policy analysts.²

Rather than debating broad methodological, epistemological, or even philosophical questions related to this quest (debates, for example, regarding the possibility or impossibility of controlling the thoughts of others), in this essay, we closely examine a recent and much lauded US policy report on this topic—titled “Data-Driven Public Diplomacy: Progress Towards Measuring the Impact of Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting Activities”—to critically reconsider the technologically-framed goals of this foreign policy sub-field.³ Herein, we argue that the renewed and intensified desire to measure and evaluate PD (now through capabilities associated with digital technology) stems from at least two under assessed and interrelated sources. One, we propose, is the ideological residue of the Cold War and a way of thinking about communication that contributes to a profound institutional inertia. Information technology scholar Paul Edwards refers to this Cold War-era thinking as “closed-world” discourse.⁴ We argue that this discourse contextualizes “data-driven” PD measurement and evaluation, not just in practice but also in how PD measurement and evaluation are being conceptualized. The other source of this compulsion involves a general lack of clarity as to what PD officials are meant to achieve, specifically PD’s measurable impacts. We argue that this unanswered “what” question—what ends are PD analysts and officials pursuing (and, at least indirectly, what has caused the problems that they are responding to)—is not so much a matter of ignorance as it is driven by influences that, curiously, may well be recognized but are treated as if they are not. Most PD efforts, we argue, do little to address (let alone redress) root causes of antipathy; yet, while many or most officials and analysts surely recognize this, the increasingly ambitious march towards the granular measurement and management of PD continues.

We seek to explain this strange state of conscious self-denial using a critical and materialist approach (and one not yet applied to the study of PD) drawn from Marx’s concept of the fetish.⁵ Through this concept’s iteration as technological fetishism, we try to better understand PD’s technology-mediated disjunction between thought and action. In bringing both Edwards’ concept of a closed-world discourse and Marx’s understanding of the fetish to bear on contemporary PD, in what follows, we seek to challenge and refresh what has been a somewhat unreflexive area of foreign policy—paradoxically unreflexive, given that digital technologies are said be “revolutionizing” PD practices.

The pairing of the theoretical orientations of Edwards and Marx might seem incongruous in that Edwards’ discourse-oriented approach draws influences from social construction of technology and poststructuralism, both of which, in part, arose from perceived shortcomings in Marx’s focus on political economy. Both Edwards and Marx, however, draw attention to relations of power and, in our view, language and culture are not reducible to narrowly-defined material conditions, but nor are they autonomous. We agree with Cultural Studies

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scholar Chris Barker that “the material-cultural binary is a hindrance to investigation and should be put to one side.” PD practices involve an assemblage of material technologies, institutional subcultures, and ways of talking about PD that permit, encourage, or forbid alternative ways of thinking. Our approach applies political economy and textual analysis and articulates them together to produce a novel interpretation of an influential PD policy guidance document. In doing so, we hope to spur consideration of alternative possibilities for PD’s future.

We begin with an overview of the institutionalization of particular ways of thinking during the Cold War, demonstrating that despite this conflict’s conclusion more than twenty-five years ago, its residue has resurfaced to taint the assumptions of PD officials fighting the post-9/11 “War on Terror.” Relating the key PD report mentioned above (“Data-Driven Public Diplomacy”) to this closed-world discourse, we proceed to address two main questions: (1) How does the report characterize the history of PD measurement and evaluation? And (2) How does the report reflect and reinforce questionable assumptions about the political and cultural potentialities commonly associated with communications generally and digital technologies more specifically? After demonstrating that PD officials are turning to technological solutions, our paper examines this concentration of resources through the lens of technological fetishism. Through its conceptual application, further contradictions are revealed—contradictions that we suggest need to be openly examined for both academic and strategic reasons. We conclude that PD’s embrace of increasingly sophisticated analytical technologies—as they reflect and further fetishize policy relations and preferred narratives—is entrenching something very different from a foreign policy truly focused on peace, security, and development.


In 1963, at the height of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States Advisory Commission on Information (established by Congress) issued its eighteenth report. In the wake of that year’s confrontations concerning Cuba, its authors pointed out that other events—such as developments in Berlin, the Chinese Communist invasion of India, and Communist insurrections in South Vietnam and Laos—demonstrated the very real threat of international Communism. An array of American state resources would need to be mobilized in response. The role of the US Information Agency (USIA), for example, was clear: “Our most urgent job is not merely to interpret US policy and the US way of life, but to more pertinently establish in men’s minds the basic distinction between western and Communist concepts of society.”

More than at any other time, America’s containment of the Communist (and especially the Soviet) threat involved both physical and psychological defenses. However, citizens were often frustrated that communication promoting America abroad lacked efficacy. “Many Americans—including Presidents and Congressmen—could not comprehend how information programs seemed incapable of blunting anti-Americanism abroad and building

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sympathy for U.S. policies.” The Advisory Commission therefore noted that critics of USIA were correct in their assertion that “enhanced research and training programs are needed in order … to develop firmer foundations for our foreign information programs in relation to the opinions, attitudes, hopes, aspirations, and misconceptions of the foreign audiences…” Topping its list of what to do about it were recommendations for “improving internal coordination and communication, inspection and evaluation, … interagency relations and coordination, … forward planning, and the role of the office of policy.”

More than fifty years later, despite dramatic changes in geopolitical conditions, as a report completed by the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD) in 2014 (“Data-Driven Public Diplomacy”) conveys, this need for ever-improving measurement and evaluation of PD has reemerged. Commissioned by the successor to the Advisory Commission on Information, the ACPD was operating in a much different world: “Non-state actors” had replaced the Soviet Union as the world’s most significant threat. Nevertheless, enhancing the capacity to measure and evaluate strategic information and communication activities—a significant element of PD’s Cold War past—has again become a priority. The “War on Terror” (or, to use official jargon, “Combating Violent Extremism”) has filled a vacuum created by the Soviet Union’s collapse. In some ways, of course, it has. But in other ways, as we argue, something more complex and worrisome is at work. Specifically, Cold War-era institutional assumptions and practices have found renewed relevance in the form of “data-driven” PD, thereby constraining the ability of policymakers and officials to think about security and PD in new ways. As one U.S. intelligence community insider noted, “Many of today’s principal analytic problems arise from continued reliance on analytic tools, methodologies, and processes that were appropriate to the static and hierarchical nature of the Soviet threat during the Cold War.” We similarly see in passages of ACPD’s “Data-Driven” report a renewed attempt to make sense of a highly complex world using aspects of a Cold War-era mindset.

According to the US Department of State, ACPD is charged with appraising US Government activities intended to understand, inform and influence foreign publics and to increase the understanding of, and support for, these same activities. Comprised of seven bi-partisan members drawn from government and industry, ACPD had been grappling with new mandates for better PD measurement and evaluation since the early 2000s, when the State Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) required units to scrutinize the use of taxpayers’ money as part of a broader Government Accountability Office (GAO) push for increased effectiveness and de-duplication of effort. In a public meeting of ACPD in 2010, Cherreka Montgomery, Director of the Evaluation and Measurement Unit (EMU) in the US Under Secretary of State’s Office of Policy Planning and Resources (R/PPR), described State’s newfound level of commitment to evaluation as unprecedented. When Montgomery was hired in 2005, PD had “more than 898 different performance measures, most of which were merely outputs,” and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had assessed State’s PD

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strategy and performance measurement as “not performing.” Montgomery described how she and others had worked to standardize, consolidate, and improve PD performance measures.\footnote{14}

Nevertheless, ACPD was temporarily shuttered in 2011 after failing to win congressional reauthorization. In announcing its reauthorization in 2013, ACPD’s new Executive Director, Katherine Brown, emphasized that ACPD was “operating under a clear mandate to itemize and assess the efficiency of public diplomacy programs across government for an annual comprehensive report.”\footnote{15} At the ACPD’s first public meeting following its reauthorization, Brown described the organization’s role as a “watchdog” that needed to “break down the activities and review how their impact is being measured.”\footnote{16} ACPD today claims that measurement and evaluation of PD and broadcasting are priorities: “Knowing when public diplomacy is working can often be elusive, yet measurement and evaluation of public diplomacy and international broadcasting activities is essential for strategic planning.”\footnote{17}

The 2014 “Data-Driven” report was produced by communication and PD scholars who also made recommendations based on their findings, which focused on five key areas:

1. increased recognition on the part of State Department officials of the importance of research in public diplomacy;
2. movement away from State Department and BBG’s [Broadcasting Board of Governors] risk-averse cultures, which can negatively impact how research data and evaluations are conceived, conducted, reported and used;
3. more consistent strategic approaches in developing and evaluating public diplomacy and international broadcasting activities;
4. increased training in strategic planning, including research and evaluation; and
5. more funding and personnel to conduct more meaningful evaluations … that can correct the course of programs and activities.\footnote{18}

Numerous institutions and commentators praised the report for its innovative approach, and it has figured prominently in ACPD’s subsequent Comprehensive Annual Reports. Indicators of the report’s significance include the Public Diplomacy Council’s (a nonprofit organization with close ties with the US Information Agency Alumni Association) declaration, “Anyone who follows US public diplomacy should read the report, starting with Nicholas Cull’s excellent introduction tracing the history of evaluating US efforts to change opinions and attitudes of publics overseas.”\footnote{19} According to another commentator, the true audience for the report was not the general public, but rather, “the specialists and especially the policy makers who can effect change….”\footnote{20} Intertextual markers of the 2014 report’s influence continue to emerge while its themes reflect trends in public diplomacy research writ large.\footnote{21}
However laudable and forward looking the report has been in the eyes of policy analysts and PD officials, our reading reveals signs of something more obscure, entrenched, and seemingly unchangeable: lingering Cold War-era assumptions about the capabilities of communication technology to sustain and advance (self-evidently benevolent) American power. Of course, the “Data-Driven” report is just one of many examples of PD discourse, not all of which reflect such Cold War assumptions. However, we argue that the “Data-Driven” report uniquely reveals evidence of what Edwards calls a closed-world discourse—a set of material and symbolic conditions that underlay US Cold War policies promoting global surveillance and control through technology. Both then and now, analytical technologies have enabled various American national security offices and officials to work together in the context of a complex of techniques, political goals, and ideological perspectives.

According to Edwards, during the Cold War, the closed and tightly policed world of US national security affairs was bound together, ultimately, through the overarching struggle between the United States and Soviet Union. As the Advisory Commission’s 1963 report (mentioned above) illustrates, American PD efforts were principally conducted to thwart real or imagined Soviet aggression. For Edwards, closed-world discourse comprised a number of inter-related elements involving a shared worldview, a tacitly agreed upon set of practices, and a common language. For one thing, it relied on “techniques drawn from engineering and mathematics for modeling aspects of the world as closed systems.” The ACPD’s “Data-Driven” report reiterates this impulse in its emphasis on complex analytical models from which to generate innovations drawn from what it calls “actionable data.”

The report’s authors urge the BBG, for example, to “employ more advanced statistical methods for analyzing cross-national survey data, such as hierarchal linear modeling (multi-level analysis) of aggregated cross-national survey data to identity and measure global and regional predictors of BBG impact.” As one commentator noted in response to the report, “The greatest opportunity for influence comes from the visualization and synthesis of big data insights with the nuance, experience, and understanding developed by generations of diplomats.” This commentator, a consultant who stands to benefit from “data-driven” developments, described the need for data scientists and diplomats to work shoulder-to-shoulder: “An understanding of the nature of data science and the roles diplomats and data scientists would play at each stage of research and analysis is critical to success.”

Closed-world discourse also relied on technologies, especially the computer, that made “systems analysis and central control practical on a very large scale.” Similarly, the ACPD’s emphasis on “data-driven planning and measurement” demonstrates that the impulse toward centralized analysis and control persists.


Fischer, “Data-Driven Diplomacy,” par. 5.

(an online performance measurement reporting tool that documents the scope, frequency and achievements of specific PD activities) and the Advancing Public Diplomacy’s Impact report (a global comparison study to measure the influence of US PD activities worldwide on key foreign audiences). Despite these and other initiatives, the “Data-Driven” report’s authors noted the need to go further, bemoaning that “there is currently no centralized methodology or office responsible for measuring and evaluating US public diplomacy and public affairs activities conducted via social media.”

Edwards, furthermore, argues that closed-world discourse involved “fictions, fantasies, and ideologies, including such visions as global mastery through air power and nuclear weapons [and] global danger from an expansionist ‘evil empire’….” While the Soviet threat has vanished, enemies have multiplied. As the “Data-Driven” report declares, “Given the fast proliferation of non-state actors who are shaping the international system this century, it [PD] has never been more pertinent to our national security strategy.” Here it should be noted that the complete absence of discussion within the report of what threat, exactly, is being countered through PD is consistent with what scholars describe as a post-9/11 homeland security “ontology,” by which they mean the “translation of virtual, potential threat[s] into specific, possible outcomes and concrete, material actions.” Vague-yet-omnipresent threats haunt the “Data-Driven” report, bolstering its urgency and recommendations.

A final element of closed-world discourse during the Cold War was its “language of systems, gaming, and abstract communication and information that relied on formalisms to the detriment of experimental and situated knowledge.” Such a language of games and control endures in the ACPD report as its authors assert that “public diplomacy, like traditional diplomacy, is a long game.” The report “makes suggestions on structures and methodologies needed to make foreign audience research more robust, impact assessment more institutionalized, and feedback loops for strategy and tactics more systematic.” For example, a “department-wide content management system for social media accounts at US embassies worldwide” would “enable better coordination of efforts in digital engagement, and potentially make for sustainable procedures for pre-and post-communication analytical efforts.” Systemization of PD, however, appears more aspirational than actual in that evaluation “should strive to be more specific and systematic in describing the research processes it undertakes” and, in some cases, there appears to be “no systematic way that evaluations” presently can be “distributed, stored, or solicited.”

The “Data-Driven” report contains residues of closed-world discourse that, at first glance, seem coincidental and are easy to overlook. Of course, there are also many notable differences between the report and Cold War-era PD efforts. For one thing, the authors demonstrate malleability in arguing for the need to “identify and develop culturally appropriate programs and messages, and the proper way to employ them.” The report’s repeated calls for field

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31 Edwards, Closed World, 15.
34 Edwards, Closed World, 15.
research, avoiding self-reported data, and deepening and expanding research efforts evidence more openness than the Cold War rhetoric that Edwards analyzed. Our concern, however, is that several of the “Data-Driven” report’s premises and recommendations eerily resemble Cold War-era thinking, implying little or no reflection on the underlying assumptions of PD itself at a time when that reflection is urgently needed.

The “Data-Driven” report’s flickers of closed-world discourse risk further entrenching the status quo. As arguably the most vaunted example of a more general and pervasive embrace of technological empowerment and scientific precision in PD, paradoxically the report undermines the pursuit of a precise understanding of why people in other countries support or (sometimes violently) oppose US policies in the first place. As Eric Nisbet and colleagues put it in the context of PD in Muslim countries:

> Public diplomacy initiatives and media lobbying efforts do not address the root causes of anti-Americanism endemic to Muslim countries and instead are likely to only lead to small gains in ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Muslim public. Short of substantial changes in US political, economic, and foreign policy, widespread hatred and loathing of the United States in the Muslim world is likely to continue.40

### 3. The Implications of “Closed-World Discourse”

Data-driven PD’s promise of sophisticated measurement, abstract representation, and statistical certitude in support of the status quo risks further marginalizing the voices of PD officials and analysts who may be critical of US national security policies, and thus an historically-grounded and substantive re-consideration of them. It is vital to recognize that, like Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s infamous Cold War-era Pentagon computers, the output of data-driven PD is not simply statistical, it is also rhetorical in that it bolsters conformity to existing policies. What is puzzling is that the “Data-Driven” report’s authors simultaneously acknowledge and ignore this situation. Echoing critiques of misleading and self-serving 1960s Defense Department “research,” they note that “current [PD] research and evaluation systems in place often seem to justify programs, campaigns, and budgets” yet the authors recommend changes that surely will be used to legitimize subsequent elaborations of many of these programs, campaigns, and budgets.41

Rather than an unacknowledged error or the intellectual inability to identify such contradictions, we propose that the authors of the “Data-Driven” report generally see this problem but, nevertheless, choose to ignore it. If this is correct, the question that needs to be answered is why? To respond directly, below we draw upon concepts from Marx to supplement Edwards’ discourse-centered approach. To productively connect Edwards’ and Marx’s approaches, however, we first need to explain how the institutional context of ACPD’s report influences its characterization of PD’s Cold War past—a preferred narrative that shapes PD’s present and future.

Whether during the Cold War or post-9/11-era, by the very nature of the institutional framework of their analysis, when writing a report for a country’s foreign policy officials, scholars are compelled (whether consciously or not) to frame what they produce in accordance with the “realities” at hand (as James Joyce famously quipped, “My consumers are they

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not my producers?”). Indeed, all scholarly work is influenced by the vested interests that directly or institutionally shape intellectual capacities. While, ideally, academics—protected by tenure and the university—are relatively free to think openly and reflexively, their “real world” circumstances (from the research cultures of their institutions, to the need to gain or maintain access to institutional arenas, to the commercial interests of their publishers) all shape what can or cannot be said and, in the context of policy questions, what can or cannot be conveyed as being reasonable and actionable. The “Data-Driven” report reflects these general limitations, but not without some remarkable moments of hesitation and even self-contradiction.

In his introduction to the report, Nicholas Cull, for example, asserts that US PD, carried out primarily through the now disbanded USIA (United States Information Agency), effectively exposed Eastern Europe and the USSR to “Western ideas:”

The leaders of revolutions spoke powerfully of the influence of US international broadcasting and analysts noted the role that exposure to western ideas through exchanges had in laying the foundations for change. Ironically the agency’s success in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union contained the seeds of its decline. USIA had always justified itself as a necessity of the Cold War. Once the Cold War was ‘won’ its political pay-masters saw it as an ideal source of a ‘peace dividend’ budget saving.42

There are, of course, many interpretations as to the reasons for the collapse of Soviet and East European communism.43 As Cull intimates, among PD scholars, the theory that the information and ideas disseminated through American state agencies, especially the USIA, played an important role conveys an implicit bias that legitimizes PD generally and the saliency of the “Data-Driven” report more specifically. It should be pointed out that we do not raise this issue as a means of simply dismissing Cull’s assertion. Instead, we wonder if this “truth,” coupled with its widespread use in associating the contemporary problem of Islamic extremism with the Cold War, is at least as much self-serving as it is insightful. The taken-for-grantedness of PD’s assumed past utility reveals, we argue, that the “Data-Driven” report itself is imbued with “baked in” institutional interests that otherwise might go unnoticed, especially in a policy paper crafted by seemingly objective academics.

This generalized and partial explanation for the report’s orientations is not novel; once any scholar is tasked to conduct research and submit recommendations—particularly on an assumed problem requiring actionable guidance—the intellectual straightjacket that is an obvious component of all nation-state policymaking (and one traditionally resisted within the university) is almost certainly strapped on. We suggest, however, that there is more to it than this: The reified object of the “Data-Driven” report—digital technologies—also plays a significant (but largely unseen) role in shaping or, to be more precise, mediating the thinking behind the report itself. Indeed, the report’s very title—“Data-Driven Public Diplomacy”—implies that data itself has become a form of agency in this policy arena.

In his introduction, Cull recognizes (and seemingly regrets) the actualization of what we might observe to be a form of technological determinism (i.e., technology itself constituting a decisive and, indeed, independent social agent). Cull traces this determinism to the

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Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which, he says, “imposed a considerable administrative burden on the entire agency [the USIA] by introducing a requirement to generate a hierarchy of goals and deliver annual assessments of the extent to which these had been met.” Cull continues, “While logical on paper, it proved a poor fit for the agency’s work,” and he goes on to discuss post-9/11 efforts to better measure PD’s results as, “The quest to measure the un-measurable.” Yet, on the same page, Cull writes that “the new tools of social media make new kinds of evaluation possible even as the communication environment requires an ever more nuanced approach for an ever more savvy audience, evaluation has an unprecedented significance. It must be part of the DNA of public diplomacy’s future.”

Measurement and evaluation of what a PD program has achieved or can achieve are therefore positioned to be both dubious and inevitable. Cull recognizes measurement and evaluation’s DNA-like entrenchment in contemporary PD alongside its inadequacies and contradictions. Thus, introducing the ACPD report is a leading PD academic and policy analyst who appears to know that the mechanization of knowledge that a data-driven PD furthers is neither doable or desirable, yet he accepts it as inevitable. Collectively, the scholars writing the “Data-Driven” report propose the renovation of PD on foundations that are far from stable yet, they assert, build it we must. As the short history of PD presented by Cull concludes, data-driven policies now are in place and, going forward, “actionable research” and “measured forms of impact evaluation” are crucial for PD’s “maximal utility.”

We next identify what might be a principal contributor to this contradiction.

4. “Data-Driven” Technological Fetishism

In its introduction and subsequent pages, the “Data-Driven” report reflects the pervasiveness of something more complex and powerful than just technological determinism: technological fetishism. According to David Harvey, this kind of fetish reflects:

the habit humans have of endowing real or imagined objects or entities with self-contained, mysterious and even magical powers to move and shape the world in distinctive ways.

The technological changes that we see all around us are, of course, very real. They are a constitutive feature of how we live our daily lives.

This focus on fetishized relations in daily life as constitutive is important in that it underlines that fetishistic thinking is not based in the mind. It is instead rooted in concrete human relations. A policy official, for example, almost certainly knows that digital technologies do not have the intrinsic power to prescribe or impel specific outcomes but, because others work and act as if they do, they in fact generate an experienced social reality; they entail a tangible form of agency. As a technology or technique is institutionalized and utilized (e.g., the internet), people really do organize their social relations, investments, and public policies around its existence as an unquestionably central agent of history. In this sense, the magic of the fetish is real. As the thing fetishized is treated as if it is powerful, it in effect exercises power.

45 Advisory Commission, “Data-Driven Public Diplomacy,” 11-12, emphasis added.
To reiterate, the technological fetish is not some kind of twisted condition of a defective mind; it is an experiential outcome of “normal” social relations. More generally, in modern society, most relations are mediated by money, contracts, technologies, and other such things. What occurs in the fetish is the mind not inverting reality but, instead, its recognition of a real inversion. In contemporary society, the (dead) products of social relations—including technologies—experientially mediate our relations and realities. Fetishization, therefore, is more than just reification (the taken-for-grantedness of human creations) or technological determinism. With the fetish, a dual reality is recognized. Specifically, most people know or have the capacity to know that a fetish is an arbitrary social construction but, through the conditions of one’s relations, act as if it is not. By comparison, technological determinism—in practically all its iterations—is not consciously understood and accepted.\(^\text{49}\)

Generally, technological determinism more directly reflects the reification of things while the technological fetish cannot, by comparison, be simply eradicated through some form of critical reflection. Instead, it constitutes what Slavoj Žižek calls (when referencing the fetish generally) an “objective illusion”—a “reality” that is inseparable from the “real world” of human relations, including the real world of policymaking.\(^\text{50}\)

Illustrating continuity between the Cold War and post-9/11 eras, the “Data-Driven” report demonstrates that the “real world” of PD seems to fundamentally require an unyielding march toward the generation and use of evermore precise and measurable forms of data. The report’s assertion of a “recent movement toward more data-driven planning and measurement” as a “positive shift in public diplomacy” both elides this historical continuity and undermines the more subjective, indeterminate, and human elements of PD.\(^\text{51}\) For the “Data-Driven” report’s authors, this problem need not be dwelled upon. Why? A circular and arguably idealistic answer is given: “Those involved in international broadcasting and public diplomacy research and evaluation are impressive both for their deep loyalty to US diplomacy generally and the need for measurement specifically.”\(^\text{52}\)

In much of the report, while technology-mediated and quantitative methods are recognized to have their limitations, they constitute an inevitable and necessary “way forward,” although a “way forward” towards precisely what remains unclear.\(^\text{53}\) By its conclusion, however, the report implicitly answers this unposed question with a call to, among other things, refine and nuance various forms of data using more developed social media assessment capabilities. The fetish, it seems, both obscures the question and structures the answers. Thus, what has become a common sense means of policy empowerment—digital technologies and data—contributes to analytical disempowerment. As with so many other mechanized applications, digital technologies do more things for us and, in the process, intellectual capabilities once exercised are subsumed.

Because technological fetishism stems from structural conditions and material relations, for analysts and officials aspiring to redress its contradictory implications, to repeat, their individual recognition of its presence is not in itself a sufficient response. The technological fetish, we argue, mediates and serves to externalize the problem it appears to be redressing.

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\(^\text{53}\) Advisory Commission, “Data-Driven Public Diplomacy,” 47.
as isolatable and resolvable. Anti-American extremism, for example, is not presented as a problem that the American state, or interests that it represents, have directly contributed to. This historical dimension of foreign policy, for practical purposes, lies outside the parameters of the analysis. Not only are the foreign policy continuities concerning American power and the problem it is confronting obscured, technological developments are themselves insulated from their socio-economic contexts.

Assessing the “Data-Driven” report and US foreign policies involving data and digital technology through an understanding of technological fetishism clarifies the implications and contradictions at hand. With this in mind, calls for the innovative use of data through PD measurement and evaluation developments should be accompanied by a far more critical recognition of the ways in which such appeals demonstrate continuity with entrenched institutionalized interests and Cold War-era assumptions about the possibilities of controlling human beings. However, this kind of reflexive historical and relational perspective becomes difficult to imagine given the mediating role of technological fetishism in now “common sense” efforts to, in effect (and to repeat Cull’s statement once again), measure the unmeasurable. Following Gramsci, common sense itself is a way of thinking that, despite its logical and empirical shortcomings, serves as a shared and often useful guide in people’s lives. As with the fetish, this usefulness involves the fact that others also act as if it makes sense. Gramsci contrasts common sense to what he calls “good sense” which, instead, entails a conscious understanding of the complexities, dualisms, and even the fetishisms that pervade everyday life.55 We assert that PD needs to be guided by less common sense and more good sense.

5. A Different Future for Public Diplomacy

Some analysts who are not obligated to a policymaking raison d’être and who are pursuing seemingly idealistic research agendas (ironically) can be useful to policymakers. Corman, Trethewey, and Goodall, for example, do not hesitate to call US strategic communication models “dysfunctional,” arguing that they have “diminished [our] status among world opinion leaders and further[ed] the recruitment goals of violent extremists.” Instead of asserting the need for tighter message control through the use of ever improving measurement and evaluation techniques, they explore the productivity of acknowledging the fallibility of American policies. “For instance,” the authors state, “rather than always promoting the virtues of democracy, the United States might try messages that discuss its problems and invite comparison of these faults to the problems of other forms of government.” They also urge officials to “deemphasize control and embrace complexity, replace repetition of messages with experimental variation, consider moves that will disrupt the existing system, and make contingency plans for failure.”

We find Corman, Trethewey, and Goodall’s critical impulse refreshing, innovative, and perhaps even a good place to begin reconsidering the foundational premises of PD.

Although the “Data-Driven” report’s principal recommendations have little to do with reconsidering the foundations of PD in this way, an opening for change is revealed in more than just Cull’s two-minded introduction; it also surfaces in one of its recommendations. Specifically, its authors state, “In the current environment, it is hard to imagine how critical, forward looking research designs could be implemented given existing cultures of fear and risk-aversion. State Department and BBG leadership should reward and encourage honest and balanced evaluations and encourage the admission of setbacks for stronger programming.”59 Furthermore, “[e]valuations should be written in a balanced manner that highlights the successes and failures of particular campaigns and activities.”60 Although we find it difficult to believe that PD policymakers and researchers will use this recommendation to reconsider their fundamental working assumptions, calls for “honest and balanced evaluations” might, going forward, promote more thoughtful accounts of the underlying policies and premises that PD campaigns and activities are designed to support.

Finally, some solace might be taken in light of Cull’s recognition, although largely implicit, of the dubiousness of the “Data-Driven” project itself. It is likely that only the more distant and critical analyst—one relatively removed from policymaking and its fetish-mediated realities—has the capacity needed to place PD on a reflexive and productive path, one very different from the cul-de-sac within which it is now travelling.

6. Conclusion
In critiquing the ACPD’s “Data-Driven” report, and the characterizations and biases on which it rests, we conclude that the enrollment of evermore sophisticated analytical technologies, particularly as they reflect and further fetishize policy relations and preferred narratives, is not a useful innovation of PD. These developments ultimately renew and entrench questionable Cold War-era assumptions about technology and the nature of state power. Data-driven approaches have less to do with building mutual understanding and peace than with supporting governments’ strategic interests and ambitions. The danger is that data-driven approaches will lead officials further away from PD’s humanistic capabilities. Just as stakeholders have witnessed US educational institutions recently diminish or eliminate important aspects of instruction in order to boost quantitative assessment outcomes,61 data-driven PD risks diminishing (or, more likely, not considering) PD’s more useful—yet more difficult to assess—potentials.

A critical perspective maintains, however, that the twenty-first century trajectory of PD is not inevitable, particularly as the technological choices being made are, simultaneously, political choices.62 Through critique and a more reflexive effort to understand these policy choices, wider and less contradictory alternatives become at least imaginable. As Edwards notes, objects of knowledge are produced under specific conditions from materials that are themselves historical products, practices, objects, and symbols.63 In this context, for academics advising policymakers on how to manage a specified problem, their elaboration and, indeed, legitimization of the magical powers vested in digital technologies and

62 Barker, Cultural Studies; Edwards, Closed World.
63 Edwards, Closed World.
measurement techniques is profoundly contradictory. The presence of the technological fetish obscures the historical and material relations shaping contemporary policy delusions; yet, when applied reflexively in our analysis, the technological fetish also illuminates and clarifies the (contradictory) realities of why PD officials and commentators are thinking and acting in certain ways. In regard to the authors of the “Data-Driven” report itself, to quote Maurice Godelier, “it is not the subject who deceives himself, but reality which deceives him.”64

Participating in fetishizing technology and, in turn, facilitating its mediation of policy, promotes an ahistorical and potentially circular analysis. This mediation entails technology’s paradoxical disempowerment of the same analysts and officials who turn to technology for empowerment. Once again, empowerment to do precisely what remains unclear, and this confusion may be related to the dualistic reality of the fetish itself. Our conclusion is that the common sense that more institutional monitoring, quantification, and measurable coordination will lead to more effective PD is something far removed from the more difficult task of exercising good sense—a way of conceptualizing PD that, we suggest, might yield a much different approach to peace, security, and development.

Bibliography


Turkish Terrorism Studies: A Preliminary Assessment*

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Abstract
This article aims to determine the academic disciplinary condition of Turkish terrorism studies in comparison to international ones. We first examine contemporary international terrorism studies and new trends, and then longitudinally assess Turkish terrorism studies via context and methodology. Last, we discuss how and through which perspectives the Turkish discipline could improve and thus contribute to the contemporary literature. We generated three datasets after examining theses, dissertations, and articles. Further, we conducted interviews with and administered questionnaires to terrorism experts to interpret the dataset findings. Regarding context, the most striking point of the Turkish research field is its multi-disciplinary character; because of this fact, Turkish terrorism studies tend to neglect the broader field's terminology and theoretical accumulation. Regarding methodology, a significant problem in the terrorism studies in Turkey is that studies are mostly composed of literature reviews rather than empirical research, thus there is much opportunity for development.

Keywords: Turkish terrorism studies, academic discipline, methodology, context, dataset

1. Introduction
Although terrorism was a research subject before the attacks on 11th of September 2001 (9/11), researchers have paid more attention to the discipline since then. With the more-recent Madrid, London, and Istanbul bombings, terrorism studies have gathered momentum and, as Shepherd says, entered the “golden age” of research.1 Moreover, many researchers have carried out seminal reviews on academic pieces of terrorism. One such scholar, Alex Schmid, has searched concepts, theories, databases, and literature.2 Silke has examined problems in terrorism studies, particularly from the methodological and conceptual perspectives.3

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Another study, which is a successor to previous works, encompasses multiple subjects such as definitions, typologies, theories, databases, secondary sources, and literature, and includes a bibliography of terrorism.

Further, there are myriad of articles considering research on terrorism from all aspects, such as content, methodology, databases, and data-analysis techniques. Methodological discussions and state situations stand out as major issues in the field. For example, Silke notes that terrorism studies have gained only incremental improvements in methodology. More-recent critical terrorism studies discuss a new approach regarding the epistemological and ontological problems in terrorism studies. It is clearly recognized that terrorism has drawn the attention of scholars worldwide.

Reviews of context and methodological perspectives have contributed to the knowledge accumulation in the terrorism domain. These kinds of studies are necessary academic endeavours because they facilitate the determination of boundaries of the field, crystallization of the concepts discussed, and exploration of appropriate research methods. These reviews help reveal the challenges encountered in the academic field so that the discipline can further develop.

However, despite the fact that terrorism has been a major aspect of Turkey’s political environment since the early 1960s, there is no comprehensive research examining Turkish terrorism studies in particular. This article aims to fill this gap by examining Turkish academic studies and views on the subject of terrorism with respect to their context and methodology. Therefore, the research was conducted through an exploratory perspective, seeking to find out the condition of Turkish terrorism studies compared to international work.

This article is divided into two main parts. In the first part, we examine contemporary international terrorism studies and new trends, discussing conceptual and disciplinary matters and then methodological achievements and challenges. In the second part, we assess terrorism studies in Turkey longitudinally perspective via context and methodology. We employed primary and secondary data sources, along with qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques, to reveal and evaluate the academic knowledge related to Turkish terrorism studies. We generated three different datasets for this purpose. First, we coded master’s theses and doctoral dissertations registered with the Turkish Higher Education Council (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK) Thesis Center since 1985. Second, we classified
articles about terrorism published in academic journals according to their research purpose and methodology. Third, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 31 academics, and asked them to fill out a questionnaire comprising eight open-ended questions and four list- and scale-type questions, which we developed based on the literature review and a pilot study. We then analyzed all the information except for the interviews via descriptive statistics and content analysis, and analyzed the data generated by the interview questions through content and discourse analysis.

2. Contemporary Terrorism Studies: The Evolution of a Research Field

The evolution of studies on terrorism can be understood through five stages. The first stage is commonly accepted to be the appearance of a new academic research topic between 1960 and 1969. Although terrorism was perceived as a sub-form of political violence rather than a stand-alone research subject, scholars such as Crozier, Thornton, and Walter conducted some seminal research on terrorism in this period. This era can be recognized as preparation for emergence of the field as a bona fide discipline.

The second stage of terrorism studies, which took place from 1970 to 1978, is considered by some scholars as the launch or emergence of the field. It was the most productive era, with 40% of all publications until 1990 generated during this period. Additionally, researchers, academics and professionals with a military or intelligence background doubled in numbers in these years. According to Schmid, terrorism was by then conceptualized as a “sui-generis” subject rather than as a sub-category of political violence, armed conflict, guerilla warfare

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The pilot study was conducted with 10 doctoral candidates from the Turkish Military Academy Defense Sciences Institute (Kara Harp Okulu Savunma Bilimleri Enstitüsü, SAVBEN) and the Turkish War Colleges Strategic Research Institute (Harp Akademileri Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü, HARPK SAREN).

13 The pilot study was conducted with 10 doctoral candidates from the Turkish Military Academy Defense Sciences Institute (Kara Harp Okulu Savunma Bilimleri Enstitüsü, SAVBEN) and the Turkish War Colleges Strategic Research Institute (Harp Akademileri Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü, HARPK SAREN).


or insurgency. However, developments in the research field did not occur by coincidence but by rising terrorist attacks, perpetrated particularly in Europe from the end of the 1960s onwards. After 1978, studies on terrorism levelled out.

As Reid contends, this stabilization occurred between 1979 and 1985, with a linear growth in publications and increasing specialization among researchers. The decline of most radical left-wing groups in the West and the end of the Cold War engendered a relative decline in international terrorism studies. The fourth stage, from 1986 to 1990, is considered a crisis in terrorism literature, since publications and membership in academic communities also declined as well as reduction of funds. Indeed, as Silke notes, there were only 100 researchers around the world researching and writing continuously on terrorism in this period.

After 9/11, due to the vigorous reaction of the United States, studies on terrorism and counter-terrorism have escalated; 150 books on terrorism were published in one 12-month period, and at least one book has been published every six months since. Another study notes that over half of academic articles published between 1971 and 2003 were in the years 2001 and 2002, and peer-reviewed articles increased about 300% in those two years.

Further, courses and modules on terrorism and terrorism studies programs have begun at virtually every major university at the graduate and postgraduate levels. A growing numbers of doctoral researchers have been undertaking their dissertations on terrorism-related topics. In addition, the number of centers, organizations, institutes, programs, networks, and projects that seek to expand the research community’s collective knowledge of terrorism and related subjects has risen. This era has been the most productive to date for terrorism studies.

As an indication of rising interest in the research field, many peer-reviewed academic journals have been publishing periodically on terrorism or related subjects since the second era. Among them, Terrorism (1977-1991) and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (SCT; 1977- ) commenced its publications at the end of the second era, Terrorism and Political Violence (TPV; 1989- ) in the fourth, and Critical Studies on Terrorism (CST; 2008- ) in the fifth. Other academic journals such as International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Security Dialogue, and American Political Science Review publish a broad range of topics with the addition of terrorism-related subjects.

The field of study, drawing scholars and practitioners from varied areas, however, has been facing essential challenges. One such challenge is the interdisciplinary character of the field, while another is related to its conceptual fragmentation.

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18 Reid, “Evolution of a Body”.
20 Reid, “Evolution of a Body”.
21 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
23 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
24 There were just 1,310 books on terrorism before September 2001, but 2,281 books were published between 2001 and 2008. See, Andrew Silke, “Contemporary Terrorism Studies: Issues in Research,” in Richard Jackson et al., Critical Terrorism Studies, 34.
2.1. Terrorism as an interdisciplinary research field

Although the figures on terrorism research are encouraging, there is ongoing debate about whether it meets the requirements for a stand-alone academic discipline. For a field to be considered a discipline it must have its own researchers, department, curriculum, products, concepts, and theories. An academic research field that does not meet these criteria could be classified as inter-disciplinary or multi-disciplinary.

Defining the field of terrorism as multi-disciplinary has some flaws. Academics from other disciplines may not have commonalities with terrorism researchers, and the former reflect their own disciplines’ perspectives and contexts when explaining terrorism issues. Defining the field as inter-disciplinary may be a better approach; even though experts studying a terrorism topic would be from different academic disciplines, a certain amount of integration is possible over topics, concepts, and methodologies.29

Some researchers argue that terrorism research has the characteristics of a stand-alone academic discipline. According to Jackson, the field is considered to have consistent shared assumptions, narratives, and labels about the definition, nature, effects, threat, causes of terrorism, and responses to it.30 Schmid supports this notion by arguing that, despite its shortcomings, terrorism studies has matured. He asserts that a fairly solid body of consolidated knowledge has emerged, and that many researchers in the field have great integrity.31

However, according to a study that examined articles in TPV and SCT for the years 1990-1999, the backgrounds and specializations of authors are mostly aggregated in the discipline of political science (48.6%). There is also a considerable number of government officials (9.6%), military (3.3%), and law enforcement personnel (2%), adding up to almost 15% of authors.32 This makeup is not surprising because the terrorism field needs people in hybrid careers.33 Practitioners’ contributions should not be overlooked because, as Sageman claims, “we have a system of terrorism research in which intelligence analysts know everything but understand nothing, while academics understand everything but know nothing.”34 This comment reveals the importance of collaboration between academics and practitioners.

Another issue on the terrorism studies field arises from authors’ academic background and experience. Many do not have an adequate experience in the field, as there is no barrier to entry.35 There are more non-academic contributions in terrorism journals than in journals of political science or communication studies.36 For example, a study covering published articles in the 1990s notes that first-time authors wrote 83% of the articles.37 Similarly, Stampnitzky draws attention to the fact that “of 1,796 individuals presenting at conferences on terrorism between 1972 and 2001, 1,505 (84%) made only one appearance.”38 There is no continuity in

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32 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
33 Stampnitzky, “Disciplining an Unruly Field”.
35 Stampnitzky, “Disciplining an Unruly Field”.
37 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
38 Stampnitzky, “Disciplining an Unruly Field”.

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terrorism studies, and researchers have not preferred it as a major research field. Further, experts have complained that the field is filled with self-proclaimed experts because there is little regulation about who can be accepted as a specialist.

Indeed, the problem of terrorism needs to be elaborated through different perspectives on levels of analysis such as individual, group, state, and international system. Each level has its own approach to understand the causes of terrorism and employ effective countermeasures. Therefore, terrorism studies have been affected by many academic disciplines, including political science, international relations, sociology, psychology, economy, history, and organizational and management studies.

It is very difficult to situate terrorism studies within only one academic discipline, and further, examining terrorism and related issues in a single discipline may generate some interpretation problems. As Toros and Gunning point out, due to the problem of fetishization, terrorism cannot be understood apart from the context in which it emerged and developed.

The field’s interdisciplinary character reflects its nature, which is realized by analyzing various disciplines’ concepts and theories. Hence, the phenomenon of terrorism needs to be studied thoroughly in order to reach an integrative approach that comprises all aspects of the considered disciplines.

2.2. The conceptual fragmentation of terrorism

Stampnitzky argues that prominent authors in terrorism studies have not been able to define the field’s concepts nor delineate the boundaries. Crenshaw states that the lack of agreement on the definition of terrorism, difficulty in creating a comprehensive theory, and having too much event-based research are essential problems that the field faces. Confirming the definitional problem, Gurr draws attention to speculative interpretations and the problems in developing standard prescriptions for counter-terrorism.

Although many in academic and governmental circles have tried to define terrorism, there is no agreement and, indeed, a large chasm among the suggestions. Elements of the definition differ; governments and organizations focus on the criminal character of terrorism

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41 Stampnitzky, “Disciplining an Unruly Field”.
46 Gurr, “Empirical Research”.
48 There are also some efforts at the international organization level. The first efforts, started by the League of Nations, came to naught because the Second World War erupted. After the war, the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism was established by a United Nations General Assembly (GA) resolution in 1972, with a subcommittee on defining terrorism. The committee developed a draft definition, and the GA staged discussions about it but came to no agreement.
while academics focus on its political character. Indeed, in academic studies, the political element of terrorism is the most-featured characteristic after violence.

Moreover, there is a dearth of conceptual studies; only eight articles have been published between 1990 and 1999 and seven articles between 2000-2007. One of the underlying causes of this problem stems mainly from the contestation of ideologies and political objectives. There is no act of violence that is in and of itself deemed to be inherently terrorist, and terrorism is a method used by variety of actors. Moreover, the modern meaning of terrorism is pejorative, especially after “second wave” of terrorism. Further, despite the fact that almost all governments and international organizations condemn terrorism, no organization calls itself ‘terrorist,’ and there may be little agreement between states whether a particular organization is ‘terrorist’ or not.

Since terrorism is a political subject and some governments and international organizations have differing (and competing) interests, there is also no universally recognized terrorist organization list. Therefore, it can be stated that although there is no agreement on the definition of terrorism, there is agreement that there is no commonly accepted definition of terrorism.

Because of this conceptual fragmentation, it has been noted that terrorism studies is a static environment, where the same ideas, definitions, hypotheses, and theories continue to be analyzed, assimilated, published, cited, and publicized by the media. Although there is considerable amount of publication in the field, Schmid complains that much of it is “impressionistic, superficial, and at the same time often also pretentious, venturing far-reaching generalizations on the basis of episodal evidence.”

It is contended that a lack of self-reflexivity and contextualization, ahistoricity, statist bias, and a dearth of fieldwork are among the essential problems of the field. Avishag Gordon calls terrorism research a “multi-paradigmatic research field,” and Reid and Chen confirm this finding by stating that the intellectual infrastructure of contemporary terrorism studies has been influenced by studies on conflict, foreign policy, regional issues, and political violence. The problems over the field’s definitional and disciplinary aspects somewhat reflect the methodology as well.

2.3. Methodological concerns on terrorism research

Studies on terrorism have been criticized for poor research methodology. Schmid and Jongman have noted that “there are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much

53 Schmid, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 42.
56 Reid, “Evolution of a Body”,
57 Schmid, Political Terrorism, 418.
is written on the basis of so little research. Perhaps as much as 80% of the literature is not research-based in any rigorous sense.”61 Terrorism articles in peer-reviewed journals between 1971 and 2003 are considered mostly “thought pieces,” theoretical discussions, or opinions; only about 3% of them employ some kind of empirical analysis.62 Many researchers are often poorly aware of what has already been done in the field and are naïve in their methods and conclusions.63

One of the causes of methodological weakness is to employ secondary sources widely, such as scholarly books and articles, media and news services, open government documents, and records originating from terrorists/sympathizers.64 Sageman concurs with these arguments by implying that terrorism research has stagnated because of the lack of primary sources and vigorous efforts to police the quality of research.65 Affirming this flaw, it is argued that no new data or knowledge has been produced because of the heavy reliance on open-source documents among terrorism researchers. It is pointed out that the 62% of studies were based on documentary analyses/reviews, while just 1% were structured and systematic interviews.66

It is very difficult for researchers to have reliable and valid information without primary sources. However, reaching sources that meet academic standards is not easy because of the clandestine natures of terrorist organizations.67 These impediments, combined with time and funding limitations contribute to the difficulty of gathering empirical evidence.

As a secondary source, event datasets provide information on terrorist-related acts, and according to one study, there are more than 30 such datasets.68 This data is beneficial for researchers in learning who perpetrates terrorist acts, types of terrorism, targets of attacks, and changing trends over time. Datasets are also used to test hypotheses in a quantitative manner.69

However, there are some difficulties in relying on datasets. Since there is no agreed definition on the concept of terrorism and a lack of reliable sources for gaining information to develop the datasets, researchers are reluctant to rely on the datum in terms of comprehensiveness and reliability. Coding errors, limited or no records of sources, lack of information, unreliable sources, and inherent uncertainty are recognized as problems with credibility and validity.70 Further, it is obvious that the governments are not eager to fund research projects or give out information on terrorist-related events because of the concern about researchers uncovering classified information. These roadblocks thus affect the quality of the product.

Another problem with terrorism research is the weak employment of statistical analyses comparing to other social science research fields.71 The statistical method, indeed, gives the researcher a useful tool to manage rough and big datasets successfully, and to explain and predict the variables in a causal manner. There is an expanding tendency to use statistical methods in articles appearing in the main terrorism journals, however, there are limitations

61 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 179. Authors imply that they could not find any data on how terrorist acts are committed after examining 6000 studies between 1968 and 1988.
63 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
64 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, 138; Schmid, Political Terrorism, 11.
65 Sageman, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”.
66 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
67 Merari, “Academic Research”.
69 Ross, “Taking Stock of”.
71 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
to solely using statistics to understand social phenomena such as terrorism. One limitation is that statistics are usually applied in quantitative analyses more than qualitative. The debate on this classification emanates from the pursuit of achieving objective and scientific knowledge; the main objective of a qualitative study is to describe a situation, phenomenon, problem, or event. Although it is beyond the article’s scope to discuss this issue in detail, it should be noted that there are ongoing debates about using the two methods in an “analytical eclectic model” for studying terrorism-related issues. Given that the main point of any research is to answer the stated research question(s), the most appropriate method and means to do so must be utilized. Thus, the means should not be a substitute for the ends.

There is a new research approach called critical terrorism studies, whose scholars believe that there are epistemological and ontological problems in terrorism studies in addition to the methodological concerns. They feel that the positivist methods used in the research do not reflect the facts of the field. These scholars argue that the most essential issue emerges from the conventional wisdom of Westerners, who try to understand non-Western problems with Western methodologies and points of view. Moreover, Jackson states that since any social researcher cannot analyze independently of his or her culture, values, perception, and identity, the categories or arguments deduced from the field can only be understood as the products and components of the researcher’s political-historical background, even though they may not intend to present them this way. In politics, key terms are often value laden, and appeal to emotions. As a socially constructed academic subject and as a type of political violence, terrorism studies would be even more open to these kinds of conjectures.

Further, the politics and interests of governments have likely affected terrorism studies. Silke points out that terrorism is an emotional subject, and it is relatively rare to find objectivity in the field; researchers’ work may reflect their feelings about terrorism, similar to any other social field. Jackson claims that terrorism studies also intrinsically carry political and ideological tendencies, and he adds that terrorism studies cannot be evaluated separately from government ideology. Indeed, Schmid indicates that political biases and mistaken assumptions can be found in terrorism studies more than in others. Thus, staying neutral in terrorism research is challenging, particularly when studying domestic terrorism.

As a large number of scholars study terrorism-related subjects, ranging from conceptual issues to theoretical assertions, the research field, gains an avalanche of concern from all perspectives. Prominent examples of this field's wide range of topics are definitional and conceptual attempts, historical perspectives, the exploitation of religion and ethnicity as motivators, terrorist acts as a way of communication, organizational perspectives, the

73 The model is proposed by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein. See Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, “Analytical Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (June 2010): 411-31.
76 Schmid, “The Definition of Terrorism,” 41.
78 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
80 Schmid, “The Literature on Terrorism,” 468.
dynamics of insurgencies and rebellion, social movement theory, democratization and terrorism, psychological approaches to terrorist behavior, counterterrorism methods, and intelligence on terrorism. However, one of the important problems of contemporary terrorism studies arises from the lack of coordination and regulation of academic efforts and field experience. Notwithstanding the foregoing difficulties faced by terrorism studies, as Schmid argues, there is a fairly solid body of consolidated knowledge, datasets, and well-known scholars in international terrorism studies. In this regard, the contemporary terrorism field presents a perspective, which is open to improvement.

After scrutinizing the literature on the evolution of terrorism studies and the methodology employed, it is found that there are three main shortfalls in international terrorism studies. First, the area has not developed its own concepts and theories, and this conceptual fragmentation sparks the discussion on whether terrorism studies is a stand-alone field. The other problem stems from the character of the terrorism field; terrorism studies are intrinsically value laden. Since terrorism is a type of political violence, researchers and officials are not able to detach themselves completely from terrorist events. The last problem consists of methodological concerns: any social research area has challenges with methodological perfection, but terrorism studies seem to experience more than other fields.

3. Terrorism Studies in Turkey

This section of the paper explores the situation of Turkish terrorism studies by using the frame drawn by the literature on international terrorism studies, which, to recap, includes the issues of whether the field is its own discipline and its methodological inadequacies.

3.1. Volume of terrorism studies in Turkey

Some essential characteristics of an academic discipline can be identified as having accumulated knowledge, departments, and research institutes working in the field. The early sign of this development in Turkey comes out with the beginning of postgraduate programs on terrorism by state-affiliated institutions and colleges after the 2000s. The first postgraduate program on terrorism began in 2002 at the Turkish Military Academy Defense Sciences Institute (Kara Harp Okulu Savunma Bilimleri Enstitüsü, KHO SAVBEN) at the master’s degree level under the International Security and Terrorism program, and doctoral education there began in 2006. Another institution, the Police Academy Security Sciences Institute (Polis Akademisi Güvenlik Bilimleri Enstitüsü), started its postgraduate programs in 2001 and currently has two postgraduate programs: International Security and Security Strategies and Management. Although there is no other postgraduate program focusing on terrorism, the Turkish War Colleges Strategic Research Institute (Harp Akademileri Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü, HARPAK SAREN), Sabancı University, TOBB University of Economics and Technology (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi, TOBB ETU), Istanbul Aydın University, and Istanbul Gelisim University have postgraduate programs on security, conflict resolution, and strategy-related topics.
Thanks to the research institutes and programs, masters’ theses, doctoral dissertations, and articles on terrorism have burgeoned in Turkey since the 2000s. To date, there are 521 theses and dissertations on terrorism, 446 of which are at the master’s level and 75 of which are at the doctoral level.\textsuperscript{85} The types and years of the dissertations and theses are shown in Figure 1.\textsuperscript{86}

![Figure 1: Number of Theses and Dissertations Registered in YOK Theses and Dissertations Database per Year](image)

The first dissertation was registered to the National Thesis Center in 1987. Only 52 theses and dissertations on terrorism (15 doctoral and 37 master’s) were registered between 1987 and 2001, and 90\% of total theses (60 doctoral and 409 master’s) were recorded after 9/11 attacks. Between the years of 2010 and 2014, during which studies reached their peak numbers, a total of 90 master’s theses and 20 doctoral dissertations were written.

We found similar numbers for articles on terrorism. According to data extracted from internationally indexed journals and the journals indexed by TR Dizin Social and Humanities Sciences Database (SHSD), a total of 198 academic articles (112 TR Dizin, 86 internationally indexed journals, Web of Science [WoS]) complying with the aims of this study were found,\textsuperscript{87} as shown in the Figure 2.

\textsuperscript{85} National Thesis Center, accessed April 26, 2016, www.tez.yok.gov.tr. Information regarding dissertations extracted from National Dissertation Center was converted into a dataset after a detailed study with quantitative and qualitative techniques by the authors. Findings and analysis about dissertations depend on this dataset.

\textsuperscript{86} The figures presented here are descriptive, and to be discussed later in the article.

\textsuperscript{87} Tübitak-Ulakbim Cahit Arf Bilgi Merkezi, accessed May 21, 2016, http://cabim.ulakbim.gov.tr/tr-dizin/tr-dizinlenen-dergi-listesi/. The internationally indexed journals searched for this article appeared in the Web of Science (WoS), accessed March 30, 2017, https://apps.webofknowledge.com/WOS_AdvancedSearch_input.do?SID=N22WtvJkjXnjMMMMqA3v&product=WOS&replaceSetId=&goToPageLoc=SearchHistoryTableBanner&search_mode=AdvancedSearch&errorQid=1#SearchHistoryTableBanner. The findings have been converted into a dataset similar to the dissertations.
It is remarkable that between 1979 and 2003 only 20 articles were published in Turkey on terrorism. These numbers began to change in 2004, as depicted in Figure 2, and reached their highest levels in 2013 and 2015. As the compiled dataset shows, 93% of the articles were published after the 9/11 attacks, which shows the similar trend like the theses and dissertation dataset.

The authors of dissertations and articles share one other essential point. It is found that almost 16% of articles and 24% of doctoral dissertations were written by authors who work(ed) for security agencies and state institutions. This finding is supported by an interviewee’s statement that “most of the authors are soldiers and law-enforcement officers.” This comment implies that state-affiliated academic institutions generate a considerable account of studies, and terrorism-related topics draw the attention of many practitioners in Turkey.

Additionally, there are nearly 30 research centers and think tanks in Ankara and Istanbul studying security, international relations, and global and regional issues. Most of these institutions were established after the 2000s. Even though all of these centers focus on regional and international security and related issues, and many of them have been publishing monographs and reports on terrorism-related issues since their foundation, only one contains “terrorism” in its title.

3.2. The question of terrorism as a stand-alone academic field

Although the academic publications in Turkey on terrorism are relatively numerous, and terrorism studies are now part of undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate programs at universities and institutions, the academic state of terrorism studies in Turkey is still under debate. In the interviews we conducted, 90% of participants responded that “terrorism is a study area or subject, not an academic discipline or sub-discipline.” Scholars who study this area stated that Turkish terrorism studies is not a stand-alone field, but related to many academic disciplines. This claim is supported by the dataset generated for theses and dissertations (Figure 3).

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The theses and dissertations we examined at the registry are related to 37 different academic branches, according to the Turkish Higher Education Council. In this context, 76% of all theses/dissertations (398) are within the scientific branches of International Relations, Public Administration, Political Sciences, Law, Sociology, and Journalism. Almost half (46%) relate to International Relations and Public Administration.

The 198 articles distribute among 15 disciplines, 12 of which are as shown in Figure 4. Political Sciences leads the classification, with 63 articles, and International Relations follows, with 57 articles. As shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, Turkish terrorism studies is part of many disciplines, but International Relations, Political Science, Economics, and Public Administration are the top four.

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**Figure 3: Primary Research Field of Theses and Dissertations Registered in YOK Theses and Dissertations Database 1985-2016**

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**Figure 4: Primary Research Fields of Articles Published in Internationally and Nationally Indexed Journals 1979-2016**

The articles were classified into various disciplines by the authors using content analysis on the abstracts and keywords.
It is also found that the varying topics and disciplines reflected in terrorism research are related to the supervisors of dissertations. After examining the names of the doctoral advisers, we found that one professor supervised 10 dissertations in total, while four professors advised two dissertations each, and 57 lecturers advised only one doctoral dissertation per person. We also note that most of the lecturers supervising doctoral dissertations are (were) PhDs or associate professors in International Relations. The problem of the one-time researcher emerges in the articles dataset as well. In the 198 articles, there are 268 authors (some articles are multi-authored), and only 25 of these authors have written more than one paper. Therefore, it can be argued that not many academics in Turkey are studying and writing regularly on terrorism.

The abovementioned findings and discussions indicate that Turkish terrorism studies draws the attention of academics and staff from varying disciplines, state-affiliated institutions, and government officials. The authors then asked participants the following question: “According to you, of which academic discipline is terrorism a sub-study area or sub-discipline and in which order would you list them?” The findings are shown in Figure 5.

![Graph showing percentage of responses designating terrorism as sub-field of a discipline](image)

Figure 5: Percentage of Responses Designating Terrorism as Sub-Field of a Discipline

The graph shows that the terrorism field is seen as linked with many disciplines, but most participants feel it is a research topic under International Relations, Political Science, and Sociology, respectively. These findings are also compatible with the dissertation and articles datasets, except for Public Administration and Economics. A probable reason for these results is that the most participants have academic degrees in International Relations. Another one is that the rigorous methodology of an academic discipline, such as Economics, allowed researchers more opportunity to publish their pieces in peer-reviewed journals despite their lack of knowledge on the context of the particular field. Another possibility is that since the majority of the authors of the theses/dissertations are (were) working in government offices, perhaps they opted to register their document under the Public Administration discipline.

One of the findings reached after analyzing the primary and secondary sources is that terrorism is generally viewed as a sub-field of many scientific disciplines. Our findings

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91 Public Administration is the second most-cited academic discipline in the dissertation dataset, but it is in sixth place among the eight academic disciplines in the questionnaire. Economics is the third academic discipline in the article dataset, but is at the bottom of the list in the questionnaire.
suggest that Turkish terrorism studies has a multi-disciplinary character; strong evidence of this result can be found in the answers of our survey respondents. For instance, most participants answered the question of “What is the main problem in terrorism studies?” with “insufficient knowledge of the area.” The participants accept that terrorism is a (sub)research field, but also state that researchers from many academic disciplines write on terrorism with little knowledge of the basic concepts and theories. Moreover, in Turkey, it should be noted that “terrorism studies” or “terrorism” is not recognized as a field of specialization under any academic discipline in the classifications determined by the Council of Universities (Üniversitelerarası Kurul). This situation is a drawback for researchers who intend to have a career in terrorism studies in particular, because the Council of Universities is the main body establishing the criteria for academic promotions.

3.3. The value-ladenness of Turkish terrorism studies

The findings thus far raise some important questions about Turkish terrorism studies. One of them is why the field only expanded after 2001, as the international field did, in spite of the fact that Turkey has been a target for terrorist organizations since the 1960s. Another question arises about the reasons over the fluctuating numbers of theses/dissertations and articles in Figure 1 and Figure 2; 2007, 2010, 2013, 2014 and 2015 have the highest numbers of theses, dissertations, and articles.

One possible explanation for both questions that students with masters or doctoral degrees in the subject graduated from scientific institutions founded since 2000s, and that there has also been an escalation in the numbers of freelance research centers and think tanks in those years. It could also be argued that some scholars and researchers have shifted their academic concerns from other disciplines to terrorism because it became a popular topic after 9/11.

The question of fluctuation was elaborated in the interviews, for example: “Academics abstain from writing about problematic issues because of fear of terrorist organizations or emotional causes; they prefer to write on terrorism-related issues when violent attacks decline and the security situation remains relatively stable.” Another participant said that “terrorism is a current problem, and while terrorist organizations are committing their attacks it is very difficult for researchers and editorial boards of the journals…to decide that publishing about terrorism” should be considered.

To determine whether these comments had merit, we compared terrorism attacks in Turkey and the dates of academic publications on the subject. As evident from Figure 6, the most devastating years for terrorist attacks in Turkey were 1977, 1990-1994, 2012, and 2015.92 Publications on terrorism by Turkish authors rose through 2007, and were at their lowest levels in 2012 and before the 2000s. Although it seems that there is no relation between terrorist attacks and academic publications, to be sure, we conducted a correlation analysis and could not find a significant correlation \( r=0.01; p>0.9 \) between terrorist attacks and Turkish terrorism studies. We repeated the analysis with the lagged values (one and two years) of publications, but it either shows no significant correlation. Therefore, there is no convincing evidence on the relation between terrorist attacks and academic publications.

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92 Number of terrorist attacks in Turkey were retrieved from Global Terrorism Database, accessed March 25, 2017, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
We also examined the effect of emotional factors on the publications. This possibility was suggested to the participants with the following questions: “Do you think that terrorism studies are affected by the socio-cultural position or thinking style in which the researchers are living? If you compare this issue to the other academic disciplines, is it possible to say terrorism studies are affected by the researchers’ social roles more than any other area of social sciences?” 40% of participants commented that “being impartial in terrorism studies” is very important, but is difficult to do compared with other fields. According to the participants, emotional factors have considerable effect on the neutrality of researchers. Indeed, one of our findings supports this idea: out of 75 dissertations, 31 theses are not accessible in the National Thesis Database because the authors have not given permission for access.

Another indication of the emotions play in research can be found in the publications themselves. In order to grasp the real picture, we examined titles, abstracts and keywords of the dissertations and articles and regrouped them thematically.93 Figure 7 shows that doctoral dissertations, mostly focus on terrorism and law, counter-terrorism, terrorism in Turkey, international terrorism, terrorism and media, religion-based terrorism, financing of terrorism, and human rights.

93 Content analysis was employed in titles, abstracts, and keywords of the dissertations and articles, and the findings were regrouped.
Moreover, most articles focus on counter-terrorism and international terrorism. Terrorism in Turkey and causes of terrorism come second and third (Figure 7). The thematic codification of the titles and abstracts of dissertations and articles indicate that Turkish terrorism research varies widely by topic. However, terrorism in Turkey itself has not been an attractive research field; we found that 52% of the theses/dissertations and 87% of the articles do not cover topics related directly to Turkey.

It can be inferred from the above findings that terrorism is not an academic topic that is preferred and studied easily in Turkey. Emotional factors and the value-laden aspect of the subject plays into this finding, but there are also serious methodological issues.

3.4. Methodology in Turkish terrorism studies

Research can be conducted via varying methodological perspectives. For example, Kumar classifies perspectives into three types: applications of the research study, objectives of the study, and type of information sought in the study. In another study, research approaches are categorized as follows: basic philosophy, objective, methodology, period of study, and unit of analysis. For the purposes of this study, we categorized the theses/dissertations and articles into objectives, data collection tools, and data analysis techniques. In this context, the study objectives consist of descriptive, explanatory, and exploratory questions; the tools for data collection were the questionnaire, observations, interviews, life stories, judicial documents,

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94 There are two broad categories, pure research and applied research, depending on the perspective of its application. Research objectives can be classified as descriptive, correlational, explanatory, or exploratory. The third perspective in Kumar’s typology is related to mode of enquiry, which are structured and unstructured approaches, and are usually classified into quantitative and qualitative research. See Kumar, Research Methodology, 29-33.

95 Basic philosophy carries basic and applied research; the objectives of a study can be exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive; the methodology of any study can be quantitative or qualitative; the time period of a study varies between cross-sectional or longitudinal; the analysis may be carried out at the levels of individual, group, organization, and society. See Sait Gürbüz and Faruk Şahin, Sosyal Bilimlerde Araştırma Yöntemleri (Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2016), 94.

96 Descriptive study attempts to systematically describe a situation, problem, phenomenon, service, or program, or provides information. Exploratory research is undertaken with the objective either to explore an area about which little is known or to investigate the possibilities of undertaking a particular research study. Explanatory research attempts to clarify why and how there is a relationship between aspects of a situation or phenomenon. See Kumar, Research Methodology, 9-10.
archived records/documents, datasets, and open sources; and last, the quantitative and qualitative techniques were part of the data analysis. The methodological characteristics of the dissertations and articles are shown in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodological Considerations</th>
<th>Dissertations (N=44)</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Total (N=198)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory</td>
<td>22 (50%)</td>
<td>35 (31%)</td>
<td>43 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive</td>
<td>17 (39%)</td>
<td>63 (56%)</td>
<td>82 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory</td>
<td>5 (11%)</td>
<td>14 (13%)</td>
<td>24 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Collection Tools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionnaire</td>
<td>3 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (--)</td>
<td>5 (--)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (--)</td>
<td>1 (--)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>10 (22%)</td>
<td>5 (0.4%)</td>
<td>2 (--)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life story</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>0 (--)</td>
<td>0 (--)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archived documents</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>7 (0.6%)</td>
<td>9 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial documents</td>
<td>13 (30%)</td>
<td>9 (0.8%)</td>
<td>4 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Datasets</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>28 (25%)</td>
<td>30 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open sources</td>
<td>30 (68%)</td>
<td>74 (66%)</td>
<td>39 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools more than one</td>
<td>16 (36%)</td>
<td>1 (--)</td>
<td>10 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Analysis Techniques</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>34 (77%)</td>
<td>84 (75%)</td>
<td>126 (64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>16 (14%)</td>
<td>39 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative and qualitative</td>
<td>8 (18%)</td>
<td>12 (11%)</td>
<td>5 (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding research objectives, doctoral candidates preferred exploratory researches, while the article authors chose to publish in descriptive and exploratory manners. Since exploratory studies generate new ideas or conjectures – which is expected from PhD candidates – this finding is not surprising. Descriptive studies share a big portion (42%) of articles, and second (39%) in dissertations.

Exploratory and descriptive studies aim to fill the gap in any field by setting the scene and by identifying the main forces at work that are not well known or researched. These two research purposes encourage scholars to study cases and analyze them qualitatively. Indeed, we found that 45% of the articles and 32% of the dissertations were carried out by the case study method.

Surprisingly, there are fewer dissertations (11%) and articles (19%) that attempt to explain a situation or a problem by examining the relations between the variables from an explanatory perspective. Comparing the articles in TR Dizin to the articles in internationally indexed journals (WoS), we see that explanatory and exploratory approaches dominate international articles, at 78%. This finding may be the consequence of the standard put forward by the internationally academic journals.

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97 It should be noted that the classifications used in this article do not have rigid boundaries but resilient ones because different techniques and varied tools can be used in one study. The most dominant methodological characteristic of the study was taken into consideration. The questionnaires, observations, and interviews were classified as primary data collection tools, while the others were classified as secondary.

98 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.

38
Explanatory study is the highest academic level of understanding a subject. Its particular aim is to explain what happened, what is happening, and what will happen. In this study, we found that explanatory studies were infrequently practiced comparing to other types. An important reason for this result is that there is not sufficient accumulated knowledge in the terrorism field. The other reason, to be explained below, is that there is a lack of reliable and valid data; explanatory research mostly requires hypothesis testing, and that requires quantitative data collected from the field.

In other findings, only 14 of the doctoral dissertations depended upon primary data collection tools and 30 dissertations benefitted mostly from secondary sources. The authors of articles also collected data mostly from secondary sources, with primary sources used only in 13 articles. In addition, most of the studies were performed with a literature review of open sources, such as published articles, books, and web searches. These findings are significant because they signify that Turkish terrorism studies are almost solely based on secondary sources and literature reviews, which Silke calls “integrators of literature.”

Indeed, this finding was reiterated in the interviews; participants agreed that “academic studies have methodological weaknesses.” Additionally, to the question of “What are the methodological problems in terrorism studies in Turkey?” most participants responded with “not having analyses based on data” and “difficulties of data collection.” Although there are multiple international databases on terrorism-related events, which are preferred by the authors of articles in internationally indexed journals, these databases have limitations. They suffer from different definitions of terrorism, missing values on dates and events, and being hinged on open sources. For this reason, there is no reliable database based on official documents that compile and classify terrorist attacks committed in Turkey. Further, the security institutions holding this kind of information have not been sharing it with the public for secrecy reasons.

The problems with collecting useful data reverberate through the analysis techniques. A lack of coherent datasets inhibits the quality and practicability of quantitative analysis. Thus, qualitative analysis techniques were used in 34 dissertations (77%) and 126 articles (64%), while quantitative analysis was used just in two dissertations (5%) and 55 articles (28%), the latter mostly in the articles from internationally indexed journals. Further, some studies (18% of dissertations and 9% of articles) employed quantitative and qualitative analysis concurrently.

It is also noteworthy that quantitative analysis was mostly used by researchers with an academic background in Economics. When we look at these techniques in detail, descriptive statistics (16% of dissertations and 11% of articles) and inferential statistics (9% of dissertations and 22% of articles) in quantitative analyses, as well as content and discourse analyses in qualitative techniques, were prominent. This fact is congruent with the findings derived from the research objectives and data collection tools, which all point to the lack of analytical studies.

In addition to these weaknesses, there are also some basic methodical problems in the articles and dissertations. For instance, 50% of the articles did not state the aim of the study. Further, there are no keywords in about 14% of articles in TR Dizin and in 44 doctoral

99. Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
100. In 15 doctoral dissertations and 11 articles, the authors used both primary and secondary sources.
101. Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
dissertations out of 75 examined. This finding was unanticipated because such statements are common and mandatory procedure for academic publications. These problems indicate that writing techniques and screening procedures for journals in TR Dizin need to be improved.

4. Conclusion

Although international terrorism studies is showing signs of becoming a stand-alone discipline, our examination of Turkish terrorism studies revealed that there are several impediments for this field specifically. The first is that it has a multi-disciplinary character, bearing largely other disciplines’ approaches, concepts, and theories. The field does not have its own researchers, authors, or supervisors of dissertations and interviews, and most articles were written by one-time authors. Due to these factors, Turkish terrorism studies tend to lack the distinct terminology and theoretical accumulation created by scholars of international terrorism studies. These problems seem to be related to the field’s multidisciplinary aspect, such that it does not have an interdisciplinary perspective or is a stand-alone discipline.

Terrorism research is intrinsically value laden. Although there is not much evidence, we suspect from the comments of our interviewees, that authors of terrorism studies have been affected by their own emotions, values, and identities. For this reason, they likely hesitate to touch upon ‘sensitive issues’. However, this issue is not specific to Turkish terrorism studies; it is argued that international terrorism studies also reflects this vulnerability.

Regarding methodology, a significant problem of the terrorism research field is that the studies are mostly composed of literature reviews or are based on secondary sources. The barriers to reaching primary sources result in the unsatisfying analysis of research problems. Moreover, there is no compiled comprehensive terrorism dataset for terrorist attacks committed in Turkey. These last two issues likely impede the quantity of research focusing on terrorism in Turkey, and, in contrast to the aim of science, which is to produce new knowledge, the area’s methodological weaknesses contribute to the reproduction of already-known facts.

These problems should be appraised as opportunities to develop the field. For example, practitioners could aim to produce collaborative papers with academics from different disciplines. Another opportunity is to develop a dataset comprising terrorist attacks in Turkey by synchronizing official documents and open sources to facilitate reliable data-based analysis. Further, an academic journal with rigorous screening and editorial policy could consolidate studies on terrorism.

Nevertheless, problems such as the field’s multidisciplinary character, transient authors, a lack of reliable and valid datasets, the dearth of primary sources and quantitative analyses are among the significant problems mentioned by many international studies on terrorism. The international field has been striving to solve these problems, for instance, by founding comprehensive datasets and by the growing numbers of analytical studies. When considered from this point of view, it can be argued that Turkish terrorism studies has been experiencing difficulties faced by the international field almost 20 years ago. Silke’s comment on international terrorism studies between 1995 and 2000 could apply Turkish terrorism studies now: “it exits on a diet of fast-food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand, and nutritionally dubious.”102 We feel that our study, as a preliminary assessment, can satisfy a need in the

102 Silke, “The Devil You Know”.
academic field and can contribute to improving perspectives on strategies for countering terrorism on the ground, which is one of the most important contemporary security threats in Turkey.

**Bibliography**


Widening the World of IR: A Typology of Homegrown Theorizing

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Abstract
It is rare that a recognized voice from non-Western world makes an impression in International Relations theory. While a few studies have looked at the structural and institutional constraints that contribute to such lack of recognition, part of the problem stems from confusion around the definition of what theorizing out of the non-Western world actually is. Based on a review of studies that embody indigenous conceptualizations of international phenomena in the periphery, we first define such ‘homegrown’ theorizing as original theorizing in the periphery about the periphery. By elaborating on these conceptualizations’ specific methods in building theories, we then provide a typology of homegrown theories and assess each theory building method in terms of its potential for global acceptance and further development. We substantiate our arguments on global acceptance by drawing on a comparison of the citation counts of 18 homegrown theories. In doing so, we try to give voice to some of the most prominent scholarly and intellectual efforts stemming from the periphery, and provide a guide for Western scholars on how to engage with homegrown theorizing in a more intellectually stimulating manner. The article concludes by highlighting a number of critical factors in opening up space for different voices in the world of IR.

Keywords: International Relations theory, core and periphery, homegrown theory, theory building, non-Western IRT, post-Western IR

1. Introduction
Over the years, various debates, multiple paradigms, a number of new methods and forms of data, as well as the incorporation of input from other disciplines, have given International Relations (IR) a remarkable level of sophistication. Indeed, there are few other disciplines that are more open to fundamental criticism, inter-disciplinarity, and input from non-academic sources than is IR. IR has also been widened as some formerly understudied--mostly non-Western--phenomena have found their way into mainstream scholarship.

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IR’s inclusiveness, however, does not apply to International Relations Theory (IRT), which remains imperfect as a tool for understanding and explaining the newest and often more problematic parts of contemporary international relations. Overwhelmed by an expanding ontology, IRT has failed to explain and foresee the most momentous international events of recent decades. Consider the surprise over the Iranian revolution, over the irrationality of suicide attacks after 9/11, or more recently, over ISIS’ efficiency. Being under-theorized, such novel phenomena are approached using concepts usually alien to the context, and ultimately unhelpful in understanding or addressing the needs surrounding these issues. The incongruence is not limited to rationalist/positivist IRT, but extends to post-positivist theories. Our supposedly revolutionary new concepts and approaches remain largely insufficient in explaining what happens globally and in offering lessons for improvement.

This deficiency can only be addressed by building more relevant theories. For theory to be relevant in accounting for contemporary international relations, we argue, it should not only apply to, but also emanate from different corners of the current political universe. The main obstacle for IRT, then, is arguably the exclusion of the periphery from original theory production. A growing literature points to the conditions augmenting this exclusion. The impediments range from peripheral conditions and attitudes such as skepticism/indifference towards social sciences in general and theory in particular, or lack of resources and institutional support, to the global “hegemonic status of Western IR theory that discourages...
theoretical formulations by others". The global hegemonic structure of the discipline pushes periphery scholars to be consumers of theory, rather than producers of it.

Despite the general agreement on the need and ongoing efforts to enrich IRT with periphery voices, there is a major divide in terms of how this can and should be done. Many argue that the best way is to have periphery IR scholars tackle with the primary questions of the core and try to modify, criticize, and improve upon existing theories. This view is advocated by more positivist leaning scholars, since they see no fundamental difference between theorizing in the core and in the periphery, except in the material conditions of scholarship. Hence, their suggestion is to improve those conditions for the periphery scholar. Interestingly, this is also the route preferred by advocates of “post-Western” theory, who share an “intuition that greater incorporation of knowledge produced by non-Western scholars from local vantage points cannot make the discipline of IR more global or less Eurocentric.”

They usually point to the role of underlying nationalistic ideology in bringing about distinctively ‘non-Western’ theories, and they argue that such endeavors only serve to recreate the relationship between the core and periphery. They warn against any project that is self-admittedly ‘non-Western’ but emulates the dominant forms of thinking (including methodology) in the West. This conviction also emanates from a belief in the falseness of the West/non-West dichotomy, hence the preference for the term ‘post-western’.

The proponents of this first route are missing a few major points. First, submerging oneself within mainstream concepts and debates and trying to work from within the system, is not particularly viable for periphery theorists. It is extremely hard for the periphery scholar to find a spot for herself/himself within the core theory circles, requiring at minimum a fully Western post-graduate education and training in Western methodologies and language. Socializing into this competitive environment requires imitation and utilization of those core ideas as reference points; for otherwise periphery scholars are regarded as less than competent. Therefore, for the voice of a periphery scholar to be heard in the core debates, whether to criticize or otherwise, s/he has to be fully immersed within that community and forego any periphery perspective.

10 Acharya and Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western,” 287.
12 See for example the two most recent presidential speeches in ISA (Paul, “Integrating International Relations”), which are about opening up IRT, the establishment of groups (Global IR) and journals which specifically seek to bring in more outside-of-the-core voices.
Secondly, core theoretical debates are, frankly, not generally open to empirical input from the periphery. Even when they are, the expectation for periphery-inspired work is that it support the core theories, rather than amend or correct them. Thus periphery scholars become “social-science socialized” producers of local data, who are expected to support mainstream theories, and operate as “native informants”. Becoming a “theorist” in the periphery means risking “becoming nobody” in the global community. In the rare instances when a periphery scholar nevertheless attempts to “do theory,” their work is likely to be dismissed as not being “theory”. This attitude highlights the dichotomy between “theory” and “local” that is imposed on the periphery scholar. Under these conditions, this first option degenerates into hiring new labor for the same task and the same purpose. Indeed, such a course of action sounds like a perfect recipe for the perpetuation of marginalization under the guise of pluralism, akin to the self-promotion of ‘ethnic food’ or ‘world music’ in contemporary Western societies.

Lastly, attempts by a few very competent periphery scholars to take up the first route have met with little success. For example, Ayoob actually tried to amend realist understandings of security by bringing in input from the Third World, but his ideas did not resonate. Similarly, Xuetong’s attempts to revise realism did not lead to substantial debate within the core. Such efforts have not managed to enrich ‘core’ theory with widened perspectives.

We see more merit in the second option, i.e. to build directly on the richness of these periphery lands, their history, practices and experiences. A genuine attempt to widen the world of IRT requires periphery voices acquiring their theorizing agency first, and this can only be done if their experience can serve as a source for unique new theorizing efforts and perspectives. Before trying to cram periphery feet in the core’s glass shoes, the discipline needs to see what those in the periphery themselves have to offer. Neither does it help to relegate the periphery’s voice to one of criticism only. Such a shattering of the glass shoes, i.e. showing that core concepts do not fit in the periphery, does not itself provide a wearable, efficient pair of shoes. In other words, “post-Western” perspectives often offer little to move beyond ‘the West and the non-West’. Diversity and dialogue can only come about when periphery scholars do not just ‘meta-theorize’ but also ‘theorize’.

Therefore, the increasing irrelevance of IRT needs to be addressed by a new form of theorizing, one which effectively blends peripheral outlooks with theory production. We call this form “homegrown theorizing,” which is defined here as original theorizing in the periphery about the periphery.

This definition may warrant further definitions. We deal with them in more detail in the next section, but can summarize our criteria as follows. First, for any idea/approach/perspective to be considered as theory it should propose a relationship between at least two concepts. This

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17 Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?”.
21 Ayoob, “Defining Security”.

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is a methodologically neutral definition acceptable by both positivists and post-positivists, even though they disagree on the nature of the relationship: for positivists it must be causal, for post-positivists it is constitutive, at best. Second, for any theory to be original at least one of these concepts must be either novel or redefined. While suggestions for new methods to operationalize extant concepts are also inventive, they remain in the purview of the original theory, and as such do not warrant substantial revision. Finally, for any original theory to be homegrown, it should be based on indigenous ideas and/or practices. It is our conviction that the disciplinary culture values scholarly work that fulfills the originality criteria, but is oblivious to the diversity that might be achieved by fulfilling the third one. This paper intends to highlight that potential.

Two caveats are in order. First, to label something as ‘homegrown’ we are not concerned with the ethnic/national identity of the author, rather, with various aspects of how the non-core experience is drawn on and conceptualized. Second, we prefer to use ‘periphery’ over ‘non-Western’ despite the ambiguous meaning of ‘periphery’ because it inherently evokes the subaltern agency in a hegemonic relationship. So the criteria we propose can be used with respect to theorizing anywhere that has been considered as peripheral in some respect. For example, it can be applied to IRT in Western Europe—considered peripheral in comparison with the US, but part of the core in comparison to elsewhere. Nonetheless, in this article, we focus on homegrown theorizing from outside of both North America or Western Europe, as that is what is generally seen as underdeveloped or even non-existent, mostly under-recognized, yet increasingly important.

A typology of homegrown theories based on the differences in their production serves three purposes. First, it makes dealing with homegrown theories a more systematic endeavor by providing a guide for recognizing original theory building in the periphery—not necessarily an easy endeavor for a phenomenon that is considered “hidden” or “unrecognizable”. Most of the extant reviews of theorizing outside of the core currently rely on geo-cultural categorizations, such as “Chinese” or “Japanese” international relations theory or independent theorizing in “emerging powers” or in a specific country. These geo-cultural categorizations may be helpful from a “sociology of the discipline” perspective but are inadequate in identifying the most valuable efforts to theorize international relations stemming from outside the US/Europe. For example, “pure theory” in the periphery refers to discussions about mainstream theories and may not translate into original theorizing. An article on game theory and rational choice that is written by a Chinese scholar may be original but “bear no traces whatsoever of ‘local theorizing’”. However, by defining what

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24 Tickner includes Canada, Western Europe and Australia as semi-periphery (In Tickner, Claiming the International).
29 Kristensen, “How Can Emerging Powers Speak?”
31 Kristensen, “How Can Emerging Powers Speak?”
is actually ‘homegrown’ in any theory, and categorizing theories accordingly, we can explain just how original and homegrown theorizing is. Focusing on the homegrownness of the idea, rather than on the background of the theorist, we identify degrees of being original as well as identifying the elements of a theory that can be original, adapted or borrowed. By contrast, saying only that a particular theory is “hybrid”\(^{32}\) tells us little about in what ways it is the same as or different from mainstream theory.

The second purpose of having a typology of homegrown theories is to reveal that different forms of original theory building are not only possible,\(^{33}\) but have already taken place. By offering a typology, we aim to move beyond general categorizations of approaches to homegrown theorizing—such as “particularism,” “provincialization,”\(^{34}\) or “denationalization”\(^{35}\)—to suggesting specific methods for building homegrown theories.

Our third purpose is to identify the prospects and challenges associated with different types of homegrown theories in terms of their potential for recognition.\(^{36}\) To do this, we collected a sample of 18 works (six books, nine journal articles, and three book chapters) that we identified as examples of homegrown theory based on the above criteria, and obtained their citation scores through the Web of Science, Cited Reference Search to assess their level of global recognition.\(^{37}\) The sample was established using a form of chain-referral technique, i.e. going through reference lists of works on the state of IR in different parts of the world\(^{38}\) and then checking individual studies to see whether they fit our criteria. The sample is by no means exhaustive but heuristically valuable. On average, the works in our sample are cited 12.4 times in the first five-year period after publication. The highest record is Cardoso and Faletto’s *Dependency and Development in Latin America*,\(^{39}\) which had 91 citations in the first five years. Comparing this to 5-year citation scores of, for example, Alexander Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics*\(^{40}\) or Kenneth Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*,\(^{41}\) it might appear that homegrown theories do not fare too badly. However, there is very wide discrepancy within our sample, since four of the homegrown theories we found were not cited at all within the first five-year period and all but two of the others received fewer than 15 citations over five years. Such lack of recognition is a major impediment for theoretical enrichment of the discipline. An emergent theory should be applied, and confirmed or disconfirmed by other researchers, so that it undergoes continuous refinement and development. This makes theory building a collective exercise. Without recognition, the development of any emergent theory is hindered.


\(^{35}\) Turton and Freire, “Peripheral Possibilities”.

\(^{36}\) Homegrown theories have varying degrees of acceptance and engagement, which are undoubtedly shaped by the wider social and institutional milieu. Our purpose here, however, is to discern the other factors, i.e. properties of the theories themselves, which may help to overcome barriers against their reception.


\(^{38}\) Tickner and Wæver, *International Relations*; Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory*.


The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the proposed definition of homegrown theory and puts forward a typology. The subsequent three sections assess each type’s potential for global acceptance and further development by relying on an analysis of citations they receive. The article concludes by considering a number of critical factors in opening up space for different voices in the world of IR.

2. What is Homegrown Theory?

What distinguishes homegrown theories from mainstream theories is their origination from a geo-cultural standpoint, whether this be at the stage of concept formation or at the stage of inference. This standpoint however, marks the background of the ideas, not the theorists: National conceptualizations of IR are not the same as indigenous conceptualizations of international relations. The national identity of a group of closely collaborating non-Western scholars, or research by non-Westerners, is sometimes related to, but not the same as the identity of the “theory.” Phrases such as ‘Chinese School’, ‘Indian School’, or ‘Russian School’, cannot constitute homegrown theories in their own right if they refer exclusively to the community of scholars who work or live in these countries or are of these nationalities. It is only if such labels refer to those works which rely on practices, customs and phrases distinctively prevalent among the respective societies, that they become homegrown theories. An example is the English School, which does not refer to English-born scholars, but to the approach characterized by Britain’s experience and diplomatic practice, or the Copenhagen school, which does not comprise only Danish IR scholars, or those affiliated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, but rather is made up of those sharing a philosophical and a normative concern on limiting state monopoly on defining security. A crucial step then is to identify where to look for the identity of theory.\textsuperscript{42}

There are basically two places to look for a theory’s “homegrownness”: the concepts can be homegrown, if they were specifically built by relying on a geo-culturally specific standpoint (whether it be a culture, civilization, religion, customs or traditions); and/or the theory can be inferentially homegrown, if the data used in the inference come from observation of geo-culturally specific phenomena, provided that such data are used for building or altering theories, not for testing them. Theorists either build on a local philosophical standpoint in their production of novel concepts and/or particularly draw their data from the part of the world they experience to invent new concepts or alter existing ones.

From these distinctions, three groups of theories emerge. Some scholars build on works by local thinkers, writers or scholars from different disciplines, and use their concepts with an IR outlook. Since most of them have indigenous intellectual and/or philosophical approaches as their starting point, we call them referential homegrown theories. A second group of scholars transforms mainstream Western ideas or concepts in such a manner that they reflect indigenous meanings attached to them by particular societies. These can be called homegrown alterations, with the level and type of alteration differing from one theory to another. Finally, some theorists develop original concepts out of geo-culturally specific experience and commonly used idioms of daily life, and use them in an IRT framework. Since they do not borrow from any pre-existing conceptualization either in the core or in the periphery, we call these authentic homegrown theories. The following sections address

\textsuperscript{42} Obviously, discussing what theory is is a huge task that cannot be meaningfully confined to the limits of this paper. What we attempt is a simple breakdown of its most basic properties.
each type of homegrown theory individually and assess their prospects for recognition by the
global IR disciplinary community.

2.1. Referential homegrown theory building

Referential homegrown theories are what come to mind first in thinking about homegrown
theories. In this type of theory building, a homegrown thinker’s ideas or concepts of an
indigenous culture, religion, civilization, etc. are used as a reference point to make inferences
about observed phenomena. Thinkers such as Kautilya, Xun Zi and Ibn Khaldun, or cultures
such as Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism or Islam, are examples.\(^{43}\) Usually the observed
phenomena come from within the same geo-cultural sphere, rather than the ideas or
concepts being applied to elsewhere. In other words, a non-Western standpoint is used both
in concept formation and inference. Referential homegrown theories investigate empirical
implications of homegrown ideas -particular cultures and thinkers-, and empirically and/or
contextually engage with these thinkers and cultures. As such, they move beyond mere
suggestions of relevance of for IRT. Generally, referential homegrown theories redefine ideas
of a homegrown thinker/culture in order to make homegrown ideas more accessible to a
wider audience and more relevant for studying contemporary phenomena. Thus, they are
instrumental in incorporating non-core ontologies into global IR.

There are a few attempts in which Xun Zi’s thought are considered as a source for
understanding and explaining Chinese foreign policy behavior.\(^{44}\) In particular his thoughts
on types of great powers and international order have inspired frameworks to explicate
China’s “peaceful rise”.\(^{45}\) Xuetong redefines power in line with Xun Zi’s ideas to account for
China’s “peaceful” rise. He particularly refers to Xun Zi’s Five Ordinance System, which is
a hierarchy of power between nations that are under the rule of the emperor. The obligations
of nations are based on their geographical proximity to the emperor and their individual
power status. More distant and less powerful nations have fewer responsibilities, whereas
closer and more powerful nations take on more responsibilities. Such redefinition of power
that comes with higher responsibility, as well as Xun Zi’s renunciation of power as solely
based on military strength, helps to explain why China’s accumulation of power has not led
to conflictual balancing behavior.

Like China, India is also very rich in sources for homegrown conceptualizations.
Three Indian perspectives on world order stand out: Nehruvian internationalism, Gandhian
cosmopolitanism, and political Hinduism or Hindutva.\(^{46}\) Bajpai argues that Nehruvian
internationalism is very similar to a Westphalian conception of order, yet it is differentiated
by non-alignment. While Nehruvianism is not naïve about the use of force in international
relations, “Jawaharlal Nehru rejected power-politics and the Western concept of maintaining
security and international order through balance of power”.\(^{47}\) Therefore, non-alignment was
both a principle of exercising autonomy in foreign affairs, and an ‘order-building’ instrument


through which a ‘third’ area of peace outside the two power blocs was to be created to secure the establishment of a just and equitable world order. Behera argues that aside from its policy implications, “non-alignment was never accorded status or recognition as a ‘systemic’ IRT because it did not suit the interests of the powers that be”.48

Gandhian cosmopolitanism emphasized non-violence (ahimsa) and presented a world order in which the rights of individuals, emancipation, and freedom are prioritized. In Gandhian thought, nation-state and nationalism were only instruments to ensure human liberation from imperial powers, and states should be radically decentralized bodies. The international system was important to the extent that it gave way to a world order, where small, autonomous groups of people interact on the basis of non-violence, truth power and economic equity. The Gandhian conception of world order was ontologically original in that it placed small communities as the primary actors of world politics.49 Inspired by Gandhi’s focus on non-violence, Galtung redefined peace as the absence of structural violence,50and proposed a theory of conflict transformation through non-violent means.51 Galtung’s theory of structural violence was widely recognized, as he was regarded as the founder of Peace Studies. He also established the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) and published the Journal of Peace Research. Although his inspiration by Gandhi was evident and self-proclaimed, it was somehow downplayed and in his later years, when Galtung focused more on peace activism, his impact in the scholarly community waned. This was partly because his wide adoption of Gandhi’s philosophy was alien to academics and researchers, as what he proposed “move[d] too far outside the usual interpretations” into what was no longer deemed peace research.52

The peace research community’s wider attitude toward Galtung’s later work is illustrative of the first major risk associated with referential homegrown theories. If homegrown ideas are used in their original form, and redefinition of concepts is either non-existent or minimal, the resulting homegrown theory becomes insular. Although, referential homegrown theories appear to be the most common form of homegrown theorizing, (10 out of 19 in our sample are referential homegrown theories), and a few prominent scholars have in fact engaged in indigenous thinking, they do not do particularly well in terms of citation compared to other works in our sample. On average, referential homegrown theories have 7.9 citations in the first five years--below the overall average of 12.4. This lower citation rate may be because even if the resulting homegrown theory is original, its empirical implications may remain vague to non-indigenous researchers, which results in a diminished understanding of the theory’s potential to be applicable elsewhere. Another explanation may be the rather exclusionary nature of some of these conceptualizations. For example, Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva presupposes a regional hierarchy of civilizations, in which Hindu civilization occupies the first place among other civilizations.53 Based on its implications, Hindutva was deemed as a form of Indian fascism.54 At other times, theories maybe evaluated on the

48 Behera, “Re-Imagining IR,” 347.
49 Bajpai, “Indian Conceptions”.
grounds of their practical consequences, i.e. the effectiveness that they hold for determining successful policy, as opposed to their explanatory power. For example, Nehru disregarded the ideas of Gandhi, which he found dangerous to the sovereignty and security of the nascent Indian state.\(^{55}\) Therefore, even when including rich tradition and innovative practice, referential homegrown theorizing attempts may not realize their full potential in terms of global reception, if they remain insular and largely prescriptive.

The second major risk associated with referential homegrown theories is the opposite of insularity: assimilation by mainstream theories. In these cases, homegrown concepts are redefined in a way that the resulting explanation is subsumed under a mainstream theory. When theorists fall short of assessing the empirical implications of referential homegrown ideas independently from preconceived paradigmatic lenses, homegrown concepts are “translated” in a way to correspond to one or more terms in current international relations lexicon. Such “translation” by subsuming the homegrown concept, usually serves as a confirmation of mainstream approaches.

Assimilation with respect to homegrown philosophers/philosophies is most often done through comparing homegrown ideas to those of “fathers of political theory,” and considering them as versions of mainstream paradigms. For example, Hassan\(^{56}\) points out 67 thinkers ranging from Herakleitos to Sartre whose ideas have been compared with or likened to those of the 14th century North African scholar, Ibn Khaldun. In international relations, he is alternatively depicted as a realist,\(^{57}\) postmodernist,\(^{58}\) or historical materialist.\(^{59}\) His ideas on group unity, *asabiyah*, have also been likened to constructivist accounts of identity.\(^{60}\)

Some of the works inspired by Indian philosopher Kautilya, who was regarded as an “Indian Machiavelli,”\(^{61}\) are also examples of assimilation. For example, Modelski asks whether Kautilya’s state system (*mandala*) was one of international order, where some sort of mutual understanding prevails. He argues that Kautilya’s system of states does not resemble an international order, but anarchy, which is remedied by relative stability in the domestic sphere.\(^{62}\) Uzzaman refers to Kautilya’s thinking to explain India’s contemporary foreign policy and argues that Indian strategic culture espouses a “Kautilyan brand of realism”.\(^{63}\)

While the above examples of assimilations border on anachronism, other forms of assimilation are less direct: scholars incorporate homegrown philosophers’ inferences as empirical findings and make use of them to support their own (mainstream) conceptualizations.


Gilpin, focusing on the relationship between physical environment and social life, is inspired by Khaldun’s explanation of the rise of the Islamic empire. Ibn Khaldun argued that the desert operated like the sea for Arabs and eased the empire’s expansion.\textsuperscript{64} Gilpin also uses Khaldunian insights on the relationship between internal composition of a state and its propensity to expand, as well as its decline because of corruption and luxury. Similarly, Deudney\textsuperscript{65} refers to Ibn Khaldun as one of the sources of his conceptualization of environment and its consequences on social and political life. Strange\textsuperscript{66} refers to Ibn Khaldun’s empirical findings, while Cox\textsuperscript{67} and Pasha\textsuperscript{68} refer to Khaldun as a potential source for conceptualization of change and world order in international relations.

Referential theories are easily identifiable as “homegrown” because they openly refer to a non-Western source of knowledge. Their level of acceptance by the global discipline might vary, however, depending on the acceptability of their policy implications on the one hand, and the theorist’s effort to articulate the novelty it brings when understanding and explaining contemporary phenomena. Insularity is particularly likely if the homegrown theory is applied to the same geo-cultural sphere from which it originates and can be overcome by applying it to other geo-cultural spheres. Assimilation is also unfruitful especially when it is anachronistic, e.g. treating Kautilya’s ideas as if he had written in a time where “realism” or “international order” meant the same as they do today. Anachronistic assimilation does not introduce novelty and basically fails to achieve anything more than just informing the reader that ‘an indigenous/non-Western thinker has thought similar ideas before’. In our sample, examples of this type of work, i.e. work focusing on conceptual correspondences, were cited just once at most. This is not very surprising as they offer little guidance as to how those concepts would be applied to today’s affairs. The non-anachronistic form, i.e. introducing old works as new empirical evidence for modern IR theories, are more scientifically fruitful as they increase the travelling ability of mainstream concepts not only across places but also time. Yet it is an equally deficient strategy in terms of homegrown theory building, because the indigenous thinkers’ ideas are used to confirm or support an already existing theory, without any alteration. Cox’s two different pieces on Khaldun receive four citations each, while Pasha’s article is not cited at all.

2.2. Alterative homegrown theories

Alterative homegrown theories are built by restructuring mainstream theories based on evidence from indigenous experiences. It can be done in two ways: either different definitions for mainstream concepts are suggested or they are applied in a different level of analysis. Unlike referential theories, relying on local evidence is a requisite characteristic for alterative theories to be called homegrown. The resulting theory offers novel insights, but since it alters an extant mainstream theory, alterative homegrown theories are corrective, rather than innovative theories.

\textsuperscript{64} Robert Gilpin, \textit{War and Change in World Politics} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
\textsuperscript{67} Cox, “Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization”.
A rather globally acknowledged example of alterative homegrown theories is world-systems theory. Wallerstein extended Marx’s depiction of class and division of labor, and applied it on a global level. World-systems theorists’ innovation consists of having world-systems as the unit of analysis, not the states, since they argue that the agents in the world-system are not confined to any state’s borders. Crucial to this innovation is their use of evidence about a wide geographical area to account for the historical rise of the West, and continuing poverty of the most non-Western societies. Luxembourg’s earlier work on Turkey, Russia, India, China and North Africa as well as Wallerstein’s own work on Africa, provided the multiregional empirical background. While Wallerstein’s work was mostly qualitative, other world-system researchers also incorporated quantitative data to show worldwide patterns.

World-systems analysis’ reception is quite wide. Although we only included in our sample Wallerstein and Hopkins, a work that was cited 13 times in the first five years of its publication, Wallerstein and his colleagues subsequently produced a substantial number of works based on the theory, which augmented its recognition. Another factor in bolstering its reception was its institutionalization in distinguished universities and research centers in North America. Although the theory was inferentially homegrown (devised based on inferences from a non-Western experience of capitalism) most of the theorists were Western, and were linked to an extensive network in the core. Further factors might have been the familiarity of the global discipline with Marxist concepts, and the wide use of quantitative data, at a time when positivism was popular. Lastly, World-systems theory has strong connections to the disciplines of history and economy, and was able therefore to generate appeal in a wide range of disciplines.

Another attempt to apply mainstream concepts in other levels of analysis is Cai Tuo’s work on global governance. Cai defines global governance as a cooperation of official and non-official agents over a global problem within the borders of a country, i.e. transnational cooperation on national territory. This definition is inspired by conditions prevalent in developing countries: first, civil society is usually too weak to project its influence transnationally; second, there is a general distrust towards “non-territorial politics and globalism,” and finally there is a preference for dealing with global problems through established intergovernmental institutions and mechanisms. Therefore, civil society takes part in transnational networks only when the global problem in question is addressed locally with involvement of the local government. Transnational cooperation is a learning mechanism for both civil society and domestic government, where a top-down understanding of management is slowly giving way to a more open one.

71 Chirot and Hall, “World-System Theory”.
74 Hopkins and Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis.
76 Cai, “Global Governance,” 58.
Cai’s correction to the global governance literature is to apply a supposedly global level concept at the domestic level, which reveals the discrepancy between the developing societies and developed societies in terms of both attitude and ability. His analysis also offers practical guidance as to the improvement of civil society and argues that involvement of host state institutions may serve to improving global consciousness and global values.

Similarly, Qin Yaqing finds fault in the mainstream global governance literature in explaining East Asian governance practice. Most theories of governance rely on rule-based governance, with the underlying assumption that individuals are rational, cost-calculating actors with exogenous self-interests. But in East Asian communitarian societies, he argues, the essence of governance is relational, and it highlights morality, and trust, all of which are drawn from Confucian philosophy. While rule-based governance takes tangible results as the objective, relational governance emphasizes process, i.e. maintaining a relationship which makes participation, strengthening of ties, and developing a shared understanding possible. Consequently, he argues that judging ASEAN and APEC as ineffective in comparison to the EU or NATO is misleading, since the merit of the former may not be in achieving tangible results, but in maintaining continuous dialogue and negotiation.

Qin Yaqing is not the first to introduce a “relational” and “processual” ontology to the study of IR, but his conceptualization differs from mainstream theories in terms of his understanding of trust as a genuine social norm, rather than as another cost-reducing mechanism. Moreover, he reconceptualizes “relational” in the domain of governance. Despite his emphasis on Confucian values, he does not directly refer to Confucius in his concepts or inferences, but he highlights the distinctive experience of East Asian subjects, whose daily life is infused with Confucianism.

Compared to the above, some other attempts involving a less substantive correction, i.e. homegrown improvements, redirect the application range of mainstream theories, by offering alternative operationalizations. For example, late socialist and then post-socialist Russian scholars incorporated a few Western-derived concepts, which gave way to the development of a “national liberal school” of IR in Russia. The school combines “nationalism” and “liberalism”, terms which acquire a different meaning in the Russian context than that employed by Western theorists. For example, they point to the importance of international institutions and a non-unipolar world as a means to achieve peace, they emphasize the risks of globalization, while not denying the opportunities associated, and argue that the democratization process must reflect local conditions.

In a similar vein, Kuznetsov builds on Toynbee’s and more recently Huntington’s theory of “clash of civilizations,” in his theory of “grammatological geopolitics.” While Huntington’s theory proposes that the potential zones of conflict run along the fault lines of nine largely denominational civilizations, Kuznetsov’s grammatological geopolitics defines civilizations

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78 Qin, “Why Is There No Chinese”.
in terms of the alphabets the nations use and argues that a more accurate prediction of conflicts can be attained by the resulting fault lines. In addition to Huntington’s, he identifies seven more, “smaller” sub-cultures: Greek, Hebrew, Armenian, Georgian, Mongolian, Korean and Ethiopian. These subcultures are more prone to conflicts than are broader civilizations because of their rather fast developmental potential. As evidence, he particularly refers to conflicts in and around the post-Soviet states, such as between Serbia (Cyrillic) and Croatia (Latin) in 1991-1995, as well as Georgia’s (Georgian) war with Russia (Cyrillic) in 2008, South Ossetia (Cyrillic) in 1991-1992, 2004, and 2008, and with Abkhazia (Cyrillic) in 1992-1993, 1998 and 2008.

Homegrown alterations of mainstream theories may reflect a) interdisciplinary approaches, b) sensitivity to changing meanings of concepts in different settings, and c) experimentation with respect to level of analysis. Through these strategies, the resultant theorizing becomes more than a simple application of the existing theory, and acquires a certain degree of originality. Other forms of engaging with mainstream concepts are less substantial, often employing only one of the above strategies. These homegrown improvements of mainstream theories are important in advancing the “traveling ability” of mainstream concepts or point out their limitations in doing so. In consequence, they are valuable for expanding the application range, i.e. “globalness”, of mainstream International Relations. Although they are hypothetically more advantageous in terms of reception, as other scholars already have familiarity with the concepts, in actuality they are the least cited form of homegrown theorizing in our sample. On average, each alternative homegrown theory work is cited six times in the first five years, which is only half of the overall average. One particular reason may be their inherent position on “the fringes” of mainstream theory, rather than being “out” of mainstream theory: taking a corrective stance by pointing out the shortcomings of an established paradigm, may be regarded as more threatening to hegemony than either referential or authentic homegrown theories. This also highlights the tremendous difficulty faced by periphery scholars when they attempt to challenge the core theories: they are not refuted, but are simply ignored.

2.3. Authentic homegrown theory building

Authentic homegrown theory building essentially relies on scrutinizing available or newly collected data and focusing on the incongruencies between what has been observed and what has been expected based on extant conceptualizations. Authentic homegrown theory building begins with putting forward empirical puzzles and coming up with original concepts to explicate these puzzles. Authentic concepts are coined with little or no reference to either homegrown ideas or mainstream theories.

Focusing on empirical puzzles for theory development is a common strategy among inductively oriented researchers. Consequently, systematic collection and/or analysis of (usually a large magnitude of) data is tremendously important to not only homegrown, but any authentic theory building. Since authentic homegrown concepts are not redefined or refined forms of indigenous conceptualizations, what makes them homegrown is the origin of the data used while making inferences. In other words, authentic homegrown theory is not conceptually, but inferentially homegrown.

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One example of authentic homegrown theory building out of the periphery comes from the latest Chinese efforts to analyze China-US bilateral relations from 1950 onwards using event data. Yan Xuetong tries to explain the “sudden deteriorations followed by rapid recoveries [which] have been the norm in China–US relations since the 1990s.”85 He proposes that fluctuating relations, characterized by “short-term improvements in China–US relations that have followed each short-term dip”86 are neither attributable to rising nationalism in China nor to Chinese overconfidence built upon China’s fast economic growth, but rather to the discrepancy between heightened expectations of the two sides and the actual policy inclinations derived by their interests. He states that the good will by both sides actually worsens the balance in their bilateral relations, because it impedes their ability to pinpoint realistic policies based on their interests.87 It actually gives way to the establishment of a “superficial friendship” in which both countries imagine they have more common interests than they actually have. The resulting inconsistency leads to instability.

Xuetong extends his argumentation by building a typology of bilateral interests with respect to different sectors of China-US relations. While in security matters, US and Chinese interests are mostly “mutually unfavourable,” in economy and culture, they have more mutually favorable interests, so much so that he calls them “cultural friends”.88

Observing different fluctuation patterns in different time periods, Xuetong’s theory explains them with the (in)congruence between expectations and interests. At the same time, he addresses the contemporary Chinese problematique: finding peaceful yet assertive ways to engage with the outside world. Accordingly, his theory can also be regarded as prescriptive; too much optimism, i.e. heightened expectations with respect to US-Chinese relations, can actually impede rather than boost stability.

Another example of authentic homegrown theory building out of the periphery is Latin American dependency theory, which is inferred from the Latin American experience in development and international trade in the 1950s. It also originates from an empirical puzzle: In contrast to David Ricardo’s thesis that free trade would benefit both parties because of the comparative advantage, terms of trade for underdeveloped countries relative to the developed countries had deteriorated over time. Raul Prebisch, an Argentinian economist, argued that there were “declining terms of trade” for Third World states, because peripheral nations had to export more of their primary goods to get the same value of industrial exports. Through this system, all of the benefits of technology and international trade transfer to the core states.89

Dependency theorists integrated Prebisch’s thesis with their observations regarding global relations of production in Latin America. Contra modernization theory, they argued that looking at domestic determinants of economic growth and development is not sufficient to understand the patterns of (under)development.90 An international outlook, which takes into account historical and sociological variables, along with interactions between and across domestic and international realms is also needed.91

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86 Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations”.
91 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development.
For Latin American structuralists Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, dependency and development were not mutually exclusive: dependency and autonomy were two ends of a political continuum, as development and underdevelopment were two ends of the economic continuum. They argued that the local political elites in peripheral states have structured their domestic rule on a coalition of internal interests favorable to the international economic structure. Therefore, international capitalist structure, by itself, does not lead to a single form of dependency; it is rather the sociological consequences and the subsequent alliances which shape the dependent status of the South.

Although originated in Latin America, structuralist dependency theory could be applied to a wider scope of countries, from economically developed ones in East Asia to underdeveloped countries in Africa. The emphasis on alliances and struggles within and across national borders makes the theory more historically nuanced and more conducive to social change albeit at the expense of predictive power.

A final example of authentic homegrown theorizing is from South Africa. Geldenhuys focuses on the South African experience of being an isolated state for four decades, and puts forward a descriptive theory of isolation. Analytically differentiating isolation from other forms of estrangement, such as short-term alienation, obscurity of a state (being ignored), or armed isolation during war, he defines isolation as either a long term, voluntary and deliberate policy by a state (self-isolation) or a deliberate policy by other states (enforced isolation) to diminish one’s level of international interaction. He gives a detailed list and description of 30 indicators of isolation and investigates questions pertaining to targets and implementers of isolation, its means, causes, objectives and effects. His framework is original in pointing out a rather understudied phenomenon in international relations, but one which dominated South African domestic and international politics for decades. On the other hand, Geldenhuys’ theory of isolation is mostly a descriptive rather than explanatory theory.

Both Xuetong and the dependency theorists pointed out patterns in the data, unforeseen or under-explained by the existing theories. Similarly, Geldenhuys’ operationalization of isolation required extensive data on several spheres of international interaction. Authentic homegrown theories seem to rely on extensive collections of data, either to reveal empirical puzzles, or to describe a situation. This is probably due to the lack of a conceptual reference point to justify their arguments. While theorists in the core can write purely theoretical pieces with little or no reference to systematically collected data, a similar option appears untenable to homegrown theorists, since it would jeopardize their acceptance by the global discipline. Such data collection, however, requires substantial time and effort, which might be one of the reasons authentic homegrown theories are rare to find. At the same time though, extensive data collection seems to augment their citation scores. The average citation score for the above three examples is 38, and even when Cardoso and Faletto, 1979 is removed as an outlier, the average score is 11.5.

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92 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development.
93 Smith, “The Underdevelopment of Development,” 251.
97 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development.
3. Conclusion

Homegrown theories are by definition local, i.e. attached to a particular geo-cultural sphere. A theory, on the other hand, is presumably universal, applicable to classes of phenomena that can be found anywhere, anytime. Accordingly, claims for homegrown theorizing are often rebuffed or downplayed on the basis of their supposed parochialism or exceptionalism. Despite the claim for universality however, mainstream IR theories are also parochial, a phenomenon that became increasingly evident over the years since Hoffmann’s declaration of IR as an American social science. If all of the supposedly ‘universal’ theories are parochial as suggested, then it would be unfair to dismiss a self-admittedly homegrown theory on the basis of parochialism. It would rather be more accurate to state that all theorizing is homegrown, with the potential for universal recognition, if not application. Such a stance can pave the way forward to a more inclusive discipline. As one scholar puts it, it might indeed be the only way for International Relations to be more inclusive and hence truly “international”.

Our review suggests that despite the inequality in the social and political sphere, there is great potential in terms of periphery-based, homegrown IRT. There are voices out of the larger world, but they are not incorporated successfully into larger literature. The supposed universalism of any theory depends on its acceptance by the wider community of scholars. All the major theories of today were once a homegrown theory, and the material and discursive power of these theories came from the power of the object they studied. As these theories grew into becoming universal, the discursive sphere was shut down to outsiders to keep the hegemony intact. Their monopoly on the scholarly imaginations of international relations has become the major obstacle to a true globalization of IR. The power of actors (whether they are states, nations, groups, civilizations or even theorists) is still the determining factor in identifying whose voices will be globally heard and integrated into the global scientific discipline. Structural and institutional factors, such as discrepancies in material capabilities, network structures and publication opportunities between the core and the periphery have a huge effect on whose theory will be popular. The theories and conceptualizations of international relations of an international system under Chinese, Russian or Indian hegemony would greatly differ from the current ones in ontology and epistemology.

A closer look at the types of publications, suggests that there remains a major packaging, production, and marketing problem, which inhibits the contribution homegrown theorizing might make to the wider discipline. On average, from our sample, books presenting examples of some form of homegrown theorizing are cited 35 times, articles 4.8 times, and book chapters 1.3 times. Clearly, publishing books instead of articles appears to pose an advantage for homegrown theorists. The prestige of the publishing house and its range of distribution network may facilitate its recognition. Additionally, the depth of elaboration permitted by the relative length of a whole book might be instrumental in augmenting an idea’s reception.

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98 Jack Snyder, “Some Good and Bad Reasons for a Distinctively Chinese Approach to International Relations Theory” (paper presented at the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, 2008); Shambaugh, “International Relations Studies”.
101 Crawford, “Where Have All the Theorists Gone,” 222-3.
On the other hand, compared to articles, publishing books, especially by a well-known publishing house, requires a higher level of pre-existing recognition by the scholar. Therefore the books may be cited more because the authors of those books are already well-known and hence already have wider access—Cardoso, Galtung and Xuetong are already well-known figures. Nevertheless, comparing citations to specific book chapters to citations for the whole book, suggests an interesting pattern. *Order and Justice in International Relations* is cited 29 times in total, but only one of these is to Bajpai’s chapter. Most of the citations are to chapters written either by the editors, or to the chapter that focuses on Europe. Governance without Government: *Order and Change in World Politics* is cited 548 times, but only 12 of them are to Cox’s piece on Ibn-Khaldun. Again the most citations in this volume are directly to the editors’ chapters or to works on the Western international system from a critical perspective. Similarly, *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies* is cited 36 times, none of which is to Pasha’s chapter. The most cited chapter in the volume is that of Stephen Gill’s piece on Karl Polanyi. Therefore, even when the material obstacles to wider access are surmounted, or even when the articles are published by well-known and elsewhere abundantly cited scholars, homegrown conceptualizations’ reception is relatively low.

Beyond the above factors that are exogenous to the process of theory building, a few observations can be made about the substantial differences between the theories themselves, which may account for how these differences reflect on their acceptance. The foremost quality of a new theory is that it can be understood and applied by other researchers. Therefore, insularity and vagueness are both fatal to homegrown theories. Accordingly, the concepts used should be adequately defined and clarified. As Lynham points out, “an important function and characteristic of theory building is to make these explanations and understandings of how the world is and works explicit and, by so doing, to make transferable, informed knowledge for improved understanding and action in the world tacit rather than implicit”. If theorists fall short of transmitting to the mind of the reader, how and where one can test the suggested theory, or how one can infer from the empirical observations that the proposed mechanism is at work, then the theory will not be engaged. Original concepts are good, but those whose meaning is too blurry for others to understand will remain unproductive. If nobody else is able to apply the concept, then the theory is doomed to isolation, and its development will halt. In particular, a poor clarification of concepts used in Referential Homegrown Theories may limit their transferability to the people cognizant of the referent culture or ideas. Limited transferability may confine such theories to discussions within communities of culturally homogenous scholars, which will deny the global IR community the fundamental benefit of referential homegrown theories, i.e. incorporation of non-core ontologies.

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103 These 18 works are only part of what we went through during the whole review. Some of the studies were left out of citation analysis because they were published long before 1980, and hence their first 5 year citation score cannot be obtained through WoS Cited Reference Search. We included Cardoso and Faletto (Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependency and Development*), however, but only citations to it from 1980 to 1984. Even when the citations in year 1979 could not be added, it still was the most cited work in our sample. In within-sample comparisons, we only considered citations made within the first five years of each cited works’ publication date. Since older works can naturally be expected to have a larger number of total citations, comparing their total citation score to those of relatively newer works would be misleading.


Insularity and policy dependence inhibit reception; assimilation and anachronism threaten originality and diversity. Comparisons across thinkers, or studies on a non-Western thinker, may be fruitful in familiarizing the global discipline with periphery theorists’ ideas, but from a theory building purpose, assessing and testing empirical implications of their ideas independently from preconceived paradigmatic lenses, is paramount. In other words, the concepts should not simply be “translated,” a practice which usually serves as an implicit confirmation of mainstream approaches. Deriving implications out of those ideas, and testing them against the data is what makes any theory stronger.

Finally, a closer look at the most cited of the theories explored here, reveals that the most efficient way of building both original and recognized theories appears to be through systematic collection of data. Xuetong relied on quantitative data on US-China bilateral relations, dependency theorists based their theoretical innovation on foreign trade data, and Geldenhuys made an extensive collection of qualitative data on levels of international interaction. It is impossible to ignore the irony in this, as empirical work is often considered in dichotomous terms with theory, and those who are empirically oriented, i.e. “native informants,”107 “area specialists,”108 or “historians”109 are seen as “non-theorists.” Such a starting perspective is a major obstacle in overcoming the broader hegemonic division of labor. Better theories cannot be built out of philosophical and meta-theoretical discussions, they can only be built through hands-on empirical work. Still better theories can only be built through the hands-on work of a wider, global scholarly community.

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### Appendix

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<tr>
<th>Type of Homegrown Theory</th>
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Homegrown Theorizing: Knowledge, Scholars, Theory*

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Abstract
In recent years, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has entered another of its turns: the homegrown turn. This new turn focuses on possible contributions to IR theorizing using non-Western knowledge and/or scholarship. This article deconstructs the idea of homegrown theorizing by focusing on its constitutive part, dealing separately with the aspects of knowledge, scholar, and theory, questioning thereby the differing meanings of homegrownness. Such an approach provides an initial framework that accomplishes two things: First, the paper discusses today’s core Western IR community and its disciplinary sociology in terms of the main factors engendering present critiques of its scholarship. Second, it then becomes possible to pay attention to peripheral non-Western IR’s position at a time of gradual post-Westernization, both world politically and within the discipline. Engaging with the pitfalls of Western IR and elaborating on the reasons not only explains the emergence of IR’s homegrown turn, but also provides the basis for understanding how scholars engaging in homegrown theorizing can learn from the (past) mistakes of core scholarship. Dealing with the impact of globalization, Eurocentrism, presentism, and parochialism as the main problem areas of (Western) IR, the article concludes by providing a list of lessons to be taken into account when engaging in homegrown theorizing within the periphery.

Keywords: Homegrown theorizing, disciplinary sociology, non-Western IR, post-Western IR

1. Introduction
There is a new turn in International Relations (IR): the homegrown turn. This approach focuses on widening IR’s theoretical bases by turning to new (in fact, at times rather old) sources from the non-Western world. This new interest can be seen as a natural consequence of IR’s broadly-perceived failure to meet the requirements inherent in its very name, that is, to be an international, even global discipline. Scholars within Western academia and their

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1 Interestingly enough, neighboring fields of IR seem to be less engaged in this quest. A comparativist’s recent call to pay more attention to China in order to develop better theories was based on the narrow recommendation to study China more closely as a possible empirical contribution to comparative theory building. There was no further specification about going to the level of Chinese knowledge or Chinese scholars. See Lily L. Tsai, “Bringing in China: Insights for Building Comparative Political Theory,” Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 3 (2016): 295-328. In the case of Political Theory, the promises of comparative political theory will play a major role in expanding our understanding of non-Western political thought, and hence homegrown theorizing. For a recent overview, see Leigh Jenco, “Introduction: Thinking with the past: Political thought in and from the ‘non-West’,” European Journal of Political Theory 15, no. 4 (2016): 377-81.

counterparts from semi-peripheral and non-Western parts of the globe have been engaged in a veritable attempt to theorize IR more globally. At this important juncture, this article will look at hurdles that should not be overlooked in IR’s homegrown turn. Learning from the many mistakes and diverse unsuccessful attempts of mainstream IR in its previous theorizing efforts is a useful means to prevent old errors from being recreated in this new era of an emerging post-Western IR discipline.3

What were some of the most significant errors committed by an IR that was completely Western? First, the Western IR of the past and the present (to the extent of its partial continuity) was Eurocentric and Western-centric, due to the high degree of interwovenness. Furthermore, the sources it was using were not always those that provided the most representative and most verifiable interpretations of past thinkers even within their European-Western context. The third dimension of its problematic nature concerned the way theory was usually perceived to assume ‘a sense of exteriority,’ that is positioning itself outside history. This thinking coincides with a search for theoretical closure, which Buzan and Lawson warn us against.4 However, by merely presenting these three major issue areas, one cannot establish a coherent framework from which to approach the future prospects of homegrown theorizing in times of a post-Western IR discipline. A more-detailed approach is needed to distinguish between three separate factors: knowledge, scholars, and theory. It is only through a broader engagement with these interacting dimensions that it becomes possible to discuss the premises of homegrownness at a time when post-Western pathways are recreating IR’s disciplinarity.

How could one discuss the processes of theorizing with regard to these three distinct features? I propose to examine all these aspects as parts of homegrown theorizing. First, we need to explain what is meant by homegrown theorizing. In their treatment of this important question, Aydınlı and Biltekin give us the following answer: ‘original theorizing in the periphery about the periphery.’5 Therefore, homegrown theorizing is a form of theorizing that provides insights about the periphery, which takes place in locations outside the core. Their approach is also extendable to the Western world, which is not hegemonic in IR (for instance, continental Europe). At the same time, while this approach provides an initial explanation for the meaning of homegrown, we need to take a further step and deal with the idea of theorizing. In this regard, it is useful to turn to the newly emerging distinction between theory and theorizing. Buzan and Lawson, relying on work by Swedberg and Reus-Smit, understand theory as ‘a statement about the explanation of a phenomenon,’ and see theorizing as ‘the “process through which theory is produced.”’6 Such an approach enables us to use theorizing as the bigger umbrella and, consequently, to perceive knowledge, scholars, and theory as different parts of theorizing. Therefore, exploring homegrown theorizing requires us to pay attention, separately and together, to the role of knowledge, scholars, and theory with regard to their own extent of homegrownness. The variations therein will point to the connection points that, at times, effectively obliterate the boundaries between the home and the global.

At this juncture, it is useful to discuss the three parts of theorizing in the context of the problem areas presented above. By emphasizing the different levels of theorizing with regard to the main issues that generate a problematic Western IR, I go beyond a brief disciplinary sociological analysis of Western IR by presenting some useful points that could serve as an early warning mechanism for the emerging post-Western IR with its focus on homegrown theorizing. In this regard, the paper presents the general areas in which Western IR led to multiple mistakes and failures. The paper begins with the general state of knowledge, continues with the role of scholars, and finishes with the theory that arises from within such a context. Based on examples from different cases, it concludes by highlighting certain aspects that could help peripheral homegrown theorizing to avoid repeating past (and, at times, present) mistakes of core IR scholarship. The opening section explains the current approaches taken by the homegrown turn to set the stage for the consequent discussion on core IR’s mistakes and the lessons thus provided for peripheral IR in the realms of knowledge, scholars, and theory.

2. Two Concepts: ‘Homegrown’ and ‘Theorizing’

In their study of homegrown theorizing, Aydınlı and Biltekin (based on their approach that defined this form of theorizing as ‘original theorizing in the periphery about the periphery’) distinguish between three types: referential homegrown theorizing, homegrown alterations, and authentic homegrown theories. In the first one, IR-related theorizing is shown to rely on non-IR local thinkers, writers, or scholars, and the introduction of their concepts into the domain of IR. The second type relates to the ways in which core (Western) ideas or concepts are reshaped in order to coincide with indigenous meanings. The last type focuses on ‘original concepts’ developed ‘out of geo-culturally specific experience and commonly used idioms of daily life’ that are consequently carried over into IR.7

A recent work by Vineet Thakur presents a not so dissimilar framework for discussing the strategies that non-Western/peripheral IR communities can employ in overcoming certain obstacles in order to discover the scholarship in the core with their local insights that so far have been rather neglected. His focus is on three dimensions of engagement: plot, language, and characters. In Thakur’s framework, which takes its clues from Karen Smith’s earlier work,8 non-Western theorizing is seen as a narrative with a plot shaped by the narrator’s positionality. Language, on the other hand, demonstrates how concepts, among other things, are to be used or developed throughout the emerging narrative of the story told by non-Western theoretical newcomers. It is about engaging with Western concepts and reshaping them or about emphasizing and explaining (to outsiders, namely Western core IR scholars) existing local concepts. The last dimension, characters, focuses on the issues that take priority among all the possible areas to be studied by IR. As Thakur specifically deals with the contributions of Africa to IR theories, what emerges is a useful framework for discussing homegrown theorizing. His consequent proposal is to combine these three dimensions and provide two options for African theorizing in each case: remain at the same level, or provide different pathways in each category. This results in eight options ranging from ‘same plot, same language, same characters’ to ‘same plot, different language, same

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7 Aydınlı and Biltekin, “Widening the World of IR”.
characters’ to ‘different plot, different language, different characters.’ This eight-options-framework can also be used with Aydınlı and Biltekin’s tripartite typology on homegrown theorizing, as they both demonstrate the different pathways that can be used in enriching global IR with contributions by peripheral IR communities’ theorizing moves.

While these scholars and many others attempt to expand the usual spheres of engagement of disciplinary approaches, it is important to state at the beginning that using certain concepts for explaining only a certain country’s or region’s domestic/regional politics carries the risk of being less IR and more Area Studies in its narrow versions. The following sections will elaborate on this aspect. Furthermore, as a consequence of problems that one finds in core IR and its theorizing processes, scholars engaged in IR at a time of a post-Western turn should actively deal with certain questions before starting their own trial with homegrown theorizing. This process is covered in the following sections.

In order to provide a structured analysis of homegrown theorizing, the next three sections will deal with knowledge, scholars, and theory by discussing the extent to which one can perceive these three factors as homegrown parts of a broader theorizing enterprise. It starts with a broad discussion of knowledge, approaching it in a wider sense and elaborating the ways in which it takes shape and is used. This first part will also provide a detailed discussion of Western IR’s failures, including Eurocentrism and problems of historical (mis)interpretation. The following section focuses on the positions and situatedness of scholars who, not infrequently, find themselves at the intersection of local and global theorizing. The possibilities of, and challenges to, homegrown theorizing will become clearer with regard to scholars’ agential limits. The last part of this tripartite analysis will turn to the role of theory and the degree to which one can ‘realize’ homegrown theories.

3. Knowledge

By knowledge, I refer to the general arena of empirical and philosophical observations and sources used in this process. It also includes certain pre-theory components such as concepts. In Western IR, these include(d) historical materials, evaluations concerning contemporary political and social developments, myths, various literary works, and even folk wisdom. Therefore, knowledge can be seen as a part of theorizing processes, although on a separate level it can also be perceived as a useful contribution to our scholarly interests even in its atheoretical or pre-theorized stage. That does not necessarily mean that knowledge is never theory-laden, but this starting point assumes that knowledge can also precede theories. Based on these assumptions, one could state that knowing, for instance, about the world political transformations is a significant part of our discipline even when one does not use it for theorizing purposes.

Following these initial clarifications, it is useful to discuss the three problems encountered in core IR scholarship in the context of their position within the dimension of knowledge. First, there is the issue of Eurocentrism. It is not merely a theoretical problem; it begins at the very start of knowledge accumulation. What kinds of knowledge are prioritized and how are these

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connected to questions of power? IR’s predominant focus on European historical experiences is a primary example of this problematic. The expansion of European great powers with their concomitant practices of colonialism and imperialism, provide the major tools of core IR mainstream’s ‘knowledge pool.’ Even when core-periphery encounters present important sources of historical knowledge, for example, Europeans’ ‘discovery’ of the Americas or the race relations integral to Western-Eastern-Southern relationships, it is the perspective of Western knowledge which becomes the ‘standard narrative.’ These assumptions signify not only the virtually total absence of non-Western knowledge, but also the dominance of a certain version of knowledge within the West. The frequently mentioned example of the Cold War was the most recent case from the twentieth century. Four decades of ‘hot wars’ in the non-Western parts of our globe were neglected at the expense of the rather questionable balance of terror that shaped the quotidien experiences of Western/Northern societies.

The second aspect that necessitates our attention is the way in which past Western thinkers and their ideas have been interpreted and used by scholars of the core IR communities. Recent revisionist historiographies of the discipline provide innumerable instances of early scholarship’s ideational confusion and, at times, clear errors in dealing with significant political philosophers and earlier thinkers whose ideas would impact on a gradually growing discipline. In this regard, the last two decades provided us with very substantive clarifications about the problematic fashion in which first and second generation IR scholars of the core (the US and the UK) have presented rather questionable, if not caricaturized, accounts of political ideas which have world political relevance. Obviously, some of these problems relate to the theory dimension, that is, tendencies to create reified theoretical summaries of political thinkers’ wide-ranging studies. However, even the disciplinary choices that led to seeing in Thucydides or Hobbes the founding fathers of (realist) IR are examples of this type of rather narrow knowledge preference. Their problematic consequences are difficult to set aside, especially due to the repeated ways in which the earlier interpretations survive (in a path-dependent manner) thanks to mainstream IR textbooks, again written by scholars of IR’s core in the US, and, to a lesser extent, in the UK.

A further difficulty that lies at the foundation of mainstream core IR is its reliance on a certain category of thinkers, tendency to ignore those earlier philosophers or scholars whose

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12 However, it is important to state that the colonialism and imperialism dimensions of this story are often overlooked, not least by the English School. See William A. Callahan, “Nationalising International Theory: Race, Class and the English School,” *Global Society* 18, no. 4 (2004): 305-23. For a work regarding overcoming this dynamic in IR, see David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, eds., *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005).

13 In this regard, even within Europe, the histories of the Balkans or Eastern Europe tend to be evaluated only within a comparison to their Western European neighbors. See Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).


16 For an interesting engagement by IR scholars with philosophers and theorists, see Richard Ned Lebow et al., eds., *The Return of the Theorists – Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).


ideational contributions are not in line with the disciplinary expectations of mid- to late-twentieth-century IR core scholarship. One example is the way early proponents of certain peace movements or social movements were set aside in IR’s accumulation of knowledge. Although the two world wars are seen as a major impetus leading to the establishment of a scientific study of world politics (mainly with the aim of finding ways to prevent such future carnage), the new discipline’s core knowledge collectors, that is Western IR’s hegemonic epistemic community did not show much interest in the earlier peace movements and thinkers. The prevalence of war, strategy, and geopolitics weighed heavily against those more idealistic approaches.

The third aspect, namely exteriority towards/from history and theoretical closure, is by its very nature something that should be more directly discussed in the section on theory. However, tied to the explanations stated in the context of knowledge dimension, it is important to underline that such detachedness from history and theoretical closure could only emerge as a consequence of the Eurocentric nature of the dominant forms of knowledge aspirations as well as the rather unpluralistic way in which twentieth-century Western orders were taken to be of a permanent character. The manner in which knowledge was pursued did not lead to a quest for wider dimensions of empirical or philosophical resources. Once generated, the ahistoricized and theoretically hermetically sealed forms of knowledge were used in a fashion that made them permanently closed to new and different ideas and interpretations.

When it comes to the ideas of non-Western thinkers or to broader concepts that are used in the regional or national contexts, we should also ask whether we find ourselves in the middle of a process of invention or of discovery. This refers to scholars who themselves become the most active agents of highlighting certain ideas, the importance of certain thinkers, or concepts. They can do this because of their local and global position, thanks to being the first one(s) to uncover ancient or more recent local knowledge. However, this also means that the researcher finds her- or himself in a place from which he or she can comment on all the possible benefits of using this knowledge from a long neglected (or even unknown) source. In Western IR, we can think of the rather sudden rediscovery of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace by Michael Doyle in the early 1980s. The question can always be the same: Why this thinker and not another one? As we know, there were many different thinkers contemplating peace – and Kant’s version seems to be one that more easily fitted the later use of democratic peace theory by twenty-first-century core IR scholarship. The potential pitfalls for non-Western homegrown theorists are even more difficult to overcome because, for the majority of these scholars, it will likely be the first time that they encounter the thinker or local concepts as the information has previously been unavailable in Western-language summarized versions. This means the researcher of homegrown theorizing has the advantage of being able to convince her or his (still mostly Western) colleagues about the validity of these newly shared insights. However, as we know from the case of core IR in the West, earlier IR interpretations of European political thinkers and ideas have now become a hot target for sophisticated revisionist studies that are very quick to problematize the failures of these initial

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approaches in IR. Martin Wight’s triad-interpretations of Kant, Hobbes, and Grotius have been overturned by later critics. These earlier misinterpretations are examples that should caution today’s homegrown theorizers. While the first scholars to uncover the non-Western ideas and thinkers in their local environments have the chance to do some very original research, they should be very careful to not exaggerate when interpreting their findings. This leads us to compare the difference between inventing ideas and discovering them. Kautilya, a long-neglected thinker, is now a more famous name in IR, even though his most important work was only rediscovered in the twentieth century. However, the following question could arise in some other cases: How do we define the authentic significance of these ideas and thinkers? Does non-Westernness suffice as a criterion, or could we actually even find more in the ideas of those thinkers, who were at the edge of their original societies, being more prone to transnational influences? These are some rather difficult questions to fully answer because they also point us towards the issue of globalization and its influence in the realm of ideas.

Scholars differ in their interpretations of globalization with regard to its timing, impact, spatial extent, and possible repetitions. While Wallerstein speaks of three waves of globalization, with late-nineteenth- and late-twentieth-century versions following those of the sixteenth century, the late German sociologist Ulrich Beck differentiated between globalism, globality, and globalization. The first concept referred to the neoliberal ideology that supported a certain manner of globalization, whereas the second concept demonstrated conditions that were creating a new world political situation. It is this second concept, globality, that I want to use to approach our understanding of homegrownness, and thus to question the extent to which it could be at all possible in the narrower sense proposed by some scholarship. Notwithstanding the differing and at times even conflicting definitions of globalization, the aspect of trans-border flow of ideas, individuals, and things could be said to be its major feature. In this regard, it is no longer possible to think of ideas as a dimension that is not affected by these globalization dynamics.

The recent turn to global intellectual history (in addition to similar developments in more general areas of historical studies) points to the need for a more self-reflexive approach when dealing with homegrown theorizing in IR. These studies provide us with important contributions that highlight the problematic nature of certain prevailing assumptions. For instance, today it is passé to assert the existence of unconnected local sources of knowledge (ideas, thinkers or concepts). IR’s newly emerging community of non-core homegrown theorists should not make suggestions about ‘undiscovered’ new ideas because one cannot speak with great assuredness about indigenous approaches that have never been influenced by non-indigenous ones. The significance of this point becomes clear when one turns to a dual option discussed by Homeira Moshirzadeh, concerning the distinction between

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25 For an example, see Aydınlı ve Biltekin, “Widening the World of IR”.
28 In the case of ‘hybrid’ ideas, meaning those that arise due to the intersection of, and interactions among, non-core and Western ideational connections, one would also need to study their Western origins/dimensions. Otherwise, focusing only on the non-Western homegrown aspects would not provide a holistic understanding of the given ideas.
endogenous and indigenous approaches. With the first one, she refers to an approach that is about ‘the needs, perspectives, experiences, and history’ of a country or a people. Using that approach, one does not necessarily rely on local sources in the process of theorizing. On the other hand, in indigenous approaches, Moshirzadeh recognizes the goal of ‘creating a genuine different view based on’ local sources and conceptualizations. What one needs to engage with in a more careful fashion is this second dimension of indigeneity. In a globalized world, the individual scholar should have to convince us about the degree of his or her research topic’s (ideas or thinkers), actual indigeneity. Even when this is not exactly the case, a less strict requirement in this process would be to expect that the ideas and thinkers discussed or presented are at least able to provide us with original tools. In this context, a less parochial or more globally shaped research agenda could provide us with important benefits. Following Acharya’s ISA presidential address, the need for a Global IR is also the means for overcoming IR’s Western (as well as non-core) parochialisms. In this regard, it becomes an essential task for scholars interested in homegrown theorizing to deal directly with the impact of transnational dynamics, global influences, and the processes through which ideas and thinkers are differently evaluated and perceived across the world. As Bourdieu showed, the processes that shape the inter-cultural transfer of ideas are complicated and relate to several contingent factors. Hence, even in cases of homegrown knowledge, once this is shared with a broader audience, its future paths are difficult to foresee. As well, one cannot know whether the ‘original’ meaning remained the same during this process, independent of past history and recognition of the ideas or thinkers studied.

A separate issue, which is not dissimilar from earlier developments in core Western IR, concerns the difficulty in stating where IR starts and where/when it ends. As postmodern scholarship has played a major role in widening the (philosophical) bases upon which new IR theorizing is taking place, it has become more difficult to provide an answer that would have lasting validity. However, in non-Western contexts, if one turns to earlier thinkers and concepts, one could also suppose that due to the long absence of non-Western actors as shapers of world politics on a global scale, there is probably more to find there that relates to the domestic, local, and regional aspects, rather than to the international aspects per se. However, this suggestion should not be interpreted as a total rejection of non-Western knowledge on the international and the global, but rather as showing its relative weakness compared to the contemporary ideas in Western geographies dealing with the same beyond-the-local spheres. If such ideas and thinkers are in turn to be investigated, their use in IR could result in a process of invention. Obviously, all scholarly works are expected to lead to differentiations between high- and low-quality research. However, if the current interest in homegrown theorizing leads to a large number of unsubstantiated assumptions about non-Western ideas’ and thinkers’ relevance for world political thinking, we could reach a situation where it becomes challenging to easily identify useful work on non-Western contexts.

An additional aspect that could arise as a possible problem concerns the extent of representativeness of a supposedly homegrown idea, concept, or theory. For instance, in the

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29 This means that while the local conditions and expectations determine the process, the answers can also come from non-local sources.
31 Acharya, “Global International Relations”.
case of divided societies—(countries that lack a substantive unifying basis for their societal structure), not only different but also conflicting ideas and theories could emerge. In such a society, a scholar who turns his or her attention to only one of these two camps runs the risk that global IR would only become familiar with one of these two groups. Stated differently, even when one accepts the locality and/or originality (i.e. the homegrownness) of these ideas and concepts, the question is whether they provide homegrown theorizing or just lead the global scholarly community to interact with only one side of these divided societies. In Turkey, the permanent ideational divergences between the more secular-Western and the more religious-conservative sections in this society mean that even contributions from Turkish IR could end up reproducing these internal confrontations at the level of global IR. For non-Turkish scholars in various localities of the core, this possibility has at least two consequences: first, to what extent should one accept a certain idea or concept proposed or developed by one of the two sides as homegrown theorizing? Examined from the perspective of Western core IR, some could even assert that secular-Western IR theorizing in Turkey could at most be limited to the case of some homegrown alterations (to use the typology of Aydınlı and Biltekin). Such an interpretation could be based on the supposedly hermetic separation between Western and Islamic ideational pools, which is itself a questionable claim.

A second point concerns the ways in which Western core IR and even global IR can engage—simultaneously with both sides of these possible homegrown contributions. An answer to this lies in the earlier debates of Western IR, mostly known to us in the form of liberalism vs realism vs Marxism. Therefore, a counter-claim to the possibility that I refer to in this context would come from Western IR—and its own internal differences that were also a natural consequence of the societal debates and political differentiations found there. It is even possible to associate various IR theories with various ideologies, and even geo-cultural settings. However, in those instances, there is a major difference that could clearly rank certain approaches at certain times, with liberalism (for instance) being the default theoretical framework of the post-World War II world political system and IR theoretical bases. In the case of what I call divided societies, with their conflicting ideational and theoretical contributions, the problem lies more directly with their internal lack of coherence, that is, an unresolved fight for domestic ideational (as well as political) supremacy. The very nature of these binary-structured societal confrontations leads us to a situation in which it becomes difficult to accept the continuous existence of both of these options. It is in this aspect that core IR as well as Global IR would need to determine how to deal with such contributions offered in the shape of peripheral homegrown theorizing.

4. Scholars
The position of the scholar matters. In the recent debates about IR’s historical development and studies of disciplinary sociology, the role of IR scholars has not been used in a way that would offer us a comprehensive and comparative framework. The focus has been on individual members of the community, especially classical realists like Hans Morgenthau.36

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33 Such strict distinctions can be used both by certain Eurocentric accounts and by fundamentalist interpretations in Islam, as these dualities help them to perpetuate their claims to provide (in their opinions) the single truth.
36 For most recent examples, see Michael C. Williams, “In the Beginning: The International Relations enlightenment and the
While the interest in such distinguished ‘founding fathers’ of IR needs no further justification and is explainable with regard to disciplinary dynamics of repositioning, what matters much more for us is the ongoing lack of prioritization of the role of the scholarly community itself. In the significant debates that have emerged about external-based vs internal-based explanations, the main focus has been on the factors and actors that were shaping the trajectory of IR and its theoretical pathways. One could emphasize the role of universities, governments, foundations, think tanks, wars, domestic political influences, etc. however, it is only in the last couple of years that IR has examined its own past and present scholars in a comprehensive way. It is useful to think of scholars of homegrown theorizing as popularizers of ideas, concepts, and theories that they share with global IR community as distinct local and original products.

In the case of scholars, one of the major problems of Western core IR is the issue of Eurocentrism, which can be interpreted today as a generational issue: the earlier scholarly community being more directly tainted by such a position due to the way Eurocentrism functioned as a permanent background condition shaping various milieux in which scholars were emerging. However, this does not mean that even in a gradually post-Westernizing IR there is no trace of Eurocentrism left. The ongoing debates in core IR communities point to this legacy, at the same time highlighting the problematic nature of racism and imperialism as influential factors present at IR’s birth and development.

As discussed in the section on knowledge, the decisions and preferences of individual scholars determine the way IR theorizing will take place. In this context, when thinking of the stages that homegrown theorizing involves, one should begin with this aspect in our analysis. Whereas Aydınlı and Biltekin prefer not to consider the ‘ethnic/national identity’ of scholars, and focus instead on ‘various aspects of how the non-core experience is drawn on and conceptualized,’ I offer a different approach, which is built on the premise that the (auto)biographies of the individual scholar matter in a way that includes not only their locality, but also their live histories and educational backgrounds.

When speaking of homegrown theorizing, there are two aspects that require clarification: first, the idea of homegrown, and second, the concept of theorizing. While I have already provided an explanation of what is meant by theorizing in this paper, the other question still stands: How can one define homegrown? In the context of scholars, can one talk of ends of International Relations theory,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 647-65; Felix Rösch, “Realism as Social Criticism: The thinking partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau,” International Politics 50, no. 6 (2013): 815-29; William E. Scheuerman, “The Realist Revival in Political Philosophy, or: Why new is not always improved,” International Politics 50, no. 6 (2013): 798-814; Vassilios Paipais, “Between Politics and the Political: Reading Hans J. Morgenthau’s Double Critique of Depoliticisation,” Millennium 42, no. 2 (2014): 354-75.


For an approach that discusses thinkers’ connection to concepts (in their local settings) see Amado Luiz Cervo, “Conceptos en Relaciones Internacionales,” Relaciones Internacionales, no. 22 (2013): 149-166. His distinction between ‘thinkers of national expression,’ (national) ‘political and diplomatic thought,’ and the thought patterns of scholars working in academic and research centers is useful to the extent that it enables us to better comprehend intra-national differences among the local scholars in various national contexts. See especially pp. 156ff.
homegrown theorizing only if the scholar doing it is herself or himself ‘homegrown’? As stated above, this question is not answered affirmatively by all scholars involved in debates regarding non-core theorizing in IR. Important works that could be labeled as homegrown theorizing, or at least that could be interpreted as part of efforts to generate conditions favorable for such theorizing, have been presented by scholars who lacked earlier national/regional ties to their locality of theorizing. One of the most active scholars in this field, Arlene Tickner, would be among the first examples; she is a US citizen who lives in Colombia and focuses on the significance of Latin American differences when it comes to theorizing in IR.

Even if one insisted that there be local ties, the question arises about the educational pathways of individual scholars. In Turkey, two of the most prominent scholars with major contributions in the area of non-Western theorizing, Pınar Bilgin and Ersel Aydınlı, have doctoral degrees from British and American universities, respectively. It could be asserted that studying abroad makes scholars even more prone to be interested in their society’s potential contributions to IR, turning them into more active pursuers of local theorizing. However, as many examples from the Chinese context show, interest in homegrown theorizing could also emerge as a result of certain national feelings that aim to give a more prominent place to the national IR community on a global platform. Therefore, one also turns to homegrown theorizing as a means of generating more favorable conditions for the further promotion of one’s own society and state. This leads us back to the earlier distinction, suggested by Moshirzadeh, between indigenous and endogenous approaches. If homegrown theorizing goes beyond a mere interest in ideas and thinkers, becoming a means of extending the influence of one’s country by prioritizing ideas that prevail in that local context, therein lies the potential danger of another form of parochialism reproduced in the guise of a pluralistic IR. This point presents us once again with the need to face the mistakes of Western core IR and its theorizing processes, and decide not to repeat those errors (of the past). It is important to stress that, notwithstanding its more recent emergence and gradual stabilization, the latecomer status of non-core IR does not allow it to overlook the mistakes of more established core IR. The reasoning is that, ultimately, all these scholarly communities belong to the same undertaking, that of the discipline of IR. Tempo-spatial divergences of the past are not an excuse because twenty-first-century IR is based on shared practices and a globalized disciplinary identity.

In the context of scholars, homegrown theorizing could overcome such dangers by openly acknowledging the limits of its possibilities. As a consequence, scholars of peripheral IR should not fall into the trap of any kind of centricism. The answer to Eurocentrism cannot come, for instance, in the shape of Sinocentrism. An IR academic’s tendency for theorizing the world in terms of her or his own national or regional framework would not lead us to a pluralistic form of Global IR if the suggested approach is itself ethnocentric. To the contrary, it would reproduce the earlier narratives in which the world was supposed to permanently turn around the West(ern societies and states), only this time in a non-Western version.

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45 See Wang, “Between Science.”
This would be the case, of course, when the participants are themselves closed to differing perspectives. Therefore, scholars engaged in IR’s homegrown turn should be clear about the consequences of differing forms of such theorizing. One of these is vernacularization (a process by which ideas from non-peripheral localities are reshaped and in turn used in its new localized quasi-hybrid version).\textsuperscript{46} Other theorizing emerges from within nationalistic thought systems that would be perceived as the new trademark of non-core IR at the periphery. Obviously, these theories overlap with the typologies of Aydınlı and Biltekin as well as Thakur at certain points. In this context, the former approach could be located in Thakur’s same-different combinations, while Aydınlı and Biltekin’s homegrown alterations would be cases of vernacularization. On the other hand, if homegrown theorizing reifies certain nationalistic or essentializing tendencies in the locality in which it is developed, the danger of parochialism can be a permanent one. At the same time, however, this does not mean that all ‘authentic homegrown theories’ are merely tools of nationalist forces. In this regard, setting the standards on a more general level, that is, by expecting homegrown theorizing to always be just about the periphery, in the context of its presumed interests, it becomes possible to find a useful means to prevent such theorizing’s potential usage as a nationalistic, essentializing device. As discussed above, in times of a globalized world, the common starting point is to not assume that regions or states are hermetically sealed off from the (ideational) influence of others.

5. Theory

One problem that the new wave of non-core homegrown theorizing could also face regards the danger of not distinguishing between native theories and other versions. Here, the focus is on the possibility of finding supposedly untouched authentic local theories. As discussed in the preceding sections, such an assumption sees in homegrown theories locally existing or to-be-produced theories that would consequently be connected to global IR scholarship. However, as Aydınlı and Biltekin demonstrate, alterations at the national or regional levels can also be part of homegrown theorizing without claiming complete local authenticity. Remembering the discussions above, it is possible to state that even in instances where the theorizing process meets readily extant local theories, without any further need for scholars to engage with local sources of knowledge in order to create themselves such a theory, it is questionable whether these theories are as homegrown and original as they are supposed to be. This means that accepting the idea of alterations, or, following Thakur, the same-plot, same-language, same-character options,\textsuperscript{47} the very idea of homegrownness can become detached from assumptions about originality and local authenticity. The novelty in certain homegrown contributions thus becomes a question of degree.

In order to explain this problematique in a clear manner, it is useful to turn to an example from Turkish IR. In an article on Turkish contributions to IR theories, Aydınlı and Matthews discussed the way the concept of the ‘strategic middle power’ was developed by Baskın Oran, a leading Turkish IR scholar.\textsuperscript{48} Starting with the concept of the middle power and using insights about Turkey’s regionally distinct position that enables it to make use of its multiple connections to the surrounding regions, Oran thus gave a new shape to the idea of middle

\textsuperscript{46} See Arjun Appadurai, \textit{Modernity at Large} (Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1996).

\textsuperscript{47} Thakur, “Africa and the Theoretical Peace”.

\textsuperscript{48} Aydınlı and Matthews, “Periphery Theorizing”.
power that has been mostly associated with some Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Canada and Australia) or some certain European countries (e.g. Sweden), whose world political impact has emerged from their normative weight in world politics. Does this concept present us with a useful means for theorizing? The answer should be in the affirmative, but one should also deal with the issue of how to determine at what point a concept leads to a theory. However, in this specific case, there are some rather surprising aspects that highlight the ways in which concepts are globally carried, reinterpreted, and reproduced. Oran first used the concept in the introduction section of his edited volume on Turkish foreign policy. This volume, with contributions by a team of respected IR and foreign policy experts, mainly from the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University, has later become the standard and popular work used by Turkish universities and has been translated into English. The idea of a ‘strategic middle power’ was used by Oran to structure the later narratives of the volume on the developmental trajectories of Turkish Republican-era foreign policy.

How did he decide to pursue this concept of middle powerhood? In his own account, the concept struck him while reading the then-recently published book by William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*. In this book, Hale, one of the leading British scholars on Turkish politics, presented a detailed account of Turkish foreign policy’s history, which started in the eighteenth-century and ended at the start of the twenty-first century. Interestingly, he opened the book with a brief reference to middle powers, referring to a standard work on middle powers, Holbraad’s *Middle Powers in International Politics*. It was this usage by Hale that would influence Oran and lead him to shift the standard account on middle powerhood to the Turkish case by adding the adjective of ‘strategic’, thereby differentiating it from its previous associations with usually Anglo-Saxon middle powers. Making this process of academic interactions even more interesting, Hale would later suggest that he was not personally so sure whether the middle power concept was a fitting way to deal with the case of Turkey’s world political role and position. In the meantime, however, Oran was already providing the Turkish scholarly community with a broader understanding of middle powerhood in its new dimension, an approach that would become quite popular in the Turkish case. In this regard, as Aydınlı and Biltekin and Thakur show, homegrown theorizing does not need to be only about locally-developed concepts and theories. What matters is the inclusion/addition of local ideas by scholars who put great emphasis on widening IR and its theories on the bases of non-Western foundations, at the same time acknowledging that this also means accepting the limits of ‘original’ and ‘authentic’ insights. Otherwise, expecting such strictly novel aspects might prevent the development of actual homegrown theorizing by placing too much emphasis on the extent to which the contributions should be of complete local origin. In this regard, it becomes difficult to overlook the blurry lines of ideational interactions within global IR community.

49 Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001).
The above example is important because it directs our attention to the significance of academic studies’ inherently non-locally-limitable feature. While IR discipline is under critique for its various parochialisms, it is, nevertheless, necessary to underline the constant dynamics of scholarly communication and connections that prevail even under the extant conditions. This means that if one considers the theory dimension as the third component of theorizing, then it becomes virtually impossible to insist on the idea of the ‘originally native’ theory. To the contrary, theories and their preceding conceptual building blocks are usually the result of intercultural and intersocietal influences, underlining once again the way the globalized world enables even more intensive scholarly connections that generate fresh, but still hybrid, insights into world politics.

At this juncture, there emerges a separate question, that of presentism. This relates especially to the aspects of knowledge and theory with regard to the times in which they can be first encountered. In the case of homegrown sources of knowledge, and even theories, how can we define the temporal context in which these ideas, thinkers, and theories (to be presented or even developed by scholars of homegrown theorizing) are to be located? As I discussed in the case of Wight’s interpretation of leading European political philosophers, and showed in the section on the sudden popularity of Kant’s framework on the possibilities of perpetual peace, we need to examine the ways in which ideas and thinkers, both from earlier and current temporal contexts, would fit the conditions of the twenty-first century. At the same time, it is possible to take a different approach and to assert that there is no theory (or knowledge) that can be used in all instances, thus preferring to provide theories that only engage with a limited number of historical eras. However, this just pushes non-core homegrown theorizing to repeat the mistakes of IR, including multiple difficulties raised in the broad critique launched earlier by Barry Buzan and Richard Little on (Western) IR’s ahistoricism, presentism, Eurocentrism, anarchophilia, and state-centrism. If homegrown theorizing turns to local sources of knowledge and thinkers without considering the extent to which the presented ideas’ validity has certain temporal limits, then it would merely reproduce core IR scholarship’s problematic approaches. Therefore, we need to pay great attention to the issue of historical ontology that focuses on the differing meanings of concepts and ideas. In fact, the very reasons for the emergence of homegrown theorizing lie in the prevailing dissatisfaction of critical scholars in the peripheral (and their similarly concerned colleagues in the core) IR communities with the manner in which certain concepts were only thought of in their Western contexts and limits. Therefore, this scholarship also needs to acknowledge that using local ideas in their local settings, without turning them into more cross-culturally usable tools, would merely lead us to provide IR with many theories whose limits are more or less set in their local frameworks. While this can be in line with another recent interest, the turn to analytical eclecticism, it also carries the risk that instead of a pluralistic IR, the discipline takes the shape of a scholarly community that is even more divided than today’s various camp-like structures.

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6. Conclusion

In the face of multiple challenges and possible obstacles for the current interest in peripheral homegrown theorizing, it is important to turn our attention to ways of dealing with these questions in a manner that could succeed in providing this new area of scholarship with a more solid basis. In this regard, the following section presents some steps we could take to avoid the failures of Western core IR scholarship. The first step could be to engage in research projects that are framed in a more collaborative fashion, including not only local scholars but also Western core scholars. This is not about denying the capabilities of the former, but ensuring a more dialogic format to our research that paves the way for constant questioning and revisions, disabling the emergence of non-Western parochialisms as an alternative to the earlier parochialisms and various centrisms (Eurocentrism, West-centrism, etc.) of the core.

As a second step, it is useful to keep in mind problems with essentially contested concepts. Ideas like democracy, violence, etc. have various meanings, some of them due to their lengthy journeys throughout Western history, some of them as a result of their simultaneous political existence in differing forms and understandings. When dealing with concepts from the periphery, the same level of caution should guide us, preventing perpetual reproductions of interpretations that reify a certain idea or concept. Otherwise, homegrown theorizing would repeat Western IR’s earlier ontological, epistemological as well as methodological pitfalls that had actually enabled the current sympathy for homegrown theorizing in the peripheries. As discussed above, theorizing within divided societies is prone to providing conflicting ideas that could emerge from within the same country. Therefore, core scholarship should also aim at gaining broader insights about the periphery’s background conditions.

Third, it is important to understand the general conditions that shape homegrown knowledge, theories, and scholars. As with the case of Western core IR, external and internal factors are difficult to analyze separately, and a better comprehension of the contributions by homegrown theorizing necessitates familiarity with the conditions that enable this process. Homegrown theorizing is a domain that presents its scholars with multiple advantages, but also requires clarity in dealing with local ideas, concepts, and theories. It is never too early to think about peripheral disciplinary histories and sociologies, as these will be the means with which to form the future trajectories of non-core and, increasingly, Global IR.

Fourth, under globalizing dynamics, the homegrownness aspect can more easily lose its distinct features, be it the knowledge and theories or the scholars involved in this theorizing process. For a pluralistic discipline that can follow in the steps proposed by Acharya and others, it is important to understand the potential promises of homegrown theorizing in the context of today’s global interactions. This means that the impact of homegrown turn can be even greater if it succeeds in not repeating the above-discussed errors of Western core IR scholarship. At the same time, such attention requires a better grasp of the possibilities provided by Global IR, which comes with a more level playing field within a gradually more post-Western discipline.

Taking these various aspects into account, it is possible to assert that the West still has much to say to the periphery. However, this time its impact could come by providing the homegrown turn with a list of the West’s past mistakes. In their quest for homegrown theorizing, scholars of the periphery need once again to engage with Western core IR. This

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61 See Acharya, “Global International Relations”. 
approach will be the means of preventing non-core IR from repeating the mistakes of the (Western) IR community. In this regard, the agenda of homegrown theorizing is (also) to learn from the past and from the West.

Bibliography


All Azimuth


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Chinese Concepts and Relational International Politics

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Abstract

The rise of China troubles the taken-for-granted epistemological and ontological constitution of International Relations (IR) theory. The Greek term ‘theoria’ implied travelling to foreign locales with the aim of gaining illumination that can then simultaneously inform and transform the ‘home’ of the traveler. Yet, instead of travelling, IR theory engages in silencing. This paper undertakes an interpretative journey of China’s IR concepts. In particular, it looks at the notion of guanxi – one of the two terms that goes into the Chinese phrase for International Relations (guoji guanxi). The contention is that ‘relationality’ renders a more accurate translation of guanxi in English. In the process, the paper uncovers the practices of ‘international relationality’ as an opportunity to redefine the ‘international’ as a co-dependent space where two or more actors (despite their divergences) can interface into a dialogical community.

Keywords: Guanxi, relationality, post-Western International Relations, Chinese International Relations, relational International Relations

1. Introduction

How China thinks and in what ways its history and traditions inform the idiosyncrasies of China’s international outlook have grown into a cottage industry both in IR and across the full spectrum of the humanities and social sciences. As Benjamin Schwartz presciently observed fifty years ago, the issue which always seems to stump China hands is whether ‘‘the Chinese’ [are] prepared to accept the nation-state system that governs the international life of the West or are their images of the world and of China’s place in it still governed by cultural habits derived from the remote past’’?1 On the one hand, such concern reflects IR’s tendency to organize around the perceived experiences, interests, and concerns of powerful (Western) nation-states.2 On the other hand, at the heart of this query is China’s positioning in European intellectual imagination as the ultimate Other or what Michel Foucault called heterotopia – a disturbing place, whose difference ‘undermines language’.3 China becomes ‘the Other country’ not merely because of its location on the opposite end of the Eurasian landmass, but also because it represents ‘a culture entirely devoted to the ordering of space,
but one that does not distribute the multiplicity of existing things into any of the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and think.⁴

In this setting, it should not be surprising that the recent promulgation of Chinese concepts into the ratiocination of IR not only questions “the very “constitutional structures” that are the core of the international system”,⁵ but also calls on IR theory to embark on the road less travelled of encountering the multiverse of relations animating global life. It would therefore make sense to embark on this journey with a brief overview of the etymology of the term theory. In its Greek original, the term *theoria* meant ‘a journey or a pilgrimage’, involving a willingness to travel to foreign locales that can then simultaneously inform and transform the “home” of the traveller.⁶ Equally significantly, by providing a potent form of social interactions, the itinerant performativity of such theoretical travels seem to have played an important role in shaping international relations at the time by providing opportunities for ‘constant reframing and reconfigurations of participants towards each other’, which allowed the ancient Greeks to ‘imagine and exploit forms of inter-polis contact’.⁷ By extension, theorizing becomes a relational process of irruptive translation that brings in dialogue the form and substance of the languages and experiences of diverse and infinitely complex worlds.⁸ Yet, instead of such itinerant translation, IR theory seems to recognize ‘other’ forms of theory-building only to the extent that they can be ‘arranged according to the English idiom’.⁹

The point here is that IR knowledge – just like any other knowledge – can neither pretend to be monological, nor does exist in isolation; rather to know one thing, IR scholars not only have to know and be curious about a lot of other things, but also be willing to engage them (and countenance others engaging) in imagining, questioning, advancing, and co-creating the range of “the plausible” practices and theories for their explanation and understanding.¹⁰ Such an endeavor should resonate with much of what the mainstream already admits theorizing in IR is about – namely, the identification, observation, explanation, and understanding of patterns by looking at the record of what happens when international actors come together in space and time. As it should become apparent, this article draws attention to the porousness and unpredictability of global life – both Western and non-Western – and the messy and contingent interactions that permeate and constitute both. This article affiliates itself with ongoing efforts to *world* IR.¹¹ On the one hand, such endeavours intend to pluralize disciplinary inquiry by engaging previously excluded alternatives for thinking and doing world politics that have been forged both historically and in contemporary times by scholars, practitioners, and activists. On the other hand, such wordings offers productive openings for

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⁴ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, xiv.
Chinese Concepts and...

bringing in conversation a wide range of cosmologies, power relations, and vulnerabilities than are typically accounted for by the narratives of IR. This article therefore intends an interpretative journey into the Chinese concepts and definitions of the international with the intention to explore whether they indeed are so heterotopic as to be unintelligible to IR.

At the centre of this investigation is the Chinese term *guanxi* (traditional: 關係 simplified: 关系). It has to be stated at the outset that the focus on *guanxi* is not entirely coincidental. It is one of the words that make up the term ‘International Relations’ in Chinese – *guoji guanxi* (traditional: 國際關係 simplified: 国际关系). In this respect, it should appear surprising that there has been so little attention in the literature on IR on the meaning and content of the terms that go into the making of the Chinese phrase for IR. The contention is that such disinterest illustrates the Eurocentric commitments of the discipline, which has consciously discouraged students of world politics to be ‘curious about the “non-West” but has encouraged them to explain away non-Western dynamics by superimposing Western categories’.

What is particularly telling is that one does not have to be fluent in Chinese to encounter the complex texture of the term – for instance, the literatures on Business Administration, Organization Studies, Cross-Cultural Communication, Psychology and Sociology offer a huge repository of information about the meaning and practices of *guanxi*. This paper draws on these literatures to tease out the content and practices of this term, as well as its implications for IR theory and practice. The epistemic verso of the relational IR theory proposed by this article is that relationality is about the cultivation of attentiveness to the self-organizing, shifting, and historically and geographically contingent realities of the global life we inhabit.

The necessary caveat is that the paper focuses on the ideal type inherent in the *guanxi* model of relationality rather than the actual practices of Chinese foreign policy. While such connections are clearly there (especially, in places like Central Asia and in initiatives such as the “One Belt, One Road” policy), the point here is to draw attention to the epistemic and ontological relationality made possible by the encounter with *guanxi*. In other words, this is an article not about the international practices of China, but about the ways in which Chinese concepts – such as *guanxi* – can aid the ‘uncovery’ of alternative and, especially, relational modes of IR theorizing. The concluding section evokes these registers of worlding mutuality by elaborating the ways in which *guanxi* can help transcend the Western/non-Western bifurcation that dominates so much of the literatures both on relationality and IR theory. The claim of this article is that the defining feature of Western/Eurocentric IR is its lack of relationality. Conversely, what makes post-Western IR ‘post-Western’ is its responsiveness and receptivity of perspectives that are not one’s own. It is with the intention to aid the disclosure of such ontological and epistemic relationality that this investigation enlists the Chinese concept of *guanxi*.

2. *Guanxi*: What’s in a Name?

*Guanxi* appears to be one of those essentially contested concepts, whose meaning and practices are anything but clear cut and universally accepted. Therefore, most commentators tend to take as their point of departure the etymology of the two characters that make *guanxi*: ‘guan means barriers and xi means connections’.

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12 Wenshan Jia, “The Wei (Positioning)–Ming (Naming)–Lianmian (Face)–Guanxi (Relationship)–Renqing (Humanized
“‘wooden crossbar for doors,’” “strategic pass,” “toll gate” or the activity of ‘closing’ or ‘connecting’, while xi used to refer to ‘tie’ or to ‘care for’. The literal meaning of guanxi then was ‘connection across barriers’ or ‘pass the gate and get connected’. Metaphorically speaking however ‘inside the door [or within the boundaries set by the barriers/toll gates] you may be “one of us,” but outside the door your existence is barely recognized’. This inference should not be misunderstood as a suggestion of a rigidly-structured framework of exclusion. On the contrary, guanxi denotes openness to connections with other people and suggests a far more flexible and dynamic ‘web of relationships that functions as the set of interlocking laces which connects people of different weis [positions/status]’. It is also claimed that even though pragmatic, a guanxi relationship is profoundly infused with ‘a higher sense of responsibility towards others’.

Guanxi is more often than not understood to denote the establishment and maintenance of ‘an intricate and pervasive relational network’ engendered by the practice of unlimited exchange of favours between its members and bound by reciprocal obligation, assurance, and mutuality. Yet, many have hinted that such practices reflect a far richer meaning of the term in Chinese than in its English counterpart ‘relationship’ – namely, ‘guanxi refers to relationship in the most profound sense of the term’. Owing to the dynamism of social interactions, ‘the final word on guanxi can never be concluded’ since the practices that it denotes are constantly evolving to adapt to the ever-changing contexts and patterns of global life. This fluidity has permeated the English-language literature on the topic through the multiple translations that the term has acquired – ‘relations’, ‘connections’, ‘friendship’, ‘networks of reciprocal bonds’, ‘social capital’, ‘nepotism’, and ‘corruption’. While such multiplicity of meanings should not necessarily be surprising (after all, any translation can offer only a partial impression of the ideational context within which the term originates), it still suggests the layered and contingent framing in the Chinese original as well.

In this respect, there are a couple of puzzling features when it comes to the term guanxi. On the one hand, despite its indeterminacy guanxi occupies a central position in China’s worldview. It has been labelled as ‘the lifeblood of all things Chinese – business, politics, and society’. The grandee of China Studies, Lucien Pye referred to it as ‘one of the most fundamental aspects of Chinese political behaviour’, while the political philosopher...
Wenshan Jia\textsuperscript{23} claims that *guanxi* is one of the central philosophical concept that ‘reflects the Chinese way to know about reality (ontology), the Chinese way to interpret reality (phenomenology), and the Chinese values about humanity (axiology)’. On the other hand, *guanxi*’s significance appears to be of a very recent provenance. While in circulation a century ago, the term was not deemed to be significant enough to warrant inclusion in the two classic Chinese dictionaries – the 1915 *ci yuan* (‘sources of words’) and the 1936 *ci hai* (‘word sea’).\textsuperscript{24} In this respect, *guanxi*’s rise to prominence is closely associated with social, political, and economic processes set in motion during the second half of the twentieth century. Some have even speculated whether there is anything particularly Chinese about *guanxi* or whether it is merely the Chinese stand-in for the general social phenomenon of reliance on favours to accomplish tasks.\textsuperscript{25} It is also noteworthy that such rearticulation of the term and practices of *guanxi* was occurring simultaneously across the expanse of the ‘Chinese commonwealth’\textsuperscript{26}– in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and Singapore, as well as the Sinophonic diaspora around the globe.

Commentators have noted that the practices of *guanxi* have acquired positive and negative connotations both of which seem to arise from its propensity for subversion of state structures. In the case of the former, *guanxi* assists with bottom-up and civil society empowerment by permitting ‘individuals to use their social ingenuity to build a web of personal relationships’.\textsuperscript{27} A number of commentators find the origins of this trend during the Maoist years in China, when *guanxi* networks provided ordinary people with opportunities to distance themselves from the oppressive state-saturated system, carve out room to manoeuvre, and order their own lives.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, by engaging in alternative forms of solidarity, the relational power of *guanxi* allows those in asymmetrical relationships to subvert established hierarchies and to mitigate the dilemmas of over-regulation and the political pressures imposed on everyday life.

The negative flavour of *guanxi* comes from its association with graft. In this respect, the very patterns that make *guanxi* a ‘weapon of the weak’\textsuperscript{29} are also the key ingredients of its dark side. Yet, rather than essentializing it as a cultural trait associated with Asian backwardness, this aspect of *guanxi* can be read as an idiosyncratic encounter between the forces of transnational capitalism and the economic development of the state.\textsuperscript{30} As the late Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of modern Singapore, has acknowledged, the Chinese use *guanxi* ‘to make up for the lack of rule of law and transparency in rules and regulation’.\textsuperscript{31} In this setting, phrases such as ‘crony capitalism’ and ‘Confucian nepotism’ seem to overlook the socio-temporal contingency underpinning the bounds of obligation and networks of

\textsuperscript{23} Jia, "The Wei (Positioning)," 49-54.
\textsuperscript{24} Luo, "Guanxi," 44; Langenberg, *Guanxi*, 4.
\textsuperscript{26} Irene Y.M. Yeung and Rosalie L. Tung, “Achieving Success in Confucian Societies: The Importance of Guanxi (Connections),” *Organizational Dynamics* 25, no. 2 (1996): 58.
\textsuperscript{28} Yang, "The Resilience,” 466.
\textsuperscript{30} Yang, "The Resilience,” 468.
\textsuperscript{31} Cited in Yeung and Tung, "Achieving Success," 56.
support that characterize the practices of guanxi.\textsuperscript{32} In fact, some have gone as far as to claim that what (Western) observers usually criticize as the corrupt side of guanxi is in fact the misunderstood ‘Confucian Ethic’ of Asian capitalism.\textsuperscript{33}

As the above discussion demonstrates, both the positive and negative features of guanxi reflect an idiosyncratic coalescence between tradition and modernity – or what some have referred to as the ‘critical inheritance and critical transformation of Chinese thought’\textsuperscript{34} – in the process of achieving collective goals. In particular, guanxi reflects a commitment to act in accordance with social demands and expectations. As the eminent Chinese scholar Liang Shiming has pointed out, the Chinese worldview is ‘neither geren benwei (individual-based) nor shehui benwei (society-based), but guanxi benwei (relation-based)’.\textsuperscript{35} The emphasis on relationality infers a different way of being present in the world. In Chinese scholarship such difference pivots on the contrast between relational and autonomous self. Associated with Western intellectual traditions, the latter insists on discrete subjectivities, praises individualism, and values and normalizes the lack of dependence on others. The relational self, on the other hand, insists that individuals do not and cannot exist unless they are enmeshed in relations with others. It seems that the origins of this conceptualization can be traced back to Confucius, himself, for whom ‘unless there are at least two human beings there are no human beings’.\textsuperscript{36} The relational self, thereby, is ‘one which is intensely aware of the social presence of other human beings’.\textsuperscript{37}

A central feature of this intersubjective identification is the claim that ‘the self so conceived is not a static structure but a dynamic process. It is a center of relationships, not an enclosed world of private thoughts and feelings. It needs to reach out, to be in touch with other selves, and to communicate through an ever-expanding network of human relatedness’.\textsuperscript{38} The interdependence and reciprocity characterizing such relational self, accords social relations much greater significance and relations are often seen as ends in and of themselves rather than means for realizing various individual goals.\textsuperscript{39} The key inference is that participants in a guanxi perceive each other to be ‘role occupants rather than individuals’.\textsuperscript{40} Concurring with Chih-yu Shih’s proposition,\textsuperscript{41} the claim of this study is that the relationality of guanxi is focused on the management of hostile role-playing in order to maintain the longevity of interactions. In particular, the proposition here is that role-demands do not emerge in the abstract, but are borne out of the process of interactions. Since roles are circumstantial, the qualitative innovation emerging from the dynamics of guanxi is that an actor can play any role on the world stage regardless of their identity.

The emphasis on relationality is premised on a holistic worldview distinct from the

\textsuperscript{32} Yang, “The Resilience,” 469-76.
\textsuperscript{33} Luo, “Guanxi,” 48.
\textsuperscript{34} Qing Liu, “From ‘All Under Heaven’ to Critical Cosmopolitanism: The Transformation of China’s World Consciousness,” in Shared Values in a World of Cultural Pluralism, ed. Candido Mendes (Rio de Janeiro: Academy of Latinity), 330.
\textsuperscript{35} Gold, Ghine, and Wank, Social Connections, 10.
\textsuperscript{38} Wei-Ming Tu, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), 133.
\textsuperscript{40} Hwang, “Face and Favour,” 945.
\textsuperscript{41} Chih-yu Shih, “Transcending Hegemonic International Relations Theorization: Nothingness, Re-Worlding, and Balance of Relationship,” All Azimuth 6, no. 2 (2017): 19-42.
Western dualistic opposition between self and other/ self and the world. The ‘focus is not fixed on any particular individual, but on the particular nature of the relations between individuals who interact with each other’. Such construction of the relational self reveals the ‘Chinese worldview as an integrated system of subject and object: the individual is placed in the spatial-temporal location of the world, with her experiences, values, and expectations constantly shaping and being shaped by the world’. In this setting, it is the guanxi process itself (rather than the individuals involved) that has agency — namely, it is ‘the “relation that selects,” meaning that relations shape an actor’s identity and influence her behaviour’. Lucian Pye sees in this dynamic the origins of the Chinese ‘compulsive need to avoid disorder and confusion, to seek predictability and the comforts of dependency [which] makes them very anxious to seek any acceptable basis for orderly human relations’.

Owing to the fluidity of the way in which these relational roles are lived, guanxi asserts that change rather than stability is an endemic feature of global life. Both through attrition or accretion and depending on the circumstances, issues, and situations, the guanxi relationship has diverse and contingent iterations. Such dynamic multiplicity of interdependent conditioning factors engenders an interpersonal realm whose complexity is only partially known to the participating actors. This calls for a contextual attunement to the transient constellations of factors that impact on the content and trajectories of a relationship. Thus, the long-term orientation of guanxi inserts a modicum of predictability by lowering the transaction costs. At the same time, it can be used for multiple and diverse purposes, it builds resilience in the context of recognizing and influencing emergent opportunities.

3. What Can We Guanxi about in IR?

How would IR look like if we were to imagine it from the point of view of guanxi? To begin with the outline of such an endeavour should not appear particularly outlandish (let alone heterotopic) to those attuned to the inescapable condition of mutual encounter defining global life. In particular, the relational pattern envisaged by the guanxi perspective supports the efforts to articulate most issues plaguing IR as ‘communication problems’. The critical contribution of guanxi to these conversations is that IR is not merely an outcome of communicative actions (or a solution to communicative problems), but reflects the willingness of actors to expose themselves to the fluidity of ongoing relations with others. In particular, it suggests that the complex patterns of global life resonate with relationality and dynamism, rather than the static and spatial arrangements implicit in the self-other/centre-periphery models.
3.1. Guanxi’s harmonious respect for the other

The focus on guanxi brings out that the basic ontological condition of international actors is relational – namely, the content of their existence as actors is constituted inter-subjectively during the very process of interaction.\(^52\) Thus, owing to prior conditions of relationality, an ‘international’ world of holistically structured meaning appears in the first place. A key feature of the guanxi outlook the relational world that it sustains is the emphasis on harmony. The discussion of the Chinese concept of harmony has attracted significant attention in recent years. What is important for the purposes of the current investigation is that these discussions of harmony draw attention to ‘respect for the other’ as the ‘cardinal value’ of China’s strategic outlook.\(^53\) Such respect for the other articulates relationality through webs of ‘non-wilful [and non-domineering] actions directed to realizing the potential events and others, and is action that animates others to act on their own behalf’.\(^54\) The mutually benevolent relationships adumbrated by such harmonious encounters advance relational agency as a dialogical process, whose efforts involve the efforts of all sides of the exchange.\(^55\) The point here is that guanxi ties are volitional (and not forced upon the participants) – actors intentionally commit to the interaction. It is for this reason that guanxi relations are characterized by dedicated cultivation.\(^56\) Such guanxi dynamics can be seen at work in China’s ‘policy of “pre-emptive participation”’\(^57\) in relations with a wide range of other international actors not only as a reassurance strategy aimed at allaying their concerns, but primarily as an effort to foster ongoing interactions with them.

Agency – especially, international agency – in such a relational setting is not about the intentional projection of self-interest, but about strategic receptivity – i.e., “knowing oneself insofar as one is related to others, and knowing others insofar as others are related to oneself”.\(^58\) Such reconfiguration of agency engenders ethical obligations to strive for harmony among and between the actors involved in the transaction.\(^59\) Guanxi, thereby, presages an understanding of international action and agency – both cognitively and affectively – as simultaneously shaped and mediated by ethical obligations and commitments to others (the structure and content of which is acquired through the very relationships by which ethical obligations and commitments to others are disclosed).

The currency of such relationality is not legitimacy, but reputation. The cultivation of reputation (or what IR observers tend to refer as status) is the main aim of the harmonious respect for the other. As Jack Barbalet cogently observes, reputational standing is a social and not an economic resource. Thus, guanxi is deployed not with the aim to gain access


\(^{53}\) Brantly Womack, “China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor,” in Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies), 294-7.


\(^{55}\) This challenge to the centrality of hegemonic monologues in the mainstream seems to resonate the inferences of the literature on communitarian IR.


to economic or political resources, but is ‘primarily directed to acquiring and expending social resources’. Not only that, but such understanding of relationality demands that those engaged in interactions are ‘more aware of the relationships that constitute the objects of their concern than they are of their own interests’. It is in this setting that *xinyong* (trustworthiness) – the reputation for meetings one obligations to others - gains its significance as ‘the most valuable asset’ in the transactional web of *guanxi*. Thus, rather than facilitating the legitimacy of one’s actions, the strategic aim of *guanxi* is to enhance the trustworthiness of actors by providing series of situations in which they can continuously enact (as well as be evaluated on) their ‘meeting the expectations of others’. China’s harmonious respect for the other is nothing short of a strategic desire for status recognition. Motivated by the status insecurity associated with the relational constitution of international interactions, the operational beliefs of *guanxi* provide ongoing modalities for engendering trust by demonstrating China’s capacity and willingness to meet its obligations to others.

3.2. Guanxi’s logic of relationships

*Guanxi* implies both a propensity and a capacity for living *with* and *in* ambiguity. In this respect, it provides a ‘relational’ (as opposed to ‘rule-based’) framework for the meaningful contextualization in the shifting patterns of global life. Thus, it is relations that are not only at the heart of explaining and understanding the world, but also central to its observation and encounter. As Qin Yaqing demonstrates, this understanding reframes power away from its association with the material possession of capacities for influence (regardless of whether they are coercive or not), but as a ‘relational practice’. On the one hand, relations (and the webs of interactions that they constitute) provide a platform for the exercise of power. On the other hand, relations themselves have power – namely, they frame future patterns of interaction.

This then becomes the centrepiece for the ‘logic of relationships’ animating global life. Such logic assumes that while the future is unknown, the partners in the future are the same as in the past and present. Therefore, the significance of any specific interaction lies in how it shapes a particular relationship… The bottom line in a relationship logic is that both sides feel that they are better off if the relationship continues—this is the minimum meaning of ‘mutual benefit’. A normal relationship does not require symmetry of partners or equality of exchanges, but it does require reciprocity [i.e., respect for the other].

It should be stated at the outset that such framing should not be misunderstood as an indication of an altruistic outlook on global life, but as an effective strategy for managing a hyper-social

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60 Barbalet, “Guanxi,” 1044.
64 Kavalski, “The Struggle for Recognition”.
66 Qin, “Rationality and Processual Construction”.
68 Kavalski, “The Struggle for Recognition”.
environment. The logic of relationships therefore outlines a ‘context for action’ in which goals can be achieved through an active, committed, and responsible involvement in world affairs.70 Informed by the extremely situational and particularistic nature of Chinese culture, the logic of relationships infers that as the circumstances of interactions change, so too will the patterns of guanxi.71 Such framing also undermines the linear causality backstopping Western takes on relationality – namely, that if two (or more actors) interact with one another their relations will necessarily lead to greater intimacy.72

Rather than focusing on the personality or identity of participating actors, the logic of relationships suggests that the conditions for interaction ‘cannot be forced’ and remain ‘largely unknown and unknowable’.73 Thus, the process of interaction facilitates the likelihood of future relations (which is the key strategic function of guanxi) rather than intimacy.74 This demands both contextual sensitivity and an ongoing commitment to the deliberate practices of relationality. What is crucial about such logic of relationships is that as the hub of social knowledge and social life, the patterns of guanxi intimate that shared understandings are not imposed as rules, rights, or obligations, but emerge in the process of interaction.

Such framing informs the formulation of external relations. Owing to the contextual ubiquity of guanxi, foreign policy making becomes a contingent outcome of relational interactions between actors – that is, the relational context frames the policy response, but because of its inherent fluidity, policy is expected to fluctuate.75 In an interesting move, some commentators have inferred the ‘logic of relationships’ through Beijing’s practice of ‘third culture building to improve international relations’.76 The proposition is that guanxi can beget a ‘third culture’ through the practices of deliberate and repeated interactions, which brings together elements of the cultures of the interacting actors as well as new ones which emerge in the process of doing things together. It is this dynamism that informs the ‘deeply relational’ character of Chinese foreign policy.77 Rather than impeding the policy process, such contextual-attunement of the logic of relationships suggest the unexpected opportunities made possible by the ‘third culture’ of guanxi – for instance, the unintended evolution of the Shanghai-5 into the One Belt One Road initiative via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.78

3.3. Guanxi’s community of practice

It is communities of practice that locate the ‘third culture’ engendered by guanxi’s logic of relationships. The inference here is that international agency emerges in a community not

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73 Chang and Holt, “The Concept of Yuan,” 54.

74 This should not however be misunderstood as an assertion that the process is not affective. The point here is that guanxi is not about the subjective qualities of the participants, but about the process of interactions that they enact.


76 Jia, “The Wei (Positioning).”


in a vacuum. As suggested, it is the relational (rather than the rule-based) nature of *guanxi* that backstop the dialogical outcomes of its effects. In particular, it is *guanxi*’s commitment to deliberate and unconditional sociality that motivates shared meaning-generation. The suggestion thereby is that while strategic, the relationality of *guanxi* is not motivated by self-interest (i.e., it is not an instrumental means to an end). Instead, the driving force appears to be a commitment to the practice of doing things together – an aspect that can explain China’s general aversion to formal institutional arrangements and the imposition of conditionality on its partners.

Such relationality is not zero-sum – i.e., ‘the debit and credit sides of this [relational] balance sheet are never in equilibrium’ – because this would spell the end of *guanxi*.

The accent is on the strategic value of maintaining the relationship. In fact, it is through the practice of doing things together that the normative and the ideational structure of global life gets engendered.

The focus on *guanxi* suggests that by cherishing the chance of interactions (rather than force/work on a relationship), the Chinese outlook is predisposed to allow for contingency to take its course. In this respect, the interactive dynamics of communities of practice stimulate new and contextual definitions of the ‘common good’. As Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, has himself hinted such ‘inclusive relationalism’ is founded on the affective feeling (*ganqing*) produced by the process of repeated interactions.

In this respect, the interactive dynamics of communities of practice stimulate new and contextual definitions of the ‘common good’. As Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, has himself hinted such ‘inclusive relationalism’ is founded on the affective feeling (*ganqing*) produced by the process of repeated interactions.

4. In Lieu of a Conclusion: What is ‘Post-Western’ about Post-Western IR?

This paper has demonstrated that the promise of a relational mode of IR inquiry is considerable. In this respect, the concept of *guanxi* shifts IR thinking away from a focus on international relations to one premised on global relationality. Thus, rather than looking at dyadic sets of relations as well as the identities and capacity of individual actors, *guanxi* inheres an IR as webs of figurations intertwined by a conscious and strategic search for relations with others. In this respect, actors (and their agency) have effects only to the extent that they are in relations with others. Thus, owing to the dynamic nature of such interactions, what passes for world order is not only constantly changing, but demands ongoing commitment to participating in and maintaining these relations.

In this respect, the claim here is that the relational turn has become a defining feature of the so-called post-Western IR theory. It seems few today would dispute that the disciplinary

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80 At the same time, the value of the personal favour rendered in the context of *guanxi* (called *renqing* in Chinese) ‘can never be calculated objectively’ – instead, its assessment is subject to an ongoing and complex ‘blend of cost and quality and relationship in which one or two elements may be interpreted, by some people at certain times, as being more valuable than the other element(s)’ (Hwang, “Face and Favour,” 963).
81 Kavalski, “The Struggle for Recognition”.
82 Chang and Holt, “The Concept of Yuan,” 54.
83 Zhang, “Confucian Foreign Policy,” 216.
84 Qin, “Rule, Rules, and Relations,” 129-53
85 It has to be acknowledged that the relationality lens has important bearing on current discussions of the content and practices of normative power in global life. In particular, it suggests that what distinguishes normative powers from soft powers is their relationality. See Kavalski, “The Struggle for Recognition”; Kavalski, *Central Asia*. 
inquiry of International Relations (IR) is indelibly marked by the ‘colonial signs’ of its Eurocentric makeup. Not only that, but the ‘apple pie’ flavour that IR acquired in the context of its Cold War transformation into an ‘American social science’ seems to have made the discipline even more inimical towards encounters with the various non-Western others that its outlook consciously occludes. In an attempt to trouble the juxtapositions of temporal and geographical difference that still seem to stump any IR alternative prefixed by a ‘non-’ or a ‘post-’, this paper emphasizes the centrality of relationality as a distinguishing feature of all such projects. Critical/post-colonial/non-Western IR narratives seem to have difficulty to obviate the theoretical slippage as a result of which ‘the East’ is unquestionably equated with ‘Asia’ and is then assumed to be part of the so-called ‘Rest’ and ‘non-West’. Equally problematically, ‘Eurocentrism’ is invariably taken as a stand-in for ‘West-centrism’, ‘Sino-centrism’ for ‘Chinese hegemony’, and ‘post’ for ‘anti’. In this setting, the relationality lens helps outline the contested terrain of post-Western IR as a space for dialogical learning, which promises a world that is less hegemonic, more democratic, international, and equitable.

In particular, such approach allows to build solidarity between like-minded projects targeting the silencing, hegemony, patriarchy, and violence of the mainstream by treating them as second-order aspects deriving from a first-order problematique – IR’s poignant ontological and epistemic lack of relationality. It is the very denial of relationality (first order issue) that perpetuates the imperial, patriarchal, and racist attitudes (second order issues) of IR. It is in this vein that the attack on latter that so much of critical, feminist, and postcolonial theorizing undertakes, overlooks the very condition of its possibility – the lack of relationality in IR. What this means is that the IR mainstream has been dominated by an atomistic understanding of global life which prioritises fixed units of analysis (nation states) and their discrete dyadic interactions (conflict/balancing in the context of anarchy). Yet, at no point is the option of a sociability infused with the contingent opportunities inherent in the encounter with the other acknowledged in this narrative; let alone the potential that the phenomena and processes animating world affairs are mutually co-constituted in relation to one another. Instead, global life is envisioned as a domain of disconnected states, infamously imagined as billiard balls – ‘closed, impermeable, and sovereign unit[s], completely separated from all other states’.86

A relational IR – which is post-Western in the sense that it does not treat the West and the non-West as discrete and disconnected homogenous opposites, but intertwined and mutually constitutive webs of interactions – proposes a molecular outlook whose unit of analysis is relations (rather than actors) and their multiple triadic dynamics (which open numerous and numinous points of and possibilities for interaction). In other words, what makes post-Western IR narratives ‘post-Western’ is their emphasis on relationality – namely, things in global life are not merely interconnected, but that they gain meaning and significance within complex webs of entanglements and encounters with others.87 The emphasis on relationality thereby acts as a reminder that IR knowledge, just like any knowledge, is acquired and mediated relationally through diverse sets of practices. IR’s denial of ontological relationality has its epistemic effects – perhaps, most perniciously evidenced by the imposition of a cannon reproduced around the world so that students can contribute to ‘core’ debates, while the

87 The paper can thereby be read as a prolegomenon to a genuinely relational IR thinking and practice – one whose attention is not on reifying the bulwarks of national sovereignty and quantifying the national interest, but rather draws attention to the porousness and unpredictability of global life – Western and non-Western (and the messy and contingent intersections that permeate and constitute both).
inputs of the ‘periphery’ are occluded from the ‘Anglosphere’ of Western IR journals and academia.\(^8^8\) Some have labeled this lack of epistemic relationality as IR’s ‘castle syndrome’ – rather than engagement with the multiverse of global life, proponents of different IR schools engage in defending and reinforcing the bulwarks of their analytical castles, while bombarding the claims of everybody else.\(^8^9\) Others have termed it as ‘returnism’ – IR’s predilection for traditional conceptual signposts that provide intellectual comfort zones, disconnected from current realities.\(^9^0\)

The claim here is that both of these are instances of IR’s unrelationality – knowledge does not exist in isolation; it is not built up atomistically and discretely from scratch; rather to know one thing, you have to know a lot of other things. A post-Western IR acts simultaneously as a reminder about the multiversal world we inhabit and the composite nature of IR’s episteme. Such relational IR theorizing is cultivated from the convivial, yet dissonant cross-pollination of values, narratives, and practices in the study of world affairs. At the same time, it is this very receptivity of a relational IR that holds the promise for working about and working with the ‘edges of radical unusual possibilities’.\(^9^1\) Thus, engaging with and listening curiously and provocatively to the phenomenon of guanxi invokes the complexity of possible worlds uncovered by relational IR theorizing.

**Bibliography**


All Azimuth E. Kavalski


Abstract

Since the emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran, social scientists, including international relations (IR) scholars, have been called to develop endogenous/indigenous theories to reflect Iranian/Islamic points of view. This theorizing has led some Iranian scholars to develop ideas about international life on the basis of Islamic texts and teachings. Furthermore, due to an increasing awareness of the Eurocentric nature of IR theories over the last few years, the international community of IR scholars has become open to non-Western IR theories. This opening has made homegrown theorizing more attractive to Iranian IR scholars, and debates about it have become more vivid. This article seeks to examine the attempts by the Iranian IR community to conceptualize and theorize IR from Iranian/Islamic points of view and to show how contextual factors have limited such attempts. The first part of the article reviews the IR scholarship in Iran to give a portrait of Iranians’ achievements in this regard. The second part examines contextual factors that may have affected homegrown theorizing in Iran, including international agency, sources of inspiration, the dynamism of the IR community, the relationship between academia and government, and intellectual autonomy. An evaluation of this structural context suggests that even if theorizing IR from an Iranian point of view is both possible and preferable, this cannot be done unless certain structural constraints are overcome.

Keywords: International Relations, Iran, homegrown theorizing, Iranian theory of IR

1. Introduction

Since the emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran, social scientists, including IR scholars, have been called to develop theories to reflect Iranian/Islamic points of view. In the first years after the Islamic Revolution, calls for the Islamization of universities were taken to mean changes in the content and curricula of social sciences and humanities courses. The Cultural Revolution of the early 1980s, which led to a temporary shutdown of university classes, sought the same idea. The curricula were changed to some degree, and Islamization led to including courses on the history of Islam, theology, and jurisprudence as requirements for all majors; adding the adjective “Islamic” to existing courses in social sciences, including political...
science and international relations (e.g., Islamic International Law, Islamic Politics, etc.); and introducing a limited number of specifically new courses such as Political Jurisprudence.

During the last decade or so, another call for change in the existing approaches to the social sciences has emerged, with an emphasis on their becoming humi (“homegrown,” “native,” “indigenous,” or “endogenous”) 2, which is taken to mean not only Islamization but also a kind of “Iranization” of knowledge pursued and produced in academia. This shift has encouraged some Iranian scholars to develop ideas about international life on the basis of Islamic/Iranian 3 texts and teachings.

At the same time, thanks to calls for marginal voices to be heard as well as to the failure of existing IR theories in their predictions about the end of the Cold War, an increasing awareness and critique of the Eurocentric nature of IR theories has led the international community of IR scholars to become interested in the status of IR in other parts of the world and more open to non-Western understandings of international relations.5 This change has made endogenous/indigenous theorizing more attractive to Iranian IR scholars, and debates about it have become more vivid. Some Iranian scholars wholeheartedly advocate such an endeavor; others find it somewhat worthwhile; and a few do not agree with it at all.

A review of the work on the status of IR and IR theories in Iran shows a variety of approaches. Some of the literature has a rather descriptive approach and shows the characteristics and trends in the country.6 7 Other research, in a ‘pathological’ analysis of IR in Iran that focuses on its shortcomings and defects, emphasizes the Westernized nature of political science/IR in Iran and the need for an Iranian/Islamic perspective to replace or at least co-exist with it.8 And some research has more of a focus on investigating new openings

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2 I must thank the All Azimuth Workshop for the word homegrown, which covers much of the meaning implicit in the Persian word humi as I have used it.

3 I make a distinction between the last two: an endogenous approach may reflect the needs, perspectives, experiences, and history of Iran and Iranians, while it might not rely on Iranian/Islamic sources for conceptualization and/or theory building. Historical events such as the experience of wars against Iran in the modern era, including wars with Russia in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, or the Iraq war against Iran in the 1980s, may lead to specific understandings of the nature of war, and, for example, to a particular Iranian realist or constructivist theory of war that can be called endogenous. An indigenous approach seeks to create a genuinely different view of IR and IR theorizing based on Iranian and/or Islamic sources and conceptualizations.

4 In Iran, when an author calls her/his work Islamic, it usually means that it is based on Islamic teachings, which, in the case of Shi’ite Iranians, include the Quran; the Prophet’s sayings and practices (sunna); the statements, deeds, and teachings of twelve Shi’ite Imams; and Islamic/Shiite jurisprudence, mainly produced by Shiite clergy (shari’a or fiqh). Interpretations of the sources may of course differ enormously, but the sources themselves are more or less the same. Sometimes Persian literary works are not produced by experts in Islam but are either inspired by Islamic concepts and teachings (much of the poetry and works on ethics, for example) or include teachings not taken to be based on shari’a (Sufis’ work, for example) that may become inspirations for conceptualizations in IR; these can be called Islamic-Iranian. We may also consider non-Islamic but Iranian sources of inspiration with references to pre-Islamic sources, such as the conduct of Iranian kings like Cyrus the Great or Zoroastrian sources; even if the conduct of post-Islamic statesmen is taken as a source of inspiration, it can be regarded as Iranian. For these reasons, I prefer to employ the adjective Islamic/Iranian to include all these “homegrown” indigenous categories. And of course, we may imagine having any combination of these in one particular work.


6 All sources with an Iranian date of publication (hijri or royal) are in Persian. The Gregorian corresponding years are given for each source.


8 See, for example, Mohammad Sotoodeh, “IR in Iran: An Evaluation,” Political Science Quarterly 8, no. 2 (1384 [2005]): 93-116.
in the discipline for Iranian/Islamic approaches to IR.9

This article seeks to examine the attempts by the Iranian IR community to conceptualize and theorize international relations from homegrown points of view and to show how contextual factors have limited such attempts.

The first part of the article reviews IR scholarship in Iran to give a portrait of its evolution and achievements regarding Iranian approaches to IR. The second part examines contextual factors that have affected homegrown theorizing in Iran, including international agency, inspiring sources, the dynamism of the IR community, the academia-government relationship, and intellectual autonomy. An evaluation of this context suggests that even if theorizing IR from an Iranian point of view is both possible and preferable, this cannot be done unless certain constraints are overcome.

2. IR Scholarship in Iran

One of the first modern higher education institutions in Iran was the “School of Political Science,” formed in 1899 to train Iranian diplomats. International Relations was deemed a subfield of political science and was a part of its curriculum.10 From the beginning, political science in general and IR in particular were more legally oriented due to the influences of French tradition, especially at the University of Tehran (the first modern university established in Iran), where the departments of law, political science, and international relations co-existed. When in the 1960s some Americanization efforts took place, political science and IR became more similar to what was taught at American universities.11 In 1966, the Center for Graduate International Studies (CGIS) was formed at the University of Tehran, with an emphasis on international law, international organizations, international economy, and peace studies. This center offered an MA program in IR.12

Another important university was Melli (National) University, which was modeled on American universities. It was established in 1961 and began to offer political science programs in 1966. The departments of politics and economics were in the same faculty, while the law school was separate. The curricula offered an economic orientation compared to the more legal approach followed by the University of Tehran. It is argued that Melli University’s formation put an end to the “monopoly” of the University of Tehran over political science and IR.13

Iranian political scientist Homayoun Elahi believes that there was an inclination towards “de-politicizing” political science in Iran by giving it a legal or economic orientation.14 In general, the curricula, syllabi, and material taught at these universities were mainly inspired by or translated from Western sources, first mostly French and later mostly English. The number of articles and books dealing with Iran’s foreign relations was relatively limited. In a few books,15 some pages were dedicated to Iran; Nazem’s work discusses Iran’s constitution, and Behzadi’s references the Shah’s nationalism and his charismatic leadership. My informal

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9 For example, Moshirzadeh, “A Hegemonic ‘Discipline’”.
10 Nasrin Mosaffa, Changes in Teaching and Research in Political Science and International Relations (Tehran: Center for Cultural and Social Studies, 1386 [2007]), 152-3.
11 Mosaffa, Changes in Teaching, 162-4; Alireza Azghandi, Political Science in Iran (Tehran: Baz, 1378 [1999]), 143-5.
12 In general, IR programs were offered by departments of political science. The exception was the MA program offered by the Center for Graduate International Studies.
13 Azghandi, Political Science in Iran, 56-66.
14 Mosaffa, Changes in Teaching, 187.
review of books published before the Revolution that were available at the University of Tehran (the oldest library of law and political science in the country) suggests that Iran’s foreign relations and its position in the world were not major concerns at the time.

An example might illustrate the above: The CGIS could be considered as the most prominent center working on IR in pre-Revolution Iran. It enjoyed wide financial and institutional support and gathered the most well-known scholars in the field. It also had international links and a few publications in English and French. A journal published by the CGIS between 1973 and 1978, *Ravabet-e Beinolmelal (International Relations)*, included only a few articles dealing with Iran’s foreign policy or its regional environment.16 The 11 books it published included two on international legal issues, authored by Iranian scholars; an edited volume on the foreign policies of Iran and France, published in French; and eight translated works on European political unification, the history of international relations, IR theories, US foreign policy, China, the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, international responsibility, and Islam and international law. The CGIS also published 13 research reports (seven bibliographies, a paper on Iran’s foreign cultural relations in French, two descriptive chronological papers on Iran-US and Iran-Soviet relations, two papers on Africa and Iran’s economic relations with African countries, and a paper on the Regional Cooperation for Development, RCD). According to the data in the last issue of *International Relations*, 14 MA theses were defended at the Center in 1977-1978, out of which only one dealt with Iran’s foreign relations. Among the courses offered, there was one MA course on Iran’s foreign policy;17 there were also some seminars, roundtables, and lectures more directly related to Iran’s foreign relations or its regional environment.18

The Islamic Revolution and the later sociopolitical developments brought about significant changes in academic life in general and IR in particular. The number of students rose rapidly both at the undergraduate and graduate levels, and the number of universities offering political science and IR increased steadily. Unlike the pre-Revolutionary era, when most of the faculty had studied abroad for their PhDs, PhD graduates from Iranian universities became the majority of the faculty members.19 Furthermore, many PhDs and MAs in IR in Iran have been and continue to be employed as researchers in such areas as strategic studies and foreign policy.

As noted earlier, the Islamic Revolution in the late 1970s and the Cultural Revolution in the early 1980s greatly affected academic life, specifically by introducing an Islamic perspective to the social sciences and humanities. For this reason, Iran might seem to be an appropriate candidate for producing a non-Western knowledge base of IR. Further, because of its Islamism, its anti-hegemonic foreign policy, and the fact that for nearly four decades, religious and political authorities have called for Islamic and/or bumī (homegrown) knowledge/theories, one might expect that non-Western, Iranian IR theories exist. But this is not the case.

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16 The journal published 12 issues until spring 1979. This assessment is based on the review of eight available issues.
17 The information is based on the appendix of *Ravabet-e Beinolmelal*, 11 & 12 (Winter 1357 and Spring 1358 [1979]): 318-26.
18 Interview with Professor Nasrin Mosaffa (November 2016). She was an MA student at the Center before the Revolution and later became its director for more than 13 years (1997-2010).
19 An official record of the total number of the faculty in the field of IR could not be found. A list of full-time faculty at public universities and higher education institutes holding their degrees in political science and IR was published by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology in 2011-2012, and includes 349 names. Yet because IR scholars are not limited to PhDs of IR, and because PhDs in political science work in different fields, this list cannot represent the total number of IR scholars in Iran. My own rough estimation on the basis of information gathered from websites is that about 100 scholars exist in political science and/or IR departments at public universities. Certainly, there are other IR scholars who work in other departments, such as geography, history, social science, etc., and they should be included for a comprehensive list. Furthermore, the Islamic Azad University (a non-profit university with branches all over the country) has dozens of faculty members working in the field not included in this estimation.
Before turning to Iranian scholars’ achievements (or lack thereof) in terms of homegrown theorizations, it is appropriate to see how scholars understand homegrown (endogenous and indigenous) knowledge. What do they believe *bumi* knowledge to be? In Autumn 2014 I conducted a research survey on IR scholars’ understanding of homegrown knowledge. The survey was based on a 30-item questionnaire, mostly related to the scholars’ understanding of IR in general and Iranian IR in particular. The questionnaire was sent to 92 IR scholars teaching at public universities in Iran. In addition to those who were already known to the author, others were identified through the websites of universities. Forty-six scholars replied.

The results of the survey suggest that Iranian IR scholars have different understandings of Iranian or homegrown knowledge. Some believe it should be extracted from Iranian and/or Islamic sources; some emphasize that if Iran’s historical and geographical context is considered, then we can talk about Iranian knowledge of IR; the majority of them consider a piece of work as being *bumi* when it is at the service of the national interest of the country; and finally, some believe that whatever is produced by Iranian scholars can be regarded as Iranian/endogenous. More than 65 percent of IR scholars surveyed see the production of homegrown knowledge as dependent upon the formation of homegrown theory. In other words, without a homegrown theory, we cannot talk of having a homegrown knowledge. Perhaps that is why 76 percent of those surveyed see little or no homegrown knowledge of IR existing in Iran – because they do not see any authentic Iranian theory.

When scholars were asked about possible reasons for the lack of a homegrown theory of IR in Iran, most of them cite the lack of relevant endogenous/indigenous knowledge in other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and philosophy, that IR theory building can rely on. In other words, they believe that producing theories of IR in a vacuum is not possible. This question was included because when we look at the theories of IR in the West, we see that almost all of them are built upon knowledge produced in other disciplines.20

Iranian scholars definitely do not want to see IR knowledge in Iran limited to homegrown theorizing. In fact, more than 78 percent of respondents are very strongly or strongly against this. More than 72 percent see empirical validation necessary for statements inspired/informed by local sources. More than 67 percent of the scholars believe that any homegrown knowledge needs to be linked to existing IR achievements, and 89 percent see this as a condition for its existence. Only 21.7 percent of respondents see a possibility for producing Islamic knowledge of international life independent of existing achievements in IR.

One may conclude from the results of this survey that while most Iranian scholars find theorization from an Iranian/Islamic point of view possible and even preferable, they do not accept ignoring or refuting existing IR theories. The same survey suggests that amongst Western theories of IR, constructivism and realism are more popular and are found to be more helpful in explaining international life. Another survey conducted in 2010 showed almost the same result.21

Despite the lack of homegrown knowledge in other disciplines, the IR community in Iran has attempted to produce homegrown IR theories. Islam has been the most important source of inspiration for indigenous theorizing and conceptualizations in Iran. A body of work that

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20 For a few examples, we see the reliance of classical realism on philosophy, history, and sociology; structural realism on economics; liberalism in IR on liberal ideas in economics and political theory; constructivism on sociology, social theory, and the philosophy of language; IR critical theory on sociology and social theory; and cognitive theories of foreign policy on psychology. The list of source disciplines can be extended when we look at particular theoretical works.

21 Moshirzadeh and Masoudi, “IR Theory and Research in Iran”.
may represent an Islamic approach to international relations was produced after the Islamic Revolution,\textsuperscript{22} either by Shiite clergy and/or based on their work. Although some of this work looks like international law from an Islamic point of view (especially that produced by Shiite jurisprudents), one can also find some explanatory or normative content.\textsuperscript{23}

There are three basic approaches to Islamic theorizing of IR in Iran:\textsuperscript{24} (1) regarding Islam as an encompassing set of ideas with a unique ‘true’ theory applicable to every aspect of life (including IR), which should be extracted from Islamic sources on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence;\textsuperscript{25} (2) considering theorizing on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence as one way of understanding international relations;\textsuperscript{26} and (3) seeing the international system as a modern phenomenon with no precedence in Islamic sources and therefore regard it as a realm where human reason should guide our understanding of it.\textsuperscript{27} From the last point of view, only some philosophical anthropological Islamic principles, such as non-conflict, can be used as a guide to theory building (in the same way that Western IR theories take, for example, peace or order as a basic principle).\textsuperscript{28} These scholars may consider Islamic ideals as a source of prescriptive/normative theory of IR and Islamic scripts and concepts as an inspiring source for developing hypotheses and theories.

As far as theoretical ideas are concerned, concepts such as power,\textsuperscript{29} order,\textsuperscript{30} war and peace,\textsuperscript{31} security,\textsuperscript{32} terrorism,\textsuperscript{33} identity,\textsuperscript{34} and globalization\textsuperscript{35} have been explored on the basis of Islamic literature and culture or Islamic sources to show how they differ from and/or are similar to contemporary understandings in international relations.

In some sources, principles are introduced that are supposed to govern international relations from an Islamic point of view. For example, Alikhani sees human dignity, diversity,
freedom and equality, peaceful coexistence, refuting violence, observing ethical standards, dialogue, observing pacts and treaties, reciprocity, and military deterrence as the basic principles of international relations in Islam. But he does not elaborate these to introduce a theory.

The most ambitious attempt at producing an Islamic theory of international relations has been made by Dehghani-Firoozabadi, a prominent IR scholar who did his BA and MA at Imam Sadeq University and received his PhD in Belgium. He is the pioneer of the second approach mentioned above. He believes that an Islamic theory should be based on Islamic sources, including its meta-theoretical foundations. In an article later developed into a book, he presents an Islamic meta-theory for international relations and explores the ontological and epistemological foundations of a potential IR theory in Islamic sources, in particular the work of 16th-century Islamic philosopher Molla Sadra. In an article on an Islamic theory of international relations, he sets out a general framework, justifying such an endeavor, clarifying its assumptions, and giving some very broad principles, such as Islamic definitions and descriptions of phenomena such as order, dominance, ethics, change, and justice. He does not provide specific statements on topics such as the nature of the modern state and the international system, the causes of war, change, and dominance, or the ways in which international justice can be actualized.

If we consider products by Iranian scholars who work more or less within existing paradigms of IR but have developed new theoretical frameworks dealing with specific international issues to be a sort of Iranian theorization of IR, an example could be the Conceptual Systematic Schema for Foreign Policy developed by Hossein Seifzadeh. On the basis of systems theory and dialectical method, he develops a complicated schema for analyzing foreign policy, which seems to be an attempt at integrating some existing theories and concepts into a more comprehensive model, where both domestic and international influences are taken into account.

Farhad Ghasemi, an Iranian realist scholar influenced by network analysis and chaos theory, has developed a theoretical framework to explain the balance of power in regional networks. His main argument is that an increase in systemic interactions has led to problems in the balance-of-power theory. By synthesizing balance of power and network balancing, he proposes a new theory called “smart balance of power.”

In these two articles we see theoretical endeavors based on existing Western theories and conceptualizations but leading to new models for explaining more specific phenomena such as foreign policy and regional orders in relation to Iran.

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37 This university was established after the Revolution as a major measure in introducing a modern Islamic university where modern knowledge is taught besides Islamic Shiite jurisprudence. It offers undergraduate and graduate programs in political science, economics, law, management, and communications.
38 Dehghani-Firoozabadi, “Meta-Theoretical Foundations”.
What Acharya and Buzan see as elites’ conceptualizations of international life\textsuperscript{43} is also a source of theorization in Iran, mostly reflected in a body of work that deals with the perceptions of two leaders of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei.\textsuperscript{44} As clergy and politicians, their ideas can be seen as originating both from Islamic teachings and an Iranian experience of world affairs. Some articles about the foreign policy of various administrations deal with Iranian politicians’ perceptions of international relations.\textsuperscript{45} In addition, Khatami’s (President of Iran from 1997-2005) idea of dialogue of civilizations has been reconceptualized within the existing IR theories.\textsuperscript{46}

Most Iranian scholars apply existing IR theories to issues significant from an Iranian point of view. As mentioned above, Iranian scholars are more interested in constructivism and realism. The former’s appeal rests on its relevance to non-material aspects of social life, which is more applicable to Iranian and Islamic culture. Furthermore, it explains the anomalies in the application of materialist/realist theories to Iran’s foreign policy. For these reasons, a constructivist analysis of various aspects of Iran’s foreign policy constitutes the theme of many articles.

Realism is also employed to explain different issues in international relations and foreign policy. Many Iranian scholars seek to explain Iran’s foreign policy from a realist point of view, while others take realism as a point of departure to criticize aspects of Iran’s foreign policy that they do not regard as realistic. Furthermore, realism is usually the preferred theoretical framework for a critical explanation of the existing international system and US foreign policy. Many articles focus on US hegemony-seeking behaviors, especially in the Middle East, and are framed in a way (as stemming from power-seeking impulses) to delegitimize them. Since regional orders are important to a regional power such as Iran, attempts have been made to apply realist theoretical insights about the international system to regional systems\textsuperscript{47} or the implications of systemic changes for Iran.\textsuperscript{48} These pieces of work, however, have not been elaborated into an Iranian realist theory.

The above Iranian reading of realism reminds us of Edward Said’s idea of traveling theories, where “the movement of ideas and theories from one place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of intellectual activity.”\textsuperscript{49} International relations ideas and theories are not exceptions; they too travel from situation to situation and this travel leads to new understandings and interpretations of world affairs and may nourish IR in general.

\textsuperscript{43} Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An introduction,” in Acharya and Buzan, Non-Western International Relations Theory, 11.
\textsuperscript{44} Dehghani-Firoozabadi and Ghanbari, “Developments in Theoretical Studies,” 15.
\textsuperscript{47} For example, Farhad Ghasemi, “Conceptual Reconstruction of Regional Deterrence Theory and Designing Its Patterns on the Basis of the Theories of Power Cycles and Networks,” Defensive Strategy 38 (1391b [2012]): 103-46.
3. Theorizing IR in Iran: Contextual Factors

The achievements mentioned above have not been celebrated by many scholars in Iran, who, on the whole, believe that these attempts are far from substantive theories of IR (and this is easily argued). But why have the attempts not led to a presentable theory of IR? An examination of the literature dealing with IR theorization in different countries reveals that several factors impact the status of IR in a country in general and IR theorizing in particular.\(^50\) This section addresses some of these factors,\(^51\) most of which have worked against the production of Iranian theories of IR.

3.1. International agency

International relations theories have mostly been developed in core countries, particularly the US. For this reason, it is sometimes asserted that IR is an American discipline that explains the world from a narrowly defined American point of view.\(^52\) It may, however, be argued that great powers have the resources and capacities to encourage such endeavors. Furthermore, the more a country is involved in international affairs, the more it needs to explain and predict what is going on at the global level. A better understanding of the world makes one’s agential capacity in international interactions more meaningful, which is why academia in these powerful countries are more involved in IR theorization.

Nevertheless, one cannot ignore that IR theorization has not been limited to the US or even the great powers; the plurality and diversity of the discipline has been emphasized in recent studies.\(^53\) Scandinavian academicians have proved that theorists from smaller countries can have a voice in the realm of IR theory. At the same time, the content of the Copenhagen School or Peace Research, for example, shows that these too have their roots in agential projects Nordic countries seek to follow at the global level. The foreign policies of these countries are rooted in Nordic “exceptionalism”: “peace-loving, oriented towards peaceful conflict-resolution and hosting ‘rational’ global ‘good citizens’.” They emphasize human rights and contributions to peace and stability through multilateralism and international cooperation. Thus we may say the Nordic-centric conception of world politics has its roots in the Nordic model of socioeconomic development and matches the foreign-policy orientations of the Nordic states.\(^54\)

The global south has traditionally faced serious impediments in its road towards agency in international life. Acharya argues that in the modern world, the agency of non-Western societies in international affairs has been denied, even if they too have had a say in the formation of some international rules and norms.\(^55\) During the last decades, however, there have been inclinations towards new conceptualizations by IR scholars from India and

\(^{50}\) See Acharya and Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory*.

\(^{51}\) This section is mostly based on a co-authored published article in Persian. See Homeira Moshirzadeh and Majid Kafi, “Theorizing IR in Iran: A Structural Explanation,” *Politics* 45, no. 2 (1394 [2015]): 337-55.


\(^{54}\) See Matthieu Chillaud, “Peace and Security Re-conceptualizations in the Agenda of PRIO, SIPRI, TAPRI and COPRI since the End of the Cold War” (presented at the ECPR Conference in Charles University, Prague, December 7-10, 2016).

China that can be related to their emerging agency in the world. Yet it can be argued that although a feeling of agency may influence the need for theorization, there is not necessarily a correlation between the two.

Iran seems to see a high agential capacity for itself at the international level, of course more from a critical perspective. In the post-Revolution era, the constitution of the Islamic Republic, inspired by revolutionary Islamic ideals, has paved the way for an active role in the global scene. Iran’s support for what it regards as liberation movements all around the world; its criticism of existing international institutions for being manipulated by great powers, especially the US; its opposition to US policies in the Middle East and elsewhere; its opposition to Israel; and its active support for Palestinians are just a few examples of its agential projects at the regional and international levels. These activities and beliefs seem to be rooted in Islamic and Iranian ideals of justice. We might expect critical agency to lead to critical theorization, yet in Iran this has not occurred.

3.2. Sources of inspiration

Due to the interdisciplinary nature of IR, it borrows concepts, models, metaphors, and theories from other disciplines, and thus many Western IR theories rely heavily on Western philosophy, economics, psychology, sociology, and history in building and formulating their hypotheses. In Iran one can find traces of such knowledge in traditional sources such as Persian literature, classic books on history, Islamic philosophy and theology; however, as noted earlier, there is little modern homegrown (Islamic/Iranian) theories in other disciplines to build on.

Another important factor contributing to the generation or modification of IR theories is genuine research in the field. In Iran, empirical IR research has not led to the formation of a robust body of accumulated knowledge. Most of what is called “research” in Iranian journals and dissertations is not based on a rigorous method leading to reliable findings. Qasem Eftekhari, a prominent professor of methodology in IR and political science in Iran, evaluated political science and IR PhD dissertations defended at the University of Tehran. He applied criteria such as elaborating the objectives of the research, choosing an appropriate method, applying the method in practice, the reliability of the results of data analysis, and the lucidity of findings. On a 20-item scale, the median of the scores he gave were between 12.95 and 14.1. In other words, his study showed that the research done by Iranian students of IR do not meet widely accepted methodological requirements and standards.

58 Ahmad Naghibzadeh, “International Relations as an Interdisciplinary Subject: Sociology and IR,” International Studies 5, no. 3 (1387 [2008]): 111-3.
61 Qasem Eftekhari, “Methodological Evaluation of PhD Dissertations in Political Science and IR at the University of Tehran,” in Teaching and Research in Political Science and International Relations in Iran, ed. H. Salimi (Tehran: Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, 1387 [2008]), 269-94.
Although the rate of publication is high, innovation in and sophistication of the works are not satisfactory, which in turn affects theorizing. Proper research contributes to good theory building because it leads to new hypotheses and conceptualizations, it acts as a test for assumptions and hypotheses, it establishes background conditions for the truth or fallacy of hypotheses, and it helps extend theories to new areas. A lack of good research leads to an unreliable context in which to generate theories and models.

Nevertheless, Iran is proud of its body of traditional sources, including Islamic Shiite sources, such as hadith (sayings of the Prophet and Imams), sunna (deeds of the Prophet and Imams), theological texts, and the Quran, as well as Iranian sources (poetry and other forms of literature, traditional historiographies, statements by public figures, and texts known as the Mirror of Prince or Siasatnameh). These documents can inspire conceptualizations and theory building in many disciplines, including IR. As noted above, while some attempts have been made in this regard, the result has been speculations rather than theory.

3.3. Dynamic academic community

Even if a country seeks to exercise its agency at the international level and thus encourages IR scholars to conceptualize the world from that perspective, and even if there is a body of knowledge to inspire scholars, if there is no dynamic academic community and significant steady academic activity, one cannot expect much research and knowledge building, let alone theorizing. This environment takes years to develop, and requires encouraging scholars and graduate students to focus on their studies, research, and training new generations of scholars.

As far as scholars are concerned, some studies suggest that Iranian academics are not highly motivated. Their relatively low income has required many of them to take second jobs. Many act as consultants or analysts for the public sector and spend much of their time producing material that is not academically valuable or publishable in academic journals. This situation has also affected the quality of their teaching: many students do not find their courses rich enough and they too become less motivated about and/or incapable of conducting good research.

The high number of admissions to PhD programs, funding limits for PhD students, and uncertainties about finding tenure positions after graduation have led to a lack of motivation, weak academic performance and thus a low quality of research.

Critically reviewing scholarly works and publications is an important aspect in developing and refining new ideas. This can be done at conferences and in academic discussions, in addition to reviews and forums in academic journals. The number of review articles in Iranian journals is very limited; some studies even suggest that Iranian scholars tend to ignore their peers’ work. For example, the major theoretical endeavors by Seifzadeh, Ghasemi, and Dehghani-Firoozabadi referred to above have not engendered serious reviews, critique, or challenges, while in China, for example, such endeavors are much more welcome.

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3.4. Academia-government relationship

The political context is also a contributing or discouraging factor in theory formation. Globally, policy making and theory building have been traditionally seen as separate and even opposing domains, leading to metaphors such as academics’ “ivory tower,” representing the distance between scholars/theorists’ imagined world and the real world politicians have to deal with. As Stephen Walt rightly observes, “Policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in IR, and many scholars seem uninterested in doing policy-relevant work.” Nevertheless, one cannot deny the fact that theory deals with public questions, is influenced by international and foreign relations issues, usually seeks to find appropriate answers to practical questions, and can be regarded as an “essential tool of statecraft.”

In many countries, a significant part of the demand for works on IR comes directly or indirectly from the state sector. This requires an appropriate relationship between the two (state support without jeopardizing the independence of academia) as well as a more or less common definition of the world. The importance of this context is evident in Nordic countries, where despite their rather small size, the academic community is very active. In Iran, however, statesmen have traditionally (even in the pre-Revolution era) had a pessimist view of the political science community in general, resulting in the establishment of research centers in different state departments to become self-sufficient in meeting their research needs and hence more or less independent of universities. Sariolghalam believes that academic IR has little influence in decision making in Iran.

According to Heshmatzadeh’s survey, 73% of political scientists in Iran believe there is a distance between political science and practice. There may be different explanations for this situation: academics’ abstract language, their lack of knowledge about government’s practical needs, the gap between the attitudes of the two sides, a suspicion of academics’ “Westernized” approaches, officials’ confidence in their own experiences rather than in academic observations, and internal divisions among scholars with various views of international politics and foreign policy.

In practice, of course, many scholars do work with public institutions, yet more often in the form of consultations, debate meetings, lectures, and seminars. Yet there is little willingness on the part of state institutions to support theoretical work because such projects are time consuming and may not meet government needs. Here, resource limitations are more relevant than other factors.

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73 Sariolghalam, “Iran.”
75 This has somehow changed during the last few years by the formation of what is called “Chairs for Theorizing” at universities to financially and institutionally support theoretical endeavors.
Considering that scholars need not only to be supported institutionally and financially but also to be heard, if the above gaps are not overcome, they will continue to block the path towards theory building in Iranian IR.

3.5. Intellectual independence and self-confidence

What might be called intellectual independence, meaning scholars’ belief in their own intellectual capacity to build theories without being swayed by existing ones, is another factor that affects the context within which theory-building efforts can be shaped. In many southern countries, including Iran, there is a tendency towards assuming that Western IR theories are good enough to explain what is going on at the international level. As their claim to universality is so strong, there is little motivation for developing new theories on the basis of endogenous conceptualizations. This situation may be the result of what some call “epistemological imperialism,” and it is not limited to Iran.

A prerequisite for self-confidence and intellectual independence is a tradition of critical thinking, which as noted above, barely exists in Iran. One Iranian IR scholar suggests that there are only a few people in Iran who have the expertise to adopt a genuine critical approach towards Western IR theories, which is why many Iranian scholars tend to uncritically accept Western theories. Critical thinking should be taught and fostered in primary school and continued throughout one’s education. Unfortunately, the educational system in Iran is based on a very large amount of reading and memorizing, and the type and amount of classwork and homework does not allow for analysis, debate, or critiques. It is perhaps for this reason that the lack of rigorous homegrown theories is a cross-disciplinary problem.

4. Conclusion

The aim of this article is to show the conditions of Iranian IR theorizing as well as its limitations and the reasons for them. Although most IR scholars in Iran see the development of Iranian theories as favorable and possible, they do not have a fully shared understanding of it. While there have been conscious attempts at presenting homegrown theories (or at least conceptualizations) they have not been fully welcomed by the community of scholars thus far. There are contextual factors that limit such efforts and result in their marginalization by other Iranian scholars.

To further complicate matters, even the limited conceptual/theoretical productions of Iranian scholars have not been published for non-Iranian audience, partly because of linguistic barriers, but more importantly, due to differences in styles of reasoning and argument leading to non-acceptance by editorial boards of well-known academic journals. It is believed that the English language is more straightforward in reasoning. For example, in English a deductive approach is used in which a direct relationship of ideas exists: from general to particular, from abstract to concrete. This linear logic is different from the circular, lateral, or spiral logics seen in other languages such as Persian. Kaplan found that the type

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80 N. Hadian, “Political Science in Iran,” Political Science Quarterly 2, no. 7 (1999): 228.
of reasoning dominant in one’s native language is reflected in his or her writing in English. Ideas are sometimes presented in a sort of ambiguity, or even when the idea is clear, it is more supported by repetition and emphasis than facts or data. This style would cause a Western reviewer to have a low opinion of an article and reject it. During the last few years there have been dozens of workshops to make Iranian scholars familiar with stylistic issues in writing articles for international journals, which may lead to more standard writing in the future.

At the same time, attempts at the domestic and regional levels of non-English-speaking countries to publish IR journals in English so as to attract the attention of IR scholars worldwide can be seen as a first step by non-Western scholars towards internationalizing non-Western theorizing.

If non-Western IR scholars’ products are presented at the international level, they should be scrutinized, criticized, and discussed so that they can be refined to the same level as Western scholars’ works. This process means they should be somehow linked to existing understandings of international life, and thus must be meaningful and comprehensible for an international audience. An important part of Iranian scholars’ work based on Islamic ideas seems to be discursively remote from the existing IR literature, which in itself may be seen as an impediment. In other words, if an Islamic theory is presented within a jurisprudential language, it will not be understandable to the international community of IR scholars.

Perhaps the idea of inter-civilizational dialogue that emerged as a principle in foreign policy in the Khatami administration could have been a good beginning to the goal of introducing Iranian IR theory to the international IR community. First, it was emphasized that the idea had its roots in Islamic thought and Iranian culture; second, it could be seen as an agential project pursued by the Khatami administration; third, IR scholars in Iran (and even some Western thinkers) welcomed the idea and were eager to theoretically invest in it; fourth, one could imagine that the government would support this theoretical investment (and it partly did by forming the Center for Dialogue of Civilizations in Tehran); fifth, since it was internationally welcomed and was somehow linked it to existing critical IR theory, it could be more seriously discussed and criticized; and finally, it could be an internationally understandable intervention (both at academic and practical levels). If the international environment were friendly enough to such an idea, it might have been further conceptualized by Iranian IR scholars. However, the 9/11 events and the developments afterwards marginalized the idea altogether.

Nevertheless, one may hope that over time Iranian IR scholars will learn to develop their ideas more systematically, discuss them more seriously, and locate them in IR’s discursive space.

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The Genealogy of Culturalist International Relations in Japan and Its Implications for Post-Western Discourse

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Abstract
This paper aims to introduce a neglected methodology from Japanese international relations (IR) – the culturalist methodology – to Anglophone specialists in IR. This methodology is neglected not only by an Anglophone audience but also by Japanese IR scholars. I argue here that despite this negligence, the culturalist methodology has great potential to contribute to contemporary post-Western international relations theory (IRT) literature by posing radical questions about the ontology of IR, as it questions not only the ontology of Western IR, but also the IR discourses developed in the rest of the world. Consequently, in understanding and imagining the contemporary world, I clarify the importance of perceptions based on what, in Japan, are commonly called ‘international cultural relations’ (kokusai bunka) and ‘regional history’ (chiikishi). I also indicate how our perceptions of the world are limited by the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention among ‘equal’ nations on the basis of state borders. While historical understanding is widely recognised as an important approach to contemporary IR, its scope is limited by its universalised principles.

Keywords: Japanese IR, diplomatic history, international cultural relations, regional history, post-Western IR theories

1. Introduction
This paper aims to introduce a neglected methodology from Japanese international relations (IR), namely, the culturalist methodology, to Anglophone specialists in IR. Interestingly, this methodology is neglected not only by an Anglophone audience but also by Japanese IR scholars. I argue here that despite this negligence, the culturalist methodology has great potential to contribute to contemporary post-Western international relations theory (IRT) literature by posing radical questions about the ontology of IR.

Post-Western IRT differs from non-Western IRT in that the latter complements the established mainstream IR literature largely developed in the Anglophone world, and the former radically criticises conventional approaches by questioning their ontological assumptions. In this sense, the culturalist methodology I introduce is very much post-Western; it questions not only the ontology of Western IR, but also that of the IR discourses developed in the rest of the world. It is worth noting, however, that post-Western IR discourses are not given serious consideration even in the rest of the world.

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In this article, I clarify the importance of perceptions on the basis of what, in Japan, are commonly called ‘international cultural relations’ [kokusai bunka] and ‘regional history’ [chiikishi] in understanding and imagining the contemporary world. I also indicate how our perceptions of the world are limited by the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention among ‘equal’ nations on the basis of state borders. While historical understanding is widely recognised as an important approach to contemporary IR, its scope is also limited by its universalised principles, and as a result, only diplomatic history has been regarded as a part of IR. Despite the introduction of culture into the IR literature by diplomatic history through the works of Akira Irie, international cultural relations by Kenichiro Hirano and regional history by Takeshi Hamashita (works introduced shortly), the importance of cultural exchange has never attracted sufficient attention from an IR audience. As a result, when we think of an alternative to the contemporary international order, it is recounted using the Westphalian mind-set, in terms of such expressions as China’s tribute system, guanxi or tianxia, in which ‘China’ directly connotes the People’s Republic of China, rather than seeing the method as a governing system of the world.3 Similarly, state-makers use ‘Japan’ to confirm a political body on the basis of state sovereignty.

Such is the case in Japan’s diplomacy, particularly when it comes to the issue of soft power politics. Japan is now trying to become more politically and economically influential over other Asian countries by using its culture, such as animation films and pop culture. Ironically, however, the cultural products of Japan that diplomats strive to promote sometimes appear to be based on a concept of pre-state sovereignty rather than the culture of Japan as a nation-state.4

There seems to be a substantial number of similar ontological deficiencies in the discourses of contemporary IR in general, and even more so when they deal with the idea of culture and cultural politics. In developing my argument on culturalist politics, I clarify why mainstream IR scholars do not give serious consideration to post-Western IRT by focusing upon Japanese IR, as an example that has disregarded culturalist methodology, and to draw lessons for the further development of post-Western IRT discourse. This paper focuses on the following questions: 1.) What is the culturalist methodology? 2.) Why have mainstream Japanese IR scholars regarded this methodology as unimportant? 3.) To what extent does the genealogical investigation of the culturalist methodology contribute to the existing post-Western IRT literature and how?

To address these questions, I start with the second one. I then focus on a particular approach to diplomatic history, developed by Akira Irie, which attempts to historicise Japanese foreign policy by concentrating on cultural relations among nations. This is the first example of a historical approach to world affairs with a specific focus on the relationship between diplomacy and culture. After this, I examine the international cultural relations approach developed by Kenichiro Hirano, which is an even more radical departure from the traditional diplomatic history tradition. This approach differs from Irie’s radical approach to diplomatic

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history in the sense that it takes into account intercultural relations as a whole and acts as a bridge between diplomatic history and the study of regional history, which I introduce in the following chapter. I then introduce an approach to East Asian history mainly developed by Takeshi Hamashita, which I assess in terms of the contribution it can make to contemporary IR literature. Following the explanation of Hamashita’s approach to regional history, I extract some conclusions to contribute to the progress of post-Western IRT literature.

2. Genealogy of Japanese IR and the Reason for its Neglect

There have been comprehensive surveys of Japanese IR, most prominently by Takashi Inoguchi, who has been engaged in an extensive attempt to introduce and analyse the genealogy of Japanese IR for more than ten years. Of the introductory texts to Japanese IR, his works are particularly detailed, informative and comprehensive. In his articles, Inoguchi argues that Japanese IR consists of at least four distinctive traditions: the Staatslehre tradition, Marxism, Historicism and American-style methodology. The Staatslehre tradition refers to policy studies for the state. It is mainly composed of state policy and external strategy. Marxism was very strong until the 1960s and was associated with the conception of Oppositionswissenschaft, which literally means ‘opposition science’. Historicism, a history-centred approach to international relations, is still strong, and many IR researchers in Japan adopt it. American-style methodology appeared after World War II under the strong political influence of the United States. European influence over Japanese intellectuals had been evident before the war, and Inoguchi contends that the American approach took over in the post-war era.

Inoguchi’s introduction of Japanese IR to an Anglophone audience is comprehensive and detailed, but he does not explain historicism in detail, particularly when it comes to the collaborative works of historical IR with area studies of Asia; that is, the study of regional history. As he explains the historical approach to IR only in terms of diplomatic history or historical studies, in collaboration with the Staatslehre tradition, his focus is rarely directed to research based on the perception from the margins, which is the methodology that many scholars of regional history use. The neglect of this methodology is not confined to Inoguchi’s explanation, however. When an introduction to Japanese IR is presented and the study of history is touched upon, it is not unusual for this ‘history’ to mean diplomatic history, not regional history, and this propensity is even more evident in the introductory texts to Japanese IR published recently. Like Inoguchi, they mention the historical approaches to Japanese IR in general, but their explanations focus solely on Japan’s diplomatic history or the history of Japan as a nation-state, and stop at an introductory level when it comes to regional history or regional studies. Consequently, they do not present an adequate research results or published works related to diverse culture or history.

Recent years have also seen numerous books and articles published on Japanese IR in English. Glen Hook published two volumes in 2001, titled Japan’s International Relations:

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Politics, Economics and Security and Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity.8 The focus of Shogo Suzuki’s recent critique of the English School, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society, also covers Japan and China.9 Chris Goto-Jones published a single authored monograph, and an edited volume, Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy.10 If we include the historical understanding of Japan’s diplomacy, Alan Tansman’s The Culture of Japanese Fascism,11 Eri Hotta’s Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy and Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War: 1931–1945, and Louise Young’s Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism constitute good examples.12

Works published in book form abroad deal mainly with Japanese foreign relations and diplomatic history, and not many examine intellectual history or theories of Japanese IR as an academic discipline. With regard to the intellectual history of IR in Japan, we seem to see more in the way of journal articles than books. In fact, since the publication of Inoguchi’s work on the four traditions,13 there have been several successive articles about the field. Some of them present an overview of Japanese IR,14 some engage in critical reflection15 and some focus on particular Japanese intellectuals.16

However, as mentioned earlier, such works are characterised by a lack of attention when it comes to the study of a regional history of Asia. Kazuya Yamamoto has come close to recognising this lack, noting that ‘Japan’s IR studies have been characterised by their historical approaches’. As Inoguchi has suggested, Yamamoto maintains that this is why Japanese IR has been characterised by a lack of interest in theoretical development.17 Inoguchi and Yamamoto have introduced a historical methodology called historicism, which is, in their perception, characterised by its concreteness and this concreteness only emphasises the lack of development of abstract theories in Japan. When Inoguchi and Yamamoto refer to IR theory, it is a theory that must be abstract and constructed on the basis of universality, objectivity, regularity, predictability and falsifiability. In other words, it must be scientific. This was particularly salient in the case of American IR,18 which has had an undeniable

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10 Chris Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity (London: Routledge, 2005); Chris Goto-Jones, ed., Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2008).
13 Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories”; Inoguchi and Bacon, “The Study of International Relations”.
influence on Japanese IR. As a result, the importance of any new methodologies developed in Japan appears to be worth mentioning only when it has an appropriate counterpart in Western IR literature, and American literature in particular. In other words, Western IR was, and still is, the unchangeable reference point for Japanese IR. Obviously, this definition of ‘theory’ is very much narrowly defined. Jun Tosaka, a Kyoto School philosopher of the inter-war period, argues that theories critical of the prevailing order only emanate from concrete experiences of everyday lives. For Tosaka, a theory is not just to explain what it is; it must also involve what it should be. In other words, the definition of ‘theory’ Inoguchi and Yamamoto have in mind is one possible definition of theory, and certainly does not include the critical theories in the Coxian sense. In this way, the academic atmosphere indeed continuously ushers Japanese IR scholars towards a definition of ‘theory’ to be universalised and abstract.

The historicism that Inoguchi and Yamamoto mention requires further explanation. In an article on Japanese IR published in 2007, Inoguchi discussed two different traditions within historical studies: Staatslehre and historicism. Here ‘historicism’ means the study of regional history. The Staatslehre tradition ‘greatly influenced military and colonial studies in the pre-war period and remained strong in a metamorphosed form even after 1945’. This tradition’s priority was to provide sufficient historical-institutional background and to describe events and personalities in context and their consequences in detail. Research recently conducted in this tradition has been in the form of regional studies, not regional history, on the basis of the sovereign state (e.g. Chinese studies, Thai studies, Indonesian studies, etc.) and has maintained a close relationship with the government. In fact, the bulk of research in this tradition has been conducted by government-related think tanks. From a Foucauldian perspective, power/knowledge relations appear very much intact because of their close relationship with the government.

One of the reasons for this intimate relationship between government and regional studies is related to the origins of IR. According to Tadashi Kawata and Saburo Ninomiya, prior to World War I, world affairs were not as important as domestic affairs as a subject of scholarly interest; rather, they were dealt with in the field of international law or diplomatic history. This thinking parallels E. H. Carr’s argument in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939* and Stanley Hoffmann’s article ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, published in 1977, which maintain that international relations was exclusively the business of diplomats and international lawyers before World War I. Post-war Japanese IR inherited this perception and, as a consequence, Staatslehre became the mainstream discourse of Japanese foreign relations.

Inoguchi explains in this context that “the strong salience of area studies in Japan’s IR study … reflects in part the reaction of academics to the domination of the Staatslehre tradition” and many scholars in this tradition have adopted the regional-history methodology of historicism. In an historical survey of Japanese post-war IRTs, Yamamoto also touches

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19 Shimizu, “Materializing the ‘Non-Western’.”
21 Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories,” 372.
22 Inoguchi, “Are There Any Theories,” 372.
upon the historicism of area studies in explaining the diversification of Japanese IR theory. He explains that Japanese IR diversified after the end of the Cold War and that area studies constituted an aspect of this. He sees the branch of area studies, or regional history, within IR as under the profound influence of Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory and contends that

Wallerstein’s macroscopic theory based on rich historical detail fascinated many scholars who, while appreciative of the traditional emphasis on history, strove to develop general arguments about world politics, economy and society. Although these scholars did not always fully embrace the ideological bent of Wallerstein’s argument, many arguments pertaining to regional systems, particularly in Asia, were developed.26

This description of historical methodology presumably refers to the study of regional history, which I introduce shortly.

Another explanation of the lack of culturalist tradition in Japan is provided by Sakai Tetsuya, a prominent diplomatic historian of contemporary Japanese IR. Tetsuya Sakai tries to situate the narratives of culturalists and regional history scholars on the margins of IR by focusing on the humanities, arguing that the reason why the voices of the scholars of regional history have been disregarded is because of IR’s two different but intertwined world orders.27 Examining a number of intellectuals from the past who could be regarded as having been situated at the margins of conventional IR literature, he notes that many of them concentrated on non-state actors and their interactions across state boundaries.

According to Sakai, the study of regional history in Japanese IR has a long history. Initially, the study of Japan’s foreign relations was divided into, on the one hand, international law and politics, and on the other, colonial policy studies. Sakai contends that the former was naturally associated closely with law, politics and economics and the latter with the humanities, including literature, ethnology and history. Sakai argues that IR literature used to be developed on the basis of the division between international relations and colonial policy studies, as the disciplines researching the ‘international order’ and the ‘imperial order’, respectively.

The term ‘international order’ refers here to the relationship between equal states, mostly in the European context, while ‘imperial order’ was an order mainly forcibly placed on the areas outside of that context. The former was, and still is, more about the institutional arrangements and organisational management of politics and international law effective among relatively equal members – mainly European nation-states – and the latter was more about blunt and bare economic and cultural power over those who were colonised.28

These two orders of the world profoundly influenced the development of intellectual society in Japan, with the former becoming the core of the discipline of IR and the latter that of regional and colonial studies, even though the two orders are inseparable in a sense that the international order was maintained practically by the suzerain states’ unceasing exploitation of the colonised areas, and thus by the imperial order.

The two-order understanding of world affairs is by no means limited to Japan, of course. Similar arguments can be found in Edward Keene’s account of the Westphalian system and colonial system and Shogo Suzuki’s criticism of British IR, in which they contend that IR only

26 Yamamoto, “International Relations Studies”.
28 Sakai, Kindai Nihon, 6–7.
concentrates on international society and does not pay sufficient attention to the functioning of imperialism in supporting the former. Japanese IR has mainly developed along with the international order in this sense, and has rarely given academic attention to the imperial order simply because the latter was regarded as the subject of regional and colonial studies. By contrast, some scholars of regional studies were well aware, thanks to their empirical and ethnological research in colonised areas, of how important violent control over those areas was in maintaining the international order and of its devastating effect on the colonised. This is precisely what Hirano’s theory of international cultural relations and Hamashita’s discourse of regional history tried to point out when they emphasised the importance of looking at the world from the margins on the basis of cultural relations. Those who critically engaged in regional and colonial studies, particularly in the post-World War II era, were thus inclined to formulate counter-discourses to that of mainstream IR, but they were gradually pushed out by those residing in mainstream IR in Japan and into the discipline of regional studies, that is, regional studies scholars for state-centrism, who developed their studies to maintain the status quo of international order and so remain in the IR scholarly circle.

Sakai argues that the above is one of the most important reasons for the lack of attention by Japanese IR to the studies of cultural politics or regional history. However, as we have seen, individual cultural theorists of IR are all too well aware of the power of the term ‘culture’, and in the cases of Hirano and Hamashita in particular, strive to relativise and provide counterarguments to the essentialised reading of culture mainly formulated in the West, such as Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis.

3. Diplomatic History and Culture

As an aspect of historical studies, the study of regional history within Japanese IR mainly developed alongside regional studies of Asia; it is often referred to as chiikishi or ‘regional history’, and focuses mostly on economic and cultural exchanges among Asian nations and their effects on diplomatic and political relations. Naturally, it contrasts sharply with the historical approach to diplomatic relations, which either separates diplomatic history from economy and culture or presumes the determinism of foreign relations over economy and culture. While diplomatic history has been generally regarded as a part of IR, the study of regional history has never been as legitimate an approach to contemporary IR as the history of diplomacy has.

One of the salient characteristics of the study of regional history is its specific focus on culture. It strives to theorise world affairs in a more comprehensive manner than the traditional mainstream IR literature does. However, the introduction of culture into IR literature was done by diplomatic history. It came to be more explicit indeed when radical diplomatic historians took it up as their methodology. The most widely known of Japanese scholars to Western readers in this context is Akira Iriye, an emeritus professor of history at Harvard University, also known for his extensive writing on Japan’s external relations, particularly on ‘cultural internationalism’. He personally experienced the defeat of World War II and the chaotic social conditions of the post-war period, which likely influenced his subsequent research.

Generally speaking, the study of diplomatic history consists of research into the history of the foreign relations of one or a few countries, and the main target is either nation-states or diplomats. While Iriye is a historian of Japanese diplomatic history in the ordinary sense, unconventionally he focuses on the cultural aspects of diplomacy. To explain the aim of his research, he says that

Japanese foreign relations are not simple. If we are to understand the international order as a whole, we need at least to take into account the three dimensions of military, economy and thought (or culture). Sometimes they are complementary to each other; sometimes they are contradictory. Either way, this approach will provide a perspective to understand the ways in which Japan has interacted with the world by focusing upon the changes of Japan's military, economic and cultural relations in the last 50 years.

Although Iriye has argued that we need to focus on military, economic and cultural dimensions to understand contemporary international relations, his academic inclination towards the cultural activities of the international arena has been highly salient throughout his writings. This approach was a radical departure from the conventional understanding of diplomatic history and marked the advent of a new, cultural approach to diplomacy, later to be developed fully in Joseph Nye’s soft-power politics. Iriye published such culture-oriented monographs as *Power and Culture: The Japanese American War 1941–1945* and *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, both of which have an exclusive focus on culture and its relationship to diplomacy.

According to Iriye, the focus on culture has great significance for IR literature because it means a move away from the state-centric view of IR towards an academic area that previously was not focused upon. In explaining the purpose of his book *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, published in 1997, he writes, ‘I hope the book will show that it is perfectly possible to narrate the drama of international relations without giving principal roles to separate national existences’. Iriye maintains that while the nation-state is undoubtedly a main focus of IR, he also believes that ‘interactions outside the (state-centric) framework exist, for which international relations may be an inadequate term but which, whatever one calls them, constitute just as much part of the story of world development as do the activities of national entities’. This belief in the importance of the activities of non-state actors in shaping world affairs is the theoretical foundation on which his argument concerning cultural politics is based.

Focusing on culture not only contributes to making sense of the shaping process of world affairs but also of the changing process of the world. His book argues that

> individuals and groups of people from different lands have sought to develop an alternative community of nations and peoples on the basis of their cultural interchanges and…while frequently ridiculed by practitioners of power politics and ignored by historians, their efforts have significantly altered the world community and immeasurably enriched our understanding of international affairs.

Thus, Iriye argues, the importance of culture is undeniable or indispensable in understanding world affairs, and the importance emanates from the diversity in cultural practices.

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However, this task is not all that easy because the term ‘culture’ is highly problematic and has a variety of meanings. There have been numerous definitions and interpretations of the term and there seems to be no universally accepted definition on which every researcher has agreed. Conscious of the need to find his own definition, Iriye defines it as ‘structures of meaning’. In this interpretation, the main focus in the cultural dimension to world affairs is on ‘a variety of activities undertaken to link countries and peoples through the exchange of ideas and persons, through scholarly cooperation, or through efforts at facilitating cross-national understanding’.34

This definition, in turn, directs us to a new definition of IR. Iriye writes that cross-national cultural forces and developments, linking the societies and peoples of different countries, can never be fully understood in a framework of geopolitics, economic mobilization, security, strategy and the like. One needs an alternative definition of international relations, a definition of world affairs not as an arena of interstate power rivalries but as a field for interdependent forces and movements, not as a structure of power relations but as a social context for interchanges among individuals and groups across national boundaries. If such a cultural formulation were adopted, it would become easier to link international to domestic affairs.35

For Iriye, the term ‘international relations’ does not seem adequate for the discipline. IR is from the outset inter-national. However, as our scholarly targets include non-state actors and exchanges among them, new names for our academic interests are definitely needed.

Iriye sees that this methodology is omitted from general academic interests, mainly because of the peculiar history of Japanese intellectuals. In the period prior to the WWII, some historians and IR scholars, such as the Kyoto School of philosophy, advocated (similar arguments to Iriye’s arguments) that cultural exchange would lead to the peaceful reconciliation of contending nation-states. Unfortunately, history tells us the tragic story that their discourses were abused by nationalists to justify the aggressive territorial expansion of Imperialist Japan.36 Thus ‘culture’ is a term which Japanese intellectuals have consciously and carefully avoided. To prevent repetition of this sad history, Iriye predicts that cultural internationalists in all countries will need to struggle against cultural chauvinists as well as geopolitical nationalists; that is, both against parochial tendencies that deny possibilities for cross-cultural communication and against policy formulations that give primacy to military considerations.37

In this way, Iriye criticises the essentialised understanding of culture and maintains his critical stance against mainstream Western IR methodology.

What effects has Iriye’s argument had? He definitely expanded the intellectual territory of IR and opened a space for the development of what diplomatic history could have become. However, not many Japanese scholars clearly grasped the meaning of his methodological case to introduce culture into IR. As a result, Japanese IR theorists did not pay sufficient attention to Iriye’s cultural methodology as an IR theory. His argument was consigned to the category of a mere variant of Japanese diplomatic history, which has nothing to do with the theorisation of IR. As a result, Iriye is still regarded as a historian, not a theorist, despite his argument’s potential to be developed into an alternative theory of IR.

34 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 3.
35 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 180-1.
36 Kosuke Shimizu, “Nishida Kitaro,” 157-83; Shimizu, “Materializing the ‘Non-Western’”.
37 Irie, Cultural Internationalism.
4. International Cultural Relations

While Iriye’s attempt to widen the scope of IR was definitely a step towards a more culture-oriented IR theory, Kenichiro Hirano made an even more explicit attempt to construct a cultural methodology for the theorisation of IR. Born in 1937, Hirano is also a scholar in the Japanese diplomatic history tradition. He received undergraduate and master’s degrees in the liberal arts from Tokyo University and obtained his Ph.D from Harvard. He returned to Tokyo University after his doctorate and taught IR and intercultural relations there before moving to Waseda University in Tokyo. He has published wide-ranging works on IR and cultural interactions in world affairs and he has been consistent in his methodology in the sense that he has specifically focused on culture in theorising world affairs.

If one is to study IR in relation to culture in Japan, Hirano’s textbook *Kokusai Bunkaron* [International Cultural Theory] is usually referred to as the starting point of the subject, and is now regarded as essential for students of cultural IR. Like Iriye, Hirano has also been concerned mainly with the term ‘culture’ and diplomatic history. However, his approach is substantially different from Iriye’s. Iriye defines culture as a separate realm of inquiry, and thus culture appears to be an object of inquiry. By contrast, Hirano contends that culture is the methodology of inquiry not an object, and thus a way of seeing world affairs. In other words, whereas Iriye’s method is to look at culture, Hirano attempts to analyse world affairs as a whole using an anthropological and cultural methodology, looking at the world through cultural lenses.

Hirano argues that we should not only focus on culture but also identify the cultural influence on the theorisation process of IR. According to Hirano, theorisation is also a human activity and thus inevitably cultural; consequently, he says, ‘IR itself is cultural’. Hirano maintains that in order to inquire into world affairs culturally, we must focus upon peripheries. He defines culture as ‘distinctive “bodies” of a variety of individuals and groups’ that can be regarded as subjects performing important roles in shaping the world. In the age of globalisation, these subjects are no longer static. Instead, they are active and dynamic in terms of geography and social class. People are mobile, transcending national borders and socio-political boundaries with ease, and continuously transforming themselves through their interactions with others. This is precisely why Hirano deliberately focuses on the margins and peripheries; because the subjectivities transforming themselves into something else are to be found where different cultures encounter each other. This encounter always resides at the margins, not at the core, of each culture. Thus, the prevailing mainstream IRT should be severely criticised for its lack of attention to the ever-changing nature of identities, which often starts on the margins.

A typical example of Hirano’s argument on international cultural relations is his stern critique of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. Hirano contends that Huntington’s theory confuses two similar but different words: civilisation and culture. Huntington unquestionably uses these two words in an interchangeable manner, and thus he confuses a clash of civilisations with cultural friction. Hirano strictly distinguishes between these two words and argues that cultural friction leads to efforts by the parties involved for reconciliation, thus becoming one of the main means of avoiding a clash of civilisations.

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40 Hirano, *Kokusai Bunkaron*, ii.
Hirano maintains that this moment takes place mainly in individuals’ minds. Citing cases of Japanese citizens and politicians encountering the West in the 19th century as examples, Hirano argues that it is the hope of reconciliation, which resides in people’s minds, that makes it possible to eventually avoid a clash of civilisations. In this manner, cultural frictions are, Hirano argues, always reconciled locally. However, the possibility of local reconciliations of cultural friction has been intentionally eliminated from Huntington’s argument in order to emphasise the confrontational nature of international civilizational relations. Thus, to Hirano, Huntington’s exclusive focus on a clash of civilisations rather than cultural friction is a characteristic of his theorisation on the basis of a perception of sovereign actors that is very much a Western cultural product, and the concept of a clash is pre-given and assumed prior to civilisation in the theorisation process of the post-Cold War political environment.

The concept of ‘cultural friction’ deserves a more detailed discussion here. According to Hirano, cultural friction is destined to be reconciled. As is discussed elsewhere, Huntington’s civilisation is described in an essentialist manner, while Hirano’s is more constructivist, because the reconciliation process affects the process of identity construction for the parties involved. Cultural frictions open a space for dialogue between the conflicting parties and transform their identities. It is important, again, that the transformation of identities is particularly salient on the peripheries, rather than at the core of each culture. Therefore, Hirano’s focus is naturally placed on those ‘bodies’ at the margins of cultures.

In this way, Hirano’s argument about international cultural relations provides new lenses through which we can look at world affairs. By using Hirano’s methodology, we can focus on cultural relations not only among different nations but also among different individuals and communities. However, his approach has failed to capture the attention of an IR audience and has not been recognised as a legitimate approach to world affairs in the Japanese IR community; he has thus set up a new academic society to put forth his views, the Japan Society of Intercultural Studies (JSIC), of which he holds the post of founding chair.

5. The Study of Regional History

Despite unceasing academic efforts with regard to culture and IR and the significant addition of a new dimension to traditional IR made by Iriye and Hirano, mainstream IR theorists still regard IR as an academic discipline constructed on the basis of an ahistorical perception of security and state sovereignty. Those working on the relationship between culture and IR have found a place within a different academic subject, namely, the study of regional history. The most notable scholar in this context is Takeshi Hamashita, a historian and regional studies scholar focusing on Asia.

Hamashita was born in Shizuoka Prefecture and studied at the University of Tokyo. He has written on a wide variety of subjects, such as modern Chinese history, the tribute system, Okinawa and Japanese imperialism and critical IR. Of these, his interpretation of the China-centred world system until the 18th century and its subsequent demise is widely known; indeed, his argument inspired Andre Gunder Frank’s Re-Orient and challenges John King Fairbank’s interpretation of the tribute system as the cause of China’s failure to protect itself from Western dominance.

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41 Hirano, Kokusai Bunkaron, 28-33.
43 John King Fairbank and Ta-tuan Ch‘en, eds., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge:
The tribute system has been the central focus of the so-called recently emerging Chinese School, which includes David Kang and Qin Yanqing. The scholars show how stable the world was under the tribute system; according to Kang, East Asia enjoyed peace and order from the 14th to the 19th century until the violent arrival of Western imperialism. In contrast to the Westphalian system of interstate relations, which is defined by its formal equality and incessant interstate conflict, the East Asian tribute system was characterised by formal inequality and ‘centuries of stability among the core participants’.

Kang’s and Qin’s arguments were developed relatively recently, but Hamashita had established his argument concerning governance and the tribute system as early as the 1980s. It is also worth noting here that Hamashita’s analysis is in some ways far more radical; he is, like Hirano, more concerned with those on the margins than in the core. Consequently, his analysis is periphery-focused and rarely uses China or Japan as the reference point.

According to Hamashita, the world before 1800 was China-centred. The development of China in that era was indeed supported by the tribute system, which involved such tributary states as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Ryukyu, Vietnam and the Philippines. These countries sent tributary missions to China regularly, while China sent envoys to tributary states for official recognition when they had new rulers. The merchants and traders who accompanied the envoys are important in this context. Hamashita notes that the volume of private trade increased over time, and the categories and quantities of goods traded were officially regulated. As a consequence, the main purpose of the tribute trade ‘came to be the pursuit of profits through the unofficial trade that was ancillary to the official system’.

On the basis of his account of the tribute system, Hamashita develops his contention that the core of the world economy resided in East Asia up until 1800, and Europe was no exception.

George III’s envoy Lord Macartney was dispatched to the court of the Ch’ien Lung Emperor with the title of Ambassador and Plenipotentiary Extraordinary in 1793. Macartney recorded in his journal, ‘I pretend not to notice that “English Ambassador with Tribute to the Chinese Emperor” is written on the ship’s flag, and I have not yet complained about it. Given an appropriate opportunity, I shall give them warning’.

According to Hamashita, China lost its momentum around 1800 in terms of its transcendental power over its tribute states; the above passage was written around that time, and still shows China’s perception of its world, clearly regarding England as a tribute state.

Hamashita contends that the study of regional history has the tremendous potential to change the widespread perception of IR about the world. It shows the possibility of different interpretations of world history, as the history of the tribute system shows us. It also proves that the world order has been constructed not on the basis of a universalised principle of non-intervention or state sovereignty. It is, rather, constructed on the basis of interactions of economy and culture, at the centre of which human beings, not nation-states, reside, regardless of their physical locations. While it is still possible to argue that the tribute system


Kang East Asia, 201.


itself was hierarchical, and thus, a first glance, constructed upon a universalised principle of power politics, it was, in reality, flexible and fluid in terms of economic and cultural exchanges among peoples, and took place across blurred state borders.\textsuperscript{48}

Hamashita’s account of regional history also shows us the importance of looking through the lenses of the periphery. In this context, Hamashita was particularly concerned with the history of Ryukyu. Between the 17th and 19th centuries, Ryukyu was under the control of two different states at the same time, China and Japan. However, these suzerain states did not interfere with each other, and practically ignored the fact that Ryukyu was at least formally under the control of the other state. What is remarkable here is that the system of blurred state boundaries made it possible in practice for a state to come under the control of two different jurisdictions. In other words, the Ryukyu Kingdom exploited the system of blurred boundaries to maintain its relative independence from both big powers. In this way, the study of regional history shows a different interpretation of state sovereignty and the construction of state identities, and proves that the autonomous state sovereignty of non-interventionism is merely a particular, provincial interpretation.

Thus far, Hamashita’s argument against mainstream IR has been the most advanced form of IR theorisation residing, or at least regarded by most IR scholars as residing, outside the IR community of Japan.

6. Conclusions: Some Implications for Post-Western IRT

What, then, can we learn from the genealogy of the Japanese IR of culture? Inoguchi, as I mentioned earlier, emphasises the differences in the four traditions of Japanese IR: the Staatslehre tradition, Marxism, Historicism and American-style methodology. Each of these has its own characteristics and disadvantages, according to Inoguchi, and he emphasises the differences among them. However, researchers from other countries in the Asia-Pacific focus on their similarities. Ching-Chang Chen, for instance, argues that while these four traditions seem to be at first glance based on different assumptions and theoretical compositions, none of them pays sufficient attention to the narratives developed in other countries of Asia as ‘Japanese IR academics believe they can learn little from the concepts and experiences of other Asian countries, because Asia lacks Westphalia’.\textsuperscript{49} In fact, all four traditions Inoguchi discusses have their origins in the European or American tradition and were imported to Japan over the course of its modernisation. Therefore, it can be argued that the answer to why the study of regional history has long been neglected in Japanese IR literature lies in the history of IR as an academic discipline itself, which developed as a subject to make sense of and analyse the events and occurrences taking place in the world. The world Western-based IR sees is divided by strict and robust state boundaries, and thus studies focusing on different interpretations and explanations of the world based on a regional history remain outside Japanese IR to the extent that the latter is a self-claimed discipline within the Western tradition and based on Westphalian subjectivity.

This situation is precisely what culturalists argue against. For them, history must be narrated from the margins if our intellectual activities are to understand the world more in terms of concrete or ‘bodily’ human interactions than of abstract concepts of nation-states.

\textsuperscript{48} Takeshi Hamashita, \textit{China, East Asia, and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives} (New York: Routledge, 2008).

\textsuperscript{49} Chen, “The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories,” 471.
Narrating the history of the margins has at least two important and intertwined meanings. First, it gives us a clue to aspects of world affairs that have never been revealed, complementing and reinforcing a more precise understanding of the contemporary world and thus becoming the basis of our future vision. Second, while it complements the existing knowledge of contemporary IR, it also relativises the traditional knowledge of IR. This relativisation is in some ways political; because the world has been constructed upon a particular perception, it has benefited those who share the same view and has excluded those who do not. Thus, narrating the world from the margins has the ethical result of ‘provincialising’ the mainstream narrative, and thus its action is political.

What does this mean specifically for post-Western IR discourse? There are at least three implications:. First, Hirano’s and Hamashita’s analyses reveal how much our perception is biased by the Westphalian presumptions of state sovereignty and strict state borders, as well as the extent to which we look at the world on the basis of strictly demarcated borders. Hirano argues that we tend to focus more on the core units of analysis, not on the peripheries. When we make inquiries into Japanese foreign policy, for instance, this mainly denotes Tokyo’s political decisions about external relations, not Okinawa’s calls to be rid of U.S. bases. Hamashita’s investigation of the tribute system also shows that the stable political order in existence before the arrival of European modernity was mainly supported by the enormous amount of transactions and exchanges in economic and cultural relations across boundaries, which was, in turn, guaranteed and encouraged by a system of blurred borders between the concerned states.

Second, however, there is a strong and robust obstacle to such unconventional arguments as Hirano’s and Hamashita’s. It is clear that their arguments contribute to the existing IR literature by providing an opportunity to reflect upon our mind-set in terms of state sovereignty and strict boundaries. However, the genealogy of Japanese IR, in which mainstream scholars have ignored the argument about the importance of culturalist methodology, make it clear that a different interpretation and understanding from the mainstream Westphalian perception towards world affairs has difficulty in being sufficiently recognised.

Third, we need to keep in mind that perceptions based on such language as the Westphalian nation-state and geographical division, for example, West and East, is more persistent than we can imagine. This situation is precisely why colonial studies specialists of Japan were drawn into the discourse of anti-Western regionalism of the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Area before World War II. In fact, there is an irresistible temptation in every moment we talk about world affairs to use such concepts as Japan, China and the U.S. as nation-states in the Westphalian sense, or of West and East in terms of civilisation and modernity. This temptation appears in a variety of forms. As the case of culturalist methodology in Japan indicates, we may simply be excluded from the discipline of IR unless we use the language of the nation-state or geographical division. Alternatively, in order to obtain the recognition of the IR community, we may be forced to make a deal by using the concept of nation-states to formulate our theory, as the Kyoto School philosophers did before World War II. However, as a consequence, we may find ourselves thinking of the contemporary world and the decline of U.S. hegemony in terms of strictly demarcated state boundaries or a dichotomised confrontation of West and East, and thus wondering uncritically which

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50 Shimizu, “Materializing the ‘Non-Western’”.

nation-state or geographical area will be the next hegemon. This seems particularly salient in light of the recent overwhelming popularity of the ‘China Rising’ discourse. However, as Hamashita suggests, what we need to examine in making sense of contemporary world affairs is not which nation-state in the Westphalian sense will become the next provider of universalised political principles, but how we stop using our exclusivist language, based on the Westphalian system, in a post-Western world.

Bibliography


Progress in Turkish International Relations

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Abstract
There are certainly grounds for optimism when it comes to progress in Turkish international relations (IR). Turkish academia has come a long way since the 1960s. The rapid expansion of IR study in Turkish academia can be attributed to the expansion in the Turkish educational system, especially after 1980, and the rising importance of international relations through globalization. Turkish society has very large potential for future work in IR, with many highly qualified scholars. Compared to a few decades ago, more IR articles are being authored by Turkish scholars, both abroad and in Turkey. The question now is how Turkish scholars can become an even stronger voice in the international academic community. In this paper, I suggest better collaboration with government and universities to develop better PhD programs, participate in PhD consortiums and establish stronger links with the international community.

Keywords: Scientific progress, Turkey, international relations, professional organization, academic community, science policy

1. Progress and Policy Relevance
Owing to the necessity of preventing another world war, the global IR discipline has recently come into its own, striving to produce relevant and actionable knowledge about the world’s most urgent problems. The extent of progress in achieving this aim depends very much on the interaction between scholars and policymakers. Political science scholars who study IR interact with policymakers in many ways. In some instances, it is a symbiotic relationship because IR scholars depend on input from policymakers to do their job. And reciprocally, policymakers often need the contributions of scholars to carry out their own work. Policymakers benefit from following the scholarly developments in their field, but often they do not have the time to do so. An increased level of interaction, however, would depend on the nature and type of IR studies and the directions in which they are progressing.

Some studies focus on developing theories, the direct relevance of which may not be apparent to policymakers at first glance. Other scholars specialize in policy-making questions and are expert in policy areas, giving them an advantage over government policymakers because they have more time to collect information from a wide variety of sources. These scholars may contribute substantially to policymaking and implementation. Other foci of IR include the art of negotiation, which concentrates on negotiation techniques and peaceful
conflict resolution. Such studies are extremely useful and beneficial for policymakers. An intriguing and critical question, of course, is whether policymakers have enough time to read these scholarly works and, given how IR has developed over time, whether they are equipped to understand what they read. For example, a scholarly work that employs complicated mathematical techniques requires specialized knowledge to follow its arguments and analyses, which a non-academic policymaker may lack. If presented in ways the policymaker would comprehend, then he or she would be able to link the implications of the quantitative research or formal models to his or her needs. We need to make more efforts in this direction.

The progress of the study of IR in Turkey can be evaluated by looking at the history of its development with regard to training, research and employment opportunities. In this commentary, I shall also offer some ideas to improve the shortcomings related to the discipline in Turkey.

2. The Expansion of the Study of International Relations in Turkey

Analyzing the history of IR in Turkey, it is evident that teaching programs were originally developed to train qualified diplomats. For this reason, the initial curricula were mainly designed to cover topics of import to diplomatic personnel. The training function was almost exclusively discharged by the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, and the curriculum was a combination of Diplomatic History, International Law and International Politics, with the last course added as the discipline began to develop rapidly after World War II. Today, another increased expansion in Turkish IR may be observed in academia, which is a result of two major developments. The first is the expansion of the Turkish university system, especially after 1980. Currently, the number of universities approach 200. The second comprises a number of developments: the rising importance of IR through globalization, Turkey’s integration into the global economic system, its rapid economic development and its growing role in regional integration projects. The increase in the development of new academic programs in a number of universities, such as European Union Studies, is an example of this expansion.

Employment opportunities for graduates of IR departments have also increased over time, something of great importance to students. Of course, there is not always a one-to-one correspondence between what one studies in college and what kind of a job one gets, but an IR degree is deemed appropriate training for a considerable array of jobs.

I should note that there is a fancy quality to the term International Relations. For example, many institutions have separate departments for Political Science and International Relations, but when the two curricula are compared, there are few differences. In fact, if a student takes a few additional courses from the sister department, he or she will have the training for everything required for either a Political Science or an International Relations degree. However, the minimum admission score required for getting into an IR program is generally higher than that for Political Science. This difference could be attributed to the aforementioned ‘fancy name effect’ or perhaps simply to the effect of globalization on what to study. The number of IR departments in Turkey is far fewer than the number of Public Administration or Political Science departments. This may mean that fewer graduates of IR are needed, or it may well mean that it is more difficult to build an IR department. The difference in numbers may reflect different levels of need, but it may also reflect the greater difficulty in finding schools in which to pursue IR undergraduate and graduate studies in Turkey.
The developments referred to above already indicate that the discipline has expanded in terms of the number of schools, subjects and staff in recent years. Such quantitative expansion does not automatically translate into scholarly progress, however. If we take the number of international publications as an important indicator of scholarly achievement, we see that nowadays compared to earlier times, one is more likely to come across IR articles by scholars of Turkish origin working abroad or Turkish scholars living in Turkey. The small number of foreign scholars working in various Turkish institutions can be added to this figure. Still, I am not aware of a major contribution by Turkish scholars to what we call the grand theories of IR. This fact might be related to the limited availability (until recently) of data on the periphery of global scholarly communication networks. Although more data is available today than in the past, opportunities such as frequent contact with international organizations, influential NGOs and corporations are fewer in Turkey than in major world centers such as London, Paris, Washington, D.C. and possibly Moscow. Support for research is also lacking, unlike, for example, in the US, where scholars have the funds to produce research with a broader scope. Despite these challenges, however, the direction of development in Turkey seems satisfactory in that Turkish scholars now are very much a part of an international community that studies IR.

3. Barriers to Progress

In earlier times, scholars from different parts of the world felt it difficult to break into the major scholarly communities in many academic disciplines because these groups were at the same time national communities that were not interested in including others in their ranks. With a closer look, however, this situation may have been more due to poorer communications rather than a conscious effort to keep foreign scholars out. In my experience, the scholarly community seems to encourage intermingling, finding it enriching and a source of pride. The numbers of scholars in any country also play a part; for example, as the US has the most IR scholars of any country, American scholars will be publishing more works than scholars from other countries. Further, American, British and French scholars are professionally much better organized than those in other countries; Turks seem particularly bad at running professional organizations. Common issues are the lack of willingness to pay dues and to produce high-quality papers for nationally organized conferences. As most scholars (especially in IR) want to reach a world bigger than Turkey, such issues result in a negligence that reflects on the quality of works in Turkish. A large community with effective internal communications creates research communities or sub-communities that tend to act together and to move ahead; and this is something we need to work on in Turkey.

Another way to encourage collaboration and scientific progress is to allocate research grants to promote the study of specific topics. Many agencies in the US and in the EU offer grants to help researchers with their work. Unfortunately, we do not have the same tradition in Turkey. Turkish scholars usually invest a lot more effort doing research and possibly get less done than an American- or a EU-based scholar because the grants made available to the latter enable them to hire research assistants, conduct surveys, and perform other work that facilitates and expedites data collection, management and analysis.

Moreover, data is also easier to secure in the US and the EU compared to Turkey. A researcher in these countries interested in a specific topic can establish friendly linkages with an organization that focus on that topic and gain direct access to a large amount of data.
For example, since the World Bank is in Washington, it is arguably easier for an American researcher to access their unpublished data. In general, researchers in major world centers have more contact with researchers and other staff working for these organizations. Their common interests can result in increased interaction and sometimes joint research and publications. There is also a lot of mobility between government, private research agencies and academia in these countries, an option generally less available to Turkish researchers.

Another barrier is language. For example, English journals and reviewers (which comprise the majority of professional journals) are not likely to publish papers written by non-native English speakers that contain grammar errors and poor forms of expression. Further, although there is a process of anonymous review, it is often possible to guess where the author originates based on his or her language, and it is commonly observed that people (i.e. editors) are generally favorably disposed toward the familiar (i.e. English). To combat this issue, Turkish institutions could extend editing support for scholars wishing to publish in international journals. Material limitations may also act as a barrier. For example, attending international symposia and conferences is more difficult for many Turkish than American or EU scholars because funds for such activities are more readily available there than in Turkey. I am happy to note that there are more funds available for taking part in international meetings now than in the past. Finally, the community of IR scholars in Turkey continues to be small. In addition, many scholars are overburdened with teaching. Under the circumstances, their output of research and writing tends to be just enough to get their next promotion rather than a sustained and patterned activity.

In conclusion, rather than a systematically established system of barriers that may stand in the way of scholars from Turkey or another country in producing globally acclaimed works, there are a number of empirical factors that have proven dysfunctional for productivity and high quality in Turkey, and may apply to other countries as well.

4. Towards a More Integrated Community

I would like to offer some suggestions for solving the above-mentioned problems so as to create opportunities for Turkish IR scholars to become more integrated with the global IR community. An important one is active membership in and consistent attendance at professional meetings in order to become and remain within the IR communication network. Membership to most institutions costs over $100 annually, and these rates increase with subscriptions to scientific journals. This amount might not seem very high, but it is a significant amount for a young Turkish scholar, especially if he or she wishes to belong to more than one organization. There is currently no support in Turkey to link scholars to the network of international organizations. The universities can provide the financial support needed a step that would greatly further Turkish contributions to IR.

Second, to help Turkish scholars organize domestically, the story of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) may be instructive. The association was established by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) after World War II to promote the development of an international community of scholars. The initiative was not limited to scholars of political science, but also included the development of professional associations in sociology, economics and disciplines in the positive sciences and engineering. UNESCO provided the seed money for scholars to meet, but over the years
IPSA has become independent of UNESCO, which today does not even have the means to extend support to IPSA and others even if it wished to.

To support a domestic organization of scholars, the Turkish government could offer help in organizing national scientific communities. One of the major problems in organizing such associations in Turkey is that political divisions outside a community tend to be replicated inside a community. Although professional disciplines are not arenas in which to debate national politics, many academics do not accept this. To encourage neutral associational development, the government could implement changes in the law of associations to promote the expansion of professional organizations. For example, the government could also encourage universities to provide space or secretarial help for these organizations. As an external example, the headquarters of IPSA are at Concordia University in Montreal, Quebec, thanks to the support of the university and the municipal and provincial governments; IPSA receives free rent and other necessary facilities from Concordia University, along with a faculty member who works half time at Concordia and the other half as IPSA's secretary general. A rare example of such cooperation in Turkey is the International Relations Council Association (Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi Derneği), which exists thanks to the efforts of Mustafa Aydın, rector of Kadir Has University, who donates some labor and, I believe, some space at the university. Such support from external sources clearly contributes to the faster evolution of a scholarly community in a particular field, and in turn, the quicker advancement of research and development of that field through the commitment of the scholars themselves. In contrast, the Turkish Political Science Association (Türk Siyasi İlimler Derneği), for example, does not have a secretariat, therefore is not effective in collecting membership dues and its activities remain limited.

Last, the quality of education is an issue that directly affects the development of any field. The sufficiency of Turkish investment in the quality of future IR scholars is an important question. Unfortunately, the simple answer is that the investment is not sufficient. The monitoring of quality is also neglected. It seems that having PhD programs is a matter of prestige for universities independent of whether they can actually undertake them. This is no less true in the field of IR. One of the main insufficiencies in Turkey is the small number of academic staff. The numbers are simply few to meet the needs of operating a satisfactory program. A related obstacle is the lack of instructors with notable achievements. One way of enhancing quality is to have inter-university consortia for PhD programs in specific urban centers, rather than each university trying to develop its own PhD program with insufficient resources. A set of standard requirements can be established for choosing instructors to teach in the PhD programs, such as a track record of successful research and publications. There are many PhD’s from prestigious foreign institutions. If implemented, such consortia can have several positive impacts on the future progress of the IR field in Turkey. First, a consortium would expand the resources available to all participating institutions for a PhD program. Second, the consortium could be granted funding to send graduate students to international conferences to attend panels, present papers etc. Third, the consortium could allow students several months for training and/or research in other countries. These opportunities would provide the new generation with broader and more diverse knowledge in IR, allow them to create a community network at the start of their careers and fill gaps in Turkish academia. PhD programs should be considered a worthy challenge rather than an opportunity to gain prestige. If an institution has limited resources, and does not take its PhD program seriously,
the graduates will be of low quality and the students they teach will be of even worse quality, which will lead to a vicious cycle of underdevelopment.

Despite the above challenges, there are certainly grounds for optimism about the study of international relations in Turkey. When I started in 1964 as a graduate assistant in the Faculty of Economics at İstanbul University, few people worked in the field, there were few Turkish books on the subject, and little research was being done. Since then, Turkish academia has far surpassed that state in terms of both quality and quantity. Change is in a positive direction, and now we need to make things better. With many highly qualified scholars, Turkish academia has great potential and we must become an even stronger voice in the international academic community through organizing more effectively, mobilizing institutional, governmental and private support, creating better PhD programs and intensifying multiple links with the international community.
Linking Status with Soft Power: Call for a Joint Research Agenda

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Review article of:

1. Introduction
The importance of non-Western regions for international politics and economy has been growing steadily in the last few decades. In particular, countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – popularly known as BRICS – and other so-called “middle powers” such as Turkey have been forming increasingly relevant poles of power, in a way that seems to suggest that the “unipolar moment” and US hegemony are, at this point, largely gone.¹ What is the nature of these processes and their consequences for global governance and International Relations (IR)? More specifically, in what ways do rising powers’ claims challenge – or even destabilise – the current world order? And is their rise necessarily a turbulent process?

The authors and editors of Status in World Politics believe that a focus on the concept of status can help answer these complex questions. They are not alone in considering status concerns as a stepping stone in explaining the behaviour of emerging powers. Status has been historically important and noted as an explanatory factor in several instances; the struggle of Mussolini’s fascist regime to establish overseas colonies is a case in point. Italy, which achieved unity only in 1861, strived hard to obtain the status of a colonial empire, considered a conditio sine qua non, to be on a par with other European great powers. In IR theory, the concept of status pervades the writings of English School scholars such as Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, who conceptualised the international system in terms of social order and status hierarchies.² English School scholars also acknowledge the intersubjective and social nature of status, which does not solely result from a state’s material capabilities but is rather conferred by the recognition of others. The editors of the book note that “the past decade has witnessed an outpouring of new multidisciplinary research on status in international politics.”³

The literature discussing the link between emerging powers and status concerns has also flourished. In light of the BRICS’ economic boom, several authors have investigated the status concern of these countries. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang, for instance, argue that the “Chinese Communist Party regime’s security, economic development and quest for great power status are the central concerns driving Chinese foreign policy,” and that Chinese elites are clearly dissatisfied with the current status enjoyed by their state. Yong Deng claims that, while China’s status concerns are “palpable,” there is actually some confusion around China’s status motivations in Chinese writings as well as in English-language literature. He believes that China considers status advancement as pivotal to its national security interests and that status can only be advanced on materialistic and socio-political fronts. In exploring status conflicts between Russia and the West, Tuomas Forsberg claims that what really matters is not objective status but perceptions thereof, and there seems to be a gap in how Russia and the West perceive status in general. This gap can be better understood, in Forsberg’s opinion, by putting perceptions and emotions at the centre of the analysis. Paulo Roberto de Almeida and Miguel Diaz affirm that “Brazil has long believed that it was destined for greatness” due to the country’s geographical size, its natural beauty and resources, and its heritage as part of Portugal’s great seafaring empire. However, despite Brazil’s proclaimed readiness to assume its “rightful place” among leading global stakeholders, the great powers have repeatedly rebuffed the country’s many recent requests to join their ranks. Focusing on Brazil, India, and China (BIC), Miles Kahler discusses the way in which these three countries interact with the great powers in their quest to eliminate their developing country status given their economic successes. According to the author, the BICs do not appear to radically challenge the status quo in global governance, but their proposals for change in the status hierarchy fall within the scope of reforming the existing order.

Hence, in light of this renewed academic interest in the topic, the editors of Status in World Politics stress that they make three main “novel analytic departures.” Firstly, they claim to go beyond the great-power subsystem and the issue of systemic war. While this claim is certainly true, it is hardly novel; the focus on rising powers and their status concerns has been encouraging an increasing number of researchers over the last years, as the examples above suggest. Secondly, the book brings together scholars utilizing different approaches, ranging from realism and rationalism to political psychology and critical constructivism. This diversity in terms of analytical and epistemological approaches is indeed present, and
represents one of the main strengths of the book. And finally, the editors underscore how the book engages with scholarly voices that have reservations on the critical importance of status as an analytical tool. This is also an interesting feature of the book, which enhances the debate among the authors.

In this review article, I reflect upon the book’s main strengths and weaknesses along three lines: after summarizing the authors’ main findings, a) I explore why a deeper reflection on the identity of the rising powers is central to the analysis of their status expectations and concerns (Section 3). b) I explore the conceptual link between status in the twenty-first century and the concept of soft power (Section 4), which the authors overlook. And c) I reiterate the main points and make a case for linking status and soft-power research programmes (Conclusion).

2. Status Matters...

To affirm that status matters is easy, but it is far more difficult to operationalise it and grasp its numerous dimensions and subtle nuances. Building on Durkheim and Weber’s classical definition of status as a hierarchy of social groups ranked in terms of societal values, the authors define status as “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic clout).” They also note that status in an organisation or an informal hierarchy is collective (rather than individual), subjective (i.e. it depends on others’ perceptions), and relative (it involves comparison with others). The authors then identify four key issues around which the analysis of status revolves. These are a) the politics of admission into the great-power club, b) status signalling and perception, c) the role of institutions, and d) a critical debate on status as opposed to structure and authority. Their key findings, usefully presented in the Introduction, are also listed according to each of those four issues.

The first issue, that is, how to accommodate new powers’ claims to great-power status, is possibly one of the most pressing matters in IR, and has been keeping IR scholars busy for decades. Status recognition and status markers are key concepts that have evolved greatly throughout the centuries. Status markers, in particular, are very much time- and culture-bound. For instance, Neumann briefly traces their evolution in Chapter 4, reporting that the main status markers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were dynastic marriages and membership in the European Concert, respectively; today, status markers include a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or membership in the G8. Gaining status recognition today might also be a very different process that it used to be in the previous centuries. Larson and Shevchenko argue in Chapter 1 that in the current world, where major-power war is unthinkable, rising powers such as India, Brazil, and Turkey are not gaining status recognition through military achievements but through their rapid economic growth, active role in regional organisations, global diplomacy and foreign aid programs, and by offering a developmental example for the region. This is not to say that material capabilities no longer matter. However, predictably, economic or military power alone will not suffice to achieve membership in the great-power club.

When it comes to the second major issue – status signalling – the discussion focuses around the rhetoric, diplomatic activity, and acquisition of status symbols by the rising powers, on the one hand, and the old powers’ abilities to accurately grasp those new powers’ signals, on

12 See the discussion on the relation between status and soft power in the fourth section.
the other. As for status signalling, both material (the enhancement of military capabilities, for instance) and immaterial factors (such as Turkey’s bid to act as a regional mediator in light of its Ottoman Empire legacy) matter. However, different audiences can interpret the same signals differently. Just as in the case of the security dilemma, misperception and miscommunication about status signalling can drive states into a “status dilemma.” This notion, introduced by Wohlforth in Chapter 5, explores the uncertainty created by the misperception of a state’s status aspirations, which, in turn, might lead to conflict between states that would otherwise have no serious conflict over their relative status. Wohlforth uses status dilemma to explain crucial historical instances such as the Crimean War or the Cold War. In the Cold War case, the author claims that while the two superpowers did enjoy a special status above the rest, they actually were not equal, as the US ranked above the Soviet Union. To achieve formal superpower parity, the USSR started a series of competitive rather than defensive security-maximising expansionist moves, which sparked more competitiveness. In fact, U.S. decision makers, while happy to talk the parity talk to jolly along their Soviet counterparts, balked at walking the parity walk. Hence, there was a real discrepancy in status preferences. But dilemma dynamics amplified this discrepancy. The actions Soviet decision makers took to secure their identity as an equal of the United States fed American fears of a Soviet “thrust to primacy,” justifying costly and at times dangerous U.S. responses. The resulting spiral was sufficiently dangerous and costly [enough] to cause both superpowers to seek rapprochement and ultimately detente in the mid to late 1980s. 14

Finally, the tendency for states to boost their strengths while minimizing their weaknesses, makes signalling more complicated. Larson and Shevchenko point out that countries with limited military power such as Brazil pursue a “social creativity strategy to draw attention to their distinctive strengths.”

The importance of international institutions for status is the third issue. The findings expectedly underline the critical interaction between status and institutions, the latter of which have a highly symbolic value as status-shapers. Paul and Shankar argue in Chapter 7 that leadership positions in international institutions or membership in elite clubs can make status-seeking by current rising powers less conflictual now compared to the past. They quote as an example the formation of the more inclusive Group of 20 (G20), which largely replaced the G8 as the premier forum for managing the global economy. Today there are plenty of examples of more inclusive organizations for rising powers to join, such as the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization – although their actual impact on global governance is debatable. 16

Several chapters of Status in World Politics also confirm the view that status is an inherently scarce resource and that the process of status-seeking may generate international conflict, especially when rising powers perceive that the current order (the institutions and structures created by the established powers) constrains their rise (as Thompson suggests in  

16 For instance, while the increasing importance of the BRICS countries in the world economy is a fact (currently mainly due to China and India), the actual significance of the BRICS organisation for global governance is less obvious. Russia has tried to move the organisation from a purely economic and rather unstructured group to a more political one. However, these efforts have not yet met with concrete results in terms of decisional power in the global arena.
Chapter 9). Yet, these chapters also highlight that conflict need not to be the only outcome generated by new powers’ status-seeking behaviours; their desire for enhanced status can be a force for good, such as in shaping a more proactive foreign policy, incentivising their participation in regional conflict resolution, or promoting free trade areas.

The fourth and final section of the book includes two authors, David A. Lake and William R. Thompson, who engage critically with the other authors of the book. While Lake contends that many of the most important effects attributed to status actually spring from contests over authority, Thompson makes a distinction between status with a little ‘s’ (concerns about a state’s ranking) versus status with a big ‘S’ (a state’s position in the international system), suggesting that only the latter matters, as it can become a driver of conflict. The conclusion by Clunan puts all these views together, providing an overview of the state of research on status. As the title of the chapter (“Why Status Matters in World Politics”) makes clear, the author also makes a strong case for the necessity and originality of the book’s research programme on status.

3. ...and So Does the Identity of Rising Powers

_Status in World Politics_’s geographical focus is diverse. Many countries from very different regions are analyzed, however, they all share one feature: they are rising powers. The starting point is indeed the assumption that rising powers seek status, and that this process is worth a careful analysis for its possible implications for world order and global governance, especially with regard to the nature (violent or pacific) of their efforts to achieve their status objectives. Yet, a fundamental question seems to remain unanswered: what do we mean exactly by “rising powers”? Larson and Shevchenko offer a brief and unsatisfactory definition of “rising powers” (which they also call “emerging powers” or “new powers”): “New powers such as Brazil, India, China, and Turkey have distinctive national interests and may not be amenable to accepting arrangements drafted by the established powers.”

This definition points at two strategic factors: the heterogeneity of rising powers and their national interests, and the possible contestational nature of their claims. However, a more expanded definition is needed in order to explain why and how status matters.

In almost all chapters of the book, the term rising power is used interchangeably with emerging powers. This is a broad and somewhat vague category, indicating countries whose economy and/or political influence are on the rise, compared to established powers and to underdeveloped countries. According to Stuenkel, to be described as an emerging power, a country usually needs to be a) large (both geographically and population-wise), b) poorer on a per-capita basis than industrialised countries, and c) following an escalating pattern that inspires optimism in the country’s future outlook in a way that those countries are incentivised to depict themselves as “rising.” However, there is no clear definition of the indicators signalling when a country ceases emerging and becomes a major power or, alternatively, when it fails to emerge. Is it possible to rely solely upon economic measurements? While GDP per capita is widely used as a satisfactory measure of growth, taking into account redistribution, it falls short of including other relevant factors of human progress such as social cohesion and the environment. Recently, the Social Progress Index (SPI) or the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) have started replacing GDP per capita in some cases, showing that countries

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can experience vastly different levels of social progress even if they have similar levels of GDP per capita. For instance, when it comes to social progress, Ghana (58.29) outperforms Nigeria (43.31) even though it has a lower GDP — $3,864 versus $5,423.\textsuperscript{19} A wider use of these new and more comprehensive indexes would be useful to determine the progress or decline of rising powers.

Emerging powers have different needs and expectations compared to today’s established powers. Climate change is a typical example of a policy field where emerging and established powers’ claims clash. While rich European powers lead the way to cutting emissions, things look different for emerging powers such as China or India, where millions of people are making a transition from poverty into the middle class, a development that causes a radical increase in per capita emissions. Therefore, emerging powers generally associate cutting emissions with curtailing their own development. And emerging powers largely differ among themselves, too. It is true that the majority of the book’s chapters use concrete states as examples; some, like Neumann’s chapter on Russia, even focus specifically on the peculiarities of a particular rising power’s approach. Yet, a deeper reflection on how particular identities in this varied group impact their general status concerns is needed.

Differentiating between emerging and re-emerging power is key when assessing the ‘expectations versus reality’ gap. Several countries usually labelled as “emerging” actually do not feel that the word does justice to their history or to their previous role in international relations. Countries like China, Russia, and India often prefer to describe themselves as “re-emerging” powers in light of their previous glories. This is not only a matter of labels or national pride. Volgy and colleagues argue that some states are either over- or underachievers in that they receive more or less status recognition than their material capabilities would warrant.\textsuperscript{20} Status overachievers such as Russia, Britain, or France benefit from a “halo effect”: thanks to their long history of being great powers, they continue to enjoy major power status, even after losing critical capabilities, and hence continue to enjoy the ability to play on the global stage. Although Volgy et al. acknowledge that a country’s former glories can indeed affect its self-image as well as other countries’ perceptions, neither they nor the other authors assess the specific impact of being ‘genuinely new powers’ on a country’s status claims. These powers have different expectations and claims about what their role on the global stage should be. In a recent article, Freedman argues that this difference matters greatly when it comes to status preferences and status signalling. He claims that many IR scholars concerned with explaining status-seeking behaviour (this goes for most authors in the book, too) draw heavily from social comparison theory and the assumption that both individuals and states “judge their worth, and accordingly derive self-esteem, through social comparisons with others.”\textsuperscript{21} Freedman, on the other hand, draws upon psychology to claim that individuals and states self-evaluate their performance using both social and temporal forms of comparison, that is, they evaluate how they have improved or declined over time, and in turn, the way they self-evaluate themselves affects their status-signalling behaviour. In my opinion, this difference is crucial and helps explain the different status claim between, for instance, Brazil and Russia.


4. Status and Soft Power

The salience of norms for both status attainment and maintenance is widely acknowledged throughout *Status in World Politics*. Clunan affirms that evolving normative understandings and social institutions impact a country’s status regardless of changes in its material capabilities. A country, she claims, “may even fall out of the status in-group as new normative standards arise that challenge its fitness.”

Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth underscore, perhaps not without some liberal bias, that “the importance of meeting prevailing normative standards...heightens uncertainty about whether Russia, China, and other nonliberal states will attain the recognition that they seek.”

But what happens when rising powers engage in normative contestation processes in order to enhance their status? In what ways do these countries contest the existing normative order to promote alternative ones?

These questions remain largely unanswered throughout the book, despite their relevance to status research. In this regard, a more active engagement with the concept of soft power – one of the most famous and highly debated IR concepts, and a possibly useful analytical tool to address these questions – could open interesting research avenues for both status and soft-power researchers. The concept of soft power – coined by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye – has been present for more than 20 years now, used by scholars and especially practitioners. Defined as the ability to achieve political ends through attraction and preference-shaping, the concept has been widely criticised for presenting researchers with several conceptual and analytical challenges (some of them, such as the measurability of such a volatile concept, are shared by status, too). Recently, there have been attempts to fine-tune and improve the concept, and to adapt it to the study of rising powers. Building on Gramscian theory, I argue that soft power is the “ability of a state or a group within the state to influence discourses in such a way that certain policies, worldviews and narratives are framed as ‘common sense,’ paving the way to the establishment of power relations.”

The most recent soft-power literature focuses on China and Russia, for these are the countries that, whether for a strategic purpose or to contest Western normative hegemony (or both), are conveying stronger alternative normative claims through their soft-power activities. Examples of these studies abound; to quote just one, Chaka Ferguson argues that Chinese and Russian strategists have incorporated “soft” or “normative” power assets into their foreign policy, and that their alternative norms, such as

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the concept of “sovereign democracy,” allow them to deliberately ignore human rights issues in order to achieve diplomatic advantage with respect to the US.27

I believe that linking status and soft-power research programmes would greatly benefit both disciplines. This connection could help assess the existence of a global standard of civilisation and its consequences. It could also shed light on possible ways in which rising powers try to challenge the existing normative order, if this is perceived as a constraint to their ability to achieve status, as well as on how old powers can or try to resist the rise of the new ones.

5. Conclusion

Status in World Politics constitutes an interesting, systematic, and necessary attempt to study status in IR. The authors share two background assumptions: First, despite a growing trend toward multipolarity, Euro-centrism or Western-centrism is still a problem afflicting IR theory,28 which is why the authors go beyond the usual focus on old powers and embrace an analysis of rising powers. Second, the growing importance of emotions in IR – such as shame, honour, and pride – are increasingly taken into account as independent or explanatory variables,29 and justifies the interest in a topic such as status that draws heavily on emotions.

Status in World Politics could be improved on two levels. First, it could give a more comprehensive definition of rising power, a concept central to the book’s analysis. A broader definition would help shed light on how genuinely new powers have different status expectations compared to ‘old’ new powers, such as Russia. Second, the book would benefit greatly from an engagement with scholars of soft power, a concept that is more known and widely studied that status. A dialogue between the two research programmes is especially relevant in light of the current state of normative contestation of the Western liberal order, and in this sense opens up some interesting future research avenues, such as investigating possible ways in which rising powers challenge the existing normative order, if the latter is perceived as an obstacle in their status-seeking path.

The general view is that rising powers are critical of the post-World War II order and call for its reform, but at the same time there is no precise or shared idea about what a new order would look like. A recent report by the Paris-based EU Institute for Security Studies claims that “[p]rofound divergences between [rising powers’] political systems remain, and in many respects they are strategic competitors. In short, emerging powers lack a key ingredient of lasting cooperation: a common system of values or interests to bind them into a cohesive force.”30 This statement is true to a certain extent, yet, we are currently witnessing changes brought about by a wave of conservative regimes in power globally today, comprised of re-emerging and current powers, that challenge the liberal values that have dominated since WWII. Regimes such as Putin’s in Russia or Erdogan’s in Turkey, the ascent of Trump in the US, the high vote (34%) for Marine Le Pen in the recent French elections, and a general increase in the number and salience of far-right and Euro-sceptic parties and movements

in the EU make the question of normative contestation highly salient. Status researchers, especially if jointly collaborating with soft-power researchers, have the potential to address some relevant aspects of this complex and extremely topical question.

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Soğuk Savaş, ölçme ve değerlendirme, kamu diplomasisi, teknoloji fetişizmi

Türk Terörizm Çalışmaları: Ön Değerlendirme

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Öz
Bu makale akademik bir disiplin olarak Türk terörizm çalışmalarının durumunun uluslararası olanlara kıyaslal birleştirmesini amaçlamaktadır. İlk olarak güncel uluslararası terörizm çalışmalarını ve yeni trendleri incelemekte, daha sonra Türk terörizm çalışmalarını bağlam ve metodoloji açısından uzun vadeli olarak değerlendirilmekteyiz. Son olarak, Türk disiplininin nasıl ve hangi perspektifler aracılığıyla gelişebileceğini ve böylelikle güncel literatüre katkı sağlayabileceği tartışılmaktayız. Yükse lisans tezleri, doktora tezleri ve bilimsel makaleleri inceleyerek üç farklı veri seti meydana getirdik. Daha sonra terörizm uzmanları ile veri seti bulgularını yorumlamak üzere röportajlar ve anketler yaptık. Türkiye’deki araştırma
sağlanın bağlam açısından en çarpıcı özelliği, çok disiplinli karakterde olmasıdır; bu nedenle de Türkiye’dede terör çalışmalarının daha geniş bilim dalındaki terminolojiyi ve teorik birikimi göz ardı etmeye eğilimlidir. Metodoloji açısından ise Türkiye’deki terörizm çalışmalarının büyük bir problemi, çalışmaların çoğunun deneysel araştırma yerine literatür taramasından oluşmasıdır, bu nedenle gelişmeye açık alanları oldukça genişdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Akademik disiplin, bağlam, veri seti, metodoloji, Türk terörizm çalışmaları

Uluslararası İlişkiler Dünyasını Genişletmek: Yerli Kuramlaştırmanın Tipolojisi

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Uluslararası İlişkiler kuramında Batı-dışı dünyadan tanınmış bir sesin bir etki yaratması nadir bir durumdur. Birkaç çalışma bu tanınma eksikliğine neden olan yapısal ve kurumsal engelleri incelediğinde de problemin bir kısmı Batı-dışı dünyada kuramlaştırmanın tanımının aslında ne olduğu hakkındaki karışıklıktan ortaya çıkmaktadır. Uluslararası fenomenlerin yerel olarak kavramsallaştırılmasını içeren çalışmalar üzerine yapılan incelemelere dayanarak, öncelikle “yerli” kuramlaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevre ülkelerde az gelişmiş ülkeler hakkında yürütülen örnek kavramsallaştırmayı çevr
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guanxi kavramına, yani Çince’de uluslararası ilişkiler anlamına gelen söz öbeğindeki iki terimden (guoji guanxi) birine, odaklanmaktadır. Görmüş göre ‘ilişkisellik’ guanxi’nin çevirisini için daha yerinde bir kelime olarak ifade etmektedir. Bu süreçte makale, ‘uluslararası ilişkisellik’ uygulamalarının, ‘uluslararası’ kavramı iki ya da daha fazla aktörün (farklılıklarına rağmen) diyolojik bir toplulukta uymuş olduğu karşılıklı-bağımlı bir alan olarak tanımlamak için bir fırsat olduğunu otaya çıkarmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çin Uluslararası İlişkileri, guanxi, Batı-sonrası uluslararası ilişkiler, ilişkisel uluslararası ilişkiler, ilişkisellik

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İran’da İslam Cumhuriyeti’nin kuruluşundan bu yana sosyal bilimcilere, Uluslararası İlişkiler bilim insanları da dahil olmak üzere, İran/İslami bakış açısını yansıtan ıscel/yerli kuramlar geliştirmeleri için çağrılmaktadır. Bu kuramlaştırmada bazı İranlı bilim insanlarının İslami metinler ve öğretileri temel alarak uluslararası yaşamlar hakkında fikirler geliştirmesine yol açmıştır. Buna ek olarak, son birkaç sene içerisinde Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerinin Avrupa merkezli doğası ile ilgili yükselen farkındalık sayesinde, Uluslararası İlişkiler biliminin uluslararası toplulüğuna Batı-dışı kuramlara daha açık hale gelmiştir. Bu açılda, yerli kuramlaştırmayı İranlı bilim insanları için daha cazibeli hale getirmiş ve bu konudaki münazaralar daha canlı bir hal almıştır. Bu makale İranlı Uluslararası İlişkiler toplulüğünün Uluslararası İlişkileri İranlı/İslami bakış açılarından kavramlaştırmaya ve kuramlaştırmaya girişimleri incelemeye ve bağlamalı faktörlerin bu girişimleri nasıl etkilemiş olabileceğine göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Makalenin ilk kısmı İranlıların bu anlamdaki başarılarını tasvir etmek için İran’ın uluslararası İlişkiler bilimini incelemektedir. İkinci kısımda uluslararası ilişki kuramlaştırmanın İranlı bakış açısıyla yapılmışsa mümkün ve tercih edilebilir olsa da, yapsal kısıtlamaların üstesinden gelmek için sürece bunun yapılamaçığını sonucunu vermektedir.

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