ONLINE APPENDIX for "Contractual Roots of Anti-Americanism: PEW 2013 Results"

Control Variable Operationalization Details for PEW 2013 Sample

Below is the operationalization information for the variables that I did not detail in the main text due to space reasons.

Household Income Dissatisfaction: Question q6 asks: *Now thinking about your personal economic situation, how would you describe it – is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?* I coded *don't know* and *refused* as missing. 6.56 % believe that their own economic situation is very good, 49.47 % report somewhat good, 30.39 % report somewhat bad, and 13.58 % report very bad.

National Income Dissatisfaction: Question q4 asks: *Now thinking about our economic situation, how would you describe the current economic situation in* ***(survey country)*** *– is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?* 7.12% reported *very good*, 33.97% reported *somewhat good*, 32.01% reported *somewhat bad*, and 26.89% reported *very bad*. I coded don't know and refused as missing.

Unemployed: Question q181 asks: *Are you employed now or not?* In the sample, 47.6% replied affirmatively to this question.

Educational Attainment: The education question is asked differently in each country, based on q180. I created a 4-category variable of educational attainment. Accordingly, the primary education category involves those who completed their primary education or those who did not complete their secondary education (22.85%). The secondary or tertiary education category involves those who completed their secondary or tertiary education as well as those who did not complete their tertiary or university-level education (49.91%). The university or above includes university graduates, those who have incomplete graduate degree or those who have graduate degrees (15.02%). The baseline category consists of respondents who do not have any formal education or who have incomplete primary education (12.22%).

Gender: Based on question q164, I created a variable that records the respondent's gender as male (=0) or female (=1). 50.81% of the sample are female respondents.

Age: Question q165 marks the respondent's age. All the respondents are 18 or above.

Islam: Country-based variants of question q55 ask the respondents about their religious affiliation. In the sample, 26.92 % of the respondents report to be affiliated with Islam – regardless of their level of religiosity.

Table A1. Correlation Matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Urban $_{ij}$	1.000													
(2) Poverty $_{ij}$	0.113	1.000												
(3) Sociotropic $_{ij}$	0.030	0.126	1.000											
(4) Egotropic $_{ij}$	0.034	0.280	0.455	1.000										
(5) Unemployed $_{ij}$	0.056	0.168	0.083	0.124	1.000									
(6) Education $_{ij}$	0.177	-0.301	-0.011	-0.166	-0.224	1.000								
(7) Female $_{ij}$	0.015	0.045	0.033	0.022	0.240	-0.054	1.000							
(8) Age $_{ij}$	0.013	-0.088	0.046	0.023	0.125	-0.115	-0.005	1.000						
(9) Islam $_{ij}$	0.009	0.090	0.100	0.105	0.082	-0.171	-0.005	-0.178	1.000					
(10) Contract-poor $_{j}$	0.008	0.229	-0.024	0.107	0.035	-0.258	-0.005	-0.241	0.320	1.000				
(11) Middle East $_{j}$	0.145	-0.027	0.117	0.152	0.012	-0.056	-0.007	-0.078	0.516	0.296	1.000			
(12) US ODA pc $_{j}$	0.069	0.034	0.078	0.120	0.046	-0.133	-0.006	-0.100	0.313	0.195	0.469	1.000		
(13) Autocracy $_{j}$	0.105	0.028	-0.192	0.028	-0.049	-0.206	-0.011	-0.101	0.015	0.323	0.158	0.289	1.000	
(14) US Troops $_{j}$	0.028	-0.162	-0.037	-0.042	-0.045	0.208	-0.011	0.160	-0.177	-0.465	-0.127	-0.096	-0.151	1.000

Table A2: Random Intercepts: Did President Obama's Re-Election Change Your View of the USA?

	Model A1: Multilevel Logit		**Model A2: Multilevel Ordinal Logit**	
	β	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*
Fixed Effects				
Urban $_{ij}$	0.021	(0.058)	0.034	(0.057)
Poverty $_{ij}$	0.033	(0.035)	0.080*	(0.035)
Urban $_{ij}$ × poverty $_{ij}$	-0.103*	(0.045)	-0.097*	(0.044)
Urban $_{ij}$ × contr-poor$_{j}$	-0.166*	(0.075)	-0.156*	(0.070)
Poverty $_{ij}$ × contr-poor$_{j}$	-0.087*	(0.041)	-0.110**	(0.039)
Urban $_{ij}$ × poverty $_{ij}$ × contr-poor$_{j}$	0.164**	(0.052)	0.133**	(0.050)
Sociotropic income dissat. $_{ij}$	0.038*	(0.018)	-0.007	(0.017)
Egotropic income dissat $_{ij}$	0.152***	(0.019)	0.113***	(0.017)
Unemployed $_{ij}$	0.052	(0.030)	0.076**	(0.026)
Education $_{ij}$	0.086	(0.082)	0.036	(0.072)
Education $_{ij}^{2}$	-0.024	(0.016)	-0.016	(0.014)
Female $_{ij}$	-0.052	(0.027)	-0.076**	(0.024)
Age $_{ij}$	0.016**	(0.004)	0.010*	(0.004)
Age $_{ij}^{2}$	-0.0002**	(0.00005)	-0.0001*	(0.00004)
Islam $_{ij}$	0.462***	(0.058)	0.456***	(0.052)
Contract-poor $_{j}$	1.068**	(0.343)	0.879**	(0.278)
Middle East $_{j}$	0.601	(0.427)	0.552	(0.345)
US Troops $_{j}$	-3.19e-06	(1.09E-05)	-3.59e-06	(8.84E-06)
US ODA pc $_{j}$	-0.023	(0.020)	-0.017	(0.016)
Autocracy $_{j}$	0.160	(0.470)	0.314	(0.379)
US ODA pc $_{j}$ × Autocracy $_{j}$	0.019	(0.020)	0.012	(0.016)
Intercept	-1.620***	(0.312)		
τ_1			1.171***	(0.260)
τ_2			2.663**	(0.260)
Random Effects				
σ_{j}	0.645***	(0.151)	0.420***	(0.098)
N_{i}	30,634		30,634	
N_{j}	38		38	
Wald χ^2	242.62		235.2	

Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **(ii)** P-values: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05
(iii) i = individual , j= country

Figure A1. Substantive Effect of the Interaction (Model A1)



Figure A2. Substantive Effect of the Interaction (Model A2)



Table A3: Random Intercepts Ordinal Logit Estimates of Alternative Outcomes

	Model A3: Opinion on Russia		**Model A4: Opinion on China**		**Model A5: Opinion on UN**	
	β	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*
Urban $_{ij}$	0.096*	(0.047)	0.020	(0.046)	0.020	(0.047)
Poverty $_{ij}$	-0.012	(0.030)	-0.022	(0.029)	0.067*	(0.030)
Urban $_{ij}$ × poverty $_{ij}$	-0.066	(0.038)	-0.084*	(0.037)	-0.082*	(0.039)
Urban $_{ij}$ × contr. poor$_{j}$	-0.115	(0.063)	-0.098	(0.064)	-0.061	(0.062)
Poverty $_{ij}$ × contr-poor$_{j}$	-0.001	(0.035)	-0.026	(0.034)	-0.061	(0.035)
Urban $_{ij}$ × poverty $_{ij}$ × contr. poor$_{j}$	0.079	(0.045)	0.134**	(0.044)	0.078	(0.045)
Sociotropic income dissat. $_{ij}$	0.199***	(0.017)	0.155***	(0.016)	0.134***	(0.016)
Egotropic income dissat $_{ij}$	0.106***	(0.017)	0.166***	(0.017)	0.141***	(0.017)
Unemployed $_{ij}$	0.060*	(0.026)	-0.026	(0.026)	0.047	(0.025)
Education $_{ij}$	0.026	(0.071)	-0.195**	(0.068)	0.219**	(0.070)
Education $_{ij}$ ^{2}	-0.016	(0.014)	0.020	(0.013)	-0.045**	(0.013)
Female $_{ij}$	0.119***	(0.023)	0.093***	(0.023)	-0.035	(0.023)
Age $_{ij}$	0.014***	(0.004)	0.009*	(0.004)	0.016***	(0.004)
Age $_{ij}$ ^{2}	-0.0001*	(0.00004)	-0.00005	(0.00004)	-0.0001**	(0.00004)
Islam $_{ij}$	-0.224***	(0.054)	-0.042	(0.051)	0.398***	(0.052)
Contract-poor $_{j}$	-0.100	(0.183)	-1.126***	(0.310)	-0.279	(0.307)
Middle East $_{j}$	0.859***	(0.231)	1.120**	(0.398)	1.031**	(0.396)
τ_1	-1.329***	(0.196)	-1.573***	(0.272)	-0.232	(0.273)
τ_2	1.085***	(0.196)	0.726***	(0.271)	2.221***	(0.273)
τ_3	2.804***	(0.196)	2.343***	(0.272)	3.695***	(0.273)
σ_{j}	0.232***	(0.055)	0.706***	(0.166)	0.708***	(0.164)
N $_{i}$	27,394		28,497		29,387	
N $_{j}$	37		37		38	
Wald χ^2	494.53		521.44		441.04	

Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. **(ii)** P-values: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 **(iii)** i = individual , j= country

Figure A3. Substantive Effects of Urban Poverty Contract Poverty on Opinion Toward China (Model A2)



Table A4: Random Intercepts Estimates of Anti-Americanism (Alternative Interactions)

	Model A6 - X_{ij}: Egotropic Income Dissatisfaction		**Model A7 - X_{ij}: Sociotropic Income Dissatisfaction**		**Model A8: Unemployment**	
	β	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*
Fixed Effects						
Urban $_{ij}$	-0.017	(0.137)	-0.168	(0.094)	-0.057	(0.038)
X_{ij} =2	0.243	(0.191)	0.069	(0.107)		
X_{ij} =3	0.512*	(0.169)	0.351**	(0.130)		
X_{ij} =4	0.554	(0.288)	0.467**	(0.175)		
Unemployed $_{ij}$ =1	0.080	(0.030)	0.083	(0.029)	0.046	(0.063)
Contract-poor $_{j}$ =1	-0.021	(0.333)	0.108	(0.291)	-0.044	(0.242)
Urban $_{ij}$ =1 × X_{ij} =2	-0.028	(0.152)	0.187	(0.097)		
Urban $_{ij}$ =1 × X_{ij} =3	-0.064	(0.122)	0.094	(0.094)		
Urban $_{ij}$ =1 × X_{ij} =4	-0.105	(0.252)	0.040	(0.138)		
Urban $_{ij}$ =1 × Contract-poor $_{j}$ =1	0.290	(0.216)	0.208	(0.304)	-0.004	(0.073)
X_{ij} =2 × Contract-poor $_{j}$ =1	0.109	(0.243)	0.098	(0.135)		
X_{ij} =3 × Contract-poor $_{j}$ =1	-0.038	(0.250)	-0.202	(0.169)		
X_{ij} =4 × Contract-poor $_{j}$ =1	-0.169	(0.359)	-0.241	(0.236)		
Urban$_{ij}$=1 × Contract-poor$_{j}$=1 × X_{ij} =2	-0.401	(0.239)	-0.344	(0.232)		
Urban$_{ij}$=1 × Contract-poor$_{j}$=1 × X_{ij} =3	-0.326	(0.235)	-0.208	(0.312)		
Urban$_{ij}$=1 × Contract-poor$_{j}$=1 × X_{ij} =4	0.188	(0.356)	-0.208	(0.386)		
Urban$_{ij}$=1 × Unemployed $_{ij}$=1					-0.029	(0.065)
Unemployed $_{ij}$ × Controact-poor$_{j}$=1					0.098	(0.086)
Urban$_{ij}$=1 × Contract-poor$_{j}$=1 × Unemployed $_{ij}$=1					-0.041	(0.079)
Control variables	*Included*		*Included*		*Included*	
Intercept	3.333***	(0.230)	3.305***	(0.189)	3.389***	(0.217)
Random Effects						
σ $_{j}$	0.519***	(0.150)	0.527***	(0.152)	0.519***	(0.151)
ε	2.252	(0.138)	2.254	(0.138)	2.256	(0.139)
N_{i}	31,155		31,155		31,155	
N_{j}	38		38		38	
Wald χ^2	1,321.35		1,251.92		522.73	

Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **(ii)** P-values: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 **(iii)** i = individual , j= country

Table A5: Random Intercepts Estimates of Anti-Americanism

	Model A9		**Model A10**		**Model A11**	
	β	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*
Fixed Effects						
Urban $_{ij}$	-0.098*	(0.038)	-0.099*	(0.038)	-0.045	(0.046
Poverty $_{ij}$ = 1	0.038	(0.078)	0.037	(0.078)	0.085	(0.117)
Poverty $_{ij}$ = 2	0.023	(0.080)	0.023	(0.080)	0.094	(0.099)
Poverty $_{ij}$ = 3	-0.072	(0.062)	-0.072	(0.062)	-0.021	(0.065)
Urban $_{ij}$=1 × poverty $_{ij}$ =2	-0.080	(0.089)	-0.080	(0.089)	-0.079	(0.108)
Urban $_{ij}$=1 × poverty $_{ij}$ =3	-0.016	(0.101)	-0.016	(0.101)	-0.055	(0.097)
Urban $_{ij}$=1 × poverty $_{ij}$ =4	0.104	(0.084)	0.104	(0.084)	-0.082	(0.058)
Urban $_{ij}$=1 × weak legal $_{j}$=1					-0.091	(0.073)
Poverty $_{ij}$=2 × weak legal $_{j}$=1					-0.081	(0.154)
Poverty $_{ij}$=3 × weak legal $_{j}$=1					-0.123	(0.158)
Poverty $_{ij}$=4 × weak legal $_{j}$=1					-0.094	(0.125)
Poverty $_{ij}$=2 × weak legal $_{j}$=1 × urban $_{ij}$=1					0.017	(0.167)
Poverty $_{ij}$=3 × weak legal $_{j}$=1 × urban $_{ij}$=1					0.082	(0.180)
Poverty $_{ij}$=4 × weak legal $_{j}$=1 × urban $_{ij}$=1					0.296*	(0.144)
Sociotropic income dissat. $_{ij}$	0.069	(0.060)	0.069	(0.060)	0.069	(0.060)
Egotropic income dissat $_{ij}$	0.111***	(0.026)	0.111***	(0.026)	0.112***	(0.026)
Unemployed $_{ij}$	0.081**	(0.029)	0.081**	(0.029)	0.081**	(0.029)
Education $_{ij}$	0.062	(0.080)	0.063	(0.080)	0.066	(0.080)
Education $_{ij}$ ^{2}	-0.027	(0.015)	-0.027	(0.015)	-0.027	(0.015)
Female $_{ij}$	-0.053*	(0.027)	-0.053*	(0.027)	-0.053*	(0.027)
Age $_{ij}$	0.027***	(0.005)	0.027***	(0.005)	0.027***	(0.005)
Age $_{ij}$ ^{2}	-0.0003***	(0.00005)	-0.0003***	(0.00005)	-0.0003***	(0.00005)
Islam $_{ij}$	0.794	(0.118)	0.790***	(0.119	0.789***	(0.119)
Weak legal $_{j}$			0.726*	(0.257)	0.784*	(0.257)
Middle East $_{j}$			0.626	(0.342)	0.622	(0.345)
US Troops $_{j}$			9.32E-06	(4.90E-06)	9.38E-06	(4.78E-06)
US ODA pc $_{j}$			-0.032*	(0.014)	-0.032*	(0.014)
Autocracy $_{j}$			0.040	(0.356)	0.040	(0.356)
US ODA pc $_{j}$ × Autocracy $_{j}$			0.033*	(0.013)	0.033*	(0.013)
Intercept	3.421***	(0.226)	2.964***	(0.267)	2.923***	(0.263)
Random Effects						
σ $_{j}$	0.637***	(0.171)	0.407***	(0.099)	0.407***	(0.099)
ε	2.256	(0.139)	2.256	(0.139)	2.255	(0.139)
N i	31,155		31,155		31,155	
N j	38		38		38	
Wald χ^2	184.12		617.93		1017.07	

Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **(ii)** P-values: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 **(iii)** i = individual , j= country

Figure A4. Marginal Impact of the 3-Way Interaction Term in Model A11



(3) ADDING PEW 2002 to PEW 2013

Variable Operationalization Details for PEW 2002

Sample: Given the covariate specifications, the sample consists of 30 nations. These are Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Ivory Coast, Czech Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela. The total number of observations is 19,076.

Anti-Americanism: Like for the outcome variable for the PEW 2013 sample, I ran a factor analysis on two 4-item questions that indicate the respondents' attitudes towards the USA and Americans. Of these, question q61b asks: *What is your opinion of the United States?* Question q61d asks: *What is your opinion of Americans?* For each question the answers are very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, and very unfavorable. I coded don't know, and no response categories as missing. The correlation between the two questions is 0.77 which is appropriate to construct a two-item factor score. The questions have equal weight in the factor score.

Urbanity: the question q97 asks: *About how many people live in the place the interview was conducted?* Like Mousseau (2011), I coded those who lived in a place with 500,000 people or

more as urbanite. Alternative questions that directly indicate urbanity are limited to a handful of countries, therefore cannot be used for the present sample. This is why, the urbanity indicator for the PEW 2002 sample that I use is slightly different than that I used in PEW 2013 sample. Of all PEW 2002 sample, 33.61 percent of the respondents live in an urban setting.

Poverty: Question q87a asks: *Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy food your family needed?* Question q87b asks: *Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to pay for medical and health care your family needed?* Question q87c asks: *Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy clothing your family needed?* For each question, I coded the affirmative answer as 1. I summed the answers to get a 4-item poverty score. Greater values mean greater levels of poverty. In the sample, 43.71 % of the respondents suffered from no poverty. 11.61% scored 1, 11.63% scored 2, and 33.05 scored 4 in the poverty score. Note that Mousseau's (2011) poverty score includes more items. Yet, these additional items were only asked in the least-developed countries of the sample.

Contract Poverty: Using Mousseau's (2019) CINE dataset, I created a binary variable indicating whether or not the respondent's country has life insurance contracts per capita that is lower than the global median in year 2001. About 93.19 % of the respondents live in a contracts-poor country.

Household Income Dissatisfaction: To record the respondent's satisfaction with their household income, I used the question q6a which asks: *Please tell me whether you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with this aspect of your life: your household income?* I coded *don't know* and *no response* categories as missing. Of all the respondents used in the regression analyses, 9.90% are very satisfied, 40.16 are somewhat satisfied, 29.64 are somewhat dissatisfied, and 20.30 are very dissatisfied with their household income.

National Income Dissatisfaction: to code the respondents' dissatisfaction with their national income, I relied on question q12 which asks: *Now thinking about our economic situation, how would you describe the current economic situation in our country*? The responses are *very good* (2.51%), *somewhat good* (26.74%), *somewhat bad* (35.40%), and *very bad* (35.36%). I coded *don't know* and *refused* categories as missing.

Unemployment: To code whether the respondent is unemployed or not, I relied on question q86 which asks the respondents: what is your current employment situation? I coded *unemployed & no state benefit, no job & other state income maintenance*, and *not employed* categories as the respondent being unemployed and 0 otherwise. Overall, 33.58 % of the sample is unemployed.

Education: Based on the country-specific variants of the question q84, I created a 4-category variable that marks the respondent's level of educational attainment. The categories are no formal or incomplete primary education (11.95%), primary or incomplete secondary education (29.51%), secondary or incomplete tertiary education (45.07%), university or above (13.47%). I also created the squared term of the education variable.

Age: Using information from question q74, I created a continuous age variable for the respondents. I also created the squared term of this age variable.

Gender: Using q73, I created a binary variable indicating whether the respondent is female (47.6%) or not.

Islamic Faith: Using question q79, I marked if the respondent practices the faith of Islam as 1 (27.58%), and 0 if otherwise. The categories 26, 27, 34 and 35 of this variable indicate that the respondent is a Muslim.

Middle East: I created a binary variable marking whether or not the respondent lives in a country located in the Middle East region. Due to missingness in covariates, only Turkey is included as a Middle Eastern country.

Table A5 displays the summary statistics for the combined PEW 2002 and 2013 samples.

Table A6. Summary Statistics (PEW 2002 and 2013)

	N	*Mean*	*Std Dev*	*Min*	*Max*
Anti-Americanism $_{ij}$	62,750	4.636	1.792	2	8
Urban $_{ij}$	59,089	0.497	0.500	0	1
Poverty $_{ij}$	71,299	1.096	1.280	0	3
Sociotropic income dissat. $_{ij}$	73,294	0.406	0.491	0	1
Egotropic income dissat $_{ij}$	72,021	2.863	0.895	1	4
Unemployed $_{ij}$	72,398	2.543	0.868	1	4
Education $_{ij}$	73,159	2.630	0.882	1	4
Female $_{ij}$	73,413	0.509	0.500	0	1
Age $_{ij}$	73,183	39.910	15.764	18	98
Islam $_{ij}$	73,413	0.273	0.445	0	1
Contract-poor $_{j}$	73,413	0.135	0.342	0	1
Middle East $_{j}$	73,413	0.776	0.417	0	1
US Troops $_{j}$	73,413	4018.006	13197.110	0	70998
US ODA pc $_{j}$	73,413	6.155	17.894	0	135.49
Autocracy $_{j}$	73,413	0.268	0.443	0	1

In estimating the statistical models, I use Hierarchical Model structure, and use two different approaches to calculate random higher unit variance. First, I use countries as higher units where j =49 . Naturally, some countries appear both in PEW 2002 and 2013 surveys. Since there are only two survey waves included in the sample, I add a binary variable that marks whether or not the observations belong to PEW 2002 survey output (Models A12, A13, and A14). The ANOVA model here shows that 23 % of the variance accounted by the model on anti-Americanism is at the higher unit level. This is calculated as $var(\sigma_j) / (var(\sigma_j)+\varepsilon)$. I indicate the random intercepts estimated for PEW 2002 countries of the sample in Figure A5.

Second, I treat countries from PEW 2002 and 2013 surveys differently (Model A15). Thus, each wave, a country gets a different random intercept estimate, and hence j=68. As the results in Table A7 show, both designations of higher units yield very similar results. For substantive effect calculations of the interaction, I use estimates from Model A14. The plot is displayed in Figure A6.

Figure A5. Random Intercepts by PEW 2002 countries, estimated by the ANOVA model for the combined sample.



Table A7: Random Intercepts Estimates of Anti-Americanism (PEW 2002 + 2013)

	Model A12		Model A13		Model A14		Model A15	
	β	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*	*β*	*(SE)*
Fixed Effects								
Urban $_{ij}$	-0.078***	(0.021)	-0.083***	(0.021)	-0.074*	(0.037)	-0.046	(0.037)
Poverty $_{ij}$	0.001	(0.008)	0.001	(0.008)	0.050*	(0.022)	0.041	(0.022)
Urban $_{ij}$ × poverty $_{ij}$	0.017	(0.011)	0.019	(0.011)	-0.082**	(0.029)	-0.071*	(0.029)
Urban $_{ij}$ × contr-poor$_j$					-0.009	(0.044)	-0.068	(0.044)
Poverty $_{ij}$ × contr-poor$_j$					-0.055*	(0.023)	-0.039	(0.023)
Urban $_{ij}$ × poverty $_{ij}$ × contr-poor$_j$					0.115***	(0.031)	0.101**	(0.031)
Unemployed $_{ij}$	0.070*	(0.016)	0.076***	(0.016)	0.075***	(0.016)	0.066***	(0.016)
Sociotropic income dissat. $_{ij}$	0.083***	(0.009)	0.088***	(0.009)	0.088***	(0.009)	0.104***	(0.009)
Egotropic income dissat $_{ij}$	0.083***	(0.009)	0.084***	(0.009)	0.085***	(0.009)	0.085***	(0.009)
Education $_{ij}$	-0.024	(0.043)	-0.030	(0.042)	-0.030	(0.043)	-0.047	(0.042)
Education $_{ij}$ ^{2}	-0.009	(0.008)	-0.007	(0.008)	-0.007	(0.008)	-0.004	(0.008)
Female $_{ij}$	-0.070***	(0.014)	-0.070***	(0.014)	-0.070***	(0.014)	-0.067***	(0.014)
Age $_{ij}$	0.018***	(0.002)	0.018***	(0.002)	0.018***	(0.002)	0.017***	(0.002)
Age $_{ij}$ ^{2}	-0.0002***	(0.00003)	-0.0002***	(0.00003)	-0.0002***	(0.00003)	-0.0001***	(0.00003)
Islam $_{ij}$	0.697***	(0.032)	0.695***	(0.032)	0.696***	(0.032)	0.687***	(0.031)
Middle East $_j$			1.415**	(0.482)	1.410**	(0.482)	0.962**	(0.329)
Contract-poor $_j$			-0.108	(0.098)	-0.101	(0.100)	-0.145	(0.255)
US Troops $_j$			0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
US ODA pc $_j$			0.016***	(0.003)	0.016***	(0.003)	-0.024	(0.015)
Autocracy $_j$			0.887***	(0.064)	0.892***	(0.063)	0.069	(0.282)
US ODA pc j × Autocracy $_j$			-0.056***	(0.008)	-0.056***	(0.008)	0.026	(0.016)
Pew 2002	-0.014	(0.020)	-0.011	(0.022)	-0.011	(0.022)		
Intercept	3.609***	(0.134)	3.426***	(0.193)	3.420****	(0.194)	3.626***	(0.238)
Random Effects								
σ_j	0.550***	(0.112)	1.073***	(0.407)	1.072***	(0.406)	0.529***	(0.091)
ε	2.370	(0.015)	2.358	(0.015)	2.358	(0.015)	2.321	(0.015)
N_i	49,970		49,970		49,970		49,970	
N_j	49		49		49		68	
Wald χ^2	1104.09		1317.59		1335.56		1206.37	

Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **(ii)** P-values: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 **(iii)** i = individual , j= country but for Model 4, j= country × Survey wave

Figure A6. **Substantive Effects of Urban Poverty Contract Poverty on Anti-Americanism (Model A14)**



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