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In This Issue
The All Azimuth team welcomes readers to a new issue showcasing a variety of topics and research traditions. Our six articles can be divided into three overarching topics, the first of which being contemporary perspectives on international security, with the first article focusing on the question of the state itself and other intra-state processes, while the second delves into the realm of traditional interstate conflict. These are followed up by two theoretical explorations of oft neglected issues in Turkish Foreign Policy, specifically concerning Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia and Turkey’s disposition towards the climate regime. We conclude with two articles on the trajectory and development of the IR discipline in Turkey that were originally presented in the 6th Annual All Azimuth Workshop.

Our first article explores security at the nexus of non-state actors and structural forces. “Neo-Weberian Reading of Violent Non-State Actors: The Case of Hezbollah” by Mustafa Yetim contributes to the literature on structuration theory by way of investigating the state-society relations and structural context in which Hezbollah emerged as an important Violent Non-State Actor (VNSA) in the Middle East, and how it came to shape the politics of the region as a significant powerbroker not only in the internal war in Syria but also in Lebanon. This interactive process between structural realities and Hezbollah has rendered a once revisionist and marginal actor into a dominant and status quo actor that now seeks to exclude rival claims and movements acting not dissimilar from a state.

Our second article revisits a more traditional security agenda featuring interstate rivalries. In “Breaking the Stalemate in the Study of the Relationship of Mutual Military Buildups, Arms Races, and Militarized Disputes,” Ioannis Nioutsikos, Konstaninos Travlos, and Magdalini Daskalopoulou argue that extant research on Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) have largely ignored dynamics like state motivations, which they contend is crucial to understanding why some arms buildups can escalate into conflict. The authors explore this key insight episodically in the Greece-Ottoman Empire and Greece-Turkey dyads from 1828 to 2016 in the form of case studies to offer proof of concept and lay the basis for future qualitative research on the relationship.

Our next two articles concern Turkish foreign policy. Our third article, “Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Central Asia: An Unfolding of Regionalism and Soft Power” by Hayriye Kahveci and İşık Kuşçu Bonnenfant, concerns Turkey’s attempts to garner influence among Central Asian republics. Though Turkey is often showcased as a successful implementor of soft power policies, Turkey’s initial attempts to influence the Central Asian region were unsuccessful and overshadowed by its attempts to pursue a leadership role. In more recent years, however, Turkish foreign policy developed a formal geopolitical vision for the region as Turkey greatly improved its commercial linkages with Central Asian countries and began to effectively utilize soft power instruments.

Our fourth article, “Frozen in Time while Icebergs are Melting: Türkiye’s Climate Policy” by Fatih Bilal Gökpinar and Özgür Aktaş contributes to the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) subfield and studies of Turkish foreign policy by scrutinizing Turkey’s disjointed policies vis-à-vis successive climate regimes, including the Kyoto and Paris Regimes, as well as the European Green Deal, using Carlsnæs’ tripartite framework. The findings show that despite the various incentives available to Turkey, its desire to preserve its core values like its energy industry, industrial interests, economic integration with the EU, and climate funds has militated against its genuine adoption of sustainable practices. With the Green Deal,
however, Turkey may now find itself having to adopt sustainable practices since the exacting sustainability criteria for trading with European countries would make genuine adoption more consistent with its values.

Our last set of articles offers opportunities to revisit the state of the IR discipline in Turkey and afford scholars and instructors with an opportunity for introspection. Our penultimate article, “Quo Vadis, Turkish IR? Mapping Turkish IR’s Footsteps within the Global” by İrem Karamık and Erman Ermihan seeks to locate Turkey as a subject within the broader discipline of IR and comment on the state of the discipline to the extent that it depicts Turkey. The article points to an overall dearth of studies related to, and therefore to an underrepresentation of, Turkey in major IR journals, although there appears to be a positive trend in recent years.

While “Quo Vadis” offers an indictment of the IR discipline more broadly, our final article shifts the focus to the IR discipline in Turkey, critically assessing its unfulfilled promises. “From Prescription to Treatment: The Disciplinary (under)achievement of International Relations in Turkey” by İsmail Erkam Sula, Buğra Sarı, and Çağla Lüleci-Sula surveys the literature on the underachievement of Turkish IR and explores why Turkey has failed to produce significant homegrown theoretical scholarship. One of the most important deficiencies, they contend, is the quality of IR teaching, leading them to deliberate on ways to improve IR pedagogy in Turkey and precipitate a more prolific generation of IR scholars.
Neo-Weberian Reading of Violent Non-State Actors: The Case of Hezbollah

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Abstract
Multiple-actor reality and the impact of different units, except the states in stratified structural relations, have become more apparent in recent international relations. Specifically, the rising role of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) in regions like the Middle East and North Africa, and their challenges to the sole and central position of states, reinforced this idea. Hence, comprehending the possible actorhood of these groups within the structural relations consisting of internal and external realms necessitates alternative concepts and challenging arguments. The Neo-Weberian approach, inspired by historical sociology, offers a grounded and balanced analysis of actors. This approach puts state-society at the center of attention and, thus, looks at all dimensions (both actor and structure) of social relations as ingrained in the theory of structuration. In this way, it seems to capture the complex interactions between actors and structural dynamics, as well as the dynamic transformation of both ontological realities. Along this line, this study intends to illuminate the intriguing aspects and certain advantages of the structuration approach by scrutinizing Hezbollah’s agency, which is a critical VNSA in the Middle East, and its impact on structural relations, as well as its evolution over time. In other words, as a modest contribution to the structuration literature, the mutual interaction between agent and structure is explored via a unique case. This study argues that Hezbollah emerged as a result of the preexisting structural realities and, during the process, it proved its agency and influential role on these stratified structural dynamics. To substantiate these theoretical arguments, the permissive structural conditions in the region and in Lebanon will be explained, and then Hezbollah’s impact as an actor on these structural realities will be surveyed with a special emphasis on Hezbollah’s role over two regional dynamics: Arab uprisings, particularly the Syrian internal war, and its now hegemonic position in Lebanese politics.

Keywords: Hezbollah, Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA), Neo-Weberian Approach

1. Introduction
Arab uprisings have clarified the increasing role and salience of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the Middle East. Hezbollah (Lebanon), Houthi militias (Yemen), Khalifa Haftar-led forces (Libya), Hamas (Palestine), and several Muslim Brotherhood-inspired organizations, as in Syria, are just some of the prominent VNSAs that need to be explored.
within historical and social contexts.\(^1\) The analytical and theoretical concepts in international relations shaped mainly by (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism, namely mainstream approaches, have been limited to analyzing the considerable resurgence of these phenomena in recent years. Most literature in international relations (IR) privileges non-state actors (NSA), which arguably contributes to the embodiment of economic liberalization, international peace, and law. Added to the (neo)liberal underestimation on the agency of states, these perspectives also imperfectly explain VNSA’s impact over domestic and regional affairs. Furthermore, other mainstream approaches, such as (neo)realism, which defines states as the only actors within the international arena, disregard VNSA’s obvious role within domestic and regional contexts.\(^2\)

Current empirical and theoretical challenges could overcome this prevalent impasse within IR. This historically- and socially-oriented literature led by Weberian scholars affected, to some degree, the ongoing actor-structure debates within IR. In particular, a second wave of the Neo-Weberian approach, a current branch of historical sociology, largely contributed to this process. This approach opposed defining states or NSAs as the only actors within social relations while accepting the central role of states both as actors and institutions/structures. It also refuses to define states as rigid, unitary, and fixed as “state-centric” realist approaches do by recognizing the partial autonomy of each actor, including VNSAs and NSAs.\(^3\) In this sense, scholars developed the VNSA as an analytical object in order to analyze these “armed non-state” organizations. Examining the “black box (state)” and focusing on “state-society relations” increasingly enabled the recognition of the relevance of these actors.\(^4\)

The Neo-Weberian approach locates the autonomous actors within the context of social and historical relations and, by extension, scrutinizes the mutual (actor-structure) interaction between these actors and social-historical structures as suggested in the structuration method.\(^5\) These structures have stratified and multi-dimensional character, thus incorporating domestic, regional, and international realms into actor debates.\(^6\) In this way, this perspective contributes to the analysis of non-state forces like Hezbollah as autonomous actors within stratified social and historical structural realities. Whereas some actor-led studies neglect the structural

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\(^3\) For a detailed study on the arguments, concepts, and the new alternatives improved by historical sociology studies, see Stephen Hobson and John M. Hobson, eds., *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).


\(^5\) This approach is widely used by constructivist approaches and specifically by Alexander Wendt as well, who drew on historical sociology studies and brought historical-social perspective to the discipline. Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organization* 41, no.3 (1987): 335-470.

\(^6\) In other words, non-reductionist and non-realist theory of state rejects asking the question of state or non-state forces, as in traditional reductionism, but calls for an analysis “of state and non-state actors.” Thus, in bringing non-state forces back in, the state should not be kicked out. See John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 205.
aspects of Hezbollah’s emergence and increasing power, other structure-led studies privilege the structural factors by dismissing the agency of Hezbollah. The mentioned arguments of the Neo-Weberian approach, however, allow us to overcome this actor-structure “duality” and to survey the trajectory of Hezbollah by locating it within these stratified structures.

In this sense, in line with the structuration approach, the main focus of this article will be to elucidate the impacts of evolving internal and external structures on the emergence and transformation of Hezbollah and, also, the agency of Hezbollah on these structures. Therefore, to comprehend how and why Hezbollah was formed by the 1980s and has transformed since then, and whether it has shaped the local-regional developments, this paper will briefly reveal the mutual interactions between Hezbollah and the regional-domestic structures through the structuration approach. To illustrate these points further, the paper will involve the following parts: the first section will brief the actor and structure debates within IR and present the alternative arguments of the Neo-Weberian approach summarized in the structuration approach. The second section will trace the structural impacts on the trajectory of Hezbollah, and the subsequent section will concentrate on the transformative role of Hezbollah on Lebanon’s domestic affairs and regional events as an agent.

2. Actor-Structure Debate within IR: Towards a Neo-Weberian Structuration Approach

“There are different types of political units in different epochs and in different places that act according to their historically situated, particular logic.” Michael Mann, 2006.

All extant approaches in international relations have certain ontological stances involving structure and actor premises, which means mainstream and dissident theories alike have advanced certain ontological arguments in the discipline. Against this background, realist paradigms generally opposed questioning the principal assumption within IR, which defines states as the only actors in the ontological reality of IR. For realists, these rational and sovereign units should be identified as the “sole power” representative of their societies. Therefore, this approach equates the state with the nation and dismisses inherent struggles within states and the alternative actors that challenge their monopoly. Daniel Chernilo claims that the “fixed” and “given” definition of states within the realist tradition caused the “territorial trap” by ignoring the relevance of state-society relations, which illustrates partial autonomy of the other actors. Due to such negligence on the analysis of domestic policy and, by extension, the presence of alternative actors, realists overemphasized states’ autonomy from their own societies and analyzed the impact of an anarchical system on the actions of the states. Not only realist, but also some liberal approaches have recently considered primary realist assumptions as practical in analyzing international relations, that is, states

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9 For a better capture on the ongoing discussion regarding the ontological issues, see Colin Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
as dominant actors and international structure as an anarchical order. Nevertheless, neo-liberalism privileged peacefully and economically motivated non-state actors as the principal actors in global affairs. In this way, neo-liberalism omitted the analysis of violent and armed non-state actors since it considered them as possible threats towards the foundation of a peaceful and stable world order. For this approach, unlike VNSAs, the NSAs contributed to the transformation of an anarchical international structure into a stable and law-based order. Overall, while the realist and liberal approaches have recently reconciled on certain aspects in the explanation of international relations, they still differ specifically with regard to the basic units within IR and the possible transformation of anarchical structure.

However, neither theory has advanced a comprehensive framework to investigate the role and impact of the violent/armed non-state actors on international relations. In other words, neither theory has recognized the multiple-actor approach, which is the central aspect of the recent historical-social approaches and intends to balance state-led analysis with its incorporation of other actors, including VNSAs. Such negligence is also present in the discipline’s several “dissident” approaches, especially in the classical Marxist perspective and its various sub-branches. Classical Marxism regards the classes as the basic actors that shape social relations. It thus ignores the role of said non-state actors and, more importantly, states’ transformative impact on social-historical developments. In brief, in line with their one-actor model, mainstream theories and some “dissident” approaches merely privilege the role and impact of the units that they designate as basic actors.

The ahistorical, given, and fixed approach of the said theories is visible not only within their actor definition, but also within their structure definition and structure-led perspectives. Additionally, they only focus on the one aspect of the complex structural realities, as exemplified in the realist over-emphasis of the international structures and liberal concentration on the domestic structures. Furthermore, these theories prioritize a one-factor reality of international relations, like ideational, economic, or political, and one-level analysis, such as international, regional, or national. This perspective, embedded in the discipline, neglects the complex realities of the social world by overlooking the intensive interaction between actors, multi-level structural realities, and divergent impacts of various factors. Therefore, the actor-structure definition of these perspectives has been criticized by the recent waves of historical sociology. According to these criticisms, structural and actor-based developments should be put inside history rather than outside history to proceed with an objective approach pertaining to social relations.

To them, this historical-social definition of both actors and structures necessitates rigorous...
analysis of mutual interaction between them. To illustrate intensive relations between actors and structures, these approaches contend that the structural mechanisms acquire objective reality and turn into the “thing” through the actions of human agencies like states, NSAs and VNSAs. Accordingly, such approaches presuppose that while structural mechanisms become stable and autonomous over time, which has remarkable influence on the actors’ behaviors, they still have historical, social and stratified character and, therefore, are liable to change as a result of their interaction with the actors as in Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory.\footnote{Anthony Giddens, Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (University of California Press, 1984). For Halliday, internationalism incorporates both analytic and normative concerns and points out erasing the sharp differentiation between the domestic and international realms exemplified by the empirical events. In sum, it is related to how the world works and how it should work. He divides the internationalization process into three realms: Liberal, Hegemonic, and Revolutionary Internationalism. Fred Halliday, “Three Concepts of Internationalism,” International Affairs 64, no.1 (1988): 188-198.} Fred Halliday’s methodological internationalization,\footnote{For Halliday, internationalism incorporates both analytic and normative concerns and points out erasing the sharp differentiation between the domestic and international realms exemplified by the empirical events. In sum, it is related to how the world works and how it should work. He divides the internationalization process into three realms: Liberal, Hegemonic, and Revolutionary Internationalism. Fred Halliday, “Three Concepts of Internationalism,” International Affairs 64, no.1 (1988): 188-198.} John M. Hobson’s structurationist theory, Michael Mann’s polymorphous state,\footnote{Stephen Hobden, International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries (New York: Routledge, 2006), 122-124.} and last but not least, Joel S. Migdal’s state-in-society approach.\footnote{Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).} In this way, Neo-Weberian studies propose an analysis of social realities by refining the abovementioned weaknesses, and they privilege the structuration method to avoid the actor-led and structure-led trap by capturing the complex dynamics of international relations.\footnote{For detailed info on the leading arguments of the historical-social return in IR, see Thierry Laponinte and Frederick Guillaume Dufour, “Assessing the Historical Turn in IR: An Anatomy of Second Wave Historical Sociology,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no.1 (2011): 97-121; Steve Smith, “Historical Sociology and International Relations Theory,” In Historical Sociology of International Relations, eds. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 229-232. Karim Knio, “Structure, Agency and Hezbollah: A Morphogenetic View,” Third World Quarterly 34, no.5 (2013): 862. Mulaj, “Violent Non-State Actors,” 8; James Worrall, “Reading Booth in Beirut: Is Hizbollah an Emancipatory Actor”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no.3 (2013): 235-254; Knio, “Structure, Agency and Hezbollah,” 856-872. Benjamin De Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John M. Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths that Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no.3 (2011): 5-10; Stephen Hobden, “Historical Sociology: back to the future of international relations?;” In Historical Sociology of International Relations, eds. Stephen Hobden}
Lebanon and the wider regional context would not only be possible, but an interesting effort as well.

To start with its brief background, Hezbollah evolved over time as an adaptive actor within the stratified structural mechanisms. Emerging initially as a local actor in 1985 with its so-called political manifesto, that is ‘An Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World (Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah ila-l-Mustad’afin fi Lubnan wa-l-Alam),’ Hezbollah adopted Islamist revisionism against both local and regional dynamics. Before its official foundation, it already structured its organizational and ideological basis as a result of intensive consultation with its regional “patrons,” Syria and Iran. The implications of this consultation were deeply reflected in the formation of the “Document of the Nine” towards the end of the 1970s and became the principles of the subsequent open letter. Afterwards, it initially rose to be the unchallenged actor in Shia populated areas by combining most Shia factions. Then, following the end of the Cold War, it embarked on the Lebanonization process, which allowed Hezbollah to shape general Lebanese politics as well given its historical decision to join the Lebanese elections. During its brief journey as such, Hezbollah always attempted at reading both local and regional structural dynamics and modified its policies and “resistance discourse” in line with these dynamics. Its staunch resistance to Israel and position as protectorate of Palestinian rights, as well as its rejection of the sectarian system in Lebanon, increased sympathy for this actor in Shia populations and Lebanon as a whole. After the end of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, this sympathy and support for Hezbollah reached its peak, and Hezbollah’s standing military capability has been less questioned since then. Indeed, Hezbollah already preserved its privileged position in the Ta’if agreement in 1989 by exempting itself from the disarmament of all Lebanese militias. On the other hand, this peak in 2006 also reinforced its status as the new power center in Lebanon and its evolution into a status-quo actor. Later, Hezbollah consolidated its hegemonic position with the May 2008 Doha agreement, which gave the opposition critical leverage over the successive Lebanese cabinets. By considering these changes in the region and domestic politics, Hezbollah declared its second political manifesto in 2009, which again revealed its adaptive posture pursuant to contextual mechanisms. Since then, moderating even its discourse based on the new realities, Hezbollah became the “king-maker” on the determination of Lebanese cabinets and upgraded its power with its effective outreach to non-Shia political players in Lebanon, which resulted in its direct impact on the elections of the Lebanese presidency as well.
3.2. Structural Realms

This brief history until the Arab uprisings proves Hezbollah’s gradually growing agency within the state-society relations in Lebanon. Yet, the other aspect of a complete analysis using structuration theory is to look at the constraints and possibilities of structural realities. As underscored previously, the Neo-Weberian approach maintains that pre-determined structural realities initially dominate the fate and trajectory of all actors, and these actors may affect these realities over time as well. These stratified structural realities bring various obstacles and possibilities for the emergence and the subsequent influence of all players, including non-state forces.27 Considering these arguments, Lebanon, or the internal context and regional-international context, can be identified as over-arching mechanisms for the existence, advancement, and transformation of Hezbollah as an actor.

In terms of domestic context, Lebanon resembles a collapsed state that has been ravaged by long-term internal conflicts and regional interventions and that lacks administrative and coercive power. Therefore, unlike the realist premises on the inside-outside separation, there is always much interaction between Lebanese domestic politics and regional developments. As a matter of fact, regional events mostly determine the course of internal developments and the rise or fall of certain local groups in the Lebanese system. To illustrate, with the impact of French colonialism between 1920 and 1943, Maronite groups, as Catholic Christians, controlled central state mechanisms in Lebanon in contrast with the supremacy of Muslim groups during the Ottoman period. And later, during the Cold War, there emerged some powerful leftist and Arab Socialist groups in Lebanon, threatening the regime as a result of a pro-Nasser regional environment.28 Turning back to state-society relations, which constitutes another main aspect of Neo-Weberian approaches, Lebanon’s constitution and state structure is based on a consociational (sectarian) democracy,29 which institutionalizes an anarchic system by granting an autonomous position to the sectarian groups.30 There are indeed different definitions, like failed state, collapsed state, or no-state reality, to explicate the anarchic nature of the internal system in Lebanon. Accordingly, the non-state challenge becomes the regular reality of Lebanese politics that validates Migdal’s following opinions on state-society relations: “neither state nor any other social force has established an overarching hegemony; domination by any one social force takes place within an arena or even across a limited number of arenas but does not encompass the society as a whole.”31 Therefore, Lebanon can hardly be identified as a unitary, homogenous, or modern territorial state with

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29 Arend Lijphart improved this approach to make sense of the power-sharing mechanisms between the demographically powerful groups in divided societies and to offer alternative, albeit fragile democracy. For the details of this theory and the problems with its usage in Lebanon, see Arend Lijphart, “Consociational democracy,” World Politics 21, no.2 (1969): 207-225; Richard Hrair Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon,” Comparative Politics 10, no.2 (1978): 251-265.
31 Migdal, State in Society, 129.
its anarchic nature where non-state forces are very active and powerful.

In such an environment, some territories of Lebanon are almost linked with certain sectarian actors. To illustrate, the South is led by Shia groups while the North is dominated by Sunni communities, with the mountainous region being historically shaped by Druze and Maronite groups. In other words, geographical, sectarian, and even family-based divisions overlap in Lebanon, which further obstructs the territorial integrity and the reconciliation of the required symbols for the constitution of a modern state-society structure. Accordingly, this “anarchic condition” leads autonomous sectarian actors to safeguard their own spatial-territorial power and to use the state as the legitimate mechanism to enhance their capabilities. What is worse, these groups perceive the state as simply a distributive mechanism through which they allocate required resources to their affiliates. In this way, each autonomous actor intends to build state-like socio-political, economic, and military mechanisms in their alleged territories and to mobilize the people via different symbols.32

Hezbollah emerged in this domestic environment as the last and the most powerful Shia organization. From the beginning, the Lebanese state was shared between the sectarian groups, involving Shia groups as well. Yet, unlike the Sunni and Maronite groups, this French-imposed confessional anarchy subordinated Shia and Druze communities in Lebanon, which generated pervasive resentment among these groups. Accordingly, both Druze and Shia groups adopted a revisionist position against the existing local balance of power in Lebanon, thus backing revolutionary ideas like nationalism and socialism. With the rise of Islamist revisionism towards the 1960s and 1970s, Shia groups rediscovered Islamism as the basic ideational force to challenge the sectarian nature of the Lebanese state and the subordinate position of the Shia groups in this system. Specifically, the groups like the Amal Movement (Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah), which was a military wing of the Deprived Movement (Harakat al-Mahrumin-1974) were founded in 1970s, and they initially mobilized Islamist revisionism. Following the turbulent period in which the anarchical environment further crystallized with the intertwined internal clashes and foreign interventions between 1975 and 1989, Hezbollah rose as a new Islamist non-state actor. It benefited from and further pushed the Islamization of Shia groups in Lebanon and was galvanized by the emergence of the Islamist regime in Iran in 1979. In other words, Hezbollah thrived in its fertile internal realm, which eventually advanced its non-state actorhood.33

In addition to domestic context, external context may shape state-society relations, and this manifests the intensive interaction between the inside and the outside. This interaction has occasionally been observed in the radical changes in Lebanese internal politics.34 Mostly with regard to war and revolution-based events, the regional (external) context alters not only the power equilibrium in Lebanon’s domestic politics between sectarian groups, but also its socio-economic patterns. Of great importance among these external dynamics are the Israeli invasion (1982-2000), the Islamist (Shia) revolution in Iran in 1979, and finally, the Syrian internal war.35 In this context, in addition to leading realist factors like wars and conflicts, as

33 Saad-Ghorayeb, “Emergence of Hizbullah.”
35 As Saouli stated, “The more intense the regional conflict, the more unstable Lebanon has tended to become, and vice-versa.” See Adham Saouli, “Stability Under Late State Formation: The Case of Lebanon,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 705; Saad-Ghorayeb, “Emergence of Hizbullah”; F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf
eventuated in the impacts of Israel’s long-term occupation in Lebanese internal dynamics, regional revolutions affect the distribution of power and the rise or fall of several local actors in Lebanon. Some scholars have further claimed that Israel’s invasion and its unconditional support for the brutal attacks of several Christian-Maronite groups like South Lebanese Army (SLA) were the basic regional impetus for the emergence of new resistance mobilization under Hezbollah’s leadership. Israel used these groups as proxies and even collaborated with them in several massacres against Palestinian-populated camps in Sabra and Shatila in 1982. Therefore, it was not only domestic conflicts between different local actors, but also the invasion and involvement of the regional actors that reconfigured the local dynamics in Lebanon.36

Unlike the wars, the impact of the revolutions on the reformulation of the other countries’ domestic politics was less investigated. In fact, in addition to the impacts of the revolutions on the course of international relations, these events brought new constraints and opportunities to the regional actors, including local players as well. The regional implications of the Nasser-led revolutionary discourse and its reflections on the domestic relations of the individual countries in the region has been studied sufficiently for the most part. Nasser-backed pro-Arab and leftist groups in the region and several Shia groups were emboldened by the increasing regional role of Nasser during this term to challenge the power equilibrium in Lebanon. There was even such a pervasive proverb as Shi‘i Shuyu (a Shia a Communist) manifesting the widespread impact of Arab Socialist revisionism among Shia-populated areas. Not only Shia groups, but also Druze organizations were attracted by the Arab Socialist revision as they felt similarly marginalized in Lebanon.37 As for Hezbollah’s case, the Iranian revolution deserves much attention as one of the main external stimuli behind the emergence and the rising power of Hezbollah. The Iranian revolution challenged Western-backed countries in the region as this revolution adopted anti-Western and anti-Israel discourse. This revisionism also bolstered some local actors, like Hezbollah, in the region, which intended to establish an Iran-like system in their own countries.38 Even before the eruption of the Islamist regime in Iran, some pro-Khomeini groups were very active in Lebanon and had intensive collaborations with Islamist actors in Lebanon, firstly with the Amal Movement and its Iranian-born leader, Musa al-Sadr, and then with other Islamist actors, which finally signaled the embodiment of Hezbollah as a new umbrella organization. The Iranian revolution and previous contacts between pro-revolution groups and Islamist actors in Lebanon completely shaped Hezbollah’s ideational, organizational, and political realities, which proved the transformative impact of the external context and, more importantly, the revolutions on the emergence of non-state forces.39

Another apparent example of the transformative impact of the revolutions was the Arab uprisings, which engulfed the region for several years and shook the internal-external dynamics, including Lebanese politics. With this process, local actors in Lebanon modified

their discourses and strategies to enhance their internal status. This change became further visible with another wave of Arab revolutions, the Syrian internal war being an example. As a matter of fact, the local actors adopted a “dissociation policy” with the Baabda Declaration in 2011 to avoid the destructive impact of the Syrian events, which indicated their awareness in regard to the greater interaction between state-society relations and the regional realm. However, Hezbollah-allied actors sided with the Bashar Assad regime, and the anti-Hezbollah axis in Lebanon backed the Syrian opposition, thus deepening the political crisis and bipolarization in Lebanon. This two-bloc politics, which indeed dominated Lebanese dynamics since the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, further sharpened in the earlier periods of the Syrian internal war.

Accordingly, there emerged unstable cabinets as a result of serious conflicts between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian Lebanese groups, and the Lebanese parliament failed to elect a new president until 2016. In other words, the Arab uprisings and Syrian internal war became the external factors shaping Lebanese internal dynamics for some time, despite the fact that this country still did not fall into complete internal war, probably owing to the Lebanese people’s vivid and embedded memory of the realities of internal war. Indeed, Hezbollah’s transformation into a hegemonic non-state force in Lebanon and sub-regional power again followed the changing dynamics of the Syrian internal war. That means that with the clarification of the resilience of the Assad regime and its consolidation of power, Hezbollah compensated for its earlier losses and translated this shifting external context into several local gains. These empirical details on the Arab revolutions and the Syrian internal war, along with their impacts on the actorhood of Hezbollah, once more underscore the intensive interaction between the actors and the external mechanisms, which proves our theoretical argument on the thicker interaction between inside and outside developments. In other words, initially, Iran’s revolutionary outreach to Lebanon and Israel’s previous invasion, along with its lasting military assaults on Lebanon, shaped the state-society relations in Lebanon and political-military positions of Lebanese sectarian actors. More recently, the transformative impacts of the Arab Revolutions and, in part, the Syrian internal war were also observed over the shifting domestic preferences. As a result of this interaction between outside and inside dynamics, Hezbollah became a “state-like” actor and even a “regional sub-power” by shaping Lebanon’s policies and forging different “foreign relations.” Therefore, starting its journey by dint of the pre-existing structural conditions, Hezbollah proved its actorhood over time and, thus, increasingly responded to and affected these conditions as well.

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4. Proving Agency: Hezbollah in Internal and External Affairs

Structural mechanisms in the internal and external contexts present both opportunities and constraints for each actor, identified by Hobson as ‘realms of opportunity’ and ‘realms of constraints.’\(^{44}\) Actors, in return, read these structural stimuli and adjust their policies pursuant to them, which indicates their adaptive character and dynamic evolution in the social-historical process. Hezbollah is one of the critical actors that utilize structural possibilities as a way to reinforce their actorhood.\(^ {45}\) This idea is better captured by structuration theory. Hezbollah, which is itself the result of the intersection of multi-faceted structural patterns, seems to modify itself in accordance with the shifting external and internal dynamics. Besides that, it affects these dynamics, which eventually brings the transformation and evolution of both ontological realities during the process.

To begin with, the Arab uprisings, as a new regional/external dynamic, urged Hezbollah to revise both its earlier political-military goals and discursive strategies. Hezbollah backed the initial waves of Arab uprisings with both new discursive and political-military strategies to weaken West-backed regimes. Therefore, it extended its foreign policy understanding from merely the Israel-Palestine conflict to the entire region by adapting allegedly revisionist policies. In this way, it largely allied with opposition groups that stood against the Western-backed regimes, such as those in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain and Yemen, by stating that “your Spring has begun; no one can lead you to another winter.”\(^ {46}\) Hezbollah claimed that this new shift in its discourse was in line with its long-held revisionist and revolutionary position as it stood by the “oppressed (mustazafin)” communities in the region. In this discourse, Hezbollah always positioned itself within the camp of “oppressed” groups to defy the local and the regional “oppressors (mustakberin),” which is the indication of its Karbala Narrative based on the oppressed and oppressor dichotomy.\(^ {47}\) In this sense, the external context initially played “a realm of opportunity” for Hezbollah to assert itself as a regional actor and to consolidate its character of resistance in local politics.

In line with these political adjustments, Hezbollah’s discursive strategies shifted as well. While the Israel-USA alliance regionally and their allies in Lebanon locally were previously regarded as the major oppressors, this was partially modified with the Arab uprisings, which clarified the impact of the regional context on Hezbollah’s discursive orientation and the context-based nature of its resistance discourse. In this manner, Hezbollah used this discourse to motivate several popular movements in the larger region, including North African countries. Yet, the radical change in this discourse came with the Syrian internal war, where this time, Hezbollah allied with an “oppressor” and intended to legitimize its policies again with resistance discourse. In that event, this discourse adopted more status-quo policies and served the interests of the embattled Assad regime, which refused similar reform calls raised all over the region.\(^ {48}\)

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\(^ {48}\) For detailed information on Hezbollah’s changing political priorities and discursive strategies during the Arab uprisings and Syrian internal war, see Mustafa Yetim and Rıdvan Kalaycı, “Tracing the Political Origins of The Hezbollah’s Resistance Discourse: From Revisionism to Status Quo,” *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 16, no.2 (2022): 209-224.
Hezbollah’s unwavering commitment to the survival of the Assad regime and the adjustment of its resistance discourse with the new regional environment can even be linked to the earlier structural factors that enabled its emergence and shaped the subsequent journey of Hezbollah. From the beginning, Hezbollah became the key non-state actor of the “Axis of Resistance (Jabhat al-Muqawama),” which consisted of Iran, Syria, and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas/Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya). The Palestinian Islamist faction and only Sunni actor in the axis of resistance, Hamas, temporarily left this bloc following the Syrian internal conflicts, but afterwards, the relations were put on a similar track with the emergent regional dynamics such that the Assad regime managed to sustain its resilience. Therefore, the survival of this anti-Western and anti-Israel regional bloc can indeed be seen as much more important than Hezbollah’s local position, as Hezbollah considers the survival of this bloc existential to sustaining its resilient status in local politics. Thus, when the Assad regime was threatened, Iran and Hezbollah perceived the possible collapse of this regime as a major concern as Syria geographically links Hezbollah to Iran via its strategic position. This time, regional dynamics played a constraint role on the preferences of Hezbollah, and Hezbollah felt it necessary to get involved in the Syrian quagmire, even to the detriment of its local status and purposes. This was a radical rupture in terms of Hezbollah’s traditional position as it now became obvious that Syria-based concerns were more central than its alleged concentration only on the “Eternal Enemy, Rapist Entity,” that is “oppressor” Israel. Thus, its pro-Palestine (oppressed) ideological stance and the related non-sectarian and pro-oppressed discursive aspects evolved in the face of perceptual threats from Syria.

After the Assad regime, with support from its allies (Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah), regained its power in Syria, Hezbollah started to announce the end of the Syrian internal war and focus more on local politics, particularly since 2016. With this new regional dynamic, Hezbollah turned into a hegemonic local actor, as it already proved its regional capacity with its successful advance and its militia groups standing inside Syrian territories, which removed geographical barriers between Iran and Hezbollah. Thus, in response to the contextual changes throughout the region, Hezbollah, along with its allies, attempted to change the regional environment as an actor in its favor, which is another manifestation of the dialogue between actors and structural realities, as well as evolving agency.

In addition to the impacts of regional events on Hezbollah’s preferences, these events determined the local strategies of Hezbollah and its relations with other local actors. This empirical reality once more highlighted the mutual interaction between the outside and the inside, the complex and dynamic relations between the actors and the structures, as well as the reciprocal transformation of both ontological realities. While externally aligning with Syria and Iran, Hezbollah defended them internally by preventing any local decision to weaken the Assad regime and allying with local actors that would not bring into question the Iran-Assad alliance. This caused a new escalation in Lebanon between the Hezbollah-led alliance involving the Nabih Barri-led Amal Party and the Michael Aoun-led Free Patriotism

Party, and the anti-Hezbollah camp composed of the Saad Hariri-led Future Party, the Samir Geagea-led Lebanese Forces Party, and the Walid Jumblatt-led Progressive Socialist Party. Some clashes between pro-Assad groups and anti-Assad opposition groups were even observed in the northern parts of Lebanon. Accordingly, there emerged successive cabinet crises, government resignations, and systemic deadlock in Lebanon, which fanned the flames of political polarization.

In this way, Lebanese politics resembled the Cold War reality, and two blocs dominated Lebanon’s political affairs for some time. This meant that regional events not only impacted the policies of Hezbollah as an actor, but they also reconfigured the complete internal politics in Lebanon. In other words, while the initial Arab uprisings did not radically trigger the chaotic situation in Lebanon, the events in Syria complicated Lebanon’s already fragile environment. Hezbollah unconditionally supported the regime by getting deeply involved in the Syrian conundrum, while other anti-Hezbollah groups refused any compromise with the pro-Assad position. Accordingly, Hezbollah intended to legitimize its pro-Assad position by claiming that the elimination of the DAESH-led “Takfiri” terrorists should be the most urgent issue of the “resistance,” as they insult the Shia Shrines like Sayyida Zeinab and threaten the existence of Shia groups in Syria. This signaled the shift in Hezbollah’s discourse, and the group was criticized for advancing a regionally sectarian and oppressive position with its rising emphasis on Shia symbols and solidarity with the Assad regime. Besides this, Hezbollah considered the pro-reform Syrian protests as a Western-backed conspiracy by reversing its initial pro-revisionist support for the popular demands made during the Arab uprisings.

Starting its journey as a revolutionary actor that challenged Lebanon’s confessional-sectarian structure and pledged the foundation of an Islamist system instead, over time, Hezbollah turned into a principal status-quo actor. This can indeed be a brief story of the evolution of any actor as a result of its interaction with contextual realities, and Hezbollah is no exception to this general argument. Hence, it did not transform the essence of the state structure (sectarian anarchy), it merely altered the balance of power in its favor. Especially with its political-military achievements in Syria, Hezbollah rose to become the hegemonic force in Lebanon. To illustrate, Hezbollah played a certain role in the election of Michael Aoun, Leader of the Patriotic Movement party, as Lebanese President in 2016 following more than two years of stalemate in the election of a new president. And it has also been one of the leading actors in determining the foundation of most cabinets since the 2010s. In this way, rapidly overcoming the earlier surprise that the Syrian internal war caused, Hezbollah consolidated its local power as well via its new achievements in Syria.

Hezbollah’s dominance and its hegemonic position in Lebanon’s political system were further observed during the “WhatsApp Intifada” protests in Lebanon, which started in October 2019 and demanded radical reforms in the sectarian system and “real democracy” in Lebanon. During this event, both the shift of resistance discourse again towards status-quo strategies and the determinant impact of Hezbollah on local politics became further

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51 Yetim, “Post-Election Dynamics in Lebanon.”
noticeable. During this process, in contrast to its previous revisionist position against the sectarian structure, Hezbollah accused protestors of having linkages with “foreign countries” and intended to intimidate pro-reform groups, thus radically adopting a status-quo position. Most protestors targeted not only the traditional powers controlling the system, they also severely criticized Hezbollah by yelling, “All of them means all of them (kullun yaani kullun).” In other words, large communities in Lebanon began to consider Hezbollah as another and much more powerful status-quo actor that controls the current system and presents a major obstacle to possible change. Some even identified the government as the “Hezbollah government” and Lebanon as “Hezbollah-land.” Therefore, perception and reality fostered each other regarding Hezbollah’s evolution from the once pro-aggrieved and “oppressed” position to its staunch commitment to the anarchical and sectarian system in Lebanon, which still harbors oppression and discrimination. Furthermore, it severely criticized the investigation of the Beirut Explosion, which took place on 4 August 2020 and caused massive destruction in Lebanon, revealing once more the dysfunctionality and abyss of the sectarian anarchy in Lebanon.

Not only in domestic affairs, but also in foreign relations, Hezbollah evolved into a “king-maker” as exemplified by the latest Israel-Lebanon maritime deal on the long-disputed maritime zones between the two countries, and its changing agency can also be observed in this realm. Hezbollah implicitly veiled its position by not resisting this deal and tried to legitimize its stance by claiming that this deal protected Lebanon’s rights. When considering that Hezbollah traditionally defined Israel not as a state but as an entity that should be destroyed, its evolution over time while responding to the contextual dynamics showed the complex interactions between the actors and the structural changes. Furthermore, Hezbollah regionally extended its foreign policy to several areas like Yemen and Iraq, where pro-Iranian groups have become more powerful recently as a consequence of the internal wars in these countries. Despite its partial reluctance concerning the excessive regional extension, Hezbollah collaborated with Iranian-backed Houthi groups in Yemen and Hashd al-Shaabi forces in Iraq, which enabled a geographical connection between the central power of the regional axis of resistance, Iran, and its regional non-state allies. This process also consolidated Hezbollah’s transition into a non-state regional actor, which is still one of the exceptional cases of exporting the Iranian system to the region. However, even though Hezbollah gained dominant local and critical regional actor status, there remain many local and regional challenges to its current position, which indicates the dynamic interaction between the structures and the actors.

5. Conclusion

In contrast to actor-led and structure-led approaches, some alternative approaches like the Neo-Weberian one underline the importance of the multiple-actor and multi-level reality of social relations and the intensive interactions between actors and structural dynamics. This argument, embodied in the structuration theory, brings new possibilities to understanding

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55 Hamid Dabashi, “Arab Spring exposes Nasrallah’s hypocrisy,” Al-Jazeera, June 22, 2011; Mersiha Gadzo, “All of them.”
56 Yetim, “Lebanese Protests via Bloc Politics.”
the journey of alternative actors like VNSAs as well. In this context, the impact of stratified structural realities on the emergence of such actors and the visible role of these realities on the success or failure of these actors over time constitutes one aspect of the romance of these actors. Another aspect is related to the agency of these actors, meaning their possible influence on the structural relations that initially enable these actors to emerge and gain power. These theoretical premises help us make sense of the emergence, transformation, and the recent actorhood of Hezbollah as a VNSA. Hezbollah emerged as a result of the certain structural dynamics consisting of internal and external mechanisms, presenting a case mostly adaptive to the shifting contextual realities as explained above via Neo-Weberian arguments.

In this context, the enduring domestic anarchy in Lebanon and the conflicted regional environment, along with several revolutions, have always impacted the socio-political dynamics in Lebanon. These structural dynamics shaped the emergence and the increasing actorhood of Hezbollah in the process. Locally, complicated internal wars between 1975 and 1989 further triggered the internal anarchy in Lebanon, and regionally, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, lasting until the 2000s, along with the Islamist revolution in Iran determined the fate of Hezbollah. Considering these structural changes as a “realm of possibility,” Hezbollah carved a state-like control over some territories in Lebanon like South Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley. In these areas, Hezbollah consolidated its military capacity and mobilized its economic instruments along with its ideological appeal based on the constitution of the resistance of society. After some time, it evolved into a dominant actor in the Shia community and led this community to challenge the existing state-society mechanisms in Lebanon.

Gaining more local power with its revisionist discourse challenging the Maronite-Sunni hegemonic and sectarian power-sharing model in Lebanon, Hezbollah further reinforced its internal autonomy over time and turned into a hegemonic force in Lebanon. Moreover, with the new dynamics unfolding as a consequence of the Arab uprisings and, in part, the events in Syria, Hezbollah utilized the new conflictual and revolution-prone regional environment to empower its regional actorhood. In this manner, proving its military power in the Syrian internal war and eliminating the geographical rupture between itself and Iran by locating its forces in Syria and enabling the Assad regime to defy the collapse, Hezbollah shaped the regional dynamics and the course of the Arab uprisings to the advantage of the resistance bloc.

Afterwards, Hezbollah used its now sub-regional power status to control the Lebanese system by altering the balance of power in Lebanon in favor of the once marginalized Shia groups. Possibly even in contrast to other sectarian actors, Hezbollah gained a stronger hierarchical and hegemonic position in Lebanon, as demonstrated in its reaction to the pro-reform and revisionist demands resonated all over Lebanon with the “WhatsApp Intifada” protests. Whereas Hezbollah was once a revisionist actor challenging the structural dynamics which enabled it to flourish, it has recently turned into a status quo actor that strives to repel any revisionist claim. In other words, the mutual interaction between structural realities and Hezbollah as a non-state actor transformed its actorhood along with its political purposes, discursive strategies, and military capability. In conclusion, as succinctly underlined by Neo-Weberian approaches, there is a continuous interaction between the actors and the structural dynamics, and both dynamics can affect each other in the process. The essence of this interaction can take different shapes over time, and VNSAs like Hezbollah can also have various impacts on the internal and external realities as elucidated in the mentioned empirical realities.
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Breaking the Stalemate in the Study of the Relationship of Mutual Military Buildups, Arms Races, and Militarized Disputes: The Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire Cases

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Abstract

The most recent surveys on the study of the connection between mutual military buildups, arms races, and military interstate disputes (MID) warn of research projects, especially in the case of the Greece-Turkey dyad, that have reached a stalemate. This is due to the difficulty of capturing motivations, which constitute the main variable that turns mutual military buildups into arms races. Using the Greece-Ottoman Empire and Greece-Turkey dyads as proof-of-concept cases, we advance a novel approach for analyzing the interrelation between mutual military buildups, arms races, and MIDs that can overcome that stalemate. We suggest a two-stage approach that focuses on the dyad as a unit of analysis. In the first stage, which we preset here, we use rivalry to divide dyad history into periods of differing subsistence military spending. We then locate periods of mutual military buildups in the different rivalry periods of a dyad history. We argue that this process provides a more nuanced and detailed grasp on the presence of mutual military buildups in a dyad. It also provides the foundation for the future second stage of analysis, where qualitative research can focus on the specific periods of mutual military buildups to unearth indicators of motivation.

Keywords: Rivalry, mutual military buildups, arms race, Greece-Turkey, Greece-Ottoman Empire

1. Introduction

The debate on the interaction of arms races and mutual military buildups with the onset of
militarized interstate disputes (MID) and their escalation to war seems to have reached a stalemate.² The use of strategic rivalry as a proxy for the motivations that transform mutual military buildups to arms races seems to have settled the task of capturing the relationship between these variables.³ And yet, it does not answer the question of how strategic rivalry transforms mutual military buildups to arms races. To assume that strategic rivalry denotes arms-race motivations in mutual military buildups would be to wield a brush too broad to permit us to advance the study of the relationship between arms races, mutual military buildups, militarized interstate disputes, and war. In this article, we use a case-focused analysis to present an alternative way to leverage rivalry analysis to locate mutual military buildups. Our method provides a richer picture of the distribution of mutual military buildups within the history of a dyad, one accounting for variation in rivalry intensity. This, in turn, can be a foundation for qualitative studies that can locate those mutual military buildups which are characterized by arms race motivations.

We use the Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire dyads as our case study. Rather than proxy motivation for arms races via strategic rivalry, we argue that rivalry levels, as conceptualized within the Peace Scale, can facilitate the capture of different levels of subsistence spending within a dyad.⁴ As we argue based on a review of the econometric Arms Race literature on the Greece-Turkey case, this is an important basic threshold to account for when looking for the above-average spending that might indicate arms races.⁵ Using military expenditures, military expenditures per capita of military personnel, and data based on the National Military Capability data set from Correlates of War, we calculate within each period of the dyad for each party the annual average rate of change.⁶ This way, we capture the variation in subsistence military spending as driven by variation in rivalry intensity. Then we locate increases in the rate of change that were above the rivalry period average. Where those overlap between the dyad members, we argue that we have a mutual military buildup. We then use that data to provide a descriptive analysis of the contemporaneity of militarized interstate dispute onset with periods of mutual military buildups in the Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire dyads.

The resulting data captures some cases of mutual military buildups missed in previous operationalizations. It also covers a much larger period of interest than previous research by including the 19th century (1828–1900). Our descriptive findings concerning the presence of periods of mutual military buildups largely agree with the existing literature, and we aim to advance the research on the subject by offering more precision and flexibility. That said, we argue that our method is but the start for the process of locating arms races. We argue that quantitative methods by themselves simply cannot differentiate those mutual military buildups that become arms races from those that do not. A review of the econometric literature on arms races in the Greece-Turkey case reveals the limits of such an endeavor. Instead, our

method provides a much more precise and rich foundation for qualitative work that will unearth the motivations that render statistical mutual military buildups into arms races.

Our argument is laid forth as follows. We first review the existing literature on mutual military buildups, arms races, and their associations with MIDs and war. We also review the econometric arms races literature on the Greece-Turkey dyad. We then discuss our use of the concept of rivalry, our operationalization of rivalry periods, and then our operationalization of mutual military buildups. We then present the descriptive analysis of the data and conclude with remarks on further research.

2. Arms Races, Military Buildups, and Militarized Interstate Disputes

One of the first definitions of arms races offered was by Samuel Huntington, who defined them as “a progressive, competitive peacetime increase in armaments by two states or coalitions of states resulting from conflicting purposes and mutual fears.” Huntington also made an original contribution to the literature by distinguishing arms races in the quantity from those in the quality of armaments. In addition, fundamental to the idea of arms races is their strategic character: arms races are purposeful and targeted.

A central debate in the research on the relationship between arms races and war onset exists between those scholars that argue that wars are the result of a process of deterrence failure and those that argue that they are the result of a process of conflict spiral. For the first group, arms races become a secondary variable within the process that leads to war, but do not cause war per se, which is instead driven by structural factors. The exception may be an association of arms races with preventive war motivations concerning the timing of war. It is in this role that arms races also concern the power-transition scholarly tradition. For the second group, any discussion of arms races became absorbed into debates about the offense/defense balance, a debate that has now lost a lot of its luster since no breakthrough has been made on the question of how to define a weapon system as defensive or offensive.

An important research strand has been the examination of the theoretical dimensions of the arms race phenomenon and its relationship with the outbreak of war from a historical standpoint. For instance, David Stevenson explored the competition in armaments procurement of six European Powers and how it inhibited the management of the crisis prior to the outbreak of the First World War. David Herrmann focused on the land armaments race during the same period and described how it made war a more probable outcome.
Joseph Maiolo examined the arms race among the great powers between 1931 and 1941 and explained how it contributed to the outbreak and the expansion of the Second World War. Finally, the collective volume *Arms Races in International Politics* re-examined the theoretical foundations of arms races studies through a primarily historical body of research that explored cases from around the globe from before 1914 until the post-Cold War period.

The difficulty of ascertaining arms race motivations in the study of international relations has meant that many scholars have opted to focus more on the observable elements of a potential arms race rather than on the unobservable motivations. This strand of research began with the work of Lewis Richardson. The advent of the Correlates of War data set permitted a new generation of scholars to work on arms races based on quantitative indicators, though initial studies were inconclusive. A central concept in this literature was the move from the idea of arms races to “mutual military buildups.” This was a result of the inability of quantitative methods to capture the motivation element of arms races.

The central difference between the concept of arms race and the concept of mutual military buildup is the confidence we have in the presence of strategic motivations. An arms race is a mutual military buildup that we know is driven by competitive strategic motivations between the two sides. If we do not know this, then all we can speak of is a quantitative mutual military buildup. Thus, the mutual military buildups we see among countries might not be driven by strategic concerns but may just be the result of coincidence. This is especially likely with cases of states with multiple opponents, or during periods of general increases in arms spending globally due either to major multiparty wars or to changes in military doctrine and technology.

The independence of the concept of mutual military buildups from motivations has made them the preferred tool for quantitative studies. This is especially the case in research conducted under the conflict-spiral model of war onset, where inadvertent war onset is possible. In this case, the pursuit of security by two states via arming leads to the exacerbation of the security dilemma and the rise of preventive war motivations among decision-makers due to psychological effects captured by stimulus-response theory. A fundamental element of these approaches is that mutual military buildups and the arms races they give rise to, can foster willingness for war independently of other factors that lead to war. Working within the Steps to War analytical framework, Vasquez and Senese found indicators that arms races in the pre-nuclear era had a strong independent influence on the escalation of militarized disputes (MID) to war.

The measurability of military buildups sparked a robust debate on their association with

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17 Correlates of War, https://correlatesofwar.org/
the onset of war. The conclusion was that without a theory that can clarify exactly when arms races have an independent influence on war onset, little traction could be gained on this research.\textsuperscript{22} That said, the work of Susan Sample provided important findings on the statistical association of arms races with war onset. First, among major powers, arms races are associated with war onset within the logic of the conflict spiral model of war, but only for the pre-1945 period.\textsuperscript{23} The later inclusion of minor powers largely reinforced her findings about the different association of arms races with war onset before and after 1945, but also found that, statistically, arms races between minor and major powers were unlikely to be associated with war onset.\textsuperscript{24}

The findings by Sample were a great contribution to the field but did not resolve the question of motivation. Indeed, we can criticize the existing literature of “jumping the gun” by treating mutual military buildups as the result of arms race motivations and seeking to proxy motivations via the presence of other conflict-fostering factors, or conditions that cause both arms races and war onset. The most important such factor used is interstate rivalry.\textsuperscript{25} In this approach, mutual military buildups do not lead to arms races that contribute to the onset of war. Instead, the transformation of mutual military buildups to arms races is an epiphenomenon of underlying conflictual conditions encapsulated in the concept of interstate rivalry.

This school of thought has located findings that arms races are highly associated with the onset of MIDs and war when they take place within a strategic rivalry.\textsuperscript{26} These findings address both the willingness element (rivalry) and the opportunity element (arms races) leading to war.\textsuperscript{27} The evolution of this research led to findings that arms races have a secondary but still important role in fostering war within rivalry.\textsuperscript{28} On the other hand, Sample found indicators that before 1946, mutual military buildups have an association with escalation of MIDs to war, independent from rivalry.\textsuperscript{29} Her work indicates that operationalization of rivalry and periodization between and within dyads are crucial elements in any explanation.

Further research found indicators that point to an interactive effect were rivalries are sometimes associated with mutual military buildups, but are not caused by them.\textsuperscript{30} That said, a major review of the field noted that there is a lack of theory about why arms races can lead to war and how arms races and rivalry might be associated, as well as a widespread


\textsuperscript{26} Gibler, Rider, and Hutchison, “Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles”.

\textsuperscript{27} Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson, \textit{Strategic Rivalries in World Politics}.

\textsuperscript{28} Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson, \textit{Strategic Rivalries in World Politics}.

\textsuperscript{29} Sample, “The Outcomes of Military Buildups: Minor States vs. Major Powers”.

lack of empirical testing of any articulated theories, such as stimulus-response theory.\textsuperscript{31} Furthermore, there has not been enough connection between the studies of what Huntington calls quantitative and qualitative arms races.

The general findings of the mutual military buildup literature already have established at least some statistical association between mutual military buildups and the escalation of MIDs to war. If one accepts that the presence of strategic rivalry resolves the issue of motivations, then a question arises regarding what extra insights are gained by bringing in qualitative research to clarify motivations. First, as we argue throughout the paper, we cannot rely on strategic rivalry as a proxy for motivations for arms races. Rivalry, instead, permits us to capture variations in subsistence spending. Second, motivations are paramount in the analysis of the path to war when using the conflict spiral framework. The dangers of arms races are that they feed into preventive war motivations, or lead decision-makers down the path of inadvertent war. Quantitative studies can provide the framework telling us where to look for motivations, but only qualitative studies can make the persuasive case of whether the mutual military buildups were motivated by dyadic strategic interaction, and how they impacted decision-making.

Let us give an example of this dynamic. The defeat of the Ottoman Navy by the Greek Navy in the First Balkan War was the direct motivation for an ambitious naval procurement program aimed at gaining two dreadnought battleships. The successful signing of contracts led to a crisis for Greek decision-makers. This led to two results, one that might be caught by quantitative analysis and one that would be hidden. The Greek government, in turn, also made its own orders. However, because the Greek dreadnoughts would arrive after the Ottoman ones, Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and Chief of the General Headquarters Staff Ioannis Metaxas began seriously exploring a preventive war option against the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{32} The only reason the war did not take place is because of the onset of the First World War, which saw the ready Ottoman dreadnoughts confiscated by the UK for its own fleet. Here we have a classical stimulus-response dynamic, where military procurement is driven by the activity of a rival, and in turn, that procurement leads to the rise of preventive war motivations. Quantitative analysis would only capture part of the story, missing the crucial preventive war motivations, which did not lead to war only due to random luck.

When it comes to the specific cases of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and Greece and Turkey, the existing quantitative research has produced different results concerning the existence of mutual military buildups. One set of scholars has located mutual military buildups preceding MIDs in the 1975–1978 period, which they consider possible candidates for being arms races.\textsuperscript{33} Another period of mutual military buildups in the 1934–1936 period is not considered a possible arms race. On the other hand, others have not found any indicators of mutual military buildups in the whole history of the Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire dyad.\textsuperscript{34} A recent study focusing on the 1985–2020 period did argue that at least Turkish air incursions into Greek airspace, a form of MID, are driven by increased Turkish military

\textsuperscript{32} For a summary from both points of view see Zisis Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy 1910-1919 (New York: Routledge, 2005), and Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
\textsuperscript{33} Sample, “The Outcomes of Military Buildups”; Gibler, Rider, and Hutchison, “Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles”.
capabilities, positing some connection between military buildups, mutuality, and increased MID engagement.35

The suggestion that the Greek-Ottoman Empire dyad is relatively free of arms races, despite the four interstate wars, multiple MIDs, and some clear examples of qualitative arms races (the 1912–1914 dreadnought naval race), is surprising. This ambiguity in findings is also characteristic of a more robust econometric tradition studying the post-1950 Greek-Turkish relationship.

This tradition developed independently of the mutual military buildups debate, and neither literature cited the other. The most important review of the literature produced by the econometric tradition was conducted by Brauer, who reviewed a decade’s worth of work on the Greek-Turkish case based on Richardson’s Action-Reaction Model.36 Their review is not thorough, as it excludes the earlier foundational works by Antonakis and Majeski, which are partly reviewed by Avramides.37 Brauer concluded that the econometric literature exploring arms race dynamics since the 1950s–1960s had reached the point of diminishing returns, and any future breakthroughs would have to rest on enriching the political, strategic, and economic factors considered. Indicators of an arms race in the period starting from 1960 and going on to the mid-1980s are there, as well as further indicators that Greece was reacting to Turkish spending in that period, but that is all that has been found.38

We are not addressing this econometric arms race tradition in this paper. The reasons for that are that a) it is almost exclusively focused on the post-1960s period of the Greece-Turkey dyad, and b) there is little to add to the findings. As Brauer pointed out, that literature has reached the point of diminishing returns. Instead, our interest here is to take the concepts of mutual military buildups, and using the Greece-Ottoman Empire and Greece-Turkey dyad

36 Brauer, “Survey and Review of the Defense Economics Literature on Greece and Turkey: What Have We Learned?”; Richardson, Arms and Insecurity.
cases, propose a different way to locate mutual military buildups within varying conditions of interstate rivalry.

But there are key insights from that literature that we will also use in our approach in this paper. This includes the use of military expenditures per capita (of military personnel) as a proxy for spending on qualitative elements of military power, and the need to account for subsistence spending. Using per capita military expenditures is the tool the econometric literature used in order to capture qualitative spending in military forces, such as training or spending on command-and-control reform. While not a perfect measure, it is the one used by the literature. Subsistence spending is important because domestic factors other than international security concerns, as well as more general trends in military technology and technique, may lead to multiple states increasing their military expenditures at the same time for reasons other than potential security competition. The threshold is needed in order to help locate those mutual expenditure increases that may be driven by attempts to gain military advantages over other states and are thus more likely to lead to arms races.

From the mutual military buildups literature, we find the attempt to proxy arms race motivations in mutual military buildups via the concept of strategic rivalry a useful but problematic waypoint. We find it problematic because the way the concept of strategic rivalry is built can lead to extremely long periods of rivalry, as is the case in the Greek-Ottoman/Turkish cases. The lack in variation of motivation contrasted with the variation in the presence of mutual military buildups tends to weaken the motivational connection between strategic rivalry and escalation of mutual military buildups into arms races. We do accept that integrating rivalry into the exploration of the occurrence of mutual military buildups and their escalation to arms races is a key to moving forward in the study of the connection between arms races and onset of military conflict. We only suggest a different way of doing it.

In the next section, we discuss the concept of rivalry and how we use it in the Greece-Ottoman Empire and Greece-Turkey cases.

3. Rivalry as a Catalyst

The two dominant ways to operationalize interstate rivalry are the one pioneered by Goertz and Diehl, and the Strategic Rivalry concept pioneered by Thompson, Colaresi, and Rasler. The main difference in the two concepts is operationalization. The Goertz-Diehl concept is based on observed behavior, as well as the presence of factors that foster conflict in a relationship, including but not limited to frequent MIDs. The strength of the Goertz-Diehl concept is that it is a replicable measure. The main problem is that because occurrence of disputes is part of the operationalization process, this concept cannot be used to explain dispute occurrence, only escalation to war. The Strategic Rivalry concept, on the other hand, is based on qualitative estimations of perceptions of enmity among decision makers. The problem with this is that the operationalization process is not easily replicable. However, it does permit the evaluation of the relationship between rivalry and onset of disputes, not just wars.

40 Gibler, Rider, and Hutchison, “Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles”.
41 Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation.
The Goertz-Diehl concept received further progressive development, with the two concepts of interstate and strategic rivalry becoming integrated in the Peace Scale, the most up-to-date operationalization of the concepts. In the Peace Scale, the Goertz-Diehl conception of Rivalry falls within the category of Severe Rivalry, the most war-prone condition, while strategic rivalries are part of the concept of Lesser Rivalry. After that, there are the conditions of Negative Peace, Warm Peace, and Security Community. These conditions will facilitate the periodization of the present study and will provide good testing grounds for the effect of rivalry on mutual military buildups and arms races.

A prominent theme in both the qualitative and the quantitative literature of arms races is the study of specific countries during a particular timeframe. In a similar fashion, the present study focuses on the case of Greece and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey from 1828 until the present. Under the Goertz-Diehl concept of rivalry, the interstate history of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and then Turkey, was characterized by two periods of Severe Rivalry. Between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, this is the period 1866–1925. The period from 1925 to 1934 is categorized as a period of transformation in the relationship. The period from 1934 to 1957 is considered a period of Negative Peace. Then, from 1957 to the present, we again have a period of Severe Rivalry. Do note that the Peace Scale is coded for the 1900–2015 period. But prior work by Goertz and Diehl had noted a Severe Rivalry active between 1866 and 1925.

What about the period before 1866? Here, the concept of Strategic Rivalry provides an answer, which can be integrated into the Peace Scale. Again, two periods exist. From 1827 to 1930, there was a Strategic Rivalry between Greece and the Ottoman Empire/Early Turkish Republic, and then, between 1955 and today, there was one between Greece and Turkey. The strategic rivalry from 1955 to today is absorbed by the Severe Rivalry concept for the same period, but the earlier Strategic Rivalry nicely captures a reality of early Greek politics. The Ottoman Empire was seen as the foe, but until the Great Cretan Revolution of 1866–1869, willingness to pursue a military policy for this goal was absent or weak. We can thus separate the interstate period of Greek-Turkish relations as follows:


Table 1 - Periodization of 1830–2020 period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Short Narrative</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Rivalry</td>
<td>Formation of Greek State, popular Megali Idea, ambiguous stance of the state.</td>
<td>1830–1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Rivalry</td>
<td>The State embraces the Megali Idea, attempts to increase military power and then use of it to implement a territorial vision of Megali Idea.</td>
<td>1866–1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Rivalry</td>
<td>Retreat of the Megali Idea, focus on internal issues, new external threats (Italy)</td>
<td>1925–1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Peace</td>
<td>Focus on other external threats, internal issues, World War II, and the Cold War</td>
<td>1931–1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Rivalry</td>
<td>Cyprus Issue, Aegean and other Maritime Issues</td>
<td>1957 to today</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is thus a good deal of variation in the presence or absence of the rivalry condition within the case study that can provide good testing grounds for the effect of rivalry on mutual military buildups. This periodization also provides a natural control variable for the influence of rivalry on the onset of mutual military buildups, and the onset of arms races. We thus break from the post-1950 focus of most existing studies of the Greek-Turkish case. We do this because we are confident that the pre-1950 period could be a useful control period for dynamics of the post-1950 period. More importantly, the pre-1950 period, and especially the 1865–1924 Severe Rivalry and the 1925–1930 Lesser Rivalry, may not be independent from the 1954–present Severe Rivalry. Instead, we may be dealing with a case of an interrupted rivalry that started in 1828 and continues with interruptions.\(^{46}\)

4. Measuring Mutual Military Buildups

Our approach to locating mutual military buildups is based on the military expenditures and military personnel data within the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities data set.\(^{47}\) This is the military expenditure data used by the quantitative literature focusing on mutual military buildups. It is not used in the econometric literature on arms races. We use this for the following reasons: 1) we want to make sure that the method we are proposing here can be applied to dyads outside the Greece-Ottoman Empire/Turkey cases, and that the data covers many states in the interstate system; 2) the data covers the pre-1945 period and thus the whole period of interest for us. The coverage of Greece is fairly complete, and adequate for Turkey, while for the Ottoman Empire, there is information lacking for stretches of time during the 19\(^{th}\) century, but not to the point of rendering the data unusable.

Using that data, we built a data set with a county year unit of observation for Greece, Turkey, and the Ottoman Empire starting from 1828. The level of analysis is the Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Empire dyad. Using that data set, we then calculate the annual rate of change ($\frac{\text{(quantity of increase on t+1)}}{\text{(value of milexp in t)}} \times 100$) in military expenditures and military expenditures per capita (based on military personnel). These variables permit us to gauge periods of increase in military expenditures for each state. The next step is


\(^{47}\) Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965”.
to differentiate spending increases in subsistence spending from those likely to be part of conscious attempts to increase military capabilities.

To capture this, we mobilized the logic of rivalry. We argue that subsistence-level spending will vary depending on the underlying rivalry conditions, as the variation in the strength of enmity will impact the role that the presence of the other state plays in the minimum required military expenditures each state sets. It is not so much that rivalry intensity drives mutual military buildups as it is that rivalry intensity increases the threshold at which military expenditures are likely to trigger arms race motivations. One of the central effects of rivalry is normalizing a state of military emergency in the minds of decision-makers and the public such that it justifies increased military spending. The stimulus-response logic means that the reaction of the other side at some point will also be normalized. This means that in severe rivalry conditions, what counts as subsistence spending is much higher than under other conditions. This means the threshold at which military expenditures will spark mutual military buildups and potential arms races is also increased.

To control for this, we calculate the average rate of change in military expenditures or military expenditures per capita for each rivalry period. We then locate those years within each rivalry period that saw rates of change above the average for the rivalry period. We consider such years to be characterized by military expenditure increases above the norm, and perhaps indicating strategic arming in reaction to the decisions of potential opponents. The average rate of change per rivalry period for Greece and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey can be found in Table 2. The information is encouraging. For all states, the highest average rates of change in military expenditures are during either periods of Severe Rivalry, or during the period straddling the Second World War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rivalry Period</th>
<th>Average Rate of Change by Rivalry Period military expenditure per capita</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Rivalry 1828–1865</td>
<td>-0.40%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Rivalry 1866–1924</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Rivalry 1925–1930</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Peace 1931–1956</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-77%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Rivalry 1957–2016</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7.70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next step is to locate years of mutual military buildups. Comparing the years characterized by above-average positive rates of change between each dyad member, we build a variable that captures periods of mutual military buildups. We code periods in two versions. One version considers periods of mutual buildups in three-year sets. If the majority of years within each three-year set was characterized by above-average rates of changes for both states in the dyad, then we consider that three-year period to feature a mutual military buildup. This condition lasts until a subsequent three-year set in which the majority of the years is not characterized by above-average rates of increase for both sides. The other version follows the same exact logic, but with five-year period sets. The three- and five-year duration
of sets is not chosen on the basis of any theoretical or statistical reason, but to provide a range that should satisfy those who wish to avoid counting as mutual military buildups periods of preparation for war.

Finally, because not all readers will agree with our method in attempting to control for subsistence spending, we also code a version of the mutual military buildups variable that sees a period of mutual military buildup take place when there is an overlap of periods with continuously positive rates of increase “in general” for the two states, even if those rates of increase are not above the average in the rivalry period. “In general” means that most of the overlapping years were characterized by positive rate-of-change scores for both sides and come to an end when three consecutive years are not characterized so. We do not ascribe explanatory power to this variable, but still code it out of ideographic interest.

We are also interested in the temporal association between periods of mutual military buildups and MID onset. We take the years of MID onset from the Correlates of War MID data set. We then code the number of MIDs that began within the mutual military buildup periods in each rivalry period, and then how many began within the five-year period after the termination of a mutual military buildup period. The first variable permits us to see if mutual military buildups and MID onsets are contemporaneous, indicating a potential interactive association. The second variable permits us to gauge if MID onsets are more likely to follow periods of mutual military buildups, indicating a potential causative association.

Here we need to address the issue of multiple rivalries. Both Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and its successor, Turkey, faced other rivalries concurrent to their bilateral ones. In the case of Greece, especially important were rivalries with Bulgaria and Italy, while in the case of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, we have the looming threat of Russia and the USSR. This raised the issue of the effect of multiple rivalries on military expenditures. We argue that this effect is not relevant in this analysis. First, the issue of multiple rivalries becomes relevant at the point of analysis where we are trying to discern the motivation for increased military expenditures. As we have noted, the concept of mutual military buildup is agnostic to motivations. It may very well be that all rivals in a rivalry network increased their military expenditures at the same time, for example, during periods of a general crisis like the Great Eastern Crisis (1875–1885). But that does not negate that those are mutual military buildups for each specific dyad.

Ascertaining which rival the buildups were targeting is the job of qualitative studies that use our catalogue of mutual military buildups in order to explore motivations. Mutual military buildups in which we know there is strategic motivation against a specific rival are arms races. We are not seeking to, and indeed methodologically cannot, ascertain those here. Second, not all platform purchases are equally usable against all opponents. Thus, there is some element in all military buildups that is opponent-specific, though locating what part is for which foe is a task for qualitative research. At this point, all this means is that we are justified in focusing on the role of mutual military buildups between two specific rivals, even if there were also similar conditions at the same time with other rivals. For example, while Greece had a rivalry with both Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire in the 1908–1912 period, the Greek naval expenditures could not be fully used against Bulgaria. The Greek navy’s capital ships were only strategically useful against the Ottoman Empire.

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While we do not seek to test any explanatory hypothesis in this analysis, we do approach our descriptive analysis with some expectations derived from existing studies. First, there is the expectation that periods of mutual military buildups should be concentrated in periods of the dyad history that are characterized by Severe or Lesser Rivalry. If mutual military buildups are part of a realpolitik policy program in reaction to threats, we should expect them to take place in periods where conceptions of threat (as encapsulated by rivalry) are more salient. Second, we expect MID onsets to concentrate in periods of mutual military buildups. This comes from the Steps to War literature, in which militarized disputes and mutual military buildups have an interactive role in pushing rival dyads up the Steps to War. Thirdly, we should expect some MIDs to follow periods of mutual military buildups due to the literature on opportunity and willingness, as mutual military buildups permit the competing states to use military options that were not available previously. This expectation does not clash with our second one. The same phenomenon may have a constitutive influence on factors that explain subsequent manifestations.

4.1. Taking stock of the data

We present the distribution of the data in Tables 3 through 5. Intercoder reliability was 95%. In Table 3, we focus on the contemporaneity of periods of mutual military buildups in each rivalry period, based on military expenditures per capita, with the onset of MIDs. We also explore whether periods of mutual military buildups tend to be followed by MID onsets within five years of their end. In Table 4, we explore the same exact relationships, but with data based on military expenditures. Finally, in Table 5, we do the same, but based on data that includes periods of continuous increases “in general.”

The findings raise interesting questions about our understanding of the role of mutual military buildups, rivalry, and militarized dispute onset, at least for the Greece-Turkey and Greece-Ottoman dyads. In all three tables, the data for the Lesser Rivalry period of 1828–1865 indicate that none of the three MIDs of that period took place during the single period of mutual military buildup. On the other hand, one MID did begin within five years of the end of that mutual military buildup period. This was the inaugural military dispute of the Severe Rivalry period of 1866–1924.

It is also interesting that the mutual military buildup (based on all three versions of the data used) during the 1828–1865 rivalry period began almost right after the 1854 Militarized Dispute. We can hypothesize that the 1854 militarized dispute, and indeed the general Crimean War crisis, led both states to increase military expenditures, which may have played a role in the inauguration of the severe rivalry period beginning with the Cretan Crisis of 1866–1868. In other words, perhaps the mutual military buildup played a role as an additional factor not so much in the eruption of any specific MID after 1865, but of the escalation of the rivalry from Lesser to Severe. From a qualitative point of view, there is no question that what was seen as a humiliation in the 1854 crisis led to serious efforts to strengthen the Greek Navy, which in turn facilitated a more active role for Greece in the Great Cretan Revolt of 1866–1868.

The data on the Severe Rivalry period of 1866–1924 challenges the expectations of the literature on the relationship between mutual military buildups, rivalry, and militarized dispute onset. This is the rivalry period associated with three interstate wars between the Ottoman Empire and Greece (1897, 1912, 1919) and the bulk of MIDs (14 out of 18 MIDs)
before the 1930 Ankara Accords that *de jure* ended a 100-year period of rivalry and conflict. Using the data based on above-average rates of change in military expenditures, there is only one period of a possible mutual military buildup (1910–1913). That one period does see the onset of the 1912 First Balkan War during its duration, and is quickly followed by the 1914 Aegean Islands Crisis. But those are only two of fourteen MIDs that took place in the 1866–1924 period. In other words, the majority of MIDs and wars that erupted between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece in the period of Severe Rivalry had no temporal association with mutual military buildups. Indeed, if we focus on above-average rates of change in military expenditures per capita, it is very hard to locate any mutual military buildups.

We can hazard an explanation for this. While the 1866–1924 period was the inflation of the Greece-Ottoman rivalry that had begun in 1828, it was also a period of both states facing multiple rivalries. The creation of Bulgaria posed a foe for both states, while the Ottomans had to also deal with the Russian Empire (a rivalry that would lead to wars in 1828, 1853, 1877, and 1914). Thus, the military expenditures of both states were reacting to potentially diverse external stimuli, which made it less likely that their periods of military buildup would coincide. Furthermore, this was also a period of economic instability for both states, with both Greece and the Ottoman Empire facing economic defaults, many times associated with periods of increased military expenditures. If we combine the multiple external stimuli, as well as the domestic economic instability, we can hint to an answer of why the Severe Rivalry period of the Ottoman-Greece dyad does not see the usual association of mutual military buildups with MID onset.

In Table 5, we present, only for informative purposes, the distribution of data when we relax our stipulation that mutual military buildups can only result from rates of increase in military expenditures (per capita or not) that are above the rivalry period’s average rate of increase. If we do this, then the 1866–1924 period is characterized by three clusters of periods of mutual military buildups, which account for 40–57% of all MID onsets in the period, with 30–50% of MIDs following them within five years of the end of mutual military buildup periods. While more in line with the narrative of rivalry, these findings are based on an ideographic operationalization that has no bearing on explanatory questions.

The de-escalation of the Severe Rivalry period of 1866–1924 after the Greek defeat in the Greek-Turkish War of 1919–1922 into a period of Lesser Rivalry between 1925 and 1930 saw only one MID. It also saw no periods of mutual military buildups if we use data based on above-average values. If we use data increasing “in general,” then there is a short period of mutual military buildups (either 1926–1927 or 1925–1926), which saw the onset of the only MID of the period. This makes sense as the period 1923–1927 saw a period of tension between the two states, both busy rebuilding their militaries, which came to an inflation point with the Pangalos Dictatorship of 1925–1926.49

The Ankara Accords of 1930 ushered a period of Negative Peace lasting from 1930 to 1956. No Greece-Turkey MIDs took place in this era, despite the presence of periods of mutual military buildups. In this case, we know those buildups were part of the broader European crisis leading to the Second World War and the early Cold War periods. These

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dynamics validate the argument that mutual military buildups, and perhaps arms races, outside of a context of rivalry will not be associated with increased tensions.\textsuperscript{50} It validates those schools of thought that argue that intentions are more important than capability as correlates of conflict.\textsuperscript{51}

The Cyprus issue gave rise to the current Severe Rivalry period in Greece-Turkey relations. Our data largely confirms existing findings on the presence of arms races or reciprocal armament. Depending on the operationalization of military expenditures per capita, 70–80\% of MIDs began during periods of mutual military buildups. Five of 28 total MIDs in the period began within five years of the termination of a period of mutual military buildups. Depending on the operationalization of military expenditures, about 50\% of MIDs in the period took place during mutual military buildups, and about 40\% began within the five-year period after the termination of mutual military buildup periods. The “in general” increase findings are similar. The majority of MIDs in the 1957–2016 Severe Rivalry Period began during periods of mutual military buildups (which cover most of the period). While which of these count as arms races is a question for subsequent qualitative analysis, our findings validate the existing literature that sees elements of arms racing in the post-1957 Greece-Turkey case.

### Table 3- Contemporaneity of MID Onsets and Periods of Mutual Military Buildups in Greece- Turkey/ Ottoman Empire dyads based on military expenditure per capita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rivalry Period (Total number of MIDs per Rivalry Period)</th>
<th>Mutual Military Buildups using military expenditures per capita (three year)</th>
<th>Number of MID onsets within period of mutual military buildups</th>
<th>Number of MID onsets in five-year period after period of mutual military buildups</th>
<th>Mutual Military Buildups using military expenditures per capita (five year)</th>
<th>Number of MID onsets within period of mutual military buildups</th>
<th>Number of MID onsets in five-year period after period of mutual military buildups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Rivalry 1828–1865 (3)</td>
<td>1855–1861</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1859–1863</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Rivalry 1866–1924 (14)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Rivalry 1925–1930 (1)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Peace 1931–1956 (0)</td>
<td>1933–1938</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1933–1938</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4 - Contemporaneity of MID Onsets and Periods of Mutual Military Buildups in Greece- Turkey/Ottoman Empire dyads based on military expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rivalry Period (Total number of MIDs per Rivalry Period)</th>
<th>Mutual Military Buildups using military expenditures (three year)</th>
<th>Number of MID onsets within period of mutual military buildups</th>
<th>Number of MID onsets in five-year period after period of mutual military buildups</th>
<th>Mutual Military Buildups using military expenditures (five year)</th>
<th>Number of MID onsets within period of mutual military buildups</th>
<th>Number of MID onsets in five-year period after period of mutual military buildups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Rivalry 1828–1865 (3)</td>
<td>1859–1861</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1859–1861</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Rivalry 1866–1924 (14)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1910–1913</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Rivalry 1925–1930 (1)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Peace 1931–1956 (0)</td>
<td>1938–1941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1938–1942</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusion

In this manuscript we suggested an alternative way to mobilize the concept of interstate rivalry in order to capture periods of mutual military buildups in a dyad. We use the Greece-Turkey and Greece-Ottoman Empire dyads as proof-of-concept examples. We use rivalry intensity, as captured by the Peace Scale in conjunction with military expenditure data from Correlates of War, to capture the variation in subsistence military spending. We argue that this will vary depending on the intensity of rivalry relations in a dyad. Unlike existing studies that use rivalry as proxy for motivations that turn mutual military buildups into arms races, we argue that large-n studies can only locate periods of mutual military buildups and will have to be supplemented by deep qualitative studies of such periods in order to ascertain arms
race motivations. Our method presents more nuanced information about periods of mutual military buildups.

Using our method, we locate periods of mutual military buildups in the Greece-Ottoman Empire/Turkey dyads from 1828 to 2014. We focus on both military expenditures and military expenditure per capita (of military personnel). Post-1945, our findings corroborate those of the largely econometric literature on a Greece-Turkey arms race. Our novel findings are about the pre-1945 period, which is understudied in the past literature on mutual military buildups. There, we find that depending on the way we capture military expenditures, more mutual military buildups took place in periods of Lesser Rivalry than Severe Rivalry. The case-specific explanation is that the period of Severe Rivalry in the Greece-Ottoman Empire dyad was also a period of multiple rivalries for both states, meaning multiple opponents acted as external stimuli for spending, making it less likely that the military increases of both states would overlap in time. That said, the more interesting findings arise when we overlay the onset of dyad militarized disputes over periods of mutual military buildups.

In the post-1945 period, most MIDs start in periods of mutual military buildups or in the five-year period after them. In the pre-1945 period, this association is not as strong, though still present. Instead, it seems that the presence of mutual military buildups is a factor that fosters the transition of Lesser Rivalry to Severe Rivalry. We posit that this is a potential role of mutual military buildups that the existing literature had not unearthed. Within Severe Rivalry, the effect of mutual military buildups might be muted due to the increased level of subsistence spending by both sides. What this means is that the rivalry condition makes mundane what before would have been extraordinary, as both states increase their military preparedness. Purchases that in the past might have triggered a crisis for decision-makers are now accepted as the price of rivalry. This means that the threshold for military procurement causing crisis conditions among decision-makers is higher. In a way, Severe Rivalry increases the threshold at which arms race motivations appear by normalizing a state of emergency.

Future research will move along the following paths. First, it is worth applying the methodology to other dyad cases. Second, within the Greece-Turkey and Greece-Ottoman Empire dyad cases, qualitative research can focus on the periods of mutual military buildups in order to discern which ones are arms races and which ones are not. All arms races are mutual military buildups, but not all mutual military buildups are arms races. It is qualitative research that can discern that. Third, the conduct of multivariate analysis to unearth causal patterns between mutual military buildups and MID onset. Fourth, exploring further the potential role of mutual military buildups in the transition of Lesser Rivalry to Severe Rivalry.

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The Greece-Turkey/Ottoman Cases on…

Sert, Deniz Ş., and Konstantinos Travlos. “Making a Case over Greco-Turkish Rivalry: Major Power Linkages and
Abstract

The end of the Cold War brought about new challenges and opportunities for Turkey in redesigning its foreign policy. The independence of the Central Asian countries, with which Turkey shares common cultural, historical, and linguistic features, prompted Turkey to rapidly adapt to the new environment in the post-Cold War world order. After three decades, Turkey’s engagement with the Central Asian republics has gradually increased and reached a level at which Turkey is capable of effectively combining its soft and hard power capabilities within regional parameters. This article critically analyzes 30 years of Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia with a focus on its regionalism and soft power elements. We argue that Central Asia has provided a unique opportunity for Turkey to reshape its foreign policy on regional terms by utilizing its soft power resources for the first time, the experience later serving as a model for other regions.

Keywords: Turkey, foreign policy, regionalism, soft power, Central Asia, post-Cold War

1. Introduction

Turkish foreign policymakers faced a series of challenges at the end of the Cold War. The unpredictability of the new period and the uncertainty about Turkey’s future role in global politics was a primary source of concern. More specifically, the fear that the collapse of the Soviet Union would diminish NATO’s position and the possible lessening of the strategic role that Turkey had played during the Cold War period were pressing issues. Since the foundation of the republic, Turkey had had a Western orientation in shaping its relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union posed a challenge to Turkey’s decades-long strategic-ally role for the West; it also introduced a new group of neighbors with which Turkey had to establish relationships.

The new period played a transformative role that led to Turkey’s pursuit of a new foreign policy path. The independence of the Central Asian states, having historical, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds in common with Turkey, stirred the emotions of Turkish nationalist...
groups and created domestic political pressure on Turkish leadership to have a more active role in the region.\(^1\) Furthermore, the region’s transformation occurred during an era of power shift in the Global East, as Gökay would call it, in which Turkey was poised to occupy an increasingly important role.\(^2\) This context presented political and economic opportunities for Turkey in the post-Cold War environment. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that Central Asia—and the broader post-Soviet geography—was now available for Turkish goods in a new market, evoking a broader economic role for Turkey in the region. In terms of foreign policy, the region also presented an opportunity for a new geopolitical role for Turkey after the Cold War. This new position could eliminate the risk of the country’s declining geopolitical importance and create dynamism in its relations with the rest of the world. To be successful, Turkey needed to improve the changing geopolitical setting and address domestic political demands while creating a foreign policy approach that could accommodate international realities.

Through an in-depth analysis of 30 years of Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia, we aim to trace the regionalism and soft power elements of Turkish foreign policy, mainly attributed to the Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments since 2002. We argue that, coupled with the global economic dynamics, this process started as early as 1991 with Turkey’s unique experience in Central Asia, which contributed to shaping its foreign policy within regional parameters and its ability to use soft power capabilities in other regions. For Turkey, the knowledge and skills acquired during the process have enabled the country to become a more vigorous, multi-regional actor, one capable of using various soft power instruments elsewhere. This article first reviews the scholarly debate on regionalism and soft power in Turkish foreign policy. It then focuses on Turkey’s endeavors in designing a foreign policy towards Central Asia from 1991 to 2002, concentrating on the initial discourse and practices of regionalism and soft power. Thirdly, it examines Turkey’s policies in Central Asia since 2002 with a focus on institutions and policies that clearly improved its regionalist perspective and soft power capabilities.

2. Regionalism and Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War led to a new wave of regionalism, with states feeling less limited by bipolar divisions and urgencies. Regionalism reemerged globally, and states tended to collaborate more to overcome regional problems.\(^3\) The US’s global hegemonic role and capabilities were under scrutiny in the post-Cold War environment.\(^4\) Around this time, Joseph Nye came up with the concept of soft power.\(^5\) Nye argued that “…the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. The factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in

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international power, while geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important.” Nye believes that soft or co-optive power is as important as hard power in terms of agenda-setting and the structuring of international politics since it can make states seem legitimate in others’ eyes. In addition, states that use soft power may encounter less resistance to their wishes. If a state’s culture and ideology are attractive and less threatening, other states may be more inclined to accept and follow.

For Nye, “The major elements of a country’s soft power include its culture (when it is pleasing to others), its values (when they are attractive and consistently practiced), and its policies (when they are seen as inclusive and legitimate).” The success of soft power rests on various factors, one of which is the government’s realization and utilization of soft power assets in a correct and acceptable manner. Utilization of soft power in foreign policy lies in a state’s ability to base its policies on contextual intelligence formed by diagnostic skills to understand its strengths and weaknesses. A combination of hard and soft power elements based on contextual intelligence is the basis for developing intelligent foreign policy strategies. According to Çevik, soft power resources and the knowledge of how to use them to one’s benefit are two different things. However, without the substantial backing of hard power, soft power alone cannot be or become an important asset. Karadağ, on the other hand, emphasized the role of military power, which is commonly defined as an element of hard power, as a potential tool of public diplomacy and soft power as well.

Turkish foreign policy practitioners were strongly influenced by these ideas as Turkey was in the process of defining its identity in the post-Cold War context. The new period provided challenges and opportunities because many of the newly-independent states were located in regions neighboring Turkey, and Turkey was compelled to design its foreign policy in regional terms. The Central Asian republics, which were previously part of the Soviet Union, were now states with which relations could be directly established without dealing with Moscow. As these states have common cultural, historical, and linguistic ties with Turkey, foreign policymakers started to envision Central Asia as a region with which Turkey could form strong, direct relationships utilizing these common ties (soft power resources).

Kaliber defines this period as the first regionalist phase of Turkish foreign policy. He argues that while regionalist thinking is attributed to the JDP foreign policy elites, this is indeed a process that had started much earlier. Bilgin and Bilgiç argue that the Turkish political elite of the 1990s, such as Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel, and İsmail Cem, are the primary architects of this regionalist vision. They also highlight that İsmail Cem, who served as a Foreign Minister from 1997–2002, created a new geographic imagination that placed Turkey at the center of regions such as Central Asia and the Middle East. Yeşiltas claims that Cem created a unique geopolitical discourse that emphasized Turkey’s cultural

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6 Ibid., 154.
8 Ibid., 161.
10 Nye, Jr., “Get Smart,” 162.
11 Ibid.
and civilizational identity in Eurasia, one which has elements from both the East and the West.16 All of these arguments suggest that when the JDP came to power in 2002, the idea about a new pivotal role for Turkey in diverse regions, a role that enabled it to use its soft power resources as assets, was already in place.

As of 2002, JDP elites advanced this image of Turkey with a more elaborate geopolitical discourse. Because he was a scholar of International Relations, the discussion was largely shaped by Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as a Foreign Minister (2009–2014) and Prime Minister (2014–2016). Turkey was depicted as a pivotal actor in a vast geography capable of utilizing its ample soft and hard power resources to provide peace and stability in various regions.17

The concept of soft power and Turkey’s utilization of its extensive soft power resources to become an effective actor in a regional context was a central theme in Davutoğlu’s new geopolitical discourse.18 It was during this period that the Turkish political elite often resorted to this concept to emphasize the transformation of Turkish foreign policy, often in binary opposition to the “old” foreign policy practices occurring before the JDP’s rule.19 Çevik argues that after the introduction of the soft power concept with regard to a more assertive foreign policy by the mid-2000s, it became a prominent one in popular discourse as well.20 Scholarly literature on the role of soft power in Turkish foreign policy also proliferated around this time.21

However, in the last decade or so, due to problems Turkey has encountered at the policy level in volatile neighboring regions, the limitations of Davutoğlu’s geopolitical discourse have become clear. This is partly due to Turkey’s overextension of its resources in a vast region and because of an overly ambitious discourse and agenda. Kutlay and Öniş argue that by returning to early JDP-era foreign policy practices, which had focused on soft power capabilities and the principle of non-interventionism and multilateral diplomacy, Turkey could still play an active regional and global role worthy of its resources.22 Central Asia is a region in which Turkey’s foreign policy followed a balanced, steady course of action. The country had learned the lessons of its overenthusiasm about and overstretching of its resources earlier on. In the following sections, we will discuss how this process evolved and matured to a level at which Turkey has become an important regional actor that skillfully uses its soft power resources.

3. Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Central Asia (1991–2002): Diagnosis of Capabilities and Limitations

Since the Republic of Turkey’s establishment, relations with the Turkic peoples of the Soviet

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17 Ibid., 673-674.
20 Çevik, “Reassessing Turkey’s,” 55.
22 Mustafa Kutlay and Ziya Öniş, “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Post-Western Order: Strategic Autonomy or New Forms of Dependence?” International Affairs 97, no.4 (2021): 1104.
Union had been shaped through and with Moscow. From 1988 onwards, Gorbachev’s policies enabled small-scale foreign relations with individual Socialist Republics. Turkey used this to establish relations with the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. A bilateral cooperation protocol to establish cooperation on science and education, press and publishing, tourism, radio and TV broadcasting, transportation, economic and trade relations, and in-service training, was signed with the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) during Turkish Minister of Culture Namık Kemal Zeybek’s visit on December 5th, 1990, is an example of this. On February 14th, 1991, another cooperation agreement was signed with the Kazakh SSR by the Ministries of Health. Yet, despite these initial contacts with the Turkic SSRs, Turkey was following a cautious policy to make it clear that it had no intention of harming relations with Moscow.

A further expansion of relations began with former Turkish President Özal’s March 1991 visit to the USSR, which began in Moscow and then continued to the SSRs of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. During his visits, a series of cooperation agreements were signed with the Soviet Union on friendship and cooperation in the realms of economy and trade, telecommunications, transportation, and broadcasting. Accompanied by a group of businessmen, Özal’s inclusion of Moscow and Kiev in his itinerary meant to reassure Moscow that Turkey did not intend to focus solely on the Turkic states. The visit was parallel to initial contacts established with the Central Asian states starting from 1988 onwards and did not represent an agenda change in terms of Turkish foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Central Asia was still considered within the framework of relations with Moscow, in line with the Treaty of Brotherhood signed between Lenin and Atatürk in 1921. From Turkey’s perspective, the changes the USSR was experiencing through Glasnost and Perestroika presented opportunities for further economic cooperation with Moscow, but Turkey preferred to maintain a careful distance from the internal problems that the Soviets were experiencing until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. In this regard, although pre-independence contacts could be considered signs of Turkish interest in the region, it is not possible to talk about Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia prior to the USSR’s demise.

After the dissolution, however, Turkey had to decide what kind of an approach to follow towards the region, especially towards the Turkic republics, which Turkey had historical, cultural, and linguistic affinities with. The declarations of independence of 15 countries in Turkey’s neighborhood, six of them having religious, ethnic, and cultural similarities with Turkey, were received with excitement, and considered to be quite promising in terms of new regional economic and political positioning. For the Turkish political elite and for the West, Turkey had an essential part to play in Eurasia in this unique geopolitical setting. For the West, a robust Turkish role was necessary in order to fill the power vacuum left behind after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and also to create a barrier against the expansion of radical

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25 Ibid., “Kafkasya ve Orta Asya ile İlişkiler.”
27 Ibid.
Islam and Iranian influence in the region. Besides, for the US, as the primary hegemonic power after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s role as a regional player in Central Asia was crucial for the protection of American geo-strategic interests in the region. In this context, Turkey emerged as a model of secular democracy for the newly-independent states of the region.

“The Turkish Model” was used by Catherine Lalumiere, the secretary-general of the Council of Europe in 1992, to define a post-Soviet path for these regional Muslim states. The term refers to Turkey as a Muslim state that is secular, pro-Western, in possession of a multi-party system, and that uses a free-market economic model. The idea of a “Turkish Model” had its own problems as well since it somehow caught Turkish foreign policymakers by surprise. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey was still a country struggling to complete its own economic and political transformation and hoping to attain the level of its Western counterparts. Despite not being a home-grown strategy, becoming a developmental model for newly-independent countries had its attraction and benefits. For Turkish foreign policymakers, the region presented an opportunity to establish a niche in the post-Cold War world. The collapse of the Soviet Union created new security threats emanating from the uncertainties regarding the path that newly-independent states would follow. As a long-standing and reliable member of NATO, Turkey had a strategic role to play in integrating the newly-independent Turkic states into the international community. This role would also contribute to Turkey’s international standing and lead to its emergence as an important regional player.

Similar to other members of the international community, the primary challenge for Turkish leadership during this period was a lack of information and understanding about the newly-independent states and what they required from various international actors, and most importantly from Turkey. In terms of Turkish foreign policymaking towards Central Asia, the initial years were turbulent since emotions, regional leadership aspirations, lack of a clear regional target, and limited capabilities characterized policy choices. On the one hand, the Turkish leadership had to establish a balance between the country’s historical foreign policy orientation, which followed a careful approach towards Turkic peoples living outside of Turkey, and the rising domestic nationalist hopes for a greater regional role towards a Turkic union. On the other hand, the Turkish leadership had to gain an upper hand in a competition of regional leadership played by countries like Iran in the absence of Russian dominance. In the wake of such urgency, Turkey tried to achieve quite a number of things on different fronts, and these were sometimes not thoroughly planned.

After the coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991, a special committee was established to assess Central Asia and the Caucasus. In September 1991, the committee went first to Azerbaijan and then to Central Asia to evaluate, firsthand, post-coup attempt developments in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The committee report indicated that regional leaders

30 Aydın, “Kafkasya ve Orta Asya.”
31 It should be noted that in terms of Turkish foreign policy-making, Azerbaijan has often been grouped with the Turkic republics of Central Asia, although it is not located in the region. This is because Azerbaijan has always had a unique place in Turkish foreign policy due to its closer historical, linguistic, and cultural ties with Turkey. Over the years, the relations between the two have grown exponentially in various fields, except for the crisis periods over negotiations on bilateral gas deals and Turkey’s rapprochement politics with Armenia in 2008-2010.
32 Ibid.; Gündoğdu and Güler, “Kazakistan’ın Bağmsızlığı.”
(except those in Kazakhstan, who did not declare independence at the time) were ready to establish diplomatic relations and cooperation with Turkey in the fields of economy and education. Following the declaration establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991, Turkey was the first to extend diplomatic recognition to all of the former Soviet Republics.

The reciprocal visits of Central Asian leaders to Turkey and that of Turkish leaders to Central Asia began even before the official extension of diplomatic recognition. They resulted in the signing of numerous bilateral agreements and statements of willingness to increase cooperation. In September 1991, the President of the Kazakh SSR, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was the first Central Asian leader to visit Turkey. In a statement to the press, he described the 21st century as the century of the Turks, one in which he wanted to benefit from Turkey’s experiences in the transition to a market economy. In his December 1991 visit to Turkey, the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, described Turkey as a model and as a big brother from whom he was willing to get support on economic, political, and cultural issues. As a result of the continued deepening of relations, by the end of the first year, following the independence of the Central Asian states, 1,170 Turkish delegations visited the region and more than 140 bilateral agreements had been signed.

In February 1992, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Çetin, visited Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, where multiple cooperation agreements were signed, including a visa waiver agreement. Çetin’s visit was then followed by the Turkish Prime Minister’s (Süleyman Demirel) visit to the region in 1992, which focused on cooperation in economic, educational (i.e., provision of scholarships for regional students), and transportation issues. During the visit, energy cooperation between Turkey and Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan occupied a large portion of Demirel’s agenda. As early as May 1992, the financial aid and credit promises of the Demirel leadership amounted to over 1.1 billion dollars, which was already a significant burden on the Turkish economy.

In order to regulate financial aid, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs went through a period of restructuring by establishing separate departments to deal with the affairs of the former Soviet Union; this was a strong indicator of its regionalist vision and about the unique place of Central Asia within it. In January 1992, a development aid organization, the Turkish International Cooperation Administration (TİKA), was established under the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its aim was to specifically address the developmental needs of the Turkic republics. Throughout the 1990s, 270 technical aid and development projects were developed under TİKA’s auspices towards Central Asia and the Caucasus. The financial and technical support transferred through TİKA constituted a crucial part of Turkey’s soft power policies in the region. Through this organization, Turkey gained the capacity to be an

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33 Mustafa Durmuş and Harun Yılmaz, “Son Yırmı Yılda Türkiye’nin Orta Asya’ya Yönelik Dış Politikası ve Bölgedeki Faaliyetleri [Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards Central Asia in the Last Twenty Years and Activities],” in Bağımsızlıkların Yirminci Yılında Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri Türk Dilli Halklar-Türkiye İle İlişkileri [Central Asian Republics in the Twentieth Year of Their Independence, Turkic Speaking Peoples-Relations with Turkey], ed. Ayşegül Aydıngün and Çiğdem Balım (Ankara, Turkey: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 2012), 492.
35 Aydn, “Türkiye’nin Orta Asya.”
37 Aydn, “Kafkasya ve Orta Asya.”
active donor country in the region. During the period of 1992–1996, Central Asia and the Caucasus were beneficiaries of 86.5% of the Turkish government’s official development aid budget. This declined to 40% between 1997 and 2003. During this period, the organization was restructured under the Prime Ministry, and its focus had then expanded to the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Another indicator of Turkey’s regionalist vision in its foreign policy towards Central Asia was the multilateral platform called the Summits of the Heads of Turkic Speaking States. The first meeting was held on October 30–31, 1992, in Ankara. Özal’s speech from the summit, which highlights close cooperation in various areas such as economics, energy, an integrated infrastructure system in transportation, telecommunications, banking, and joint discussions on issues that were internationally and regionally important, reveals the ambitious prospects of cooperation in the initial years.

However, while the Ankara Declaration signed at the end of the summit vaguely focused on the commitment of all parties to cooperate on matters of culture, education, language, security, economy, and legal issues, Turkey’s aim to boost ties through cooperation under Turkish leadership was not readily accepted by the other actors involved. This can be attributed to the Central Asian leaders’ not being completely comfortable with Turkey’s overtures for regional leadership in a big brother-type role. These new nations were struggling to consolidate their independence from a major power that had dominated them for almost a century. Still, eight additional summits were organized up until the 2009 Nakhchivan Summit, where the agreement establishing the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (renamed as the Organization of Turkic States in 2021) as a permanent international organization with headquarters in Istanbul was signed. The regular occurrence of these summits and the fact that these events eventually became an international organization is a clear sign of the institutionalization of relations based on collective interests and cooperation.

Starting from the mid-90s, Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia became visibly more pragmatic and realistic because of the country’s limited economic capabilities and Russian recovery of influence over the republics. Despite Turkey’s goodwill and generosity, its economic limitations in meeting the developmental needs of the Central Asian republics became apparent over time. The newly-formed countries were in dire need of financial and technical support for their state-building processes, and Turkey was falling short of meeting those expectations. Moreover, contrary to an initial promise of an active Turkish business involvement in the regional states’ economies, this soon proved to be unrealizable to the degree expected because, except for the energy resources of some, the republics did not have a rich export market or even goods that could lead to increased trade collaboration. As a result, in many instances, this was only a one-way product transfer from Turkey. Furthermore, the lack of necessary institutional frameworks that normally provide a competitive and secure business environment, as well as the presence of strong economic ties and relations inherited from the former Soviet system were considered limitations to business prospects by Turkish investors.

42 Aydın, “Kafkasya ve Orta Asya ile İlişkiler.”
44 Mert Bilgin, “Türkiye’nin İhracata Yönelik Politikalarında Avrasya’nın Önemi [The Importance of Eurasia in Turkey's
Despite the obstacles encountered during the early years, once Turkey established a more balanced approach towards the region, accommodating its soft power assets with its political, economic, and geopolitical realities, its foreign policy started to produce results that set the tone for its level-headed relations with the countries of the region, and this continues even now, in the present. What is more important with regard to the main argument of this article is that many of the soft power institutions and tools Turkey created in this period later served as a basis and a model for Turkish foreign policy in other geographical locales.

Based on common linguistic, historical, and religious heritage, Turkey developed various soft power instruments, enabling it to become a significant regional actor. One of the longest-lasting cultural initiatives has been the television broadcasting initiated by TRT (Turkish Radio and TV Corporation). TRT Avrasya (Eurasia) started broadcasting various programs targeting the Turkic world in 1992. TURKSOY was established in 1993, with Turkey’s initiative, as a multilateral international organization with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan as co-founding members. It has been working towards the protection of Turkic culture, art, language, and historical heritage, introducing these values, and transferring these and other concepts to future generations, while also increasing their exposure to the world. Such a relationship was not visible in relations with Tajikistan, who does not share similar cultural or linguistic characteristics with Turkey.

In the religious realm, Turkey has also cooperated closely with the Central Asian republics since the early 1990s. The Eurasian Religious Council is a product of these collaborative efforts. The institution was formed in 1994 to promote Turkey’s religious outreach into Central Asia, along with the Caucasus, Balkans, and Russia’s autonomous republics. Balcı defines the council’s purpose as wanting “to facilitate dialogue about the proper relationship between Islam and the state and the role of Islam in society.” Turkey’s Diyanet (The Presidency of Religious Affairs) has also been a key institution in reaching the Central Asian republics in a spiritual way. Together with the Diyanet Foundation, it has helped build and restore mosques, trained the new religious elite, and distributed religious publications originally printed in Turkey. Turkey’s influence via the Diyanet in Central Asia (and in other parts of the world) can be evaluated as an example of transnational Islam and forms a core element of Turkish political and cultural influence in the region. However, another form of cultural outreach even preceded religious networking in Turkey’s soft power approach to Central Asia.

Turkey’s educational policies towards the region can perhaps be evaluated as another major attempt to reflect its soft power with long-term goals. In this regard, the establishment of scholarships and the opening of schools and education centers can be listed as some of Turkey’s additional soft power assets in the region. A major initiative was the Great Student Exchange Program, which was developed by the Ministry of Education and started in the 1992–1993 academic year. The program aimed to distribute scholarships specifically to

47 Ibid.
49 Murat Özoğlu, Bekir Gür, and İpek Coşkun, Küresel Eğilimler Işığında Türkiye’de Uluslararası Öğrenciler [International
undergraduate and graduate students from Central Asia, enabling them to study at Turkish universities. According to Engin-Demir and Akçalı, the program aimed “to increase the educational level of the population in Turkic republics, to create generations familiar and sympathetic to the Turkish culture and to provide trained manpower in these republics.”

In addition to providing scholarships to Central Asian students to study in Turkey, the Turkish Ministry of Education has established various educational centers including elementary, secondary, and higher education institutions abroad. The Ministry provides these schools with some of their teachers and administrative personnel. There are also Turkish language learning centers in the capitals of each Central Asian republic, except in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Finally, there are two universities in the region, established in 1993 and 1995, on the basis of bilateral agreements: Turkish-Kazakh International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University in Turkestan (Kazakhstan) and Turkish-Kyrgyz Manas University in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan).

4. Turkey in Central Asia since 2002: A regional power capable of using soft and hard power resources

With JDP’s rise to power in 2002, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Central Asia entered its second regionalist phase. The JDP’s first government initiative emphasized its commitment to preserving the current balanced policy towards Russia and Central Asia. However, while the program defined Russia as a neighbor, the Turkic states were portrayed as having a unique place because of their shared culture with Turkey. The difference was further emphasized in the 2007 program, in which the Central Asian states were considered siblings of Turkey that the country felt historical responsibility for. Overall, JDP policies towards Central Asia were persistent and did not show any major deviation from earlier periods. The JDP’s ability to maintain single-party power and Turkey’s steady economic growth as of the mid-2000s positively affected the country’s soft power capabilities in terms of the proliferation of its tools and the presence and back up of hard power instruments.

The most striking aspect of the post-2002 soft power involvement of Turkey has been in the economic domain. It is possible to analyze this involvement on two fronts. On the one front, Turkey’s soft power elements in the region take the form of trade relations and investment activities of Turkish companies. On the other hand, though diminishing over the years, development aid continued to form an important part of Turkey’s economic soft power over the region. Developing strong economic ties with Central Asia had been a major goal of Turkish foreign policy from the early 1990s until around 2000. However, due to the problems related to the Turkish economy and to that of the Central Asian republics as discussed earlier,
economic relations did not show much progress during this period. With Turkey’s steady economic growth as of the mid-2000s, the country became a more assertive and capable actor in terms of expanding its economic influence in Central Asia, along with other regions. According to Bülent Gökay, this was very much related to the strengthening of Turkey’s economic position in the world economy, which also explains the country’s progress towards becoming both a middle power and regional leader. Gökay argues that this is the result of two parallel processes: at the global level, a major shift in global economic power “from the developed West and North to the underdeveloped East and South” and, at the domestic level, the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy. As a result of these concurrent developments, with its strong and dynamic business sector, successful financial restructuring, and fast export-oriented industrialization, Turkey began to explore economic opportunities in neighboring regions. Burgeoning economic and business ties with the Central Asian republics as of the mid-2000s should be considered part of this general trend.

Two major economic areas of cooperation that have grown exponentially between Turkey and the Central Asian republics are trade and investment. As the below tables on trade patterns suggest, Turkey has become an important trade partner to the countries of the region, particularly through its exports, a reflection of the general trend of the country’s expansion of export-oriented industrial production and its growing export share. Turkey’s major exports are machinery, textiles, pharmaceutical equipment, plastics, furniture, and an array of other various manufactured products; its major import items are copper, aluminum, iron, steel, mineral fuels, cotton, agricultural raw resources, food materials, and miscellaneous animal products. However, there is still a long way to go for both Turkey and the republics in attaining full trade potential. Nevertheless, there is an increased commitment among all parties to overcome the barriers related to an increase in trade. In a recent report by the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) of Turkey, its aim to improve trade relations with the Central Asian republics is highlighted by the inclusion of concrete policies towards this very goal. The Organization of Turkic States provides a multilateral mechanism to facilitate trade between its members through common solutions for major problems such as logistics, transportation, and the possibility of bureaucratic obstacles. Creating a common market for goods, investment, labor, and services in the future is also on the agenda of the parties involved.

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Gökay, *Turkey in the Global*.

58 Prepared by the authors based on the data retrieved from International Trade Centre at https://www.trademap.org (accessed on 19 December 2022).


### Table 1 - Turkey’s Trade Relations with Kazakhstan

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<tr>
<th>Product label</th>
<th>Turkey’s exports to Kazakhstan US Dollar thousand</th>
<th>Product label</th>
<th>Turkey’s imports from Kazakhstan US Dollar thousand</th>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>900,182</td>
<td>985,685</td>
<td>1,288,305</td>
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<tr>
<td>Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted</td>
<td>87,463</td>
<td>113,281</td>
<td>186,670</td>
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<td>Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof</td>
<td>134,466</td>
<td>130,047</td>
<td>177,357</td>
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<tr>
<td>Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted</td>
<td>68,886</td>
<td>93,823</td>
<td>127,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television . . .</td>
<td>97,492</td>
<td>77,196</td>
<td>91,593</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pharmaceutical products</td>
<td>50,672</td>
<td>65,929</td>
<td>72,630</td>
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<td>Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions, and similar stuffed furnishings; . . .</td>
<td>39,986</td>
<td>39,107</td>
<td>55,459</td>
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<td>Plastics and articles thereof</td>
<td>35,941</td>
<td>38,228</td>
<td>53,639</td>
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<td>Carpets and other textile floor coverings</td>
<td>27,566</td>
<td>33,812</td>
<td>50,359</td>
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<td>Articles of iron or steel</td>
<td>61,137</td>
<td>37,567</td>
<td>48,249</td>
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<td>Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof</td>
<td>47,023</td>
<td>52,932</td>
<td>44,330</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>249,550</td>
<td>303,763</td>
<td>380,043</td>
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## Table 2- Turkey’s Trade Relations with Uzbekistan

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Value</td>
<td>1,232,288</td>
<td>1,154,334</td>
<td>1,841,893</td>
<td>Total Value</td>
<td>1,140,193</td>
<td>969,984</td>
<td>1,800,044</td>
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<td>Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof</td>
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<td>364,613</td>
<td>624,164</td>
<td>Copper and articles thereof</td>
<td>646,536</td>
<td>500,844</td>
<td>936,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television . . .</td>
<td>75,477</td>
<td>59,052</td>
<td>172,556</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>216,095</td>
<td>240,195</td>
<td>497,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics and articles thereof</td>
<td>99,027</td>
<td>93,027</td>
<td>148,176</td>
<td>Zinc and articles thereof</td>
<td>126,076</td>
<td>106,416</td>
<td>142,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles of iron or steel</td>
<td>76,156</td>
<td>59,262</td>
<td>102,142</td>
<td>Plastics and articles thereof</td>
<td>66,366</td>
<td>66,091</td>
<td>104,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous chemical products</td>
<td>49,761</td>
<td>68,579</td>
<td>95,669</td>
<td>Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons</td>
<td>27,433</td>
<td>24,363</td>
<td>20,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments, and other coloring . . .</td>
<td>55,541</td>
<td>59,260</td>
<td>75,612</td>
<td>Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, . . .</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>14,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceutical products</td>
<td>18,523</td>
<td>57,577</td>
<td>65,584</td>
<td>Aluminum and articles thereof</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>14,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>470,203</td>
<td>392,964</td>
<td>557,990</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>56,847</td>
<td>30,952</td>
<td>69,446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 - Turkey’s Trade Relations with Turkmenistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product label</th>
<th>Turkey's exports to Turkmenistan US Dollar thousand</th>
<th>Product label</th>
<th>Turkey's imports from Turkmenistan US Dollar thousand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Value</td>
<td>744,766</td>
<td>786,966</td>
<td>984,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television . . .</td>
<td>79,799</td>
<td>97,621</td>
<td>174,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof</td>
<td>135,162</td>
<td>134,895</td>
<td>170,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles of iron or steel</td>
<td>95,864</td>
<td>102,956</td>
<td>90,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions, and similar stuffed furnishings; . . .</td>
<td>45,713</td>
<td>52,850</td>
<td>62,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics and articles thereof</td>
<td>45,086</td>
<td>38,321</td>
<td>51,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal</td>
<td>19,294</td>
<td>38,624</td>
<td>39,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum and articles thereof</td>
<td>20,051</td>
<td>36,625</td>
<td>34,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>303,797</td>
<td>285,074</td>
<td>363,973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the early 1990s, economic relations among the Central Asian countries and Turkey have steadily developed. In addition to the various sizes of Turkish business investments in these countries, the content of economic trade is primarily based on exports consisting of processed food, textiles, machinery, transportation equipment, and imports of agricultural raw resources, food materials, steel, iron, and other metals. An overview of data provided in the tables showing trade relations between Turkey and the regional countries indicates a set pattern of relations. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have shared the most economic activity with Turkey in the last 30 years. However, Turkey’s economic relations have remained limited with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Even so, the volume of trade between Turkey and all the regional states has continued to increase, even under the lockdown conditions and travel bans during the COVID-19 pandemic period.

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Table 4 - Turkey’s Trade Relations with Kyrgyzstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product label</th>
<th>Turkey’s exports to Kyrgyzstan US Dollar thousand</th>
<th>Product label</th>
<th>Turkey’s imports from Kyrgyzstan US Dollar thousand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Value</td>
<td>442,091</td>
<td>417,547</td>
<td>749,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad . . .</td>
<td>95,680</td>
<td>84,217</td>
<td>239,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knitted or crocheted fabrics</td>
<td>59,265</td>
<td>74,599</td>
<td>106,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted</td>
<td>56,447</td>
<td>36,36</td>
<td>68,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof</td>
<td>27,413</td>
<td>25,717</td>
<td>40,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted</td>
<td>24,992</td>
<td>22,851</td>
<td>29,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceutical products</td>
<td>7,631</td>
<td>20,193</td>
<td>21,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television . . .</td>
<td>19,407</td>
<td>17,294</td>
<td>21,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles of iron or steel</td>
<td>4,575</td>
<td>15,631</td>
<td>20,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>146,298</td>
<td>120,515</td>
<td>175,284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5 - Turkey’s Trade Relations with Tajikistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product label</th>
<th>Turkey’s exports to Tajikistan US Dollar thousand</th>
<th></th>
<th>Product label</th>
<th>Turkey’s imports from Tajikistan US Dollar thousand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Value</td>
<td>156,608</td>
<td>173,711</td>
<td>258,441</td>
<td>Total Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television . . .</td>
<td>12,833</td>
<td>12,652</td>
<td>26,476</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics and articles thereof</td>
<td>14,368</td>
<td>15,654</td>
<td>24,232</td>
<td>Aluminum and articles thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof</td>
<td>17,473</td>
<td>17,872</td>
<td>22,694</td>
<td>Raw hides and skins (other than fur) and leather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous manufactured articles</td>
<td>19,769</td>
<td>18,115</td>
<td>19,968</td>
<td>Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted</td>
<td>4,232</td>
<td>8,810</td>
<td>12,039</td>
<td>Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof</td>
<td>7,167</td>
<td>5,501</td>
<td>10,855</td>
<td>Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials</td>
<td>6,508</td>
<td>6,641</td>
<td>10,634</td>
<td>Zinc and articles thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>74,258</td>
<td>88,466</td>
<td>131,543</td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkish investment in Central Asia has also grown during this same period. As emphasized above, Turkey’s business sector was positively influenced by the neo-liberal transformation within the country. Such business turned to Central Asia, but also to Eastern Europe while looking for investment opportunities at the end of the Cold War. According to Yıldırım, the Turkish government has promoted investment in Central Asia through certain incentives for Turkish companies’ outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in the region. There are other factors positively influencing Turkish entrepreneurs’ decisions to invest in Central Asia, such as historical, cultural, and geographical proximity, the region’s vast resources, and the presence of a similar business environment. According to Egresi and Kara, foreign direct investment decisions are never purely economic. Most companies’ choices of a location for investment are determined by cultural factors as culturally closer markets are more favored, compared to unknown markets. Governments are often influential in directing investments from their business sector towards regions they prioritize politically. Cultural proximity, governmental

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65 Istvan Egresi and Fatih Kara, “Foreign Policy Influences on Outward Direct Investment: The Case of Turkey,” *Journal of*
preferences, and a dynamic business sector explain Turkey’s growing investment in Central Asia. The Turkic Business Council, a subsidiary organ of the Organization of Turkic States, is particularly supportive in guiding the business sector to investment opportunities in the region. The food and beverage, iron and steel, textile, and telecommunication sectors are major areas for investment, along with construction, for Turkish companies.66 There are various major Turkish construction companies that have undertaken several important projects in Central Asia, including infrastructure and superstructure construction, industrial facilities construction, restoration work, and numerous residential projects (see tables below for Turkish investments in Central Asia).67

Table 6 - Turkish Investments in Kazakhstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock Of Foreign Direct Investment (US$ Million)</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Turkey to Kazakhstan</td>
<td>162.99</td>
<td>325.43</td>
<td>333.03</td>
<td>361.14</td>
<td>500.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Kazakhstan to Turkey</td>
<td>216.8</td>
<td>166.7</td>
<td>180.3</td>
<td>107.47</td>
<td>102.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 - Turkish Investments in Turkmenistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock Of Foreign Direct Investment (US$ Million)</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Turkey to Turkmenistan</td>
<td>403.53</td>
<td>576.7</td>
<td>468.48</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>809.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Turkmenistan to Turkey</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 - Turkish Investments in Uzbekistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock Of Foreign Direct Investment (US$ Million)</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Turkey to Uzbekistan</td>
<td>141.35</td>
<td>107.37</td>
<td>93.99</td>
<td>83.26</td>
<td>183.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Uzbekistan to Turkey</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data accessible through the International Trade Center do not cover the post-2019 period. We assume that this was primarily because of the disruptions experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, a closer look at the investment tables shows that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan occupy the top positions in terms of Turkish investment in Central Asia, a similar pattern to the trade relations data. On the other hand, investments in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are lower in volume, the latter showing the lowest

67 “Tables are prepared by the authors based on the data retrieved from International Trade Centre,” https://www.investmentmap.org/investment/time-series-by-country (accessed on 19 November 2021).
investment rate. It can be claimed that the investment gap in Tajikistan, compared to the other countries, is in line with Egresi and Kara’s argument about the role of cultural proximity in investment decisions.68

Table 9 - Turkish Investments in Kyrgyzstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock Of Foreign Direct Investment (US$ Million)</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Turkey to Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>46.16</td>
<td>101.39</td>
<td>87.78</td>
<td>-48.54</td>
<td>63.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Kyrgyzstan to Turkey</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 - Turkish Investments in Tajikistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock Of Foreign Direct Investment (US$ Million)</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Turkey to Tajikistan</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>26.45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Tajikistan to Turkey</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of Turkish development aid to the region, according to the 2019 Turkish Development Assistance Report published by TIKA, Kyrgyzstan occupied 7th place ($24.12 million) and Kazakhstan, 8th ($22.3 million), in the list of countries benefiting the most from Turkish official development assistance. During the same reporting period, Syria’s development assistance accounted for $7.2 billion.69 While the amount of aid delivered to the Central Asian countries steadily increased under the JDP, their share in total aid decreased since the Middle East and Africa have since become regions of priority, and due to the breakout of the Syrian civil war.70

The post-2002 period can be characterized by the further steps taken toward the institutionalization of regional cooperation. In 2009, at the end of the Ninth Summit of the Heads of Turkic Speaking States, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan signed the Nakhchivan Agreement, which established the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (Turkic Council) as a permanent international organization with headquarters in Istanbul; later, Uzbekistan became a member as well. The organization was later named The Organization of Turkic States in its Eighth Summit in Istanbul. The recent decision of the organization to give observer status to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is an example of how regional states became more receptive to the soft power diplomacy that

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Turkey has been following over the years, along with the regional developments favoring Turkey’s position. Historically speaking, Central Asian states were not receptive towards the initial Turkish endeavors to acquire support on the Cyprus issue. The organization is an umbrella one and is affiliated with the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries (TURKPA-2008), the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY-1993), the Turkic World Education and Scientific Cooperation Organization (Turkic Academy-2010), the Turkic Business Council (2011), and the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation (2012).

As mentioned before, TRT has been a key player in Turkey’s soft power accession in Central Asia, and this has not abated in the current period. This state radio and television company, which started broadcasting in the region as TRT Eurasia, became TRT Avaz in 2009. Avaz, which means “voice,” is a common word in many Turkic languages. As the name change suggests, TRT Avaz is an inclusive type of project and broadcasts in Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbek, with subtitle options in numerous Turkic languages.

While there is no data on viewership in Central Asia, this channel and TRT World are considered important tools for Turkey’s soft power strategy in the region. In addition to Turkish TV channels, the development of communication infrastructures has enabled the viewing of private Turkish TV channels through satellites. Over the years, popular Turkish soap operas, documentaries, and various daily programs have enabled constant and close exposure to Turkey, Turkish culture, and Turkish products, which positively contributed to trade and tourism activities. Turkish soap operas are currently being marketed to various areas, from the Former Soviet region to the Middle East, Balkans, South Asia, and Latin America. As an example, Kazakhstan was the first country to which Turkey sold its soap opera “Deliürek” in 2001. However, at times, authorities in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan banned the broadcast of many Turkish series on their state televisions because of immoral content, or for reasons of cultural protectionism and promotion of national values.

Other projects in different areas continue. The previously mentioned Diyanet supports Turkey’s soft power capabilities by constructing and renovating mosques, as well as providing religious literature in regional languages and in the training of personnel in religious vocational schools and theology centers, either in the region or in Turkey. According to Balci and Lilles, the Diyanet has managed to “diffuse a Turkish variant of Islam” in the region capable of existing in harmony with state structures.

In the higher education realm, the Directorate of Overseas Turks, and Related Communities (YTB), founded in 2010, became a central organization in overseeing the coordination of higher education grants for Central Asian students along with those from

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71 See: Durmuş and Yılmaz, “Son Yırtma Yılda Türkiye'nin Orta Asya'ya Yönelik Dış Politikası” 493; Fidan, “Turkish Foreign Policy,” 116.
77 Yılmaz and Kılıçoğlu, “Türkiye’nin Orta Asya’daki.”
other regions. According to the statistics of the Higher Education Council (YÖK), in the 2020-2021 academic year, the number of students studying in Turkey from Central Asia was as follows: Kazakhstan, 4,857; Kyrgyzstan, 1,766; Turkmenistan, 15,578; Tajikistan, 681; and Uzbekistan, 3,390.\(^79\) While Turkey experienced problems with this program in the beginning, including problems with student selection, a high dropout ratio due to the limited financial means of the chosen students, and adaptation problems, including students’ limited knowledge of Turkish,\(^80\) there has been much improvement since then. The program, which initially only catered to students from Central Asia, is important in that it has pioneered Turkey’s current policy of internationalization of its education to students from a wider geographical area. The YTB also oversees a program that aims to remain in touch with alumni students from the Central Asian region.\(^81\)

In addition to the Turkish government’s official educational activities in the region, there have also been non-state actors from Turkey active in Central Asia since the early 1990s. Two prominent ones that should be mentioned are the Gülen Movement and the Turan Yazgan Turkic World Research Foundation. Both have been operating elementary, secondary, and high schools and higher education institutions abroad, albeit the latter’s activities are more limited. While the Foundation has a more pan-Turkic character and provides secular education, the Gülen Movement belongs to the Nurcu school of Islam and emphasizes the Islamic teachings of this tradition. The Gülen Movement and its schools were prevalent in almost all Central Asian countries except for Uzbekistan, which closed all Gülen schools in 1999; Turkmenistan did the same in 2011.\(^82\) The Gülen schools’ preeminent position in Central Asia diminished quite sharply after the July 15th events in Turkey, after which the JDP requested that all Gülen schools be closed in various parts of the world, including Central Asia. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan agreed to close them, while Kyrgyzstan did not. However, the name was changed and the schools’ status was negatively affected there, with the schools being put under strict surveillance.\(^83\)

The Maarif Foundation was established as Turkey’s official overseas educational foundation in 2016 as a soft power tool to reduce the influence of Gülen schools abroad, including in the Central Asian region.\(^84\) Finally, the Yunus Emre Foundation, which has been active since 2009 and aims to introduce the Turkish language and culture to foreigners through Turkish Cultural Centers, is a relatively recent soft power component. In Central Asia, there is currently only one Center operating in Kazakhstan’s capital, Nur-Sultan.

It should be noted that Turkey’s relations with each republic did not always follow a linear progress and faced challenges, leading to the slowing down—even stagnation—of relations. This is mostly due to domestic factors and leadership perceptions regarding Turkey’s role and intentions vis-à-vis each republic. Central Asian leaders established one-man regimes, gradually consolidating their power by eliminating the opposition and by other means. All of the first presidents, except for Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akaev, were part of the Soviet political

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\(^79\) Turkish Higher Board of Education, “Statistics on Foreign Students,” https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr, (accessed date December 21, 2022). The reason for the number of Turkmen students being much higher is that most of these students mainly come to Turkey for work with a student visa, which is much easier to receive and enables them to stay for longer periods (Rustomjon Urinboyev and Sherzod Erailiev, *The Political Economy of Non-Western Migration Regimes: Central Asian Migrant Workers in Russia and Turkey*, (New York City, NY: Springer, 2022).


\(^83\) Ibid.

\(^84\) Çevik, “Reassessing Turkey’s Soft,” 57.
nomenclature before independence. Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, and Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat Niyazov strengthened their hold on power by gradually eliminating the opposition; Tajikistan’s president, Emomali Rakhmon, was able to confirm his incumbency after the end of the country’s bloody civil war in 1997. Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akaev, despite his initial promises about a rapid democratization of the country, also solidified his position through various institutional changes. However, he was ousted from power in 2005 as a result of widespread popular protests and the opposition’s claims that Akaev had rigged parliamentary elections. Kyrgyzstan is unique in terms of the frequent shuffling at the top leadership level as the country would go through a change of leadership three more times as a result of popular discontent. In Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan the transition of political power came as a result of Niyazov and Karimov’s deaths and Nazarbayev’s resignation; these three leaders had established a very firm grip on power and steadily eliminated all opposition forces.

As the top leadership levels are quite dominant in foreign policy decision-making in Central Asia, the perceptions of the presidents are very influential in the foreign policy trajectories they have pursued. For example, during the first years of post-independence, Uzbekistan-Turkey relations were very close, but they soured after Turkey provided a safe haven to the Uzbek opposition leader Muhammed Salih in 1993. President Karimov’s wary attitude about Turkey’s intentions led to a stagnation of relations between the two countries for almost two decades. Only after Karimov’s death, with Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s ascension to power in 2016, did relations begin to improve with renewed vigor in multiple areas.

5. Conclusion

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of the Central Asian republics encouraged Turkish foreign policymakers to develop new foreign policy principles and priorities. These were characterized by an increase in relations with the new geography using soft power through economic and cultural outreach, and Central Asia has provided Turkish policymakers with a fertile ground to use these new soft power foreign policy tools. The increase in diplomatic, economic, political, social, and cultural contacts has resulted in developing additional, comprehensive, and specific policy choices over time. Initially shaped after the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia has evolved since then. Between 1991 and 1992, both the benefactor and recipient exhibited overenthusiastic and ambitious agendas in the initial phase.

As part of the post-Cold War period transformation, Turkey’s foreign policy direction evolved more around soft power tools. The country has increasingly emphasized its economic and commercial links with many parts of the world, including Central Asia. Today, there are intense networks and links between the two, mainly in the economic, commercial, and energy sectors, and culture and education are the soft power tools used in Turkey’s relations with the Central Asian states. Official institutions such as TİKA, TRT, the Diyanet, and various educational institutions are active in the region and contribute to the increasing cultural links

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between Turkey and its Turkic neighbors.

While Turkey is often depicted in the literature and official and popular sources as a regional actor currently capable of using its soft power capacity, the use of soft power assets and the geopolitical vision for a cooperative Turkic region actually began with the formulation of Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia after the Cold War. During the initial years, regional leadership aspirations might have overshadowed those policies; however, more recently, the increasing application of soft power strategies has resulted in the emergence of a pragmatic foreign policy approach supported by contextual realities and motivated by economic interests.

Bibliography


Frozen in Time while Icebergs are Melting: Türkiye's Climate Policy

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*Istanbul University*

Abstract

In this paper, we adopt Walter Carlsnaes’ tripartite approach in order to scrutinize the consistency of Türkiye’s climate policy with changing climate regimes. We explain the actor-structure duality in climate policy through the interaction of climate regimes and Türkiye’s climate policy. The paper reveals the causality behind the policies implemented by Türkiye as a result of its core values and preferences, and explains their continuities. Finally, we address the potential of the European Green Deal to influence Türkiye’s preferences, and therefore its climate policy.

Keywords: Climate Change, Türkiye, Tripartite Approach, Foreign Policy Analysis, European Green Deal

1. Introduction

The fight against climate change remains one of the main issues studied in world politics. The issue of climate change is strongly interconnected with many other areas; even different massive problems such as global justice, gender, and the COVID-19 pandemic are examined in conjunction with climate change. Similar to other global challenges, the climate crisis is not an issue to be solved by isolated initiatives, but it requires comprehensive action supported by many actors. This characteristic of the problem brings the climate crisis to the center of international relations. Especially since the foundation of UNFCCC in 1992, climate politics has been a crucial part of foreign policy agendas. As nation-states preserve their status of being primary actors in world politics, foreign policy analysis (FPA) is a key tool to understand and explain the deadlock in global problems. However, there are plenty of approaches of FPA that prioritize different ontologies and causalities to expound why nation-states act in some particular ways but not in others. So, the question still remains, what is...
the most convenient approach to analyze foreign policy action within the context of global issues?

Numerous approaches of FPA could be categorized in many different ways according to their epistemological and ontological premises. However, the main determinant in this literature is the agent-structure problematic. No matter how it is named (domestic & international politics, innenpolitik & aussenpolitik, internal factors & systemic incentives, holism & individualism, etc.), the approaches of FPA are always shaped by the tension between agent-based and structure-based positions. Here, a third way is to focus on the interplay between agent and structure to examine how these two ontologies generate causalities to transform each other. In the case of global climate politics, the two main factors to analyze are the structure of the climate regimes and the actions of nation-states. These two elements have been constructing each other especially since the 1990s, thus the foreign policy actions concerning climate politics could not be pictured via solely agent-based or structure-based explanations.

This paper aims to examine Turkey’s lack of cooperation in fighting against climate change. Since the 1990s, Turkey’s foreign policy objectives and tendencies have drastically changed several times, yet its climate policy of not taking genuine responsibility for climate change has firmly endured. Arguably, throughout the foundation of the Republic, this foreign policy behavior of Turkey might be the most consistent one, and we claim that with the European Green Deal, this consistency in foreign policy will potentially change. Thus, by focusing on the interplay between agents and structure, we intend to explain the reasons generating the consistency and promising change via applying Carlsnaes’ tripartite approach. In accordance with our purposes, the paper is structured in three parts. First, Carlsnaes’ approach will be introduced, and how the approach is going to be adopted will be explained. Second, the Kyoto Protocol and Turkey’s foreign policy actions will be examined in four steps. This part will be followed by an examination of the Paris Agreement and Turkey’s foreign policy actions in the same four steps as the second part. Third, the European Green Deal’s potential to change the structural conditions for Turkey will be discussed. The concluding part will speculate on the potential changes of TFP with respect to climate regimes.

2. Methodology

In this paper, we will adopt Walter Carlsnaes’ tripartite approach to scrutinize the consistency of Turkish foreign policy (TFP) on climate regimes. There is a genuine connection between the tripartite approach’s ideational background and its tools that are designed to elucidate foreign policy. Thus, to introduce this approach, it is crucial to track the theoretical debates

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4 In this context, the concept of regime might signify two meanings: Regime as a formal international framework and regime that is widely used by International Relations scholarship and is not necessarily related to an international agreement. In International Relations literature, there are several definitions of regime. In this paper, we particularly use the concept of regime as “multilateral agreements among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue area” (See Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons. “Theories of International Regimes,” *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 493-496). Therefore, we do not claim that the agreements that will be analyzed in this paper are different ‘formal’ international regimes. Our use of regime as a concept is a purely analytical preference. We thank both anonymous referees for drawing our attention to this to prevent a potential misunderstanding.

Second, in accordance with the first constituent, Carlsnaes adapted the critical realist approach, specifically Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic framework, as his position on the agent-structure problem. While the critical realist scholarship provided the meta-theoretical background for analyzing the reciprocal interaction of agents and structure, Archer’s morphogenetic framework particularly contributes to Carlsnaes’ approach by adding a temporal perspective. A general critical realist perspective to the agent-structure problem is embodied by the idea that agents and structures ontologically exist and that they generate causalities for the conditions of existence of each other.\footnote{Roy Bhaskar, “On the Society / Person Connection,” in The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (London, UK: Routledge, 2014), 38.} In addition to this, Archer’s morphogenetic framework argues that structure and agency are analytically separable and temporally sequenced.\footnote{Margaret S. Archer, “Taking Time to Link Structure and Agency” in Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995).}

Last but not least, it is crucial to understand the connection between the tripartite approach and the transformation that FPA underwent. Since the end of the Cold War, FPA as a sub-field has attracted notable attention. The new dynamics of world politics undermined ‘arcane’ systemic explanations and indicated the need for a change in perspective. This caused a proliferation of models and approaches of FPA. Besides, the so-called ‘cognitive revolution’—a commentary on the limits of rationality based on the development of the discipline of psychology—had a remarkable influence on the studies of IR and FPA.\footnote{Joe D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter?” in Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions: Understanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking, ed. Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishers, 2002); Margaret G. Hermann, “Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis,” in The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, ed. Jerrold M. Post (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005); Philip A. Schrodt, “Artificial Intelligence and International Relations: An Overview,” in Artificial Intelligence and International Politics, ed. Valerie Hudson (New York City, NY: Routledge, 2019), 9-31.} Accordingly, the psychological and cognitive approaches lend impetus to studies of FPA. In this environment of newly proliferating approaches to FPA, Carlsnaes aimed to propose a
‘flexible’ approach that would involve different perspectives to analyze foreign policy. It is also flexible since it allows the practitioners to focus on certain relations and causalities while giving subsidiary attention or neglecting others.\textsuperscript{12}

These constituents of the ideational background were critically influential on the formation of the approach, and they distinctly shaped its main features.

i. He classifies approaches to foreign policy study based on their epistemological (objectivism and interpretivism) and ontological (holism and individualism) premises, and therefore suggests a four-cell matrix.\textsuperscript{13}

ii. In order to analyze the dynamic interplay between agents and structures, he treats agents and structures analytically separately, and conceptualizes them sequentially (see Figure 1).

iii. He claims that as long as the foreign policy approach characteristically fits into one of the cells of the matrix, it is \textit{ipso facto} problematic.\textsuperscript{14} He points out that these approaches indispensably privilege some causalities over others due to the meta-theoretical commitments. Thus, a persuasive FPA approach should be embodied in several approaches.

![Figure 1: A Model of Morphogenetic Cycles\textsuperscript{15}](image)

The tripartite approach could be divided into two main parts: namely, dependent and independent variables, or as Carlsnaes typically uses, \textit{explanandum} and \textit{explanans}. While \textit{explanandum} signifies foreign policy action, \textit{explanans} consists of three aspects: intentional, dispositional, and structural dimensions.\textsuperscript{16} This approach embodies three dimensions of explanations (see Figure 2). First, there is a teleological relationship between foreign policy actions and the intentional dimension. The intentional dimension includes two conceptual categories: preferences and choices. This explanation (arrow c in Figure 2) evinces the specific reasons for or goals of a certain policy. As Carlsnaes specifies, this is a necessary step by reason of the intentional nature of the \textit{explanandum}. The analysis between the intentional


\textsuperscript{13} Carlsnaes, “How Should We Study the Foreign Policies of Small European States?,” 14.

\textsuperscript{14} Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem,” 250.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 260.

\textsuperscript{16} Walter Carlsnaes, “Where is the Analysis of European Foreign Policy Going?,” \textit{European Union Politics} 5, no. 4 (2004): 495-508.
dimension and foreign policy action would only unearth the reasoning behind a particular action. Although this analysis might be adequate to understand the connection between actions and intentions, it will be deficient to illuminate why the actor is driven to have certain intentions. To comprehend this, an analysis between intentional and dispositional dimensions (arrow b in Figure 2) is required. The dispositional dimension embraces two conceptual categories: values and perceptions. In this analysis, it is intended to address the perceptions and underlying values which drive the actors to pursue certain goals. This is the analysis that cognitive and psychological approaches might enter into the study.\footnote{Carlsnaes, “Foreign Policy,” 317.} In order to strengthen the study by scrutinizing structural causalities, a third analysis is needed between structural and dispositional dimensions (arrow a in Figure 2) to examine how structural factors constrain and enable the actor’s behaviors. The structural dimension consists of objective conditions and institutional settings. Unlike the first analysis, in the second and third, there are causal relations between dimensions.

Despite its theoretical strengths, the tripartite approach also has shortcomings regarding its explanatory capacity and applicability. Concerning the approach, two main issues are relevant to this study. First, at the second step of the analysis, Carlsnaes’ explanations for his approach mostly focus on clarifying a cognitive analysis that addresses individuals as a scientific object.\footnote{Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem,” 256-266; Carlsnaes, “Where is the Analysis of European Foreign Policy Going?,” 505.} Therefore, his account lacks detailed instructions for foreign policy analyses that take nation-states as the unit of analysis. Second, as Carlsnaes states, his framework is disposed to explain single-policy actions. Thus, it is not suitable for analyzing a series of actions over time. To examine a series of actions, he suggests considering the outcomes of the policy undertakings, however, he does not introduce a structured model.\footnote{Walter Carlsnaes, “Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 127.} By proposing to connect the foreign policy action and the structure, he stresses that the actions are capable of affecting structures and actors.\footnote{Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem,” 264.} What he does unsatisfactorily is formulating the foreign policy action of the nation-state as if it has the capacity to alter structures. However, from the critical realist perspective, even though the actions are capable of changing the structures, since the social structures are enduring, one particular action would hardly alter the structure.\footnote{Bhaskar, “Some Emergent Properties of Social Systems,” 42.}
In light of the ideational background and the substances and shortcomings of Carlsnaes’ aforementioned approach, the present study offers a particular way of employing the tripartite framework to enhance its explanatory power for scrutinizing the consistency of Turkish foreign policy on climate regimes. For our study, three structures are considered to be relevant to the analysis, meaning that the analysis could be separated into three temporal dimensions. These can be referred to as the Kyoto regime, the Paris regime, and the European Green Deal.

All three dimensions of the tripartite model consist of two conceptual categories to allow practitioners to make an exhaustive analysis. Nevertheless, in this study, we aim to utilize four of these conceptual categories. While it is intended to examine the objective circumstances regarding environmental degradation in the objective condition, in institutional settings, the key features of the climate regime will be analyzed. The relations between these two factors of the structural dimension are reciprocal, thus they are viewed as both mutually dependent and analytically distinct. In the first step, how Türkiye, as the actor, is disposed toward the causalities of the structural dimension will be scrutinized. This analysis will lead us to a dispositional dimension, where the values that might coincide and collide in driving the actor to different preferences. In this study, we intend to examine Türkiye’s dispositional dimension by referring to four values. These are: i) energy industry, ii) interest of industry, iii) economic integration with the EU, and iv) climate funds. In the second step, how these four values drive Türkiye to have particular preferences will be examined. This analysis will be followed by the third step, in which the teleological link between the preferences and the actions of the actor is pointed out. Unlike the other steps, in which a causal relationship between dimensions is analyzed, due to its teleological nature, this step will be purely descriptive.

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22 Created by the authors based on several works of Walter Carlsnaes, cited before.
24 Ibid., 61.
In order to address the shortcomings of the tripartite approach, two solutions will be suggested for our analyses. First, we found it useful to adapt Kuniko P. Ashizawa’s state-centered method for the second step of the tripartite approach contrary to Carlsnaes’ version. Instead of a cognitive-based method that focuses on individuals, Ashizawa introduces “value-processing,” meaning that a state-centric analysis could be held by defining states’ coinciding and colliding values for some cases. Influenced by structural causalities, while some of these values might be highly effective in driving the actor towards a particular intention, others might be relatively less effective. A different structure is capable of changing which values will be most influential in determining the decision-making process. Second, to explain the connection between three temporal dimensions, an additional step to tripartite analysis will be added. Yet, the foreign policy action of one nation-state obviously would not be able to alter the structure. Thus, in this additional analysis, we will examine the character of Türkiye’s action by giving references to its preferences (intentional dimension) and explaining how the collective actions of nation-states that are driven by the same preferences generated a new structure.

![Figure 3: Modified version of Tripartite Approach](image)

**3. Kyoto Regime**

**3.1. Kyoto regime analysis, step 1: from structural dimension to dispositional dimension**

In the preparation of the Kyoto Protocol, and previously in the establishment of the UNFCCC, the impact of the objective conditions at that time was highly influential. In the IPCC First Assessment Report, published in 1990, it was revealed that the cause of global warming is undoubtedly human activities and that CO₂ is responsible for more than half...
of the greenhouse-gas effect. In addition, it has been announced that under a “business as usual” scenario, the planet would continue to warm by 0.3 degrees Celsius per decade.\(^{27}\) The conclusion derived from this report is that global warming would affect life in a relatively short time period, and that the earth would not support the current form of habitats if new policy actions are not undertaken.

The Kyoto Protocol was the first agreement in which states agreed, with binding targets, to reduce global emissions in order to prevent global warming. The establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992 was the first step towards the creation of the Kyoto regime. Along with the UNFCCC, based on scientific evidence, states have accepted global warming as a threat caused by humanity and have agreed to work together to solve it. The Kyoto Protocol was accepted at the 3rd Conference of Parties (CoP) in 1997. With this agreement, a collective target was set to reduce greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere. (Kyoto Protocol, Article 2).

The central claim of the Kyoto Protocol, which stems from the principle of the UNFCCC, is that although all countries have a share in carbon emissions, the share of early industrialized and developed countries is many times higher, so the responsibilities that such countries must undertake are different from those of other countries. Accordingly, the key feature of the Kyoto Protocol is the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities.’ This principle puts the responsibility of reducing carbon emissions on the shoulders of developed countries.\(^{28}\)

The responsibilities that countries have to undertake are basically divided into three different groups according to the classification made under the umbrella of the UNFCCC in 1992. The first of these groups is Annex I. Annex I covers OECD countries, EU countries, and countries undergoing the transition process to a market economy. According to the Kyoto Protocol, the countries responsible for making emission reductions are Annex I members.\(^{29}\)

The second group created under the UNFCCC is Annex II. This group includes OECD countries, namely Annex I countries except for the transition countries. In addition to the responsibilities given to them in Annex I, countries in this group are required to provide financial and technological support to enable developing countries to undertake emissions reduction activities under the Convention and help them adapt to the adverse effects of climate change.\(^{30}\) Countries outside these groups are categorized as non-Annex I countries. The non-Annex I group consists of developing countries. No binding emissions reduction responsibility has been imposed on these countries by the Kyoto Protocol. To sum up, the structural dimension of the Kyoto Protocol strongly encouraged developing states to be part of the Protocol. However, in this framework, those states had the opportunity to take no responsibility since there were no binding conditions to take genuine climate measures.


\(^{29}\) UNFCCC, “Kyoto Protocol - Article 2, 3, and 4.”

\(^{30}\) UNFCCC, “Kyoto Protocol - Article 11.”
3.2. Kyoto regime analysis, step 2: from dispositional dimension to intentional dimension

Türkiye’s initial value was to maintain its energy supply, which should be compatible with its growing population and developing economy. In other words, since Türkiye has scarce resources in terms of natural resource reserves, it has prioritized energy security in its economic model and continues to do so when assessing future developments. Therefore, Türkiye’s energy security sensitivity was so dominant that it would affect climate policies as well as energy policies. In order to ensure energy security and reduce its dependence on energy imports, Türkiye aimed to exploit domestic coal resources more, thus alleviating the energy security problem. Accordingly, between 1990 and 2009, Türkiye doubled its energy-based carbon emission rate. In the First National Communication on climate change published in 2007, Türkiye underlined that the optimum use of domestic resources such as coal and hydraulics is extremely important to create a reliable energy supply. It was officially emphasized that coal had an indispensable place in Türkiye’s energy map. The National communication that came after this year continued to underline that coal is vital to protect the energy security required by Türkiye’s developing economy and growing population. It was also emphasized that Türkiye would not have enough energy without coal. In 2012, the aim was to promote domestic energy in order to reduce dependence on oil and natural gas, so 2012 was declared the Year of Coal, and a series of incentives were announced for coal investments. This has meant that Türkiye would adopt a high-carbon economic model to ensure energy security. Aiming to develop a coal-based energy sector and diversify the energy supply to ensure energy security, Türkiye was also importing coal from abroad to a large extent, depending on its energy needs. This stance ignored Türkiye’s contribution to the global fight against climate change and has thus made a climate policy that ensures that greenhouse gas reduction is impossible. To sum up, Türkiye’s perspective on energy security was one of the key factors preventing genuine measures to fight against climate change, since they were inherently in conflict.

Another value of Türkiye was to protect the interests of its industry. By the 2000s, Türkiye’s primary goal was to increase its production capacity and develop its industry. Türkiye has built sectors such as construction, domestic transportation, textiles, and real estate services, especially after 2003, on the path of rapid economic growth. Therefore, Türkiye, especially in construction and textiles, has turned to a high-carbon, low-tech developmentalist path for its economic growth, as Ümit Şahin has said. Economic studies show that economic growth between 2003 and 2009 became more energy- and pollution-intensive than the 1995-2002
period, and high-carbon economic activities related to construction, such as real estate and transportation, were among the leading sectors.\textsuperscript{38} Although the share of energy used by the iron-steel and cement sectors in the manufacturing industry decreased from 36.9\% in 1990 to 23\% in 2003, it increased rapidly starting in 2008 to 45.3\% at the end of 2014.\textsuperscript{39} By declaring that “environmental policies should not harm development,”\textsuperscript{40} Ministry of Development has made a clear implicit hint that Türkiye would not adopt a climate policy that would hinder Türkiye’s path in economic development.

Another value determining Türkiye’s climate policy was to improve its economic integration with the EU. Since the late 1990s, Türkiye has taken significant steps towards becoming an EU member and revised its institutional framework with regulations in this direction. However, Türkiye’s priority in integration with the EU was to advance economic integration between the parties. All the chances of establishing a partnership with the EU, Türkiye’s largest export and import partner, were being evaluated. Climate negotiations were also seen as an opportunity for Turkey to improve relations with the EU. Although one of the reasons for Türkiye’s inclusion in the climate change negotiations was to get closer to the EU, on the other hand, Türkiye did not want to take a responsibility that would harm its economic relations. In short, one of the values determining Türkiye’s climate policy was to increase integration with the EU, but in a way that would not harm its economic development.

The fourth value of Türkiye was access to climate funds. As it was stated in many official documents, Türkiye intended to conduct its fight against climate change via financial sources provided by other actors. Therefore, Türkiye’s ability to access non-Annex funds was one of the main factors that would enable it to take adequate steps as a party to the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, as an Annex II country, Türkiye could not receive these resources, and moreover, it was also obliged to support underdeveloped countries. Even though it was crystal clear that Türkiye was not able to benefit from climate funds due to its status in the UNFCCC, in almost every official report and document, Türkiye repeated that accessing the climate funds was vital for developing an effective climate policy. Türkiye underlined that climate funds were an indispensable part of its climate policy.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, the motivation for acquiring more climate funds should not be neglected when considering Türkiye’s involvement in the Kyoto Protocol.

While Türkiye’s concerns for energy security and preserving the interest of industry were strong motivations for not taking any genuine responsibility for climate change, its goals of improving economic relations with the EU and benefiting from climate funds affected its consideration of joining the Kyoto regime. The worsening objective conditions have been influential in increasing the number of signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, since the Protocol did not impel the non-Annex I parties to take serious measures, under these circumstances, Türkiye’s preference has been to stay in the negotiations but not take responsibility for tackling climate change. The following section explains how this preference turns into a foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 123.
\textsuperscript{39} TÜSİAD, İklim Değişikliği ile Mücadele, 43.
3.3. Kyoto regime analysis, step 3: from intentional dimension to foreign policy action

Türkiye’s preference of “being part of the climate regime yet taking no responsibility” became the most crucial determinant of Türkiye’s actions concerning the Kyoto regime. When the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992, Türkiye, as a member of the OECD, was included among the countries of the Convention’s Annex I and Annex II.\(^2\) Being part of both Annex I and Annex II, if Türkiye wanted to maintain its energy security and industrial development, it could not have undersigned the responsibilities brought by the Kyoto Protocol. This position was officially announced as such: “Türkiye has chosen not to be a party to the convention due to the responsibilities brought to Annex I and Annex II countries.”\(^3\) However, to benefit from climate funds and increase its economic integration with the EU, Türkiye preferred to remain a part of the regime, even if it did not ratify it. Accordingly, Türkiye decided that being excluded from the Annexes was the main preference in order to stay in the regime without taking responsibility. The main argument was that it was not possible for Türkiye to support developing countries as an Annex II member, since Türkiye was less developed than most of the countries it was obliged to support.\(^4\)

At the 7th Conference of the Parties held in 2001, Türkiye’s name was finally removed from the list of Annex II countries. While remaining an Annex I country, it was also accepted that Türkiye had its own special circumstances.\(^5\) Though its removal from Annex II enabled Türkiye to ratify the UNFCCC in 2004, it was not enough to become a part of the Kyoto Protocol. Stating that Türkiye was the country with the lowest emissions among Annex I countries, Türkiye also requested to be removed from the Annex I list.\(^6\) Even if it was removed from the Annex II list, being a signatory to the Protocol as an Annex I country would also bring to Türkiye important obligations and emission reduction responsibilities with reference to a base year. In the first commitment period that started in 2008, Türkiye, which did not have any responsibility as it was not yet a part of the Kyoto Protocol, finally decided to become a part of the regime by ratifying the Protocol in 2009. Türkiye had created a situation whereby it could ratify the Kyoto Protocol, as the Kyoto regime would not impose any responsibility on itself, and thus it could also possibly benefit from the support funds\(^48\) allocated in the UNFCCC.\(^49\)

Türkiye’s policy of developing the coal-based energy sector has made it impossible to achieve the emission reduction target that the Kyoto regime expected from Türkiye, an Annex I country. Considering its growing population and economy, Türkiye had emphasized in official documents that it could not reduce its emissions by referring to a base year and that it

\(^{23}\) Ibid.
\(^{24}\) Şahin, “Uluslararası İklim Değişikliği Rejimi.,” 116.
\(^{28}\) As stated in the text, Türkiye thought that it would gain access to climate funds after its special circumstance was recognized ([https://www.mfa.gov.tr/united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change-_unfccc_-and-the-kyoto-protocol.en.mfa](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change-_unfccc_-and-the-kyoto-protocol.en.mfa)). However, as a remaining Annex I member, Türkiye actually was only eligible for the Capacity Building Support, not for the climate funds.
\(^{29}\) Semra Cerit Mazlum, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy on Global Atmospheric Commons: Climate Change and Ozone Depletion,” in *Climate Change and Foreign Policy – Case Studies from East to West*, ed. Paul G. Harris, (London, UK: Routledge, 2012), 75.
was not possible for Türkiye to meet the Kyoto regime’s expectations. Moreover, Türkiye’s value of prioritizing the interest of industry undermined the possibility of Türkiye taking more responsibility. For example, the iron-steel and cement sectors in the manufacturing industry, which brought an expeditious economic development in the short term, also increased carbon emissions quite rapidly, which caused Türkiye to further disconnect from the Kyoto regime. Even in the climate change plans announced after the drought experienced in 2007, which had a significant impact on Türkiye, the primary responsibility for combating climate change was placed on households and the savings to be made by households. As a result, Türkiye attempted to alleviate public pressure by making plans that would not affect industrial development. The interests of the industry continued to be protected by putting the responsibility on “Aunt Ayşe.”

3.4. Kyoto Regime Analysis, Step 4: Collective Action

The structural causalities that disposed Türkiye’s preference also became influential in shaping other nation-states’ preferences. Türkiye’s preference of not taking genuine measures all while being part of the Kyoto regime might simply be conceptualized as ‘free-riding.’ Free-riding problems in international climate policy have been referred to by many seminal works to explain the lack of collective actions for environmental degradation. From the perspective of game theory, as Olson suggests, actors in any groups have incentives to free-ride off the group members’ efforts. In larger groups, this behavior will be adopted by more actors. This is because, in larger groups, there will be more to gain from the free-riding. Besides, it will be less likely to be punished since the cost of free-riding will be blurred as groups become larger. Nordhaus claims that the free-riding problems were one of the main reasons why the Kyoto Protocol failed and suggests that to overcome this issue, imposing sanctions on non-participants is a key solution. Furthermore, Napoli examines statements from 14 Annex I states’ public officials about growth in emissions to explain the Kyoto Protocol’s failure. As in the case of Türkiye, protecting the interest of industry and ensuring energy security were critically influential for those states. For the free riders of the Kyoto Protocol, the structural and dispositional incentives are alike. Due to the foreign policy actions of free-rider states like Türkiye, Kyoto Protocol targets could not be met, and the aggregation of these actions generated the Paris regime.

4. Paris Regime

4.1. Paris regime analysis, step 1: from structural dimension to dispositional dimension

Even though the Kyoto Protocol is an extremely important agreement since it is the first environmental agreement that imposes certain responsibilities on states, the Kyoto regime has produced disappointing results. The information revealed by the IPCC Fifth Assessment

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Report published in 2014 showed that the period between 1983 and 2012 was the warmest 30-year period in the last 1,400 years and concluded that there is no doubt that the reason for this was human activities. Moreover, the data shared by the World Bank revealed that carbon emissions increased by 60 percent between 1990 and 2013, causing global temperatures to increase by 0.8 °C. The increase in the last two decades also indicates that the Kyoto regime could not achieve its goals, and the longer we wait to reduce emissions, the more expensive it will become. So, the objective conditions made it essential to revise the failed Kyoto regime with a more effective agreement as soon as possible.

The main purpose of this new regime was to change the approach toward the fight against environmental degradation by involving more parties and emission reduction targets. Therefore, the distinguishing feature of the Paris Agreement was that the regime put responsibilities not only on developed countries but also on developing nations. In other words, the Paris Agreement lifted the differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I countries inscribed in the UNFCCC. The second distinguishing feature was the form of responsibility given to countries by the Paris Agreement. In Paris, unlike Kyoto, countries were given the opportunity to set their own targets instead of being subjected to common emission reduction targets for all countries. In other words, countries would set their emission reduction targets and undertake the responsibility in proportion to their capacities. This change was extremely important in terms of convincing developing countries to take responsibility as well. The regime envisaged that all parties should submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) to the secretariat every five years and stick to the plan they submitted. In order to enhance the ambition over time, the Paris Agreement provided that successive NDCs should depict a progression compared to the previous NDC and reflect its highest possible ambition. As a result, the Paris Agreement emerged to keep the temperature increase well below 2 degrees above the preindustrial period, with the individual goals states had determined with their own consent. Akin to the Kyoto regime, the objective conditions concerning the Paris regime steered the states toward ratifying the agreement. Furthermore, the institutional settings, particularly the NDC system, gave states plenty of space to maneuver to avoid taking any severe action.

4.2. Paris regime analysis, step 2: from dispositional dimension to intentional dimension

After the 2008 economic crisis, energy security became more important due to the need to reduce production costs, while the demand for cheap energy increased rapidly as well. For this reason, Türkiye, which had increased its dependence on natural gas, also continued to increase its coal investments. This had been the main determinant for Türkiye concerning its energy security during the Paris regime. Several new coal power plants were established with support from the government in order to maintain Türkiye’s “short-term gain-based”
energy policy. As a result, while many EU and OECD countries started phasing out coal-powered generators and stopped building new plants, Türkiye’s coal investments continued to increase. Thus, once again, Türkiye’s tendency to preserve its coal-based energy policy collided with the policies that support the struggle against climate change.

During this period, the construction, transportation, and energy sectors have come to the fore as the primary sectors that provide “hot money” investments to Türkiye for maintaining rapid economic development. Industrial interests were configured upon the urban transformation policies, the construction of coal power plants, and nuclear power plant projects. In addition, projects such as Kanal İstanbul have also led Türkiye to adopt an economic growth model led by construction and transportation. Therefore, high-carbon industrial development was again the key characteristic during this period. Especially with the procurement law and construction zoning law that changed numerous times during this period, Türkiye preferred to protect the construction industry by putting aside concerns over ecological destruction and decent climate policy.

Economic integration with Europe continued to be an essential value of Türkiye’s foreign policy in this period. Ever since the Union adopted a more structured strategy to lead the way in the global pursuit of climate action, to be unconcerned with international climate action has become more troublesome for Türkiye. However, it is crucial to stress that the Paris Agreement has not particularly encouraged Türkiye to pursue a genuine environmental policy. The emergence of the possibility of producing many high-carbon products in Türkiye, which EU countries have given up to combat climate change, had begun to be seen as a source of economic gain. In turn, this ironically caused Türkiye to move further away from the Paris Agreement and its climate targets to increase its economic integration with the EU.

Climate funds continued to be of great importance for Türkiye’s climate policy in the Paris regime, as it was in the Kyoto regime. Those climate funds were crucial for Türkiye, so much so that Türkiye even prepared almost all the official climate reports through the use of such funds. In addition, it has been repeatedly stated by Türkiye in almost every COP meeting and national document that utilizing climate funds was vital for Türkiye’s ability to combat climate change. For these reasons, Türkiye chose not to ratify the Paris Agreement for a long time, even if it was signed as early as 2016. Türkiye’s biggest concern was that being a party to the Paris Agreement as an Annex I country might mean that Türkiye would not benefit from climate funds since it was classified as a developed country.

Like the Kyoto regime, due to the ‘easily achievable’ emission reduction targets, the structural dimension of the Paris regime constrains states to be part of the agreement. Moreover, the NDC solution promoted states to enter the Paris regime, yet at the same time, its non-binding character enables states to not take responsibility. For Türkiye, while the values of energy security and the interest of industry have been in conflict with genuine climate-neutral policies, the aims of improving economic relations with the EU and benefiting from climate funds are the driving factors to being part of the Paris regime. Besides, as pointed out, considering its economic relations with the EU, Türkiye benefited from producing high-carbon products. Under these circumstances, once again, Türkiye’s preference remained to be a part of the climate regime yet taking no responsibility.

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4.3. Paris regime analysis, step 3: from intentional dimension to foreign policy action

Türkiye signed the Paris Agreement without taking responsibility and also managed to reach climate funds due to its preferences. Nevertheless, Türkiye declared that it signed the agreement as a “developing country.”

Although the Paris Agreement can be ratified without annotation, the actual reason why Türkiye did so is that Türkiye still has a desire to benefit from different climate funds that might be on the table in the future. As in Kyoto, Türkiye developed a similar preference to the Paris regime and chose to remain a signatory to the regime without ratifying the agreement for a while, that is, to continue to be a part of the negotiations without taking responsibility. The most important step states had to take within the Paris regime was to prepare the NDC to be submitted to the secretariat of the Convention. Türkiye has prepared its NDC within the framework of the above-mentioned values. Therefore, forming a NDC that would not harm its economic development, industry interests, and carbon-intensive energy consumption and not taking responsibility within the Paris regime formed the mainstay for determining Türkiye’s intention. Türkiye submitted its NDC to the UNFCCC secretariat on 30 September 2015 and declared that it would reduce its carbon emissions by 21 percent by 2030 compared to the business-as-usual scenario. The amount of emissions that Türkiye agreed to reduce, in fact, did not envisage any reduction. Its only aim was to reduce the projected carbon increase regarding Türkiye’s foreseen economic growth and population increase.

The emission reduction targets that Türkiye set have been criticized not only because they did not contain an actual reduction but also for being prepared inattentively. In addition, these targets did not foresee any peak until 2030, nor did they foresee any peak after 2030 in which emissions would begin to decrease. The fact that the economic growth rate and the associated emission increase rate stated in the NDC were calculated so high meant that Türkiye would have achieved this target even if it did not put up a fight. The conclusion drawn from this is that Türkiye’s NDC had been formed to depict that Türkiye intended to avoid any responsibility.

Even after submitting the NDC in a non-responsible manner, Türkiye continued to implement the “wait and see” policy as it did in the Kyoto process. Thus, Türkiye waited a long time to ratify the Paris Agreement. One of the primary reasons was the ongoing request of Türkiye to be removed from the Annex I membership. Türkiye wanted to be sure that being an Annex I country would not pose any problems in accessing climate funds, and so decided to wait until its access to funds would be guaranteed by the regime. The return of the US to the Paris regime in 2020 pushed Türkiye’s stance to a pretty marginal position as one of the last six countries that did not ratify the Paris Agreement (192 out of 198 countries became a party to the Paris regime before Türkiye).

Finally, in the second half of 2021, Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in parliament and became a party to the Agreement. The pressure from the European countries was the main
factor that directed Türkiye to sign the Agreement. Moreover, the three billion euros of green credit that two European countries (Germany and France) and the World Bank promised to provide to Türkiye enabled Türkiye to sign the Agreement. After Türkiye felt sure that accessing the green funds would not be a problem, Türkiye decided to withdraw its request to be removed from Annex I, which it had included in all previous agendas at COP meetings for nearly 20 years. Türkiye’s chief climate negotiator, Birpınar, also approved that this request was withdrawn as a sign of goodwill after the funding had been promised to Türkiye. The statement by Birpınar indicated how Türkiye’s value is influential in determining its preferences. In addition to accessing the climate funds, Türkiye’s preference for being a party without taking responsibility also successfully turned to policy action. In the end, even when Türkiye ratified the contract in late 2021, it had fixed itself in a position in which it would not have to take profound responsibility and could continue to be a free-rider inside the regime.

4.4. Paris regime action, step 4: collective action
Although the institutional settings of Kyoto and Paris are different, they both lack the binding mechanisms for states to take genuine climate measures. After the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, studies stressed the need for tightened emission limits and an effective agreement that introduces enforcement mechanisms. The Paris Agreement was able to involve more actors in the climate regime, however, the NDC system failed to impose sanctions on non-participants. Thus, the Paris Agreement could not be successful in resolving the problem of free-riding. Moreover, the U.S.’s official withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2020 and the longstanding reluctance of states to commit to larger emission targets intensified the failure. To sum up, like in the case of Kyoto, due to the foreign policy actions of free rider states like Türkiye, the global emission targets could not be accomplished, and the deficiencies of the Paris Agreement led EU countries to take a new initiative to achieve the Paris Agreement’s goals with different conditions. Thus, the European Green Deal was put into action.

5. European Green Deal: Türkiye towards A New Climate Policy with the Old Values
After the Kyoto regime, the Paris regime also could not make the necessary contribution to the fight against climate change. As Climate Tracker has shown, almost no country can carry out a successful fight against climate change under the Paris regime. Moreover, from the beginning, it was apparent that it was impossible to keep global warming well below 2 degrees since the submitted NDCs of the parties are so inadequate in relation to the target. In addition, countries that took responsibility to combat climate change suffered economic losses due to the inaction of free-riding countries. The shift of production lines to free-rider countries that continue carbon-intensive production also prevented global emission rates from decreasing. Regardless of the desired reduction of emissions, the objective conditions

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got worse. Eventually, the EU, which declared itself as the leader (climate leader) in the fight against climate change, finally put forth its own efforts in 2019 to achieve the goals and objectives set by the Paris Agreement: European Green Deal.

The European Green Deal is a policy initiative by the European Commission that aims to make Europe a carbon-neutral continent by 2050. The primary purpose of the Green Deal is to achieve the political and economic transformation that will meet the criteria set by the Paris Agreement in the period leading up to 2050. Besides creating a carbon-neutral Europe, stimulating the economy and ensuring the protection of nature are the main objectives of the Green Deal. In the process of implementing the Green Deal, the EU emphasizes that it is extremely important for the success of the process that the partner countries also transform their production process in accordance with the Green Deal targets. Otherwise, it does not seem possible to stop carbon leakage, and thus, it would be impossible for the EU to achieve its goals. There are Green Deal mechanisms that are relevant to this study. ‘The emission trading system mechanism’ is one of the primary means for that purpose, which has already been in use in Europe for a long time. The emission trading system, introduced to encourage companies to use clean energy and low-carbon production, aims to make companies pay for their emissions by determining emission limits every year. Along with reducing the total emission rates to be determined every year, it is seen as the main objective for companies to lower carbon emissions over the years. The second mechanism is ‘the carbon border adjustment mechanism.’ It is a carbon pricing policy that is planned to be applied to some goods coming from non-EU countries that have not implemented regulations comparable to the climate change policies implemented in the EU. Hence, the mechanism’s primary goal is to level the playing field between European and non-European producers. So, non-EU producers have to set the same standards as EU producers applied, and they have to pay the same carbon price when they do not apply the standards put in place by the EU. This mechanism will affect all countries that trade with the EU and will affect countries that do not take efficient steps and do not uphold their responsibilities for climate change.

Just like the objective conditions of the Kyoto and Paris regimes, the scientific climate facts concerning the Green Deal period most certainly constitute the key reasons for actors to pursue a profound multilateral climate initiative. The objective conditions generate substantially similar causality in all three temporal dimensions. Moreover, whereas the institutional settings for the Paris and Kyoto regimes are considerably alike in terms of not compelling the actors to take genuine measures, the Green Deal introduces a rather different approach. Unlike other climate regime regulations, the two mechanisms mentioned above are binding for all the relevant actors. In this regard, the Green Deal regulations signify a radical change in the structural dimension that might increase constraints on actors to conduct policies that are compatible with emission reduction targets. Since it has been released recently, we are unable to make an accurate analysis of Türkiye’s position on this new structure. Based on the account developed in this study, we will conclude by speculating how the preference of Türkiye may alter.

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76 European Commission, “The European Green Deal, Introduction - Turning an Urgent Challenge into a Unique Opportunity.”
77 Ibid.
6. Concluding Remarks: New Wine in Old Bottles for Türkiye’s Climate Policy

In this paper, we examine the continuity and change of Turkish foreign policy on climate regimes via Carlsnaes’ tripartite approach. The present study ascertains that since the foundation of the UNFCCC in 1992, some causal dynamics between the structure of climate regimes and Türkiye’s foreign policy actions are considerably durable. Whereas the Kyoto and Paris regimes had drastic structural incentives to drive states to be part of the climate agreements, they lacked the procedures to force actors to take profound measures to limit carbon emissions. Under these circumstances, in accordance with its values, Türkiye’s preferences are to be a part of climate regimes but to take no responsibility.

As it is proposed in this study, Türkiye has four core values concerning environmental politics. Under the Green Deal circumstances, we believe, these values will be the key motives to determine its preferences. For many years, the EU has been Türkiye’s largest export and import partner. With a longstanding value of “increasing the economic integration with Europe,” Türkiye had developed an intention by sacrificing the fight against climate change to develop its exports to the EU and produce lots of ‘low-tech carbon-intensive products’ under the Kyoto and Paris regimes. However, in this new structure, in order to preserve and develop economic integration with the EU, Türkiye will be compelled to follow the Green Deal mechanisms. Before, in not taking any responsibility, Türkiye has not suffered any economic damage; on the contrary, it increased its profits by increasing its exports to EU countries. This dynamic seems to have vanished soon via new regulations. For instance, with the activation of the carbon adjustment mechanism, it will not be possible to export carbon products to Europe without paying the carbon tax. As a result, it will not be possible for Türkiye to increase its economic integration with the EU without taking responsibility within

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76 Created by the authors.
the climate regimes anymore.

Energy security was another value for Türkiye in determining its preferences. Türkiye has ensured its energy security with a coal-based energy policy so far. However, it seems that if Türkiye aims to continue trade with the EU on fair terms, it needs to gradually change its intention and move away from the use of coal. Otherwise, the carbon tax that Türkiye will pay to EU countries will be so high that exporting these products may become meaningless. Preserving the interests of the industry is considered another value for Türkiye. If Türkiye had taken responsibility during the Kyoto and Paris regimes, it would have been able to allocate resources to new investments and use clean energy resources, waste management, etc. Eventually, it could face the risk of losing its profitability. However, due to the implementation of the Carbon Adjustment Mechanism, the Green Deal requires Türkiye to take some initiatives this time to protect the interests of its industries. Otherwise, it seems highly probable that many export companies may lose their export power. In fact, in recent months, industrial organizations have started to encourage the Turkish Republic to ratify the Paris Agreement and adapt to the Green Deal, which should have happened in the opposite way under normal circumstances. Lastly, climate funds are examined as a value for Türkiye that drives Türkiye’s preferences. Even though this value explains many causalities for the Kyoto and Paris regimes, in the Green Deal structure, it will be relatively ineffective. So far, the EU has not announced any grants in the Green Deal framework for non-member states to promote climate actions. Nevertheless, we suppose, new funds released in the future would be influential for ascertaining Türkiye’s preferences just like it did before.

Türkiye's climate policy has remained constant since the beginning of the climate regimes. This continuity has developed in line with the structural causalities and Türkiye’s interests, shaped by its values, and has led Türkiye to be part of climate regimes in different ways while not taking genuine responsibility. As long as Türkiye did not take responsibility, it had the opportunity to protect its core values. This situation was implemented by Türkiye and many other countries in similar ways. The fact that many countries did not contribute positively to the climate regimes and chose not to take responsibility weakened the structures. At last, the EU took its leadership one step further and prepared a plan that would invite the member nations and countries that trade with the EU to take the initiative.

Türkiye may have to turn to different intentions and, therefore, a different policy action this time, in order to preserve its values. Otherwise, it does not seem possible for the country to protect and maintain its values, which they previously protected by not taking responsibility, without taking responsibility this time. The continuity seen in Türkiye’s climate policy thus far has the potential to be replaced by complying with the European Green Deal. Even though Türkiye signed the Paris Convention without taking any responsibility, this signature, which came years later, points to the change that the Green Deal has already created in Türkiye’s intentions. Türkiye’s chief climate negotiator also emphasized that one of the most important reasons for Türkiye’s ratification of the Paris regime was its attempt to adapt to the Green Deal’s responsibilities. The possibility that Türkiye will prepare the successive NDC to be compatible with this has now appeared on the horizon. As such, it also seems possible

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Türkiye may adopt a greater sense of responsibility moving forward. Fingers crossed!

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Quo Vadis, Turkish IR? Mapping Turkish IR’s Footsteps within the Global

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Abstract
The International Relations (IR) discipline is ascendant because of the theoretical and methodological divisions and controversies within. As it is mostly placed in the Non-Western IR category, Turkish IR is an interesting case in that it reveals the temporal changes of theoretical debates in IR and their local resonance from the purview of a geography that is jammed between the West and the rest. For this reason, this paper examines the literature on the Turkish School of IR (if there is any) and draws some conclusions regarding its current state. This research first utilizes the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) surveys conducted by the International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT) between 2007 and 2018. More extensively, the top 20 journals categorized under Google Scholar’s “Diplomacy and International Relations” list are coded based on their titles containing “Turkey.” Articles from the 1922–2021 period are then analyzed considering their authors, abstracts, and keywords. From this analysis, the study finds that studies focusing on Turkey have improved over the years, although there is a need for more theoretical and methodological advancements. As a “peripheral” country in IR, Turkey is still a subject of study by the “center” countries.

Keywords: Turkey, Global IR, International Relations, Non-Western IR

1. Introduction
In tandem with the developments and changes in global politics, IR has also been going through significant theoretical and methodological phases. During this transition, IR scholars have been discussing ways of transcending the Western dominance in the discipline. In doing so, recent studies have put forward various propositions under Post-Western IR, Non-Western IR, Global IR, and the like. However, scant attention has been given to the intricacies between global and local developments. To this end, Turkey represents an interesting case to investigate the connection between local and regional developments in IR. For this reason, this article will attempt to unravel Turkey’s position in these discussions by studying articles

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focusing on Turkey in the top twenty journals that appear in the Google Scholar database. Thus, this article will uncover the relationship between Turkish IR and Global IR, which would enable a better understanding of the discipline’s path forward.

Along with the developments of critical perspectives towards IR, the increasing focus on non-Western, post-Western, and Global IR reflects a need for progressive change in the discipline. Subsequently, such new perspectives pave the way for new discussions on IR’s different localities within the global. Those discussions highlight Turkey as an interesting case study given that the country represents different theoretical and methodological variations of IR, especially over the last two decades. Thus, focusing on and studying countries such as Turkey will enable researchers to see the different contributions to IR.

We begin with a brief review of the literature to study and locate Turkish IR in relation to the broader discipline and within the burgeoning Global and Non-Western IR discussions. We follow this up with a brief historical reflection on the development of the IR discipline in Turkey. This will help to contextualize our empirical study of Turkish IR, which we will discuss in the succeeding section. Along with the results of the analysis, the final sections present the main conclusions of this study while offering several suggestions for further research.

2. Turkey Between Global and Non-Western IR

The development of International Relations (IR) as a discipline in Turkey could be traced back to the Tanzimat period, during which civil servants were trained under public administration programs, leading to the creation of Mülkiye in 1859. Such a historical account takes the first IR department, founded in 1919 at Aberystwyth, further back in history by highlighting different localities within the discipline. Thus, by focusing on the contributions of other localities such as Turkey, this study aims at locating Turkey in the broader discussions on center-periphery in IR. Back then at Mülkiye, the focus was mostly on “hukuk-ı düvel”/International Law. In the following period, there were significant changes in the discipline. For instance, there were idealistic attempts to move IR beyond simply the study of states. With the rise of the influence of the United States over Mülkiye, however, IR became a separate discipline in the Faculty of Political Science in the 1960s.

Until the 1980s, IR in Turkey was studied in close relation to Turkish foreign policy, international relations, and international law. After the 1980 coup, many IR faculty members were fired and imprisoned, causing the discipline to loom up activity-wise. Entering the 1990s, the discipline in Turkey witnessed a period of rich theoretical and methodological research, and an increase in the scholars who conducted research on IR. In other words, more studies with theoretically and methodologically rich and sophisticated research started to be produced. As of August 2021, according to Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi (Higher Education Information Management System) of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) in Turkey, there are currently a total of 1,602 scholars in the departments of International Relations.

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4 The data covers all the departments carrying the name of International Relations: Middle East Political History and International Relations, Political Science and International Relations, International Relations and European Union, and International Relations and Public Administration. The report was accessed online on August 3, 2021, through the
Currently, scholars of IR in Turkey pose certain theoretical, methodological, and structural criticisms of the current state of IR in Turkey. One such criticism is about getting lost in big theoretical debates. Köstem argues that knowledge of relevant facts is crucial to building theoretical arguments around them, urging the need for familiarity with non-Western political theory as well as Western political theory. It is further argued that although the recent emphasis on constructivism and critical theories in Turkish IR scholarship is promising, there is a considerable tendency to disregard theoretical perspectives from the mainstream Western IR. In other words, there is a lack of theoretical debate among scholars who are militating against field consolidation. In addition, it is underlined that there are hardly any theoretical contributions to the grand theories of IR from Turkish IR scholars. This is likely aggravated by a systemic problem of low support for those scholars who aim to bring a new breath to the field.

One of the recent criticisms drawn to the Turkish School of IR is the lack of quantitative research. Aydınlı and Biltekin argue that the Turkish School of IR has a fragmented nature, and that one way of overcoming such fragmentation is to produce more research in the quantitative field. Moreover, a recent study observing 7,792 articles in the top twelve journals in the field dating between 1980 and 2014 has shown that quantitative research is more likely to get published, creating fault lines and divides within the IR and Political Science disciplines. The analysis suggests that the discipline now faces top journals following a one-method-only tradition: the researches in the field are either only quantitative or only qualitative. For scholars from the Turkish School of IR, publishing more quantitative studies might strengthen the presence of the scholars on the one hand, while contributing to the existing divides in the discipline on the other. Another recent criticism posed to the Turkish School of IR is that the regional studies produced in Turkey on the Middle East and Europe mostly remain as case studies on Turkey and receive citations largely from Turkey. Thus, the study argues that the knowledge produced on the IR discipline in Turkey stays within Turkey and cannot reach the rest of the world.

Rather differently, Bilgin and Tanrısever develop another argument about the Turkish School of IR and explain it in its dualities. For instance, while scholars of Turkish IR choose different topics for their Ph.D. research, their international publications remain limited to

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the scope of Turkish foreign policy. Such duality is an example that could be sought in the “disciplinary politics of IR” and the “dynamics of international politics.” In the disciplinary politics of IR, scholars such as those from Turkey are expected to apply the universal theories to their areas and collect data as if they are “native informants.” The dynamics of international politics, moreover, aim at explaining Turkey’s Western state identity in scholarly works. With the 1980s’ liberalization attempts, the authors argue that IR in Turkey became a separate discipline, decreasing its interdisciplinary nature and reducing interest in homegrown theory-building. In addition, the lack of internal debates among Turkish scholars of IR and the debates revolving around Turkey’s national interest in becoming a European Union (EU) member contributed to the existing dualities of the Turkish School of IR.

Turkey’s position in the Western–Non-Western IR debate was observed from a variety of perspectives in several studies. Mentioning this debate on Western–Non-Western IR also requires references to the developing Global South arguments, which might be tied to the Turkish School of IR as well. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan discuss this issue in two studies published in the ten years between 2007 and 2017. They argue that some reasons for the lack of a non-Western IR theory could be found in the hegemony of Western IR, asymmetry in scholarly resources, and the like. When they revisit their work ten years later, they find out that there is an increasing interest in theory in Asian IR. Such interest in theory is argued to be challenging Western IR. Moreover, there is hope in non-Western IR that scholars relying on middle-range theories use more inductive approaches. Such scholars also benefit from classical traditions and civilizations when challenging Western IR, such as those coming from the “Turkish-Islamic world.” However, the authors suggest that developing a regional school of IR is unlikely.

Having examined some of the recent debates about the status of IR, Turkey, and Turkish IR within the wider IR discipline, it is appropriate to observe how the field of IR developed in Turkey. Outlining the milestones during the development of Turkish IR would pave the way for a better understanding of this paper’s analysis and its empirical results. Thus, the next section briefly focuses on how the discipline of IR was shaped in academia in Turkey.

3. The Development of the International Relations Discipline in Turkey

As stated above, the Turkish School of IR coalesced under Mülkiye, which was established to provide education on diplomatic history and international law. Mülkiye was primarily an “elitemaking institution,” which aimed at producing diplomats and cadres for the political elite in Turkey. Until the 1980s, it could be argued that the discipline was limited to the

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13 Ibid., 176.  
15 Acharya and Buzan, “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?” 287.  
academic engineering made under the roof of Mülkiye, which was highly influenced by the national social and political atmosphere. Imagining a Western-influenced IR education in Turkey was, before all, an identity-building tool on the path to Turkey’s Westernization attempts. Moreover, because the main purpose was to train future diplomats, theory education was not a primary concern. However, with the liberalization attempts in the 1980s, students from various backgrounds found the opportunity to acquire the relevant skills to contribute to the discipline.

In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, a significant number of faculty members lost their jobs, and IR was placed under the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences in several universities. After the coup, it is argued that YÖK was formed to work in parallel with the aims of the coup and become one of the key actors who would enable Turkey to transition to a neoliberal economy. Meanwhile, IR education in Turkey had been degraded so much that in 1986, the number of IR scholars in Turkey was only 13. Gradually, as the number of scholars in the IR discipline in Turkey increased, they were sent to Anglo-Saxon universities to learn the core theoretical debates and apply them to their studies in Turkey as the emphasis on history was sidelined.

After the end of the Cold War, the transition from a bipolar to a unipolar international system had an impact on the IR discipline as well. The discipline started to discuss issues such as globalization, economic dependency, organized crime, global terrorism, and environmental degradation. The increasing number of non-state actors also contributed to uncertainty both in the international structure and the IR discipline. Moreover, as Aydın further argues, at the beginning of the 2000s, the Turkish School of IR witnessed an increase in the methodological debates and studies beyond Turkey. Concomitantly, novel global developments and extant disciplinary trends began to gain traction. Scholars began to question the scientific integrity of the discipline that is increasingly marked by a division of labor in which Anglo-Saxon scholars engaged in the prestigious task of theory-building. At the same time, the application of those theories was left to scholars in non-Western IR.

4. Empirical Studies on the Status of Turkish IR
To understand the recent interactions between the Turkish School of IR and mainstream IR in the last decade, the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey conducted by the International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT) surveys are indispensable. The first two studies in 2007 and 2009 were directly conducted by IRCT. The three studies in 2011, 2014, and 2018 were conducted in cooperation with the Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at the College of William and Mary. In the 2007 research conducted

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only with Turkish scholars, there are some questions regarding IR theories.

In the 1990s, the scholars who participated in the survey indicated that realism was given the most emphasis, followed by constructivism and liberalism. When asked about the most dominant theoretical approach in the discipline, the respondents indicated neorealism by 47%, followed by neoliberalism (27%) and constructivism (24%). In the 2009 survey, the respondents stated that they use a blend of different theoretical approaches in their courses or when they try to explain the incidents in IR. When they are asked about the current theoretical approaches in the IR discipline, they state the mainstream approaches more and weigh the critical theories less. For instance, 66.3% of the respondents state that the Marxist approach is used between 1–20%, while 45.2% think that the liberal/neo-liberal approach is used between 21–40%.

In the 2011 TRIP survey, the results offer more nuanced conclusions about the Turkish School of IR. In 20 countries involved in the research, constructivism is seen to be the most common theoretical approach. On the other hand, the respondents who do not use any theoretical approach have the same ratio with constructivism. In Turkey, realism is the most common approach, followed by constructivism and liberalism. Compared to this study, the 2014 TRIP survey reveals that IR scholars around the world use constructivism the most. However, 26% of those scholars state that they use no theoretical approaches. In Turkey, constructivism is the second most common theoretical approach after realism. The percentage of Turkish scholars that do not use a theoretical approach in their research is much lower than the world average (10%). This percentage decreases more in the 2018 TRIP survey (8.3%), while the world percentage increases slightly (26.7%). Furthermore, constructivism is placed at the top in this survey both by international and Turkish scholars. The Turkish scholars who use constructivism and realism are higher than the world average by 5.7% and 8.8%, respectively (Figure 1; Figure 2).

Use of Theories in Turkey Over the Years

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28 The figures include the responses to the question on “the use of theories” by the survey respondents.
The five TRIP surveys mentioned above are peculiar and highly beneficial both for the Turkish School of IR and global IR because they reveal decades-long tendencies and shifts in the discipline. As could be observed, the Turkish School of IR is following the global theoretical trend, which gives primacy to the constructivist approach. What is significant is the divergence of the Turkish School of IR from global IR in terms of the absence of mid-range and grand theory use. While a considerable number of global IR scholars persist in not using any theoretical approaches, the Turkish School of IR generally benefits from them. Coined due to the criticisms of the lack of theoretical contributions by the Turkish School of IR, this could create a dilemma that could prevent the Turkish School from reaching its potential. Such critical approaches are presented in the next section in more detail.

5. Methodology

Based on the aforementioned literature, this study offers an analysis of Turkish IR’s global position. To this end, this paper utilizes Google Scholar’s “Diplomacy and International Relations” list that showcases twenty of the top journals in the field. By analyzing the articles written on Turkey in these journals (Table 1), this article aims to locate both how Turkey is studied in the international journals (if they are international) and how many of the studies on Turkey are of Turkish or international origin. In addition, the study also aims to analyze the scholars’ institutional backgrounds to see whether scholars publishing on Turkey in the mentioned journals come from and/or work at Turkish or international universities.

To avoid data loss, we scrutinized all twenty journals’ websites and searched for the keyword “Turkey” in all relevant fields since their foundation dates, making the database span between 1922 and 2021. In 417 articles that are gathered through the analysis of the journals

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29 The 2009 survey was not conducted in other countries and therefore is omitted from the graph.
listed in the Google Scholar, the search, titles, abstracts, and keywords are accumulated based on whether they contain “Turkey” and words related to “Turkey,” such as “Turks” or “Turkish.” Then, the relevant articles are classified based on their respective authors, their institutional affiliations, and their regional location at the time of publication. Moreover, the articles are classified by their titles, keywords, and their stated use of any theory, methodology, and case topic. We did not introduce any temporal limitations to these searches so as to find all scholarly articles in top IR journals related to Turkey because as demonstrated in Table 1, there is a large gap in time between the foundations of the 20 journals included in the dataset. As Turkish IR academia started to show more progress during the 1980s and 1990s, and as the study of Turkey became more widespread with the effects of neo-liberalization and globalization, the dataset is aimed to be as inclusive as possible to avoid skewing the data toward only contemporary articles and, instead, reveal the current state of IR studies on Turkey.

6. Analysis and Results

Our coding of a total of 417 articles offers seminal conclusions about the state of the discipline and Turkey’s position within. First of all, while the publications on Turkey had a steady rhythm until the 1990s, they enjoyed a dramatic upsurge in popularity in the following years and decades. Moreover, as can be seen in the figure, the number of studies on Turkey has been increasing, especially since the early 2000s (Figure 3). This period coincides with Turkey’s new domestic and foreign policy with the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as it had new regional ambitions, willingness to pursue the European Union (EU) candidacy process, and the like.

![Figure 3. Number of Studies on Turkey Over the Years](image-url)
The articles written on Turkey are hosted by distinct journals of differing density. As can be observed in Figure 4, most articles on Turkey found a home in Third World Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, and International Affairs. This could be a result of the journals’ scopes and aims; however, being commemorated as a matter of the Third World comes into conflict with Turkey and Turkish IR’s aim of Westernization, or First Worldization, in this context. It is worth noting that these journals are in the top five list of Google Metrics. Thus, it could be argued that Turkey receives scholarly attention in high-ranking journals based on their impact factors.
Table 1. Journals and Their Publishers’ Origin Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Journal</th>
<th>Publishing Country</th>
<th>Year of Foundation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Affairs</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third World Quarterly</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Democracy</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Peace Research</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Studies Quarterly</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of International Political Economy</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Journal of International Relations</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism and Political Violence</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Policy</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies in Conflict &amp; Terrorism</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Dialogue</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Studies Review</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of International Studies</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of European Integration</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Soviet Affairs</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pacific Review</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows that out of the 20 journals examined in this research, 13 journals are published in the UK, whereas seven are published in the USA. This is also an issue in the ongoing post-Western IR debates as well. As problematic as it is, there is a dominance of US- and UK-based journals in academia. In the last few years, publishing in top journals has also become challenging, as could be seen by their acceptance rates. However, academic visibility and performance criteria are still heavily based on publishing in top journals, having high impact factors, and citation scores, which are still considerably low in Turkish academia. Moreover, the very database used in this study is Google Scholar’s journal metrics, which are impacted by top publishers and indexes rooted in the Anglo-American academic tradition that also determines the authors’ citation scores and academic rankings. In addition, many journals host a tradition of theirs in terms of their specific issue areas, theoretical focuses, and methodological standards, which engraves Third Worlders in their current status and prevents them from developing a globally visible tradition of their own. Nevertheless, this very issue could be a matter of another article that might reveal the gatekeeping mechanisms in the academic publishing industry.

Based on the articles analyzed for this research, it is also vital to observe the issues and/or cases studied in tandem with Turkey. This is done by collecting the keywords of the articles and creating a frequency list. As shown in Table 2, the issues of the European Union, terrorism, identity politics, religion, conflict, and democracy/elections are studied the most. It is also worth noting that as derived from the results of this study, many articles do not indicate any keywords and hence give a blurry idea of what the matter at hand is. The results of “foreign policy” and the geopolitical keywords such as “European,” “European Union,” and “Middle East” follow Turkey’s foreign policy footsteps, and these results are not surprising to the authors, who expected as much. What is striking is that studies about Turkey are often associated with “terrorism,” “Islam/Islamism/Islamic,” and “security.” For studies on security, conflict, and terrorism, Turkey constitutes a significant case study due to its ongoing counterterrorism measures and security agenda that encapsulates the Syrian conflict. Following the global counterterrorism context that occurred after 9/11 and the War on Terror approach, Turkey, under the AKP government, aimed at coining Islam and democracy, especially through its efforts in the “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative, which also paved the way for constructivist ideational analyses on Turkey’s possible soft power attempts.

Furthermore, four of the selected journals directly subjectify security, terrorism, and conflict. Hence, these keywords are emphasized in studies on Turkey. In tandem with the global post-9/11 structure, Turkey’s domestic conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which led to a short interval of peace negotiations especially between 2009 and 2015, inspired several studies on conflict resolution, peace studies, and terrorism. Moreover, after 2011, with the start of the Syrian Civil War and the creation of the Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS), Turkey’s conflict with other organizations, called the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the People’s Defense Units (YPG), came into question in several studies.

Another aspect of the articles is their interaction with theories and methods. As a serious limitation of the study, of the articles that focus on Turkey, 383 out of 417 articles (91%) do not express a theoretical focus, as stated in their abstracts.32 The articles that have a theoretical focus, on the other hand, are diverse in their use of theories. In addition, some of the articles utilize more than one theory. When the theories are analyzed closely, the

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Table 2. Top 10 Issues Studied in Tandem with Turkey—Keyword Frequencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam/Islamic/Islamism</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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32 As the TRIP survey indicates, the respondents use theories quite frequently. However, the abstract analysis of this study shows that many of them lack a theoretical focus in their abstracts. This might have arisen from TRIP’s use of survey methodology, while we manually code the abstracts. Secondly, as a limitation of this study, although some of the articles might have used a theoretical lens, they were not mentioned in the abstract.
securitization theory and the constructivist theories are used three times each, making them the most used theories in the articles. Including the different varieties of constructivism, 39 different theories are utilized in the articles. Such results demonstrate that the articles that study Turkey refrain from using and/or specifically indicating their theoretical approaches. This finding corroborates existing studies by revealing that Turkish IR is indeed trapped in the mainstream theoretical approaches, and there is no effort for a local, original theoretical contribution in sight.33

The articles’ use of various methodologies also highlights significant issues regarding studies on Turkey. Of the articles that focus on Turkey, 347 out of 417 articles (83%) do not make any references to methods or methodologies in their abstracts. This percentage is slightly lower than that of the use of theories. As in the case of theories, some articles employed more than one methodology. Moreover, compared to theories, articles that focus on Turkey showcase a more diverse set of methodologies. In those articles, 47 different methods are utilized when the different variants of the same method are also included. In such methods, interviews and surveys are the most common (12 times and 10 times, respectively), followed by discourse analysis (5 times). Although the most frequently employed methods are qualitative, quantitative methods, regression analysis, synthetic control method, and the like are also used. Overall, similar to the case for the use of theories, there is still room for progress for the studies focusing on Turkey in terms of their utilization of methods (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Focus</th>
<th>34 / 417 (9%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Theoretical Focus</td>
<td>383 / 417 (91%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Different Theories</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method Stated</td>
<td>70 / 417 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Method Stated</td>
<td>347 / 417 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Different Methods</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Theoretical and Methodological Situation of the Articles

As discussed by Çiğdem Kentmen-Çin and Ebru Canan-Sokullu34 on the data gathered in 2014, 67 out of 101 Turkish universities who teach International Relations accommodate at least one quantitative methods class in their curriculum. However, surveys conducted in the same study display that students associate IR with qualitative methods and shy away from quantitative methodology. In a similar vein, Göçer and Şenyuva’s study35 on the research of migration in Turkey reveals that unlike dominant migration studies, Turkish IR studies approach the migration issue from the context of security; however, method-wise, they are restrained compared to the rest of the world. Göçer and Şenyuva clearly underline that the methodological shortage salient in Turkish IR is also evident in migration research,

and, in many cases, the tools used in quantitative research, such as interviews and surveys, are not executed correctly. Şatana reassures us that despite some methods and theories being preferred, in Turkish IR, no approach will expire, and every method and theory will find its followers. She also highlights Turkish IR’s capability of adopting itself to the emerging approaches in the field. However, it is also open for discussion since the field is impacted widely by Western approaches, and local studies hardly find a home within IR.

Besides the theoretical and methodological focus of the articles, there are also other critical points to highlight. First of all, there is a lack of interdisciplinary work regarding the case of Turkey. Although there needs to be more rigorous work on this point, it could be argued that an overwhelming majority of the articles is rooted in the discipline of IR. It should also be underlined that the articles published on Turkey in these journals are not confined to the ones produced only by the scholars coming from the discipline of IR. Although it is possible to argue that these journals constitute a common ground for IR to become interdisciplinary both theoretically and methodologically, one of the jarring omissions is the lack of interdisciplinary studies on Turkey in the coded journals. Similarly, international law remains on the margins of studies on Turkey, although it is an often-debated field regarding Turkey’s disputes with terrorist organizations and maritime borders.

Figure 5. Number of Cases Studied

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36 Nil S. Şatana, “Uluslararası İlişkilerde Bilimsellik, Metodoloji ve Yöntem [Scientificity, Methodology and Method in International Relations],” Uluslararası İlişkiler 12, no. 46: 11-33.
When we correlate Turkey with specific regions and case studies, the European Union emerges as the most popular topic that appears in Turkey-related articles (Figure 5). It should also be noted that several articles dealt with more than one case. In order to discern broader trends, Figure 4 below does not contain all the cases found in the studies because their number of uses is less than three. Geographically, most of the cases focused on are Turkey’s neighbors, especially in the Middle East and Mediterranean (Figure 6), or the prevalent issue areas that Turkey is known for: the Kurdish issue, Cyprus conflict, or Syrian migratory flows of 2015. However, though the Cyprus issue has become prevalent again in recent years, there are very few articles that focus on it, along with the case of Turkey. More importantly, there is a gap in the literature that focuses on Turkey, which does not take the Global South much into account. In addition, China and Russia also stay in the margins of the studies that focus on Turkey.

Figure 6. Number of Cases Studied - Map
Another dimension of the analysis focuses on the authors’ affiliated universities. Observing the scholars’ affiliated universities reveals their schools of employment at the time of submitting the coded articles. The universities at which the scholars are employed may reveal their theoretical and methodological backgrounds and preferences. After coding the authors’ universities as they are indicated in their articles at the date of publication, it is possible to argue that there is Western domination, as was the case in the observed journals in this article (Figure 7). Conversely, the scholars who contribute to Turkish IR and are employed in the USA are almost equal to those in Turkish universities, as seen in Figure 7. Contrary to our hypothesis, Cyprus hosts the fewest scholars that publish in Turkey. Moreover, as indicated in Figure 6, Germany has a mix of scholars that have Turkish affiliations (such as heritage), which are reflected in the results. All in all, these very factors should be studied further to compare the differences between non-Western and Western training in IR.
The study’s final dimension highlights the universities where authors received their Ph.D. degrees. Using official open-source information on the authors, the universities and countries are coded based on the number of frequencies. As a methodological note, there are minor double-coding cases, i.e., if an author published multiple articles. However, it does not affect the overall finding of this particular data. As can be observed in Figure 8, the authors received their Ph.D.s predominantly from Anglo-Saxon universities in the USA (210) and the UK (128). Such a finding is similar to the one in Figure 6, revealing the Anglo-Saxon domination in authors’ affiliated universities. After the USA and UK, Turkey (46), Canada (24), Germany (20), Italy (19), and France (14) follow suit, respectively. This is also similar to what Figure 6 suggests. For this reason, it is possible to argue that the authors who have published on Turkey circulate among Western institutions in their educational and vocational careers.

For the discipline of IR in particular, drawing influences from Acharya’s recent study, which calls for the creation of “Global IR,” it could be suggested that much could come from the Turkish School of IR in creating Global IR, which respects diversity and aims at benefitting from different theoretical and methodological approaches as well as histories, cultures, and experiences of different nations and societies. While doing so, Acharya notes the risk of “neo-marginalization,” which means the respect of diversity being drawn to other outcomes that might damage the status of creating a Global IR. Thus, the scholars of the Turkish School of IR would make more solid contributions if they take this risk into account.

In addition, as highlighted by this study, Turkey, as a subject of study, is still in the margins of the broader center-periphery debate. Although the study of Turkey has expanded in the last two decades with new theoretical and methodological approaches, there is still more room to grow for the scholarship in Turkey. In addition, the scholars who study Turkey are educated in the institutions located at the center, which brings the question of “neo-marginalization” to the fore. Moreover, the studies on Turkey are published in journals that belong to Anglo-Saxon publishing companies, which necessitates a closer look into where Turkey is situated among the post-non-Western debates and localities. For this reason, the scholars coming from 37 Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations,” 656.
Turkey might reduce such obstacles and limitations by highlighting why different localities matter in IR and bringing Turkey to the fore as a case study.

These results reopen the discussions on academic imperialism, academic dependency, and knowledge hegemonies. As Alatas reminds, “Today, academic imperialism is more indirect than direct.” It is concerning that what is valuable to study and research, who studies it, and what kind of knowledge produced is still controlled by the West. In our case, it is salient that the articles on Turkey that are published in Western journals, the authors that studied in the West, and the knowledge produced outside of Turkey are more visible and significant. Furthermore, when the theories and the concepts utilized in articles and dissertations are considered, it is evident that Turkey’s academic dependency and acknowledgement of its academic “vulnerability” are still on the table. Studies on Turkey are still not equipped with their own theoretical and intellectual tools, and despite showing intellectual acceptance to new approaches and methods, they are constantly shopping these approaches from the West.

7. Conclusion, Limitations, and Further Research

Research has shown that the IR discipline in Turkey and the studies that focus on Turkey have more to accomplish. For this reason, this paper aims to contribute to the Turkish School of IR by taking stock of the literature on the evolution and the current state of the discipline in Turkey by empirically analyzing all publications concerning Turkey in top-ranked IR journals.

As uncloaked by the literature, it could be argued that the Turkish School of IR has made considerable progress in terms of theoretical and methodological contributions until the end of the Cold War. As seen in Figure 3, the considerable rise in interest in Turkey as the subject of study is also paving the way for scholars from the Turkish School of IR to reach out to a wider audience with their studies. Considered as a part of the “periphery,” Turkey is now a part of the areas of study in the “hegemonic” and “dominant” academic circles rooted in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. With the rise of Global IR, “peripheral” countries such as Turkey may be studied more in-depth not only by the “hegemon,” but also by the “periphery” itself. However, this is dependent on whether the “core” is ready to yield its dominance to the “periphery” and accept it to become an “equal” or “hegemonic.” As a further study, aiming to situate Turkish IR scholars in the wider discipline with their collegial ties, theoretical and methodological orientations, and approach to the discipline would be valuable to observe the

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41 Syed Farid Alatas, “Academic Imperialism.”


43 Academic dependency refers to intellectually dependent societies who need to borrow the academic tools of Western social science in order to make sense of their own sociality (Alatas, 2003).


45 It would also be beneficial to reiterate that the term “Turkish School of IR” is solely used to denote the community of scholars contributing to the International Relations discipline by focusing on Turkey. For this reason, this paper does not aim at establishing judgmental claims on whether there is a Turkish School of IR or not.
core-periphery debates in IR.

Although the debut of IR to Turkey was immensely fresh and exciting, Turkish IR is non-visible in the Global, and Turkey is solely a hot case spot to provide newsworthy analysis for the Global. Furthermore, there is room for more progress in both theoretical and methodological areas. As shown by the analysis, the studies focusing on Turkey stay limited in utilizing theories and methodologies. As the discipline progresses along with new interdisciplinary and methodological innovations, studies focusing on Turkey and scholars from Turkey have numerous possible offerings to advance the discipline. As the discipline currently engages in the Global and Post-Western discussions, comparative studies using Turkey and scholars using new theoretical and methodological tools from Turkey can contribute significantly, as shown by this article.

The results of the analysis reveal several gaps and caveats for Turkish IR within the global. First and foremost, studies that focus on Turkey have been rapidly increasing over the last two decades. Secondly, Turkey is being studied in the top twenty IR journals, especially in the top ten journals, which show the increasing attention given to Turkey as a case study. However, the top IR journals are published either by the US or the UK, revealing the Western-centric dynamics of the discipline. Nevertheless, the issues studied in tandem with the case of Turkey center around the EU, identity, conflict, and terrorism. Moreover, this study also shows a lack of utilizing theoretical and methodological novelty in the study of Turkey. Thus, Turkish IR would benefit from attempting to fill those gaps. Finally, the number of other cases studied along with Turkey also highlights significant lacunae. For instance, Turkish IR would progress by conducting more comparative case studies, especially with understudied countries and/or issues within Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Having noted such recent discussions in the field, it would be efficient to conclude this paper by pointing out some remarks on the limitations of this research and some possible further research items. First of all, although the observed journals’ databases offer a large dataset for the articles on Turkey, there are issues with the search filters. The filters within journals’ websites were often inefficient, which prevented relevant results from being prioritized. This could be a point of further improvement that needs to be addressed by journal administrators to give room for more convenient research. Moreover, on the authors’ side, the use of relevant keywords was sometimes misleading. For this reason, some articles might have been omitted from the analysis just because some articles focus on Turkey, although it is not stated in their keywords. Lastly, the focus on abstracts is also another limitation in this study, as they might have skewed the data in favor of the aforementioned findings. For instance, the majority of the articles may not have indicated their theoretical focus in their abstracts, which might have caused a high percentage of the lack thereof.

Further research might explore the recent studies produced by the Turkish School of IR by providing concrete data focusing on the journals the scholars of the Turkish School of IR published in, the theoretical approaches, and the methodologies they used. In addition, more research on the structural factors shaping the evolution of the Turkish School of IR could be an asset. Finally, to triangulate the data collected for this research, Google Scholar’s other relevant ranking list titled “Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies,” which consists of more journals that focus on Turkey, could be analyzed to garner more data on the issue.
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From Prescription to Treatment: The Disciplinary (under)Achievement of IR in Turkey

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Yıldırım Beyazıt University

Buğra Sarı  
Mersin University

Çağla Lüleci-Sula  
TED University

Abstract

International Relations (IR) in Turkey has been assessed by scholars on topics, including but not limited to the need to increase contributions from Turkish IR scholars to theoretical discussions, the need for homegrown theorizing, and to improve the methodological quality of IR research originating in Turkey. This literature has revolved around the diagnosis of and prescriptions for what is referred to as the ‘disciplinary underachievement’ of IR in Turkey. Recently, an increasing number of scholars have focused on disciplinary self-reflection discussing the limitations and prospects in the state of the IR discipline in Turkey. Adding to this emergent literature, this paper identifies the reasons for the ‘disciplinary underachievement’ in Turkish IR. The paper discusses the conditions that hamper IR education in Turkey under three groups: 1) the structure and content of undergraduate and graduate curricula, 2) the state of IR as an academic discipline in Turkey, and 3) the state of IR literature in Turkish. The paper also offers suggestions for a prospective treatment to improve the state of the IR discipline and pedagogy in Turkey. It argues that an improvement in the quality of IR education has significant potential to contribute to further inclusion of locally produced IR knowledge into ‘global IR,’ which is widely cited in the existing literature as a significant sign of ‘disciplinary progress.’

Keywords: Global IR, Pedagogy, Methodology, Self-reflection, Turkey

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1 An earlier version of this research was presented at the 6th All Annual Azimuth Workshop: “Think Global Act Local: The Globalization of Turkish IR”, Bilkent University. November 6-7, 2021, Ankara. The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions received from the participants of and discussions at the workshop. The authors also appreciate the comments and contributions of the anonymous reviewers of All-Azimuth.
1. Introduction
Most IR scholars in Turkey are familiar with ‘self-reflections’ on the state of the discipline. Since the early 2000s, the literature has been built up on the development and limitations of the IR discipline and pedagogy. Discussions vary around topics ranging from structural conditions, such as the limitations of the higher education system, to the content-based and quality-based factors, such as critiques on theoretical and methodological improvement. In this article, we aim to identify what has been discussed so far, compare those discussions with what we observe and experience in the field, and point at a potential direction for further treatment of the existing limitations. We argue that reasons for what is cited as the ‘disciplinary underachievement’ of Turkish IR in the literature mainly emanate from pedagogical limitations at both undergraduate-level and graduate-level education.

Before diving into the literature and presenting our analysis and contribution, we consider it necessary to locate ourselves in this study as researchers who have experience in research abroad but got all our degrees in schools/universities in Turkey and currently hold faculty positions at different universities in the country. As scholars who have experienced most of the disciplinary limitations firsthand, we think that IR academia in the country has matured enough to move forward from ‘diagnosis and prescription’ of limitations to the ‘treatment’ of them. We argue that searching for treatment is significant because the persistence of those limitations continues to affect us and many of our counterparts on at least two main aspects: the training we offer in our IR classes and the way we do research and/or determine the agenda that we work on. We base our arguments and analyses on the assumption that educational background has a direct impact on what scholars research, and maybe more importantly, the ways scholars produce disciplinary knowledge.

The article has two main parts. In the first part, we review the ‘self-reflections’ of IR scholars on the state of the discipline. We utilize a comprehensive selection of conference papers, meeting minutes, online/video talks, surveys, and research articles where scholars identify and discuss the state of IR in Turkey and its development. In the second part, we present our assessment of the current state of the IR discipline in Turkey. We discuss what we prefer to call ‘disciplinary underachievement’ in three groups and offer prospects for the way forward: 1) the structure and content of undergraduate and graduate curricula, 2) the state of the IR discipline, and 3) the state of the IR literature. In addition to tracking the development of the discipline locally and locating our training and scholarship in it, this part also discusses the limitations that we experience in action. We discuss our findings and what we believe may become potential directions for the treatment of the above-mentioned limitations.

2. Self-reflections of Turkish IR Scholars: Local Disciplinary and Pedagogical Limitations
Turkey’s IR discipline has been studied by multiple scholars since the early 2000s. Discussions mostly revolve around the lack of theory development and methodological quality in Turkey’s IR. The state of IR education has been occasionally discussed at workshops and conferences. A significant attempt to discuss the state of IR education was made in the Workshop on International Relations Studies and Education in Turkey (April 16-17, 2005), a forum that convened Turkish IR scholars who were at different stages of their academic careers. Based on her observations during the workshop, Dedeoğlu identifies...
that the most frequently encountered limitations in Turkish IR studies are: 1) IR studies do not have a clear problematique, a thesis, or proposition(s), 2) methods and methodological choices are either absent or vague, 3) the conclusions of studies do not conclude the study but are mere summaries of what is written, 4) studies do not rely on the original/main sources but rather benefit from secondary sources, 5) mistakes in referencing and footnotes, and 6) vague and incomprehensible Turkish language in translated studies. Dedeoğlu also refers to the problems of IR as a profession in Turkey. According to her arguments, professors have a heavy course load, are pushed to teach courses that do not fall into their areas of expertise and are underpaid. These factors are cited as hampering scholars’ potential and leading them to neglect some of their responsibilities.

In a follow-up roundtable organized by the International Relations Council (Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi) at Middle East Technical University (METU), Turkish IR scholars discussed the shortcomings and the state of IR in Turkey. Aydın, citing what Suat Bilge put forward in 1961, identifies two anomalies in Turkish IR: there is a ‘lack of interest in reading’ among Turkish IR students, and there is too much emphasis on current events rather than analysis in IR studies. He argues that in 2005, after forty-five years, Turkish IR scholars had kept complaining about similar problems. Based on his observations at the Ilgaz Conference (the conference on April 16-17, mentioned above) he adds that significant limitations in Turkish IR are the lack of conceptual analysis, the lack of methods/methodology, and the lack of established local epistemic communities. In the same roundtable, when asked about the state of IR, Karaosmanoğlu summarizes the progress of IR in Turkey in four stages. The first is the Mekteb-i Mülkiye stage where IR was taught as a vocation. As IR departments mainly aimed at training prospective diplomats, the focus of IR education around the 1960s was “the Turkish state’s needs and explanation of Turkey’s foreign policy and Turkish diplomatic history.”

The second stage is when IR theory is more adequately referred to (relative to the previous stage) during the late 1960s and 1970s. This shift was mainly dominated by the political science departments of METU, Boğaziçi University, and Istanbul University. The third stage is in the 1980s, which corresponded with Turkey’s economic opening to the international economic system in the Özal period. As Karaosmanoğlu argues, this paved the way for the entrance of new sub-fields into Turkish IR, such as International Political Economy and liberal IR theories. The fourth stage was the post-Cold War period when certain Turkish universities opened graduate programs specifically on International Relations, separating it from Political Science. IR “moved from simplicity and inflexibility of the Cold War to cover much more diversity and complexity of international relations.”

From the discussion of the abovementioned four stages, one may identify the direction of the evolution of IR in Turkey from a more history-oriented discipline towards a theory-oriented one. In the first stage, the IR discipline seems to be more interested in descriptions of Turkish foreign policy, while in the second stage there is a limited introduction of IR theory

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3  Ibid., 153.
4  Mustafa Aydın cited in Şule Kut et al., “Workshop Report International Relations Studies and Education in Turkey” Uluslararası İlişkiler 2, no. 6 (2005): 131–47.
5  Ibid., 136.
6  Ibid., 138.
7  Ibid., 140.
that mainly revolves around the Cold War conception of security. The third stage welcomes a limited diversification in theoretical approaches, while in the fourth stage there is a relatively more comprehensive diversification in the knowledge and use of IR theory among Turkish IR scholars. Appreciating the level of development in the quality of IR scholarship in Turkey, Karaosmanoğlu also identifies a continuing deficiency. He points out that IR research in Turkey is opening itself to ‘global’ academia as the number of international publications increases; however, Turkish IR scholars “have not contributed to the development of IR theory yet.” Eralp agrees with Karaosmanoğlu and claims that although there is a significant improvement in IR education in Turkey, Turkey’s IR scholars still need progress in terms of theory. Eralp also adds two more directions for improvement. The first one is the “issue of methodology,” which is especially significant in teaching and doing research in IR, and the second one is the need for more collaboration among IR departments and scholars across Turkey.

Another significant point is made by Bilgin in her article that situates the state of Turkey’s IR discipline on the wider global “center-periphery relations” debate. The argument is based on several other IR scholars’ observation that “standard” concepts and theories of IR that are developed in the ‘center’—the ‘developed’ world—remain insufficient in explaining the problems of the ‘periphery’—the ‘developing’ world. As the development of conceptual frameworks continues to be monopolized by the center, a hierarchical division of labor with those in the periphery is also being reproduced. According to this division of labor, those in the center develop the standard theories and concepts, while those in periphery adopt them—occasionally regardless of their capacity to explain or understand other experiences—to apply to their respective empirical cases. Focusing specifically on security studies, Bilgin argues that Turkish scholars do not necessarily debate whether the ‘standard’ conception of security applies to the Turkish case. Yet, this standard conception of security that mainly focuses on external threats and realist alliance theories has been insufficient to explain the insecurities that Turkey has faced. In the period when the IR discipline was newly established in the country, the standard concepts and theories were accepted without question, used in academic studies, and taught to students of IR in Turkey. Bilgin points at an important path forward for IR scholars in Turkey. Scholars in Turkey may ‘debate’ the applicability of existing ‘standard’ concepts and theories and, when necessary, contribute with new and more applicable ones through conceptual and theoretical criticism inspired by Turkey’s experiences.

We observe a flourishing debate by the late 2000s on scholars’ self-reflections regarding the state of IR discipline. For instance, based on an interview conducted with Turkish IR scholars, Aydın assesses the scientific research and teaching perspectives.

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8 Ibid., 137–40.
9 Ibid., 140.
10 Ibid., 143.
12 Ibid., 7–8.
13 Ibid., 8.
14 Ibid., 11.
decades. By the 2000s, scientific debates in Turkey’s IR had, to some extent, reached a level parallel to IR scholarship in the West. IR scholars have overcome the limitation of ‘just studying Turkey,’ have developed an interest in global politics, and have started to discuss the possibility of developing a ‘local theory’ of international relations and providing specific courses on various sub-fields of IR, including but not limited to political economy, strategic studies, and security studies. Observing a similar diversification in IR education, Keyman and Ülkü made a comparative assessment of the undergraduate curricula of various IR departments in Turkey. They emphasize that, based on the courses offered, IR undergraduate education has limitations on the topics like political theory, globalization, security and conflict studies, and methods. The authors suggest that IR departments need to improve their capacity to teach political theory to support IR theory knowledge and should offer specific courses on globalization, security studies, and research methods. They identify that despite the importance of methods in the development of the IR discipline, undergraduate curricula have somehow overlooked the significance of methodology and the need to include specific courses on research methods.

The literature also discussed limitations in graduate education. For instance, Özcan identifies a list of structural and student-related limitations of graduate education. In terms of structural limitations, he claims that social sciences in general do not receive adequate attention and funding. This fact results in limited library resources, causes indifference in training graduate students and, as a result, a limited number of faculty members, and turns out as a high course load for professors and limited variety in course offerings. Another structural limitation he points out is the insufficient training that graduate students take in their undergraduate education. Third, IR graduate programs are too ‘Turkey-oriented,’ and limited attention is devoted to other countries and areas. Özcan also highlights the consequences of these problems. For instance, academic advisors and jury members tend not to devote enough time and proper attention to graduate theses and dissertations. He identifies the inadequacy in the number of books and articles written in Turkish on main topics such as IR theory and foreign policy analysis. Özcan also also student-related limitations in graduate education. First and foremost, there is a lack of motivation among students, as they generally tend to see graduate education not as a way of becoming a scholar, but instead as a way of postponing unemployment or compulsory military service. He also touches upon limited financial resources, bursaries, and stipends given to graduate students as a potential reason for the loss of motivation among graduate students.

Scholars also discussed the issue of local theory-building in Turkish IR. Kurubaş identifies two important characteristics of IR in Turkey that hampers the development of

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16 Here, we should take note that there is no “common” definition of “improvement” or “failure” in IR among the scholars that we cited throughout this article. However, we understand that scholars usually tend to compare the state of IR in Turkey with the state of global IR (or IR in the “West”) or count the number of research articles written by Turkish scholars in WoS/Scopus Indexed and refereed international journals to discuss “improvement and failure.”
17 Ibid., 3.
18 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 107–9.
22 Ibid., 109–10.
23 Ibid., 110–11.
a local theoretical approach: ‘historical-factualism’ and ‘interdisciplinary research.’

He argues that while these are not negative or undesired characteristics, Turkish IR scholars should define the limits of historical analysis and interdisciplinarity to provide more space for local theory development and scientific and analytical research, thereby defining the limits of the IR discipline.

The author argues that since historical factualism leads to descriptive but not necessarily analytical studies, IR scholars should move towards a more theoretical perspective. He adds that rather than defining itself as an ‘interdisciplinary discipline,’ IR should move towards becoming an ‘independent and original discipline’ to achieve scientific progress.

Kurubaş suggests that offering research methods in social sciences and philosophy of social sciences to IR students may be a way to overcome this limitation. Looking at the issue from an alternative perspective, Yalçınkaya and Efegil stress the estrangement or alienation in IR education. They argue that Turkish scholars have left the responsibility of developing theories to Western theoreticians while concentrating on writing descriptive studies. As a result, while contributions of non-Western local experiences to IR theories remain limited, theoretical approaches that are produced by Western scholars based on the experiences of Western societies are accepted as universally valid approaches.

They make a call to Turkish IR scholars to focus more on theory development rather than contributing to this dependent relationship. They suggest that while using English or other foreign languages is an integral part of IR pedagogy, Turkish IR scholars should publish in Turkish, and IR education should be given in Turkish.

The debate on theory development continued as other scholars also comprehensively searched for the potential for local theory development. By the late 2000s and 2010s, Aydınlı and Mathews produced a couple of pieces where they elaborated on the possibility of developing original theories, or what they prefer to call ‘homegrown theorizing,’ and maybe even developing an ‘Anatolian School of IR.’ They assess the development of Turkish IR with reference to the above-mentioned ‘four stages’ defined by Karaoğlan and add that ‘non-elite IR scholars’ (local periphery) have used theory as a way to balance the dominance of ‘elite IR scholars’ in the field (Mülkiye Tradition - local core). They identify that by the early 1990s, many Turkish IR students were sent abroad for graduate education. When those scholars returned from North American and European universities, they had a...
more theory-oriented research interest, which led to a rise in theoretical studies produced in Turkey. Yet, Aydınlı and Mathews highlight that having a theory-oriented research interest does not necessarily result in the development of new theories. They base this argument on their assessment of ‘theorizing’ under four categories: 1) pure theorizing, 2) application theorizing, 3) translation theorizing, and 4) homegrown theorizing.

The authors observe that Turkish IR has been unable to move beyond application and translation scholarship and discuss potential reasons for the continuing “underachievement of homegrown-theorizing.” One of the reasons they address is the above-mentioned use of theory by new generations of “foreign-trained” IR scholars to balance the dominance of the “elites” at the local core: “With theory being used as a balance of power tool, its practice often remains elusive, unsubstantiated, and shallow.” They highlight that some professors who did not take any comprehensive exams on theory during their graduate education are assigned to offer graduate-level IR theory courses, give training to new generations of IR scholars, and even come to be known as “theorists” just because they completed graduate education abroad. This resulted in a non-comprehensive understanding of theory among graduate students as those scholars offer a “limited picture of IR theory – focusing on whatever theory(ies) the professor is familiar with, from selected epistemological and methodological approaches to formal IR theories.”

Aydınlı and Mathews also highlight the “memorization-based” education system, lack of methodology training, limited pay-back (media coverage, television spots, newspaper columns) of theoretical studies, publication criteria, and standards in Turkey that discourage conceptual and theoretical studies, and lack of “a cohesive, conscious, organized, and institutionalized Turkish IR disciplinary community” as possible reasons. Yet, they do not only blame Turkey-based (global periphery) causes, but also argue that the global core, “where training patterns, advisor–student relationships, core prejudices, and scholarly competition all tend to push the periphery student and scholar away from engaging fully in theoretical discussions,” also has responsibility. They address the “IR theory classroom” as a starting point and “front” for local theoretical improvement.

Based on the Teaching, Research, and International Politics (TRIP) survey made with IR scholars in 2009, Aydın and Yazgan put forward several indicators which, they argue, prove that IR scholars in Turkey “have made progress” in developing a local disciplinary community, and that the IR discipline has significantly matured in the country, especially during the 2000s. They come up with certain indicators of such progress: an increase in the number and quality of ‘global level’ publications; establishment of regular IR conferences that convene scholars from different parts of the world in Turkey; and increased participation of Turkish IR scholars in international conferences to become part of the global IR community. Other indicators are the establishment of new IR journals and quality improvement in the

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35 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 706–10.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 217–18.
41 Ibid., 218.
42 Ibid., 220.
existing ones, and finally, the increasing number of funding opportunities by higher education institutions.\textsuperscript{44}

Aydın and Yazgan’s findings show that scholars mainly focus on foreign policy, Turkey, and great power rivalry, while realism is relatively more widespread than other theories of IR.\textsuperscript{45} Compared to the previous period, the authors appreciate this level of development and the relative diversity in the local community. When compared with the follow-up surveys in 2011, 2014, and 2018, their findings indicate that IR scholars continued to have a narrow theoretical focus. Despite the level of complexity in IR theory literature at the global level, Turkey’s IR discipline seems to get increasingly dominated by the three mainstream theoretical approaches: Realism, Constructivism, and Liberalism.\textsuperscript{46} Referring to the previous discussion on the disciplinary core and periphery relations,\textsuperscript{47} Aydın and Dizdaroğlu also observe that IR in the country has continued to remain at the periphery as the function of the studies produced in Turkey is shifting from “telling Turkey’s story to the world” to “telling the story from Turkey to Turkey.”\textsuperscript{48}

The findings of the above-mentioned consecutive surveys also indicate that despite all academic meetings where scholars problematize, identify, diagnose, and prescribe solutions for the underachievement in theory, and despite all the ‘urge’ and ‘call’ for local theory development, theoretical studies in Turkey’s IR discipline has kept reproducing the local disciplinary community as an emulator of what has been produced at the core. Aydınlı and Biltekin relate this situation to the lack of methodological diversity and, therefore, knowledge accumulation.\textsuperscript{49} They claim that due to the lack of methodological diversity, IR community in the country remained “fragmented,” and studies have not been able to engage in dialogue with each other. This inability to communicate hampers scholarly debates, which resulted in an underachievement in knowledge production and theory development. Referring to TRIP Surveys and their analysis of 251 articles written by Turkish scholars, they argue that the

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 8–9.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 30–31.
\textsuperscript{46} The four consecutive surveys indicate that the scholars in Turkey who identify their theoretical approach with one of these three theories are 56% in 2009, 65% in 2011, 70% in 2014, and 69% in 2018. Those who identified themselves with critical theory were significant in 2009 with 9%, but relatively declined in 2011 to 5%, and were counted among ‘other approaches’ in 2014 and 2018. Those who identify themselves with ‘other theoretical approaches’ also declined significantly from 18% in 2009 (Critical Theory excluded), 11% (with 5% Critical Theory included) in 2011, 10% (with critical theory) in 2014, and 9% in 2018. The percentage of scholars who do not use any theoretical approach increased from 5% in 2009 to 11% in 2011 and remained relatively constant at around 9-10% in the following surveys. See the TRIP Surveys for further comparison: Ibid., 31; Mustafa Aydın and Korhan Yazgan, “Türkiye’de Uluslararası İlişkiler Akademisyenleri Eğitim, Araştırma ve Uluslararası Politika Anketi-Anketa-2011 [International Relations Scholars in Turkey Education, Research, and International Politics Survey-2011],” Uluslararası İlişkiler 9, no. 36 (2013): 18; Mustafa Aydın, Fulya Hisarlioğlu, and Korhan Yazgan, “Türkiye’de Uluslararası İlişkiler Akademisyenleri ve Alana Yönelik Yaklaşmalar Üzerine Bir İncелеme. TRIP 2014 Sonuçları [An Investigation of International Relations Academics and their Approaches to the Field: TRIP 2014 Results].” Uluslararası İlişkiler 12, no. 48 (2016): 15; Mustafa Aydın and Cihan Dizdaroğlu, “Türkiye’de Uluslararası İlişkiler: TRIP 2018 Sonuçları Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme [International Relations in Turkey: An Assessment of the Results of the 2018 TRIP Survey],” Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi 16, no. 64 (December 1, 2019): 13, https://doi.org/10.33458/ulidergi.652877.
methodological choices of Turkish scholars are predominantly “qualitative.” They suggest that Turkish IR scholars may benefit from utilizing more “quantitative” methodology, as it would require the researchers to define the concepts and clarify the indicators they use, collect data to produce comparable empirical results, and create studies that have methodological clarity. In turn, they offer that the methodological clarity required by quantitative studies may become a solution to the fragmentation in the local disciplinary community and promote progressive scholarly debates. In line with this argument, Aydınlı, later on, argues that one of the most important problems of IR in Turkey is not the lack of theoretical studies but instead the lack of methodological quality. He argues that “methodology, its tools and approaches and the expertise needed to apply them in a competent and skilled manner, constitutes the universal language of an academic discipline.” He observes two interrelated limitations: “lack of appreciation for the importance of methodology,” and “overall inadequacy in the knowledge of and competence in applying methodological approaches and tools.” Aydınlı argues that these limitations also affect the training that the new generation of IR scholars get in Turkey, which in turn affects the quality of theses, dissertations, and studies.

Observing the disciplinary self-reflections, Sula suggests that Turkish IR scholars should move from the diagnosis and prescription of problems to the actual treatment of them. While appreciating Aydınlı and Biltekin’s suggestions on methodological clarity, he argues that an exclusionary position on the ‘qualitative methods versus quantitative methods’ distinction may hamper the authors’ call for the development of a ‘non-fragmented’ local community. Alternatively, he proposes that what the IR discipline in Turkey needs is not “more quantitative methods but instead more ‘methods’ in general.” Conceptual and methodological clarity should not be seen as exclusive characteristics of quantitative approaches, but instead, they should be seen as characteristics of all scholarly studies. Sula highlights a tendency to label every ‘non-quantitative’ study as ‘qualitative,’ which is also an important limitation that Turkish IR scholars should overcome. To further clarify this claim, he presents data from another study that analyzes all “securitization” articles written in Turkish and published in an IR journal indexed in the Turkish citation index, ULAKBIM. His data indicates that none (0 out of 34) of those articles label their methodological approach as ‘quantitative,’ and more than half of the articles (18 out of 34) do not talk about their methodological approach at all. In the remaining half (16 out of 34), the authors imply the use of a “qualitative approach” in their research. These figures indicate that Turkish scholars predominantly use qualitative methods in their articles. However, Sula argues that an in-depth study of these

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50 Ibid., 268–79.51 Ibid., 279–83.
54 Aydinli, “Methodological Poverty and Disciplinary Underdevelopment in IR.”
55 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 13.
58 Ibid., 14.
figures better clarifies the problem. He proposes that Scholars may have a better grasp of the methodological quality problem if they get beyond the ‘qualitative versus quantitative’ dichotomy and make a proper meta-theoretical distinction between the term ‘methodology – as defining the scholarly approach’ and ‘methods – defining the technique/tool used to collect information.’60 After making this distinction, he identifies that only 26% (9 out of 34) of the authors specified which research method they used in their article.61

In addition to the analysis of the securitization literature, Sula also argues that “qualitative research does not imply methods-free research or an ‘anything goes’ approach” and highlights that “specifying the methodological approach does not directly result in methodological clarity.”62 While agreeing with the existing literature on the need for improvement in methodology training and encouraging methodological clarity, he highlights that the way forward does not necessarily have to be a more ‘quantitative’ one. Sula prescribes that rather than establishing ideological and exclusionary positions between quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methodological approaches, training new generations of graduate students through data-collection projects and the establishment of a social science data repository where Turkish scholars may openly share data may turn out to be a feasible direction in encouraging methodological clarity in Turkey’s IR.63 Turkish IR scholars should increase the number of ‘data-collection’ projects and let graduate students get training in action by participating in all stages of data collection.

Table 1 below illustrates the main arguments put forward by the abovementioned literature. Although respective studies have their understanding of what failure/limitation and improvement/progress are, one can identify similar points made by most of these scholars. Diversification of subjects and subfields in both teaching and research is cited by most scholars as a sign of improvement. An increase in theoretical debates and theory-building attempts are also considered to be an indicator of progress in the IR discipline. Researching cases other than Turkey, taking part in ‘international’ conferences, and publishing in ‘international’ journals are usually regarded as signs of participating in ‘global IR.’ We interpret that there is a tendency among Turkish scholars to regard this—becoming part of global IR (usually IR in the “West”)—as an improvement in the IR discipline. Definitions of underdevelopment and limitation further strengthen this interpretation. In terms of IR research in Turkey, insufficient efforts to conduct theoretical research, as well as to establish ‘home-grown’ theoretical and conceptual frameworks that are fed by Turkey’s experiences, are widely cited as obstacles to a developed discipline in Turkey. As the table illustrates, recently, some scholars also argue that the lack of the proper use of methods or methodological rigor is the main reason behind disciplinary underachievement, which has a mutually constitutive relationship with insufficiency in methods and methodology training in undergraduate and graduate education. What makes this deficiency part of the global IR debate is that these scholars present methodology as a common language that would help Turkish IR researchers to communicate with the outside world, or ‘global IR.’ Moreover, Turkish as a medium of instruction and language of research in publications is also considered to be one of the crucial points of discussion for disciplinary development.

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60 Sula, “‘Global’ IR and Self-Reflections in Turkey,” 17.
61 Ibid.; Sula, “Güvenlikleştirme Kuramında ‘ Söz Edim’ ve ‘Pratikler.’”
63 Ibid., 19–22.
Table 1. Arguments about Limitations and Improvement in IR in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Limitations in research</th>
<th>Limitations in teaching</th>
<th>Improvement in research</th>
<th>Improvement in teaching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dedeoğlu cited in Aydın et al. (2005)</td>
<td>Lack of argumentative studies, methodology, use of original sources; mistakes in referencing; poor translation</td>
<td>Heavy course loads; teaching outside area of expertise; underpayment in academia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın cited in Aydın et al. (2005)</td>
<td>Lack of conceptual analysis, methodology; epistemic communities</td>
<td>Students’ lack of interest in reading; too much emphasis on current events; lack of analysis training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karaoğlanoğlu cited in Aydın et al. (2005)</td>
<td>Lack of contribution to IR theory development</td>
<td></td>
<td>New sub-fields (in the post-Cold War)</td>
<td>Diversity and complexity (since the 1960s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eralp cited in Aydın et al. (2005)</td>
<td>Lack of contribution to IR theory, collaboration among IR scholars, methods/methodology</td>
<td>Lack of collaboration among departments, methodology training</td>
<td></td>
<td>Improvement in IR teaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın (2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase in ‘global level’ publications; establishment of conferences in Turkey; participation in international conferences; establishment of IR journals; increasing funding opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilgin (2005)</td>
<td>Lack of criticism of ‘standard’ concepts and theories based on Turkey’s experiences</td>
<td>Focus on ‘standard’ concepts and theories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keyman and Ülkü (2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited IR education in political theory, globalization, conflict studies, and methods;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özcan (2007)</td>
<td>Lack of IR theory and foreign policy literature in Turkish</td>
<td>Lack of funding, library sources; limited number of faculty members; heavy workload; limited course variety; Turkey-oriented curricula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karubaş (2008)</td>
<td>‘Historical-factualism’ and ‘interdisciplinary research’; lack of analytical studies, theory development</td>
<td>Lack of methods and philosophy of social sciences training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yalçınkaya and Efeçil (2009)</td>
<td>Lack of theory development, IR studies in Turkish</td>
<td>English as the medium of instruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydınli and Mathews (2008; 2008a; 2009)</td>
<td>Lack of homegrown theorizing; instrumentalization of theory; limited pay-back of theoretical studies; publication criteria; lack of disciplinary community</td>
<td>Non-comprehensive understanding of theory among graduate students; memorization-based education; lack of methodology training</td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of theory-oriented research (in the post-Cold War)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın and Yazgan (2013)</td>
<td>Narrow theoretical focus (Realism, Constructivism, Liberalism)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Progress towards a local disciplinary community; increase in ‘global level’ publications; establishment of conferences in Turkey; participation in international conferences; establishment of IR journals; increasing funding opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydınlı and Dizdaroğlu (2019)</td>
<td>Remains in the periphery (telling the story from Turkey to Turkey)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydınlı and Bültekin (2017)</td>
<td>Lack of methodological diversity, and knowledge accumulation; fragmented IR community (inability to communicate); underachievement in theory development; lack of quantitative methodology</td>
<td>Inadequacy in the knowledge of methodology and competence in applying methods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydınlı (2018)</td>
<td>Lack of methodological quality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sula (2022)</td>
<td>Inadequacy in the knowledge of methods, methodology, meta-theory</td>
<td>Lack of training in methods, methodology, and data collection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. IR Education in Turkey: The Current ‘State of the Art’

Reviewing the previous literature on the state of the IR discipline, we identify three generations of IR scholars in Turkey. The first generation of scholars, those who correspond with Karaosmanoğlu’s abovementioned first stage, tended to focus more on diplomatic history, international law, and descriptive explanations of Turkish foreign policy, as their main aim was to train students for diplomatic service. The second generation, those who have trained abroad as Aydınlı and Mathews mentioned, tended to focus more on IR theoretical analysis, as they used theory in their encounters with the first generation and as a way of balancing the dominance of the local elite (which is again represented mostly by the first generation). As the IR discipline developed in Turkey and the number of IR departments and scholars increased, we are now observing a third generation in the making that has hybrid characteristics. A significant portion of scholars of this hybrid third generation are trained by a mixture of first- and second-generation scholars (probably more by the second one), and the remaining portion of this generation is trained or continues to be trained abroad. This hybrid generation has gone through most limitations that are indicated in the self-reflections of the second generation. As such, the responsibility of overcoming some of those already diagnosed limitations and finding prescriptions or, if possible, treatment for the problems faced by the local IR community would most likely fall upon the shoulders of the third generation; at least on those who are willing to take it.

As the authors of this article, we are scholars trained mostly by the abovementioned second-generation IR scholars. This is significant not only for locating ourselves in this research, but also, because we have experienced most of the structural problems that IR scholars have written and talked about, and we may testify for them. Together with limitations already diagnosed in the local IR discipline, we also have observations on the limitations that affect our scholarship in two aspects. First, these limitations affect the training we offer in our education for the next generation of scholars.
undergraduate and graduate-level IR classes. Second, they affect the way we do research and determine the agenda that we work on. While discussing the contemporary state of the discipline, adding to the existing literature, we discuss these limitations under three groups and offer prospects for the way forward: 1) the state of undergraduate and graduate education in Turkey, 2) the state of the IR discipline in Turkey, and 3) the state of IR literature in Turkish.

Reasons for the ‘disciplinary underachievement’ in the Turkish IR discipline mainly emanate from pedagogical limitations in IR education. Both undergraduate and graduate IR education in Turkey have their distinct but interrelated issues. It is important to start with curricula and sourcebooks. First, most IR curricula in Turkey lack specific courses on disciplinary concepts. The data we collected from twenty-three IR departments across Turkey (see Table 2) confirms this argument. Students usually encounter IR concepts in IR theory and introduction to world politics courses. Consequently, these courses cannot devote enough time to get students engaged with the philosophical roots of the concepts, how their definitions and meanings have changed across different theories, and the ways they can be utilized to analyze global politics. Students, most of the time, take theory courses without being able to define ‘theory’ as a concept. Such a pedagogical limitation reduces future scholars’ ability to think conceptually in academic research, which hampers their capacity to make conceptual and theoretical contributions from ‘local’ to ‘global.’ We believe that this feeds what Aydınlı and Matthews mention as Turkish IR’s tendency to only produce ‘translation conceptualizing.’

IR departments tend to locate research methods courses in freshman or sophomore years. While most (19 out of 23) IR departments are offering method courses in the first two years, only a few (3 out of 23) have their method courses in the third year, and one IR department does not have any method courses in the curriculum. Considering that most of these students are not yet taught courses on the fundamental concepts and principles of IR, as well as basic requirements of research in social sciences, it is too early for them to be able to properly master methods of inquiry. This situation has a wider impact on the quality of methods courses as it causes the lecturers to simplify the content of the course to adapt it to the current level of the students. As a result, most courses on methods cannot provide a detailed account of the methodological roots and principles of research, nor a systematic application of certain methods as tools to conduct empirical research. An interesting finding is that in most IR departments, these courses are not offered by scholars specialized in methods and methodology. In some cases, these courses are taught by scholars from other disciplines. Specifically, methods courses are offered or coordinated by IR scholars in twelve departments, while six departments assign these courses to scholars from other disciplines. Based on their own claim in the information packages on their official university websites, none of them specifically specialize in research methods and methodology.

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67 We applied the following systematic selection criteria: 1) Each university has an IR department with a consolidated history (established more than 10 years ago), 2) each university has online-accessible information packages including department curricula, and 3) We also limited our selection 5 from Ankara and Istanbul (randomly selected), and at least 1 university from each geographical region of the country. The results and tables do not have information on all universities in Turkey but aim to give a general representation of the state of IR discipline in the country.

68 There is no information regarding the lecturer of the methods course in the information package of five IR departments.
Table 2. Undergraduate Courses on Concepts and Research Methods in IR Departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Semester of Research Methods Course</th>
<th>Origin of Lecturer</th>
<th>Lecturer’s Specialization in Research Methods</th>
<th>Courses on IR Concepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U1</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U2</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Non-IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U3</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U4</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U5</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Non-IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U6</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Non-IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U7</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U8</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U9</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U10</td>
<td>Mersin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U11</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Non-IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U12</td>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U13</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U14</td>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U15</td>
<td>Kayseri</td>
<td>2</td>
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The abovementioned issues are also observed in graduate education. Limitations on teaching concepts, theories, and methods in the undergraduate classroom have a multiplier effect on problems in graduate education. Students that lack conceptual and theoretical thinking, as well as proper skills in applying methods, have difficulties in improving their abilities in graduate education. Most graduate IR programs do not have courses that teach the main IR concepts and their philosophical underpinnings in their curricula. Research methods courses are not designed specifically for students of IR in most of these programs. Again, and even more questionable than undergraduate education, research methods courses are given by lecturers from other disciplines or scholars without a methodology expertise. This deficiency hampers IR students’ capacity to properly utilize methods in their research, as is evident in the master’s and Ph.D. dissertations, and which is also related to limitations in graduate supervision, at least for two interrelated reasons. 69 First, advisors’ competencies in main concepts and theoretical and methodological approaches might be insufficient. As a result, these limitations are constantly in reproduction. The second factor, also addressed in the literature, might be related to the heavy workloads of advisors. Due to a lack of proper planning in the master’s and Ph.D. admission processes, professors in most IR departments must undertake more supervision duties than they can manage, which reduces the time they can devote to each student. This problem results in the production of theses and dissertations.

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that only satisfy the minimum requirements of graduation, far from having done proper considerations of conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues.

Our review of the literature suggests that the state of the IR discipline has so far been referred to as ‘underachieved’ or ‘underdeveloped’ on theoretical and methodological grounds. Considering these limitations at different levels of education, it is probably not realistic to expect original contributions or the integration of ‘local knowledge and experiences’ to the existing global debates on concepts and theories. Based on our teaching and supervision experiences, we also argue that there are limited conceptual contributions to disciplinary concepts in terms of meaning-clarification (or conceptualization), classification, and application in theses and dissertations produced in Turkey. Rather than engaging in systematic conceptual analysis, dissertations tend to utilize concepts to explain or understand a particular case study. According to data we gathered from the National Thesis Center (Ulusal Tez Merkezi) of the Higher Education Council (Yükseköğretim Kurulu), there are only twenty-nine theses and dissertations that engage in conceptual analysis among a total of 5,769 produced in IR and related sub-fields between 2000 and 2022. This means that only 0.5% of the dissertations produced in IR and related departments in Turkey engage in conceptual analysis, which indicates that Turkish IR academia seems to have little interest in studying and developing disciplinary concepts.

We argue that conceptual thinking and analysis are significant due to their relations with disciplinary knowledge production and theory building. Concepts have a central role in knowledge production because they make it possible to distinguish a particular object, event, action, or set of relations from whatever ‘is not’ that object, event, action, or set of relations within a discipline. This is to say that concepts are basic building blocks of a discipline (see Figure 1). For example, IR as a discipline is built and developed upon a series of disciplinary concepts and disciplinary reflections on those concepts such as international, diplomacy, war, peace, anarchy, state, power, security, hegemony, interdependence, emancipation, and so on. Therefore, conceptual analysis of disciplinary concepts helps to identify borders of discipline, improve scholarly communication, and produce knowledge.

Conceptual analysis as a method of inquiry can be descriptive or performative. Descriptive conceptual analysis is to clarify and explicate a concept, demonstrate its links with other concepts, and identify different utilizations of them. Conceptual clarity is one of the main elements to achieve scholarly communication, seen as the key condition for the advancement of knowledge within a discipline. Performative conceptual analysis engages in conceptual history or genealogy by questioning how the concept at hand has arrived at its current meaning. Hence, performative analysis relies on the argument that it is “impossible to isolate concepts from the theories in which they are embedded, and which constitute part of their very meaning.” This refers to a mutually constitutive relationship between conceptual formation and theoretical formation. Furthermore, as Guzzini states, conceptual analysis...
is performative in the sense that it affects the order of social relations and is also part of the social construction of knowledge. Thus, the lack of interest in concept development contributes to the discipline’s limited capacity in identifying, labeling, classifying, and relating the objects, events, and phenomena to develop original theoretical approaches and arguments. This further limits Turkish IR’s capacity to contribute to the global based on local experiences and approaches.

Figure 1: The Place of Concepts in Scientific Knowledge Production

Graduate theses and dissertations perform better in the use of theory than in conceptual analysis. However, we agree with the previously defined diagnosis in the literature that most of these studies conduct ‘translation’ or ‘application theorizing’ without necessarily making original theoretical contributions. Moreover, theoretical and empirical chapters of the dissertations appear as separate researches that is not necessarily contributing to the dissertations’ main arguments and analyses. Most dissertations share this similar structure: limited discussion on methods in the introductory chapters, a literature review chapter on theory, and a literature review chapter on the case, which is usually not connected to the theory. The number of dissertations that utilize appropriate methods is also considerably low. Most of those that utilize some sort of methods also cannot fulfill the sufficient criteria of methodological clarity and transparency as they do not explain the actual steps of data collection, analysis, and interpretation. Here, the distinction between methodology and research methods should be highlighted. While the former points to “the logical structure and procedure of scientific inquiry” and specifies the relationship between the researcher and the world that is being researched, the latter refers to actual techniques for collecting, processing, and analyzing data or information. Methodology, whether objectivist or interpretivist determines methods. Sound methods based on deliberate methodology selection provide the research community with an opportunity to test the validity of claims through an interrogation of the processes of data collection, processing, and findings. In this regard, lack of methods and methodological clarity limits not only replicability, but also scholarly communication, and stands as a challenge to the potential to further progress in concept- and theory-building.

Another limitation that we want to point out is related to the literature on IR in Turkish. Due to the history and development of IR as an “American social science” (see Hoffman, 1977), the English language has worldwide dominance in IR course materials, which is also the case

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75 Ibid., 513.
in Turkey. Therefore, most IR departments in the country rely heavily on translated course material. A professor who teaches IR in the Turkish language has roughly three options: 1) they may read in English, translate the reading material, and summarize the content as lecture notes/slides, 2) they may take the challenge to produce a textbook in Turkish on the course they offer, and assign the end product to students, 3) they may rely on the literature in Turkish for quality material to assign to students. The first option is neither feasible nor sustainable in the long run. It is not feasible because through lecture notes and slides, there can only be a limited amount of knowledge and skill transfer to students. In addition, this option limits the personal research and self-development capacity of students by getting them accustomed to ready-made course material. It is not sustainable because considering the average course load of professors in most universities, academics do not have enough time to translate/summarize/prepare lecture notes for each course they offer. The same reasons apply to the second option. In addition to giving a limited perspective to the students, it is not practical or even possible for a professor to write a textbook on every course they have to offer. The third option, which is to utilize the existing material written in Turkish, remains the most feasible one with the caveat of all the limitations we touched upon so far regarding the state of Turkish IR literature.

To provide an example from IR theory courses, most theory books in Turkish seem to adopt ‘translation theorizing,’ essentially summarizing the existing literature in English without a sufficient in-depth analysis of theoretical and meta-theoretical assumptions and arguments. Moreover, those books are not necessarily interested in engaging with the interpretation and categorization of theoretical approaches in IR or contributing to ‘global’ debates within IR theory literature. On the other hand, students that are educated in full or partial English-medium IR departments that assign source books in English have their own issues in mastering theories due to the language barrier. As a result, most students experience difficulties in learning theories thoroughly, and in some cases, their knowledge of theories remains descriptive and maybe even superficial. Utilizing this literature without carefully selecting the material would be nothing more than reproducing the current limitations or postponing the solution to the problem.78

We agree with Özcan’s above mentioned argument that the lack of a rich literature on IR in Turkish stands as a challenge that hampers further development in IR. Writing books, articles, and book chapters in Turkish based on solid methodological, theoretical, and conceptual analysis may be a way out of this problem for those Turkish scholars willing to take the responsibility. It is an obstacle both for research on the development of concepts and theories that are based on Turkey’s (local) experience and for progress in teaching in universities with Turkish as their medium of instruction. The responsibility, unfortunately, falls heavily on the ‘hybrid third generation’ of Turkish IR scholars mentioned above. If new generations of Turkish IR scholars continue to be inadequately trained and unable to develop original theoretical, methodological, and conceptual studies, the problems faced by IR programs offering Turkish education will in turn become a ‘chicken and egg problem.’ We need more IR studies written in Turkish, but the only ones who seem to care about this need and may be willing to address the problems in the Turkish IR literature are those that are educated in Turkish. If IR scholars ignore this need, new generations of scholars educated in

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78 For now, we leave the task to write a detailed article specifically focusing on the shortcomings of IR literature in Turkish to a courageous future author of such a study.
Turkish will most likely continue to reproduce the very Turkish IR literature that seems to be problematized (or not problematized at all) by Turkish IR scholars.

Last but not least, it is also necessary to briefly bring up the academic quality assessment and promotion criteria in Turkish higher education as hampering IR education in the country. Such criteria encourage scholars to produce in English and publish in ‘high impact factor’ journals, while scholars who contribute to Turkish literature are being pushed to the margins. Universities’ prioritization of English-written academic publications and encouragement of assigning only English-written material in course syllabi hampers the development of Turkish IR literature. Those ‘prestigious’ IR departments also apply ‘Ph.D. degrees from Western (mostly American) institutions’ as recruitment criteria, which discourages young researchers and students in their attempts and enthusiasm to contribute to the local development of the discipline. To say the least, this trend contributes to the ‘disciplinary underachievement’ of Turkish IR.

4. Conclusion and the Way Forward

Our review of Turkish IR scholars’ self-reflections suggests that IR academia has updated their initial diagnosis that ‘there is not enough theory’ into a new one suggesting that ‘there is some theory but not methods.’ We suggest that IR academia in Turkey does not have its distinctive language, as it has limited capacity to teach even its own ‘theories, concepts, and methods’ to the new generations of scholars. The distinctiveness and advancements of a discipline are inherently related to the development of its disciplinary concepts, theoretical approaches, and methods of inquiry. Otherwise, the discipline would become a mere collection of knowledge accumulated in other related disciplines without engaging in comprehensive knowledge production.

Probably due to many interrelated limitations mentioned above, IR in Turkey produces a significant number of graduate dissertations/theses without methods, theories without empirics, and descriptions without analyses. The conceptual, theoretical, and methodological deficiencies in dissertations and theses are indicators of the disciplinary underachievement of IR in Turkey. We believe that only diagnosing limitations in the state of the discipline in Turkey is a futile effort to overcome the problem. Moreover, the previous generations of IR scholars seem to have allocated a significant amount of time to consider, diagnose, and offer prescriptions for the problem without necessarily treating it. We suggest that despite all the limitations, with a hybrid third generation in the making, Turkish IR academia has reached a transition period to move beyond self-reflective diagnosis and prescriptions toward treatment. For now, we see a potential for treatment in three directions.

First, in agreement with the prescriptions in the literature, since methodology is the lingua Franca of academia, we believe that one of the first things to do is to improve methodology training at the graduate level. In this direction, we agree with Sula’s previous suggestion to establish a Turkish data repository and disseminate data-collection-based learn-in-action projects as a feasible direction to overcome this limitation. Second, we think that there is a need to improve the IR literature in Turkish, both in quantity and quality. Our observation is that even students who are trained in 100% English education programs are inclined to read complimentary Turkish IR material during their education. Improving the quality and

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79 Aydınlı, “Methodology as a Lingua Franca in International Relations.”
80 Sula, “‘Global’ IR and Self-Reflections in Turkey,” 140.
quantity of Turkish IR material will certainly contribute to the new generations of Turkish IR scholars’ comprehension of the disciplinary theories, concepts, and methods. We believe that increasing the number of theoretical and conceptual IR studies written in Turkish would be a step toward further treatment.81

Finally, we appreciate the development of a local IR disciplinary community, albeit loosely. However, for the development of a true community, Turkish IR scholars need to engage in deeper self-reflections unveiling the local center-periphery relations, cliques, under-appreciations, unfair treatments, and discouragements that result in nothing more than hampering the development of Turkey’s IR discipline in general.

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81 In this direction, we (Sarı and Sula) started a book series to be composed of new volumes as needed and be written by what we call the ‘hybrid-third generation’ of IR scholars that theoretically discusses the main IR concepts in Turkish. The first volume is published on September 2021. Please see Buğra Sarı and İsmail Erkam Sula (eds.). Kuramsal Perspektiften Temel Uluslararası İlişkiler Kavramları [Basic International Relations Concepts from Theoretical Perspective], Ankara: Nobel Yayınevi, 2021.
Anatolian School?"


Abstracts in Turkish

Neo-Weberci Bakış Açısıyla Şiddet Kullanan Devlet Dışı Aktörler: Hizbullah Örneği

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Öz


Anahtar Kelimeler: Hizbullah, Devlet-Dışı Şiddetli Aktörler, Neo-Weberyan Yaklaşım
Karşılıklı Askeri Yığımlar, Silah Yarışları ve Militarize Edilmiş Anlaşmazlıklar İlişkisinin Çıkmazlarını Aşmak: Yunanistan-Türkiye/Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Örnekleri

Ioannis Nioutsikos  
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Öz


**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Silah Yarışı, Yunanistan-Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Yunanistan-Türkiye, Eşzamanlı Askeri Yığımlar, Rekabet
Orta Asya’ya Yönelik Türk Dış Politikası: Bölgeselcilik ve Yumuşak Gücün Ortaya Çıkışı

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**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Türkiye, Dış Politika, Bölgeselcilik, Yumuşak Güc, Orta Asya, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası

Buzullar Eriken Zamanda Donmuş: Türkiye'nin İklim Politikası

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**Öz**

Bu makalede, Walter Carlsnaes'in üçlü yaklaşımı benimseyerek Türkiye'nin iklim politikasının değişen iklim rejimleri içindeki tutarlılığını inceleneceğiz. İklim politikasındaki aktör-yapı ikiliği, iklim rejimleri ile Türkiye'nin iklim politikası arasındaki etkileşim yoluya açıklanacaktır. Türkiye'nin temel değerleri ve tercihleri sonucunda uyguladığı politikaların nedenleri ortaya konulacak ve süreklilik açıklanacaktır. Son olarak, Avrupa Yeşil Anlaşması'nın Türkiye'nin tercihlerini ve dolayısıyla iklim politikasını nasıl etkileyebileceği üzerinde durulacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İklim Değişikliği, Türkiye, Üçlü Yaklaşım, Dış Politika Analizi, Avrupa Yeşil Anlaşması

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Türk Uluslararası İlişkileri Nereye Gidiyor? Küresel Ül İcinde Türk Ül'nin İzlerini Sürmek

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Öz


Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Küresel Ül, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Batı Dışı Ül
Reçeteden Tedaviye: Uluslararası İlişkilerin Türkiye'deki Disiplin Başarısı(zliği)

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**Öz**
Türkiye'deki Uluslararası İlişkiler (Üİ) alanı, Türk Üİ akademisyenlerinin teorik tartışmalara katkılarını artırma ihtiyacı, yerli teorileştirmenin gerekliliği ve Türkiye'den kaynaklanan Üİ araştırmalarının metodolojik kalitesinin iyileştirilmesi gibi konularda akademisyenler tarafından değerlendirilmiştir. Bu literatür, Türkiye'deki Üİ'nin “disiplinin başarısızlığı” olarak adlandırılan durumunun teşhisine ve önerilere odaklanmıştır. Son zamanlarda, birçok akademisyen, Türkiye'deki Üİ disiplininin sınırlamalarını ve gelecek perspektiflerini tartışarak disiplin içi öz eleştirilere odaklanmıştır. Bu yükselen literatüre katkıda bulunan bu makale, Türkiye'deki Üİ alanındaki “disiplinin başarısızlığı” nedenlerini tanımlamaktadır. Makale, Türkiye'deki Üİ eğitiminin engelleyen koşulları üç grupta ele almaktadır: 1) lisans ve yüksek lisans müfredatının yapısı ve içeriği, 2) Türkiye'de akademik bir disiplin olarak Üİ'nin durumu, ve 3) Türkçe'deki Üİ literatürünün durumu. Makale ayrıca Türkiye'deki Üİ disiplinini ve pedagojisini iyileştirmek için olası bir tedavi önermektedir. Üİ eğitiminin kalitesinin iyileştirilmesinin, özgün Üİ katkılarını artırmak Türk akademisinin küresel Üİ ile olan bağlantılarını geliştireceği öngörülmektedir ki mevcut literature göre bu disiplinin ilerlediğine dair önemli bir gösterge olduğu savunmaktadır.

*A H A N T A R K E L İ M E L E R: Küresel Üİ, Pedagoji, Metodoloji, Öz-eleştiri, Türkiye*