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In This Issue

In this issue of *All Azimuth*, we present to our readers a diverse selection of studies spanning mainstream disciplinary topics, such as the impact of China's rise, as well as powerful critiques of the discipline. We also want to highlight the methodological diversity of the present issue, showcasing rigorous quantitative research designs, well-crafted process-tracing of policy decisions, Leader Trait Analysis, and not to mention a commanding use of autobiographical research to critique the latent colonialism in the IR discipline. We are particularly interested in topics like decision-making and leadership on one hand, and contemporary debates in security studies on the other.

We open with “At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis” by Yang Gyu Kim and Félix E. Martín, who enter into a conversation with the deterrence literature to investigate American decision-makers' ultimate policy decision of pursuing a hedging strategy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The deterrence literature often focuses on the policies of the challenger rather than the choices of the defender in cases of deterrence failure. Nuclear revolutionists, who envisage a positive role for nuclear weapons in ensuring peace, and pessimists, those who ascribe limited utility to nuclear deterrence, offer rival explanations for the American decision, but neither satisfactorily explains the variations in the decisions of policymakers during crises. To amend this deficiency, the article employs process-tracing to track the unfolding crisis and the policy recommendations of key American decisionmakers, concluding that Soviet nuclear weapons did not fully affect American decision making until developments on the ground made such weapons feasible tools of punishment.

Our second article, “Exogenous Dynamics and Leadership Traits: A Study of Change in the Personality Traits of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan” by Ali Balcı and İbrahim Efe, inquires into personality trait changes in leaders. Specifically, they inquire into the role of exogenous shocks and incumbency on leadership traits. This topic is explored by way of studying Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's personality traits along seven dimensions of leadership, including distrust of others, task focus, belief in the ability to control events, in-group bias, self-confidence, conceptual complexity, and need for power, as well as how these traits have evolved not only during Erdoğan's tenure, but also as a result of traumatic events. The overall findings have important implications for the study of leadership as it is suggested that leaders who remain in power for a long time do not exhibit stable personality characteristics, and so a fixed-trait assumption should not be taken for granted.

The third article, Efe Tokdemir's “Reputation Building as a Strategy for Terror Group Survival,” investigates the staying power of terrorist organizations. Using data from the Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset and Global Terrorism Database, Tokdemir argues that terrorist organizations that rely on either positive (hearts and minds) or negative (coercive) reputational strategies are more capable of securing resources needed to sustain their organizations as opposed to organizations with more neutral reputations. However, organizations that pursue positive reputation-building strategies towards their constituencies also tend to attract more willing and loyal recruits, which positively affects their organization's survival. These findings suggest that effective counterterrorism strategies against entrenched terrorist groups cannot succeed unless predicated on winning the hearts and minds of their constituents.

In our fourth article, “Tianxia (All-Under-Heaven): An Alternative System or a Rose by another Name?”, Mehmet Şahin, contrasts the Chinese concept of Tianxia with mainstream IR theories, positing that their differences are less pronounced than is often argued. On the contrary, Western IR theories and Tianxia exhibit significant commonalities along dimensions like cooperation and conflict, possible levels of analysis, and the nature of international anarchy. The author further argues that some critiques of mainstream IR unfairly neglect the nuances in Western political theory, noting Western IR scholars' often overlooked

acknowledgement of the limitations of Western analyses and practices. Şahin likens Tianxia to a form of Hegemonic Stability Theory that not only shares similar assumptions as Western theories with respect to international hierarchy, but also seems to add legitimacy to the hegemonic aspirations of a rising China.

Our fifth article, “A Government Devoid of Strong Leadership: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of Turkey’s Iraq War Decision in 2003” by Samet Yılmaz, analyzes Turkey’s decision to deny military access to the United States and allies seeking to intervene in Iraq in March 2003. The Turkish government’s decision not to grant access to the U.S. is puzzling and has received attention because it showcases an instance in which a single-party government with a parliamentary majority could not pass a crucial resolution on foreign policy as the Turkish parliament proved to be the deciding actor. Reviewing earlier findings from a neoclassical realist framework of foreign policy, the article goes on to argue that unipolarity, the attitude of other great powers, and the U.S.’ resolve to be involved in Middle Eastern affairs created a systemic milieu that constrained Turkish foreign policy executives to pursue bandwagoning with the U.S. However, the Turkish government had yet to achieve domestic political cohesion, and in the initial absence of a strong leader who could coordinate the key institutional actors, the Turkish Grand National Assembly became the arbiter of foreign policy, resulting in a counterintuitive foreign policy outcome.

The penultimate article, “Hedging as a Survival Strategy for Small States: The Case of Kuwait” by İsmail Numan Telci and Mehmet Rakipoğlu, examines Kuwait’s foreign policy by focusing on the concept of hedging. Hedging, a strategy intended to reduce risks and uncertainties when neither balancing nor bandwagoning are viable, has garnered great scholarly attention, but small powers like Kuwait have received relatively scant attention, especially beyond its relations with its immediate neighbors like Iraq and Iran. Approaching Kuwait’s strategic conundrum through an analysis of Kuwait’s systemic, regional, and sub-regional environment, the article argues that Kuwait is pursuing a hedging strategy favoring China to offset risks brought about by American retrenchment from the Middle East while also pursuing closer relations with Turkey as a possible counterweight to Saudi domination.

The final article, “The Interactions of International Relations: Racism, Colonialism, Producer-Centered Research” by Deep K. Datta-Ray, reflects on the colonial and racist logics embedded not only in the International Relations discipline, but also in the heart of diplomacy. The core originally sought to make sense of world politics through an imperialist lens and with inappropriate analytical assumptions that have yielded fruitless results. While these tendencies have somewhat subsided in the core, owing to what the author calls a calculated forgetting of IR’s racist origins, scholars from the periphery seem to reinforce this intellectual hierarchy due to their predilection for overvaluing modes of thought originating in the West. This results in analytical violence because these theories not only come at the expense of genuine explanatory efficacy, but they also result in the squelching of scholars who do not replicate Western theories. To get around this intellectual problem, the article offers Producer-Centered Research (PCR), which operates on the logic of abduction and advocates a mode of inference better grounded in the unique context of the periphery. In the final section, we are treated to an in-depth analysis of the author’s own experiences and challenges with implementing PCR, which suggests that scholars in the periphery present a bigger challenge to a more pluralist and relevant discipline than their core counterparts.

At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

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Abstract

Recent studies in nuclear deterrence show that nuclear punishment is infeasible in most cases due to the opponent's second-strike capability, tactical redundancy, and the logic of self-deterrence. However, if the challenge against nuclear deterrence is expected to go unpunished, the deterrent policy is not credible and will likely fail. Can the defender violently punish the challenger possessing nuclear weapons? If it can, under what conditions? Thanks to President Kennedy's tape recordings, the Cuban Missile Crisis provides researchers an exceptional laboratory for testing various theories on the defender's policy choices after deterrence failure. This article derives a research hypothesis and its competing counterpart and examines their respective explanatory power via a process-tracing analysis of key members within the Executive Committee during the crisis. The study finds that the challenger's feasibility of retaliating with atomic weapons is a crucial predictor for the defender's policy choices.

Keywords: Deterrence, nuclear weapons, Cuban Missile Crisis, credibility, feasibility

1. Introduction

The Cold War generated multiple political and military showdowns between the Americans and the Soviets. They contended for geostrategic superiority and political influence in Greece, Germany, Korea, Hungary, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. All these crises heightened the intensity of their systemic rivalry to unprecedented levels. However, none was as extreme, frightening, or threatening to humanity as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. This crisis was unique because it brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. Besides U.S. General MacArthur's 1951 proposal to President Truman to bomb China and resort to atomic weapons in the Korean War—a suggestion immediately rejected by the President—the specter of a nuclear war was never as real until then, nor has it been since. The resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis brought pause to the superpower rivalry, and it probably saved the world from complete annihilation.

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Notwithstanding this positive outcome, world citizens still live in an international state system where several countries possess sufficient nuclear firepower to cause a cataclysmic disaster. Given the current references to a new Cold War between China and the U.S., the uncertainty of the first nuclear multipolar system in history, and tensions in the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani borders, it is instructive to investigate how American decision-makers reacted to Moscow's attempt to revise the status quo, and how their group-thinking evolved over two weeks, prompting the reformulation of a firm, new policy against the Soviet infringement in Cuba. This article focuses on this theme, seeking to discuss the implication of the crisis for nuclear deterrence literature.

Rational deterrence is a central theoretical notion in the study of war and peace in International Relations. Its prominence increased exponentially with the invention and proliferation of nuclear weapons, which raised the specter of a potential U.S.-Soviet nuclear showdown during the Cold War. The added urgency to understand and prevent a nuclear war produced an instant and keen interest among academics, policy circles, and the general public about deterrence theory and practice. Subsequently, the "four waves"¹ of deterrence literature significantly advanced the understanding of the conditions necessary for a successful operation of a deterrent threat, such as short-term military balance, costly signaling, domestic audience costs, and reputation for resolve, which could purportedly dissuade a revisionist state from initiating an attack.²

Nuclear weapons have been treated as a special instrument of deterrence with their unprecedented capability to inflict unacceptable damage. Accordingly, the traditional deterrence literature, especially the Nuclear Revolutionists mentioned below, regards nuclear weapons as the ultimate means to buttress a deterrent policy. However, various studies in the Nuclear Pessimist tradition show that nuclear punishment or retaliation is infeasible in most cases due to the opponent's second-strike capability, tactical redundancy, and the logic of self-deterrence. In this vein, if the challenger's defiance against nuclear deterrence is *expected* to go *unpunished* by the defender, then the deterrent policy is not credible and, thus, will likely fail. Consequently, the following questions about the possible aftermath of deterrence failure are pertinent: Can the defender violently punish the challenger possessing nuclear weapons? If it can, under what conditions?

This article provides answers to these two crucial questions by tracing who suggested which policy during the American deliberation process of the Cuban Missile Crisis. First, teasing out the theoretical implications of deterrence theory, it derives a testable hypothesis and its competing counterpart from the literature. Second, the article uses the Cuban Missile Crisis as the litmus test for the analysis. Given the presumable failure of the American deterrence threat in October 1962, the article focuses only on the American side of the decision-making process during the crisis. Accordingly, the study examines the evolution of the thinking process of key members of the Executive Committee from the beginning of the Crisis to its decision to quarantine Cuba on October 20, 1962. Finally, the article presents the conclusions of the analysis as well as the associated theoretical and policy implications.

¹ Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (1979): 289–324; Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," *Contemporary Security Policy* 31, no. 1 (2010): 1–33.

² Paul Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 27.

2. Theoretical Discussion: Policy Choices After General Deterrence Failure

2.1. The understudied topic: Policy dynamics after deterrence failure

Deterrence literature has focused on conditions for general or immediate deterrence success. There are two approaches in the literature: Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories. A more prominent approach is the Rational Deterrence perspective,³ which in turn contains four models: (1) the *Classical Rational Deterrence*;⁴ (2) the *Costly Signaling*;⁵ (3) the *Inherent Credibility*;⁶ and (4) the *Feasible Punishment*⁷ models. They share one fundamental assumption: The defender's deterrent threat is most likely to succeed when the opponent considers it *credible*. Nonetheless, divergence emerges from how each model defines threat credibility.⁸ The comprehensive list of significant variables for deterrence success includes (1) "offensive military capability;" (2) "probability of victory;" (3) "interest at stake;" (4) "war cost;" (5) "audience cost;" and (6) "military/political feasibility of punishment."

Few attempts, however, have been made to identify conditions for the defender's policy choice to respond to deterrence failure. This result is possible because, during the Cold War, failure was considered as the ending point of strategic exchanges: nuclear war and humanity's annihilation. Notable exceptions are Huth and Russett,⁹ Wu,¹⁰ and Danilovic.¹¹ These studies assume that the same independent variables suggested by the general deterrence theory will define the policy dynamics after the general deterrence failure. That is, the more credible the deterrer is, the more likely it will respond to the failure with crisis escalation from general deterrence to immediate deterrence and, ultimately, war. For example, the defender is more likely to punish the challenger militarily in a favorable short-term balance of forces if the expected utility of war exceeds the capitulation payoff, and when there is high interest at

³ Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict," 28.

⁴ John Orme, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," *International Security* 11, no. 4 (1987): 96–124; Paul K. Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): 423–43; Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (1990): 466–501; and Frank P. Harvey, "Practicing Coercion: Revisiting Successes and Failures Using Boolean Logic and Comparative Methods," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 6 (1999): 840–71.

⁵ James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (1997): 68–90; Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, *Perfect Deterrence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Branislav L. Slantchev, "Military coercion in interstate crises," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (2005): 533–47; and Branislav L. Slantchev, *Military Threats: the Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

⁶ Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); and Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*.

⁷ Roseanne W. McManus, *Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁸ The *Classical Rational Deterrence model* suggests that a threat is considered credible when the attacker believes that the defender possesses "the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an attacker in an armed conflict" and that "the defender is resolved to use its available military forces." Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict," 29. However, the *Costly Signaling model*, argues that capability and credibility are two very different concepts that need to be analyzed separately. Stephen L. Quackenbush, "Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011): 761. This leads them to drop the capability dimension in defining the concept of the threat credibility and to argue that threat credibility shall be "determined by a state's preference between conflict and backing down." Zagare and Kilgour, *Perfect Deterrence*, 83; and Quackenbush, "Deterrence Theory," 747. The "tying hands" strategy is a way to enhance threat credibility in this regard. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests" and Slantchev, *Military Threats*. Meanwhile, the *Inherent Credibility model* highlights that the interest at stake "shapes the opponent's perception of the deterrer's resolve." Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*, 5. Thus, it is impossible to enhance the credibility of a deterrent threat if it is for protecting a non-vital and unimportant national stake. Lastly, the *Feasible Punishment model* criticizes the signaling model for its attempt to focus merely on "costs of making or backing down from the statements" and emphasizes the importance of the ability to follow through on threats in enhancing the credibility of threats. McManus, *Statements of Resolve*, 11.

⁹ Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (1988): 29–45.

¹⁰ Samuel S. G. Wu, "To Attack or Not to Attack: A Theory and Empirical Assessment of Extended Immediate Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34 (1990): 531–52.

¹¹ Danilovic, *When the Stakes Are High*.

stake due to alliance ties and other possible arrangements. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons can dramatically change the dynamics of policy choice after deterrence failure due to their excessively destructive power.

2. 2. Impact of nuclear weapons after deterrence failure

There are two competing views in the literature on the significance of nuclear weapons for the stability of deterrence posture: *Nuclear Revolutionists* (hereafter Revolutionists)¹² and *Nuclear Pessimists* (henceforth Pessimists).¹³ The Revolutionists argue that due to their enormous destructive power, nuclear weapons have made military victory impossible.¹⁴ A minor military skirmish could escalate to nuclear war when crisis actors possess atomic weapons. Even a minimal number of nuclear penetrations should cause sufficient damage to the side that absorbs the strike.¹⁵ This dreadful image of nuclear war will surely dissuade crisis actors from making a violent move or having an illusion of victory in war.¹⁶ The “crystal ball”¹⁷ effect of nuclear weapons revolutionizes policymakers’ strategic calculations, and nuclear weapons shall promote peace.¹⁸

Surprisingly, however, many studies find falsifying evidence to the Revolutionist prediction.¹⁹ Statistical evidence shows that the impact of nuclear weapons capability is not statistically significant,²⁰ or fails to discourage crisis escalation.²¹ American deterrence has failed despite its advanced nuclear capability,²² and its weapons did not have a consistent impact on deterring the Soviet Union or China.²³ One possible explanation for these puzzling trends is that most studies cover extended deterrence cases, which inherently struggle to succeed. However, those cases of the 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Falklands War, and the 1999 Kargil War reveal that even nuclear powers’ attempts to protect their people and territories have failed often.

The Pessimists provide interesting explanations for these anomalies. First, according to Snyder’s famous logic of “strategic stability-tactical instability,”²⁴ “each side’s nuclear weapons cancel out the influence of the other’s”²⁵ under Mutually Assured Destruction

¹² Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989); Robert Powell, *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewed*, ed. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 3–45.

¹³ William L. Border, *There Will Be No Time* (New York: Macmillan, 1946); Paul Nitze, “Atoms, Strategy and Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 34, no. 2 (1956): 187–88; Colin Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham: Hamilton Press, 1986).

¹⁴ They can effectively destroy the “social and industrial heart of the enemy, so producing internal collapse and obviating the need for a traditional battlefield victory.” Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 3. A small nuclear warhead (20-kiloton) is estimated to have 10,000 times more destructive power than a 1-ton conventional explosive. The damage will increase tenfold if dropped in densely populated cities. Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should be Done?” *International Security* 16, no. 1 (1991): 5–41.

¹⁵ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 36.

¹⁶ Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1988).

¹⁷ Albert Carnesale et al., *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Bantam Books, 1983), 44; Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, 7–8; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Waltz Responds to Sagan,” in Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 114–15.

¹⁸ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, 23–38.

¹⁹ Harvey provides an excellent summary of these empirical findings. Harvey, *The Future’s Back*, 22–32.

²⁰ Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?”; Huth and Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation.”

²¹ Daniel S. Geller, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 2 (1990): 291–310.

²² George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*.

²³ Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987).

²⁴ Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury ed., *The Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965): 184–201.

²⁵ Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, 20.

(MAD). As it becomes almost nonsensical to fight with the high-level violence of a nuclear strike, crisis actors might believe it is safer and more feasible to turn to lower levels of assault.

Second, if it is a non-MAD situation, the logic of “preventive war” could encourage a superior nuclear power to destroy a much weaker nuclear adversary that lacks second-strike capability.²⁶ Nevertheless, a preventive attack is most likely to involve surgical strikes against the opponent’s nuclear facilities, which would make the balance of conventional forces matter more than that of nuclear weapons.²⁷ Thus, nuclear weapons are often redundant under non-MAD conditions.²⁸

Third, nuclear powers would be “self-deterred” from punishing the adversary due to the enormous economic, political, and normative costs they must pay.²⁹ The weapons’ destructive power is excessive, killing both combatants and non-combatants disproportionately, and nuclear punishment easily violates important international norms such as the UN Charter and the Nuremberg principles.³⁰ Subsequently, the weapons’ actual use could bring about political isolation from the international community, domestic backlash, loss of foreign investments, a coalition of balancing force, or even nuclear attacks by others.³¹

A recent study finds that American policymakers were reluctant to use nuclear weapons for punishing their adversaries through the analysis of the U.S. political-military wargames from 1958 to 1972. The key rationale supporting this choice was the adversary’s second-strike capability, lack of tactical necessity to use the weapons, and fear of setting the precedent of using atomic weapons.³² In other words, sanctioning the challenger with nuclear weapons is unlikely until the defender successfully turns to these weapons as a feasible punishment tool. If this Pessimist theory were applied to the case at hand, it is highly probable that the original cause for the general deterrence failure—that is, Soviet defiance of the U.S. deterrent threat to avoid transforming Cuba into its forward military base—was the inherent low credibility of punishment with nuclear weapons.

If the Pessimist approach can predict Moscow’s rationale undergirding its move to deploy middle-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, will this theory continue to be relevant in explaining Washington’s reaction during the Cuban Missile Crisis? Given that the crisis broke out under the MAD context between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, policymakers in Washington might have pursued a violent punishment path anticipating non-nuclear retaliation by the USSR, as the Pessimists suggest. Nevertheless, it is plausible that the “crystal ball” effect ultimately led some cooler-headed security advisors to forgo recommending escalatory measures. The next section advances a hypothesis and its competing counterpart to test the relevance of the Revolutionist and Pessimist theories in explaining moves made by the U.S. during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

²⁶ Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 46–88.

²⁷ Lyle J. Goldstein, *Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

²⁸ Todd S. Sechser and Mathew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 47–8.

²⁹ Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005): 5–49; T.V. Paul, “Self-Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons and the Enduring Credibility Challenge,” *Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 71, no. 1 (2016): 20–40; Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*.

³⁰ T.V. Paul, “Self-Deterrence,” 33–9.

³¹ Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*, 48–50.

³² Reid B.C. Pauly, “Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint,” *International Security* 43, no. 2 (Fall 2018): 151–92.

2.3. Research hypothesis and its competing counterpart: The infeasibility of nuclear retaliation

The dependent variable of this study is the policy choice available to a defender after the failure of direct-general deterrence: (1) rapid escalation, (2) hedging, (3) gradual escalation, and (4) de-escalation. First, *rapid escalation* indicates that the defender decides to use actual force to respond to the general deterrence failure. Second, *hedging* means the defender's use of military force in a non-violent way to employ it as a bargaining chip. Third, *gradual escalation* implies its use of non-military measures. Fourth, *de-escalation* implies that the defender directly opts for a non-action course, surrendering what it possessed before the crisis' outbreak.

This study's independent variable is the *feasibility of nuclear weapons retaliation*. The ultimate *infeasibility* of implementing nuclear punishment makes American nuclear deterrence non-credible in the eyes of the Soviets. Washington also would not believe that Moscow would turn to nuclear retaliation if U.S. punishments stay below the threshold of using nuclear weapons. Thus, the Pessimist hypothesis posits that Washington D.C.'s policy circle should be open to violent military measures such as airstrikes and invasion.

The logic explained above would only change if the USSR were to successfully address the weapons' inherent infeasibility problem. The following two cases would meet this condition. First, Moscow secures full power projection capability to deliver the weapons. Second, American forces destroy or are about to destroy densely populated cities in the Soviet Union or Cuba, providing political justification to respond with nuclear riposte. Hence, the Soviet feasibility of nuclear retaliation is a function of Moscow's *military feasibility to implement nuclear retaliation* and the *degree of aggressiveness* in American policy choices. The rival hypothesis is the Revolutionist approach: mere possession of nuclear weapons, not the feasibility of their use, should make Americans refrain from taking violent measures.

Research Hypothesis: If nuclear retaliation appears *infeasible* to the USSR, the U.S. will consider *military options*.

Rival Hypothesis: If the Soviet Union *possesses nuclear weapons* (regardless of the type of nuclear balance), the U.S. will *avoid* punishing the defiance violently.

3. Case Study: The Cuban Missile Crisis

3.1. Case selection and methodology

This article tests research and rival hypotheses against the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is a remarkably rare case in which humanity may have been on the brink of a nuclear holocaust and the possibility of mass extinction. Thus, this case provides researchers with an exceptional laboratory for testing various hypotheses on crisis escalation and de-escalation as well as deterrence and compellence involving nuclear threats. President John F. Kennedy contributed to the elevation of this crisis's academic significance even further by recording almost all of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) meetings that took place during the portentous thirteen days. The availability of the Kennedy Tapes allows scholars to open the black box and analyze the decision-making process of the crisis actors at the critical juncture. This study tests the set of research and competing hypotheses proposed in the previous section against the American policymaking dynamic during the crisis. The article investigates declassified primary sources, the Kennedy Tapes, and memoirs

of the political elites in Moscow and Washington.

It is a single case study with a limited number of observations. This is a methodological inconvenience recognized at the outset of the study in order to work around it and use the case effectively. Of course, it is recognized that to test the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable, the study needs multiple observations that would produce variations on the dependent variable. In an ideal methodological condition, this would allow the study to engage in a controlled comparison. The unavailability of multiple observations makes the single case study approach a weak design of the research.³³

The study generates multiple observations within a single case study by disaggregating the data to address this shortcoming.³⁴ Consequently, this study develops more observable implications of the theory expounded above by running process-tracing on key individuals who integrated the various political elites within the ExComm over different phases of the thirteen-day crisis. Accordingly, every single individual who participated in each ExComm meeting constitutes an empirical observation. By treating the data as such, this article aims to conduct a “most similar system” comparison, analyzing the same actors at different intervals throughout the tense crisis.³⁵

This research traces the deliberation process throughout the ExComm meetings from the point when Washington discovered the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 15 and convened the first ExComm meeting the next day to the moment when Kennedy decided to take the naval blockade option on October 20. The analysis compares divergent perspectives within the ExComm. It attempts to demonstrate how different individual perspectives about the USSR’s feasibility of nuclear retaliation led policymakers in Washington to decide on different countermeasures against the Soviet challenge to the U.S. deterrent threat. Specifically, the focus of the analysis is on the following five individuals as separate within-cases in this study as they represent the final two approaches—“airstrike” vs. “blockade”—that emerged at the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on October 20³⁶: First, McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, second, General Maxwell Taylor, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, third, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, fourth, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and, fifth, President John. F. Kennedy.³⁷ The following analysis is based on the transcription of tape recordings of the ExComm meetings³⁸ and the minutes of the 505th NSC meeting.³⁹

³³ Many recent studies on qualitative methodology disagree with this argument. Their arguments are mainly based on: (1) difference between causal-process observations (CPOs) and data-set observations (DSOs); (2) importance of studying deviant cases; and (3) usefulness of with-in case studies. Henry E. Brady, “Data-Set Observations versus Causal-Process Observations: the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election,” in *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 237–42; and David A. Freedman, “On Types of Scientific Inquiry: The Role of Qualitative Reasoning,” in *Rethinking Social Inquiry*, 221–36; and Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Boston: MIT Press, 2005).

³⁴ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 48.

³⁵ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 81.

³⁶ The first two supported the “airstrike alternative” and the other two suggested the “blockade route.” Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997): 193–5. May and Zelikow break down these two groups into four perspectives that include: (1) *airstrike* (by Special Assistant Bundy and Chairman of JCS General Taylor and), (2) *blockade as an ultimatum* (by Secretary Dillon, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and CIA Director McCone), (3) *blockade as deterrence* or freezing the Soviet action (by Secretary Rusk), and (4) *blockade as an opening of negotiation* (by Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Stevenson, and Special Counsel Sorensen). May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 191.

³⁷ Kennedy, in the following passages, refers to the President, not his brother, Robert Kennedy, who also participated in the ExComm meetings as Attorney General.

³⁸ For the transcript of the Kennedy’s tape recordings, this study uses *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition* published by the Rotunda and the Miller Center.

³⁹ *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963*, Volume XI: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), 126–36.

3. 2. Kennedy's deterrent threats in September 1962

Before starting to analyze the ExComm meetings, it is important to check whether the U.S. made a clear deterrent threat before the crisis. Starting in August 1962, a series of reports arrived in Washington about a significant increase in the number of commercial ships sailing towards Cuba.⁴⁰ CIA Director John McCone believed that the astonishing boost of Soviet shipments to Cuba might be the harbinger of his worst nightmare: turning the island less than 100 miles away from the U.S. into a Soviet missile base. He feared that Khrushchev would always be tempted to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba to even the scales of nuclear balance significantly favoring the U.S. McCone first raised this possibility during the Special Group meeting on August 10, 1962, and called for the use of the U.S. military force only to be rejected by the majority of security advisors.⁴¹

The U-2 flight over Cuba on August 29 found that eight Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites were only one or two weeks from completion, and that there had been a significant increase in defense capability compared to what the previous reconnaissance flight found on August 5. However, instead of following McCone's proposal, Kennedy decided to give a fair warning to Khrushchev. On September 4, the White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger read the presidential statement that the U.S. was aware of Soviet technicians and USSR weapons such as antiaircraft defense missiles and motor torpedo boats in Cuba. Washington confirmed that they had not found "any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet-bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or other significant offensive capability." However, the statement added, "[w]ere it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise."⁴² Kennedy reiterated this warning on September 13, 1962, during the presidential news conference.

If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger, or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the *lives of American citizens* in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an *offensive military base*⁴³ of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do *whatever must be done* to protect its own security and that of its allies [emphasis added].⁴⁴

The Kennedy administration's warnings on September 4 and 13 confirm that the Missile Crisis was a case of deterrence failure. Yet, it could also be labeled as a compellence failure because, before Kennedy made those threats, Khrushchev had already ordered the implementation of Operation Anadyr and done things described in Kennedy's list of don'ts. These actions included authorizing deployments of two R-14 IRBMs regiments, three R-12 MRBMs regiments, thirty-three IL-28 bombers, thirty-three Mi-4 helicopters, forty MiG-21s, and four Motorized Rifle Regiments.⁴⁵ The first ship carrying SAMs and supporting

⁴⁰ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, 198–99; Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 511–12.

⁴¹ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, 199–204.

⁴² Mark J. White, *The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), 151.

⁴³ When asked by a journalist, Kennedy defined the "offensive force," as "a capability to carry out offensive actions against the United States." *Ibid.*, 156.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 155.

⁴⁵ "List of Troops and Commanders to take part in Operation 'Anadyr'," June 20, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov papers, 1887–1995, mm97083838, reprinted in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11. Translated by Raymond Garthoff. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/>

apparatus for the MRBMs left the Soviet port at the end of July,⁴⁶ and the first shipment, the *Maria Ulyanova*, arrived in Cuba on July 26.⁴⁷ In this regard, Kennedy's threats in September 1962 can be identified as a compelling threat in the eyes of Moscow.

However, the main element of Soviet forces that Kennedy was most worried about had not arrived in Cuba when he made his September threats. The first Soviet MRBMs arrived on September 15. It was two days after the announcement of Kennedy's second threat and eleven days after his first warning.⁴⁸ This fact, thus, still makes the crisis a *general* deterrence failure. Besides, Washington was not aware of Khrushchev's decision in June and responded to the crisis as if the U.S. general deterrent threat had failed. Therefore, after detecting the failure, the deliberation should be treated as an example of the strategic thinking process after general deterrence failure because the defender *believed* that it was such. Thus, those complications related to the true nature of the failure would not pose a severe challenge to this research's validity.

3.3. The first ExComm Meeting on October 16, 11:40 AM – 1:00 PM

This first ExComm meeting started with the report by CIA Assistant Director of Photographic Interpretation Arthur Lundahl and Chief of the Missile and Space Division Sydney Graybeal. They summarized what the CIA had found from the photos taken during the October 14 U-2 flight over Cuba: one MRBM launch site and two newly-established military encampments in west-central Cuba. However, many uncertainties put the committee in a challenging position in devising countermeasures. For example, Washington did not know: (1) how many other missile sites might have been under construction on different parts of the island; (2) when these other missiles would be operational; (3) whether the missiles had nuclear warheads or, if not, where they were stored; and, critically, (4) what the intention of the Soviets was.⁴⁹ In other words, while it seemed clear that Khrushchev blatantly challenged Kennedy's deterrent posture, the exact degree and depth of the violation was uncertain.

Secretary Rusk was the first advisor to suggest possible countermeasures. First, he defined the missile deployment in Cuba as a "very serious development," which the U.S. should eliminate. Secretary Rusk then proposed two general courses of action: (1) a surprise attack, but not necessarily an invasion of Cuba, and (2) a combination of non-violent measures that could make Moscow give up the missile bases.⁵⁰ Although he was open to both paths (*rapid* and *gradual* escalations), Rusk preferred the second option. For him, the U.S. was facing "a situation that could well lead to general war," and it would be essential to give "everybody a chance to pull away from it before it gets too hard."⁵¹

org/document/113050.

⁴⁶ Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 14, no. 3 (1989-1990): 149.

⁴⁷ Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 550.

⁴⁸ Allyn, Blight and Welch, "Essence of Revision," 152.

⁴⁹ Don Munton and David A. Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 51.

⁵⁰ The measures include: (1) stimulating the OAS procedure and operate through an OAS inspection team; (2) sending a message to Castro to warn him that Khrushchev would trade Cuba for Berlin; (3) calling up highly selected units less than 150,000 for emergency and reinforcing forces in Guantanamo; (4) creating confusion in Cuba using anti-Castro guerrilla groups; (5) alerting other allies; and (6) calling in General Eisenhower. May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 54–7.

⁵¹ "Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis on 16 October, 1962," Tape 28, John F. Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection, *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition* [The Great Crises, vol. 2, ed. Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: <http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/8020044> (accessed on July 17, 2020). All direct quotes in this section are from this source.

In response, Secretary McNamara tried to set a principle that any type of airstrike would only be feasible if those Soviet missiles in Cuba were *not* operational. Furthermore, he argued that if the final course of action were to involve a military measure, it should be either an invasion of Cuba or an extensive strike that could wipe out all related offensive assets (i.e., the missile sites, aircraft, airfields, and potential nuclear storage sites). Before the meeting was over, McNamara emphasized that they should decide on three separate issues: (1) whether Washington should inform the public about the discovery of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba; (2) whether the U.S. should conduct military action in tandem with a political measure; and (3) how much time should be allocated to prepare for effective military action. Indeed, similar to Rusk, he was open to both political and military measures, but McNamara's perspective (*conditional rapid-escalation*) was the most cautious one among all the ExComm members as he strictly set a precondition for the airstrike option: only *before* the missiles became operational.

General Taylor agreed with McNamara on the need to take out all the missiles once the U.S. Air Force went into Cuba. However, he was pessimistic about the possibility of knowing the exact timing of when those missiles would be operational. This uncertainty made General Taylor suggest that the U.S. should get "all the benefit of surprise" and destroy all the offensive weapons, including missiles, airfields, and nuclear sites, as soon as Washington acquired sufficient information on the locations of those targets. Simultaneously, the implementation of two more measures was suggested: (1) a naval blockade for the sake of preventing further deployment of Soviet missiles to the island, and (2) reinforcement of the Guantanamo naval base and evacuation of dependents from the garrison. Whether an invasion was necessary or not could be determined after this, he argued. His idea was the most aggressive approach (*rapid escalation*) within the ExComm.

Special Assistant Bundy's position was not clearly defined in this first meeting. He pointed out that a surgical strike should not be ruled out because of the "substantial political advantage in limiting the strike." However, Special Assistant Bundy also demonstrated his interest in a non-violent track toward resolution. When Kennedy summarized his staffs' positions into three alternatives—an immediate surgical strike, a general airstrike, and the invasion—, Bundy added that the committee needed to work out a contingency on the political measures as well.

In sum, although all ExComm members were open to some types of military responses, except for Taylor, the rest were cautious about going directly to a military punishment such as an airstrike (either surgical or extensive) or an invasion. They also revealed the varying degree of circumspection: the most reluctant among the three was McNamara, possibly the least hesitant was Bundy, and in between them was Rusk. President Kennedy did express that the U.S. was "certainly going to do [option] number one. We're going to take out these missiles" in the end and emphasized the importance of preparing for it. Nonetheless, he preferred to listen to his advisors' suggestions rather than push his stance during this meeting.

3. 4. The second ExComm Meeting on October 16, 6:30 PM – 7:55 PM

When the ExComm meeting convened at 6:30 PM again on the same day, General Marshall Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, brought additional information to the committee based on further readout of photographic evidence reported in the morning. First, there may be sixteen to twenty-four missiles in Cuba. Second, these missiles were likely

the solid-propellant type with an inertial guidance system, which would take about two weeks to be ready, yet could be fired on short notice once they became operational. Third, these missiles were highly vulnerable even to ordinary rifle fire. Fourth, the reconnaissance flight did not find any evidence of nuclear warhead storage. Fifth, they verified again that those missiles were MRBMs that matched the information provided by “IRONBARK.”⁵² These reports revealed that the USSR flagrantly challenged the U.S. deterrent threat but that American conventional weapons could quickly take out those Soviet missile facilities.

Since the missiles did not appear operational, McNamara backed the airstrike. He opposed any attack that could leave out some nuclear capabilities—missiles, MiG aircraft, airfields, nuclear storage facilities, radar installations, and SAM sites—on the island and specified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) unanimously supported this military option. McNamara explained that the extensive airstrike would require around 700 sorties a day, but that the U.S. Air Force and Navy could conduct the massive strike operation well beyond this level. Taylor concurred with him and claimed that it would be a mistake to take any limited version of the strike as it would attract reprisal attacks. He argued that there might not be a second chance once the U.S. attacked those bases. Taylor underscored that JCS’s position was that Washington would rather take *no* military action at all than to go with a limited strike.⁵³

From his vantage point, Rusk raised the issue of rendering warning, including a compelling threat to Cuba, before the attack. He shared a couple of measures suggested by his people in the State Department, namely (1) sending a direct warning message to Castro; (2) indicating the imminent danger rising from Cuba to states in Latin America that were vulnerable to communist revolutionary actions (i.e., Venezuela, Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico); and (3) letting close allies in Europe know about the situation. However, this did not mean that his position tilted to the political course of action. Rusk implied that the committee should discuss “what political preparation, if any, is to occur before an airstrike or in connection with any military action.”

McNamara opposed this political course of action because “it almost stops subsequent military action.” He was open only to an intermediate route that included concurrent execution of a declaration of open surveillance, a blockade, and preparation to attack the Soviet Union immediately. Taylor agreed with McNamara and emphasized that he “can’t visualize doing it [an air attack] successfully that way [announcing the attack]” as the missiles were the movable type that could quickly disappear into the forest. Although preferring a limited strike, Bundy also aligned with McNamara on the *surprise* attack idea.

When the majority was suggesting a massive strike, President Kennedy set forth his view from here. He agreed that Washington should do something because he warned Khrushchev twice not to deploy any offensive weapons in Cuba and “when we said we’re not going to, and then they go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then I would think that our risks increase.” But his position was different from that of others on two grounds.

First, Kennedy was very reluctant to eliminate the limited strike option as the crisis was

⁵² May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 78–82. IRONBARK was a code name for Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, a Soviet military intelligence officer, who provided information on Soviet nuclear capabilities to the U.S. He was exposed and arrested on October 22, 1962, later executed.

⁵³ “Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis on 16 October, 1962,” Tapes 28 and 28A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection, *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition* [The Great Crises, vol. 2, ed. Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: <http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/8020045> (accessed on July 17, 2020). All direct quotes in this section are from this source.

“a political struggle as much as military.” Efforts to destroy too-extensive targets were not very different from invasion and would significantly increase “the dangers of the worldwide effects.” In this regard, the selective strike was much more “defensible [and] explicable, politically, or satisfactory in every way.” Bundy wholeheartedly agreed on this and said the political advantage of the surgical strike was substantial as it corresponded to “the punishment fits the crime”—“we are doing only what we warned repeatedly and publicly we would have to do.”

Second, even though he acknowledged that public warning before the attack would “lose all the advantages of our strike,” Kennedy wanted to discuss further the way to inform NATO allies and fragile governments in Latin America. He wished to make a public statement due to the political merits of expressing Washington’s “desire to restrain.” Rusk responded that a combined course of action—the limited strike, plus sending messages to Khrushchev and Castro—was feasible. The reason was that the move to take out the offensive assets was “none other than simply the fulfilling of the statements” that Kennedy made earlier.

To sum up, almost every participant in the second meeting, except for President Kennedy, leaned towards the *rapid escalation* path. This increase of aggressiveness in the American policy choice was because it turned out that while the level of the Soviets’ challenge (sixteen to twenty-four MRBMs under construction) was severe, it seemed entirely feasible for the U.S. to take out those missile bases. They were not operational yet and very vulnerable.

3.5. The third ExComm Meeting on October 18, 11:10 AM – 1:15 PM

On October 17, President Kennedy resumed his regular schedule to avoid possible suspicions by Moscow. He met the West German foreign minister, attended a luncheon for the Libyan Crown Prince, and flew to Connecticut to support the campaign of a Democratic candidate running for the U.S. Senate. Meanwhile, his staff continued to meet and discuss possible countermeasures against the Soviet challenge. CIA Director John McCone returned from his stepson’s funeral and joined the team. The JCS came up with five different groups of targets with required numbers of sorties: (1) Target I—missiles and nuclear storages (52 sorties); (2) Target II—Target I plus IL-28s and MiG-21s (104 sorties); (3) Target III—Target II plus other aircraft, SAM sites, cruise missiles, and missile boats (194 sorties); (4) Target IV—all military targets except for tanks (474 sorties); and (5) Target V—all military targets (2,002 sorties). Key agendas for the ExComm meeting on October 17 were, first, which type of military action Washington should take; and second, whether political measures were to precede before the attack. Kennedy returned from his campaign trip on Wednesday night but decided to stay out of the discussion until the next day. The meeting went on until midnight.⁵⁴

The next morning, McCone informed the president of new findings from complete readouts of images taken by U-2 flights over Cuba on October 14 and 15 as well as from additional photographs taken on October 17. First, the reconnaissance mission discovered two more missile sites to the southwest of Havana that showed the pattern of a MRBM/IRBM launch complex. Second, the three missile bases discovered earlier seemed to have expedited the development. Sixteen to twenty-four missiles were now to be operational within a week. Third, two more cruise-missile sites were found at Santa Cruz del Norte. Fourth, the photo images revealed an airfield for IL-28s at San Julian.⁵⁵ These intelligence updates revealed

⁵⁴ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 119–21.

⁵⁵ “Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis on 18 October, 1962,” Tapes 30 and 30A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office

that the situation was much more dangerous than the ExComm members had first thought, specifically because of the IRBMs that placed ninety-percent of the American population in jeopardy.⁵⁶

It turned out that the Soviets had made an extremely dangerous move, and most ExComm members, including Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, and Kennedy, ruled out the non-action option. Rusk warned that backing down from the clear warning of the head of state would inevitably “free their [Soviets] hands for almost any kind of intervention,” possibly in Berlin and Korea. He also feared that non-action should “undermine and undercut the long support [from the public] that we need.” He recommended that Washington take massive military action with the legal basis of the Rio Pact or by the declaration of war on Cuba. Rusk emphasized that a surgical strike would involve “the greatest risks” because it was to aim at destroying a too-high number of targets. Nevertheless, he continued to share a more prudent voice in his department, especially the note⁵⁷ of Charles Bohlen, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who asserted the necessity of taking diplomatic actions before turning to any military measure.

McNamara sided with Rusk and underscored the need to remove any limited strike option, aiming to destroy only Targets I or II, from the table. The new intelligence indicated that the U.S. should at least destroy Target III. Leaving any Soviet nuclear capability behind would pose an enormous risk to the Guantanamo naval base and the eastern coast of the States after the airstrike on Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. However, he did not believe that a twenty-four-hour warning before the military action would adversely affect the success of the strike operation.

Taylor also agreed with Rusk and McNamara on the necessity of an extensive strike. However, he disagreed on the impact of warning before the attack. He reminded the committee members of the great vigor and swift progress in the developing Soviet offensive capabilities on the island, and that time was not on the Americans’ side. Considering the vulnerable air defense system in the southern part of the States, Washington needed to destroy IL-28s. Unfortunately, the new intelligence report showed that these jet bombers were in ideal and well-protected airfields. U.S. forces, thus, should wipe out the SAM sites before attacking those airbases. Also, IRBMs would turn the island into a powerful forward base of the Soviet Union. He was very skeptical about the merit of diplomatic action as it would never stop the Soviets from building up their capability. All the Soviet offensive missiles and IL-28s should be smashed with a massive surprise attack as soon as possible. This idea of a massive surprise attack, however, was not welcomed by others. Llewellyn Thompson, ambassador to the Soviet Union, argued that it would kill a lot of Russians, which should arouse a public reaction in Moscow. Under Secretary of State George Ball compared it with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and said: “It is not conduct that one expects of the United States.”

President Kennedy agreed that the U.S. should take some measures to punish Khrushchev for his flagrant challenge against American deterrent threats. Still, those actions should be conducive to lessening “the chances of a nuclear exchange” and maintaining “some degree

Files, Presidential Recordings Collection, *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition* [The Great Crises, vol. 2, ed. Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: <http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/8020048> (accessed on July 17, 2020). All direct quotes in this section are from this source.

⁵⁶ Muntun and Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 54.

⁵⁷ Bohlen’s major concerns over a strike without warning were threefold: the strike (1) would immediately lead to war; (2) might disunite the U.S. allies as the Soviet would choose to retaliate indirectly such as against Turkey, Italy, or Berlin; and (3) would be very difficult to be justified without the proper declaration of war. “Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis on 18 October, 1962,” *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition*.

of solidarity with our allies.” The unannounced attack, in this regard, was too risky. In the same vein, he was reluctant to declare war on Cuba, even if it was merely for providing a legal ground for the blockade, as the term gave an impression that the U.S. objective was an invasion. In contrast, warning Khrushchev might not only lead to minimizing the Russian casualties but also to Moscow’s backing down. Based on these arguments, Kennedy laid out a prospective course of action that included an announcement about the U.S. discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba and limited airstrike to take out only those missiles. He strictly went against the invasion. Instead, Kennedy suggested a possibility of trading missiles in Turkey with those in Cuba.

Bundy sided with the president and elaborated on the idea of a missile trade. Interestingly, he argued that this bargaining process could occur even if Washington made the “sudden strike.” During the talk, Bundy said, it was necessary to give a message to Khrushchev stating that the U.S. could understand the Soviet rationale of building these missile bases in Cuba and Washington was open to trading the U.S. base in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba. McCone opposed this trade idea, but Bundy replied that the crisis would eventually lead to the presence of Soviet submarines in the Caribbean, and this was “a political not a military problem.”

Based on this discussion, McNamara outlined the two courses of action that Washington could take: (1) “slow introduction to military action” (or *hedging*) that included a political statement and blockade and (2) the “rapid introduction to military action” (or *rapid escalation*), a brief warning to Khrushchev followed by a forceful military attack. Except for Taylor, all the ExComm members believed that Washington should notify Moscow in some way before the U.S. military operation against the Soviet bases in Cuba. Before they closed the meeting, Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy’s speechwriter, summarized the discussion by saying that there was a “general though not unanimous agreement” that “some kind of representation to Khrushchev ahead of time [before the military action]” was necessary.

3. 6. The fourth ExComm Meeting on October 20, 2:30 PM – 5:10 PM

The meeting started with the intelligence report as usual. This time, CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline updated the council on missile developments in Cuba. He reported that among those four to five MRBM sites, two of them were believed to be in the state of “limited operational readiness.” Also, the reconnaissance mission found two fixed IRBM sites under construction. One was estimated to be operational within six weeks, while the other would be between December 15 and 31. Although the U-2 flight did not find the nuclear warhead storage, the intelligence team supposed that these warheads should be nearby, given that the MRBMs and IRBMs would be “ineffective” without them. The report concluded with the estimation that around eight MRBMs were fully operational and ready to be fired.⁵⁸

The two courses of action that McNamara summarized in the previous ExComm meeting were developed into a Presidential message and a well-formulated scenario report. Because the intelligence report suggested that some of those Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba were operational, McNamara switched his position from *rapid escalation* to “blockade route” (*hedging*). Rusk, McNamara, Stevenson (U.S. Ambassador to the UN), and Sorensen supported this path. Bundy, on the other hand, converted from gradual escalation to “airstrike

⁵⁸ Mary S. McAuliffe, *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Darby: Diane Pub Co, 1995), 221–26; May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 191–92.

alternative” (*rapid escalation*) as he believed that a decisive action might lead to “*a fait accompli*” that would be difficult to be reversed by the Soviets.⁵⁹ Taylor, C. Douglas Dillon (Secretary of the Treasury), and McCone endorsed this course of action.

Unfortunately, as the ExComm members convened in the Oval Office, we do not have the tape-recording transcripts for this meeting. Instead, we have the minutes for this NSC meeting that are “exceptionally detailed” and included “two-turn exchanges” (e.g., argument and counterargument; question and answer).⁶⁰ However, they still lack “the intensity of exchanges” between the clashing approaches.⁶¹ This section, thus, briefly discusses the main argument of the two competing perspectives.

First, the “blockade route” was defined as a series of attempts to prevent the additional transfer of Soviet missiles to Cuba and to remove the already deployed offensive assets through negotiations (e.g., trading American missiles in Turkey or Italy with the Soviet ones in Cuba, limiting American use of Guantanamo). If Moscow responded with too-risky demands, the blockade could be followed by an ultimatum to remove the missiles backed by the punishment of an airstrike. McNamara knew it might take a long time to take out those missiles, and that it would damage the U.S.’s reputation, which would have some repercussions for domestic politics and alliance relations. This gradual escalation path, he believed, had at least four advantages: (1) causing less trouble to allies; (2) avoiding a surprise attack that would betray the American tradition; (3) taking the only possible military action that fit “the leader of the free world”; and (4) preventing escalation to a general war.⁶²

The “airstrike alternative” was a path to destroy all the missiles and the jet bombers simultaneously. Those who supported this course of action had the following rationale. First, the very existence of those missiles could not be accepted, and the longer they remained stationed there, the riskier the situation would be.⁶³ Second, this was the last chance for Washington to remove USSR offensive capability in Cuba because it would become impossible to locate them once the Soviets completed camouflaging the weapons.⁶⁴ Third, even though some nuclear missiles might survive after receiving the extensive American airstrike, Moscow would not retaliate against Washington with the second-strike capability.⁶⁵

Figure 1 summarizes the shifting positions of the American policymakers throughout the first four ExComm meetings.

⁵⁹ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 189.

⁶⁰ David R. Gibson, *Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 99.

⁶¹ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 202.

⁶² *FRUS 1961-1963*, Vol. 11, 129.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 129.




Figure 1: American Policymakers' Shifting Positions⁶⁶

On average (the line with circle markers), the ExComm members urged more aggressive policies as they learned more about the nature of the Soviet challenge. However, they swiftly toned down their approach as soon as the intelligence team informed them that eight MRBMs had gotten ready to be fired. Both Rusk and McNamara followed quite a similar pattern of the average fluctuations within the ExComm, though McNamara showed a more extreme change of positions. Bundy demonstrated a somewhat divergent tendency in his policy recommendations as he abruptly changed his position from hedging to *rapid escalation* accompanying an unannounced extensive strike on Cuba. Kennedy and Taylor did not display much variation in their policy choices. But they asserted very stark positions: *hedging* with political inducements vs. *rapid escalation* turning to surprise air attack aiming at all Soviet assets on the island.

⁶⁶ The numbers in the y-axis are dummy variables indicating different degree of aggressiveness in their policy choice. “0” means “Non-action”; “1” indicates “Gradual Escalation”; “2” is “Hedging (Non-violent Use of Military Force plus Political Assurance)”; “3” implies “Unannounced Rapid Escalation but Limited in Scale”; “4” signifies “Unannounced Rapid Escalation Involving Extensive Strike”; and “5” denotes “Maximum Retaliation Including Nuclear Attack”

3.7. Explaining the origin of the American hedging: Testing research and rival hypotheses

Table 1- Summary of the Decision-making Process during the Cuban Missile Crisis

	Actor	U.S. Credibility	Soviet Credibility		Policy Recommendation	
			Military Feasibility	U.S. Aggressiveness	Policy	Type
1	Rusk1	No mention	No mention	Undecided	Unannounced Surgical Strike or Warning	Gradual or Rapid Escalation
2	Rusk2	No mention	Low	Violent	Political Measures followed by Surgical Strike	Hedging and Rapid Escalation
3	Rusk3	Credible	Low	Extremely Violent	Announced extensive strike (declaration of war if necessary)	Rapid Escalation
4	Rusk4	Credible	High	Non-violent	Blockade	Hedging
5	McNamara1	No mention	Uncertain	Undecided	Conditional Extensive Strike	Conditional Rapid Escalation
6	McNamara2	Credible	Low	Extremely Violent	Unannounced Extensive Strike	Rapid Escalation
7	McNamara3	Credible	Low	Extremely Violent	Unannounced (or 24-hour Warning) Extensive Strike	Rapid Escalation
8	McNamara4	Credible	High	Non-violent	Blockade and Negotiation	Hedging
9	Taylor1	No mention	Uncertain	Extremely Violent	Unannounced Extensive Strike	Rapid Escalation
10	Taylor2	No mention	Low	Extremely Violent	Unannounced Extensive Strike	Rapid Escalation
11	Taylor3	No mention	Low	Extremely Violent	Unannounced Extensive Strike	Rapid Escalation
12	Taylor4	No mention	Low	Extremely Violent	Unannounced Extensive Strike	Rapid Escalation
13	Bundy1	No mention	Uncertain	Violent	Unannounced Surgical Strike or Warning	Gradual or Rapid Escalation
14	Bundy2	Credible	Low	Violent	Unannounced Surgical Strike and Negotiation	Rapid Escalation
15	Bundy3	Credible	Low	Violent	Announced Surgical Strike and Negotiation	Hedging

16	Bundy4	Not Clear	Low	Extremely Violent	Unannounced Extensive Strike	Rapid Escalation
17	Kennedy1	No mention	No mention	Violent	Unannounced Surgical Strike	Rapid Escalation
18	Kennedy2	Credible	High	Non-violent	Warning, Public Announcement, and Surgical Strike	Hedging
19	Kennedy3	Credible	High	Non-violent	Warning, Public Announcement, Surgical Strike, and Negotiation	Hedging
20	Kennedy4	Credible	High	Non-violent	Blockade and Negotiation	Hedging

* Numbers next to names indicate the four ExComm meetings from October 16 to 20, 1962.

How can we explain the divergence among the American policymakers (Table 1)? According to the Rival Hypothesis, when the challenger possesses nuclear weapons, the “crystal ball effect” gets activated, and the defender would not take any measures including use of military force. This self-containment is caused, first, by the use of violent measures that could escalate the crisis into exchanges of atomic weapons, and second, the war cost approaches negative infinity, and the probability of victory goes down to zero in nuclear wars. The Rival Hypothesis predicts that policymakers in Washington would possibly choose a *gradual escalation* path. This is because, first, Washington should not review violent measures due to the crystal ball effect, and second, the interest at stake is too significant to take the path of inaction.

These causal models of the Rival Hypotheses based on Rational Deterrence studies and the Nuclear Revolutionist perspective do well to explain the *general pattern* of American policymakers’ shifting positions. However, the models show clear limitations when tested against the *actual policy recommendations* each ExComm member made during the initial phase of the crisis. First, the final policy decided by the ExComm was not gradual escalation but *hedging*, that is, the combination of non-violent use of military force and political assurance. The Soviet nuclear capability on the island did have some crystal ball effect and constrained the U.S. from deciding on the massive air assault or invasion routes. Nonetheless, the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons failed to prevent Washington from adjusting the degree of violence below the use-of-military-force level. Although the blockade was a milder punishment compared to the extensive airstrike, it did involve the use of substantial military power that could trigger a major armed conflict, possibly a nuclear war. What would have happened if the Soviet ships continued on course and the U.S. Navy started to open fire on them? As Jervis rightly explains, the blockade was not merely a signal of the American resolve but “a threat that leaves something to chance.”⁶⁷

Second, the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles failed to deter ExComm advisors from advocating the airstrike option. On the contrary, most advisors asserted the necessity of forcefully removing those Soviet assets as soon as U-2 flights detected Il-28 jet bombers,

⁶⁷ Robert Jervis, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: What Can We Know, Why Did It Start, and How Did It End?,” in *The Cuban Missile Crisis: a Critical Reappraisal*, ed. Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (New York: Routledge, 2015), 15. This theoretical term was invented by Schelling. See Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 187-204.

MRBM/IRBM launchers, and cruise-missile sites on the island. They took it for granted that the U.S. should attack these bases. Their approaches diverged solely on the scope (i.e., surgical strike, general strike, and invasion) and the sequence (i.e., announced vs. surprise strike). It deserves close attention that the majority opinion was taking the *rapid escalation* path before a major shift occurred during the fourth ExComm meeting on October 20. The crystal ball effect only activated when CIA intelligence personnel informed the committee that some of these nuclear missiles were *operational* and that the Soviet bases in Cuba would be able to maintain a second-strike capability after absorbing an American airstrike.

Third, more interestingly, for Bundy and Taylor, even the possibility of the existence of the Soviet second-strike capability did *not* prevent them from advocating the *rapid escalation* route and urging extensive airstrike on all the Soviet bases in Cuba. It is fascinating to see that the introduction of nuclear weapons had no impact at all for some of the policymakers in Washington. These individuals believed that a blockade would only prevent further deployment of Soviet offensive assets to Cuba and could not do anything about the missiles that had already been deployed. The U.S. had only two options: either “trade [the missiles] out” or “go in and get them out ourselves.”⁶⁸ For those who did not like the idea of trading missiles, the forceful removal was the only option left despite the enormous risk it carried. In closing, the three points discussed above reject the Rival Hypothesis. Why were some ExComm members recommending the *rapid escalation* path of wiping out the entire Soviet bases on the island despite the MAD’s strategic condition and the possibility of a nuclear holocaust?

As posited in this study’s Research Hypothesis, the feasibility model predicts that Washington would *not* believe that the U.S.’s attempts to remove the Soviet bases in Cuba forcefully would result in a nuclear war under two conditions. These conditions include first, if Soviet nuclear retaliation were not militarily feasible, and second, as long as the Americans religiously turned to conventional forces. This explanation survives the smoking gun test. Discrepancies among policymakers in Washington precisely stemmed from their different estimation about the feasibility of the Soviet nuclear retaliation against a conventional American airstrike. The ExComm advisors recommended that Kennedy make either an announced or a surprise air strike on the Soviet missile sites in Cuba only when they believed that Moscow would most likely *not* use their nuclear missiles to retaliate against the U.S. attack.

For example, Rusk argued that as a nuclear attack would inevitably initiate a “general nuclear war” under MAD, Moscow should become very much restrained.⁶⁹ He, thus, just could not “see that possibility” of Soviet nuclear retaliation.⁷⁰ McNamara agreed with taking the airstrike option only when it seemed likely to destroy all the possible second-strike capability of the Soviet forces (i.e., MiGs, airfields, nuclear storage sites, radar installations, SAM sites).⁷¹ Taylor expected that after receiving the American airstrike, the Soviets would retaliate only with “some conventional bombing.”⁷² This prediction allowed him to persistently support the unannounced massive air strike option even though he knew that destruction brought by the most extensive attack would “never be guaranteeing 100

⁶⁸ May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes*, 283.

⁶⁹ “Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis on 16 October, 1962,” Tape 28, *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition*.

⁷⁰ “Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis on 16 October, 1962,” Tapes 28 and 28A, *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition*.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

percent.”⁷³ There would always remain some Soviet nuclear missiles ready for retaliatory action. It is fascinating to find that the transcript of the ExComm meetings from October 16 to 18 is full of statements that discredit the possibility of Moscow’s decision to use any surviving nuclear missiles in Cuba for reprisal.

However, the mood had changed when a few advisors pointed out that the Soviets might retaliate with atomic bombs. During the first ExComm meeting on October 16, McNamara argued that Rusk’s assumption about the political prudence in using nuclear weapons was misleading because it was uncertain “what kinds of control they [the Soviets] have over the warheads.” Specifically, the authority to shoot the missiles might be at the hands of the Soviet military leadership in Cuba rather than the political leaders in Moscow. In such a scenario, if U.S. fighters and bombers attacked the Soviet military command, they might press the nuclear button for defending their bases.⁷⁴ Besides, when the council convened on October 18, Thompson expressed his concerns that the unannounced strike would kill many Russians, and the U.S. would “end up the whole way.”⁷⁵ McNamara concurred with this and said, “If we’ve killed Russians, we’re going to go in,” which should result in escalation to war. If “they [the Soviets] can’t stop,” then the Americans probably “have to go on.”⁷⁶ In other words, McNamara and Thompson pictured a scenario in which nuclear missiles could be launched by the Soviet commander in Cuba when the Soviet death tolls rocketed due to massive American attacks from the sky.

Although it is not certain whether Rusk or other committee members bought their arguments, a similar rationale should have evolved within their minds for them to change their positions rapidly. The only difference from the October 18 ExComm meeting to that on October 20 was the change in intelligence report: from “not-yet operational” Soviet missiles to their state of “limited operational readiness.” The fact that (1) the Soviets could manage to maintain a second-strike capability after receiving the American airstrike; and (2) an American attack would slaughter a myriad of Soviet soldiers was *sufficient* for most advisors in Washington to shift their policy recommendation from *rapid escalation* to *hedging*. This explanation passes the smoking gun test for McNamara’s modified position because he precisely explained his rationale, and it provides the hoop evidence for other ExComm members’ convergence to the blockade option.

4. Conclusion

Although the general trend of change in Washington’s policy debate in the aftermath of deterrence failure follows the Nuclear Revolutionist prediction, the model fails to explain individual advisors’ specific positions at each information set. First, most ExComm members advocated the *rapid escalation* path until the intelligence team confirmed that some Soviet nuclear missiles had been operational. Second, even after this confirmation, Taylor and Bundy urged Washington to take a *rapid escalation* path. Third, the final policy decision of Washington was hedging, rather than gradual escalation.

This mitigated impact of the “crystal ball” effect implies that threats backed by nuclear weapons are not credible until the crisis actor successfully makes the use of these weapons

⁷³ “Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis on 18 October, 1962,” Tapes 30 and 30A, *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition*.

⁷⁴ “Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis on 16 October, 1962,” Tape 28, *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition*.

⁷⁵ “Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis on 18 October, 1962,” Tapes 30 and 30A, *Presidential Recordings Digital Edition*.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

a *feasible* tool of punishment. The ExComm advisors did not “think twice” about the infeasibility of the threat as Khrushchev had expected until they realized that (1) there might be some surviving nuclear missiles ready to be launched after receiving the extensive U.S. airstrike on the Soviet bases; (2) the control of atomic warheads might not lie in the hands of politicians in Moscow, but in those of the local commander; and (3) the considerable size of Soviet ground forces in Cuba would significantly increase the number of Soviet casualties when the U.S. air force struck the island. The Soviet nuclear weapons finally began to affect the Americans’ strategic thinking once these three conditions were met on October 20.

This study is not without limitations. Its most serious weakness is its limited external validity. Fortunately for humanity’s sake, there have not been many observable and documented cases of nuclear war near-misses. However, the analysis compensated for this limited number of observations by increasing the number of within-case observations by disaggregating the data into individual policymakers rather than treating this crisis as a single country. In the end, however, they are all *Americans*. The model this research suggests, thus, needs to be tested against a broader number of cases involving different regions, periods, and possibly the nature of various international crises.

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Exogenous Dynamics and Leadership Traits: A Study of Change in the Personality Traits of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

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Abstract

Do leadership attributes change/persist with experience in office, and after a dramatic event? Answers to this agent-structure question represent the main division line between situational and dispositional theorists. While the first posits that leader's actions are a product of configuration imposed by experience, and traumatic events, the latter focuses on persistent set of beliefs in leaders. This paper aims at testing the role of these two variables, experience, and traumatic event, on the personality of political leaders with a special focus on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. To recover the personality attributes of Erdoğan, and measure their resilience or weakness against experience and traumatic events, the paper uses Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) developed by Margaret Hermann. LTA assumes that leaders' choice of certain words in public speeches reflects their personality traits, through which they can be compared with other leaders, and even themselves in different roles and times.

Keywords: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Leadership Trait Analysis, tenure in office, traumatic event

1. Introduction

The last decade has witnessed the renaissance of leadership psychology research in the fields of political science and international relations.¹ As part of this renaissance, scholarly publications using assessment-at-distance methods to measure the personality of leaders have burgeoned. This new interest, using large-scale computerized text, pays careful attention to the issue of when and why leaders' characters change, and undermines the conventional wisdom of political psychology, according to which politicians are driven by consistent attributes.² Political psychology scholars have only recently begun to display interest in

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¹ Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes, and David G. Victor, "The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making," *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (2013): 368–86.

² See for example, Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); and Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, "How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Modelü," *American Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 1 (1984): 95–126.

this topic, amid extensive research on trait changes in social psychology.³ While one body of research has focused on incremental dynamics such as experience, aging, and learning, others have looked at sudden dynamics such as political shock and role change in order to understand how leaders' personality attributes change. However, these two sets of variables, incremental and sudden dynamics, have been studied in isolation. It would thus be prudent to examine interactions between these two sets of exogenous dynamics in a similar case.⁴

The theoretical objective of this study, therefore, is to further our knowledge of the role of exogenous dynamics in leadership traits. Inspired by Renshon's stimulating study of George W. Bush's strategic and operational beliefs, this paper will empirically evaluate whether situational factors affect the personality traits of political leaders by using the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) method.⁵ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the former prime minister and the incumbent president of Turkey, provides an excellent case for a study aiming to measure the effect of experience in office and traumatic events on a leader's personality attributes.⁶ Not only has Erdoğan remained in office for a long time (18 years now), he has even experienced traumatic events of differing magnitudes at various times during his ruling career.

In April 2007, when Erdoğan was relatively less seasoned in office, he was confronted with an e-memorandum from the military (Traumatic Event 1, henceforth TE1), resulting in snap elections in July. Later, during the summer of 2013, he faced a series of demonstrations known as the Gezi Park protests (TE2) after he had gained a considerable amount of experience in office, a time which Erdoğan himself referred to as his 'master' (*ustalık*) period. Finally, the July 2016 military coup attempt orchestrated by the Gulenist cadres in the army led to the deaths of 248 civilians and threatened Erdoğan and his rule (TE3). All of these events were existential threats to Erdoğan's political survival.⁷

Studying the effect of exogenous dynamics via the case of Erdoğan presents a major methodological challenge, i.e., making generalizations from a single case.⁸ The aim of this

³ Studies about the effect of exogenous dynamics on personality traits has recently increased especially in the field of social psychology. For an inspiring study dealing with the impact of specific love- and work-related life events on personality trait change, see Wiebke Bleidorn, Christopher J. Hopwood and Richard E. Lucas, "Life Events and Personality Trait Change," *Journal of Personality* 86, no. 1 (2018): 83–96. For a component review of such studies within the psychology discipline, see, Brent W. Roberts, Jing Luo, Daniel A. Briley, Philip I. Chow, Rong Su, and Patrick L. Hill, "A Systematic Review of Personality Trait Change through Intervention," *Psychological Bulletin* 143, no. 2 (2017) 117–41.

⁴ For an exception see, Jonathan Renshon, "Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 6 (2008): 820–49.

⁵ Renshon, "Stability and Change in Belief Systems"; Görener and Ucal provides year-based data to make comparison between Erdoğan's changing scores during his time in office (Aylin Ş. Görener, and Meltem Ş. Ucal, "The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 3 (2011): 370 and 374). They find statistically significant variances in Erdoğan's 6 scores for 2008 and his 5 scores for 2007, and attribute changes in 2007 to electoral campaign, and changes in 2008 to the Constitutional Court's narrow rejection of the case to close his party. Given the fact that 2004 and 2009 were also election years in Turkey, what makes the year 2007 so distinct was not election but the military intervention into politics in April 2007. In passing, Görener and Ucal (2011) also deduce an argument from year-based scores of Erdoğan about the lasting effect of contextual events. For them, this effect is "short-lived" simply because Erdoğan's changed scores in 2007 and 2008 return to the average level of the first three years (2004, 2005, and 2006) in 2009. Although the central aim of their study is not to measure the effect of traumatic events on Erdoğan's traits, year-based data provided by Görener and Ucal provokes readers to ask questions about the effect of traumatic events. Erdoğan encountered those traumatic events in his comparatively less experienced period and therefore any comparison of their effects on traits with that of traumatic events in his 'master' period can be very informative, which is one of the aims of this paper.

⁶ At this writing, no other published study has addressed these two situational factors through the LTA technique. A working paper on the effect of situational factors on leadership traits has been presented at a conference. See for this study, Esra Cuhadar, Juliet Kaarbo, Baris Kesgin, and Binnur Özkececi-Taner, "Changes in Personality Traits and Leadership Style Across Time: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting, International Society of Political Psychology, Edinburgh, 29 June -3 July 2017). For a more general overview of the Turkish political psychology see Cengiz Erisen, "The Political Psychology of Turkish Political Behavior: Introduction by the Special Issue Editor," *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 1 (2013): 1–12.

⁷ Soner Cagaptay, *The New Sultan: Erdoğan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey* (London: IB Tauris, 2017). M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balcı, *Turkey's July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why* (Salt Lake: Utah State University Press, 2018).

⁸ Brian Dille and Michael D. Young, "The Conceptual Complexity of Presidents Carter and Clinton: An Automated Content Analysis of Temporal Stability and Source Bias," *Political Psychology* 21, no. 3 (2009): 592.

paper, however, is not to arrive at generalized conclusions about the effects of traumatic events on leadership traits. Rather, it will unearth testable hypotheses regarding exogenous dynamics from the current literature on leadership psychology and bring them to the test in the case of Erdoğan (the congruence method).⁹ The paper, then, unfolds as follows. First, it will introduce the LTA methodology and how it is used to measure the change in political leaders' traits. Second, the related hypotheses are derived from the reviewed literature on the role of traumatic events on leaders' personalities. Third, the paper will reflect on Erdoğan's personality attributes and the changing scores of these attributes over time. Finally, the paper will assess theoretical ramifications of the empirical findings.

2. Measuring Change in Leaders' Traits

One of the most prominent and enduring techniques for studying political leaders' personality traits is the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) method, developed by Margaret Hermann after decades-long research. Assuming that the personalities of leaders have important effects on foreign policy outcomes, the LTA technique primarily assesses the individual characters of political leaders according to seven traits (see Table 1).¹⁰ In LTA, it is assumed that spontaneous speeches of political leaders (leaders' instinctive choice of certain words) before the public can reveal the presence of certain personality traits in leaders. The application *ProfilerPlus* (developed by Social Science Automation) is used to count certain words and phrases leaders use in their interview responses and to determine the individual scores of political leaders in each of the seven traits. In order to interpret the meaning of the results, scores for individual leaders are compared with the average result of 284 world leaders.

Table 1- Leadership Traits, Descriptions, and Coding Procedures¹¹

Traits	Description	Coding Procedures
Distrust of Others (DIS)	Doubt about and wariness of others.	Percentage of nouns that indicate misgivings or suspicions that others intend harm toward speaker or speaker's group
Task Focus (TASK)	Relative focus on problem solving versus maintenance of relationship to others.	Percentage of words related to instrumental activities (i.e., "accomplishment," "plan," "proposal") versus concern for other's feelings and desires (i.e., "collaboration," "amnesty," "appreciation")
Belief in Ability Control Events (BACE)	Perception of the world as an environment leader can influence.	Percentage of verbs used that reflect action or planning for action of the leader or relevant group
In-group Bias (IGB)	Perception of one's group as holding a central role in political world.	Percentage of references to the group that are favorable (i.e., "successful," "prosperous," "great"), show strength (i.e., "powerful," "capable") or a need to maintain group identity (i.e., "decide our own policies," "defend our borders").
Self-confidence (SC)	Personal image of self-importance in terms of the ability to deal with the environment.	Percentage of personal pronouns used such as "my," "myself," "I," "me," and "mine," which show speaker perceives self as the instigator of an activity, an authority figure, or a recipient of a positive reward.
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	Ability to distinguish complexities of political life.	Percentage of words related to high complexity (i.e., "approximately," "possibility," "trend") vs. low complexity (i.e., "absolutely," "certainly," "irreversible")
Need for Power (PWR)	Interest in gaining, keeping and restoring own power.	Percentage of verbs that reflect actions of attack, advise, influence the behavior of others, concern with reputation

⁹ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 81.

¹⁰ Margaret G. Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis," in *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, ed. J. M. Post (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003), 178–212.

¹¹ See, Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 178–212; Stephen Benedict Dyson, "Gordon Brown, Alistair Darling, and the Great Financial Crisis: Leadership Traits and Policy Responses," *British Politics* 13, no. 2 (2018): 121–45.

Most of the LTA scholarship looks at how specific leadership traits shape leaders' perceptions of the external environment, crises, and significant events. Reviewing scholarship using at-a-distance techniques for measuring personal characteristics, Kille and Scully come to the conclusion that "strong support now exists for the argument that leaders have particular and identifiable traits that predispose them to behave in certain ways".¹² Instead of looking at how pre-office variables,¹³ such as a leader's age, gender, military background, business experience, education, and inherited biology, form the traits of leaders, the LTA scholarship measures traits by looking at leaders' time in office and the effects of traumatic events on leaders, arguing that those traits shape political preferences and outcomes. To cite an example, Yang determines two different stable scores of conceptual complexity for both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Leaving aside the question of how those traits come to be formed, he finds that Clinton's higher score in conceptual complexity made him open to new information throughout his experience in office, resulting in a change in his previous policy towards China.¹⁴ On the other hand, Bush's lower score in conceptual complexity made him more vulnerable to traumatic events, causing a fundamental shift in his perception of China after the 9/11 attacks.

Like Yang, the majority of LTA scholars take leadership traits as a casual variable when it comes to the effects of experience in office and traumatic events on foreign policy changes.¹⁵ That means it is neither experience nor a traumatic event that first alters leadership traits to later produce a foreign policy change. Rather, it is some stable leadership traits that make experience or a traumatic event the cause of change in foreign policy. Although Hermann emphasizes the "effects of events and tenure in office" on leadership traits,¹⁶ there is a dearth of systematic LTA studies answering the question of whether a leader's personality scores (dispositional) are more/less affected by situational factors such as traumatic events or experience in office. Instead of these two factors, recent LTA research has examined the effect of role change on leaders' personality traits and found that when leaders experience a role change in their political careers, some of their traits undergo statistically significant changes.¹⁷ In addition to role change, the LTA scholarship has also examined the impact of experience and significant events, but only in passing. For example, in their study, based on the assumption that traits are stable, Cuhadar et al.¹⁸ touched on the effect of experience on leadership traits, but they found no significant correlation between change in traits and experience in office.

To assess the effect of exogenous dynamics on leaders' personality traits, we need fine-grained divisions in time. One approach is to split the time in question into equivalent

¹² Kent J. Kille and Roger M. Scull, "Executive Heads and The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the European Union," *Political Psychology* 24, no. 1 (2003): 175.

¹³ For a brief review of these pre-office variables see, Michael C. Horowitz and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Studying Leaders and Military Conflict: Conceptual Framework and Research Agenda," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 10 (2018): 2072–086.

¹⁴ Yi Edward Yang, "Leaders' Conceptual Complexity and Foreign Policy Change: Comparing the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush Foreign Policies toward China," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (2010): 415–46.

¹⁵ Among many see, Stephen Benedict Dyson, "Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair's Iraq Decisions," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, no. 3 (2006): 289–06; Vaughn P. Shannon and Jonathan W. Keller, "Leadership Style and International Norm Violation: The Case of the Iraq War," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3, no. 1 (2007): 79–104.

¹⁶ Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 220; Margaret G. Hermann, "William Jefferson Clinton's Leadership Style," in *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, ed. J. M. Post (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 313–23.

¹⁷ Esra Cuhadar, Juliet Kaarbo, Baris Kesgin, and Binnur Ozkececi-Taner, "Personality or Role? Comparisons of Turkish Leaders Across Different Institutional Positions," *Political Psychology* 38, no. 1 (2017): 39–54; Dyson, "Gordon Brown, Alistair Darling," 139.

¹⁸ Cuhadar et al., "Personality or Role?"

periods, such as one-year intervals or half-year segments. Another way is to divide time by case, whose effects on leaders' traits will be measured. Both are found in existing literature in the Turkish context. On the one hand, Cuhadar et al.¹⁹ look at how role changes altered Turkish leaders' traits and therefore they divide the time according to the moments when role changes occurred. On the other, Gorener and Ucal²⁰ split the time Erdoğan stayed in office between 2004 and 2009 into one-year intervals to determine whether there have been any changes in Erdoğan's trait scores as time passes. While the former is useful to measure the impact of significant events on leaders' traits, the latter is helpful in measuring the change 'experience in office' imposes on traits.²¹ In addition to these two methods, a comparison between two different groups of years is also useful to assess the impact of experience. For leaders who remain in power long enough, a comparison of the first four years in office with the next four can help with measuring the effect of experience, rendering the role of sudden events irrelevant.²²

To isolate the effect of traumatic events from other exogenous dynamics such as role change and experience, we use multiple divisions for Erdoğan's tenure in office. First, we generate two-year groups before and after all three traumatic events in order to measure the effect of traumatic events on the changing traits of Erdoğan.²³ A two-year interval provides ample data for covering a sufficient amount of words, and it also naturalizes the effect of other situational factors such as experience. Second, we divide Erdoğan's time in office into five groups of years, making it possible to isolate the effects of traumatic events from those of other exogenous dynamics such as experience and role change.²⁴ Erdoğan served as prime minister from 14 March 2003 to 29 August 2014, more than 11 years in total. Thus, we also split this 11-year period into three intervals according to government changes, because a comparison of Erdoğan's traits in three different premiership periods will provide useful data to measure the effect of experience. If experience involves changes in leadership traits, we need another measurement design to isolate the effects of traumatic events. Third, we measure together the effects of experience and traumatic events during Erdoğan's presidency from 29 August 2014 to 24 June 2018. In this specific time span, Erdoğan was not only president but also an experienced leader, a factor excluding the effect of role change and time in office. Moreover, he encountered a traumatic event in the middle of this time span. In order to generate two equal intervals before and after TE3, we extend the end of the first presidency term to September 2018 when Erdoğan was still the president. All in all, Table 2 demonstrates Erdoğan's time in office and the three traumatic events occurring during his tenure.

¹⁹ Cuhadar, et al., "Personality or Role?"

²⁰ Görener and Ucal, "The Personality and Leadership Style".

²¹ Hermann, "William Jefferson Clinton's Leadership Style".

²² Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 220.

²³ Cuhadar, et al., "Personality or Role?"

²⁴ Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 220.

Table 2- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Leadership Roles, Their Durations and Traumatic Event Moments²⁵



3. Theoretical Framework

In political psychology literature, three exogenous dynamics have attracted the most attention: traumatic events, tenure in office, and role change. With a special focus on traumatic events, we debate the effect(s) of three exogenous dynamics in interaction with each other. In this regard, we define traumatic events as large shocks “in terms of visibility and immediate impact on the recipient”.²⁶ Rather than as a psychological disorder, we treat “trauma” as a political one that is shattering and “results from human behavior that is politically motivated and has political consequences”.²⁷ Acknowledging the fact that other significant events can be categorized as ‘traumatic’ and included in the analysis, we have focused on the three aforementioned traumatic events given their relative severity in the context of Turkey.

Political shock stemming from a traumatic event²⁸ is an experience, however, unlike experience, it occurs in a specific moment. Therefore, it is different from experience acquired from being in office for a period of time. In politics, as Robert Jervis argued in 1976, “sudden events influence images more than do slow developments”.²⁹ Although Jervis provides historical examples, he does not put his hypothetical argument to an empirical test. Two decades later, Paul F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz³⁰ looked at the role of “political shocks” at the system and state levels in the beginning and at the termination of rivalries. While they left individual shocks less examined, Diehl and Goertz posit in passing that “some

²⁵ See, Cuhadar, et al., “Changes in Personality Traits”; and The website for The Presidency of the Republic of Turkey at <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/receptayyiperdogan/biography/>, accessed June 9, 2018.

²⁶ Charles F. Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (1990): 12.

²⁷ Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, “The Antinomies of Collective Political Trauma: A Pre-Theory,” *Political Psychology* 18, no. 4 (1997): 864.

²⁸ Dramatic event, traumatic event, major events, and formative event are used interchangeably for events whose effect on political leaders is fundamental, leading to change in some (or all) attributes of leaders. See, Benjamin E. Goldsmith, *Imitation in International Relations: Observational Learning, Analogies, and Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 11.

²⁹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 308.

³⁰ Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks,” *American Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (1995): 30–52.

stronger individual shocks are also statistically significant” in explaining the onset and end of rivalries.³¹ Before studies using the Operational Code technique were conducted, the linkage between traumatic events and policy decisions remained a hypothetical assumption based on historical narratives.³² By looking at George W. Bush’s operational code before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Renshon finds that “traumatic shocks do have the capacity to effect fundamental change in individuals’ belief systems”.³³ In a similar vein, by looking closely at how the NATO military exercise ‘Able Archer’ transformed President Reagan’s mental construction of the Soviet Union in November 1983, DiCicco concludes that “dramatic events can help policymakers break free of [their] mental constructs, consequently making possible first step toward peacemaking”.³⁴

Both Bush (8 months) and Reagan (less than 2 years) were comparatively less experienced in presidential office when they encountered their respective traumatic events. Although Renshon and DiCicco leave readers uninformed about how traumatic events shape the character or mentality of experienced leaders, we can deduce from their research that leaders with less experience in office are particularly vulnerable to traumatic events. Similarly, Jimmy Carter’s philosophical beliefs underwent a dramatic shift when he faced significant international turmoil, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage affair in Iran, during his second year in office.³⁵ On the other hand, when Helmut Kohl, German chancellor, encountered the fall of communism and German reunification, he had been in office for almost eight years. Closer analysis of Kohl’s belief system indicates that although he shifted his priorities regarding European integration from economic issues to political ones, he continued his pro-European convictions after such traumatic events, resulting in no substantive change in his belief.³⁶ Similarly, Malici and Malici³⁷ find that the fall of Soviet socialism had no discernable effect on the control-over-historical-development attribute of Kim Il-Sung and Fidel Castro, two long-standing communist leaders.

H1: traits of novice leaders are more vulnerable to traumatic events

Are all leaders the same when it comes to the effect of traumatic events? In other words, what is the relation between leadership traits and traumatic events when the experience variable remains constant? For van Esch, openness to information is logically connected to the level and direction of belief change³⁸, and thus the lesson drawn from a traumatic event is most likely to change two attributes of a leader, cognitive complexity and self-confidence. Since openness to information largely shapes how leaders make sense of crises, the effect a traumatic event has on a leader is primarily conditioned by traits associated with crisis sense-making.³⁹ Then, leaders who score higher on conceptual complexity than on self-confidence

³¹ Goertz, and Diehl, “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries,” 27.

³² Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young, “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational Code,” *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (1998): 175–89.

³³ Renshon, “Stability and Change in Belief Systems,” 835; see also, Huiyun Feng, “The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist?” *Security Studies* 14, no. 4 (2005): 637–62.

³⁴ Jonathan M. DiCicco, “Fear, Loathing, and Cracks in Reagan’s Mirror Images: Able Archer 83 and an American First Step toward Rapprochement in the Cold War,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, no. 3 (2011): 253; see also Walker et al., “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis,” 185.

³⁵ Walker et al., “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis,” 185.

³⁶ Femke Van Esch, “Why Germany Wanted EMU: The Role of Helmut Kohl’s Belief System and the Fall of the Berlin Wall,” *German Politics* 21, no. 1 (2012): 43.

³⁷ Akan Malici and Johnna Malici, “The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?,” *Political Psychology* 26, no. 3 (2005): 387–412.

³⁸ Femke Van Esch, “A Matter of Personality? Stability and Change in EU Leaders’ Beliefs During the Euro Crisis,” in *Making Public Policy Decisions: Expertise, Skills, and Experience*, ed. D. Alexander and J. M. Lewis (London: Routledge, 2014), 57.

³⁹ Arjen Boin, Bengt Sundelius, and Eric Stern, *The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure*

are open to information, leaving them more vulnerable to traumatic events no matter how experienced they are in office. Rosati, however, finds that being relatively open to new information is not sufficient in itself to produce change in leadership traits.⁴⁰

H2: leaders open to new information are likely to change after traumatic events.

Renshon, in his study of the former US President George W. Bush, finds that traumatic events can permanently alter fundamental attributes of leaders, rather than simply causing a fleeting shift.⁴¹ This finding indicates that leaders who continue to stay in office do not change their attributes imposed by traumatic events. According to Renshon's findings, experience can only change leaders' scores on the control-over-historical-development attribute, which is interestingly resistant to traumatic events.⁴² On the other hand, Ziv finds that interaction with information flows over time and learning in office leads political leaders to better internalize this information, and in turn, reassess their beliefs.⁴³ This happens because a significant amount of disconfirming evidence indicates that the preferences resulting from a traumatic event may not be having the desired effect.⁴⁴ Therefore, traits consolidated by experience are the main obstacle before learning from traumatic events. These two findings, taken together, propose that when traits are influenced by experience or a traumatic event, they become more resistant to new exogenous factors.

H3: traits once changed by exogenous factors are more resistant to new situational effects.

4. Measuring Erdoğan's Leadership Traits

In gathering and assessing data, the LTA scholarship follows specific guidelines.⁴⁵ First, the LTA scholars select data from media interviews and Q/A sessions of a press conference, both of which are spontaneous. Second, those spontaneous speeches, available from different sources such as newspapers' archives, leaders' webpages, and transcripts of TV interviews, are collected. Third, if the leaders are non-English speaking, one can collect their English-translated responses to questions in interviews and press conferences across his time in office.⁴⁶ Finally, an adequate analysis requires at least 5000 words from those sources. When the data collection is complete, researchers use *ProfilerPlus*, developed as a computerized 'at-a-distance' method, for the assessment of leadership traits. This computerized program calculates each leadership trait according to a coding scheme and gives them a value between 0 and 1; the higher the value, the more leaders exhibit one trait. At this point, researchers focusing on change in traits through time use 't-tests' and ANOVA in order to assess if changes in scores are statistically significant.⁴⁷

To measure all leadership traits of Erdoğan, his responses to questions in interviews and press conferences from March 2003, when he was elected to the parliament, until September 2018, were collected. The data was retrieved from Lexis Nexis with the search terms "Erdoğan" and "interview". In addition, independent research was conducted to find

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), Chapter 2.

⁴⁰ Jerel A. Rosati, "Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Leaders: Addressing the Controversy over the Carter Administration," *Political Psychology* 9, no. 3 (1988): 478.

⁴¹ Renshon, "Stability and Change in Belief Systems," 839.

⁴² Renshon, "Stability and Change in Belief Systems," 834 and 839.

⁴³ Guy Ziv, "Simple vs. Complex Learning Revisited: Israeli Prime Ministers and the Question of a Palestinian State," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9, no. 2 (2013): 203–22.

⁴⁴ Goldsmith, *Imitation in International Relations*, 71.

⁴⁵ Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style".

⁴⁶ Görener and Ucal, "The Personality and Leadership Style"; Hermann, "Assessing Leadership Style," 210.

⁴⁷ Cuhadar et al., "Changes in Personality Traits".

interviews absent in the Lexis Nexis search. This data-gathering process resulted in an initial corpus of more than 70 million words that had to be downsized. A group of 7 research assistants and a researcher scanned all of the data to retrieve the most pertinent segments. Only interviews and Q/A sections of press conferences with President Erdoğan were included in the data in order to reduce the potential effects of speechwriters on the usage of language. The interviews were coded according to date considering that the primary aim of this study is to compare Erdoğan's scores across his time in office. Eventually, we compiled a corpus consisting of interview transcripts from March 2003 to September 2018, amounting to a corpus of 202,724 words. 204 texts were included in the corpus. Since the paper's primary objective is to assess whether the changes in Erdoğan's scores across time are statistically significant, a t-test was employed to analyze the data.

5. Results and Discussion

To measure the effect of the selected traumatic events on the leadership traits of Erdoğan, we generated four different charts below. The first one (Table 3) contains trait scores calculated according to the effect of three traumatic events (TE1, TE2, and TE3). The table presents before and after scores for each traumatic event in order to show which traumatic event changed Erdoğan's trait scores by a significant margin. The second (Figure 1) and third charts (Table 4) include trait scores calculated according to five different groups of years (PM1, PM2, PM3, PS1, and PS2). Variances among three groups of years (PM1, PM2, and PM3) show the effect of experience because these three periods are neutralized from both role change and traumatic event. If TE1 and TE2 had no effect on Erdoğan's traits, this might be because his traits remained stable during the period in question. If we find any effect of experience and role change on his traits, this may increase the confidence level of our findings about TE1 and TE2. The last chart (Table 5) compares Erdoğan's trait scores in different periods with the average scores of world leaders.

Table 3 shows that TE3 changes two different traits (DIS, and IGB) on a statistically significant scale. This finding has four significant implications for the hypotheses set out in this paper. First, the findings in Table 3 reveal that the magnitude of TE3 is comparatively higher than the other two because only this traumatic event has a significant effect on Erdoğan's traits. More importantly, only TE3 is confirmed as a traumatic event while our preliminary assumption that TE1 and TE2 are also traumatic remains unconfirmed. Second, the results of the analysis of TE3 show that traumatic events can dramatically influence traits of political leaders with a long experience in office. This finding clearly contradicts H1 positing that expert leaders are impregnable against traumatic events. Third, the results in Table 3 partly refute H3 because traits imposed by experience (see Figure 1 and Table 4) are dramatically changed by TE3. Moreover, in the case of IGB, the more a trait is influenced by time in office, the more it is displaced by TE3. Table 3, however, does not provide enough data to test whether traits imposed by traumatic events are altered by time in office simply because we do not observe any change in trait scores as a result of TE1 and TE2.

Table 3- T-scores of Traumatic Events

	TE1 - 27 April 2007 E-memorandum						Mean Dif.	t	P	df
	Before			After						
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N				
DIS	,227	,153	17	,190	,133	10	,037	,637	,530	25
TASK	,666	,170	21	,579	,116	14	,087	1,667	,105	33
BACE	,406	,196	21	,398	,114	13	,009	,142	,888	32
IGB	,179	,094	18	,180	,113	13	,000	-,009	,993	29
SC	,432	,226	14	,426	,165	11	,006	,076	,940	23
CC	,594	,099	21	,637	,110	14	-,044	-1,221	,231	33
PWR	,301	,161	21	,341	,131	12	-,040	-,730	,471	31
	TE2 - Summer 2013 Gezi Park Protests						Mean Dif.	t	P	df
	Before			After						
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N				
DIS	,188	,149	30	,219	,178	22	-,031	-,684	,497	50
TASK	,592	,119	32	,624	,178	23	-,032	-,807	,423	53
BACE	,407	,127	31	,407	,094	23	,000	-,015	,988	52
IGB	,123	,085	26	,109	,051	18	,014	,628	,533	42
SC	,380	,167	26	,335	,141	20	,045	,970	,337	44
CC	,598	,112	32	,598	,126	23	,001	,026	,979	53
PWR	,256	,115	31	,211	,093	22	,045	1,519	,135	51
	TE3 - 15 July 2016 Failed Coup Attempt						Mean Dif.	t	P	df
	Before			After						
	M	SD	N	M	SD	N				
DIS	0,224	0,135	21	0,308	0,165	31	-,084	-1,937	,058*	50
TASK	0,616	0,163	22	0,621	0,147	41	-,005	-0,119	,906	61
BACE	0,402	0,109	21	0,398	0,151	42	,005	0,127	,9	61
IGB	0,097	0,052	16	0,178	0,13	32	-,082	-2,409	,02**	46
SC	0,344	0,187	21	0,416	0,148	30	-,072	-1,535	,131	49
CC	0,576	0,154	20	0,63	0,132	44	-,054	-1,44	,155	62
PWR	0,242	0,074	19	0,298	0,154	37	-,057	-1,516	,135	54

Note: M, mean; SD, standard deviation; N, number; t, independent-samples t-test value for equality of means; p, two-tailed p value; df, degrees of freedom. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

The last implication is about H2. In three groups of years, including 2 years before TE1, 2 years after TE1 (see Table 3), and five years during PM1 (see Figure 1), novice Erdoğan's scores for CC are higher than his scores for SC, making him open to new information. Also, the fact that his average scores for both CC and SC during the periods in question are higher than the scores of world leaders again makes Erdoğan open to new information. Therefore, our results seem to contradict H2 because TE1 has no significant effect on Erdoğan's traits, despite his openness to new information. Since Table 3 does not confirm that TE1 is a traumatic event, however, it may be misleading to judge from these results whether novice

leaders open to new information are more vulnerable to traumatic events. On the other hand, the findings in Table 3 confirm H2 because TE3 alters some traits of Erdoğan, who maintained his openness to new information during his late time in office. But unlike van Esch's findings, TE3 has no effect on traits associated with a leader's openness to new information, namely conceptual complexity and self-confidence.⁴⁸




Figure 1: Comparison of LTA scores of Erdoğan across executive terms

Score variances in three premierships periods as shown in Figure 1 and Table 4 suggest that leadership traits are influenced by time in office. Four leadership traits of Erdoğan, TASK, IGB, SC, and PWR, undergo significant changes in the absence of a traumatic event and role change. Figure 1 and Table 4 also show that BACE and CC are the most robust traits against the effect of experience. The score of SC steadily decreases as Erdoğan gains experience. The t-test for the SC scores of PM1 and PM3 shows that there is a statistically significant change ($p=0,023$, $p<0.05$) as a result of spending time in office (Table 4). Although TASK and PWR undergo significant variations from one period to another during Erdoğan's premierships (Table 4), the effect of experience is not in one direction (Figure 1). Therefore, we cannot easily attribute variations in TASK and PWR to the effect of experience.

⁴⁸ Van Esch, "A Matter of Personality?".

Table 4 - One-way ANOVA Results of Erdogan's Traits by Different Executive Terms

Personal Traits	Executive Terms	Mean Differences between Executive Terms			
		PM2	PM3	PS1	PS2
DIS	PM1	-,000465 (,037282)	,011328 (,035719)	-,030804 (,045131)	-,096775** (,038783)
	PM2		,011793 (,035435)	-,030339 (,044908)	-,096310** (,038522)
	PM3			-,042132 (,043618)	-,108103*** (,037011)
	PS1				-,065971 (,046161)
TASK	PM1	,109262*** (,031145)	,075390** (,031489)	,044739 (,041045)	,055523* (,032264)
	PM2		-,033872 (,031489)	-,064523 (,041045)	-,053738* (,032264)
	PM3			-,030651 (,041307)	-,019867 (,032596)
	PS1				,010784 (,041901)
BACE	PM1	-,0036437 (,0302355)	-,0233299 (,0305844)	-,0108564 (,0397185)	,0037664 (,0311627)
	PM2		-,0196863 (,0309008)	-,0072127 (,0399626)	,0074100 (,0314733)
	PM3			,0314733 (,0402273)	,0270963 (,0318086)
	PS1				,0146227 (,0406687)
IGB	PM1	,022138 (,025132)	,052026** (,024949)	,052150 (,033005)	-,001532 (,025741)
	PM2		,029887 (,025132)	,030012 (,033143)	,033143 (,025919)
	PM3			,000124 (,033005)	-,053558** (,025741)
	PS1				-,053682 (,033608)
SC	PM1	,042040 (,041118)	,090114** (,039200)	,085500* (,047729)	,024369 (,042184)
	PM2		,048074 (,039531)	,043460 (,048000)	-,017670 (,042492)
	PM3			-,004613 (,046368)	-,065744 (,040638)
	PS1				,302
CC	PM1	,0126123 (,0255860)	-,0095142 (,0258745)	,0255102 (,0345395)	-,0343386 (,0261863)
	PM2		-,0221266 (,0261368)	,0128979 (,0347364)	-,046951** (,0264455)
	PM3			,0350244 (,0349495)	-,0248244 (,0267248)
	PS1				,0598488* (,0351810)
PWR	PM1	-,035642 (,027811)	,051891* (,027460)	,043018 (,036910)	-,017717 (,028834)
	PM2		,087533*** (,028546)	,078661** (,037725)	,017925 (,029870)
	PM3			-,008873 (,037467)	-,069608** (,029544)
	PS1				-,060736 (,038485)

Note: Mean differences with standard error in parentheses based on multiple comparison of LSD Post Hoc test. Mean differences is significant at the following levels, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Figure 1 and Table 4 are also telling more about PWR. When we exclude PM1, we observe that scores steadily decrease from PM2 to PM3 and from PM3 to PS1 (Figure 1), and changes from PM2 to PM3 and PS1 are statistically significant (Table 4). Unlike 2 years before and after comparison (Table 3), Table 4 also shows that TE3 changes experience-imposed scores of PWR during PM3 and PS1. From this, we can infer that experience and traumatic events have opposite effects on PWR scores, as in IGB and SC. The PM3 and PS1 scores of PM3 and PS1 periods for IGB, SC, and PWR are moved back to the scores of novice Erdoğan after the traumatic event of the 15 July coup attempt. Therefore, changes imposed by experience are not resistant to the effect of traumatic event, rendering H3 unconfirmed.

Table 5- Comparison of Erdoğan's scores in different periods with world leaders'

Traits	World Leaders	Erdoğan's Average	PM1	PM2	PM3	PS1	PS2
DIS	0,130	0,229 ↑	0,210 ↑	0,210↑	0,199↑	0,241 ↑	0,307 ↑
TASK	0,630	0,612↓	0,671↑	0,561↓	0,595↓	0,626↓	0,615↓
BACE	0,350	0,399↑	0,393↑	0,396↑	0,416↑	0,403↑	0,389↑
IGB	0,150	0,150 --	0,172↑	0,150 --	0,120↓	0,120↓	0,174↑
SC	0,360	0,402↑	0,449↑	0,407↑	0,359↓	0,363↑	0,424↑
CC	0,590	0,601↑	0,597↑	0,584↓	0,606↑	0,571↓	0,631↑
PWR	0,260	0,279↑	0,284↑	0,319↑	0,232↓	0,241↓	0,301↑

In view of the above findings, it appears that the interpretation approach to LTA scores in most of the existing studies are problematic simply because scores that ignore one of the two exogenous dynamics, traumatic event and tenure in office, might be misleading. If these two exogenous dynamics have a significant effect on traits as this study reveals, it is misleading to use average trait scores for leaders who stay in power for a long period of time. To test this, we generate Table 5, comparing average scores of Erdoğan with his scores in different periods. For example, if we use Erdoğan's average scores in explaining his political decisions during the periods of PM3 and PS1, we will expect Erdoğan's scores in IGB and PWR to be higher than those of world leaders. However, his scores for IGB and PWR are lower than those of world leaders when we look at these two periods. Depending on which scores we use, our inferences about Erdoğan's decisions will be completely different. Therefore, the main task for LTA scholars is to solve the problem stemming from the tension between dispositional and situational effects.

6. Conclusion

Recent scholarship has shown convincingly that foreign policy change is not solely determined by international and domestic factors, but also by the prism of individual leaders' personal beliefs.⁴⁹ Instead of explaining policy change by comparing leaders in power with their predecessors or successors,⁵⁰ this study posits that personality shifts in a specific leader can lead to varying analytical implications. When a leader's behavior is studied over time, however, stable traits fall short of explaining why the same leaders behave remarkably

⁴⁹ Gustavsson, Jakob. "How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?," *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 1 (1999): 73–95.

⁵⁰ Stephen Benedict Dyson, "Alliances, Domestic Politics, and Leader Psychology: Why Did Britain Stay out of Vietnam and Go into Iraq?," *Political Psychology* 28, no. 6 (2007): 647–66; Keller, "Constraint Challenger, Constraint Respector, and Crisis Decision Making in Democracies: A Case Study Analysis of Kennedy versus Reagan," *Political Psychology* 26, no. 6, (2005): 835–66.

differently. Therefore, it is misleading to attribute fixed traits to leaders, especially those who stay in office for relatively long periods of time, leaving the change in foreign policy preferences in the course of an incumbent's term of office inadequately explained. In the case of Erdoğan, our findings prove that using the average scores of political leaders who stay in office for a long time and experience a traumatic event can be misleading. Instead of viewing traits as situation-free, LTA scholars should allow for the effects of experience and traumatic events as exogenous dynamics alongside role change.

Where might these new scores of traits originate? This paper looked at the most 'formative' factors in office, experience and traumatic events. However, as traits are also formed by pre-office factors in complicated and nonlinear ways, change in leaders' traits during their time in office might be influenced by numerous factors at play in a complicated way. Family affairs of incumbent leaders might be more important than traumatic events experienced in political life. If leader age does matter as some studies have proven, getting older in office makes the impact tenure has on traits more complicated.⁵¹ In methodological terms, this leaves us with two challenging tasks. On the one hand, it is a herculean task to put *all* factors in an empirical analysis. The main task of future studies, then, is to determine which situational factor is more relevant. However, the effect of exogenous dynamics is not free of dispositional traits. Leaders with specific characters might be influenced more by some situational factors. This is the second challenge for future studies.

Dispositional (focusing on leaders' cognitive properties) and situational (looking at leaders' differing environments and background experiences) studies in political psychology within the IR discipline occasionally talk to one another.⁵² However, a study of leaders' dispositional traits together with leader-level situational variables can demonstrate that the dispositional characteristics of leaders are fluid rather than fixed.⁵³ Especially for leaders who remain in power for a long time, the combination of dispositional traits with situational factors can provide a deeper understanding of leadership personality. Although this finding is based solely on the case of Erdoğan, the effect of situational dynamics on dispositional traits can be tested by new studies examining traits of leaders who stay in office for a very long time, such as Vladimir Putin of Russia and Angela Merkel of Germany. Such new research may not only test results from the Erdoğan case, but can also potentially update the relevance of some hypotheses in this paper and add more important ones into the hypothesis catalogue.

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⁵¹ See, Daehee Bak and Glenn Palmer, "Testing the Biden Hypotheses: Leader Tenure, Age, and International Conflict," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, no. 3 (2010): 257–73; and Michael Horowitz, Rose McDermott, and Allan C. Stam, "Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 5 (2005): 661–85.

⁵² Joshua D. Kertzer and Dustin Tingley, "Political Psychology in International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms," *Annual Review of Political Science* no. 21 (2018): 319–39.

⁵³ Joshua D. Kertzer, *Resolve in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

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Reputation Building as a Strategy for Terror Group Survival

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Abstract

In this paper I investigate terror groups' survival. The fate of terrorists hinges heavily on the power the terror group derives from its reputation. The reputation, which depends on policies and actions the group takes within their constituency, determines the degree to which each group can find recruits, resources, and support for its cause. I contend that terror groups investing on positive or negative reputation within their constituency— the people they claim to represent—are likely to survive longer. Yet, I argue, building a positive reputation has a greater impact on a group's staying power given that this attracts loyal and committed supporters. Conversely, groups with no clearly defined reputation-building policies undergo an organizational change. I find support for my expectations by testing my arguments over all domestic terror groups active between 1980 and 2011 using the RTG and GTD databases. The findings reveal that once a terrorist group is formed, it is exceedingly difficult to obliterate it so long as it follows a clear reputational strategy to achieve their goals.

Keywords: Terrorist groups, group survival, reputational strategies

1. Introduction

Boko Haram, a fundamentalist terror group in Nigeria, has abducted over 500 schoolboys, seized towns and territories, and killed thousands of civilians since its inception in 2002. Despite being highly unpopular among Muslim Nigerians, the constituency it is claiming to represent, and the efficacy of the Nigerian military and police forces that continue hunting it down, the terror group is yet to be defeated. How does a brutal, unpopular terror group like Boko Haram manage to survive? True, terrorism is a relatively inexpensive tactic and easy to conduct, with many potential benefits such that even groups with meager resources can linger on.¹ Nevertheless, groups who used terror tactics in the past like the Red Brigades in Italy or al Gama'a al-Islamiyya in Egypt have long been defeated. While terrorism, as a tactic, can prolong the survival of non-state actors, this variation in terrorist groups' survival records poses an interesting puzzle. In this project, I seek to resolve this puzzle.

While state sponsorship of terrorism has dwindled in the aftermath of the Cold War,² acquiring internal resources, whether they are about material or non-material sources of

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¹ Leonard Weinberg, *The End of Terrorism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012).

² Belgin San-Akca, *States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (1999): 145–67.

supply, continues to matter for non-state actors and even more so in the absence of external patronage. In line with Akcınaroğlu and Tokdemir, I argue that groups engaging in the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of their constituencies (positive reputation building) are well equipped to sustain the internal resources required for the survival of the group.³ This result also applies, however, to groups like Boko Haram that conversely adopt coercive policies (negative reputation building) such as kidnapping, forced recruitment, or extortion, which terrorize their own constituency. Both types of terror groups are able to find money, food, recruits, and safe havens to continue their activities. The key differences, however, are in the way they obtain these resources, voluntary in the former case and coercive in the latter, which affects the relative success of positive versus negative reputation on group survival. Terror groups seeking constituency support achieve not only a high level of internal resources (e.g. many recruits) but also of high-quality resources (e.g. committed recruits). In contrast, groups that use coercive tactics achieve the former but not the latter, which in return reduce the life span of the groups.

Lastly, I argue that groups with neutral reputations are more likely to opt for organizational transformation as, lacking full legitimacy, such groups have the motivation to experiment with change, while the minimum acceptable level of legitimacy they have lowers the risks of change. In sum, I argue that reputation building strategies that help achieve both quantity and quality in internal resources matter in understanding groups' survival.

The contribution of this article is fourfold: First, by offering an alternative explanation which builds on a non-violent aspect of terrorism studies, I demonstrate that the success of terrorist groups does not merely rely on their military effectiveness. Instead, I argue, it is also the non-violent strategies they engage in that provide them with necessary resources to continue their operations. Second, and relatedly, by focusing on the non-violent aspect of the story, I take terrorist groups as organizations that prioritize their survival. Hence, terrorist groups are not only determined to resort to violence, and to sacrifice themselves to achieve their political goals, but also to survive for post-conflict setting. Thirdly, while my arguments can equally apply to groups using guerilla tactics, my focus in this paper is exclusively on non-state actors using terror tactics. After all, since terrorism is a tactic of the weak, the need to find resources should be more pronounced for such groups, and the impact of reputation building in their constituency is expected to be more vital for their survival. Hence, I go beyond group level indicators of capabilities such as peak size to comprehend group viability.⁴ Instead I look at group strategies of reputation building as a signal of the quantity and quality of internal resources vital for survival. Since reputation building is a lengthy process, it works as a credible and costly signal of the group's short- and long-term potential to survive.⁵ I argue that reputation provides a better assessment of the real capabilities of each terror group rather than its current size. Specifically, those groups with high constituency support are the ones most likely to survive. Fourth, as a policy implication based on the findings, I contend that counterterrorism strategies should be geared towards weakening the reputation base of groups that enjoy legitimacy within their constituency by

³ Seden Akcınaroğlu and Efe Tokdemir, "To Instill Fear or Love: Terrorist Groups and the Strategy of Building Reputation," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35, no. 4 (2018): 355–77.

⁴ Seth Jones and M. C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda* (Santa Barbara, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008); Brock Blomberg, Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, "Terrorist Group Survival: Ideology, Tactics, and Base of Operations," *Public Choice* 149, no. 3/4 (2011): 441–63.

⁵ Akcınaroğlu and Tokdemir, "To Instill Fear or Love".

substituting for the group provision of public goods and addressing the roots of grievances through political and economic reforms.

In the next section, I discuss previous work on terrorism to lay out my contribution to the literature. Then, I outline the main argument in the theory section by hypothesizing the relationship between positive/negative reputation in terror groups' constituency and group survival. In the research design section, I discuss the data and coding, which is followed by the findings in the analysis section. Lastly, I conclude the research by way of discussing the policy implications of the argument.

2. What We Already Know about the Survival of Terror Groups

Group level quantitative studies of terror groups is still a recent development in the literature, and only a few have investigated the survival of terror groups. While Fortna shows that terrorism as a tactic prolongs the survival of non-state actors, her work includes only rebel groups and does not shed light on what influences the longevity of groups among those who use terror tactics.⁶ Blomberg, Gaibullov and Sandler argue that both ideology and tactics matter in terror groups' survival.⁷ Specifically, they show that religious and capable groups, and those using diversified tactics, are more likely to be durable. Young and Dugan on the other hand examine the environment in which terror groups operate.⁸ By applying the theory of outbidding, they argue that strategic *competition between groups* leads to group failure where only old dogs, those with greater resources, can manage to survive. In contrast, Phillips demonstrates the role of cooperation between terrorist groups as having a positive impact on their survival.⁹ Blomberg et al. find that older transnational groups and those that are lethal are more likely to survive.¹⁰ Abrahms argues that branding is crucial in the success of terrorist groups, hence avoiding brutal attacks.¹¹ Lastly, Daxecker and Hess turn to government strategies to explain the duration of terror groups, basically arguing that repression helps them survive by creating a backlash against measures taken by governments.¹²

While I agree with the above scholars that capabilities, ideology, competition, age, lethality and resources are relevant indicators of group duration, I take a step backward and focus on group strategies of reputation building to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of why and when these indicators may matter. For example, terror groups with a positive reputation are more likely to find recruits willing to fight for them. However, while recruitment is voluntary in groups with positive reputations, groups with negative reputations are equally successful in increasing their groups' size by forced methods. The difference between the two types of groups, however, lies in their future viability and the level of commitment of their recruited members. While the first group can benefit from a continuous stream of committed recruits, the second group's viability is endangered by the limits of forced recruitment.¹³ Another

⁶ Page Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes: 1989-2009," *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (2015): 519-56.

⁷ Blomberg, Gaibullov, and Sandler, "Terrorist Group Survival," 441-63.

⁸ Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 2 (2014): 1-23.

⁹ Brian J. Phillips, "Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2014): 336-47.

¹⁰ Brock Blomberg, Rozlyn C. Engel, and Reid Sawyer, "On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorist Organisations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 2 (2010): 303-30.

¹¹ Max Abrahms, *Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

¹² Ursula E. Daxecker and Michael L. Hess, "Repression Hurts Coercive Government Responses and the Demise of Terrorist Campaigns," *British Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 3 (2013): 559-77.

¹³ Eli Berman, "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias," (Working Paper 10004, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004); Kristine Eck, "Coercion in Rebel Recruitment," *Security Studies* 23

robust finding in the literature is the relationship between a group's religious ideology and its survival. However, those findings fail to take into consideration other factor, for example, many religious groups such as Hamas, Taliban, and Hezbollah have built a positive reputation in their constituency by investing in healthcare, schools and charities which may explain why these groups may be durable.¹⁴ Young and Dugan argue that competition and greater resources overall decrease the life span of groups.¹⁵ Along the same lines, Nemeth argues that groups become more lethal in competitive environments in an effort to outbid others.¹⁶ Related to this, I argue that reputation building is a crucial mechanism through which groups acquire resources for lethality and distinguish themselves from rival groups in competitive environments. Those that can do this based on their good reputation can survive in a competitive environment while forcing others' demise. Thus, exploring group strategies of reputation building is in the right direction; the reputation of groups provides a comprehensive theory that merges most of the current findings from the literature, offering refined conditions under which those indicators are most effective, as well as suggesting other novel means to understand the survival of terror groups.

3. Reputation and Survival

A terror group, like any other non-state actor, requires resources to purchase weapons and food, take care of day-to-day expenses, travel, train, and fight. The viability of a terror group heavily relies on the extent to which the group can acquire these tangible and intangible assets. Terror groups can either find these resources externally and/or internally. States have often sponsored terrorism in the past to topple hostile regimes,¹⁷ but this trend has declined with the end of the Cold War. Of the 36 groups on the U.S. foreign terrorist organizations list in 2002, less than a quarter enjoy state support today. Hence, the importance of safeguarding internal resources has become of paramount importance to terror groups. How can terror groups generate these internal resources? At this point, Mao Tse-tung's wise quote comes to mind: "The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea."¹⁸ Like any other non-state actor, terror groups heavily rely on their constituency, the group of aggrieved people they claim to represent and fight for, to provide them with most of the resources.

Terror groups can differentiate themselves from others if they win the hearts and minds of their constituents, that is, by building a positive reputation.¹⁹ The process of building reputation is not costfree, but by spending meager resources on the welfare of their constituency, terror groups can send a costly signal about their commitment to the people they fight for. One way to win the support of the people is through the provision of public goods such as education, health, or law and order. Substituting for inadequate goods and services binds constituents to the group in a web of loyalty and affection. According to Chandrakanthan, provision of services by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) increased the loyalty of the Tamil youth to the group, created community support, and minimized the need for the LTTE to

(2014): 364–98.

¹⁴ Berman, "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground"; Eli Berman and David D. Laitin, "Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model," *Journal of Public Economics* 92, no. 10-11 (2008): 1942–967.

¹⁵ Young and Dugan "Survival of the Fittest".

¹⁶ Stephen Nemeth, "The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 2 (2014): 336–62.

¹⁷ Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Justin Conrad, "Interstate Rivalry and Terrorism. An Un-probed Link," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 4 (2011): 529–55.

¹⁸ Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Chicago, IL.: University of Illinois Press, 1937).

¹⁹ Akçınaroglu and Tokdemir, "To Instill Fear or Love".

resort to coercion.²⁰ Hezbollah spends millions of dollars on its Shia constituency; and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) established gender equality laws, adopted land reform, built infrastructure, and delivered social services in the areas it liberated, despite its scarce resources.²¹ By investing time and resources in the welfare of its constituents, both of the latter groups gathered thousands of voluntary recruits that helped them survive for decades against the powerful Israeli and Ethiopian armies respectively.

Using mass media, terrorist organizations can publicize the past and current grievances of the people, use myths and symbols to cement existing identities, and enhance the group's image by focusing on victories and reframing losses. A terror group can broadcast terrorist propaganda on TV, through the internet or in printed form, to inspire the masses by disseminating the heroic deeds of the fallen and the unwavering courage of those still standing.²² Terror groups can also form political wings or political parties to help consolidate grassroots support. Political branches can reach out to local people, spread the group's ideology and improve upon the negative connotation attached to its activities by highlighting the group's political aspirations. Thus, the provision of public goods, mass media advertisement, and engagement in politics all help to provide legitimacy to terror groups and bring much needed constituency support. The sympathy of the constituency in return helps groups remain active by allowing them to find a pool of available recruits to replenish or increase their membership to survive.²³

Like any other investment, positive reputation building brings not only short term but also long term benefits. People who believe in the terror group and fight for its cause are likely to pass that ideological commitment and conviction on to their close friends and relatives, and their children tomorrow. The members of the IRA, for example, belonged to the same families over multiple generations.²⁴ The means through which terror groups build a positive image, that is establishing a political branch or party and using mass media channels, make it easier to justify the group's ideology to those people whose motivational process has already been set in motion by their closeness to existing recruits.²⁵ In sum, while I acknowledge that positive reputation building requires resources, even small amounts of resources spent on constituents bring short and long term benefits that go well and beyond the groups' initial investment, thereby increasing the group's viability. Thus, I pose the following hypothesis,

Hypothesis 1: Groups with high positive constituency reputation are more likely to survive compared to other groups.

Not all terror groups choose, however, to invest in strategies that build a positive reputation. Production and distribution of goods and services, establishment of a political wing, and foundation of a press require effort and time, even if such strategies do generate ample internal resources. Alternatively, a terrorist organization may employ coercive tactics

²⁰ A. J. V. Chandrakathan, "Eelam Tamil Nationalism: An Inside View," in *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. A. Jayaratnam Wilson (London: Hurst and Company, 2000), 157–75.

²¹ Dan Connell, "Inside the EPLF: The Origins of the 'People's Party' & its Role in the Liberation of Eritrea," *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 89 (2001): 345–64.

²² Christopher Paul, "How do Terrorists Generate Maintain Support?," in *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Craigin (Santa Barbara, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009).

²³ Audrey K. Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009).

²⁴ Laura Dugan and Joseph Young, "Allow Extremist Participation in the Policymaking Process," in *Contemporary Issues in Criminal Justice Policy*, ed. Natasha Frost, Joshua Freilich and Todd R. Clear (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth: 2010), 159–68.

²⁵ Arie W. Kruglanski, Keren Sharvit, and Shira Fishman, "Workings of the Terrorist Mind: Its Individual, Group and Organizational Psychologies," in *Intergroup Conflicts and Their Resolution: A Social Psychological Perspective*, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal (Psychology Press, 2011).

(e.g. build a negative reputation) to bring in the required resources in the short run. Kidnapping civilians for ransom, abducting children or adults for recruitment, or extortion, all create internal resources vital for the group's militant survival. For example, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) founded in 1991 in Sierra Leone has employed cruel tactics to consolidate its power. It has recruited thousands of children and men forcefully, trained them to attack villages, loot, and set up roadblocks for the purpose of extortion.²⁶ Similarly, Boko Haram has acquired millions of dollars from kidnapping, drug trafficking, and bank robbery, and has forcedly recruited children into its ranks. These cases demonstrate that despite alienating their constituencies, groups with negative reputations can also manage to accumulate internal resources via coercive policies. Thus, I posit my second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Groups with high negative constituency reputation are more likely to survive compared to other groups.

So far, I have argued for the advantages of good, and disadvantages of bad, constituency reputation for terror groups. But what happens to groups that are unable to distinguish themselves either through good or bad constituency reputation—those groups that meander on an uncertain course? Or, what can these groups do to survive despite the lack of means to build good constituency reputation, or the means to avoid all the policies that build a negative group image? I argue that groups with a neutral image—those with neither completely good nor bad reputation—tend to terminate their operations given that they have neither carrots nor sticks in their arsenal to acquire necessary resource to maintain their operations.

Hypothesis 3: Terror groups with no investment on constituency reputation are more likely to go for organizational change than groups with good or bad constituency reputation.

Despite the acquisition of a high amount of internal resources, groups with negative reputation suffer from the quality of resources. Coercive policies create an abundant flow of recruits who stay either because of self-enrichment or flee at the first glimmer of opportunity. The use of threat in recruitment brings a constant need for policing to prevent defection, which in the long run becomes a costly investment for the group.²⁷ Terrorists rewarded for abducting kids and young men, forcing civilians to provide food, money or safe haven, learn to act without limits, often resorting to excessive and pointless violence, looting, and other types of crimes against the constituency they claim to represent. Having limited constituency support, the group leadership, in return, faces no incentives to discipline its members or punish them for their behavior towards their constituency.²⁸ Shortly, the absence of constituency support sets off a vicious cycle by making group members more reckless in behavior, which further diminishes the group's support, and induces incentives to defect to the government side.²⁹ In sum, groups with negative reputation can find the resources for group survival in the short run, but the low quality of recruits and the limits of coercive policies endanger the group's viability in the long run. Thus, I argue the following:

Hypothesis 4: The impact of high negative reputation on group success is likely to be lower than the impact of high positive reputation on group success.

²⁶ Myrian Denov, *Child Soldiers: Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²⁷ Scott Gates, "Recruitment and Allegiance: Microfoundations of Rebellion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 111–30.

²⁸ Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

²⁹ Eck, "Coercion in Rebel Recruitment".

4. Research Design

The data are in group-year format and include 443 *domestic terrorist organizations* operating over a span of 31 years and listed in the Reputation of Terror Groups (RTG) dataset.³⁰ The dataset is limited to groups with at least five attacks in the time period between 1980 and 2011, resulting in a total of 2,645 observations listed. By restricting the sample to domestic groups with at least five attacks, I aim to prevent any bias in the empirical analyses such as lack of a clear constituency or of intention to build reputation.

4.1. Dependent variable

For Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, the dependent variable is the survival of a terrorist group, and the length of survival refers to its age in each year. On average, terror groups survive for 15 years. I right censor observations that are still ongoing by 2011. For Hypothesis 4, I updated and recoded the variable, “ended” in RAND’s ‘How Terrorist Groups End’ database.³¹ The ended variable is coded in six categories: defeat, policing, victory, politics, splintering and merge. Among these categories, I coded *Success* as the dependent variable if the terror groups ended their operations by acquiring a victory through military means by toppling the incumbent government or declaring independence or autonomy, or engaging in political space as a result of a concession by the incumbent. Out of the 443 terror groups in the dataset, 37% achieved success, 43% failed through military defeat or policing, and 20% underwent organizational change (merging with others or splintering).

4.2. Independent variables

I use three independent variables to test the hypotheses: positive reputation (*Hypotheses 1 and 4*), negative reputation (*Hypotheses 2 and 4*), and no reputation (*Hypothesis 3*). To form these variables, I utilize six variables coded in the RTG dataset. The dataset first identifies the constituents of each group, and then codes three positive and three negative actions, which I combine and label as positive and negative reputation, respectively.³² The positive reputation variable is an additive index composed of public goods provision, media power, and political existence. Groups that provide public goods such as free education, security, or health services to their constituency can enhance their image. Second, terror groups that own a television or radio channel have the means to disseminate their grievances and spread their propaganda, thereby affecting the way their constituency perceives them. And last, terror groups affiliated with a political party, or those with a political branch can also increase their support at the grassroots level by spreading their political ideology and message. By adding the scores of each group on these three indicators, I arrive at a 0-3 scale that represents the internal-constituency reputation of each group.

The negative reputation variable is also an additive index composed of forced recruitment, child recruitment, and forced funding. Coercive strategies tend to be highly unpopular, with terror groups that do resort to abduction or forced funding generally alienating their support base. Adding these up, I created an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 3. And lastly, I created a no reputation variable by coding terror groups as 1 if they did not engage in substantive

³⁰ Efe Tokdemir and Seden Akcınaroğlu, “Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset: Measuring the Popularity of Terror Groups,” *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 2 (2016): 268–77.

³¹ Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*.

³² Tokdemir and Akcınaroğlu, “Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset”.

reputation building strategies (scoring 2 or 3 in either reputation dimensions), and hence score 0 or 1 in both positive and negative reputation dimensions. Scoring 0 and 1, in that sense, means a group was either not investing on reputation strategies at all, or only had limited investment on selected cheap strategies, which could have limited impact on the constituents, if any at all. The variable coded 0, if the group scored 2 or 3 in any of these dimensions.

4.3. Control variables

At the group level, I controlled for whether the terrorist organization is a rebel organization or not by referring to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset, as rebel groups that oscillate between guerilla and terror tactics may have more constituency support.³³ I also controlled for goals of terror groups, as groups with broader objectives are less likely to have constituency support.³⁴ I updated the *Type* and *Goal* variable in Jones and Libicki's data and I recoded the variable *goal* in a binary nature, with 1 indicating broad objectives (social revolution and empire) and 0 indicating relatively limited objectives (policy change, territorial change, regime change, and status quo). I controlled for *ideology*, as religious or ethno-nationalist groups are less likely to perish.³⁵ The term *International* codes terror groups operating cross-border, as groups with multiple bases may have more internal resources.³⁶ Since competition may hasten each group's demise, I also control for the number of terror groups operating simultaneously.³⁷

The findings in the terrorism literature show that contextual factors are effective in shaping terrorist groups' strategies. For example, Blomberg et al. show that democratic institutions enhance the survival of terror groups.³⁸ Higher socioeconomic conditions may indicate a larger state capacity, increasing the chances of achieving outcomes that are worse than the status quo for each group.³⁹ In contrast, extensive surface areas create monitoring problems for the state thereby facilitating the survival of terror groups,⁴⁰ while large supplies of discontented youth generate opportunities for group recruitment⁴¹ thereby increasing the chances of survival of each group. Thus, I added national level control variables such as the polity score from Polity IV, logarithmic area from Piazza, and the logged GDP per capita of the country each terror group operates in.⁴² Additionally, I controlled for the post-Cold War era, as state sponsorship for terror groups has shrunk with the end of the Cold War, thereby hastening the defeat of terror groups.

³³ Cronin, "Raw Data Downloads".

³⁴ Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*.

³⁵ Blomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler, "Terrorist Group Survival": Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*.

³⁶ Blomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler, "Terrorist Group Survival".

³⁷ Young and Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure".

³⁸ Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer, "On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorist Organisations".

³⁹ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 303–30.

⁴⁰ Joe Eyerman, "Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems," *International Interactions* 24 (1998): 151–70.

⁴¹ Paul Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, "Some Roots of Terrorism," *Population and Environment* 24, no. 20 (2002): 183–92.

⁴² James A. Piazza, "Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination, and Domestic Terrorism," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 3 (2011): 339–53.

Table 1- Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Positive Reputation	1.303	1.047	0	3	2641
Negative Reputation	1.217	1.118	0	3	2641
No Reputation	0.426	0.495	0	1	2641
N of Competitors	4.779	4.62	1	24	2619
Leftist	0.344	0.475	0	1	2521
Nationalist	0.413	0.492	0	1	2521
Religious	0.2	0.4	0	1	2521
Rebel	0.44	0.497	0	1	2641
Broad Goal	0.082	0.274	0	1	2489
Cross-Border Op.	0.172	0.377	0	1	2641
Cold War	0.328	0.469	0	1	2641
GDP (logged)	8.534	1.188	4.678	10.684	2458
Military (logged)	5.305	1.408	0	7.881	2553
Area (logged)	13.025	1.664	7.857	16.648	2573
Polity Score	5.196	5.627	-10	10	2506

4.4. Model specification

To test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, I employ a Cox proportional hazards model and estimate the impact of each terror group's reputation on the survival of each group. The basic specification for the Cox model is:

$$h_1(t) = h_0(t) \exp(\beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{ik} + \dots + \beta_k x_{ik}) \text{ or } h(t) = h_0(t) e^{x\beta}$$

where $h_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard, β 's are slope parameters, and x 's are independent variables. In this semi-parametric model, the hazard function, $h_0(t)$, remains unspecified while the covariates enter the model linearly. I report the hazard ratios which are interpreted according to whether or not they exceed 1; those ratios that are greater than 1 imply that greater values of the variable increase the risk of failure, or in this case, the termination of conflict with each terror group. Higher values of the variables with hazard ratios less than 1 contribute to the survival of the terror group or continuation of terrorism.

To test Hypothesis 4, I employ a competing-risk model, as standard survival analysis takes failure-time with a single type of failure into account. A failure, in this case, the termination of the conflict with each terror group, may occur due to different events that are independent from each other.⁴³ In the data, I have several competing events for the termination of conflict: the terrorist group achieving victory, engaging in politics, being defeated militarily, being criminalized by local law enforcement, or undergoing an organizational change (splintering or merging). Occurrence of any of these events competes to determine the termination of conflict for each terror group. If the event of interest is success, as in this case, then the term competing risks refers to the chance that instead of success, I will observe other events

⁴³ John P. Klein, "Competing Risks," *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics* 2, no. 3 (2010): 333–39.

that terminate conflict, such as failure or organizational change. When competing events exist, hazards are computed for the event of interest as well as for competing events, h_{1t} , h_{2t} , h_{3t} , h_{4t} where the cumulative incidence function (CIF) the probability that the event of interest occurs before t , will depend on the hazard of the main event as well as the hazards of competing events.⁴⁴

5. Results

I present the results of the empirical analyses by reporting the hazard ratios in Tables 2 and 3. Hazard ratios represent the likelihood of facing the hazard, in this case, termination of a terrorist group's operations. If the ratio is higher than one, it means observing the hazard is more likely, and if smaller than 1, then observing the hazard is less likely. I first performed diagnostics checks to test the assumption of proportionality of hazards. Aside from using the *phptest* command of Stata, which automatically detects any violation of proportional hazard assumption, I also plotted Schoenfeld residuals to see possible violations manually.⁴⁵ Then, I re-estimated the analysis in the model by applying time varying covariates for the variables that failed the individual and global test.

The results confirm the first hypothesis on the survival of groups, that is, groups that have obtained legitimacy by investing in positive reputation are more likely to survive. I find that one-point increment change in *positive reputation* (ranges between 0 and 3) decreases conflict termination by 50% based on the full models. This is expected as constituency support provides the groups with the necessary resources and committed recruits to ensure their viability. In Figure 1 (left), I plot the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of the groups with high and low positive reputation scores. At the mean analysis time (15 years), survival probability of a group with very low positive reputation is 32% whereas it is 80% for groups with high positive reputation (reputation score=3) *ceteris paribus*.

⁴⁴ Jason Fine and Robert Gray, "A Proportional Hazards Model for the Subdistribution of a Competing Risk," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 94 (1999): 496–509.

⁴⁵ Jeannette Box-Steffensmeier and Seth Jones, *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Table 2- Impact of Reputation Strategies on Group Survival

Hazard: Termination	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Positive Reputation	0.388*** (0.049)		0.517*** (0.077)	0.501*** (0.079)	0.509*** (0.089)			
Negative Reputation		0.316*** (0.048)	0.401*** (0.068)	0.463*** (0.076)	0.400*** (0.078)			
No Reputation			1.198 (0.318)			7.866*** (2.110)	4.800*** (1.528)	3.205*** (0.648)
N of Competitors				0.950* (0.021)	0.991 (0.027)		0.942** (0.022)	0.995 (0.028)
Leftist				0.328** (0.137)	0.467* (0.149)		0.299** (0.123)	0.491* (0.154)
Nationalist				0.385* (0.159)	0.502* (0.168)		0.342** (0.139)	0.528+ (0.175)
Religious				0.234** (0.126)	0.228*** (0.099)		0.203** (0.108)	0.247** (0.106)
Rebel				0.961 (0.179)	1.232 (0.440)		0.811 (0.147)	0.676+ (0.152)
Broad Goal				0.643 (0.181)	0.785 (0.234)		0.732 (0.206)	0.921 (0.271)
Cross-Border Op.				0.654 (0.173)	0.800 (0.242)		0.635+ (0.167)	0.763 (0.232)
Cold War					0.591+ (0.182)			0.444*** (0.086)
GDP (logged)					1.444* (0.206)			1.575** (0.220)
Military (logged)					0.702*** (0.066)			0.662*** (0.065)
Area (logged)					1.062 (0.078)			1.095 (0.080)
Polity Score					0.992 (0.021)			0.990 (0.021)
Observations	2637	2637	2637	2453	2179	2637	2453	2179
χ^2	85.141	99.982	148.837	126.153	159.999	103.996	98.269	127.010

Standard errors in parentheses, Time-varying covariates are not reported. + p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Models in Table 3 also reveal that terror groups that invest in negative reputation are also more likely to survive. One-point increment in *negative reputation* (ranges between 0 and 3) decreases conflict termination by 60% based on the full model (Model 5). Negative reputation may not provide those groups with constituency support in the long run; but investing in negative reputation may help groups find resources and recruits in an inexpensive way, which eventually increases the capabilities of the group in the short run. Indeed, substantive analysis drawn in Figure 1 (right) shows us the effect of negative reputation: at the mean analysis time, the probability of survival is only 38% for groups with very low negative reputation while it is 78% for groups that have invested in high negative reputation.




Figure 1: Reputation Strategies and Survival Odds




Figure 2: Impact of Reputation vs. No Reputation on Group Survival

Lastly, in line with Hypothesis 3, which is partly tested in the previous analysis, I find that groups not investing on reputation strategies are dramatically less likely to survive. Looking at Models 6-8 and Figure 2, I see that it is significantly more likely for terrorist organizations that invest heavily on either positive or negative reputation to survive. Contrary to this, those groups not investing on constructive or coercive strategies fail to survive as a result of lacking enough supplies to maintain their operations.

Most of the other control variables are in the expected direction: the Post-Cold war era has diminished available external resources hastening the termination of terror groups. I also find that groups that switch between guerilla and terror tactics (rebel terrorists) and those that operate cross nationally are more durable. However, I also have some unexpected findings, for example larger military size seems to be prolonging group survival while large surface area seems to be shortening it. It may be that states with strong militaries may be tempted to resort to military tactics to defeat terror groups, an ineffective counter-terrorism strategy as suggested. Larger surface areas may also lead to the emergence of multiple groups, a factor that may bring competition and group defeat.

These results also reveal the importance of reputation building in general regardless of the type of reputation. While positive reputation increases the survival of terror groups, negative reputation also serves this purpose, as expected, through resource extraction. This implies that not adopting a reputation building strategy is suicidal for terror groups. I do not imply that the inability to build any type of reputation is a deliberate strategy. Instead, I contend that if a terror group can build neither positive relations with its constituency nor manage to extract resources forcefully, then it is very plausible for that group to quickly terminate.

In Table 3, the main independent variables are once again positive and negative reputation. Yet, this time I do not analyze whether a group with specific strategy can survive, but rather the likelihood of achieving success in its operations. The findings confirm that terror groups with positive reputations are more likely to achieve success. One-unit increment in positive reputation score increases the probability of a success by 27%. I plot the cumulative incidences in Figure 3 (left). At the mean age of terror groups, those with higher positive reputation are almost four times more likely to end up in victory or politics. Lastly, I applied some diagnostic tests for models; I analyzed the residuals, which are estimated as a function of exponential time. If proportional assumptions hold, these residuals should be a random walk unrelated to survival time. Using Schoenfeld and scaled Schoenfeld residuals I tested the proportionality assumption in all three models, but I did not detect a violation of the assumption in any of the variables.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ David Schoenfeld, "Partial Residuals for the Proportional Hazard Regression Model," *Biometrika* 69, no. 1 (1982): 239–41; Patricia Grambsch and Terry M. Therneau, "Proportional Hazards Tests and Diagnostics Based on Weighted Residuals," *Biometrika* 81, no. 3 (1994): 515–26.

Table 3- Impact of Reputation Strategies on Group Success

Hazard: Ending with Success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Positive Reputation	1.331** (0.127)		1.375** (0.137)	1.272* (0.156)	1.284+ (0.167)
Negative Reputation		1.002 (0.103)	0.900 (0.100)	0.875 (0.102)	0.742* (0.109)
N of Competitors				0.905* (0.040)	0.953 (0.048)
Leftist				0.310** (0.116)	0.350* (0.149)
Nationalist				0.227*** (0.090)	0.296* (0.140)
Religious				0.129*** (0.066)	0.216** (0.122)
Rebel				1.429 (0.390)	1.044 (0.394)
Broad Goal				0.092* (0.088)	0.168+ (0.157)
Cross-Border Op.				0.237* (0.135)	0.236+ (0.183)
Cold War					0.230*** (0.098)
GDP (logged)					0.906 (0.138)
Military (logged)					0.718* (0.098)
Area (logged)					1.013 (0.124)
Polity Score					0.991 (0.034)
Observations	2637	2637	2637	2453	2179
χ^2	8.982	0.000	10.198	40.342	98.106

Hazard ratios reported, + p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001




Figure 3: Positive vs. Negative Reputation and Success

6. Conclusion

Terrorism is a tactic that helps non-state actors survive, but what explains why some groups that use terror tactics tend to survive longer than others? Terror groups need resources to survive, but the end of the Cold War has decreased state sponsorship for terror groups, making it more vital for them to sustain internal resources. In this paper, I argue that reputation building strategies are good indicators of the extent to which terror groups can acquire internal resources, both in terms of quantity and quality.

The findings reveal that either playing the good or bad guy can actually extend the survival time of terrorist groups, as they are more likely to acquire their needs voluntarily or forcedfully. To remind, surviving for longer periods neither means the defeat of the government, nor indicates the success of terrorist organizations. Yet, it is a clear indication of an ongoing conflict, and continuation of problems relatedly. Lastly, I showed that to achieve success terror groups should invest in positive reputation building tactics.

Looking at the reputation of the group provides several advantages, the first being that while building a positive reputation is a costly investment, it tends to stick. Thus, reputation provides a costly signal about the type of the terror group, helping policymakers decide whether they are facing a committed and politically driven group with effective governance capabilities, or instead a self-interested and aimless terrorist group detached from the welfare of the people it claims to represent. Good reputation, as a costly gesture, connects the group with the people, helping buy their long-term commitment and loyalty, both of which can help the terror group bounce back even at bad times.

The findings of the article offer important policy implications, as well. The results demonstrate that the existing trends in counter-terrorism strategies to defeat a terror group, without addressing the roots of the conflict or winning the hearts and minds of the group's targeted constituency, is no longer a viable option. That said, a strategy to follow for an effective counterterrorism is to support weak or failing governments where terrorism might flourish economically to address the grievances of the people before they emerge. Indeed, the United States' increase in its aid and development programs in building Iraq and Afghanistan can be interpreted along those lines. Moreover, some studies show that the provision of public goods by terror groups that substitute for the absence of government services makes them more lethal.⁴⁷ I agree that making governments more effective to drain the swamp can sever the ties between the terror group and its constituency. However, the findings also point to the sensitivity of timing in the adoption of such strategies. Once reputation is built, and the loyalty of the constituents is cemented, then severing the ties may no longer be feasible. Hence, preventive measures should be at the core of counter-terrorism strategies; the findings confirm that political and economic reforms enacted before the reputation of the group sets in will be more effective in weakening terrorist groups.

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⁴⁷ Berman, " Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground".

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Tianxia (All-Under-Heaven): An Alternative System or a Rose by another Name?

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Abstract

Tianxia is considered as an alternative institutionalization to govern the international system. It refers to world governance that is regulated by a world institution. Accordingly, a world institution plays the harmonizer role under this system. States, on the other hand, choose their economic models and the leader organizes the relations among different units. This paper thus argues that Tianxia is an alternative framework to Western-oriented IR theories. In that sense, this article aims to explore the similarities between the philosophical idea of Tianxia and Western-oriented IR Theory. More specifically, the article explores the issue from the international system perspective. The epistemological gaps and ontological similarities between the two frameworks will be demonstrated.

Keywords: Tianxia, IR Theory, Chinese hegemony

1. Introduction

China is considered as the most important rising power. The rise of China is not only a subject matter of economic growth and development of a state but also an inquiry of global power redistribution in International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) studies. Due to its rapidly growing economy, China has become one of the major powers in International Political Economy. Accordingly, one significant change that has led to the raising of a significant new question in IPE is China's huge amount of products, which have transformed the country into a manufacturing center and made it a major player in international trade and finance.¹ For that reason, China is now one of the main subject matters of both IR and IPE in the early 21st century.

Mirroring this rise, debate has emerged between mainstream IR and historical sociologists, regarding China's role in international politics. According to realists, the rise of a new big power unavoidably leads to conflict and war, and China will not be an exception to this rule. From this point of view, the American dominated realists emphasize the competitive rise of China. As an illustration, the offensive realist, Mearsheimer, takes a pessimistic position, claiming that China will seek power maximization in East Asia and eventually will dominate Asia, as the United States does in the Western Hemisphere.² Even moderate realists, like Kirshner, who believes that the USA can accommodate China's rise, also draw attention to

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¹ Robert O. Keohane, "The Old IPE and the New," *Review of International Political Economy* 16, no. 1 (2009): 41.

² John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," *Current History* 105, no. 690 (2006): 162.

the uncertainty of a rising power problem.³ From the American perspective, the concern is not only realists' subject matter but also liberals', who highlight China's rise as a potential threat to the functioning of the liberal world order,⁴ with a rising China eventually even ending the US-led liberal global order.⁵ Accordingly, China's rise will lead to power competition both economically and militarily, which will result in tension between the USA and China.

Chinese politicians, on the other hand, emphasize the cultural heritage of Chinese history. Referring to historical context, they highlight the term *Peaceful Rise*. This term is conceptualized by Zheng Bijian, a longtime advisor to the Chinese leadership. The idea was later renamed *Peaceful Development* by Hu Jintao, to eliminate the negative perception of the term "rise". Accordingly, while emerging powers in modern history have traditionally pursued colonization, war, and other aggressive policies, China is argued to be using peaceful means such as capital and technology.⁶ Thus, China should not be considered as a Hobbesian state that will inevitably seek power maximization to survive. Instead, it has its own historical and philosophical legacy, which encourages China to act differently from Westphalian state behavior. Different schools of IR support this claim, pointing to China's past. According to Arrighi, the Americans are expecting an Armageddon because of the lack of knowledge about Chinese history.⁷ He claims that China's history suggests peaceful coexistence with neighbors unlike the rise of the West, which featured territorial and overseas expansion as well as conflict and war. In contrast to this, the Peaceful Rise does not contain territorial expansion. In that sense, he argues, China's rise may falsify the American School of IR in that it may create an interdependent and respectful global order.⁸ Similarly, Kang highlights the historical differences between Europe and Asia, underscoring the need for alternative paradigms beyond realism, liberalism and, constructivism to understand China and its role in Asia.⁹ Finally, a prominent scholar of the English School of IR, Buzan, predicts that a Peaceful Rise is possible if China aims to construct a regional level international society.¹⁰

This potential raises the question of how such a peaceful rise/development is anchored in Chinese political thought. What is the background of the political framework of the Chinese Way? How does China conceptualize its *sui generis* characteristic? Is there a political theory with Chinese characteristics, which is different from Western political thought, Hobbesian fear or Westphalian understanding? What is the philosophical background of Peaceful Development? Such questions have been posed for more than a decade. Obviously, as a rising power, China needs knowledge power along with material capacities. With regard to this, one of the main components of political theory with Chinese characteristics is the ancient thought of *Tianxia* (All-under-Heaven) framework. Accordingly, every entity around the world (family, clan, nation-state) is an integral part of the same world system. This system should be governed in accordance with moral obligations by a world institution beyond the

³ Jonathan Kirshner, "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 1 (2012): 53–75.

⁴ John M. Owen, "Ikenberry, International Relations Theory, and the Rise of China," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 21, no. 1 (2019): 55–62.

⁵ Yongjin Zhang, "'China Anxiety': Discourse and Intellectual Challenges," *Development and Change* 44, no. 6 (2013): 1421.

⁶ Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (2005).

⁷ Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the twenty-first century* (London: Verso, 2007), 307.

⁸ Arrighi estimates that this is a possible result of peaceful ascent among other possibilities, which are a North-South Alliance and an Asian-oriented war. For more details see, Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing*, 379.

⁹ David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): 83.

¹⁰ Barry Buzan, "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, no. 1 (2010): 34–5.

United Nations. This raises the idea of Tianxia, because it suggests an international institution that is based on ancient Chinese moral principles. On the one hand, China names itself as a “responsible great power,”¹¹ therefore, the establishment of an international institution for keeping stability in the world order is China’s moral purpose. On the other hand, the Tianxia idea raises concerns against China due to the hegemonic¹² content of the idea.

This article will explore the Tianxia concept with regard to political theory. It seeks to understand exactly what the components of Tianxia are and what its relation is with existing IR Theory literature. Is it an alternative IR Theory to the Western School, or is it an old wine in a new bottle, with Chinese characteristics? More specifically, *how does Tianxia differ from the Western school of thought in terms of the international system?* It is going to be argued that Tianxia is, in fact, an eclectic approach to Western political thought in terms of international system and hegemony. Tianxia’s critique for mainstream Anglo-American IR Theory is based on epistemological inconsistency between the Chinese and Western schools of thoughts.

It is worthy to note that this article will inquire neither into the applicability of Tianxia to the real world nor whether China’s policies are consistent with it or not. This is because Tianxia is suggested as a utopia rather than a narrative of real-world events. That is to say, Tianxia exists mostly at the theoretical level in the modern era. Thus, there is little empirical evidence to prove or disprove such an experience in world government. Moreover, both supportive and unsupportive implications of China’s policies regarding Tianxia have already been discussed in the literature, particularly by Callahan¹³, Chang¹⁴, Dreyer¹⁵, and Carlson¹⁶. Moreover, China does not officially claim to institutionalize Tianxia as a foreign policy aim. Nor is it identified as a foreign policy goal by Chinese authorities despite some narratives such as Xi Jinping’s “the community of common destiny of mankind,” which could be considered as an implication of Tianxia. Tianxia remains therefore a concept of political idea rather than an evaluation of real-world events, despite its critiques of the United Nations (UN), which is, in fact, one of its shortcomings. For these reasons, this article attaches importance to comparing Tianxia with IR theories rather than looking at its implications for Chinese foreign policy.

Accordingly, the second section of this article will elaborate on the rise of China and the need for a framework of rising powers. The third section will put forward the characteristics of Tianxia. Having demonstrated Tianxia’s shortcomings, the fourth section will compare the similarities between Tianxia and IR theories, which will be followed by the conclusion.

¹¹ Xia Liping, “China: A Responsible Great Power,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 26 (2001): 17–25.

¹² Zhao insistently claims that Tianxia is not based on a hegemonic logic. He asserts that since the European theoretical framework is based on state-centrism, the ‘hegemon’ is associated with empire by Europeans, which is not the case for Tianxia [Tingyang Zhao, *Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 65]. The fourth section of this article will demonstrate the reason why it can be considered as a hegemonic idea.

¹³ William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?,” *International Studies Review* 10, no. 4 (2008): 749–61.

¹⁴ Chishen Chang, “Tianxia System on a Snail’s Horns,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 12, no. 1 (2011): 28–42.

¹⁵ June T. Dreyer, “The ‘Tianxia Trope’: Will China Change the International System?,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 96 (2015): 1015–31.

¹⁶ Allen Carlson, “Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent Changes in China’s Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the Tianxia Concept,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 20, no. 68 (2010): 89–102.

2. The Rise of China and the Need for a Framework

China's rapid industrialization in the post-Mao era not only presents the growth of a country but also a shift in the global production network. "The decision of the Chinese government under Deng Xiaoping to enter into an alliance with the diaspora aimed at the double objective of upgrading the economy of the PRC through its reintegration in regional and global markets and of promoting national reunification with Hong Kong, Macau and it may end up with re-centering of Chinese tribute system and, eventually, Taiwan in accordance with the 'One Nation, Two Systems' model."¹⁷ Thus, in the post-Mao era, the Chinese elite reorganized the state in accordance with becoming a global production center that imports primary goods from neighboring countries and developing countries. These products are either reassembled or developed as high technology commodities and exported to international markets as finished goods. Owing to the Chinese diaspora in East Asian countries, China was able to transfer high technology to the mainland. More importantly, technology and managerial skills were also transferred from Western businesses in exchange for the cheap labor force in China. Throughout the 1990s, a Sino-centered global production network was established in technological goods. As a result, China became the center of the assembling industry and the country's political economy was transformed from isolationism to an active great power.

This process, for several reasons, led China to construct a political theory. First and foremost, every economic system and political structure evolves in cooperation. As Susan Strange accurately pointed out, the decision-makers have disproportionately high resources and knowledge, which enables them to promote certain politico-economic modus operandi over others.¹⁸ In this regard, a newly emerging political economy legitimizes its position by knowledge production. In the end, economic activities and international political systems are not separable from each other. On the contrary, the "international political system provides the necessary framework for economic activities."¹⁹ From that point of view, China is not an exception. Chinese politicians and philosophers have been specifying the "Chinese characteristics" of their political frameworks since the Mao era. China's economic rise boosted this desire. According to Chinese authorities, becoming an economic power should be accompanied by knowledge production.²⁰ As a result, Chinese academics and politicians have sought to construct a political framework with Chinese characteristics.

Secondly, China seeks to maximize not only its material power but also political power. It is obvious that China's spectacular economic growth corresponded with an increase in its political power. Since ancient times, Chinese political thought has emphasized political power. Accordingly, "Economic and military factors are all important, but political capability is the foundation that integrates comprehensive state power."²¹ Thus, economic power alone does not necessarily transform a state into a great power. For this reason, the idea of Peaceful Development is coherent with political power rather than military power. Political power could be accomplished with an alternative political framework. Thus, China would have a

¹⁷ Giovanni Arrighi, "Reading Hobbes in Beijing: Great Power Politics and the Challenge of the Peaceful Ascent," in *Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy*, ed. Mark Blyth (London: Routledge, 2009), 178.

¹⁸ Susan Strange, *States and Markets*, 2. ed. (London: Continuum, 2004), 121.

¹⁹ Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 295.

²⁰ Thuy T. Do, "China's Rise and the 'Chinese Dream' in International Relations Theory," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 27, no. 1 (2015): 23.

²¹ Yan Xuetong, "A Comparative Study of Pre-Qin Interstate Political Philosophy," in *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*, ed. Xuetong Yan et al., The Princeton-China series (Princeton, N.J., Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2011), 53.

greater ability to use structural power, namely shaping the policies and directions of political and economic relations.²²

Last but not least, China seeks to create an alternative international political economic system to the Bretton Woods institutions and US-supremacy, particularly in East Asia. China sees the Asia-Pacific region as the “most dynamic economic region with the greatest development potential in the world.”²³ This has led China to establish a regional order in East Asia. Although China is considered as a status quo power²⁴ because of the benefits of the current international system, it has started to challenge both the mechanisms and influence of Bretton Woods institutions. The main expression of this policy is the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). The AIIB is founded on those principles that China has criticized in the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the veto power of the US and conditional credits. China feels that existing international organizations serve Western interests by referring to its experience of the ‘Century of Humiliation’. The Bretton Woods institutions are not exceptions of this historical legacy. They are seen as having created asymmetrical growth between the Global South and the Global North due to a lack of morality. For that reason, China seeks to revise the international institutions and norms in favor of itself and Third World countries. Unlike the Bretton Woods institutions, AIIB promises to provide unconditional credits for Third World development, and argues that China’s veto power in the bank is a temporary situation.

It is not only China’s growing economy but also the Asian financial crisis that has encouraged Chinese authorities to embrace this policy. The Asian financial crisis disfavored the IMF and Western economic system in East Asia. Although China did not raise the obstacles of the international financial system at that time, its development model served as an inspiration for the developing economies in the region. Moreover, the neighboring economies use the Chinese market as the most significant engine of growth for themselves.²⁵ This encouraged China to highlight alternative approaches after the 2009 global financial crisis. “The outbreak of the global financial crisis simply provided Beijing with an opportunity to publicize the proposals and, because of the crisis, it has drawn much attention from around the world.”²⁶ As a result, unlike the Bretton Woods institutions, Chinese aid and no-strings-attached loans help third world countries to develop without sacrificing their sovereignty. Thus, it diminishes the systemic influences of the IMF and the World Bank,²⁷ thereby leaving a gap that demands replacement by an alternative approach.

These changes create a need for a new framework to construct Sino-centric international order. The ancient concept of Tianxia has been proposed by Zhao Tingyang, a political philosopher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and has been supported by several scholars. Although Tianxia has not been institutionalized among the Chinese political elites, it is being widely discussed in academia. As a principle, it both criticizes Western political

²² Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), 57.

²³ Bates Gill, “China’s Evolving Regional Security Strategy,” in *Power Shift: China and Asia’s new dynamics*, ed. David L. Shambaugh (Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 2005), 251.

²⁴ Christopher Layne, “China’s Challenge to US Hegemony,” *Current History* 107, no. 705 (2008) and Evan S. Medeiros, “Is Beijing Ready for Global Leadership?,” *Current History* 108, no. 719 (2009).

²⁵ John Wong, “A China-Centric Economic Order in East Asia,” *Asia Pacific Business Review* 19, no. 2 (2013): 288.

²⁶ Ren Xiao, “A Reform-Minded Status Quo Power? China, the G20, and Reform of the International Financial System,” *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 11 (2015): 2030.

²⁷ Gregory Chin, “China’s Rising Institutional Influence,” in *Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges For Global Governance*, ed. Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper (Waterloo, Ont.: Centre for International Governance Innovation; Washington, 2010), 93.

thought with respect to the international system and suggests a Chinese perspective on world issues. The following section will demonstrate the principles of Tianxia regarding the levels of analysis of international relations and the international system.

3. The International System of Tianxia

Tianxia is proposed by Chinese philosophers as an alternative framework to Western-oriented theories on international government. It is argued that while Western theories take international relations from a state-centric perspective, Tianxia emphasizes the world itself as the level of analysis. From that point of view, “the most important political problem today is not the so-called ‘failed states’ but the failed world.”²⁸ Accordingly, it is the selfishness of the nation-states that results in global imbalance, conflicts, and wars. In order to cope with this, it is not the so-called failed states that need to gussy up but the world as a whole. There is a need for a holistic approach rather than unit level solutions, and the international system needs to go beyond state-centric perspectives and solutions. Moreover, the world needs an institutionalized system that promotes universal values rather than the interests of dominant powers,²⁹ rather than the Westphalian nation-state system, which is seen as the fundamental reason for international chaos. International relations must instead be governed by a higher and moral authority in order to overcome the selfishness of nation-states. In sum, the anarchical structure of the system should be replaced by a hierarchical order.

In this regard, a supranational institution for world governance is a necessity for permanent peace. Accordingly, world governance should be ensured by an empire, which acts more like a world institution rather than a conventional empire.³⁰ Such a world institution would be obliged to arrange regimes and rules, and should constitute an alternative to the United Nations, as the UN is viewed as a reflection of the incomplete Western system. Zhao makes the analogy that:

Underlying the UN model are ideals of international democracy and rational communication; roughly speaking, a continuation of the great Greek tradition of agora. However, it is a pity that the UN is only an agora without a polis. It has therefore become a serious problem. Unless it is institutionally well-organized, an agora can become chaotic and confused.³¹

Therefore, anarchy is inevitable without an organizer, and anarchy unavoidably brings chaos. The states are unable to order their domestic politics due to the lack of an external organizer.³² International governance *can* be executed however, via a world institution. Since such a world institution is lacking in the Western political system, the latter is considered philosophically incomplete.³³ In the case of the Westphalian system, the UN is not a hierarchical institution over the nation-states but a bargaining market among them. For that reason, the lack of such a supreme political authority over nation-states is the primary reason for international conflicts.³⁴ In order therefore to achieve permanent peace and establish a harmonious world order, the Westphalian system of anarchy has to be replaced,

Tianxia comes into play at this point. In contrast to the Westphalian system, states are not

²⁸ Tingyang Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia),” *Social Identities* 12, no. 1 (2006): 34.

²⁹ Tingyang Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia),” *Diogenes* 56, no. 1 (2009): 8.

³⁰ Zhao, “Rethinking Empire,” 30.

³¹ Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 16.

³² Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 10.

³³ Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 11.

³⁴ Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 12.

viewed as independent entities but as sub-states of the world government under Tianxia.³⁵ In order to create a harmonious system, all sub-states should be essentially homogenous or homologous and must be ordered by the highest world institution.³⁶ Thus, there is a top-down political path to construct a peaceful environment. Therefore, Tianxia suggests an international system that is featured by hierarchy in the world government. The nation-states are not separate units, but only a part of the political realm,³⁷ which prevents them from competing for their interests only. Instead, they should cooperate harmoniously owing to the moral governance of a world institution. Owing to this world institution, nation-states will abandon their selfish interests, and global problems will be solved through negotiations by the sub-entities. In that sense, the most important pillar of the harmonious world order is the autonomy of the sub-entities. States will have autonomy in choosing their own way to sustain the world. Tianxia discredits interference into sovereign states unless a sub-state declares war on others.³⁸ Instead, “Tianxia advocates the resolution of global issues by having each country act according to its own conditions.”³⁹ All political entities are included in the international system. Thus, world politics will feature negotiations by nation-states rather than conflicting interests among them. These negotiations must be discussed openly and governed by a moral authority instead of bilateral bargaining.

In this regard, Tianxia can be considered an inclusionary system, in contrast to Western political thought. It is asserted that since the Westphalian system is based on power maximization and self-interests, it is an exclusive system in nature, emphasizing “self” and “other”. Tianxia on the other hand, is a system in which nobody would be excluded; in which there would be no “foreign or pagan.”⁴⁰ Instead, “in the process of globalization, one or several nation-states may transform themselves into new empires.”⁴¹ Rather than being forced in through imperial means, other states are expected to join the system voluntarily because of Tianxia’s appeal as a benign and cosmopolitan system. As a result, neither hegemonic wars nor territorial conquests and violence will take place unless a sub-state violates the sovereignty rule. Therefore, all entities will cooperate with each other instead of conflict.

This leads us to conclude that the main criticisms of Tianxia against the Western political theory are grouped into three categories. Firstly, Tianxia is an inclusionary system, whereas Western thought is exclusionary. Secondly, the Western perspective is state-centric, which is the source of the international conflicts and wars due to the Westphalian conceptualization of nation-states, which encourages and rationalizes their selfishness. Finally, the international order needs an authority to govern the relations among sub-units. This leads us to elaborate on the validity of these arguments.

4. All-Under-“Hegemonic Stability”

Having put forward the pillars of Tianxia, the shortcomings, as well as its similarities between the Western frameworks, will be demonstrated. Zhao’s analysis of the comparison of Tianxia

³⁵ Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 8.

³⁶ Zhao, “Rethinking Empire,” 33.

³⁷ Henry W.-C. Yeung, “The Rise of East Asia: An Emerging Challenge to the Study of International Political Economy,” in Blyth, *Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE)*, 205.

³⁸ Zhao, “Rethinking Empire,” 34.

³⁹ Chih-Yu Shih and Chiung-Chiu Huang, “Preaching Self-Responsibility: The Chinese style of global governance,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 22, no. 80 (2013): 359.

⁴⁰ Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 8.

⁴¹ Dreyer, “The ‘Tianxia Trope,’” 1022.

and the Western framework has two theoretical shortcomings. Firstly, Zhao criticizes Western political theory as if there is a unique and homogenous political theory. More specifically, Zhao's criticisms mostly focus on realist and liberal concepts in IR Theory. However, when we are talking about Western political and international relations theory, it implies a range of competing ideas including Marxism, critical theory, constructivism, the English School and even post-structuralism. The variety of schools is reasoned by epistemological and ontological differences, which have resulted in competing and contrasting perspectives. Therefore, the main subject matter of the aforementioned Western-oriented theories differs from each other, from the identity politics of constructivism to the class conflict of Marxism. Zhao's criticism of Western political theory, however, concentrates on national interests as if it is the only concept in the West. Thus, he disregards numerous concepts that take place both in the West and China, which leads to confusion. As an illustration, Zhao asserts that "in western political theory, the biggest political unit is found to be a country or nation/state, while in Chinese theory it is the framework of world/society."⁴² Yet since the 1970s the English School's main contribution has been "to articulate the international society perspective on world politics."⁴³ Moreover, the English School discusses socially acceptable ways of a hegemonic contribution to international order.⁴⁴ In this sense, the English School does not perceive the great power hierarchy and international society as mutually exclusive. Western political theory is clearly composed not only of state-centric approaches but also of the global level of analysis, namely Wallerstein's World Systems analysis, which takes the globe as the unit.⁴⁵

The second shortcoming of Tianxia is Zhao's "double standard" approach.⁴⁶ There is an epistemological inconsistency between Tianxia and Western political theory. That is to say, while the Western-oriented mainstream IR theories seek to analyze state *behavior*, Tianxia is concerned with how to perfectly *organize* the behaviors. In that respect, Tianxia and Western political theory are different domains in fact. However, Zhao does not make this factual/normative distinction. Nor does he seek to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Rather, Zhao makes a comparison between the Chinese *utopia*, which is the normative side, and Western *practice*, which are the factual outcomes of politics. On the one hand, Tianxia is considered an "ideal of a perfect empire" and "a utopia of the world-as-one-family."⁴⁷ He also fails to utilize the historical record of modern China, yet he criticizes Western practices by overemphasizing alliances or unions of nation-states⁴⁸ with reference to the historical record as well as the incomplete bodies of the United Nations. Thus, Zhao highlights the actual politics of the Westphalian system rather than Western ideas such as Kant's *The Perpetual Peace* or Wilsonian idealism.

Shifting our attention to the comparable concepts of Tianxia and Western political theory, we may start with the fundamental assumption of political theories that refer to human nature. It is argued that while the Westphalian system is exclusionary in nature, Tianxia is

⁴² Zhao, "Rethinking Empire" 30–1.

⁴³ Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 15.

⁴⁴ Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 50.

⁴⁵ It is worth to note that both Tianxia and World-systems do not cover the entire planet by the globe. The historical Tianxia implies the known world of the Zhou dynasty as the world. Similarly, the World-systems refers to the capitalist world-economy, which can be considered as the entire world only after the 20th century.

⁴⁶ Shuguang Zhang, "Theory of Tianxia and World Institution: Learning from Mr. Zhao Tingyang by asking Questions on Tianxia System," *China Book Review* 5 (2006) and Chang, "Tianxia System on a Snail's Horns," 28.

⁴⁷ Zhao, "Rethinking Empire," 30.

⁴⁸ Zhao, "Rethinking Empire," 31.

based on the principle of “inclusion of all”. Thus, it is asserted that Chinese political theory fundamentally differs from its Western counterpart. Indeed, realism highlights the conflictual nature of humankind. Zhao also does not deny the selfishness of human nature.⁴⁹ However, as it is already mentioned that Western political theory does not consist of a homogenous framework, it is critical to note that, in contrast to realism, the liberal school of thought emphasizes humanity’s cooperative nature. According to liberal philosophy, although humans are selfish in nature, they are unable to survive without cooperation, which results in the promotion of good.⁵⁰ Thus, human reason lifts society into cooperation and common life awareness. Similarly, the English School presupposes that humanity has been arranging a social life to promote certain values.⁵¹ From that point of view, both liberalism and the English School seek to promote the coexistence of states and international society. Zhao suggests the same, in the sense that establishing a system based on shared interests rather than sabotaging it would be beneficial for all parties.⁵² Furthermore, from the English School perspective, a *raison de système* is a necessity to manage the pressures of the international system and to create a working society.⁵³ Bull suggests that international law should promote the interests of international society rather than individual states.⁵⁴ In this regard, while Bull legitimizes the use of force only for the purposes of international society, Zhou also suggests that intervention is intolerable in Tianxia unless a sub-state declares war on others. This means that both Tianxia and the English School consecrate state autonomy by putting a reserve on aggression. Similarly, liberal internationalism asserts that even though the dominance of a great power declines, the international regime and rules are maintained for the sake of cooperation.⁵⁵ Therefore, both the English School and liberalism presuppose the cooperative nature of humankind, which is presupposed also by Tianxia by emphasizing a harmonious world as well as the inclusion of all.

The criticism of the state-centric approach brings the level of analysis debate forward. It is asserted that while Western politics deal with state-centric conflicts, Tianxia promotes the perspective on the global level. It is worth reminding that the level of analysis in IR is concerned with state behavior rather than how to organize them. In this regard, it is not easy to understand whether the global perspective of Tianxia is a level of analysis question or a normative approach to the international system. Regardless of the purpose, Tianxia does not radically differ from Western political theory in that point of view. If we consider it as a level of analysis, that does not contradict with IR theory. When David Singer coined the level of analysis problem in IR literature, he stressed that apart from systemic and sub-systemic analysis, many other levels are available for researchers.⁵⁶ Indeed, the level of analysis question has expanded from the individual level of liberalism or constructivism to the global level of world-systems approach. Among these, world-systems analysis raises the exact same criticism with Tianxia by arguing that state-centric approaches are ahistorical, whereas

⁴⁹ Zhao, *Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance*, 13.

⁵⁰ Edwin van de Haar, *Classical Liberalism And International Relations Theory: Hume, Smith, Mises, and Hayek*, 1st ed., The Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought Series (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 20–2.

⁵¹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order In World Politics*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 3–4.

⁵² Zhao, *Redefining a Philosophy For World Governance*, 14.

⁵³ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London, New York: Routledge, 1992), 322.

⁵⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 230.

⁵⁵ Robert O. Keohane, *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy* (Princeton: Guildford Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁵⁶ David J. Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 90.

the world-systems orientation to understand the globe is more substantive.⁵⁷ Thus, it is too deductive to claim that Western theory as a whole is stuck in state-centric approaches. If we take the global perspective of Tianxia as normative analysis, still the West is not deficient, as there has been a growing literature for more than two decades on normative IR Theories beyond state-centric approaches, namely Feminist IR Theory or Green Theory. In that sense, it is hard to claim that the global level of analysis is the reflection of Chinese characteristics of world perspective. Instead, the global level of analysis of Tianxia shows parallels with the critical approaches of Western-oriented theories.

When Zhao claims that the Western political system is incomplete due to the lack of higher authority over nation-states, he actually supports the basic realist assumption which is “anarchy is the permissive cause of war.”⁵⁸ According to realism, since the structure of the international system is anarchy, states seek to maximize their power to survive. In this regard, an effective control over the states or removal of the imperfect states would put an end to international conflict.⁵⁹ This means that permanent order could be settled by the replacement of the anarchical international system with a hierarchical one. Since the world is not governed by a higher authority however, each state seeks power maximization for their self-interests. Thus, both Western realism and Chinese philosophy perceive the global order in the same way. In that sense, Tianxia does not suggest an alternative framework to the Westphalian nation-state system. It acknowledges the anarchical structure of the international system and its conflictual outcome. At this point, the difference between Tianxia and realism lies in the factual/normative distinction. Realist IR theory seeks to explain the cause of war by referring to factual events, whereas Tianxia proposes a solution by addressing the same assumptions. Therefore, Tianxia and realism are not competing ideas in terms of their perspectives on the structure of the international system. International anarchy leads to perpetual conflicts, which can be ended only by a hierarchical structure.

This raises the authority problematic of Tianxia. More specifically, who governs the hegemonic order or whose rule will be established under Tianxia? Although Tianxia promises a world government, in the end the principles of the world government also need to be based on shared values, otherwise, it would operate with the rules and regime of a dominant power. Nonetheless, Chinese values are proposed as the only alternative for this obligation instead of shared values. In this respect, Zhang claims that all under heaven must be designed on three principles: “promotion of ethical world order as the moral purpose, serving the great by the small in exchange for security and emulating Chinese standards of appropriateness in relational conduct, submit to Chinese authority, and transform themselves along the lines of Chinese culture and custom.”⁶⁰ Therefore, it is suggested that the international order would be provided by China’s leadership, with China playing the harmonizer role. China’s harmonizer role provides the guarantee for self-determination to states in the system, in which states choose their own economic models and the leading state, namely China in this case, organizes the relations among different units. This self-determination legitimizes China’s leadership position by noninterfering in domestic issues. From that point of view, a

⁵⁷ Ladd W. Hollist and James N. Rosenau, “World System Debates,” *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (1981): 5–17.

⁵⁸ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2001), 232.

⁵⁹ Waltz, *Man, The State and War*, 182.

⁶⁰ Feng Zhang, *Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History* (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 157–60.

big nation-state is taking responsibility in exchange for its supremacy accepted rather than that of an international institution.

In that sense, the idea coincides with the hegemonic leadership proposal of realist terminology, basically the ‘Hegemonic Stability Theory’, which suggests that “the hierarchy of power among the states gives order and stability to the international system”⁶¹. Gilpin argues that the creation of an interdependent market is the precondition for being a hegemonic power,⁶² which is one of the main principles of the Tianxia system⁶³—a hegemonic power is the main agent for order. Accordingly, this hegemonic power establishes the rules and regimes and provides both security and public goods for smaller states. The lesser states follow the rules and regimes due to the legitimacy and utility of the existing order.⁶⁴ In that sense, hegemony is a concept beyond dominance. Instead, the hegemon must be settled down by consent among smaller states and the great power. Smaller states should accept the leadership of the great power in exchange for security and arrangement of rules. Tianxia, which will be based on shared interests, is also expected to be accepted by all states and people rather than sabotaged by it.⁶⁵ From that point of view, the main principles of Tianxia and Hegemonic Stability Theory do not contradict but overlap. Both frameworks claim that order must be maintained by a hegemon/Chinese values under hegemonic stability theory/Tianxia. Thus, in case Chinese values are accepted as the international norms, then it could not only be called Tianxia but also the establishment of stability under Chinese hegemony.

This leads us to conclude that peaceful development is far from promising an alternative international system. The main reason for this is the theoretical framework of the possible Sino-centric world order. The theoretical framework of the Tianxia system is based on Western-oriented IR theories, including the hegemonic stability of realism. Since the theoretical background is similar to Western-oriented approaches, the political implications of the system do not promise an alternative outcome. Rather, the Sino-centric order suggests a hegemonic order with Chinese characteristics. In other words, if China follows Confucian principles to govern the international system, it would be no more than a new hegemonic order. Replacement of the liberal values by moral authority or Bretton Woods institutions with the AIIB-like institutions⁶⁶ thus, would change only the dominant power of the international system. At this juncture, China’s moral authority may have some legitimacy among the countries that have previously suffered from IMF policies, but it is still doubtful in the liberal world. Thus it is not easy to claim that there would be a consensus on the Tianxia system.

To sum up, Tianxia and Western-oriented IR theories show outstanding similarities in three aspects. Firstly, Tianxia recognizes both positive and negative elements regarding human nature. That is to say, it accepts the selfishness of human nature, as does realism. It also presents similarities with liberalism as well as the English school by pointing out the cooperative nature of humanity. Secondly, Western-oriented IR theories present a wide range of level of analysis from the micro unit to global level. The Western political framework does not only contain state-centric approaches but also world level ones, unlike what is argued

⁶¹ Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988): 613.

⁶² Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 129.

⁶³ Zhao, *Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance*, 7.

⁶⁴ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 30.

⁶⁵ Zhao, *Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance*, 14.

⁶⁶ As a matter of fact, China considers AIIB as a supplementary institution to the Bretton Woods regime despite some revisions regarding the voting process. In this regard, it acts as a status quo power under the current Westphalian system.

in Tianxia. In that sense, Tianxia's level of analysis does not present a real alternative to Western IR, just with Chinese characteristics. Finally, both IR theories and Tianxia argue that since there is no authority in the international system, international politics is characterized by wars and conflicts rather than order. Although Zhao claims that this is reasoned by the failure of the Western political theories, none of the Western theories in fact embraces the anarchical structure of the international system. Western academics recognize the inefficiency of the UN as well. What Western academia and political theory try to do is to understand the dynamics of the conflicts, whereas Tianxia proposes a utopia. Therefore, Tianxia and Western political theory, including realism, are not competing ideas in the sense that both recognize the anarchical structure of the international system and its conflictual outcome. Furthermore, Tianxia resembles Western hegemonic stability theory by referring to the leadership of the superior power. In this regard, it may be perceived as the theorization and legitimization of Chinese hegemony.

5. Conclusion

The rise of China sparks both political and academic debates on the redistribution of power in the international system. This provokes not only inquiry regarding the rise of China's material capability but also its intellectual capabilities. In that respect, this article sought to understand the ancient Chinese thought of Tianxia, which has been revived by Chinese scholars in the 21st century. Although Tianxia is a hotly debated concept at the philosophical level, it presents a political theory perspective of Chinese academics. Thus, it is worth examining in order to understand Chinese perceptions of the international system.

It must be noted that this paper does not argue that the Sino-centric tribute state is being pursued along with Tianxia. It is obvious that, as the Chinese economy grows and as it becomes the economic center of East Asia, a tendency to compose its political economy arises in order to maintain the interdependent market in the region. Therefore, in any case, China will seek to establish its political economy to maintain the Sino-centric order. Although Tianxia could not be considered as the political framework of a Sino-centric tribute system, still it sorts out the Chinese perception on international affairs and political economy, and gives some clues about Chinese critiques of Western politics.

The most prominent pillar of Tianxia is its approach to the international system. Accordingly, the anarchical structure of the international system should be replaced by a hierarchical order, in which an international organization regulates the harmony of interests among all political entities. The UN is not seen as serving for this purpose, because it is the reflection of Western politics, which is based on the selfishness of nation-states and the dominance of great powers. Therefore, the main deficit of the Westphalian system, according to Tianxia, is a state-centric approach to global problems. Since the Westphalian system is state-centric, it is exclusionary in nature.

However, this approach has both theoretical and analytical shortcomings as have been discussed. It is demonstrated that Tianxia itself bears some stamp of Western-oriented political thought. It exhibits liberal and English School characteristics in its understanding of human nature. Its level of analysis is similar to the world-systems approach, and its perception of the international system shows parallelism with mainstream IR theory, although it argues exactly the opposite. The reason why Tianxia claims it differs from the IR theory is the lack of normative/factual distinction between the two approaches. Finally, it can be safely asserted

that Tianxia's 'all-under-heaven' is in fact hegemonic stability with Chinese characteristics. With sub-entities expected to accept the supremacy of Chinese values, and in general the supremacy of China and Chinese values to be accepted in consent, the reference is to Chinese hegemony, in Western conceptualization.

From this point of view, Tianxia seems like an eclectic approach to international relations rather than IR with Chinese characteristics. It is worth noting that it is not asserted that Tianxia has drawn from IR theories. Instead, there is a dialogue of the deaf between Chinese and Western political thought. Both academies have composed more or less the same framework with different conceptualizations. As has been demonstrated, Tianxia shows parallelism with not only mainstream IR theories but critical as well as Marxist approaches, namely world systems, as well. In this regard, Tianxia seems more like a rose by any other name. Tianxia does not seem an alternative framework to Western political thought. Instead, it redefines the concepts in Chinese characteristics and theorizes the political economy of a Sino-centric world order. In other words, despite China seeking for knowledge production as the challenger of the current international system, the result is actually hegemonic stability with Chinese characteristics.

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A Government Devoid of Strong Leadership: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of Turkey's Iraq War Decision in 2003

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Abstract

This study deals with Turkey's Iraq War Decision that led up to the March 1 Parliamentary Motion Crisis in 2003 from the perspective of neoclassical realism, which analyzes the interaction between systemic and unit-level variables. The United States requested Turkey's collaboration in the war against Iraq. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government initially sought a peaceful settlement but eventually decided to align with the United States. Systemic and structural factors made cooperation with the United States an imperative for Turkey, which may be classified as a secondary state in the regional context. While the domestic political environment was favorable for the Turkish government to reach such a decision, it was hindered by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). In this framework, the study has two primary purposes. The first is to prove that in restrictive international environments where opportunities and threats are clear and the decision-making process is constrained by time, domestic divisions may matter in foreign policy and prevail over the systemic imperative, contrary to conventional expectations. The second is to demonstrate that in a restrictive international milieu, strong leadership, a factor underappreciated by neoclassical realists, is essential even for single-party governments, which are normally expected to have greater autonomy in democratic parliamentary systems, to formulate foreign policy.

Keywords: Neoclassical Realism, Turkey's Iraq War Decision, Justice and Development Party, March 1 Motion

1. Introduction

As soon as it came to power in November 2002, the AK Party faced a global challenge.¹ The United States requested Turkey's collaboration in the war against Iraq and demanded the deployment of American troops in Turkish territory to open a northern front. The AK Party government decided to cooperate with the United States, but the parliamentary decision that would enable such cooperation failed to pass at the GNAT in what came to be known as the March 1 (2003) Motion. This development was interesting. Turkey has had close relations with the United States since the 1950s,² despite occasional frictions and bouts of increasing

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¹ Abdurrahman Babacan, "AK parti dönemi ilk küresel karşılışma: 1 Mart 2003 tezkeresi," *Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 51 (2018): 21-38.

² Füsün Türkmen, "Turkish-American Relations: A Challenging Transition," *Turkish Studies* 10, no. 1 (2009): 109-29;

anti-Americanism in the Turkish public.³ Furthermore, the failure of the motion was an exception as it is the executive that principally conducts foreign policy in Turkey. With the exception of the March 1 motion, the GNAT had accepted all previous parliamentary motions that warranted the dispatching of Turkish troops abroad or the deployment of foreign troops on Turkey's territory.⁴

Turkey pursued an ambivalent policy in the period leading up to the March 1 motion. Turkish decision-makers initially abstained from participation in the war against Iraq alongside the United States and sought a peaceful settlement since a military intervention could undermine the territorial integrity of Iraq and thereby strengthen Kurdish groups seeking independence. They also expressed their concerns about a unilateral intervention by the United States and voiced their concerns regarding international legitimacy.⁵ Under pressure from the global superpower, and within a limited time frame covering the period from December 3, 2002, to March 1, 2003, however, Turkish decision-makers changed their position. Systemic factors and the urgency of the issue led the newly-elected AK Party government to align with the United States. The domestic political environment was favorable for the ruling party to implement its decision as it had the majority in the GNAT and held key posts in the state structure. Nevertheless, it failed to get the March 1 motion approved. Though systemic factors were clear and demanded urgent action, the issue divided the AK Party, which made the GNAT the decisive agent in the decision process. Consequently, the formal research questions of the study are, 1) Which factors led the government to change its approach to the issue, and 2) Why did a government that had a favorable position in domestic politics fail to carry out its decision?

This study deals with the questions above from the perspective of neoclassical realism, which analyzes the interaction between systemic and unit-level variables. The study has two primary purposes. The first is to prove that in restrictive international environments where opportunities and threats are clear and the decision-making process is constrained by time, domestic divisions may matter in foreign policy and prevail over the systemic imperative, contrary to conventional expectations. Turkey, which may be classified as a secondary state in the regional context, encountered a restrictive international milieu. The unipolar international system and aggressive policies of the United States, Turkey's geographical proximity to Iraq, the distribution of power in the Middle East and the nature of bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States restricted the former's foreign policy options. Under these conditions, the Turkish government decided to align with the global hegemon. However, the final foreign policy decision did not reflect the system-level urgency. This brings us to the second purpose of the article, which is to demonstrate that in a restrictive international milieu, strong leadership, a factor underappreciated by neoclassical realists, is essential even for single-party governments, which are normally expected to have greater autonomy in

Mustafa Türkeş, "NATO bağlamında ABD-Türkiye ilişkilerinde devamlılık ve değişim," in *Türk dış politikasının analizi*, 3rd ed., ed. Faruk Sönmezoglu (Istanbul: Der, 2004), 379–403; Şaban Kardaş, "Turkish-American Relations in the 2000s: Revisiting the Basic Parameters of Partnership?" *Perceptions* 16, no. 3 (2011): 25–52.

³ Füsün Türkmen, "Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study," *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 3 (2010): 329–45; Omer Goksel Isyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (2005): 21–52; Nasuh Uslu, *Çatlak ittifak: 1947'den günümüze Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri* (Ankara: Nobel, 2016).

⁴ Çağrı Erhan and Ersin Embel, "Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Vericileri Yönlendiren Yapısal Faktörler," *BİLİG*, no. 72 (2015): 145–170.

⁵ Ramazan Gözen, "Causes and Consequences of Turkey's Out-Of-War Position in the Iraq War of 2003," *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* no. 36 (2005): 74–99.

democratic parliamentary systems, to formulate foreign policy. The systemic and structural factors would have led the Turkish government to participate in the war against Iraq alongside the United States. Nevertheless, the top leadership, albeit in favor of aligning with the global hegemon, could not display a firm and resolute stance during the process. The lack of strong leadership crystalized the divisions in the AK Party, weakened the government's control over foreign policy and disrupted the harmony between state organs. For this reason, the GNAT played a decisive role in the foreign policy of Turkey.

2. Explaining Turkey's Iraq War Decision

Turkey's Iraq War decision has been analyzed within the framework of various perspectives. It is mostly framed in terms of domestic politics and decision-making theories. In some studies, it is claimed that the Islamic background of the AK Party precluded the collaboration with the United States in the war against a Muslim-populated country, and the GNAT rejected the March 1 motion.⁶ Such an approach has some defects. The party sought the support of the United States before the general election held on November 3, 2002,⁷ and even though it was more attentive and vigilant towards Middle Eastern affairs than previous governments,⁸ it embraced a multi-dimensional and pragmatic foreign policy.⁹ The leadership of the AK Party also gave priority to the national interest of Turkey in conducting foreign policy, rather than adopting an ideological-ideational discourse.¹⁰ Other studies highlight the role of the media¹¹ as well as public opinion in influencing the parliamentary decision.¹² These studies emphasize that the GNAT was vulnerable to public pressure and its members voted as they preferred since the executive was indecisive about the motion. The media and public may affect foreign policy, especially in democratic states.¹³ Nevertheless, their effect is primarily indirect and not enough to explain specific foreign policy actions.¹⁴ Moreover, the influence of civil society on foreign policy is marginal in Turkey.¹⁵ Studies that deal with the issue within the framework of decision-making or decision-unit approaches have profound findings¹⁶ but were not made with reference to the distinct realm of international politics. Additionally, these studies are not a substitute for systemic and domestic explanations of foreign policy.¹⁷

⁶ Hasan B. Yalçın, "Making Sense of 1 March: A Proactive Strategy of Avoidance," *Perceptions* 18, no. 1 (2013): 158.

⁷ "ABD'lilerin duymak istediklerini söyledi," (editorial), *Milliyet*, January 30, 2002; Derya Sazak, "Erdoğan ikiz kuleler değişimi," *Milliyet*, February 2, 2002.

⁸ Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran, "AKP dış politikası: teori ve uygulama," in *AK Partili yıllar*, ed. Zeynep Dağı (Ankara: Orion, 2006), 15–70.

⁹ İlhan Uzgel, "Dış politikada AKP: Stratejik konumdan stratejik modele," in *AKP kitabı: Bir dönüştürme bilançosu*, ed. Bülent Duru and İlhan Uzgel (Ankara: Phoenix, 2010), 11–39.

¹⁰ Şaban Kardaş, "Türkiye ve Irak krizi: Kimlikle çıkar arasında AKP," in *AK Parti toplumsal değişimin yeni aktörleri*, ed. Hakan Yavuz (İstanbul: Kitap, 2010), 359–89.

¹¹ İpek Özlem, "Türk dış politikasında medyanın etkisi: 1 Mart 2003 tezkeresi" (Unpublished Master thes., Yeni Yüzyıl University, 2018).

¹² Baris Kesgin and Juliet Kaarbo, "When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey's Iraq Decision," *International Studies Perspectives* 11, no. 1 (2010): 19–36.

¹³ Lester W. Milbrath, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free, 1967), 231–51; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43, no. 4 (1991): 479–512.

¹⁴ Robert H. Trice, "Foreign Policy Interest Groups, Mass Public Opinion and the Arab-Israeli Dispute," *The Western Political Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (1978): 238–52.

¹⁵ Abdullah Akyüz, "Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde sivil toplum kuruluşlarının rolü," in *Sivil toplum ve dış politika: Yeni sorunlar, yeni aktörler*, ed. Semra Cerit Mazlum and Erhan Doğan (İstanbul: Bağlam, 2007), 209–33.

¹⁶ Fatma Anıl Öztop, "Karar birimi kuramı çerçevesinde Türk dış politikasının analizi: 1 Mart 2003 tezkeresi örneği," *Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 1, no. 2 (2015): 33–45; and Türk dış politikası yapım sürecinde karar birimlerinin etkileri (İstanbul: Gündoğan, 2018). Zeynep Taydaş and Özgür Özdamar, "A Divided Government, an Ideological Parliament, and an Insecure Leader: Turkey's Indecision About Joining the Iraq War," *Social Science Quarterly* 94, no. 1 (2013): 217–41.

¹⁷ Taydaş and Özdamar, "A Divided Government," 220.

Sensitive to the dynamic interaction between political leadership and international and domestic structures, some studies propose that leaders' personality traits influence foreign policy choices in similar international and domestic structural constraints. For instance, the literature has compared President Turgut Özal's 1991 Iraq War decision with that of the leader of the AK Party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in the 2003 Iraq War.¹⁸ However, despite similarities, the international and domestic structures in the two crises differ from each other in certain respects. Moreover, placing personality traits at the fore misses the crucial point that favorable political conditions are a precondition for exercising decisive individual leadership. The AK Party government's specific attitude to the March 1 motion, therefore, merits investigation.

Other studies that use structural analyses have suggested that Turkey pursued soft balancing strategies against the United States during the crisis. These studies assert that American preponderance in the international system made internal or external balancing policies prohibitively expensive for balancers, which is why Turkey embraced a soft balancing strategy.¹⁹ Soft balancing offers a sound analytical lens to understand Turkey's foreign policy with respect to the Iraq War. However, such a rendering will not be able to illuminate some points. Did Turkish decision-makers, for instance, really believe that they could balance and persuade the United States to opt for a peaceful solution that structurally stronger states such as France, Germany, Russia, and China could not? More importantly, why did the government submit a new motion to the GNAT on March 20, 2003?

Turkey's Iraq War decision should be handled by considering the joint interaction between systemic and unit-level variables. Therefore, analyzing the issue within the framework of neoclassical realism, which introduces a holistic and comprehensive methodology to foreign policy analysis without ignoring the distinctive characteristics of international politics, may present opportunities for further understanding the foreign policy of Turkey during the crisis and yield instructive inferences for future studies in the neoclassical realist research agenda as well as Turkish foreign policy.

3. A Neoclassical Realist Explanation of Foreign Policy

As one of the variations in the realist theory of international relations, neoclassical realism essentially emerged as a reaction to criticisms against structural realism. It aims to increase the explanatory power of realism by introducing domestic variables without losing the primary insights of structural realism to explain power relations in international politics.

Neoclassical realism rests on the systemic basis of structural realism yet also considers "*the complex relationship between state and society found in classical realism.*"²⁰ Neoclassical realists accept the international system as the chief variable determining the actions of states. They also argue, however, that states' evaluation of system-level power relations is not a smooth process since state officials may not properly comprehend the distribution of power in international politics. Hence, neoclassical realism primarily deals with the foreign policy

¹⁸ Esra Cuhadar, Juliet Kaarbo, Baris Kesgin, and Binnur Ozkececi-Taner, "Examining Leaders' Orientations to Structural Constraints: Turkey's 1991 and 2003 Iraq War Decisions," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 20 (2017): 29–54.

¹⁹ Murat Yeşiltaş, "Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Case of the 2003 Iraq War," *Perceptions* 14, no. 1 (2009): 25–51; and "Peşine takılma mı yumuşak dengeleme mi? Türkiye'nin Birinci ve İkinci Irak Savaşına yönelik ABD ile müttefiklik ilişkisinin karşılaştırmalı analizi," in *Mekân, kimlik, güç ve dış politika*, ed. S. Gülden Ayman (İstanbul: Yalın, 2012), 69–110.

²⁰ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2009), 23.

of states on two variables: the international system as the independent variable and domestic politics as the intervening variable. The system-level signals from the international system are filtered by unit-level variables such as leaders' images of world politics, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions.²¹

There is a thriving literature on neoclassical realism due to the eclectic and pragmatic nature of the approach, which offers a practical framework for analyzing foreign policy.²² Its eclecticism has also made neoclassical realism a target for some scholars.²³ While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the controversies surrounding the approach, it is necessary to understand how scholars have sought to utilize the framework to better articulate this study's contribution. According to the classification elaborated by Ripsman et al., the neoclassical realist literature may be identified with two distinct types of research. Type I neoclassical realism is aimed at ameliorating the shortcomings of structural realism by employing domestic-level variables. It mainly handles the cases in which states inappropriately respond to the systemic imperative. Type II seeks to explain foreign policy choices and grand strategic adjustments. Studies in this category basically argue that states have more policy options when there are no clear and imminent threats in the international system. Ripsman et al. also carve out a third type with the purpose of forging a theory of international politics. They claim that neoclassical realism may explain international outcomes and systemic change, which are affected by states' policy choices.²⁴

This study seeks to explicate which factors had a major effect on steering the foreign policy of Turkey towards the March 1 motion process. It suggests unipolarity as the systemic imperative and geography as the structural modifier primarily directing Turkey's attitude. In a unipolar international system, Turkey faced the pressure of the superpower, and its decision-makers acceded to the demands of the United States. Moreover, Turkey's geographical proximity to Iraq and the possibility of the emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq affected the decision calculus. Therefore, the international systemic signals and geography, the effects of which may objectively be observed in the statements of Turkish decision-makers, compelled Turkey to side with the United States. Additionally, the regional features of the Middle East as a sub-systemic factor and the nature of the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States had a constraining influence on Turkey. Under these circumstances, the AK Party government adopted a kind of bandwagoning policy so as not to confront the superpower and to have a say in the region after the war.

The systemic factor and structural modifier specified above chiefly conditioned Turkey's position. Nevertheless, the AK Party government was impeded by domestic politics. For this reason, unit-level elements require elaboration. First of all, the present theory identifies key decision-makers as the foreign policy executive (FPE). Foreign policy is primarily conducted by the executive, particularly by the government. In principle, the president, prime minister,

²¹ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72. Taliaferro, et al., "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism," 1–42.

²² Gustav Meibauer, Linde Desmaele, Tudor Onea, Nicholas Kitchen, Michiel Foulon, Alexander Reichwein, and Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Forum: Rethinking Neoclassical Realism at Theory's End," *International Studies Review* (2020): 1–28, doi: /10.1093/isr/viaa018.

²³ Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55; John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4 (1997): 899–912; Kevin Narizny, "On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics: A Critique of the Newest Realism," *International Security* 42, no. 4 (2017): 155–90.

²⁴ Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2016).

key cabinet members, ministers, especially the minister of foreign affairs, and foreign policy advisors are charged with formulating foreign and defense policies.²⁵ Yet, the FPE is not free from domestic impediments.²⁶ In other words, it is not totally autonomous in implementation of foreign policy. Institutional structures, decision-making procedures, and procedural norms are the most significant indicators of foreign policy autonomy (FPA), which “refers to the structural capacity of the foreign policy executive to pursue policies when faced with public or legislative opposition.”²⁷ Additionally, a government’s vulnerability may affect its autonomy. The likelihood of whether the current leadership is removed from political office specifies the degree of vulnerability.²⁸ Autonomy and vulnerability are essential variables for this study since a single-party government that possessed key governmental posts could not manage to implement its foreign policy decision even though it had a sufficient parliamentary majority.

The study draws on the variables specified above to analyze Turkey’s foreign policy disposition. However, some points need further elaboration. Firstly, realism in general and neoclassical realism in particular are criticized on account of the fact that they mainly deal with great power politics. In fact, as power is the basis of the realist tradition, great powers are prominently featured in the realist literature. Nevertheless, this does not mean that neoclassical realism has little relevance to the strategic behaviors of middle and small powers. From the perspective of neoclassical realism, it is essential to investigate how these states may react to a unipolar international environment in which the United States embraced unilateral policies.²⁹ In this sense, this study may be fruitful since Turkey is generally regarded as a regional middle power.³⁰ The exact nature of Turkey’s international political status requires comprehensive research that is beyond the aim of this article. Drawing on Lobell et al.,³¹ it may be proposed here that Turkey is a secondary state in the regional context. It cannot single-handedly and directly affect the distribution of power in the international system but can influence international politics by forging alliances with enough number of states.

Secondly, neoclassical realism incorporates systemic and unit-level variables yet offers little insight about how to construct the interaction between them.³² It is uncertain in what circumstances which level carries more weight in the conduct of foreign policy. In general, the theory predicts that permissive international environments present more policy options for decision-makers while restrictive ones have a constraining effect on states and diminish the influence of domestic divisions on foreign policy, especially in times of crisis.

²⁵ Ripsman et al., *Neoclassical Realist Theory*, 61.

²⁶ Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism*, 172–74.

²⁷ Norrin M. Ripsman, *Peace-Making by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University, 2002), 43–57.

²⁸ Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): 173–75.

²⁹ Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, “Conclusion: The State of Neoclassical Realism,” in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism*, 295–96; Ripsman et al., *Neoclassical Realist Theory*, 185–86.

³⁰ Emel Parlar Dal, “Conceptualising and Testing the ‘Emerging Regional Power’ of Turkey in the Shifting International Order,” *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 8 (2016): 1425–453; Hasan B. Yalçın, “The Concept of ‘Middle Power’ and the Recent Turkish Foreign Policy Activism,” *Afro Eurasian Studies* 1, no. 1 (2012): 195–213.

³¹ On the basis of David R. Mares’s classification of states in the international system, Lobell et al. examine why secondary and tertiary states support, follow or challenge the regional rising states, such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. Mares makes a four-fold distinction on the position of states in the international system, drawing on structural realist theory. He classifies states as great, secondary, middle, and small ones. In this classification, secondary and tertiary states of Lobell et al. in the regional context basically equate middle and small states to secondary and tertiary states, respectively. Steven E. Lobell, Neal G. Jesse, and Kristen P. Williams, “Why Do Secondary States Choose to Support, Follow or Challenge?,” *International Politics* 52, no. 2 (2015): 146–62.

³² Ali Balci, Tuncay Kardeş, İsmail Ediz, and Yildirim Turan, “War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War,” *War in History* (2018): 1–28, doi: 10.1177/0968344518789707.

When opportunities and threats in the international system are clear, variances for optimal policy choices among societal actors are low.³³ From this perspective, the March 1 motion offers many complexities as domestic divisions in Turkey became evident in a restrictive international milieu, and the ruling majority government was unable to formulate and implement a coherent policy.

Third, though assumed to be unified, the FPEs may be divided³⁴ or ambivalent. In such cases, bodies or individuals that are not directly in charge of conducting foreign policy may function as the FPE. Thus, especially in a restrictive international milieu, even for single-party governments, strong leadership may be required for proper translation of systemic signals as well as the achievement of coordination between state organs for a consistent foreign policy response.³⁵ An influential and resolute leader may facilitate the implementation of a hierarchical decision-making procedure and thereby promote the FPA of governments. In fact, the ambivalent attitude of the AK Party's top leadership on the issue led to the loss of control of the government over foreign policy and disrupted the coordination between state organs, resulting in a foreign policy response by Turkey inconsistent with the expectations of conventional neoclassical realist assumptions.

4. The Iraq Issue in Turkish Foreign Policy

The Iraq issue entered the Turkish political agenda long before the AK Party came to power. When Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait in August 1990, Turkey allied with the coalition states against Saddam. The military intervention changed the domestic political order of Iraq, and the control of the central government over Iraqi territory weakened. Therefore, the future of the country and the rising influence of the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq became a security matter for Turkey throughout the 1990s.

The 9/11 attacks ignited the Iraq issue again. Turkish decision-makers condemned the attacks and stated that Turkey would support the United States' efforts against the war on terror. The coalition government took permission from the GNAT to deploy Turkish troops abroad, and Turkey provided logistic support and training to Afghan personnel. However, the attitude of the decision-makers towards a military intervention in Iraq was different. They were anxious that the intervention could lead to the dissolution of Iraq, and a Kurdish state might emerge. Staying out of the war against Iraq was therefore the preferred policy of Turkey's coalition government.³⁶

Shortly before the March 1 decision, Turkey held a general election that resulted in the emergence of a new political actor, the AK Party. The fact that a single party came to power enabled the United States to cooperate with a more unified cabinet and legislature. Thus, American officials swiftly contacted the new government. Three actors from Turkey actively participated in the process. The first was the head of the government, Prime Minister Abdullah Gül. The second was the influential leader of the AK Party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was banned from politics. Gül and Erdoğan were the key decision-makers in charge of Turkey's policy response. Though less effective, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yaşar Yakış,

³³ Ripsman et al., *Neoclassical Realist Theory*, 52–8

³⁴ Balci et al., "War Decision and," 1–28.

³⁵ See for a discussion Ariel Ilan Roth, *Leadership in International Relations: The Balance of Power and the Origins of World War II* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

³⁶ Samet Yılmaz, "Neoklasik realizm ve dış politika: 1 Mart tezkeresi örneği" (Unpublished Master thesis., Uludağ Üniversitesi, Bursa, Turkey, 2014), 64–7.

was included as the third actor.

The United States made first contact with the new government on December 3, 2002. United States Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman arrived in Ankara. Wolfowitz stated that the United States expected Turkey's full and complete cooperation. He offered a three-phased plan to Gül. In the first stage, the American military officials would inspect the communication facilities and military bases in Turkey. Second, the condition of these facilities and bases would be improved. Third, the American and English land and air forces would be stationed in Turkish territory, when necessary, to be employed in the war against Iraq.³⁷

Though the AK Party government had its own *modus operandi* and agenda, its approach to the issue was not different from its predecessor's. It was anxious that the intervention could fuel the aspirations of Kurdish separatists to pursue autonomy or establish a Kurdish state and result in economic losses for Turkey.³⁸ Thus, Turkey implemented multilateral and bilateral initiatives to find a peaceful settlement in January 2003.³⁹ If the intervention was to be carried out, it was supposed to be in cooperation with the international community. However, international political developments rendered it difficult for Turkey to adopt a normative or principled stance towards the issue.⁴⁰

5. One Option for Turkey in a Unipolar World

The government initially abstained from formally allying with the United States in the war against Iraq, yet American demands were gradually included in the Turkish political agenda. Two of three among these demands were approved with the February 6 motion.⁴¹ So, the government gradually shifted from a cautious and non-committal approach to a position in line with systemic and structural factors. The systemic factors that forced Turkey to change its position were the unipolar structure of the international system and the inclination of the American executive to turn the national power of the United States into influence on international politics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States remained the sole superpower. Despite occasional objections, there was no open challenge to American supremacy.⁴² The Bush administration declared the will of the United States to impose a new world order and act unilaterally if need be.⁴³ While the United Kingdom supported the invasion of Iraq, other key allies, like France and Germany, were critical. Russia and China were also opposed to the operation but could not affect the United States. American officials declared that they would strike Iraq even without the support of their allies.⁴⁴ So, any kind

³⁷ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak krizinin gerçek öyküsü*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Remzi, 2004), 98–101.

³⁸ Gözen, "Causes and Consequences," 74–99.

³⁹ Yılmaz, "Neoklasik realizm," 95–6.

⁴⁰ Sevilay Z. Aksoy, "The Turkish Stance Toward the US Requests for the 2003 Iraq War: A Case of Norms Versus Interests?," *Ortaoğu Etütleri* 10, no. 2 (2018): 8–47.

⁴¹ Yılmaz, "Neoklasik realizm," 102–05.

⁴² The article takes Wohlforth and Brooks's statements on the structure of international system after the Cold War as a reference. They claim that the national capacity of the United States shows how dominant it is. No country is ever close to the United States in terms of political, economic, and military power. It is the leader in all areas, which is unprecedented in history. Thus, the international system following the Cold War is certainly unipolar. William C. Wohlforth, "Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 5–41; William C. Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks, "American Primacy in Perspective," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2002): 20–33; and *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 2008).

⁴³ Colin Dueck, "Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000–2004," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004): 511–35; Janothon Monten, "Primacy and Grand Strategic Beliefs in US Unilateralism," *Global Governance* 13, no. 1 (2007): 119–38.

⁴⁴ "US Will Attack without Approval 'Zero Tolerance' Policy by Bush Administration," November 11, 2002, accessed June 11,

of balancing behavior seemed useless and costly. Turkey had already taken notice of this situation. The Turkish Embassy in Washington had warned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the general election and stated that the United States would strike Iraq even without a United Nations resolution.⁴⁵ Hence, three options emerged for Turkish FPEs. Turkey would either ally with the United States, stay out of the conflict, or act unilaterally by sending its troops to northern Iraq.

Turkey chose the first option. The FPEs thought that Turkey “faced with the painful central reality of the unipolar structure”⁴⁶ could not stop the war, and the other options would lead to confrontation with the United States. This conviction could be observed in the various remarks of the FPEs. Gül said on February 5 that Turkey had done everything to find a peaceful way, and the responsibility was now in Saddam’s hands. Turkey could not stay out of the issue and should act together with the United States.⁴⁷ Before the vote on the February 6 motion, Erdoğan attempted to persuade AK Party deputies to support the motion, underscoring that no country could challenge the United States.⁴⁸ Yakış, meanwhile, also stated that when it was understood that the war was unavoidable and Turkey could not stop it, the government considered siding with the United States.⁴⁹

In addition to the unipolar international moment, the geographical proximity of the conflict forced the government to cooperate with the United States. Turkish officials postulated that the emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, the fall of Mosul and Kirkuk into the hands of Kurdish groups, the strengthening of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the fate of the Turkomans were Turkey’s redlines.⁵⁰ The PKK factor was notably critical. The Turkish military performed many cross-border operations throughout the 1990s to protect Turkey’s southern borders.⁵¹ In fact, Erdoğan warned the AK Party parliamentary group before the vote on the March 1 motion that if Turkey did not act with the United States, a Kurdish state could emerge in northern Iraq, and separatist activities in Turkey could rise again.⁵²

The regional characteristics of the Middle East and the nature of Turkey’s relations with the United States also restricted the AK Party government. The Middle East is a dynamic and unstructured region. There is no state in the region, such as China, Russia, or India, that has the capacity to claim regional supremacy. The absence of a regional hegemonic power makes the Middle East more vulnerable to external intervention and penetration.⁵³ Therefore, Turkey could not rely on the states in the region to balance the United States. Moreover, the United States has been strategically engaged with Middle Eastern politics since the mid-1950s, and its policies have an impact on the national security of the states in the region. Consequently, security has been the basic variable determining the bilateral relations between Turkey and

2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/11/iraq.usa>

⁴⁵ Öztop, *Türk dış politikası*, 231.

⁴⁶ Yalçın, “Making Sense of,” 176.

⁴⁷ Murat Yetkin, “Irak’ta ABD’nin yanındaız,” *Radikal*, February 6, 2003.

⁴⁸ “Irak tezkeresi AKP’yi çatlattı,” (editorial), *Milliyet*, February 7, 2003.

⁴⁹ Özgür Özdamar, “Dış politika karar alımı sürecinde lider merkezli yaklaşım: akılcı tercih kuramı ve Türkiye’nin Irak Savaşı’na katılmama kararı,” in *Dış politika teorileri bağlamında Türk dış politikasının analizi*, ed. Ertan Efeğil and Rıdvan Kalaycı (Ankara: Nobel, 2012), 488.

⁵⁰ Fikret Bila, *Ankara’da Irak savaşları: Sivil darbe girişimi ve gizli belgelerle 1 Mart tezkeresi*, 6th ed (İstanbul: Güncel 2007), 225.

⁵¹ Özlem Tür, “Türkiye’nin Irak ve Suriye ilişkileri,” in *XXI. yüzyılda Türk dış politikasının analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezöğlü, Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, and Özlem Terzi (İstanbul: Der, 2012), 595–98.

⁵² Öztop, *Türk dış politikası*, 262.

⁵³ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Middle East Middle Powers: Regional Role, International Impact,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 11, no. 42 (2014): 29–49.

the United States,⁵⁴ and the security consequences of the Iraq issue also compelled Turkish decision-makers to collaborate with the United States.

Turkey failed to follow a consistent and stable policy during the crisis. It was in favor of preserving the status quo and peacefully resolving the issue at the outset as the war might lead to destabilization of the region. But, when the FPEs saw that the United States would strike Iraq and an international consensus was not reached, they concluded that Turkey had to align with the United States. Furthermore, the geographical proximity and the regional distribution of power in the Middle East undergirded this conviction. So, suggesting that Turkey adopted a kind of bandwagoning policy in order to have a say in reshaping the region seems telling. As bandwagoning is more feasible when faced with states that have greater capabilities and aggressive intentions,⁵⁵ the government decided to cooperate with the United States due to the difficulties in balancing the superpower. Whether Turkey embraced a defensive (status quo) or aggressive bandwagoning policy is unclear. However, it may be argued that the government pursued a jackal and piling-on bandwagoning policy in Schweller's terms⁵⁶ to a certain degree. It was almost certain that the United States would prevail over Iraq. The government avoided confronting the United States and sought to share the spoils of war to protect the national security of Turkey and increase its influence over the region.

6. Why the AK Party Government Failed

The March 1 motion, which would allow the deployment of up to 62,000 foreign troops on Turkey's territory and the dispatching of Turkish troops abroad, was submitted to the GNAT on February 25. It did not pass due to the small margin of approving votes on March 1. In principle, the government had a high degree of autonomy. The AK Party was the majority in the GNAT and held all executive posts at the ministerial level. Furthermore, it had just won the general election, which gave it democratic legitimacy. Thus, the government was less vulnerable to removal from power. Nevertheless, it failed to get the motion through. It may be proposed that two reasons account for this.

The first and the most significant one was the ambivalence of the leadership. Gül and Erdoğan were in favor of the motion, but they faced some constraints and assumed different roles. As prime minister, Gül was politically and legally beholden to the public opinion. Therefore, he was more cautious and always responsive to other options.⁵⁷ Furthermore, as Erdoğan would take over the prime ministry, it was stated in the press that Gül's advisors recommended him to be cautious.⁵⁸ Similarly, Erdoğan, too, was constrained. He had a great influence on the party, which is why the United States' officials interacted more with him than Gül during the process.⁵⁹ The fact that Erdoğan was out of the GNAT and did not have an official post, however, limited his influence. He was negotiating a constitutional amendment to be elected as prime minister and was then preparing for interim elections to be held on March 9, 2003. Erdoğan seemed to be in a quandary. If he forced the deputies, the party could

⁵⁴ Türkmen, "Turkish-American Relations," 109–29.

⁵⁵ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning," in *International Politics: Enduring Concepts, and Contemporary Issues*, 13th ed., ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson, 2016), 159–60.

⁵⁶ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 93–6.

⁵⁷ Ahmet Sever, *Abdullah Gül ile 12 yıl: Yaşadım, gördüm, yazdım* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2015), 38–47.

⁵⁸ Bila, *Ankara'da Irak savaşları*, 213.

⁵⁹ Marina E. Henke, "The Rotten Carrot: US-Turkish Bargaining Failure Over Iraq in 2003 and the Pitfalls of Social Embeddedness," *Security Studies* 27, no. 1 (2018): 120–47.

be divided, and he could lose his authority over the party. If he went against the United States, he could lose his international support.⁶⁰

The ambivalence of the leadership paved the way for external penetration and the dissolution of the AK Party. The United States' officials held informal meetings with those who were not officially liable for conducting foreign policy but were influential within the ruling party, such as Ömer Çelik, Cüneyd Zapsu, and Egemen Bağış.⁶¹ They were among Erdoğan's consultants and gave utmost importance to Turkey's relations with the United States. Naturally, they favored the motion.⁶² So, the coordination between the FPEs was disrupted. Moreover, since no actor was able to act as a predominant leader, a hierarchical, or in other words, ordinary decision-making procedure could not be implemented.⁶³ The party discipline disappeared, and the motion was sent to the GNAT without a party group decision. The urgency of the issue concretized the divisions in the AK Party, which was composed of diverging political tendencies.⁶⁴ Some members of the party, such as Murat Mercan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, who were among Gül's advisors, believed that Turkey should develop a multi-dimensional foreign policy and establish good relations with its neighbors, even at the expense of harming relations with the United States.⁶⁵ Cabinet members also had opposing views on the motion.⁶⁶ During the plenary session in which the motion was negotiated in the GNAT, Önder Sav's speech on behalf of the main opposition party seemed to have a negative effect on the already hesitant deputies of the AK Party.⁶⁷ Hence, as Erdoğan said on May 26, 2007, the party was divided concerning the motion.⁶⁸

Second, governmental control over the bureaucracy was weak. There were two reasons for this situation. The first was that the AK Party was a new one, founded on August 14, 2001. It could not yet establish control over the civil bureaucracy, which had acted as an organized and influential agent since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.⁶⁹ The government faced this ossified state system after the general election. The second was the AK Party's political background. Its founders mostly came from the Welfare Party (WP), which resigned from government after the military memorandum on February 28, 1997, and which was closed by the Constitutional Court on account of its anti-secular actions. The successor of the WP, the Virtue Party (VP), was also shut down by the Court in June 2001. After these developments, a new clique from the VP referred to by the media as 'reformists' formed the AK Party. The founders expressed that they changed their political stance. Because of its Islamist origins, however, the party had strains with the military and civil bureaucracy.⁷⁰

Its limited control over the bureaucracy led the AK Party to benefit from its political advisors, rather than the bureaucracy, in the conduct of foreign policy. Advisors were especially influential in the early tenure of the government. Hence, the bureaucracy and politicians were disunited. While the negotiations with the United States were on going, the

⁶⁰ Özdamar, "Dış politika karar," 494–97.

⁶¹ Bila, *Ankara'da Irak savaşları*, 186–88; Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak krizinin*, 103–04.

⁶² İnat and Duran, "AKP dış politikası," 40.

⁶³ Öztop, "Karar birimi kuramı," 33–45.

⁶⁴ Kardaş, "Türkiye ve Irak," 379–93.

⁶⁵ İnat and Duran, "AKP dış politikası," 41.

⁶⁶ Yılmaz, "Neoklasik realizm," 114.

⁶⁷ Yılmaz, "Neoklasik realizm," 109–11.

⁶⁸ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart vakası: Irak tezkeresi ve sonrası*, 4th ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap 2008), 136.

⁶⁹ Gökhan Tuncel, *Sivil toplum ve devlet* (Malatya: Bilsam, 2011), 99–173.

⁷⁰ Gareth Jenkins, "Semboller ve gölge oyunu ordu-AKP ilişkileri 2002-2004," trans. Bayram Sinkaya, in *AK Parti toplumsal değişimin yeni aktörleri*, ed. Hakan Yavuz (İstanbul: Kitap, 2010), 235–57.

lack of coordination between Yakış and the foreign affairs bureaucracy was observed in some cases.⁷¹ The lack of governmental control over the bureaucracy reduced the government's ability to steer information. In fact, the deputies of the AK Party were not even informed of the content of the memorandum of understanding between Turkey and the United States.⁷² Furthermore, the government attempted to share responsibility with other state organs. It waited for the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on February 28, 2003, and expected a decision to facilitate the approval of the motion by the GNAT. Then an influential advisory body, the NSC was liable for protecting the unity of the state and society against internal and external threats,⁷³ but on this occasion did not make a recommendation as expected.⁷⁴ Just like the AK Party, the commanders of the different branches of armed forces had divergent opinions on the March 1 motion.⁷⁵ Therefore, the responsibility for joining the war alongside the United States was left to the government, which was bereft of an authoritative leader.

The developments specified above impaired the harmony between state organs and decreased the government's influence on foreign policy. Thus, the GNAT became a significant agent in the process. It may be proposed that it almost functioned as the FPE.⁷⁶ The fact that the leadership could not display a firm and coherent stance towards the March 1 motion made the GNAT a balancing actor. After the vote, the Chairman of the GNAT's Foreign Affairs Commission Mehmet Dulger stated that *"a new motion...- should be presented in a different manner to Parliament and a strong-looking government with a stronger voice is also needed."*⁷⁷ The approval of a new motion on March 20, 2003, after Erdoğan became prime minister on March 14, shows how important strong leadership is as a unifying factor, necessary for making coherent foreign policy decisions consistent with the requirements of the international system.⁷⁸

7. Conclusion

Turkey displayed an unusual attitude and refused the demands of its close partner in a unipolar international structure. The AK Party government initially eschewed entering the war along with the United States. Then, it changed its initial position and embraced a kind of bandwagoning policy. This choice seems rather clear in view of prevalent systemic and geographical factors, and as neoclassical realists anticipate,⁷⁹ Turkey's eventual decision was a reaction to the uncertainties that might emerge in its surrounding regions following the war. The government had a favorable domestic political environment for implementation of its decision, yet the ambivalence of the leadership and the weakness of governmental control over the bureaucracy debilitated the government's position. So, Turkey could not pursue an effective bandwagoning policy. Some conclusions may be drawn from the investigation.

First, it may be suggested that when encountering the aggressive policies and demands of a global hegemon, which may result in the destabilization of its surrounding regions,

⁷¹ Yılmaz, "Neoklasik realizm," 90–3.

⁷² Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart vakası*, 156.

⁷³ Gencer Özcan, "Türkiye dış politikasında algılamalar, karar alma ve oluşum süreci," in *Türk dış politikasının analizi*, 13th ed., ed. Faruk Sönmezöğlü (İstanbul: Der, 2004), 850.

⁷⁴ Bila, *Ankara'da Irak savaşları*, 217.

⁷⁵ "Hilmi Özkök, tezkereyle ilgili bilinmeyenleri anlattı," (editorial), *Hürriyet*, August 6, 2012.

⁷⁶ Kesgin and Kaarbo, "When and How," 19–36.

⁷⁷ Kemal Balci, "Dulger: Turkey Needs Government With Strong Voice," *Turkish Probe*, March 9, 2003 quoted in Kesgin and Kaarbo, "When and How," 32.

⁷⁸ Kardaş, "Türkiye ve Irak," 384; Öztop, "Karar birimi kuramı," 42.

⁷⁹ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism," 152.

a secondary state primarily considers three variables while formulating its foreign policy: the attitude of the great powers in the international system towards the global hegemon, the regional distribution of power, and the degree of engagement of the global hegemon in the region. When the great powers are unable to deter the hegemon's aggressive intentions, it may be unwise and costly for the secondary state to pursue balancing. The fact that the global hegemon is strategically engaged in a region lacking a regional great power also precludes a balancing strategy. Furthermore, the nature of the bilateral relations between the secondary state and the global hegemon is significant for the strategies of the former. If security is at the core of bilateral relations, it is difficult for the secondary state to resist the hegemon.⁸⁰ In such cases, the secondary state may opt to bandwagon with the global hegemon to protect its national security and thereby enhance its influence over its surrounding regions.

Second, contrary to the neoclassical realist expectations, even when opportunities and threats in international politics are explicit, domestic actors may have the opportunity to articulate their alternative preferences particularly on national security matters. The study demonstrates that although the systemic messages were clear and discernible, the domestic divisions in Turkey had an influence on the decision-making process towards the March 1 motion. The systemic and structural factors, including time pressure, led to the emergence of a restrictive international milieu for Turkey. The FPEs concluded that Turkey had to cooperate with the United States. However, on this occasion the urgency of the issue concretized the divergences in domestic politics. As the international pressure increased, the cohesion of the ruling party and the coordination between state organs weakened. Therefore, domestic divisions prevailed over the systemic imperative in a restrictive international environment.

Third, especially during crisis periods in which decision-making is constrained by time, strong leadership is required to ensure coordination between state organs and promote the ability of the executive to perform a coherent foreign policy. Moreover, a strong leader decreases the disruptive effects of foreign penetration on the decision-making process. A predominant leader allows external actors to establish contact with a state through a single interlocutor with control over his or her milieu. This way, the executive may manipulate information about the developments in international politics, allowing better coordination between FPEs and the bureaucracy, promoting greater governmental control over the bureaucracy, and marginalizing alternative policy options. Therefore, it may be proposed that strong leadership, among other things, is one of the factors that determine the degree of governments' FPA even under majority governments. An influential decision-maker who can act with authority enables the articulation and implementation of a coherent foreign policy. In such cases, governments have more autonomy. This study shows that even though a single party had the majority, and institutional structures, decision-making procedures, and procedural norms favored the executive, the legislative virtually took on the function of the FPE due to the lack of strong leadership within the government.

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⁸⁰ See Lobell, et al., "Why Do Secondary," 146–62.

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Hedging as a Survival Strategy for Small States: The Case of Kuwait

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Abstract

Strategic hedging has not been studied adequately in Middle Eastern countries. This study is an attempt to include hedging into the analysis of a small state's foreign policy choices. It contends that the hedging strategy can be applied to small states because it allows them to confront/respond to risks/threats at three levels: international, regional and sub-regional. It is argued that Kuwait has pursued a hedging policy by taking possible shifts in the global and regional power distribution and the lasting regional security dilemma into consideration. By strengthening military cooperation with China and Turkey, Kuwait has aimed to hedge the risks that could arise from the rise of China and Turkey in the Gulf, the US' retrenchment from the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia's aggressiveness. The main purpose of this strategy is analysed as a move to empower the regional alliance with Turkey, ensuring Kuwait's security and warding off potential risks from the changing dynamics of the Middle East.

Keywords: Hedging, foreign policy, Kuwait, China, Turkey

1. Introduction

Any attempt to conduct an analysis of a state's foreign policy choices must be divided into categories defining the state's attributes, such as its size, strength, and capabilities. Within the scope of power, states are generally classified either as a superpower, a great power, or a small power. Due to its limited potential to change the current international order and inability to protect its national interests using its own political or military means, Kuwait is considered a small state. Small states lack the capacity to ensure their own security and are unable to significantly influence international order.¹ Therefore, small powers' foreign policies generally consist of balancing or bandwagoning. However, there is a smart choice of strategy available to small states: hedging. Hedging allows small states such as Kuwait to offset and reduce the scale of threats. In implementing this strategy, Kuwait can avoid confrontations with the US, China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. While Kuwait's foreign policy

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¹ Živilė Marija Vaucekaskaitė, "Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World," *Journal on Baltic Security* 3, no. 2 (2017): 9.

has been widely described as well-hedged, especially regarding its relations with Iraq² and Iran³, there is a significant gap in the literature in terms of analysing Kuwait's relations with China and Turkey. This study thus aims to fill that gap.

On the other hand, the hedging strategy has been studied by focusing on threats. In this sense, Kuwait's hedging is considered a tactic used to address Iranian expansion, Iraqi irredentism, and the domestic uprising of Shiites. While we agree with this analysis, we contend that hedging is not only a strategy to be used against threats. Rather, we argue that hedging can also be used for the benefit of rising powers. With the Kuwaiti example in mind, hedging is implemented in order to manage potential risks and additional costs from China and Turkey's growing influence in Gulf politics.

Lastly, hedging is generally employed in order to avoid threats from rising regional powers. In this sense, Kuwait seeks to avoid confrontations with China and Turkey. Additionally, by hedging, Kuwait is not beholden to China or Turkey. In other words, Kuwait's security environment is not based on the rigid logic of an alliance bloc. Kuwait need not sever its ties with the US or Saudi Arabia despite China's and Turkey's interest in the area. As an alternative strategy for Kuwait, hedging allows it to maintain good relations with all powers. Rather than prioritizing relations with either the US, China, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey, we argue that by improving ties with China and Turkey, Kuwait hedges them and maintains multiple policy options. To reflect this, we selected the types of hedging that were developed by Koga.⁴




Figure 1: Kuwait's hedging towards China and Turkey

Based on Koga's methodological framework, it can be argued that engaging in economic bandwagoning and diplomatic balancing constitutes soft hedging, which is Kuwait's strategy towards China. On the other hand, Kuwait's strategy towards Turkey can be defined as economic hedging, which includes military bandwagoning and economic balancing.

In order to understand the dynamics, instruments, and motivations of Kuwaiti foreign policy, the study firstly reflects on the foreign policy objectives and choices of Kuwait at a historical level. Given the recent shifts in the global power structure, Kuwait has also been in search of a change, albeit a limited one, in its foreign policy direction and priorities. It is important to understand these changes in order to better evaluate whether Kuwait is

² Daniel J. Jackson, "Kuwaiti Relations with Iraq in the post-Saddam Era: Strategic Hedging, Regional Effects & the Structural Power of Small States" (Master Thesis, Middle Eastern Studies, Leiden University, 2017).

³ Sofie Hamdi and Mohammad Salman, "The Hedging Strategy of Small Arab Gulf States," *Asian Politics & Policy* 12, no. 2 (2020): 1-26.

⁴ Kei Koga, "The Concept of "Hedging" Revisited: The Case of Japan's Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia's Power Shift," *International Studies Review* 20, no. 4 (2017): 633-60.

attempting to implement a new foreign policy direction, different from its traditional one.⁵

The study employs a relatively new and, to some extent, novel approach by classifying Kuwaiti foreign policy behavior as hedging rather than bandwagoning or balancing. It is, therefore, the aim of this study to assess whether Kuwait pursues a hedging strategy in its foreign policy. In order to better analyse the topic and test the assumptions, the study focuses on Kuwait's foreign policy choices towards China and Turkey. By understanding the strategic choices Kuwait made in relation to these countries, the study reveals why and how bandwagoning and balancing are no longer rational policy choices for Kuwait. As the study unfolds, hedging is offered as the most suitable foreign policy strategy for Kuwait. The initial phases of this study focus on the theoretical account of the hedging strategy, which also discusses the security dynamics within the Gulf region. Extracting from the literature on hedging, this part is devoted to defining hedging as well as Kuwait's choice in strategy. The succeeding sections detail Kuwait's policies towards Turkey and China while documenting Kuwait's growing rapprochement with both countries.

2. Hedging as a Foreign Policy Strategy

Hedging strategy is derived from economics.⁶ In the 1940s, economists proposed and refined the concept of hedging. Hedging theory had become a staple in finance by the 1960s. While the concept began to appear in the works of IR scholars in the 2000s⁷, strategic analysts and policy makers are also increasingly subscribing to the concept of hedging, with most applications reflecting US policy perspectives. However, hedging in international politics has never been clearly defined. Without a common definition, hedging appears as an underdeveloped concept.⁸ Therefore, even if there exists a plethora of studies on hedging, there is a lack of consensus on its definitions, motivations, conditions, patterns, and identification.⁹ The nature of hedging has thus not been fully explored.

Hedging can be defined as the position of states that aim to offset potential losses or gains. It helps a small state to prepare for confrontation, uncertainty, and risks by protecting and promoting its security position in case its relationship with the leader of the unipolar system worsens. It is a useful strategy for states that are unable to settle on other strategies such as balancing, bandwagoning, or buck-passing. Evelyn Goh, for instance, defines hedging as “a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality.” States seek to “cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another.”¹⁰ Roy defined hedging as “keeping open more than one strategic option against the possibility of a future security threat”.¹¹ His definition does not question whether the state has decided to take sides, nor the degree to

⁵ Mediation and neutrality are very center within Kuwaiti foreign policy. Abdullah R. Al-Saleh, “Conflict Analysis: Exploring The Role of Kuwait in Mediation in the Middle East” (Master diss., Portland State University, 2009).

⁶ Peter Fusaro and Tom James, *Energy Hedging in Asia: Market Structure and Trading Opportunities* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁷ Emine Akçadağ Alagöz, “Blue-Water Navy Program as a part of South Korea's Hedging Strategy,” *Güvenlik Stratejileri* 13, no. 25 (2017): 67.

⁸ Mohammad Salman, Moritz A. Pieper, and Gustaaf Geeraerts, “Hedging in the Middle East and China U.S. Competition,” *Asian Politics & Policy* 7, no. 4 (2015): 1.

⁹ Koga, “The Concept of ‘Hedging’ Revisited,” 634.

¹⁰ Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies,” *Policy Studies* 16 (2005): 2.

¹¹ Dennis Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, no. 2 (2005): 205–322.

which the state has weighed one strategy against another when it mixes strategies. Because Roy's definition mixes balancing, bandwagoning, neutrality, engagement, and accommodation, there can be difficulty in identifying and implementing it in a specific case. A more detailed definition, by Cheng-Chwee Kuik, defines hedging as "a behavior in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-stakes".¹² Kuik's definition of hedging offers by far the most precision and allows us to think about policy application. Its aim is clear: "offsetting the risk". By aiming to offset the potential risk of choosing one state over another, the hedging state avoids provoking the target states. David Lake, meanwhile, defines¹³ hedging as "an insurance policy against opportunism" while Medeiros defines it as a "geopolitical insurance strategy" because it allows states to offset and reduce the scale of potential threats in their relations with both international and regional powers without confronting any of them.¹⁴ Similarly, Tessman and Wolfe define strategic hedging as an insurance policy that helps states guard against two possibilities: that relations between the hedging state and the system leader deteriorate to the point of a militarized crisis, and/or that the system leader will cease the provision of public goods that the hedging state currently enjoys.¹⁵ However, by defining hedging as merely a response to the "system leader" by second-tier states¹⁶ in a unipolar system, Tessman and Wolfe's theoretical exposition of hedging is too restrictive and narrow, hence missing a wide range of hedging behaviors under other conditions. Containment is not hedging, just as using force is not deterrence. Use of force is an option after deterrence fails. Similarly, containment is an option should hedging fail. Such a distinction is helpful for theoretical rigor as well as more rigorous strategic and policy analysis. This strategy allows states to utilize other instruments of statecraft, such as entanglement, balancing, engagement, and restraining.¹⁷

Hedging is a strategy that can be employed by any kind of state.¹⁸ It is argued that hedging is generally used by second-tier states as a strategic option, but it can also be used by great powers.¹⁹ There is a plethora of studies on hedging²⁰ being employed as a strategy focused mainly on the Asia-Pacific region²¹. China's utilization of hedging as a strategic option in its competition with the United States is widely studied in scholarly literature. We also contend

¹² Cheng-Chwee Kuik, "The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 30, no. 2 (2008): 163.

¹³ David Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (1996): 1–33.

¹⁴ Evan S. Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia Pacific Stability," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (2005): 164.

¹⁵ Brock Tessman and Wojtek Wolfe, "Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security Strategy," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 2 (2011): 214–40.

¹⁶ It is argued that hedging is generally used by smaller states as a strategic option. But it can also be used by great powers. Mohammad Salman and Gustaaf Geeraerts, "Strategic Hedging and China's Economic Policy in the Middle East," *China Report* 51, no. 2 (2015): 104.

¹⁷ Alagöz, "South Korea's Hedging Strategy," 67.

¹⁸ Mordechai Chaziza, "Strategic Hedging Partnership: A New Framework for Analyzing Sino-Saudi Relations," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 9, no. 3 (2015): 442.

¹⁹ Salman and Geeraerts, "Strategic Hedging," 104.

²⁰ Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran, "Iran's Nuclear Programme: A Case Study in Hedging?," *Contemporary Security Policy* 35, no. 1 (2014): 26–52; Alexander Korolev, "Russia in the South China Sea: Balancing and Hedging," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 15 (2019), 263–82; Alexander Korolev, "Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China-Russia Relations," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 4 (2016): 375–97; Thi Bich Tran and Yoichiro Sato, "Vietnam's Post-Cold War Hedging Strategy: A Changing Mix of Realist and Liberal Ingredients," *Asian Politics & Policy* 10, no. 1 (2018): 73–99.

²¹ Wojtek M. Wolfe, "China's Strategic Hedging," *Orbis* 57, no. 2 (2013): 300–13; Van Jackson, "Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 14, no. 3 (2014): 331–56.

that hedging is ideal for exploring the behaviors of small powers, such as those of Kuwait,²² which we argue has received relatively little attention, especially regarding its relationships with China and Turkey.

The final theoretical consideration here is that hedging is irreducible to a single country, issue, or region. Instead, as we argue, hedging can occur at multiple levels and issue areas, and can therefore be best understood through the lens of a level-of-analysis. In other words, Kuwait hedged China and Turkey at the international, regional and sub-regional levels.

We argue that Kuwait can hedge not only in the center of the Middle Eastern multipolar system, but also with other regional and global powers. This hedging strategy can be studied through an investigation of regional and sub-regional dynamics, such as the Arab uprisings, the uncertainty about US intentions, the rise of new actors in Gulf politics, and other geopolitical risks. The argument is that, considering the possible shifts in the global and regional power distribution and lasting regional security dilemma, Kuwait preferred to hedge rather than employ balancing or bandwagoning. Kuwait intends to strengthen its military alliance with China while seeking to develop a stronger partnership with the US. On the other hand, it also wishes to strengthen its military alliance with Turkey, simultaneously hoping to develop a stronger partnership with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Kuwait's hedging strategy has at least two logics: pursuing defensive strategies to ensure its security and empowering its regional alliance with Turkey to ward off potential risks emanating from the changing dynamics of the Middle East.

The first logic is mostly a consequence of the regional policies of the United States, which have resembled a swinging pendulum in recent years. As explored in later sections, Washington's ambivalent policies about intervention have created uncertainties and risks for regional powers by creating a power vacuum that has potential to be filled by threatening actors such as Iran, Hezbollah or ISIS. Meanwhile, as showcased in the past decade by regional powers like Egypt, Libya, Yemen, countries of the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have adopted more aggressive and assertive foreign policies. To deal with the risks and uncertainties of the US' and Saudi Arabia's policies, Kuwait again approached China and Turkey respectively. While getting closer with Beijing and Ankara, Kuwait also felt compelled to keep its favourable relationship with both Washington and Riyadh. Clearly, Kuwait uses neither balancing nor bandwagoning in its strategy regarding these four states; rather, it hedges.

3. Hedging As Foreign Policy Strategy for Small-States: A Conceptual Approach

According to structural realism, the polarity of the international system (unipolar, bipolar, multipolar), shapes the behavior of states to a great extent. In a unipolar international system, "small" states can rely on several strategies to survive. The anarchical nature of the international system forces small states to implement hedging, hiding, and wedging²³ strategies in addition to bandwagoning.²⁴ In a unipolar international system, small states are likely to engage in strategic hedging. Especially during times of uncertainty, states are able to pursue "strategic hedging". In a bipolar system, hedging is a rarely-applied strategy. In a

²² Koga, "Asia's Power Shift," 635.

²³ Timothy W. Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics," *International Security* 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 155–89; Tessman and Wolfe, "Chinese Energy Security Strategy".

²⁴ Tessman and Wolfe, "Chinese Energy Security Strategy"; Kai He, "Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity, Threat Perception and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War," *Security Studies* 21, no. 2 (2012): 154–91.

multipolar system, small and second-tier powers can adopt hedging as a viable policy. Having all these options, it is assumed that Kuwait is one of the small states in the international system and the ruling family of Kuwait, al-Sabah, prefers to adopt “strategic hedging”. The decision-making elites of Kuwait and other Gulf states favor strategic hedging as a safeguard against threats to their regimes.

Some scholars conflate balancing and hedging; however, there are subtle differences that place hedging somewhere between balancing and bandwagoning.²⁵ According to Waltz, balancing is the flocking together of weaker sides against the strongest, which is a threat by virtue of its superior capabilities.²⁶ The goal of balancing is to prevent a rising actor from becoming a hegemon within the region both politically and militarily, but the balancing choices of second-tier states uniquely involves choosing between multiple more-powerful states. Within the scope of balance of power theory, hedging is considered a type of balancing behavior, but is distinct from conventional balancing as well as bandwagoning.²⁷ The main difference between balancing and hedging is the strategy’s method. Balancing is undertaken to directly counter a rising or threatening country with appropriate measures, whereas hedging aims to prevent a rise in tension or conflict with more powerful and potentially threatening states by sustaining a more collaborative stance with either.²⁸ Bandwagoning, meanwhile, can be defined as “alignment with the source of danger” to gain benefits and ensure security at the expense of autonomy and opportunities to cooperate with other powers.²⁹

Adopting either strategy is risky, however. Balancing has at least two branches: internal and external. The internal one relates to a state’s defense capacity and its internal efforts to increase it. With internal balancing, states try to develop an economic share to build up the structure of the army, augment the defense budget, foster defense policies, and advance defense technology and equipment. On the other hand, the external one is about alignment with an external state in the search for security.³⁰ Small states are more likely to choose external balancing because of their lack of military and economic resources.³¹ The risk and uncertainty related to internal balancing stems from the possibility of destabilization caused by the mobilization of internal resources. The risk and uncertainty related to external balancing stems from the unreliability of alliances. A more powerful state can entrap allies and possibly carry the risk of abandoning one’s allies, thereby resulting in balancing failure.³² The risk and uncertainty related to bandwagoning, meanwhile, is that a state’s foreign policy autonomy can be undermined by the stronger state as it asserts its power over the weaker state. To make sense of lower-risk alternative policies, scholars have weighed in on concepts such as accommodation, passing the buck, soft-balancing, hard-balancing, and “hedging”.³³

Hedging is not only distinct from bandwagoning, it is also a strategic option that states employ to find a balance between soft and hard balancing and bandwagoning. It aims to

²⁵ It is a state behavior allying with a source of threat. Koga, “Asia’s Power Shift,” 634.

²⁶ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 129.

²⁷ Dennis Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, no. 2 (2005): 306; Evelyn Goh, *Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies*, Policy Studies no.16 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2005).

²⁸ Koga, “Asia’s Power Shift,” 636.

²⁹ Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 72–107.

³⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 118, 163.

³¹ Stephen Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Columbia University Press, 1987), 30–1.

³² Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 461–95.

³³ Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 3 (2008): 489–518.

open up a strategic choice for states; it does not force states to choose either balancing or bandwagoning, instead offering states time to determine their position in the international power constellation and afford them the possibility of preserving a favorable status quo. Rather than forcing states to choose sides or commit wholesale to risky policies, strategic hedging allows states to adopt diverse security strategies and reduces potential risks and uncertainties that can result from changing power dynamics both regionally and globally.³⁴ Hedging is ultimately chosen when a state wishes to decrease risks and uncertainties when balancing or bandwagoning are not sufficient responses to allay them, or when fully committing to either of these strategies produces negative outcomes. Even between the concepts of risk and uncertainty, which are mostly similar in terms of context-dependence and subjectivity, there exists a difference regarding probability. Risks can be measured while uncertainties cannot. Therefore, states must identify potential courses of action, which can be a source of uncertainty. In other words, the hedging state also accepts some level of risk by pursuing hedging. This can be interpreted by third parties in different ways. To overcome this, hedging states should be careful to match their actions with their rhetoric. Consequently, states choose the hedging strategy when there exist risks and uncertainties.³⁵ For this reason, hedging is ideally suited for explaining the foreign policies of small states.

When choosing which states to hedge, states may look beyond military security and base their hedging decisions on other metrics, such as the three primary sources introduced by Tessman and Wolfe,³⁶ which are economic capacity, military power, central government or decision-making capability. Mohammad Salman and Gustaaf Geeraerts also suggest that states may base their hedging decisions on a country's gross domestic product (GDP), foreign exchange and gold reserves, government debt, military expenditure, growth of military arsenal, and democracy.

IR scholars are keenly following the shifting global balances of power. The US' retrenchment policy, the significant rise of China, Russia's turn to the Middle East through the Syrian civil war and its assertive foreign policy, as well as debates over the EU and its future have led many analysts to re-examine the geopolitical rivalry in the world and in the Middle East. The impulses of great powers during this shift have been analysed by many realist scholars, but the Gulf states' behaviors have yet to be studied. What has been studied is the strategic choice of behavior regarding the global shift of power dynamics, but this is mostly examined in terms of alignment or realignment.

Adopting hedging as an analytical concept affords us the opportunity to explore the changing dynamics of the distribution of power in the regional and international order, which have caused not only a global change of power, but also shifts between actors within specific regions like the Middle East, and which are of great consequence for small states. Great powers and even regional powers have been exercising pressure on small states to express their positions, especially in times of crisis³⁷ as was seen during the Gulf crisis. Kuwait was restrained by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar regionally, and the US internationally.

The new regional order in the Middle East following the Arab uprisings is rife with uncertainties. Therefore, many actors have adopted new policies to prepare for a new regional

³⁴ Alagöz, "Korea's Hedging Strategy," 91; Salman and Geeraerts, "Strategic Hedging," 104.

³⁵ Koga, "Asia's Power Shift," 639.

³⁶ Tessman and Wolfe, "Chinese Energy Security Strategy," 220.

³⁷ Koga, "Asia's Power Shift," 634.

order. The regional distribution of power is more important for small powers since for those powers, geographical proximity with rising powers is highly concerning. For example, Kuwait does not concern itself with the rise of Brazil, but does so with that of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, hedging can be pursued by being concerned not with polarity and power status per se, but with geographical proximity and regional power distribution. Changes in extant balances have resonated very strongly with small Middle Eastern states, causing them not only to review their current relations, but also to reevaluate their foreign policy options. Balancing, containment, bandwagoning, buck-passing and neutrality can be considered such options for those countries to choose.

4. Hedging as a Survival Strategy for Kuwait

Kuwait has been struggling to maintain its position as a neutral country in the face of intensifying rivalries among the Gulf states. Even though the country has been insistently following a neutral policy, tensions among the regional actors have forced Kuwait to take sides or approach certain actors. During the political and economic blockade initiated by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain against Qatar, Kuwait experienced serious concern over possible effects of the crisis. Especially in the wake of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi's aggressive attitude, Kuwait has tried to eliminate potential threats by developing close relations with regional and international actors.³⁸ In fact, Kuwait has historically experienced similarly weak positions. Kuwait confronted threats to the monarchy during the 1950s and 60s from the rising tide of Arab nationalism in the region, while seeking to protect itself from the regional fallout of the Iranian revolution in 1979. During the Gulf War, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq and the country was forced to remain under the security umbrella of Western powers such as the United States, as well as its allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia.³⁹ The Western security umbrella and alliance with Saudi Arabia was crucial for Kuwait to secure its regime. The Kuwaiti leadership was concerned about the new developments, such as the instability in the region unfolding after the Arab revolutions of 2011 and the expansion of Iran's sphere of influence. This political conjuncture has forced Kuwait to adhere to a hedging strategy. The literature argues that the hedging strategy is generally utilized by secondary or small, weak states when facing two possible situations. The first one is an ascendance of crisis between the hegemon and hedging states. The second is a hegemon ceasing policies that provide subsidies and public goods to hedging states.⁴⁰ We argue that Kuwait's hedging strategy, which aims to protect the country from possible threats arising from intra-Gulf disagreements, can be analysed using three levels of analysis: international, regional and sub-regional.

Following the Arab revolutions, the Gulf countries, including Kuwait, had to adapt to the new political conjuncture in the region. These policy revisions were also responding to the changing policies of extraregional powers like the US, as well as those of other Middle Eastern states. As an example, the United States' policies during the Obama administration were seriously damaging for US-Gulf relations. Gulf states, which relied on Washington for decades to ensure their security, lost their confidence in US leadership during the Obama presidency. While this break in trust was acutely felt by Saudi Arabia, countries such as

³⁸ Giorgio Caferio and Cinzia Bianco, "Kuwait Looks to Turkey, But Hedges its Bets," *Inside Arabia*, November 13, 2018, <https://insidearabia.com/kuwait-looks-turkey-but-hedges-bets/>.

³⁹ Geoffrey F. Gresh, *Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of Basing* (California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 163.

⁴⁰ Chaziza, "Sino-Saudi Relations," 442-43.

the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Kuwait felt the need to develop alternative alliances and coalitions, fearing that Obama-era policies would become permanent. The US' retrenchment in the Middle East led these countries to more seriously consider Russia and China, two globally rising powers with growing influence, as alternatives to the US.⁴¹

Another transformation in global politics vis-a-vis the Gulf region is Russia's activities aimed at increasing its presence in the Middle East and the Gulf.⁴² Moscow considered the process that started with the Arab revolutions as a serious opportunity to gain more influence and thus became a permanent actor in the region, especially through its military engagement in Syria since 2015. On the other hand, aware of the uncertainties in the relations between the US and the Gulf states, Russia has sought to cultivate its relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Russia's disposition towards the Middle East and the Gulf region is not temporary, and Moscow's pursuit of long-term goals has made it a possible ally for the countries in the region.

Another dynamic that led the Gulf countries to seek other global partners is the rise of China.⁴³ Beijing has long been competing with and has become a serious regional and global rival to the US. Therefore, the countries in the Gulf region have paid more attention to China's rising agency in global politics. The relationship between the Gulf countries and China is particularly important from the purview of energy security since China's growing economy renders it one of the most avid consumers of Gulf energy. Additionally, China has been developing its military capacity, paving the way for a more active role in both the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, the Gulf countries have a vested interest in improving their relations with China. The recent increase in high-level visits between the leaders of the Gulf countries and the Chinese administration can be viewed as an indicator of this sentiment.

Regional-level developments have also influenced Kuwait's decision to adopt a new foreign policy. The rise of new actors as well as a reshuffling in the regional alliance system has triggered a possible transformation, by which the decades-long status quo would change. The most important of these is undoubtedly the new political environment that was created in the period following the Arab revolutions. The popular uprisings that began in December 2010 in Tunisia and then spread to many other countries in the region led to a new political atmosphere in the Middle East. In this new political environment, previously inconsequential actors like the Muslim Brotherhood became more important players in regional politics, thereby triggering anxiety and uncertainty for the Gulf monarchies, which have been in power for many years. In the period following the Arab revolutions, the increasing level of instability at the regional level and the increasing strength of non-state actors have called into question the legitimacy of these regimes. Another new dynamic of the Arab revolutions for the Gulf states is the increasing regional influence of Iran. Kuwait was one of the countries that considered Iran's increasing influence as a concern since at least 30% of its population is Shia. This uncertainty, propounded by new and unpredictable actors, has become a threat for Kuwait and therefore, like other countries in the region, Kuwait has sought alternative foreign policy strategies in order to ensure the security of the regime. Thus, Kuwait also

⁴¹ Steven W. Hook and Tim Niblock, *The United States and the Gulf: Shifting Pressures, Strategies and Alignments* (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2015).

⁴² Li-Chen Sim, "Russia's return to the Gulf," in *External Powers and the Gulf Monarchies*, ed. Jonathan Fulton and Li-Chen Sim (New York & London: Routledge, 2019).

⁴³ Steve Chan, *Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia* (California: Stanford University Press, 2013).

hedges Iran.⁴⁴

In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, sub-regional developments have also impelled foreign policy innovation for Kuwait. The first of these developments is that Saudi Arabia abandoned its traditional foreign policy track⁴⁵ in favor of a more aggressive one.⁴⁶ Saudi Arabia has traditionally dictated to the other Gulf countries to align with Riyadh, but has redoubled its efforts in the post-2011 period. The Riyadh administration took a counter-revolutionary position against the Arab revolutions and expected other countries in the Gulf to follow suit. Riyadh, which played an important role in terminating the Egyptian people's revolution with a military coup, pressured countries like Kuwait and Bahrain to provide financial support to the Sisi regime that came to power after the coup. This continued during the reign of King Salman, who took office after King Abdullah's death in 2015. Saudi Arabia's foreign policy became more assertive in the early period of King Salman's rule. Together with the UAE, Saudi leadership initiated a military campaign to fight against the Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi requested the support of the countries in the Gulf for the military operation in Yemen. In contrast to its policy of non-interference in regional conflicts, Kuwait joined the coalition against the Houthis in Yemen, possibly as a result of the pressure by the Saudi administration. Although it fulfills Saudi Arabia's demands, the Kuwaiti leadership is concerned with the Riyadh's regional policies.

These concerns have come to light with the political and economic blockade of Qatar initiated by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. It was a serious disappointment and source of discomfort for the Kuwaiti leadership to witness three Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members politically blockade a fellow neighbor, Qatar. Oman was also not happy with this move and did not support the blockade. The Kuwaiti and Omani administrations, which traditionally had political leanings different from those of the Saudi and Emirati leaderships, became concerned that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could put pressure on them in the case of an exacerbated disagreement in response to other regional actors such as Iran and Turkey.⁴⁷ In order to prevent such a possibility, Kuwait sought to foster new links both at the regional and global levels and took initiatives to this effect.

Another sub-regional factor affecting Kuwait's foreign policy is the ambiguity surrounding the future of the GCC. The initial mistrust among the GCC members started with the 2014 crisis when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from Qatar. During the crisis, the weaker GCC states realized that the alliance system in the region was fragile and could break in the case of a serious crisis. The 2017 blockade on Qatar by its neighbours was another development that threatened the unity among the GCC states. As a result of the crisis, the members of the GCC started to question the future of the alliance. Additionally, the divergence that exists among the member states in their approaches on many issues has gradually deepened. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have sought to undercut Turkey, Qatar has instead opted to develop a strategic alliance with Ankara. Kuwait, too, has been looking to increase its cooperation with Turkey and Iran. Therefore, the loss of harmony between the members of the GCC, both in foreign policy and intra-regional politics, not only

⁴⁴ Hamdi and Salman, "The Hedging Strategy," 1-26.

⁴⁵ René Rieger, *Saudi Arabian Foreign Relations: Diplomacy and Mediation in Conflict Resolution* (Abingdon, Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 2016).

⁴⁶ Thomas Richter, "New Petro-aggression in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia in the Spotlight," *Global Policy* 11, no. 1 (2020): 93-102.

⁴⁷ İsmail Numan Telci and Omair Anas, "Towards a New Security Architecture in the Gulf?" (ORSAM Series on Middle East in Transition, September 2020, Ankara), 19.

cast doubts about the viability of the organization, but have concurrently fuelled Kuwait's insecurities, prompting it to pursue, as we discuss in the next section, a hedging strategy.

5. Kuwait's Dual Hedging Strategy towards China and Turkey

Kuwait is one of the small states in the Middle East due to its economic dependence and growing security concerns after the Arab Spring; with these and many other dimensions in mind, it started to pursue the hedging strategy. The main purpose of this strategy is to "avoid having to choose one side at the expense of another". Hedging strategies manage to be effective and sustainable because they avoid antagonising any other states. Hedging also provides assurance when part of an engagement fails, emphasizing cooperation as a primary objective.⁴⁸ In doing so, these strategies also aim to prevent other states from undermining the security environment. Meanwhile, the hedging state enjoys relatively peaceful relations, enough to implement a coherent long term plan⁴⁹ to develop its competitive ability (military and economic) while avoiding direct confrontation with the leader of a unipolar system.

Through hedging, states are able to implement a counter-acting policy. Such a policy assures them of at least two usable tactics. The first one is to strengthen economic cooperation with others. The second is to increase military capability and alignment to confront potential adversaries, including states and non-state actors. Kuwait started to increase its military capabilities and enhance diplomatic ties with both international (China) and regional (Turkey) actors. Therefore, it is hedging security. Kuwait's strategy towards China can be defined as "soft hedging". It is a mixture of diplomatic balancing and economic bandwagoning.⁵⁰ Kuwait's strategy regarding Turkey, meanwhile, can be defined as "economic hedging". It is a mixture of military bandwagoning and economic balancing.⁵¹ We argue that by having a new approach to the hedging strategy but also staying within the main line of theory, Kuwait hedged China's rise itself by maintaining good relations with the country. On an international level, by hedging China, Kuwait has also prepared itself for the risks and uncertainties resulting from the US' retrenchment policy. At the regional level, Kuwait also hedges Turkey by deepening its military and economic ties with Ankara. This choice of policy also allows Kuwait to hedge the risks that could result from regional ambiguity. In other words, to deal with the security concerns and risks overflowing since the Arab revolutions, Kuwait was inclined to approach Turkey. This rapprochement allows Kuwait to balance Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' aggressive foreign policy doctrines. The assertive foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE have severely damaged the Gulf Cooperation Council, to which Kuwait attaches importance. The war on Yemen and the blockade of Qatar also pushed Kuwait to lean on Turkey militarily, thus demonstrating that there is regional instability and uncertainty. To deal with these challenges at two distinct levels, both the international and regional system, Kuwait launched a dual hedging strategy towards China and Turkey.

5.1. Chinese-Kuwaiti cooperation

The rise of China has been welcomed by Middle Eastern countries due to Beijing's far-reaching economic, military, and political capacity. Positive expectations are held especially

⁴⁸ Koga, "Asia's Power Shift," 636.

⁴⁹ Salman, Pieper and Geeraerts, "Hedging in the Middle East," 3.

⁵⁰ China started to improve its military ties with Middle Eastern countries for securing energy. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, "China's Energy-Driven Soft Power," *Orbis* 52, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 123.

⁵¹ Koga, "Asia's Power Shift," 642.

by the Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are among those, but Kuwait is one of the most outstanding members of the GCC that is inclined to form an alliance with China. By forming an alliance or engaging more institutionally with China, Kuwait aims to deal with two existential threats. The first one is the confrontation diverted by the Baathist Iraqis under Saddam Hussein's administration that undermined and confined Kuwait. The second one is originating from Iran. Thus, Iran has also been undermining the Shia population to politicize them against the al-Sabah regime and Saudi Arabia, who has no tolerance towards political neutrality. Therefore, Kuwait has started to adopt new foreign policy principles to eliminate these threats by playing the diversity card in foreign policy.

It is the hedging strategy that prevents confrontation between Kuwait and the US, as well as the capture of Kuwait by China's yoke. During the Obama administration, US foreign policy did not satisfy its allies, especially in the Gulf, due to its reluctance to engage with Middle Eastern politics, resulting in US allies adopting hedging strategies. During this period, the US declined to aid its allies. More specifically, the US aided neither the Mubarak regime of Egypt nor the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia. When the pro-revolutionary movements became a threat for the Gulf regimes, the monarchies understood that the US was unwilling to help shore up their regime security. Additionally, the US Congress and some democrats in the US have criticized the regimes in the Gulf, which compelled their rulers to evaluate the US as an unreliable partner, rather than as an ally. In this sense, China does not pose a threat to the Gulf monarchies. Beijing has a long-term vision and has no stakes in the domestic affairs of the Gulf countries. Therefore, upon assessing the relations between Kuwait and China using a cost-benefit analysis, it becomes clear that Beijing has been providing benefits to three fields of vital importance to the Gulf monarchies.

The first field is economy. Changes in the global financial sector, such as the crisis in 2008 and challenges in regional/local oil sectors, pushed some Arab countries to diversify their policies. As a result, the "Look East" idea has emerged as an alternative to the Gulf states. To transform Kuwait into "New Kuwait" via the 2035 Vision, the al-Sabah regime has intensified its relations with China. Commerce, culture, logistics, finance, tourism and other sectors are among the cooperative fields between Kuwait and China. Additionally, China's dependence on Gulf oil has increased its diplomatic ties with Kuwait. China's need for energy has resulted in several agreements. Moreover, Kuwait has welcomed foreign investments, especially from China. In this sense, cooperation between the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) and the China Investment Corporation (CIC) has grown.⁵² There have thus been several agreements signed by the two countries. For example, Kuwait and China have signed an agreement to accelerate and facilitate the completion of the Silk City project, which promises a major economic boon.⁵³ It is no surprise that since 2009, Kuwait has been looking towards the East, particularly to China, in terms of political and economic outreach.⁵⁴ However, since 2018, more agreements have been signed and both countries have agreed to establish a strategic partnership.⁵⁵ Therefore, it can be argued that Kuwait has been more enthusiastic with regard to improving its relations with China rather than its relations with the US. As a result, Kuwait

⁵² Khizar Niazi, "Kuwait Looks towards the East: Relations with China" (The Middle East Institute Policy Brief No: 26, September 1, 2009).

⁵³ "Kuwait, China ink deal to move forward with Silk City project," *Arabian Business*, November 24, 2018.

⁵⁴ Niazi, "Kuwait Looks towards the East".

⁵⁵ Mordechai Chaziza, "China's Strategic Partnership with Kuwait: New Opportunities for the Belt and Road Initiative," *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 7, no. 4 (December 2020): 501–19.

has invested significantly in its economic relations with China.

The second field is the military. The unpredictability of the US' security policies in the region has had a negative impact on Kuwait. By withdrawing its presence from Syria and recalling several Patriot missiles from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain the US administration unsettled Kuwait's leadership.⁵⁶ In contrast, China has been supplying conventional weapons, drones, and other military equipment to Kuwait without any concern over Kuwait's domestic issues.⁵⁷ Moreover, there has been strong military training cooperation between the two countries. Kuwait is the first GCC member to sign a military cooperation agreement with China.⁵⁸ Also, there is a historical rapprochement between the two countries. After Saddam's invasion, Kuwait signed defense and security pacts with the five permanent members of the UNSC and gained a closer relationship with China. Instead of the US or UK, Kuwaiti authorities bought howitzers from China.⁵⁹ Kuwait is clearly eager to have close relations with China.

The third field is politics. Being the first GCC member to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with China on 22 March 1971, Kuwait has the longest relationship with the Beijing administration. Having a close relationship with China provides at least two benefits to Kuwait. The first one is that it enhances Kuwait's international influence. Beijing has a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, which leverages China's power into play in the international arena. The second one is related to domestic politics. China has no concern over civil rights or humanitarian issues in Kuwait or elsewhere in the Gulf. That makes China more reliable than the US in the eyes of Kuwait. Lastly, the previous crown prince of Kuwait, Nasser Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, has been eager to expand the relations' range. Trying to transform Kuwait into a modern trade hub, Nasser al-Sabah places great value on China and is therefore enthusiastically pursuing a partnership with China.⁶⁰

5.2. Turkish-Kuwaiti cooperation

The relationship between Turkey and Kuwait has been positive as the two countries have not experienced any serious crises in recent history. These friendly relations have developed further since the AK Party's coming to power in Turkey in 2002. In fact, President Erdogan's special interest in Kuwait has allowed the relations between the two countries to blossom into a strategic partnership. This situation became noticeable following the Arab revolutions as the two countries signed a number of cooperation agreements in different sectors. In 2013, an agreement was signed between the two countries on security and military cooperation. Other agreements in the fields of energy, construction, industry, and culture soon followed.

This situation accelerated especially after the Gulf Crisis in 2017. Kuwait's now-deceased Amir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah had visited Turkey in 2017. The Kuwaiti Amir al-Sabah and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed an additional six agreements on various sectors. In November of the same year, President Erdogan also visited Kuwait, in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. The two leaders emphasized that the Gulf Crisis should

⁵⁶ Theodore Karasik and Tristan Ober, "Kuwait And The China-U.S. Geopolitical Rivalry," *Lobelog*, January 30, 2019, <https://lobelog.com/kuwait-and-the-china-u-s-geopolitical-rivalry/>.

⁵⁷ George G. Eberling, *China's Bilateral Relations with Its Principal Oil Suppliers* (USA: Lexington Books, 2017), 121.

⁵⁸ Mohamed Mousa Mohamed Ali Bin Huwaidin, *China's Relations with Arabia and the Gulf 1949-1999* (New York&London: Routledge, 2002), 200.

⁵⁹ Mahmoud Ghafouri, "China's Policy in the Persian Gulf," *Middle East Policy* 16, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 89.

⁶⁰ Giorgio Cafiero, "Kuwait's New Strategy: Pursuing a Partnership with China," *Inside Arabia*, October 8, 2018, <https://insidearabia.com/kuwait-strategy-pursue-partnership-china/>.

be resolved and the conflicting parties must work on reducing the tension. During the visit, the Chiefs of the General Staff of the two countries also held meetings and discussed military cooperation. The Turkish-Kuwaiti Cooperation Committee meeting held in Kuwait on October 9-10, 2018, resulted in two agreements, including a new military cooperation agreement that took effect in 2019. These agreements aimed to enhance the military cooperation between the two countries.⁶¹ In this context, several scholars and analysts have argued that a new regional Kuwait-Turkey alliance⁶² is poised to begin following the latest agreement stipulating Kuwait's approval for the deployment of Turkish troops on its territory and the purchase of Turkish defense products.⁶³

The close relationship between Kuwait and Turkey can also be seen in the fields of culture and economy. According to a poll conducted in Kuwait in March 2019, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was named the most popular foreign leader. As for tourism, a large number of Kuwaitis choose Turkey as their travel destination, while scores of them buy property in the country. Such developments are signs of Turkey's increasing popularity in Kuwaiti society. This is also evident in economics in view of the burgeoning economic cooperation between the two countries in recent years. Turkish companies have undertaken more than 30 projects in Kuwait, which together are worth at least 6.5 billion USD. Turkey also attracts Kuwaiti investments. In 2005, Kuwait decided to name Turkey as one of its priority investment targets. In this sense, Kuwait became one of the top five foreign investors in Turkey.⁶⁴

Why does Kuwait pursue a rapprochement with Turkey? The first reason is the changing nature of alliances and power relations in the Middle East. As Turkey's importance has become more apparent, the Gulf countries have attempted to rearrange their alliance patterns with Ankara. Some of the Gulf leaders wish to have better relations with Turkey in order to balance other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The second reason is the 2017 blockade imposed on Qatar by its Gulf neighbours: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. Other smaller Gulf countries such as Kuwait and Oman watched the developments under immense pressure and they became concerned with the actions of these aggressive powers.⁶⁵ As a result, these countries decided to establish new relationships with other powerful regional actors such as Turkey and Iran, as well as a number of global players. Finally, the continuation of historical disputes between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has been a source of concern for the latter. This urges Kuwait to be cautious in the face of Riyadh and encourages it to secure itself in case of possible tension with different alliances.

6. Conclusion

Strengthening its alliance with China, Kuwait uses hedging to prevent the risks and uncertainties left by the US policy of retrenchment from the Middle East. On the other hand, by strengthening its alliance with Turkey, Kuwait uses hedging to prevent Saudi Arabia from leading or dominating the regional order, while also developing its economic and security

⁶¹ "Turkey, Kuwait sign 2019 military cooperation agreement," *Anadolu Agency*, October 11, 2018, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-kuwait-sign-2019-military-cooperation-agreement/1279001>.

⁶² Javad Heiran-Nia and Somayeh Khomarbaghi, "Turkey And Kuwait: A New Regional Alliance?," *Lobelog*, October 25, 2018, <https://lobelog.com/turkey-and-kuwait-a-new-regional-alliance/>.

⁶³ "Why is Kuwait approaching Turkey for military cooperation?," *TRT World*, October 26, 2018, <https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/why-is-kuwait-approaching-turkey-for-military-cooperation-21102>.

⁶⁴ "Turkish firms eye lion's share of Kuwait's \$150B investment plan", *Daily Sabah*, March 22, 2017. <https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2017/03/22/turkish-firms-eye-lions-share-of-kuwaits-150b-investment-plan>

⁶⁵ Ismail Numan Telci, "Qatar-Gulf rift: Can Riyadh be triumphant?," *Al Jazeera*, June 9, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/6/9/qatar-gulf-rift-can-riyadh-be-triumphant>.

ties with both the US and Saudi Arabia.

The first benefit is that this strategy reduces the risks and uncertainties originating from the rising power of Saudi Arabia, which has been conducting assertive foreign policy both regionally and internationally since 2015. By allying with Turkey, Kuwait does not directly target Saudi Arabia. Additionally, because of this cooperation, Kuwait's relations with Riyadh are not harmed. In deepening its security alliance with Turkey, Kuwait wants to make sure that it has a reliable partner in the case of a threat from its GCC partners, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Kuwait's actions in this regard aim to prevent a direct confrontation with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in order to avoid sharing the same fate as Qatar.⁶⁶

The second benefit is that this strategy reduces the risks and uncertainties originating from the leader of the unipolar system, the US. The US' pivot to Asia under the Obama administration and its concomitant retrenchment from the Middle East were deeply troubling for Kuwait, prompting the need to find another major power, in this case China, to secure itself. By allying and cooperating more with China, Kuwait does not directly target the US because its cooperation with the US still continues. So, Kuwait's hedging strategy focuses on including new powers into its foreign policy orbit while keeping traditional allies such as the US on its side.

This study has attempted to apply a concept from finance to international relations. As such, previous applications of the concept were highly useful in explaining the alignment and balancing behaviors of states. The present study aims to help IR scholars understand what drives some states to seek new alliances, either as replacements for or additions to existing alliances. Strategic hedging has been increasingly used in explaining such situations. It is the aim of this study to focus on Kuwait's foreign policy behavior and its decision to form new alliances with some regional and international actors.

The findings of this study can be extended to other cases. It can be argued that the concept of hedging can successfully explain the foreign policy behavior and relationship pattern of Qatar and its policies towards regional and global actors. Qatar's hedging strategy can be understood along patterns similar to those of Kuwait and with similar cases, namely Turkey and China. Meanwhile, Turkey's foreign policy is suited for such analysis as Ankara's rapprochement with Moscow can offer invaluable insights about hedging behavior.

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⁶⁶ İsmail Numan Telci, "Müttefiklikten nüfuz mücadelesine Suudi Arabistan-BAE ilişkileri," *Anadolu Ajansı*, February 22, 2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/muttefiklikten-nufuz-mucadelesine-suudi-arabistan-bae-iliskileri/2152733>.

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The Interactions of International Relations: Racism, Colonialism, Producer-Centred Research

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Abstract

The racial hierarchy underscoring colonialism persists, organises core-periphery interactions and so undermines International Relations' (IR's) purpose of accounting and explaining to mitigate violence. Despite IR's awareness of its colonialism, it reconstitutes in the hermeneutic's deductive and inductive method via aphasia (calculated forgetting) about its heuristic: diplomacy. The result, analytic-violence or the core's heuristic corrupting interaction with the periphery. Yet, its evasiveness testifies to a meaningfulness beyond IR's hermeneutic. Irretrievably corrupted by its heuristic, IR's hermeneutic is ejected for an altogether new hermeneutic: Producer-Centred Research (PCR). Eschewing deduction and induction, and so colonialism, PCR initiates with abduction or a problem arising from theory and practice to resolve it in terms of rationality because of its, and the problem's, significance. Changing "rationality" to "rationalities" registers the core's rationality as colonialism while preventing it from contaminating PCR's collection and assessment of peripheral practices to determine if they cohere into another rationality. Moreover, treating peripheral practitioners authoritatively, as capable of rationalising themselves and thus equal to rationality, further protects PCR from aphasia. Verifying efficacy shows PCR's decolonisation of the hermeneutic is not entirely replicated externally, amongst IR scholars. The core engages PCR, but it incites violence in the periphery which defends rationality and so is colonialism's bastion, now.

Keywords: Diplomacy, Eurocentrism, racism, colonialism, hermeneutics

1. Introduction

On the morning of 26 February 2019, Indian Mirage-2000 nuclear capable fighter-bombers struck Pakistan's Balakot region, but New Delhi called this event "non-military". The paradox of terming the use of strategic airpower as anything but military catalysed analysts and International Relations (IR) into geostrategic simulations of New Delhi's actions. Since geostrategy only considers the material, such as hardware or geography, India's action was rendered a function of Pakistani action in an endless tit-for-tat and so denuded of its history and culture. Compounding this superficiality was analysts and scholars not utilising the terms

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and categories used by Indians. The consequence was not even a simulation, but a simulacra,¹ for being limited to the material, which in any case was not represented in India's manner.² At stake in this double-blinding is humanity. After all, there is no brinkmanship greater than a nuclear power striking another. Nor are there any precedents, for even the USSR and USA did not risk a homeland attack during the Cuban Missile Crisis or at any other point during their Cold War. Requisite, then, are in-depth understandings of international politics. Yet such a work for India does exist, is from the periphery, and was well received by the core. Cambridge University's Vere Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History, at Trinity College, Samita Sen, writes in her review: "This book is a valuable addition to ... intellectual history. It is a significant text for historians as well as political scientists and will of course be compulsory reading for international relations experts".³ SOAS's Professor of World Politics Sir Stephen Chan writes the book is, "a superb rendition of a diplomatic culture which Western observers would normally miss or misunderstand,"⁴ and Oxford University historian Faisal Devji writes: "This highly original study represents the first examination of Indian foreign policy as the product of a distinctive political culture ... an important corrective to the allegedly universalistic theories of interest that dominate political analysis".⁵

Nevertheless, that the risk of repeating the simulacra resulting from Balakot remains is well illustrated by how the book was actively attacked by the periphery and whose attacks undermined the core. How this paradoxical situation arose begins to become apparent in that core-periphery interaction is hierarchical.⁶ Aggravating this is racism, making for racial hierarchy.⁷ These abound, but only the European variant valorises and globalises itself.⁸ This dual process of being constituted and constituting racial hierarchy transnationally is colonialism and it is violence.⁹ It is this process that reduced analysis of Balakot to meaninglessness, but it also enervates IR because colonialism makes the discipline irrelevant in terms of its own metric: to account for and explain the international so as to mitigate violence.

To redirect IR back toward its professed purpose, this article begins with showing disciplinary awareness of colonialism from the origin of its foundational concept, theories, and subject, to the practice of international politics: diplomacy. Racial hierarchy, in short, is implicit in the practice of IR, that is, its hermeneutic's method – abduction and induction. Nevertheless, aphasia – calculated forgetting, in this case, of the racially hierarchical ordering of the core's understanding of diplomacy – ensures that diplomacy remains the heuristic and

¹ Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006).

² Deep K. Datta-Ray, "Diplomacy Beyond History: Analytic-Violence, Producer-Centred Research, India," *India Quarterly* 77, no. 1 (2021): 9–24.

³ Samita Sen, "A 'Cosmological' Approach to Diplomacy," *Economic and Political Weekly* 55, no. 49 (2020): 24–6.

⁴ See cover endorsement by Sir Stephen Chan, Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy: a Critique of Eurocentrism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁵ See cover endorsement by Faisal Devji, Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*.

⁶ On hierarchy see: David A. Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics," *International Security* 32, no. 1 (2007): 47–79.

⁷ Race is constituted, but it also constitutes.

⁸ On caste being race see: Ambrose Pinto, "UN Conference Against Racism: is Caste Race?," *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 30 (2001): 2817–820; On the Indian origins of caste see Nicole Boivin, "Anthropological, Historical, Archaeological and Genetic Perspectives on the Origins of Caste in South Asia," in *The Evolution and History of Human Populations in South Asia*, ed. Michael D. Petraglia and Bridget Allchin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 341–61. On the Chinese origins of race see Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (London: Hurst, 1992). On the European origins of race see Howard Winant, "Race and Race Theory," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, no. 1 (2000): 169–85.

⁹ Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam, "Confronting the Global Colour Line: An Introduction," in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line*, ed. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (New York: Routledge, 2015), 1–16.

so, inevitably, the hermeneutic utilises and forwards racial hierarchy. Hence the hermeneutic is colonialism, and its attendant, violence. It initiates in the periphery that is India with the hermeneutic imposing the heuristic. The failure to account or explain the periphery escalates violence, which oscillates between mangling the core by creating impossible categories – irrational in their own terms or rendering practice impossible because of the imposition of alien categories – and obliterating the periphery’s practices. Patently, this carnival of destruction within and without cannot do, but it does testify to the periphery’s excess being meaningful. Why else the need for impossible categories or obliteration?¹⁰ The prevalence of both in the hermeneutic amounts to a syndrome, *analytic-violence*, which only fortifies the periphery’s meaningfulness as another diplomacy unavailable to the hermeneutic. These interactions within the hermeneutic and between the core and periphery make for the following diagnosis: awareness cannot decolonise IR’s hermeneutic because it is fundamentally corrupted by colonialism and so requisite is an entirely new hermeneutic divorced from the heuristic’s racial hierarchy and capable of regenerating IR.

Colonialism in the hermeneutic is treated in the article’s second section, which recognises colonialism as the hermeneutic because its deductive and inductive methods are constricted by racial hierarchy and so it cannot navigate the periphery’s data. Hence the need to eschew these methods and to form an entirely new hermeneutic: Producer-Centred Research (PCR). This approach deviates from the hermeneutic in four ways: Unlike IR’s method, PCR is initiated by a problem, in this case, colonialism, and so PCR does not replicate core concerns when engaging the periphery. While IR’s sites are theory and practice, the therapeutic site for PCR is “rationality” because of its, and the problem’s, significance. When IR considers rationality, it is singular, but PCR converts it to the plural, rationalities. This ensures colonialism’s claim to rationality is maintained, but it is also rendered as one of many, which safeguards against aphasia. Enabled, then, is PCR engaging rationality and its handmaiden, colonialism, while searching for rationalities not colonially but in the form of robust phenomena, arising from practice and made sense of in practitioner terms. This treatment of the periphery as “authoritative sources” further protects against aphasia and is the final deviation from IR’s hermeneutic.¹¹ Next, the treatment’s efficacy in decolonising interaction in the periphery that is India is verified via two examples: a misapplication of PCR and its uncovering of the rationale for secrecy. The examples illustrate the way in which PCR deletes colonialism *internal* to core-periphery interaction in that the method is no longer about imposing heuristics. This is how the key concept of “secrecy” is relieved from core presumptions about safeguarding or imperilling the state and instead exposed as simply a status symbol bolstering diplomats’ low personal status. The success of this deployment lies in eschewing the violence of imposing core concerns while uncovering practitioners’ meaning, and this also explicates how PCR may be replicated.

The final section verifies the treatment’s *external* efficacy. Whether PCR ameliorates the violence of IR scholars is gauged via the first deployment of PCR from a PhD proposal to its

¹⁰ On the scholarly destruction of the periphery by historians, theoreticians, and participants, see Deep K. Datta-Ray, “The Analysis of the Practice of Indian Diplomacy,” in *Political Science: Vol. 4: India Engages the World*, ed. Navnita Chadha Behera and Achin Vanaik (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 234–69; and, Deep K. Datta-Ray, “Violence, Hermeneutics and Postcolonial Diplomacy,” in *Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial Politics*, ed. Olivia U. Rutazibwa and Robbie Shilliam (New York: Routledge, 2018), 140–56. On analytic-violence into the core, see Priya Chacko, “Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of Nehru Years,” *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 48, no. 2 (2011): 305–07.

¹¹ Murphy Halliburton, “Gandhi or Gramsci? The Use of Authoritative Sources in Anthropology,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 77, no. 4 (2004): 793–817.

reception as an academic monograph. This shows that the core is decolonising but also that PCR is an incitement to violence in the periphery. There is preclusion, that is, when PCR's facts are harnessed to colonialism. The core's openness is also subverted to occlude PCR by a hysterical periphery. Hysteria arises from peripheral reviewers defending rationality because they are invested in the material benefits distributed by the core, for instance, and at the very least, being paid to travel to conferences in the core. Nevertheless, the core states rationality was invented by it and the periphery mimics, thereby rendering the latter counterfeit. The paradox of peripherals defending a rationality which itself denotes them as counterfeit, is exposed by PCR in embarrassing detail. PCR is therefore intolerable to peripheral scholars for exposing their colonialism and discomfort, hence their hysteria. Yet they choose to remain colonised, which is why colonialism's bastion is now the periphery. A glimpse to why is the Indian IR lecturer and militant advocate of non-core IR managing the pain of a presumed slight by resorting to repeatedly stating she is to contribute to a London School of Economics (LSE) publication. In addition, this scholar was only able to afford an apartment in a lower middle-class New Delhi neighbourhood because of a fellowship at a European university.¹² In short, the plight of peripheral scholars is such that they must bear the subservience demanded by colonialism to aspire to a life like that what is only tolerable for core scholars.

2. Assessment and Diagnosis

An assessment of colonialism and IR cannot miss disciplinary awareness of race having been the fundamental ontological unit of colonial politics,¹³ nor its centrality to the "Anglosphere," which was a slave-trading organisation. Race became the metric for a global hierarchy because of Anglosphere slave-traders' self-perception of being the "bastion" of European civilization, which underscored their claim of being central to global governance.¹⁴ The slave-trading economy's globalisation extended racial hierarchy across all peoples. Constituted and then naturalised was the boundary between colour-coded European sameness, defined as superior, to non-Europeans. This was operationalised via imperialism's vectors of administration within the colonies, operating within colonial discursive authorisations received from metropolises.¹⁵ Cementing the installation of racial hierarchy as the metric and vector to establish colonialism transnationally was that even its challengers could not transcend it.¹⁶

Into this context was born IR and its ontology was race. A founding IR figure wrote *The Negro Race and European Civilization*, which assumed physiological differences between black and white brains and stated the former's organic development ceased at puberty.¹⁷ Such works were about biological race, but also imperialism, which made its metric the vector, and so inaugurated IR as colonialism.¹⁸ An IR textbook proclaimed transforming international politics, "to increase the resources of the national state through the absorption or exploitation

¹² Conversation at dinner in Beijing, during an academic conference organised by the Berggruen Institute.

¹³ Duncan Bell, "Race and International Relations: Introduction," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2013): 1–4.

¹⁴ Robbie Shilliam, "The Atlantic as a Vector of Uneven and Combined Development," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22, no. 1 (2009): 69–88.

¹⁵ Barnor Hesse, "Racialized Modernity: An Analytics of White Mythologies," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30, no. 4 (2007): 652.

¹⁶ Robert Vitalis, "The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations," *Millennium* 29, no. 2 (2000): 331–56.

¹⁷ Paul Reinsch, "The Negro Race and European Civilization," *American Journal of Sociology* 11, no. 2 (1905): 145–67.

¹⁸ William Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now* (London: Harper Collins, 1991), 75.

of ... inferior races".¹⁹ This developed into a morality for colonization.²⁰ Its imbrication in IR continued in the *Journal of Race Development* becoming *Foreign Affairs*, the discipline's "founding" journal in 1922, and it is still published by the *Council on Foreign Relations*. In other words, IR constituted colonialism because it was the "policy science designed to solve the dilemmas posed by empire-building and colonial administration facing the white Western powers expanding into and occupying the so-called 'waste places of the earth,'" as the periphery is called.²¹ That even disciplinary opponents could not transgress colonialism confirmed its hold over the discipline. For instance, the first African American *Rhodes Scholar* sought to undermine colonialism by reversing its claim that race created culture, but in doing so only maintained the colonial category of race.²²

In the wake of World War II, race was veiled to make colonialism so insidiousness it became neo-colonialism. Once again, IR was aware²³ that the Holocaust rendered biological race untenable,²⁴ and politics, both global anti-colonialism and internal to the core in the UK and USA, was engulfed by agitation, which is why race had to be camouflaged.²⁵ This cumulated with UNESCO statements on *The Race Question*, rebranding race as "ethnicity".²⁶ It was rebranding because replacing naturalist with historicist explanations did not undermine race, but maintained racial hierarchy and since it was also the category of analysis, perpetuated colonialism as neo-colonialism.²⁷ In keeping with a changing context, IR also embraced neo-colonialism. In 1948, Hans Morgenthau wrote not of race, but of the "politically empty spaces of Africa and Asia".²⁸ Such seemingly innocuous language proliferated. For instance, "humanitarian intervention," which is neo-colonialism as its claim to morality cloaks racial hierarchy since all morality is presumed to originate in the West. Hence, only the West is mandated to "intervene" to spread morality.²⁹

Colonialism continues to order international politics and IR in a multiplicity of manners. An instance is "pre-emption". This defence is restricted to the colonial elite by its concomitant, "rogue states". The subterfuge whereby imposition upon the periphery also denies it its own defence is what makes neo-colonialism insidious. This is apparent in IR's core concept and theories, all of which the discipline is aware of. Discernible in the language of the *Family of Nations* is its racial hierarchy because only those nations are permitted war, and it is waged against those beyond the family – the racial dregs of global society.³⁰ Their threat is racial hierarchy, and the combination's outcome is IR's foundational concept: *anarchy*. It is "largely assumed to inhere in the 'primitive' politics of the 'inferior' races ... of what we'd

¹⁹ Paul Reinsch, *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Macmillan, 1900), 14.

²⁰ Philip Henry Kerr, "Political Relations Between Advanced and Backward Peoples," in *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, ed. A. J. Grant, Arthur Greenwood, John David Ivor Hughes, Philip Henry Kerr Lothian, and Francis Fortescue Urquhart (London: Macmillan, 1916), 142, 163.

²¹ Anievas et al., "Confronting the Global Colour Line", 2.

²² Jeffrey Stewart, "Introduction," in *Alain Locke: Race Contacts and Interracial Relations*, ed. Jeffrey Stewart (Washington: Howard University Press, 1992), xix-lix.

²³ Howard Winant, *The World is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy Since World War Two* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

²⁴ Elazar Barkan, *The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States between the World Wars* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

²⁵ John Solomos, *Race and Racism in Britain*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

²⁶ Ashley Montagu, *Statement on Race*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).

²⁷ David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2002).

²⁸ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 369.

²⁹ Makau Wa Mutua, "Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights," *Harvard International Law Journal* 42 (2001): 210.

³⁰ Antony Anghie, "The Bush Administration, Preemption Doctrine and the United Nations," *American Society of International Law Proceedings*, 98 (2004): 326–29. Antony Anghie, "The War on Terror and Iraq in Historical Perspective," *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 43, no. 1 (2005): 45–66.

now consider the ‘third world’”. *Anarchy* is racial hierarchy and it threatens the *Family* and this is the foundation for IR’s theories, which is why they, too, propagate neo-colonialism in varying forms. *Realism* directs the “construction of a hierarchical racial order to be imposed upon the anarchy arising from the tropics,” while *Liberalism* mandates “the imposition of a white racist order on indigenous peoples”.³¹ Meanwhile, *Constructivism* asserts that the burden of civilising the world rests with the racial elite because it maintains *anarchy*.³²

IR’s racial hierarchy and awareness of it today extends into the discipline to the conceptualisation of its subject, the practice of international politics: *diplomacy*.³³ Here “culture” and “rationality” cloak the racial hierarchy palpable in the acceptance of the “essence of diplomacy” as the “elite culture, comprising the common intellectual culture of Europe,” which is why diplomacy is “a *corpus Christianorum* bound by the laws of Christ”.³⁴ In other words, diplomacy is the “attempt to sustain behaviour” in keeping with the “culture of the dominant Western powers,”³⁵ where culture arises from “rationality in the sense of action that is internally consistent with given goals.” The key is “rationality,” which fuses racial hierarchy with Europe, culture, and diplomacy. Hence, rationality is why diplomacy’s seminal authors are of the colonising core. They must be, because as a core author states, the “world system ... came into being in the Italian peninsula and reached its full expression in Europe”. Its “goals” are the same as diplomacy’s, which is why diplomatic theory “appeared at the same time as diplomacy began to assume its ... form in the late fifteenth century”.³⁶

That diplomacy began at the core as racial hierarchy and its vector makes for colonialism also emerges in diplomacy’s “goals”. These are set by “European diplomacy’s logical frame of reference ... the notion that unity is the natural condition of social order, which should be restored through proper mediation among its divided parts.”³⁷ In other words, Europe originates the racial hierarchy that is diplomacy and utilises it to incorporate all. The extravagance of this violent practice of using diplomacy as heuristic and hermeneutic is rooted in Western society’s self-proclaimed culture: Christianity, which sets estrangement from God as the origin in the *Old Testament* story of the fall of man. This is universalized as the “brotherhood of man” in the *New Testament*, the semantic shift conflating one man’s origin with everyone’s. Hence, we are all dependent on God’s mediator: Christ. He legitimises the Papacy, uniquely imbuing it with the power to unify us with God. The Papacy establishes spiritual unity in medieval Europe because people believe in the Papacy. Its demise is the Reformation because of the rise in belief of man’s direct ability to negotiate unification with God. Significantly, the will to unify remains, despite the fracturing of Christianity into Catholicism and Protestantism. This newfound belief in man’s ability to unify results in Christian society fragmenting into states as they usurp the Church’s role. Nevertheless, this splintering necessitates the diplomatic system, and its harbinger is the Treaty of Westphalia’s appropriation and reproduction of spiritual unity as a secular contract: that is, accept Westphalia’s assumptions to mitigate violence.

³¹ Errol A. Henderson, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in International Relations Theory,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2013): 85–7.

³² Aaron Sampson, “Tropical Anarchy: Waltz, Wendt, and the Way We Imagine International Politics,” *Alternatives* 27 (2002): 429–57.

³³ For the literature on the centrality of diplomacy to IR, see Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, 1–26.

³⁴ Hedley Bull and Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), 128.

³⁵ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 39.

³⁶ G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, T.G. Otte, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1–2.

³⁷ Quoted in, Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, 13–6.

Embarrassingly, this heralds diplomacy to realise unity which simultaneously obliterates unity because diplomatic relations regularize Europe's fragmentation. In short, Europe displaces God, but not his logic: a pre-set origin and end remain. Spirituality is abandoned for failing to deliver unity as oneness with God, but the idea of unity persists as a secular diplomatic project. Naturally, and crucially, as promulgator of this transnational system, the core sets the terms for unity. In practice, unity is assimilation, which is projected from the spiritual into the corporeal.³⁸ The result is unending violence now, initiated by the racial hierarchy of the heuristic, which the hermeneutic must utilise. This duality constitutes colonialism with the IR scholar as its vanguard and the diplomat, its foot soldier. The scholar utilises the hermeneutic to enclose the periphery intellectually, permitting the latter to assimilate whatever remains. This violence is unending, for assimilation's purpose is the impossible ideal of "unity". This makes violence a syndrome: *analytic-violence*.

That analytic-violence now qualifies as interaction is illustrated by the periphery that is India. It is managed in the genres of memoir, history, and theory, which are suffused with violence as wonderment, incoherence, and a combination of deletion, dismissal, and denigration.³⁹ The violence of wonderment stems from converting this pathic experience into an agential and intellectual phenomena or rationality⁴⁰ via nativism. Memoirists rationalise their wonderment as superiority, replacing core with periphery to make their experience substantive. Yet the entire process is contained within, and perpetuates, colonialism.⁴¹ Buttressing colonialism is wonderment's irrationality, an example of this are two Indian diplomats who are so entranced with themselves that both, in the same anthology, claim to have invented a policy everyone knows originates elsewhere.⁴²

The violence of incoherence is inaugurated by the impulse to identify diplomacy's rationality, which is so self-evident that it can only be glimpsed in its absence, such as when a historian explains, "even with archive material, our speculations may be hard to verify since Indian strategic decision-making appears to be mostly oral".⁴³ The unavailability of documentary facts is significant only because it disallows uncovering rationality, or "strategic decision-making" and thus there is "speculation," or the process of inducing. This is illogical in at least two ways. Factual error renders speculation incoherent,⁴⁴ and despite professing to be led by empirical evidence, speculation manifests as the imposition of core concepts. The insufficiency of these concepts is why they are mangled into ontologically incompatible categories such as *Liberal* and *Realist*.⁴⁵ This violence directed at the core is a necessary by-product of containing the periphery. A variation of incoherence is distinguishing between rationality as core and practice as "non-conventional" in core terms, because practice is forced into an incompatible rationality.⁴⁶ Prevalent, too, is the incoherence of futurism, or the wish

³⁸ Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, 16–21.

³⁹ For a survey till 2013, see Deep K. Datta-Ray, "The Analysis of the Practice".

⁴⁰ Wolff-Michael Roth, "Astonishment: a Post-Constructivist Investigation into Mathematics as Passion," *Educ Stud Math* 95 (2017): 97–111, 106.

⁴¹ A recent example is: Shyam Saran, *How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century* (New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2017).

⁴² Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, "Twenty Years of Looking East," *Business Standard*, July 14, 2012, <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/sunanda-k-datta-ray-twenty-years-looking-east/480356/>.

⁴³ Dewan C. Vohra, *India's Aid Diplomacy in the Third World* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981), 173.

⁴⁴ Krishnan Srinivasan, "Special Bond," *The Telegraph*, January 31, 2014, https://www.telegraphindia.com/1140131/jsp/opinion/story_17876883.jsp#.WJCH40navIU.

⁴⁵ Priya Chacko, "Srinath Raghavan".

⁴⁶ Priya Kumari, "India as a Normative Power: The Mixed Migration Crisis of the Indian Ocean," *International Studies* 51, no. 1 (2014): 180–94.

that the core could order the periphery, which raises the question of how the hermeneutic can operate in the periphery now since its heuristic does not even exist there?⁴⁷ Such colonialism is occasionally overt,⁴⁸ as is the aspiration to incorporate India into colonialism.⁴⁹

Other commonplace forms of incoherence include the colonialism of ascribing to Indians incompetence in mimicking the core⁵⁰ or passivity towards the core,⁵¹ and even when Indians are found to be neither incompetent nor passive, their practice is limited to colonialism's purpose of unity.⁵² Patently, incoherence flourishes in the hermeneutic, claiming to induce but really imposing the heuristic. An example of this is the assumption that India, like the core, seeks *great power* status, or does so because of how *great powers* enforce themselves upon India, or that this is India's purpose since it is the *great powers'* purpose. Significant is not India's desire for sameness but rather the fact that these assertions originate in the hermeneutic, not in practice.

Indeed, practice is deleted, dismissed and denigrated because rationality is imposed upon the periphery since IR's approach is analytic-violence. This violence is both inward and outward with *Liberalism's* deployment to contain India, but it is slippery and so the theory's integrity is broken to make it account for phenomena that it ordinarily cannot.⁵³ Increasingly popular is *Realism*. As with *Liberalism*, *Realism* is violence toward both itself⁵⁴ and the periphery in imposing itself upon India.⁵⁵ Both make for incoherence. In *Realism*, this is most startling in its claiming that Indians and Pakistanis are different in terms of rationality, but then accounting for both with *Realism!*⁵⁶ Moreover, Indian slippages haunt *Constructivism* so that it is enslaved to *Realism*.⁵⁷ Regardless of which theory is being discussed, what distinguishes their violence is the vanishing subject. For instance, India's nuclear diplomacy is, for *Realists*, about material security,⁵⁸ but for *Postcolonials*, it is about status-seeking.⁵⁹ Both eradicate, in turn, Indian material concerns or Indian leaders' long history of status-seeking. Exacerbating this is that both theories assume India begins *Liberal* and is becoming *Realist* by learning from the masters of nuclear diplomacy.⁶⁰ This infantilising of India is

⁴⁷ For a recent example, see Sumit Ganguly, "India's Foreign and Security Policies," in *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, ed. Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 411–26.

⁴⁸ Purnendra Jain, "Energy Security in Asia," in Pekkanen, Ravenhill, and Foot, *The Oxford Handbook*, 547–68.

⁴⁹ Harsh V. Pant, "The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics," *Asian Security* 5 (2009): 273–95.

⁵⁰ P.R. Kumaraswamy, "National Security: A Critique," in *Security Beyond Survival: Essays for K. Subrahmanyam*, ed. P. R. Kumaraswamy (New Delhi: Sage, 2004). Mimicry is the premise in a recent overview, see Atul Kohli and Prerna Singh ed., *Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2013). Similarly, mimicry is used to explore every aspect of the Indian state in another recent overview, see Shipping Hua ed., *Routledge Handbook of Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

⁵¹ Jingdong Yuan, "Nuclear Politics in Asia," in Pekkanen, Ravenhill, and Foot, *The Oxford Handbook*, 505–23. For an earlier rendition see Andrew B. Kennedy, "India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb," *International Security* 36 (2011): 120–53.

⁵² Jonathan Holslag, *India and China: Prospects for Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

⁵³ R. Bhaskaran, "The Philosophical Basis of Indian Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy of India: A Book of Readings*, ed. K.P. Mishra (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1977).

⁵⁴ T.V. Paul, "Integrating International Relations studies in India to Global Scholarship," *International Studies* 46, no. 1-2 (2009): 129–45.

⁵⁵ George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

⁵⁶ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

⁵⁷ Arndt Michael, "Realist-Constructivism and the India-Pakistan Conflict: A New Theoretical Approach for an Old Rivalry," *Asian Politics & Policy* 10, no. 1 (2018): 100–14.

⁵⁸ Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (1999): 148–77.

⁵⁹ Itty Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atom Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Post-Colonial State* (London: Zed Books, 1998). Itty Abraham ed., *South Asian Cultures of the Bomb: Atomic Publics and the State in India and Pakistan* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009). Karsten Frey, *India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security* (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2006).

⁶⁰ C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2003).

colonialism and it occurs because regardless of the theory in question, the hermeneutic utilises a heuristic that constitutes racial hierarchy whereby rationality originates in the core and is mimicked by the periphery. Even self-conscious attempts to avoid this by not imposing the hermeneutic results in colonialism because core concepts are smuggled in with an Indian guise,⁶¹ or are limited because the parameters are from the core.⁶²

Though nothing redeems the numerous forms of analytic-violence, its occurrence does substantiate the core's shortcomings in its interactions with a periphery that clearly remains evasive. Moreover, the frequency of the core's slippages in these interactions signifies an altogether alternate rationality. Sanctioning this are flashes of meaning in the work of Sunanda K. Datta-Ray on India's annexation of Sikkim, relations with Singapore,⁶³ and practices of secrecy.⁶⁴ In all three instances, Datta-Ray initiates with "issues" and proceeds with practitioners and official documents, reading them in conjunction. Unfortunately, this corpus does not systemise meaning beyond specific historical processes and individual practices to the level of the state and towards rationality. Perceptible, though, is that in addition to the core's limits in both hermeneutic and heuristic, there exists the possibility of a new hermeneutic that avoids violence and so returns to IR's metric.

The diagnosis for the analytic-violence pervading core-periphery interaction in memoirs, histories, and theories, cannot be self-awareness. IR *is* aware of the colonialism of its components: origin, concept, theory, and the practice of diplomacy. All that remains is the process that combines these components: the hermeneutic. Evidently, it is analytic-violence's vector, but it cannot simply convey violence since its components have been cleansed by self-awareness. The hermeneutic must therefore constitute violence. In other words, the very practice of IR as inducing or deducing pivots on its heuristic, diplomacy, which is understood as racial hierarchy, thereby necessarily negating self-awareness about its components and so restoring violence. This is "aphasia," or "calculated forgetting," and it is not new to IR.⁶⁵ "Racial aphasia" was invoked for the components of IR in the post-War period in order to continue to utilise them.⁶⁶ Moreover, the manoeuvre's success is what renders self-awareness insufficient for neutralising colonialism in practice via more self-awareness. For these reasons, the diagnosis is that the hermeneutic is irretrievably compromised as deducing and inducing in practice and theory by the recurrence of aphasia about diplomacy. In short, what is requisite is a completely new hermeneutic to restore IR to its metric.

3. Treatment and Internal Efficacy

The treatment proposed to eradicate colonialism, including neo-colonialism, from the hermeneutic is "Producer-Centred Research" (PCR) because it is neither inductive nor deductive. The former accounts for the violence of wonderment and incoherence because

⁶¹ Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice: Nehruvian, Gandhian, Hindutva and Neo-Liberal," in *Order and Justice in International Relations*, ed. Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 236–61. Kanti Bajpai and Siddharth Mallavarapu ed. *International Relations in India: Bringing Theory Back Home* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2004).

⁶² David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Srinath Raghavan, *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁶³ Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim*, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Westland, 2013); Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, *Looking East to Look West: Lee Kuan Yew's Mission India* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009).

⁶⁴ Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, *Waiting for America: India and the US in the New Millennium* (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2002), viii–ix.

⁶⁵ Ann Laura Stoler, "Colonial Aphasia: Race and Disabled Histories in France," *Public Culture* 23, no. 1 (2011): 121–56.

⁶⁶ Debra Thompson, "Through, Against and Beyond the Racial State: the Transnational Stratum of Race," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2013): 133–51.

the hermeneutic starts at the periphery and examines its results for implications to develop an inference that some rationality is operative. However, this is nearly always undermined by the truism that observation is necessarily informed by rationality, which in this case is particularly malignant: colonialism. In short, induction cannot handle the vicissitudes of colonialism. Meanwhile, deduction accounts for the violence of deletion, dismissal, and denigration because the hermeneutic starts with colonialism and proceeds through the periphery to arrive at a result which either demonstrates colonialism or falsifies it. However, falsification never arises as violence is enhanced to enforce conformity. Instead, PCR initiates with neither colonialism nor tainted data, but with consequences, and then constructs reason.

For instance: The surprising fact that the hermeneutic does not keep to its metric, is observed. But if the periphery exceeds the hermeneutic, then the hermeneutic not keeping to its metric becomes a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that the periphery exceeds IR.⁶⁷ Thus, PCR initiates with the perception of surprise. At issue is not theorising the surprise, but rather choosing which hypothesis to follow. This is indicated by the relationship between observations, which, in the case of core-periphery interaction, points to IR's subversion by colonialism despite awareness and peripheral excess. Hence, the hypothesis is that the hermeneutic is compromised. This makes PCR, at its inception, abductive. Its utility is that it transgresses inductive and deductive reason because it is initiated by "an act of *insight*, although of extremely fallible insight."⁶⁸

Hence the need to establish PCR precisely. PCR's initiator is surprise, and it is related to other observations, either as a hidden cause and effect, as a phenomenon like others already experienced and explained in other situations, or of creating new general descriptions. Surprise takes two forms: novelty and anomaly. In colonialism's case, it is the latter since IR's metric is subverted. The depth, extent, and tenacity of the subversion is why it is not viewed in the terrain of theory or practice, but as "rationality". Embedded in rationality is "culture" and "diplomacy," and rationality is the operational location of choice for retired bureaucrats, historians, and theorists, who, in turn, misunderstand, seek, and impose it. Moreover, as the extent of analytic-violence intimates, the periphery exceeds colonialism and, at a minimum, is meaningful. Despite its prevalence and because it is pregnant with meaning, the vague use of rationality is refined to "loose and implicit practical-cum-theoretical pattern networks of knowledge, based on the experience of physical instances,"⁶⁹ or "an ideas toolkit". It is not just "a phenomenon to be accounted for," but also "one that accounts".⁷⁰ The treatment, and thus the interaction, is not undermined by using rationality. Being a colonial concept does not foreclose its usage for maintaining colonialism. That is as absurd as stating that perceiving, eating, or blinking is colonial. The error is assuming these concepts are internal to colonialism when they are external. In short, rationality in the singular is rejected for rationalities in the plural, hence colonialism is not rationality, but rather one of its forms. Yet, given the very embeddedness of rationality in the society that produces it, colonialism may be forgotten via aphasia, which is rampantly labelled as *common sense*. This necessitates further elaboration to make for movement between rationalities without imposing colonialism across rationalities.

⁶⁷ Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. 5, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 117.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁶⁹ Maurice Bloch, *How we Think they Think: Anthropological Approaches to Cognition, Memory and Literacy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 6.

⁷⁰ Quoted in, Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, 109–10.

Required is inoculation against confirmation bias, which is to consistently remind oneself it is rationalities rather than rationality.

Constantly self-conscious, the final inoculation begins to become apparent in the accounting for the anomaly. This starts with examining the discipline itself, as has been done by engaging its origins, concepts, theories, and practice, to understand how the heuristic furthers racial hierarchy and organises the hermeneutic to make for colonialism. Also involved is examining the subject. This raises the issue of how to determine if it is rationality or rationalities in the absence of induction and deduction. The answer is that rationality as singular or plural is expressed in real-life, micro-sociological situations composed of practices.⁷¹ The implication is to be aware of one's own rationality and simultaneously explore for another via practices. On the former, knowledge of, but not the privileging, of rationality's theories is recommended in contrast with deduction's emphasizing one and induction's claiming to eschew all. A plurality of theories assists, at a minimum, in fostering self-consciousness about rationality. For instance, only a deep familiarity of *Liberalism*, *Marxism*, and *Global History* engenders awareness of their colonialism, expressed as paternalistic sentimentalism; similarly, only awareness of *Postcolonialism* and *Postmodernism* uncovers their egocentric fantasias' foundation in a profoundly colonial narrative of unending violence. In short, rationality is all too familiar to PCR's practitioner, who therefore cannot allow it to taint the engagement with sociological practices.

How these are engaged completes the break with the hermeneutic and reveals the second inoculation against aphasia. While the hermeneutic cannot contemplate the periphery as capable of generating "authoritative sources," PCR not only can but does by treating the periphery as capable of generating practice and rationalising it. In short, the periphery is placed on par with theory and core. That this step arises from engaging rationality reiterates that it should inform empirical work, which should also be in consonance with rationality – only, not as deduction or induction. They negate the self-awareness of "grounded" disciplines such as Sociology and Anthropology and restore colonialism in their hermeneutic. For instance, Anthropologists collect data, but interpret via core personalities, rather than, say, Mahatma Gandhi or Chairman Mao Zedong, or local texts that have for thousands of years been part and parcel of Asian societies.

In other words, PCR is not "grounded research," but it accounts for an anomaly arising from interaction and so proceeds to investigate in terms of rationality, disciplinary practice, and the practices of the periphery. What reinsulates the latter is that practices are not just collected to verify if they accrue into patterns to determine if they are robust enough to indicate a rationality and to then verify whether this constitutes colonialism. Rather, the entire process is made sense of in terms of the practitioners: their practices are interpreted by them while also referring to rationality. In short, aphasia, even as common sense, is actively countered in the hermeneutic that is PCR. The result, therefore, is not "Agent-Based Modelling" because it is ignorance-preserving, abstract, and exploratory. PCR in contrast creates knowledge, albeit on another register, is grounded, but not in induction or deduction, and is conclusive because hypotheses arising from theory's interaction with the periphery are explained by the latter's data being self-explanatory.⁷²

⁷¹ Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, and Benjamin Nelson, "Note on the Notion of Civilization," *Social Research* 38, no. 4 (1971): 810–12.

⁷² Matus Halas, "In Error We Trust: an Apology of Abductive Inference," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 28, no. 4

The novelty of the treatment's dissolution of the hermeneutic's colonialism necessitates demonstration to evaluate efficacy and illustrate proper conduct. The first example is Ashis Nandy's practice, which initiates with establishing secularists and Hindu-nationalists, despite their violent differences about the status of Muslims in India, as one and the same for they are locked in a "historical' battle [and so] understand each other perfectly" because the battleground is "empirical, verifiable history". But of course, the historical facts are impossibly contested. Nandy's cure is to negate empiricism by the "point of view" articulated by the Indian monk, Swami Vivekananda, to manage the pain of verifiable empirical "fact" through an "ahistorical" "moral": principled forgetfulness.⁷³ Within Vivekananda, this form of pain-management to survive the present affirms the power of the moral in managing "fact," and in doing so, affirms the concept of "timeless truths". Evidently, Nandy has begun, as PCR does, with the anomaly of two divergent practices, history and principled forgetfulness, to alleviate violence. Moreover, Nandy makes the therapeutic site rationalities, signified by history and principled forgetfulness, because the latter is an abomination to history's purpose of laying bare the past as a frame of reference. Therefore, Vivekananda is either insane or a practitioner of "doublethink".⁷⁴ But neither category describes him without analytic-violence, either branding him insane or, via imposition, straitjacketing him in rationality.

Next, Nandy accounts for principled forgetfulness not by the impossibility of eschewing rationality, but by utilising it rationally since his deployment of the "historical imagination" never exceeds its archival limits.⁷⁵ Paradoxically, Nandy uses history to account for *ahistory*, and does so by presenting the Bengali, Girindrasekhar Bose, in the proper way of historians, by contextualizing him in his society, elements of which search for their own empirically-verifiable history. Of significance is that Bose finds the *puranas* – ancient Indian mythical texts – to be a type of truth beyond history whose importance lies not in empirical fact but in their presenting alternative theories which possibly indicate an alternative rationality. Significantly, all of this is not to raise dead theories as a gift to rationality, but to account for an anomaly to reduce violence now.⁷⁶

It is here, in verifying if myths make for a rationality, that Nandy is subverted by aphasia into imposing a totally alien tool-kit: psychoanalysis. This is not only because psychoanalysis is, even in Europe, a new invention, or that it is a personal invention, but also because it is entrenched in the intersection of the cultures of the *Enlightenment* and *Romanticism*.⁷⁷ In other words, Nandy uses the historical method but it produces aphasia, drawing him further into rationality, and so colonialism follows in the imposition of the core on hundreds of millions of the periphery's denizens. Of course, they might fit into the core's matrix, but what is certain is that Nandy wilfully eschews the "superabundance" of textual material that has been compiled over millennia and is utilised by Indians daily, just as Nandy's example of Bose demonstrates.⁷⁸ The betrayal of Bose is that he thinks he can explain himself by referring to his society's productions, but Nandy consciously forgets this by way of aphasia.

(2015): 701–20.

⁷³ Ashis Nandy, "History's Forgotten Doubles," *History and Theory* 34, no. 2 (1995): 47–54.

⁷⁴ George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1949), Part I, Chapter 3, 32.

⁷⁵ Roger Smith, "Reflections on the Historical Imagination," *History of the Human Sciences* 13, no. 4 (2000): 103–08.

⁷⁶ Indebted for this insight to Ersel Aydinli.

⁷⁷ Quoted in, Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, ft. nt. 70, 300.

⁷⁸ Of just one such text it has been written: "It would not be an exaggeration to say that the people of India have learnt to think and act in terms of the Mahabharata." R.N. Dandekar, Quoted in Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, 109. The *Mahabharata* is how Indian diplomats today make sense of their work. See Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, 110–16.

It occurs because Nandy refuses to treat, starting with Bose, the periphery's inhabitants as "authoritative sources". That the self-avowedly peripheral Nandy recognises rationalities but denies them to the periphery reaffirms colonialism's insidiousness. It is unsurprising, then, that this is so regular an occurrence in IR that one academic proclaims: "When shit happens – events defy conventional language, fit no familiar pattern, follow no conception of causality – I reach for Virilio's cosmology."⁷⁹ The writer epitomises a core that cannot reach out to the people making shit happen, for doing so is to admit rationality exists in the plural and that colonialism undermines the practice of IR in terms of its own metric.

What Nandy should do to restore efficacy is evident in the final example, secrecy in theory and practice, in India. The concept of "secrecy" for *Realists*, safeguards democracy, but it is undermined by secrecy, according to *Postcolonials*. Meanwhile, in practice, the Indian Prime Minister's calls for "declassification" and also says so in conversation.⁸⁰ The combination of all three makes for anomaly and thus commences PCR. A way to surmount this impasse between theories and practice by viewing the practitioner as an equal to theory is to continue with PCR. Its completion begins with another practice: the refusal to allow my travel with Indian diplomats to Bombay during my fieldwork at India's Ministry of External Affairs because of, as the Foreign Secretary explained, secrecy.⁸¹ On the diplomats' return, they refused to engage in conversations mundane to the point of banality about Bombay. Questions were about the stay, sightseeing, the ocean – which was new for several – and the visit to Bombay's nuclear facilities, about which my inquisitiveness was limited to "what is it like?" One bureaucrat muttered "national secrecy" as if that were an explanation – as it is for *Realists* and *Postcolonials* since they interpret in their own terms, rather than the periphery's. Another bureaucrat added that their oath of secrecy denies the Constitutional right of free speech, which interlinks all of us. This wall of silence was punctured by a young female diplomat who giggled, "they don't want to talk about it because it gives them status(!)" and added: "I was talking to one of the [nuclear] scientists and he was saying ... 'Why for all this secrecy? It's just to hide *incompetencies* here. And as for this national security business ... we use all these private contractors and all their records are public. If any Chinese want to find out what we do, all they have to do is go look at the private company's records!' These peoples' [the new officials] heads are spinning now with all this secrecy!"⁸²

To treat the quote as an equal to rationality, as "authoritative" counters aphasia as common sense and provides an avenue to interrogate the rationality for secrecy in the periphery that resolves the anomaly between *Realism*, *Postcolonialism*, and periphery. Secrecy's accounting in peripheral terms is what authorizes the contention that secrecy is an ostentatious display of high status. Reinforcing the contention is a wealth of data about bureaucrats' pre-bureaucratic lives being peripheral, which makes them status-seekers. Secrecy enables positive differentiation, thereby negating low status which continues into the bureaucrat's life from pre-bureaucratic times. This is because low racial and economic status cannot be compensated for by a newly-acquired job status. It requires constant bolstering, and so secrecy. In other words, secrecy enables and empowers, which is democracy's purpose.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, 22.

⁸⁰ "PM: To aid research, may consider declassification," *Indian Express*, April 18, 2006, <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/pm-to-aid-research-may-consider-declassification/2732>. Manmohan Singh, Conversation, 7 Racecourse Road, New Delhi, October 12, 2009.

⁸¹ Shivshankar Menon. Email, July 27, 2007.

⁸² IFS Probationer 23, Conversation, Foreign Service Institute, New Delhi, 2007.

Secrecy delivers democracy and so has nothing to do with *Realism's* and *Postcolonialism's* presumptions about state-level operations. In short, PCR mitigates analytic-violence not by imposing rationality, but by utilising it to account for and explain a significant IR concept in the periphery. This establishes efficacy in practice, for PCR dissolves colonialism internal to the hermeneutic and so aligns core-periphery interaction with IR's metric. Moreover, PCR also lends itself to comparing, and also cross pollination, between multiple rationalities, as has been done for the concept of *ritual* in diplomacy in the core, India, and China.⁸³

4. External Efficacy and Conclusion

Alignment's external dimension is if PCR ameliorates the colonialism of its context. Establishing this completes efficacy's evaluation, however, it is complicated by PCR possibly generating irrationality in rationality's terms while addressing it, raising the spectre of occlusion or preclusion. To elaborate, in eradicating colonialism, PCR is an "authentic homegrown" hermeneutic that can unearth "authentic homegrown" rationalities,⁸⁴ as it does with "secrecy". This is efficacious for operating beyond colonialism and so revealing what is actually going on, but this may elude the context's colonialism, or it may obstruct PCR from progressing. To assess this, the first self-conscious monograph-length deployment of PCR, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy: a Critique of Eurocentrism* (New York: OUP, 2015) is viewed in its context: scholars, primarily of IR. Their practices are made sense of in terms of PCR by treating its producers as "authoritative sources". However, they are not engaged with as extensively as the producers in the monograph are. Hence, relative to the monograph, this section is speculative. Furthermore, managing context as core and periphery is not to endorse colonialism's racial metric, but to map its operation, flow, and "bastion" now.

The monograph's origins suggest that IR's neo-colonialism dominated the core in 2005, when a proposal for a PhD was rejected outright by dozens of prospective supervisors primarily in the departments of IR, Anthropology and Sociology at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, the LSE, and elsewhere in the United Kingdom over the course of numerous meetings. Only a Politics professor at SOAS was receptive, contingent on co-supervision with a colleague experienced in fieldwork within NGOs. The former's enthusiasm switching to rejection indicates PCR eluded his colleague. As the professor explained after discussions with his colleague, "the larger rationale - the motivation for the study - needs to be better articulated."⁸⁵ To overcome the impasse, with "sly civility" the proposal was civilized into a test for Foucauldian theory.⁸⁶ In short, rationalities were subsumed to rationality and so submitting to colonialism was a prerequisite for entering the core. This is how proposal became project at the University of Sussex. Revelation of true intent led to two supervisors quitting the project, and indeed a brief expulsion from the University. Another academic, Dr. Fabio Petito, frankly stated in a meeting the need for a proper IR framework, and since his proposal did not disable PCR, it was accepted. Within four years, Professor Kees van der Pijl and Sir Stephen Chan passed the project "with no corrections". Professor van der Pijl commented that the claim to an alternative hermeneutic is IR proper. Sir Stephen enquired

⁸³ Deep K. Datta-Ray, "India's Diplomacy is Absentia: Offence, Defence, Violence," in *Bridging Two Worlds: Comparing Classical Political Thought and Statecraft in China and India*, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Yan Xuetong (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, forthcoming).

⁸⁴ Ersel Aydinli and Gonca Biletekin, "Widening the World of IR: a Typology of Homegrown Theorizing," *All Azimuth* 7, no. 1 (2018): 45–68.

⁸⁵ Email, February 1, 2005.

⁸⁶ Homi K. Bhabha, "Sly Civility," *October* 34 (1985): 71–80.

why the project was not activated at my undergraduate school, SOAS, and, upon learning why, said he would report my performance to his dissenting colleague. The heady pleasure of completion, heightened by champagne, was punctured within minutes by an IR academic commenting: “What?! ... Not even any spelling mistakes?” It was the final instance of routine, everyday neo-colonialism. Prior to completion, the project was selected for publication by a core academic publisher who stated his ideal book is about lesbian terrorists murdering white men. In other words, the project arrived at the cusp of publication by manoeuvring around and ignoring neo-colonialism, which was trumped by capitalism and profit.

Since publication, five years have elapsed, during which the monograph has been reviewed, criticised, and utilised over thirty times by academia and the media. In comparing favourably with the average citation count of approximately twelve for “authentic homegrown” work,⁸⁷ it appears the monograph is dissolving the colonialism of core-periphery interaction. A slim but solid track between monograph and core is evident in that it understands, welcomes, and utilises PCR. The contrast with 2005 is interaction without dissimulation. The core’s openness to revision is apparent in reviews of the book. Professor Ian Hall’s review in Australia’s *Asian Studies Review* finds the monograph “extraordinary,” notes PCR requires “considerable persistence and high-level intervention,” that “specialists in the field set aside practically all the assumptions that underpin our understanding of international relations,” and that: “Each of the latter chapters could have been books in themselves.” Hall also incisively writes that more can be made of the data, “fascinating for what they reveal ... about the social contexts” that make India and its denizens into “individuals wrestling with” entrenched poverty, superficialities, misogyny, and racism.⁸⁸

Colonialism’s waning in the core of cores is attested to by the United States’ *Association of College and Research Libraries* stating, “few are as determined or as ambitious” as the author and that the “effort is commendable and bold”.⁸⁹ Singapore’s *The Straits Times* concurs.⁹⁰ *The Round Table*’s reviewer writes the book is, “highly rewarding ... raises fascinating questions ... about diplomacy ... the very idea of modernity [and] will be a critical resource for scholars and practitioners everywhere.”⁹¹ *The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy* notes that the book does “retrieve the non-Eurocentric origins of diplomacy, to illustrate how mythical principles of negotiating a unified cosmos offered valuable diplomatic principles before, during, and after the colonization of India.”⁹² An article in *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*⁹³ agrees, as does a monograph by OUP New York.⁹⁴ Furthermore, scholars endorse PCR by using its facts about, for instance, Mughal diplomacy to support the idea of rationalities rather than rationality.⁹⁵ The track cutting through the Anglosphere’s colonialism extends to the Francosphere with

⁸⁷ Aydinli and Biltekin, “Widening the World of IR”.

⁸⁸ Ian Hall, “The Making of Indian Diplomacy: a Critique of Eurocentrism,” *Asian Studies Review* 42, no. 2 (2018): 378–79; Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, Chapter 2.

⁸⁹ A. Ahmad, “Datta-Ray, Deep K.: The Making of Indian Diplomacy: a Critique of Eurocentrism,” *CHOICE: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries* (March 2016): 1081.

⁹⁰ Asad Latif, “Unique Insights into the Making of Indian Diplomacy,” *The Straits Times*, May 16, 2015.

⁹¹ Anton Harder, “The Making of Indian Diplomacy: a Critique of Eurocentrism,” *The Round Table* 109, no. 5 (2020): 648–52.

⁹² Costas M. Constantinou and Paul Sharp, “Theoretical Perspectives in Diplomacy,” in *The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy*, ed. Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp (London: Sage, 2016), 21.

⁹³ Costas M. Constantinou, “Visual Diplomacy: Reflections on Diplomatic Spectacle and Cinematic Thinking,” *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 13, no. 4 (2018): 404.

⁹⁴ Thorsten Wojczewski, *India’s Foreign Policy Discourse and its Conceptions of World Order: The Quest for Power and Identity* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018).

⁹⁵ Christophe Jaffrelot and Laurence Louër, “Introduction: The Gulf-South Asia Religious Connections: Indo-Islamic Civilization vs. pan-Islamism?,” in *Pan-Islamic Connections: Transnational Networks Between South Asia and the Gulf*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot and Laurence Louër (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1–20.

a review in *Politique étrangère*,⁹⁶ and PCR is recommended in *Sciences Po's, Manuel de diplomatie*.⁹⁷ The core also enforces its openness on the periphery that is Pakistan, where the author's failure to secure a review is dramatically overturned by an Englishman, Dr. David Taylor.⁹⁸ All of this is presaged by Canada's *Pacific Affairs*, to use colonialism's metric, "ethnic" reviewer with ancestors from the periphery writing that PCR is "a highly original formulation [which] demonstrates clearly the need for IR scholars to venture into unfamiliar theoretical and methodological terrains."⁹⁹

Interaction also results in preclusion, but this violence is not colonialism when the integrity of rationalities is maintained, as it is when PCR's facts service core academic work on kinship,¹⁰⁰ neo-institutionalism,¹⁰¹ and surveys.¹⁰² Preclusion's violence is colonialism when unreflective usage shatters integrity. It is smashed in a core academic book attributing the monograph to a "patriotic desire," because the presumption is the author mimics European nationalism and so, too, rationality.¹⁰³ Another instance of such violence is to use the book to state that Indian rationality utilises European institutions to make for "hybridity"; regardless of this sentiment being repeated in journals, it is disproved by the book detailing comprehensive appropriation and subsumption of Mughals and their diplomatic apparatus by the British.¹⁰⁴ PCR's results are also precluded by being harnessed to a hunt for *great power*, which constitutes colonialism since there is no evidence that India seeks unity.¹⁰⁵ Accounting for these preclusions might be a lack of understanding, but colonialism lurks beneath. Instructive was the comment, "I was reading your work again, but it's *too* theoretical," because the speaker is an ethic-Indian theorist of Indian IR. He epitomises what passes for the periphery's engagement with theory, or for that matter, fact: months later he published, blissfully unaware that his use of PCR's facts refutes his mimicry of rationality, that India seeks to be a *great power*.¹⁰⁶

Evidently the core is open to revision, but the periphery responds with violence ranging from disengagement and sabotage to occlusion via instrumentalism. Moreover, that the periphery is consistently the source of all opposition signals colonialism is untethered to the core and that if it flows, it is from the periphery. For instance, while the core reviewed, the periphery refused.¹⁰⁷ An instance is India's *Economic and Political Weekly* (EPW). A new

⁹⁶ Isabelle Saint-Mézard, "Book Review: The Making of Indian Diplomacy: a Critique of Eurocentrism," *Politique étrangère* 80, no. 4 (2015): 210–11.

⁹⁷ Christian Lequesne, "Les États et leur outil diplomatique," in *Manuel de diplomatie*, ed. Thierry Balzacq, Frédéric Charillon and Frédéric Ramel (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2018), 143–61.

⁹⁸ Ammar Ali Qureshi, "The Roots of Indian Foreign Policy," *The News on Sunday*, Pakistan, January 27, 2019, <http://tns.thenews.com.pk/roots-indian-foreign-policy/#.XUwgQegzBIU>.

⁹⁹ Sinderpal Singh, "Political Science. Volume 4, India Engages the World. ICSSR Research Surveys and Explorations," *Pacific Affairs* 88, no. 1 (2015): 143–44.

¹⁰⁰ Francesca R. Jensenius, "Kinship in Indian Politics: Dynasties, Nepotism and Imagined Families," in *Kinship in International Relations*, ed. Kristin Haugevik and Iver B. Neumann (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2019), 138–53.

¹⁰¹ Méliissa Levaillant, "The Contribution of Neo-Institutionalism to the Analysis of India's Diplomacy in the Making," in *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy*, ed. Mischa Hansel, Raphaëlle Khan and Méliissa Levaillant (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2017), 160–80.

¹⁰² Bernhard Beitelmaier-Berini, "Theorizing Indian Strategic Culture(s): Taking Stock of a Controversial Debate," in Hansel, Khan, and Levaillant, *Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy*, 91–111.

¹⁰³ Alyssa Ayres, *Our Time Has Come: How India in Making its Place in the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 41–3.

¹⁰⁴ Karin M. Fierke, "Introduction: Independence, Global Entanglement and the Co-Production of Sovereignty," *Global Constitutionalism* 6, no. 2 (2017): 167–83; Karin M. Fierke, "Contraria sunt Complementa: Global Entanglement and the Constitution of Difference," *International Studies Review* 21, no. 1 (2018): 146–69.

¹⁰⁵ Bharat Karnad, *Staggering Forward: Narendra Modi and India's Global Ambition* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2018).

¹⁰⁶ Kanti Bajpai and Byron Chong, "India's Foreign Policy Capacity," *Policy Design and Practice* 2, no. 2 (2019): 137–62.

¹⁰⁷ A chapter on PCR in another book is favourably reviewed, see Sanjeeb Mukherjee, "The State of the Science of Politics in Contemporary India," *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, no. 51 (2016): 34.

editor, Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, was amenable to reviewing the book but his attacks on the powerful, industrial, Adani Group resulted in his removal by the academic Romila Thapar colluding and working hand-in-glove with the Adanis.¹⁰⁸ The colonialism undergirding action was visible in that EPW finally acquiesced to a review, but only at the prompting of a reviewer who is indisputably of the core, Trinity College Cambridge's Vere Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History, Samita Sen.¹⁰⁹ That colonialism drives the periphery and explains why the book was not reviewed is reinforced by Professor Sen's call for the book to be read by the academy beyond IR. That colonialism is a peripheral quality is further reiterated in the three peripheral scholars, that is, located in the periphery, who were commissioned by three core journals to write reviews neither delivering nor explaining, which suggests sabotage. This is active in the case of the review commissioned by the core IR journal *Political Studies Review*, for the review is subverted by a periphery reviewer studiously avoiding evaluation and thus occluding. Compounding this is the error of presumption, imposition, and everything but PCR, evident from the outset in the reviewer imposing his Hindustani meaning upon the "K" in my name.¹¹⁰

The periphery is also where the only academic dismissal of PCR arose from a scholar who is, and this is perhaps not incidental, an immigrant to the core.¹¹¹ Thornstein Veblen who himself was an immigrant to the core, noted that immigrant scholars dismiss what they leave behind so to fit into their new homelands.¹¹² In the case of PCR, Veblen's insight does not make for a correlation, but does suggest an instrumental form of colonialism, for the book was rejected to entrap rationalities in rationality and so to forward integration of the peripheral scholar into the core. This is also suggested by another scholar, also an immigrant, noting the book in a journal but attributing it¹¹³ in another journal not to the puzzle at the core of the book but to a will to create "Indian IR" which yet again highlights intent as maintaining colonialism by containing rationalities within rationality.¹¹⁴ Related is occlusion in reverse, or maintaining colonialism but with India on top, which accounts for tensions in a media review by a possible immigrant.¹¹⁵ However, these flows of colonialism need not be permanent. An "ethnic," and thus relative to the immigrant, integrated scholar, used in an academic monograph PCR's conclusion that Mahatma Gandhi influences Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign policy to argue that this constitutes an intellectual line from the *Mahabharata* to the Non-Aligned Movement. The claim's significance lies in it breaking peripheral colonialism which concocts – because it contradicts everything each said about the other – that Nehru's usage of Gandhi is instrumental in an effort to impose rationality.¹¹⁶ There is also occlusion

¹⁰⁸ Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, Email, March 27, 2017.

¹⁰⁹ Samita Sen, Email, August 29, 2019.

¹¹⁰ Pankaj Kumar, "Book Review: The Making of Indian Diplomacy: a Critique of Eurocentrism," *Political Studies Review* 15, no. 1 (2016): 103–04.

¹¹¹ Vineet Thakur, "Panditji Knows Best," in *Postscripts on Independence: Foreign Policy Ideas, Identity, and Institutions in India and South Africa*, ed. Vineet Thakur, Siddharth Mallavarapu, Himadeep Muppidi, and Raymond Duvall (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

¹¹² Thornstein Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men* (New York: B.W. Heusch, 1918), 4. See too, Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, 18.

¹¹³ Amitav Acharya, "Theorising the International Relations of Asia: Necessity or Indulgence? Some Reflections," *The Pacific Review* 30, no. 6 (2017): 824.

¹¹⁴ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years On," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 17 (2017): 360.

¹¹⁵ Jaideep A. Prabhu, "There's an Indie Way of Thinking About Foreign Policy But We are Doing It the Wrong Way," *Swarajya*, January 14, 2017, <https://swarajyamag.com/books/theres-an-indic-way-of-thinking-about-foreign-policy-but-we-are-doing-it-the-wrong-way>.

¹¹⁶ Bhakti Shringarpure, *Cold War Assemblages: Decolonization to Digital* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019), Chapter 1. See

not by colonialism but by self-imposed methodological limits in a journal article,¹¹⁷ and in a memoir,¹¹⁸ but it was colonialism which made for a former Indian Foreign Minister's¹¹⁹ and a Foreign Secretary's¹²⁰ occlusion in their reviews.

The periphery's novel combinations of violence crescendo in hysteria only because of another iteration of the core's waning colonialism: the commissioning of a review beyond IR in *Philosophy East and West*. Once again, the periphery reviewer subverted the review, using it instrumentally to redirect the reader to his research agenda. Instrumentalism accounts for occlusion, but only colonialism accounts for the reviewer's conspicuous violence obvious in, for instance, the virulence of the assertion that "the book is poorly written in terms of logic of arguments and development of thoughts in a systematic and coherent way". Along with other such assertions, what emerges is that at issue is rationalities, which the reviewer submerges for rationality and so mandates colonialism, whose inevitable violence comes to personify the reviewer. This reviewer must act so for he accepts rationality but its inventor, the core, deems rationality is a derivative in the periphery because it mimics. That ensures perpetual insecurity, twice over, for the reviewer. He must constantly educate himself about the core since it changes constantly, which in turn also entails constant vigilance of slippage, revealing what he was before becoming rational.¹²¹ The need for both is directly enhanced by the book unveiling the periphery for what it is and doing so in embarrassing detail, evident in the practice of keeping "secrecy" and about what Hall, politely, calls "social contexts".¹²² What the interaction reveals, then, is that the reviewer's violence is to neutralise the threat of PCR from revealing the counterfeit status of the reviewer, and since he cannot, violence becomes the purpose –not just to occlude, but to erase all trace of the book. It is another replaying of his demonstrated instrumentalism, only now the instrument of violence is also the purpose.

Violence as purpose inevitably overcomes peripheral reviewers and renders them hysterical. This is apparent in another peripheral reviewer for whom, once again, it is rationalities that is at stake. This is clear in the rhetorical question of whether the book is an "elaborate hoax," for repeated is the age-old ascribing of irrationality by the coloniser. This is, however, insufficient to safeguard the reviewer, particularly since he was an Indian diplomat, which carries the implication that he is a direct target of the book's exposure of compromising details. Hence, the previous reviewer's violence is necessary and rises to overcome the reviewer, for the only alternative he has is to reveal himself as counterfeit. A moderate line from the review is: "The trees that gave up their lives to get [the book] printed died meaningless deaths."¹²³ In other words, peripheral reviewers maintain colonialism to partake in rationality's benefits, but this mandates that they are only fakes with all that it implies. Just how fraught their situation is, is exposed by PCR, heightening their precariousness. Hence, they attack.

Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Indian Diplomacy*, 205–6.

¹¹⁷ Vikas Kumar, "Recovering/Uncovering the 'Indian' in Indian Diplomacy: An 'Ancient' Tadka for a Contemporary Curry?," *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 5, no. 2 (2018): 197–215.

¹¹⁸ Shivshankar Menon, *Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016).

¹¹⁹ Shashi Tharoor, "Diplomatically Hindu," *Open* (23 May 2016): 59–61.

¹²⁰ Krishnan Srinivasan, "Different Worlds: Looking Beyond the Zero-Sum Game," *The Telegraph*, September 15, 2015, <https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/different-worlds/cid/1443847>.

¹²¹ Homi K. Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," *Discipleship: a Special Issue on Psychoanalysis* 28 (1984): 125–33.

¹²² Ananta Kumar Giri, "The Making of Indian Diplomacy: a Critique of Eurocentrism (review)," *Philosophy East and West* 68, no. 3 (2018): 1020–023.

¹²³ Satyabrata Pal, "In Search of Roots in the Epic," *The Book Review* (2015): 9–10.

To conclude, the book affects colonialism within the hermeneutic and in its context. The book's efficacy is its aligning the hermeneutic with the purpose of eradicating violence and this licenses the treatment that is PCR for general usage. If deployed outside IR, PCR may stem IR's slide into irrelevance, evident in its imports from, far exceeding its exports to, other disciplines, and which is widely known.¹²⁴ Indeed, PCR may prove regenerative, for on offer is the generation of new theory – not as abstractions, but from PCR's practice, and so capable of accounting, explaining, and becoming models all the more relevant for being material. PCR can even reconstitute diplomacy as an entirely new heuristic, with the potential to transform interstate relations itself. The possibilities are limitless, but they are contingent on managing the external dimension. Its core is engaging, which is suggestive in the quelling of violence by PCR, yet it incites in the periphery violence artful in circumscribing the core's openness, but also visceral and hysterical. That renders the book's ability to stem colonialism by overcoming preclusion and occlusion in the periphery ambivalent, at best. Yet all may not be lost, for one peripheral voice in one of the periphery's newspapers, concludes *The Making of Indian Diplomacy* is a "brilliant and innovative narration".¹²⁵

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¹²⁴ For a summation, see Muznah Siddiqui, "Assessing the Claim That the Development of International Theory Is Over," *E-International Relations*, March 15, 2019, <https://www.e-ir.info/2019/03/15/assessing-the-claim-that-the-development-of-international-theory-is-over/>.

¹²⁵ B. Ramesh Babu, "Dealing with the World, Indian Style," *The Hindu*, November 01, 2015, <https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-sundaymagazine/dealing-with-the-world-indian-style/article7828083.ece>.

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Abstracts in Turkish

Nükleer Savaşın Eşiğinde: Misillemenin Uygulanabilirliği ve 1962 Küba Füze Krizi Sırasında ABD Politika Kararları

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Öz

Nükleer caydırıcılık konusundaki son araştırmalar, nükleer cezanın çoğu durumda rakibin ikinci vuruş kabiliyeti, taktiksel fazlalık ve kendini caydırıcılık mantığı nedeniyle mümkün olmadığını göstermektedir. Bununla birlikte, nükleer caydırıcılığa karşı meydan okumanın cezasız kalması bekleniyorsa, caydırıcı politika inandırıcı değildir ve muhtemelen başarısız olacaktır. Savunmacı, nükleer silahlara sahip olan rakibi şiddetle cezalandırabilir mi? Yapabiliyorsa, hangi koşullar altında? Başkan Kennedy'nin teyp kayıtları sayesinde, Küba Füze Krizi, araştırmacılara, caydırıcı politikaların başarısız olmasından sonra savunucunun politika seçimleri üzerine çeşitli teorileri test etmek için istisnai bir laboratuvar sağlıyor. Bu makale bir araştırma hipotezi ile onun rakip muadilini türetmekte ve bunların açıklayıcı güçlerini kriz sırasında Yürütme Komitesi içindeki kilit üyeler üzerinden bir süreç izleme analizi yaparak incelemektedir. Çalışma, meydan okuyanın atom silahlarıyla misilleme yapma fizibilitesinin, savunucunun politika seçimlerini belirlemede çok önemli bir tahmin unsuru olduğunu ortaya çıkarmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Caydırıcılık, nükleer silahlar, Küba Füze Krizi, güvenilirlik, fizibilite

Dışsal Dinamikler ve Liderlerin Özellikleri: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Kişisel Özelliklerinin Değişimi Üzerine Bir Çalışma

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Öz

Liderlerin özellikleri, makamlarında edindikleri tecrübe ve travmatik olaylar sonucu değişir mi/sabitlik mi gösterir? Bu yapan-yapı sorusu, durumsal ve eğilimsel teorisyenler arasındaki temel bölünmeyi temsil etmektedir. İlk gruba göre, liderlerin davranışları elde ettikleri tecrübe ve maruz kaldıkları travmatik olaylardan etkilenmektedir. İkinci grup ise, liderlerin inançları üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan özelinde, tecrübe ve travmatik olay değişkenlerinin siyasi liderin kişiliklerinde nasıl rol oynadığını sınamayı amaçlamaktadır. Erdoğan'ın kişisel özelliklerini anlamak ve bunların tecrübe

ve travmatik olaylar tarafından ne derece etkilendiğini ölçmek için Margaret Hermann'ın geliştirdiği Liderlik Özellik Analizi (LÖA) kullanılmaktadır. LÖA, liderlerin konuşmalarında kullandıkları bazı kelimelerin kişilik özelliklerini yansıtmak suretiyle diğer liderler ve hatta farklı zamanlarda ve rollerde kendileri ile karşılaştırılabileceğini varsaymaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Liderlik Özellik Analizi, makamda geçen süre, travmatik olay

Terör Grubunun Bekası İçin Bir Strateji Olarak İtibar İnşası

Efe Tokdemir
Bilkent Üniversitesi

Öz

Bu yazıda terör gruplarının bekasını araştırıyorum. Teröristlerin kaderi, büyük ölçüde terör grubunun itibarından aldığı güce bağlıdır. Grubun kendi nüfusu içinde gerçekleştirdiği politikalara ve eylemlere bağlı olan itibarı, her grubun kendi davası için ne kadar yeni eleman, kaynak ve destek bulabileceğini belirler. Kendi nüfusu -temsil ettiklerini iddia ettikleri insanların –nezdinde olumlu veya olumsuz itibara yatırım yapan terör gruplarının daha uzun süre varlığını devam ettireceğini iddia ediyorum. Yine de, sadık ve kararlı destekçileri cezbetmesi nedeniyle, olumlu bir itibar inşa etmenin bir grubun kalıcı gücü üzerinde daha büyük bir etkisi olduğunu savunuyorum. Tersine, açıkça tanımlanmış bir itibar oluşturma politikası olmayan gruplar örgütsel bir değişime uğrar. Argümanlarımı test etmek için 1980-2011 yılları arasında faaliyet gösteren tüm yerli terör grupları üzerinden RTG ve GTD veri tabanlarını kullanarak beklentilerimi desteklemektedirim. Bulgular, bir terörist grup kurulduktan sonra, hedeflerine ulaşmak için net bir itibar stratejisi izlediği sürece onu yok etmenin son derece zor olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Terörist gruplar, grup bekası, itibar stratejileri

Tianxia (Hepsi Cennetin Altında): Alternatif Bir Sistem mi Yoksa Başka Bir İsimle Gül mü?

Mehmet Şahin
Aksaray Üniversitesi

Öz

Tianxia, uluslararası sistemi yönetmek için alternatif bir kurumsallaşma olarak kabul edilmektedir. Dünya çapında bir kurum tarafından düzenlenen dünya yönetimini ifade eder. Buna göre, bir dünya kurumu bu sistemde uyumlaştırıcı bir rol oynamaktadır. Devletler ise kendi ekonomik modellerini seçerler ve lider de farklı birimler arasındaki ilişkileri düzenler. Dolayısıyla bu makale, *Tianxia*'nın Batı yönelimli Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerine alternatif bir çerçeve olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu anlamda, bu makale *Tianxia*'nın felsefi fikri ile Batı yönelimli Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi arasındaki benzerlikleri araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Daha spesifik olarak, makale konuyu uluslararası sistem perspektifinden incelemekte, iki

çerçeve arasındaki epistemolojik boşluklar ve ontolojik benzerlikleri göstermektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Tianxia*, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi, Çin hegemonyası

Güçlü Liderlikten Yoksun bir Hükümet: Türkiye'nin 2003 Irak Savaşı Kararına Neoklasik Realist Bir Bakış

Samet Yılmaz

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Öz

Bu çalışmada 1 Mart 2003 Tezkeresinin Parlamentoda sebep olduğu kriz, uluslararası sistem ve birim-düzeylelerinin etkileşimini analiz eden neoklasik realist perspektifinden incelenmektedir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Irak'a müdahalesi öncesi Türkiye'den destek istemiştir. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti) hükümeti ilk etapta barışçıl bir çözüm arasa da, nihayetinde ABD ile işbirliği yapmaya karar vermiştir. Bölgesinde orta-kuvvetli bir devlet olduğu kabul edilen Türkiye, uluslararası sistemin baskılarıyla ABD ile iş birliğine doğru itilmiştir. Keza, Türkiye'nin iç-siyasi ortamı böyle bir karar alınması için uygun koşullar sağlamasına rağmen, Irak tezkeresi Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM) tarafından engellenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, çalışmanın iki amacı bulunmaktadır. Birincisi, uluslararası alanda tehditlerin ve fırsatların devletler için sarı olduğu ve karar alma sürecinin zaman kısıtlamasına tabi olduğu koşullarda, geleneksel beklentilerin aksine, devletin içindeki siyasi bölünmelerin dış politika üzerinde belirleyici olabileceğini ve sistemik zorlukların önüne geçebileceğini kanıtlamaktır. İkinci amacı ise, parlamenter sistemlerde siyasi otonomisinin fazla olması beklenen tek-parti hükümetlerinin, uluslararası şartlar kısıtlayıcı olsa bile dış politika kararları verilebilmesi için neoklasik realistlerin yeterince ilgi göstermediği önemli bir değişken olan kuvvetli liderlerin önemini vurgulamaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Neoklasik realizm, Türkiye'nin Irak Savaşı kararı, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 1 Mart Tezkeresi

Küçük Devletlerin Varoluşu için Riskten Korunma Stratejisi: Kuveyt Örneği

İsmail Numan Telci

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Öz

Orta Doğu ülkelerinin riskten korunma stratejileri (strategic hedging) yeterince çalışılmamıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, küçük devletlerin dış politika seçeneklerini riskten korunma stratejileri bağlamında analiz etmektir. Çalışma, riskten korunma stratejisinin sistem, bölge ve bölge-altı düzeylerin incelenmesinde sunduğu analitik faydalardan dolayı küçük devletlere de uygulanabildiğini savunmaktadır. Buna göre, Kuveyt, küresel ve bölgesel güç dağılımındaki

değişikler ve bölgesinde süregelen güvenlik ikilemini göz önünde bulundurarak riskten korunma politikaları izlemektedir. Kuveyt, Çin ve Türkiye ile askeri işbirliğini güçlendirerek, Çin ve Türkiye'nin Körfez'deki yükselişinden, ABD'nin Ortadoğu'dan çekilmesinden ve Suudi Arabistan'ın saldırganlığından kaynaklanabilecek risklerden korunmayı hedeflemiştir. Bu stratejinin temel amacı, Türkiye ile olan bölgesel ittifakını kuvvetlendirilerek Kuveyt'in güvenliğini sağlamak ve Orta Doğu'nun değişen dinamiklerinden kaynaklanan olası risklerden korunmak olarak tanımlanmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Riskten korunma (hedging), dış politika, Kuveyt, Çin, Türkiye

Uluslararası İlişkilerin Etkileşimleri: Irkçılık, Sömürgecilik, Üretici Merkezli Araştırma

Derin K. Datta-Ray

S. Rajaratnam Uluslararası Çalışmalar Okulu, Singapur

Öz

Sömürgeciliğin altını çizen ırksal hiyerarşi devam etmekte, merkez-çevre etkileşimlerini organize etmekte ve dolayısıyla Uluslararası İlişkilerin (UI) şiddeti azaltmak için muhasebe ve açıklama yapma amacını baltalamaktadır. Uluslararası İlişkiler kendi sömürgeciliğinin farkında olmasına rağmen, tefsirin tümdengelimsel ve tümevarımsal yönteminde, kendi aracı olan diplomasi hakkında afazi (hesaplanmış unutmama) aracılığıyla yeniden oluşturur. Sonuç, analitik şiddet veya Merkez'in Çevre ile etkileşimini yozlaştıran buluşsallığıdır. Yine de, bu baştan savmalı, Uluslararası İlişkilerin yorumlayıcılığının ötesinde bir anlamlılığa tanıklık eder. Buluşsallık tarafından geri dönüşü olmayan bir şekilde bozulan UI'nin tefsiri, tamamen yeni bir tefsir için çıkarılır: Üretici Merkezli Araştırma (PCR). Tümdengelim ve tümevarımdan ve dolayısıyla sömürgecilikten kaçınan PCR, kendisinin ve problemin önemi nedeniyle abduksiyon yani teori ve pratikten kaynaklanan bir sorunu rasyonalite çerçevesinde çözmekle başlar. "Rasyonelliği" "rasyonelliklerle" değiştirmek, Merkez'in rasyonelliğini sömürgecilik olarak kaydederken, onun PCR'nin Çevre'nin uygulamalarını başka bir rasyonaliteye uyup uymadıklarını belirlemek için toplamasını ve değerlendirmesini kirlenmesinin önüne geçer. Ayrıca, Çevresel uygulayıcılara kendileri rasyonalize edebilen ve dolayısıyla rasyonalitenin eşiti olarak yetkinlikle muamele etmek, PCR'yi afaziden daha fazla korur. Etkinliğin doğrulanması, PCR'nin tefsiri dekolonizasyonunun, Uluslararası İlişkiler uzmanları arasında tamamen harici olarak kopyalanmadığını göstermektedir. Merkez PCR'i ile muhatap olur, ancak rasyonaliteyi savunan ve şimdi sömürgeciliğin kalesi olan Çevredeki şiddeti teşvik eder.

Anahtar kelimeler: Diplomasi, Avrupa-merkezcilik, ırkçılık, sömürgecilik, tefsirbilim

Aims and Scope

All Azimuth, journal of the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, is an English-language, international peer-reviewed journal, published biannually. It aims:

- to provide a forum for academic studies on foreign policy analysis, peace and development research,
- to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements in the dialogue between the “center” and the “periphery“,
- to encourage publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches.
- to transcend conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries,
- to highlight works of senior and promising young scholars,
- to uphold international standards and principles of academic publishing.

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Manuscripts submitted for consideration must follow the style on the journal’s web page (<http://www.allazimuth.com/authors-guideline/>). The manuscripts should not be submitted simultaneously to any other publication, nor may they have been previously published elsewhere in English. However, articles that are published previously in another language but updated or improved can be submitted. For such articles, the author(s) will be responsible in seeking the required permission for copyright. All manuscripts are subject to review by anonymous referees. Manuscripts should be submitted through the submission form at:
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